Edwina, List: I could post a lengthy rebuttal, but it would basically just repeat what I have already laid out in considerable detail in this thread and the others associated with Peirce's Cosmology, so I will spare everyone (including myself) the dissertation. I will simply reiterate a few quick points about the blackboard illustration.
- The blackboard is "a sort of diagram" (CP 6.203), not a metaphor; this means that it *embodies *the significant *relations *among the parts of whatever it represents. - The blackboard "is a continuum of two dimensions" that represents "a continuum of some indefinite multitude of dimensions" (CP 6.203); and a continuum is a paradigmatic manifestation of Thirdness. - The chalk mark is not a point, or even a line; it is a *surface*, and its continuity is entirely derived from and dependent on that of the underlying blackboard (CP 6.203). - The chalk mark exhibits all three Categories (CP 6.203&205)--Firstness (whiteness), Secondness (boundary between black and white), and Thirdness (continuity). - Aggregations of merged chalk marks represent "reacting systems" that aggregate further into "Platonic worlds" (CP 6.206-208), each of which I call a "whiteboard." - The Big Bang corresponds to our existing universe being differentiated out of one of these "Platonic worlds" (CP 6.208) as "a discontinuous mark" (NEM 4:345, RLT:162) on the whiteboard. Consequently, the blackboard--which precedes the whiteboard, and is the source of its continuity--*cannot *be post-Big Bang; and the three Categories *must *be pre-Big Bang, with Thirdness primordial among them. Regards, Jon On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 7:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Gary, list - yes, I think that both tone and repetition are getting > tiresome, to say the least. > > I'm not sure what you mean by your suggestion of differentiating the > 'early cosmos' from 'this our existential one' *contra* an Aristotelian > one 'once there exists a particular three category semiosic universe'. > > 1) My confusion comes from my own view that our 'existential cosmos' IS a > three category semiosic universe. That is, my view is that the three > categories only emerge within the existentiality of the matter/mind > universe. There are no categories before this 'Big Bang' or whatever began > our universe. > > That is, in the pre-universe, "We start, then, with nothing, pure > zero'....This pure zero is the nothing of not having been > born......boundless freedom". 6.217. My reading of this is that this pure > zero is NOT the same as Firstness, because, my reading of Firstness is that > it is an embedded state of feeling, which means, that its nature is to > express a quality of some form of matter/mind. Redness; heat; coldness.... > Therefore, my reading of this pre-universe state is that it was, as Peirce > notes "unbounded potentiality'. This "Nothingness of boundless freedom > 6.219..."is not, in my view, the same as the logic of freedom or > possibility [which is Firstness]. > > "What immediately resulted was that unbounded potentiality became > potentiality of this or that sort - that is ,of some *quality*' 6.220. > Now - my reading is that the unbounded Nothing [which again, is NOT > Firstness or Thirdness]...suddenly moved into Firstness. > > Again, 'the zero of bare possibility, by evolutionary logic, leapt into > the *unit* of some quality" 6.220. So again, the zero of nothing moved > into Firstness, where 'something is possible/Red is something; therefore > Red is possible'. 6.220. Again - the zero of bare possibility is NOT > Firstness or Thirdness. It is Nothing. Then..it moved into being 'embedded' > within matter - as Firstness....where *something* is possible. Not > unbounded possibility but *something* is possible. This is already > constrained possibility, very different from the 'zero of boundless > possibility'. > > 2) His next phase seems to be, following the basic 'vague to the definite' > 6.191, from a 'vague potentiality; and that either is or is followed by a > continuum of forms having a multitude of dimensions too great for the > individuals dimensions to be distinct" 6.196. These would be > differentiated units in Secondness [and Firstness]. Then, habits of > relations or Thirdness begin...and this vast multitude is 'contracted'. > "The general indefinite potentiality became limited and heterogeneous" > 6.199. > > 3) With regard to the blackboard metaphor, my reading of it is that the > blackboard refers to 'the original vague potentiality, or at any rate of > some stage of its determination' 6.203. My reading is that this > blackboard is POST Big Bang. The blackboard is NOT the 'zero of bare > possibility'. Instead, it is POST Big Bang - and suddenly, a singular point > appears - that chalk line. [I'll leave out Peirce-as-God having drawn it]. > As a point, it has *identity*, that continuity-of-being that Peirce > refers to ['There is a certain element of continuity in this line" > 6.203]..This is a unit in Secondness. > > The white chalk line appears within the act of Firstness, but is, in > itself, operating ALSO within the mode of Secondness - because it is > discrete and distinct. > > And then, habits or Thirdness, that generalizing tendency, develops. NOTE > - Thirdness did not pre-exist on its own; it develops as the discrete units > appear within Firstness and Secondness. That is, Thirdness is embedded > within the existentialities of matter operating within Firstness and > Secondness. It 'feeds and works' within these individual 'bits'...and > develops generalizing laws. > > That's how I see this metaphor. > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 11:46 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology) > > Jon, Edwina, Clark, List, > > Perhaps this back and forth--especially the tone and tendency towards > repetition--has gotten "tiresome" for some readers as well as the most > active participants. > > I had hoped my suggestion a while back of a Platonic cosmos *pre*-the Big > Bang (note: of course I completely agree with Clark that one shouldn't > really bring such very much later notions into the picture, which is why I > used the modifier "loosely" when I last referred to it--but what language > *do* we have to distinguish the early cosmos Peirce describes in the last > lecture of the 1898 *Reasoning and the Logic of Things* from *this, our,* > existential > one?) *contra* a more Aristotelian cosmos once there *exists* a, shall we > say, *particular* three category semiosic universe might be helpful in > moving this discussion forward. So, my question: Are these two different? > If so, how so? If not, why not? > > One thing I would be very interested in is what Edwina, Clark, and others > make of the final 1898 lecture, esp. the blackboard metaphor. Here, as I > interpret it, Peirce seems not at all to be considering the semiosic > universe we inhabit, but *the conditions* *for any, perhaps many, > possible universe(s) to arise*. Unlike the Neglected Argument essay, > there is no explicit mention of God here, and Peirce seems to be making a > purely scientific hypothesis. So, perhaps, dropping the God-talk for a > moment, what is Peirce attempting in RLT? > > Best, > > Gary R > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 8:06 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com > > wrote: > >> Edwina, List: >> >> Lest we get bogged down any further in yet another tiresome exegetical >> battle, I will simply say that I find almost nothing in your last post to >> be consistent with my understanding of Peirce's own thought. I once again >> leave it to the List community to decide which of us--if either of us--has >> demonstrated the more accurate interpretation. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon >> >> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 6:50 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> wrote: >> >>> Jon - as Clark has been trying to point out, you and I are locked in >>> terminological difficulties. Your insistence that YOUR use is identical >>> with that of Peirce's use - is simply your own opinion. >>> >>> My reading of Peirce is that all three categorical modes only function >>> within Relations. Firstness is NOT 'real' in the sense of it being a >>> generality [ie., the reality of the laws of Thirdness] and it does >>> *exist* as a *state* of 'existentiality; i.e., as a quality, a feeling, >>> an openness, BUT, this state *is itself an experience, entire in itself*, >>> and as such, it *exists* within that experience of its fullness. There >>> is no such thing as an unembodied Firstness! Since it is a *state of >>> experience*, then, it must be embodied. It is simply 'complete', so to >>> speak and not open to the Otherness of analysis or reaction. >>> >>> You confine 'existence' to Secondness - which is, I feel, too narrow an >>> understanding of the three categories and of the term 'existence'. >>> >>> I disagree that 'pure nothing' is Firstness and Secondness in the >>> absence of Thirdness. I agree that without Thirdness - it would be chaos, >>> but i don't see this as PURE nothing. After all, 'the original chaos, >>> therefore, where there was no regularity, was in effect a state of mere >>> indeterminacy, in which nothing existed or really happened". 1. 411. My >>> reading of that, is that there was no matter in a mode of Firstness or >>> Secondness in this 'original chaos' - no 'existences' and no 'feelings'. >>> Nothing. >>> >>> Now - of course, and as usual, you can disagree with me. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> ----- Original Message ----- >>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>> *Cc:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> >>> *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 7:25 PM >>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's >>> Cosmology) >>> >>> Edwina, List: >>> >>> Once again, I find your use of terminology inconsistent with Peirce's. >>> Firstness is real, but does not exist. It has no Relations, because any >>> Relation requires Secondness. "Pure nothing" is the chaos of Firstness and >>> Secondness in the absence of Thirdness. Accepting any matter of fact--such >>> as the origin of our existing universe--as inexplicable is unacceptable, >>> because it blocks the way of inquiry. Nothing new here, so I will leave it >>> at that. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon >>> >>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 5:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> I think that 'actualization' and 'cause' are two entirely different >>>> actions. >>>> >>>> With regard to Firstness, I see it, as a spontaneous *state* *of >>>> existence* which *might* then act upon/be reacted to.., in the >>>> 'fullness of this state'. The point of all the categories is that they >>>> operate within Relations; they are not isolate in themselves. Firstness, as >>>> that *spontaneous state of existence* [which might dissipate in a >>>> nanosecond if it doesn't *bond/relate* to another entity]...can >>>> provide a novel form of existence. >>>> >>>> For example, a spontaneous mutation of a cell *might* be accepted by >>>> other cells and might become part of the organism's nature. Or, *might >>>> not* be accepted and its energy-content would dissipate. >>>> >>>> Or, a novel mode of transportation [*Uber*] might suddenly develop and >>>> might spread to other domains. Or, like many a new invention - it might >>>> disappear in a month. >>>> >>>> The causality of Firstness is the Relations that the novelty ir >>>> provides has on other organisms/entities. It can actually cause/effect >>>> changes in the larger system. >>>> >>>> Yes, I see the universe as self-emergent and self-organizing - and >>>> refer to 1.412 for the Peircean outline of these actions. But I don't see >>>> this as a transition from Firstness to Secondness, for I don't consider >>>> that the pre-universe was in any categorical mode [ie, not in a mode of >>>> Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness. It was simply nothing]. >>>> >>>> Certainly, the 'somehow', i.e., the bridge between 'nothing' and >>>> 'something' is not explained beyond a 'chance flash'. But because there is >>>> no explanation, does not mean that I can or even should come up with one - >>>> certainly, science hasn't been able to do so, and since I'm an atheist, >>>> then, I'm not going to offer a self-organized belief in god as having been >>>> First Cause. I simply don't know. >>>> >>>> Edwina >>>> >>>> ----- Original Message ----- >>>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >>>> *To:* Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> >>>> *Cc:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> >>>> *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 5:59 PM >>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's >>>> Cosmology) >>>> >>>> Clark, List: >>>> >>>> Your points, as usual, are well-taken. Is it helpful at all to refer >>>> to "actualization," rather than "cause"? Edwina's position, as I >>>> understand it, is that our existing universe is not only self-*organizing >>>> *but also self-*generating *or self-*originating*; as Houser put it in >>>> his introduction to EP 1, "Somehow, the possibility or potentiality of the >>>> chaos is self-actualizing." This is the crucial transition from Firstness >>>> (possibility) to Secondness (actuality), and the word "somehow" reflects >>>> the fact that Houser's attempt to summarize Peirce's cosmology effectively >>>> leaves this step unexplained. >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>> >>>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:29 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Nov 3, 2016, at 1:50 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> ET: Of course I didn't mean an individual [human or god] force by the >>>>> term of 'chance'!. I find that Jon jumps to disagree with me as a matter >>>>> of >>>>> habit. Either that, or his tendency to read in a literal manner leads him >>>>> to such conclusions. I meant 'chance or Firstness or spontaneity as a >>>>> causal force - and there's plenty of comments in Peirce on just this >>>>> state. >>>>> >>>>> No, I understood exactly what you meant. My disagreement is that I >>>>> take "chance" (in Peirce's usage) to be freedom or spontaneity, rather >>>>> than >>>>> randomness or inexplicability; and it is certainly not something that >>>>> could >>>>> ever be "a causal force." I even quoted Peirce to support this view, but >>>>> you refer to my "tendency to read in a literal manner" as if it were a bad >>>>> thing! >>>>> >>>>> Again I think we’re all talking past one an other by equivocating over >>>>> the term ‘cause.’ In a certain cause pure freedom or spontaneity isn’t >>>>> causal and in an other sense it must be. Effectively each firstness is its >>>>> own unmoved mover. The problem is that making sense of causality at all >>>>> when little is necessary and most things are underdetermined is >>>>> problematic. >>>>> >>>>> I think causality is problematic for a variety of other reasons too. >>>>> For instance in terms of physics we could oppose the classic Newtonian >>>>> formulation of mechanics in terms of forces and masses to the Hamiltonian >>>>> or Lagrangian forms. They’re mathematically equivalent yet metaphysically >>>>> quite conceptually different. The Hamiltonian is the evolution of the wave >>>>> function (what in quantum mechanics becomes the Dirac or Schrodinger >>>>> equation) and it’s hard to make sense of causality in terms of it. >>>>> >>>>> Likewise again turning to Duns Scotus we have classic arguments >>>>> against causality being continuous. (Basically part of the same extended >>>>> argument I linked to earlier for a first cause) For Peirce where any sign >>>>> can be divided it’s worth asking if we have causality at all. >>>>> >>>>> Despite these problems of causality we all use the term causality. >>>>> >>>>> He referenced the same series of articles in what was probably his >>>>> very first draft of "A Neglected Argument" (1908), and made a few other >>>>> comments about it that are relevant to this discussion. >>>>> >>>>> CSP: I there contended that the laws of nature, and, indeed, all >>>>> experiential laws, have been results of evolution, being (such was my >>>>> original hypothesis,) developments out of utterly causeless determinations >>>>> of single events, under a certain universal tendency toward habit-forming >>>>> ... But during the long years which have elapsed since the hypothesis >>>>> first >>>>> suggested itself to me, it may naturally be supposed that faulty features >>>>> of the original hypothesis have been brought [to] my attention by others >>>>> and have struck me in my own meditations. Dr. Edward Montgomery remarked >>>>> that my theory was not so much evolutionary as it was emanational; and >>>>> Professor Ogden Rood pointed out that there must have been some original >>>>> tendency to take habits which did not arise according to my hypothesis; >>>>> while I myself was most struck by the difficulty of so explaining the law >>>>> of sequence in time, if I proposed to make all laws develope from single >>>>> events; since an event already supposes Time. (R 842, emphasis added) >>>>> >>>>> I think this might be better read as there being no cause *for* firstness >>>>> not that firstness can’t be seen a not causal. Again I suspect we’re >>>>> talking past one an other again but the mere fact firstness can be an >>>>> element in a triadic sign more or less entails a certain sense of >>>>> causation. (Although I prefer Peirce’s term determination although that >>>>> too >>>>> has the genealogy in problematic metaphysical understanding) >>>>> >>>>> I should add that this problem of language for this foundational event >>>>> isn’t new. You see similar debates in late antiquity over whether the >>>>> platonic One is one or ought to be considered two emanation steps. While >>>>> I’ll confess to finding such matters idle talk there’s usually a logical >>>>> reason for the analaysis. (Much like the whole disparaged “how many angels >>>>> could dance on a pin” makes sense in the context of the debates over kinds >>>>> in medieval scholasticism) >>>>> >>>>
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