Jon S, Edwina, List,
Jon wrote:
- The Big Bang corresponds to our existing universe being differentiated
out of one of these "Platonic worlds" (CP 6.208) as "a
discontinuous mark"
(NEM 4:345, RLT:162) on the whiteboard.
Consequently, the blackboard--which precedes the whiteboard, and is the
source of its continuity--*cannot *be post-Big Bang; and the three
Categories *must *be pre-Big Bang, with Thirdness primordial among them.
Minus your addition of the notion of a whiteboard--which additon I think is
quite helpful in representing the "Aggregations of merged chalk marks
represent[ing] "reacting systems" that aggregate further into "Platonic
worlds" (CP 6.206-208"--this is certainly the way I have always seen
Peirce's blackboard discussion and, I believe, a fair minded reader must
see it (whether or not they agree with Peirce here). As I wrote just
yesterday, in the blackboard *diagram*--*not* a metaphor (I stand
corrected)--"Peirce seems not at all to be considering the semiosic
universe we inhabit, but *the conditions* *for any, perhaps many, possible
universe(s) to arise*."
Thanks especially for succinctly putting the argumentation into bullet
points (including pointers to the exact passages in CP 6.203-208), this
constituting an excellent summary of Peirce's 1898 argument.
Best,
Gary R
[image: Gary Richmond]
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*
On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 11:56 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:
> Edwina, List:
>
> I could post a lengthy rebuttal, but it would basically just repeat what I
> have already laid out in considerable detail in this thread and the others
> associated with Peirce's Cosmology, so I will spare everyone (including
> myself) the dissertation. I will simply reiterate a few quick points about
> the blackboard illustration.
>
> - The blackboard is "a sort of diagram" (CP 6.203), not a metaphor;
> this means that it *embodies *the significant *relations *among the
> parts of whatever it represents.
> - The blackboard "is a continuum of two dimensions" that represents "a
> continuum of some indefinite multitude of dimensions" (CP 6.203); and a
> continuum is a paradigmatic manifestation of Thirdness.
> - The chalk mark is not a point, or even a line; it is a *surface*,
> and its continuity is entirely derived from and dependent on that of the
> underlying blackboard (CP 6.203).
> - The chalk mark exhibits all three Categories (CP
> 6.203&205)--Firstness (whiteness), Secondness (boundary between black and
> white), and Thirdness (continuity).
> - Aggregations of merged chalk marks represent "reacting systems" that
> aggregate further into "Platonic worlds" (CP 6.206-208), each of which I
> call a "whiteboard."
> - The Big Bang corresponds to our existing universe being
> differentiated out of one of these "Platonic worlds" (CP 6.208) as "a
> discontinuous mark" (NEM 4:345, RLT:162) on the whiteboard.
>
> Consequently, the blackboard--which precedes the whiteboard, and is the
> source of its continuity--*cannot *be post-Big Bang; and the three
> Categories *must *be pre-Big Bang, with Thirdness primordial among them.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 7:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> Gary, list - yes, I think that both tone and repetition are getting
>> tiresome, to say the least.
>>
>> I'm not sure what you mean by your suggestion of differentiating the
>> 'early cosmos' from 'this our existential one' *contra* an Aristotelian
>> one 'once there exists a particular three category semiosic universe'.
>>
>> 1) My confusion comes from my own view that our 'existential cosmos' IS a
>> three category semiosic universe. That is, my view is that the three
>> categories only emerge within the existentiality of the matter/mind
>> universe. There are no categories before this 'Big Bang' or whatever began
>> our universe.
>>
>> That is, in the pre-universe, "We start, then, with nothing, pure
>> zero'....This pure zero is the nothing of not having been
>> born......boundless freedom". 6.217. My reading of this is that this pure
>> zero is NOT the same as Firstness, because, my reading of Firstness is that
>> it is an embedded state of feeling, which means, that its nature is to
>> express a quality of some form of matter/mind. Redness; heat; coldness....
>> Therefore, my reading of this pre-universe state is that it was, as Peirce
>> notes "unbounded potentiality'. This "Nothingness of boundless freedom
>> 6.219..."is not, in my view, the same as the logic of freedom or
>> possibility [which is Firstness].
>>
>> "What immediately resulted was that unbounded potentiality became
>> potentiality of this or that sort - that is ,of some *quality*' 6.220.
>> Now - my reading is that the unbounded Nothing [which again, is NOT
>> Firstness or Thirdness]...suddenly moved into Firstness.
>>
>> Again, 'the zero of bare possibility, by evolutionary logic, leapt into
>> the *unit* of some quality" 6.220. So again, the zero of nothing moved
>> into Firstness, where 'something is possible/Red is something; therefore
>> Red is possible'. 6.220. Again - the zero of bare possibility is NOT
>> Firstness or Thirdness. It is Nothing. Then..it moved into being 'embedded'
>> within matter - as Firstness....where *something* is possible. Not
>> unbounded possibility but *something* is possible. This is already
>> constrained possibility, very different from the 'zero of boundless
>> possibility'.
>>
>> 2) His next phase seems to be, following the basic 'vague to the
>> definite' 6.191, from a 'vague potentiality; and that either is or is
>> followed by a continuum of forms having a multitude of dimensions too great
>> for the individuals dimensions to be distinct" 6.196. These would be
>> differentiated units in Secondness [and Firstness]. Then, habits of
>> relations or Thirdness begin...and this vast multitude is 'contracted'.
>> "The general indefinite potentiality became limited and heterogeneous"
>> 6.199.
>>
>> 3) With regard to the blackboard metaphor, my reading of it is that the
>> blackboard refers to 'the original vague potentiality, or at any rate of
>> some stage of its determination' 6.203. My reading is that this
>> blackboard is POST Big Bang. The blackboard is NOT the 'zero of bare
>> possibility'. Instead, it is POST Big Bang - and suddenly, a singular point
>> appears - that chalk line. [I'll leave out Peirce-as-God having drawn it].
>> As a point, it has *identity*, that continuity-of-being that Peirce
>> refers to ['There is a certain element of continuity in this line"
>> 6.203]..This is a unit in Secondness.
>>
>> The white chalk line appears within the act of Firstness, but is, in
>> itself, operating ALSO within the mode of Secondness - because it is
>> discrete and distinct.
>>
>> And then, habits or Thirdness, that generalizing tendency, develops. NOTE
>> - Thirdness did not pre-exist on its own; it develops as the discrete units
>> appear within Firstness and Secondness. That is, Thirdness is embedded
>> within the existentialities of matter operating within Firstness and
>> Secondness. It 'feeds and works' within these individual 'bits'...and
>> develops generalizing laws.
>>
>> That's how I see this metaphor.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
>> *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>> *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 11:46 PM
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's
>> Cosmology)
>>
>> Jon, Edwina, Clark, List,
>>
>> Perhaps this back and forth--especially the tone and tendency towards
>> repetition--has gotten "tiresome" for some readers as well as the most
>> active participants.
>>
>> I had hoped my suggestion a while back of a Platonic cosmos *pre*-the
>> Big Bang (note: of course I completely agree with Clark that one shouldn't
>> really bring such very much later notions into the picture, which is why I
>> used the modifier "loosely" when I last referred to it--but what language
>> *do* we have to distinguish the early cosmos Peirce describes in the
>> last lecture of the 1898 *Reasoning and the Logic of Things* from *this,
>> our,* existential one?) *contra* a more Aristotelian cosmos once there
>> *exists* a, shall we say, *particular* three category semiosic universe
>> might be helpful in moving this discussion forward. So, my question: Are
>> these two different? If so, how so? If not, why not?
>>
>> One thing I would be very interested in is what Edwina, Clark, and others
>> make of the final 1898 lecture, esp. the blackboard metaphor. Here, as I
>> interpret it, Peirce seems not at all to be considering the semiosic
>> universe we inhabit, but *the conditions* *for any, perhaps many,
>> possible universe(s) to arise*. Unlike the Neglected Argument essay,
>> there is no explicit mention of God here, and Peirce seems to be making a
>> purely scientific hypothesis. So, perhaps, dropping the God-talk for a
>> moment, what is Peirce attempting in RLT?
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>> [image: Gary Richmond]
>>
>> *Gary Richmond*
>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>> *Communication Studies*
>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>> *C 745*
>> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>>
>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 8:06 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Edwina, List:
>>>
>>> Lest we get bogged down any further in yet another tiresome exegetical
>>> battle, I will simply say that I find almost nothing in your last post to
>>> be consistent with my understanding of Peirce's own thought. I once again
>>> leave it to the List community to decide which of us--if either of us--has
>>> demonstrated the more accurate interpretation.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon
>>>
>>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 6:50 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Jon - as Clark has been trying to point out, you and I are locked in
>>>> terminological difficulties. Your insistence that YOUR use is identical
>>>> with that of Peirce's use - is simply your own opinion.
>>>>
>>>> My reading of Peirce is that all three categorical modes only function
>>>> within Relations. Firstness is NOT 'real' in the sense of it being a
>>>> generality [ie., the reality of the laws of Thirdness] and it does
>>>> *exist* as a *state* of 'existentiality; i.e., as a quality, a
>>>> feeling, an openness, BUT, this state *is itself an experience, entire
>>>> in itself*, and as such, it *exists* within that experience of its
>>>> fullness. There is no such thing as an unembodied Firstness! Since it is a
>>>> *state
>>>> of experience*, then, it must be embodied. It is simply 'complete', so
>>>> to speak and not open to the Otherness of analysis or reaction.
>>>>
>>>> You confine 'existence' to Secondness - which is, I feel, too narrow an
>>>> understanding of the three categories and of the term 'existence'.
>>>>
>>>> I disagree that 'pure nothing' is Firstness and Secondness in the
>>>> absence of Thirdness. I agree that without Thirdness - it would be chaos,
>>>> but i don't see this as PURE nothing. After all, 'the original chaos,
>>>> therefore, where there was no regularity, was in effect a state of mere
>>>> indeterminacy, in which nothing existed or really happened". 1. 411. My
>>>> reading of that, is that there was no matter in a mode of Firstness or
>>>> Secondness in this 'original chaos' - no 'existences' and no 'feelings'.
>>>> Nothing.
>>>>
>>>> Now - of course, and as usual, you can disagree with me.
>>>>
>>>> Edwina
>>>>
>>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
>>>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>>> *Cc:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
>>>> *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 7:25 PM
>>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's
>>>> Cosmology)
>>>>
>>>> Edwina, List:
>>>>
>>>> Once again, I find your use of terminology inconsistent with Peirce's.
>>>> Firstness is real, but does not exist. It has no Relations, because any
>>>> Relation requires Secondness. "Pure nothing" is the chaos of Firstness and
>>>> Secondness in the absence of Thirdness. Accepting any matter of fact--such
>>>> as the origin of our existing universe--as inexplicable is unacceptable,
>>>> because it blocks the way of inquiry. Nothing new here, so I will leave it
>>>> at that.
>>>>
>>>> Regards,
>>>>
>>>> Jon
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 5:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> I think that 'actualization' and 'cause' are two entirely different
>>>>> actions.
>>>>>
>>>>> With regard to Firstness, I see it, as a spontaneous *state* *of
>>>>> existence* which *might* then act upon/be reacted to.., in the
>>>>> 'fullness of this state'. The point of all the categories is that they
>>>>> operate within Relations; they are not isolate in themselves. Firstness,
>>>>> as
>>>>> that *spontaneous state of existence* [which might dissipate in a
>>>>> nanosecond if it doesn't *bond/relate* to another entity]...can
>>>>> provide a novel form of existence.
>>>>>
>>>>> For example, a spontaneous mutation of a cell *might* be accepted by
>>>>> other cells and might become part of the organism's nature. Or, *might
>>>>> not* be accepted and its energy-content would dissipate.
>>>>>
>>>>> Or, a novel mode of transportation [*Uber*] might suddenly develop
>>>>> and might spread to other domains. Or, like many a new invention - it
>>>>> might
>>>>> disappear in a month.
>>>>>
>>>>> The causality of Firstness is the Relations that the novelty ir
>>>>> provides has on other organisms/entities. It can actually cause/effect
>>>>> changes in the larger system.
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes, I see the universe as self-emergent and self-organizing - and
>>>>> refer to 1.412 for the Peircean outline of these actions. But I don't see
>>>>> this as a transition from Firstness to Secondness, for I don't consider
>>>>> that the pre-universe was in any categorical mode [ie, not in a mode of
>>>>> Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness. It was simply nothing].
>>>>>
>>>>> Certainly, the 'somehow', i.e., the bridge between 'nothing' and
>>>>> 'something' is not explained beyond a 'chance flash'. But because there is
>>>>> no explanation, does not mean that I can or even should come up with one -
>>>>> certainly, science hasn't been able to do so, and since I'm an atheist,
>>>>> then, I'm not going to offer a self-organized belief in god as having
>>>>> been
>>>>> First Cause. I simply don't know.
>>>>>
>>>>> Edwina
>>>>>
>>>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>>>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
>>>>> *To:* Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com>
>>>>> *Cc:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
>>>>> *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 5:59 PM
>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's
>>>>> Cosmology)
>>>>>
>>>>> Clark, List:
>>>>>
>>>>> Your points, as usual, are well-taken. Is it helpful at all to refer
>>>>> to "actualization," rather than "cause"? Edwina's position, as I
>>>>> understand it, is that our existing universe is not only self-*organizing
>>>>> *but also self-*generating *or self-*originating*; as Houser put it
>>>>> in his introduction to EP 1, "Somehow, the possibility or potentiality of
>>>>> the chaos is self-actualizing." This is the crucial transition from
>>>>> Firstness (possibility) to Secondness (actuality), and the word "somehow"
>>>>> reflects the fact that Houser's attempt to summarize Peirce's cosmology
>>>>> effectively leaves this step unexplained.
>>>>>
>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>
>>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:29 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Nov 3, 2016, at 1:50 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>>>>>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ET: Of course I didn't mean an individual [human or god] force by
>>>>>> the term of 'chance'!. I find that Jon jumps to disagree with me as a
>>>>>> matter of habit. Either that, or his tendency to read in a literal manner
>>>>>> leads him to such conclusions. I meant 'chance or Firstness or
>>>>>> spontaneity
>>>>>> as a causal force - and there's plenty of comments in Peirce on just this
>>>>>> state.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> No, I understood exactly what you meant. My disagreement is that I
>>>>>> take "chance" (in Peirce's usage) to be freedom or spontaneity, rather
>>>>>> than
>>>>>> randomness or inexplicability; and it is certainly not something that
>>>>>> could
>>>>>> ever be "a causal force." I even quoted Peirce to support this view, but
>>>>>> you refer to my "tendency to read in a literal manner" as if it were a
>>>>>> bad
>>>>>> thing!
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Again I think we’re all talking past one an other by equivocating
>>>>>> over the term ‘cause.’ In a certain cause pure freedom or spontaneity
>>>>>> isn’t causal and in an other sense it must be. Effectively each firstness
>>>>>> is its own unmoved mover. The problem is that making sense of causality
>>>>>> at
>>>>>> all when little is necessary and most things are underdetermined is
>>>>>> problematic.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I think causality is problematic for a variety of other reasons too.
>>>>>> For instance in terms of physics we could oppose the classic Newtonian
>>>>>> formulation of mechanics in terms of forces and masses to the Hamiltonian
>>>>>> or Lagrangian forms. They’re mathematically equivalent yet metaphysically
>>>>>> quite conceptually different. The Hamiltonian is the evolution of the
>>>>>> wave
>>>>>> function (what in quantum mechanics becomes the Dirac or Schrodinger
>>>>>> equation) and it’s hard to make sense of causality in terms of it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Likewise again turning to Duns Scotus we have classic arguments
>>>>>> against causality being continuous. (Basically part of the same extended
>>>>>> argument I linked to earlier for a first cause) For Peirce where any sign
>>>>>> can be divided it’s worth asking if we have causality at all.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Despite these problems of causality we all use the term causality.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> He referenced the same series of articles in what was probably his
>>>>>> very first draft of "A Neglected Argument" (1908), and made a few other
>>>>>> comments about it that are relevant to this discussion.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> CSP: I there contended that the laws of nature, and, indeed, all
>>>>>> experiential laws, have been results of evolution, being (such was my
>>>>>> original hypothesis,) developments out of utterly causeless
>>>>>> determinations
>>>>>> of single events, under a certain universal tendency toward habit-forming
>>>>>> ... But during the long years which have elapsed since the hypothesis
>>>>>> first
>>>>>> suggested itself to me, it may naturally be supposed that faulty features
>>>>>> of the original hypothesis have been brought [to] my attention by others
>>>>>> and have struck me in my own meditations. Dr. Edward Montgomery remarked
>>>>>> that my theory was not so much evolutionary as it was emanational; and
>>>>>> Professor Ogden Rood pointed out that there must have been some original
>>>>>> tendency to take habits which did not arise according to my hypothesis;
>>>>>> while I myself was most struck by the difficulty of so explaining the law
>>>>>> of sequence in time, if I proposed to make all laws develope from single
>>>>>> events; since an event already supposes Time. (R 842, emphasis added)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I think this might be better read as there being no cause *for* firstness
>>>>>> not that firstness can’t be seen a not causal. Again I suspect we’re
>>>>>> talking past one an other again but the mere fact firstness can be an
>>>>>> element in a triadic sign more or less entails a certain sense of
>>>>>> causation. (Although I prefer Peirce’s term determination although that
>>>>>> too
>>>>>> has the genealogy in problematic metaphysical understanding)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I should add that this problem of language for this foundational
>>>>>> event isn’t new. You see similar debates in late antiquity over whether
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> platonic One is one or ought to be considered two emanation steps. While
>>>>>> I’ll confess to finding such matters idle talk there’s usually a logical
>>>>>> reason for the analaysis. (Much like the whole disparaged “how many
>>>>>> angels
>>>>>> could dance on a pin” makes sense in the context of the debates over
>>>>>> kinds
>>>>>> in medieval scholasticism)
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>
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