Gary R, list:
Well, I consider myself a 'fair-minded reader of Peirce' and I certainly don't
agree with Jon S's view that the blackboard is pre-Big Bang and that the three
Categories are pre-Big Bang, with Thirdness primordial.
Of course the blackboard is a metaphor - set out as a diagram...but that
diagram is a metaphor of what we assume is that 'original vague potentiality or
at any rate of some early stage of its determination'. 6.203. As I said in my
earlier post today, my reading is that this blackboard is POST Big Bang, which
is why it is a 'continuum of some indefinite multitude of dimensions'. 6.203.
This is NOT the same as the pre Big Bang Zeroness - which is NOTHING.
And by 'continuum', I certainly don't see this as Thirdness, for Thirdness is a
continuum of some particular habits, not just a 'continuum and certainly not of
'indefinite multitude of dimensions. The very nature of Thirdness is its
function to constrain novelty and insert morphological habits.
As for quibbling about whether the chalk mark is a point or a line - that's
irrelevant. It is a unique 'bit' of matter/mind - that is differentiated from
what-it-is-not ["the limit between the black surface and the white surface}
6.203]. It's the differentiation from 'what-it-is-not' that is important, for
this is obviously Secondness.
The first chalkmark exhibits only Firstness [its novel appearance] and
Secondness [its differentiation from the blackness] but would only exhibit
Thirdness if it stayed 'as it is' and if other chalkmarks appear and they
develop common habits of formation. As Peirce notes 'However, the mark is a
mere accident, and as such may be erased. It will not interfere with another
mark drawn in quite another way. There need be no consistency between the two.
But no further progress beyond this can be made, until a mark with stay for a
little while; that is, until some beginning of a habit has been established by
virtue of which the accident acquires some incipient staying quality, some
tendency toward consistency. This habit is a generalizing tendency" 6.204.
The three categories are fundamental laws of nature; their origin is with
nature - which includes the physico-chemical as well as biological realms.
Therefore - I disagree that they are pre-BigBang. I read Peirce that they
originate, as natural laws, with the BigBang's potentiality.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Gary Richmond
To: Peirce-L
Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 12:27 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Jon S, Edwina, List,
Jon wrote:
a.. The Big Bang corresponds to our existing universe being
differentiated out of one of these "Platonic worlds" (CP 6.208) as "a
discontinuous mark" (NEM 4:345, RLT:162) on the whiteboard.
Consequently, the blackboard--which precedes the whiteboard, and is the
source of its continuity--cannot be post-Big Bang; and the three Categories
must be pre-Big Bang, with Thirdness primordial among them.
Minus your addition of the notion of a whiteboard--which additon I think is
quite helpful in representing the "Aggregations of merged chalk marks
represent[ing] "reacting systems" that aggregate further into "Platonic worlds"
(CP 6.206-208"--this is certainly the way I have always seen Peirce's
blackboard discussion and, I believe, a fair minded reader must see it (whether
or not they agree with Peirce here). As I wrote just yesterday, in the
blackboard diagram--not a metaphor (I stand corrected)--"Peirce seems not at
all to be considering the semiosic universe we inhabit, but the conditions for
any, perhaps many, possible universe(s) to arise."
Thanks especially for succinctly putting the argumentation into bullet points
(including pointers to the exact passages in CP 6.203-208), this constituting
an excellent summary of Peirce's 1898 argument.
Best,
Gary R
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 11:56 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:
Edwina, List:
I could post a lengthy rebuttal, but it would basically just repeat what I
have already laid out in considerable detail in this thread and the others
associated with Peirce's Cosmology, so I will spare everyone (including myself)
the dissertation. I will simply reiterate a few quick points about the
blackboard illustration.
a.. The blackboard is "a sort of diagram" (CP 6.203), not a metaphor;
this means that it embodies the significant relations among the parts of
whatever it represents.
b.. The blackboard "is a continuum of two dimensions" that represents "a
continuum of some indefinite multitude of dimensions" (CP 6.203); and a
continuum is a paradigmatic manifestation of Thirdness.
c.. The chalk mark is not a point, or even a line; it is a surface, and
its continuity is entirely derived from and dependent on that of the underlying
blackboard (CP 6.203).
d.. The chalk mark exhibits all three Categories (CP
6.203&205)--Firstness (whiteness), Secondness (boundary between black and
white), and Thirdness (continuity).
e.. Aggregations of merged chalk marks represent "reacting systems" that
aggregate further into "Platonic worlds" (CP 6.206-208), each of which I call a
"whiteboard."
f.. The Big Bang corresponds to our existing universe being
differentiated out of one of these "Platonic worlds" (CP 6.208) as "a
discontinuous mark" (NEM 4:345, RLT:162) on the whiteboard.
Consequently, the blackboard--which precedes the whiteboard, and is the
source of its continuity--cannot be post-Big Bang; and the three Categories
must be pre-Big Bang, with Thirdness primordial among them.
Regards,
Jon
On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 7:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
Gary, list - yes, I think that both tone and repetition are getting
tiresome, to say the least.
I'm not sure what you mean by your suggestion of differentiating the
'early cosmos' from 'this our existential one' contra an Aristotelian one 'once
there exists a particular three category semiosic universe'.
1) My confusion comes from my own view that our 'existential cosmos' IS a
three category semiosic universe. That is, my view is that the three categories
only emerge within the existentiality of the matter/mind universe. There are no
categories before this 'Big Bang' or whatever began our universe.
That is, in the pre-universe, "We start, then, with nothing, pure
zero'....This pure zero is the nothing of not having been born......boundless
freedom". 6.217. My reading of this is that this pure zero is NOT the same as
Firstness, because, my reading of Firstness is that it is an embedded state of
feeling, which means, that its nature is to express a quality of some form of
matter/mind. Redness; heat; coldness.... Therefore, my reading of this
pre-universe state is that it was, as Peirce notes "unbounded potentiality'.
This "Nothingness of boundless freedom 6.219..."is not, in my view, the same
as the logic of freedom or possibility [which is Firstness].
"What immediately resulted was that unbounded potentiality became
potentiality of this or that sort - that is ,of some quality' 6.220. Now - my
reading is that the unbounded Nothing [which again, is NOT Firstness or
Thirdness]...suddenly moved into Firstness.
Again, 'the zero of bare possibility, by evolutionary logic, leapt into
the unit of some quality" 6.220. So again, the zero of nothing moved into
Firstness, where 'something is possible/Red is something; therefore Red is
possible'. 6.220. Again - the zero of bare possibility is NOT Firstness or
Thirdness. It is Nothing. Then..it moved into being 'embedded' within matter -
as Firstness....where something is possible. Not unbounded possibility but
something is possible. This is already constrained possibility, very different
from the 'zero of boundless possibility'.
2) His next phase seems to be, following the basic 'vague to the
definite' 6.191, from a 'vague potentiality; and that either is or is followed
by a continuum of forms having a multitude of dimensions too great for the
individuals dimensions to be distinct" 6.196. These would be differentiated
units in Secondness [and Firstness]. Then, habits of relations or Thirdness
begin...and this vast multitude is 'contracted'. "The general indefinite
potentiality became limited and heterogeneous" 6.199.
3) With regard to the blackboard metaphor, my reading of it is that the
blackboard refers to 'the original vague potentiality, or at any rate of some
stage of its determination' 6.203. My reading is that this blackboard is POST
Big Bang. The blackboard is NOT the 'zero of bare possibility'. Instead, it is
POST Big Bang - and suddenly, a singular point appears - that chalk line. [I'll
leave out Peirce-as-God having drawn it]. As a point, it has identity, that
continuity-of-being that Peirce refers to ['There is a certain element of
continuity in this line" 6.203]..This is a unit in Secondness.
The white chalk line appears within the act of Firstness, but is, in
itself, operating ALSO within the mode of Secondness - because it is discrete
and distinct.
And then, habits or Thirdness, that generalizing tendency, develops. NOTE
- Thirdness did not pre-exist on its own; it develops as the discrete units
appear within Firstness and Secondness. That is, Thirdness is embedded within
the existentialities of matter operating within Firstness and Secondness. It
'feeds and works' within these individual 'bits'...and develops generalizing
laws.
That's how I see this metaphor.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Gary Richmond
To: Peirce-L
Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 11:46 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Jon, Edwina, Clark, List,
Perhaps this back and forth--especially the tone and tendency towards
repetition--has gotten "tiresome" for some readers as well as the most active
participants.
I had hoped my suggestion a while back of a Platonic cosmos pre-the Big
Bang (note: of course I completely agree with Clark that one shouldn't really
bring such very much later notions into the picture, which is why I used the
modifier "loosely" when I last referred to it--but what language do we have to
distinguish the early cosmos Peirce describes in the last lecture of the 1898
Reasoning and the Logic of Things from this, our, existential one?) contra a
more Aristotelian cosmos once there exists a, shall we say, particular three
category semiosic universe might be helpful in moving this discussion forward.
So, my question: Are these two different? If so, how so? If not, why not?
One thing I would be very interested in is what Edwina, Clark, and
others make of the final 1898 lecture, esp. the blackboard metaphor. Here, as I
interpret it, Peirce seems not at all to be considering the semiosic universe
we inhabit, but the conditions for any, perhaps many, possible universe(s) to
arise. Unlike the Neglected Argument essay, there is no explicit mention of God
here, and Peirce seems to be making a purely scientific hypothesis. So,
perhaps, dropping the God-talk for a moment, what is Peirce attempting in RLT?
Best,
Gary R
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 8:06 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
<jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
Edwina, List:
Lest we get bogged down any further in yet another tiresome
exegetical battle, I will simply say that I find almost nothing in your last
post to be consistent with my understanding of Peirce's own thought. I once
again leave it to the List community to decide which of us--if either of
us--has demonstrated the more accurate interpretation.
Regards,
Jon
On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 6:50 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
wrote:
Jon - as Clark has been trying to point out, you and I are locked
in terminological difficulties. Your insistence that YOUR use is identical with
that of Peirce's use - is simply your own opinion.
My reading of Peirce is that all three categorical modes only
function within Relations. Firstness is NOT 'real' in the sense of it being a
generality [ie., the reality of the laws of Thirdness] and it does exist as a
state of 'existentiality; i.e., as a quality, a feeling, an openness, BUT, this
state is itself an experience, entire in itself, and as such, it exists within
that experience of its fullness. There is no such thing as an unembodied
Firstness! Since it is a state of experience, then, it must be embodied. It is
simply 'complete', so to speak and not open to the Otherness of analysis or
reaction.
You confine 'existence' to Secondness - which is, I feel, too
narrow an understanding of the three categories and of the term 'existence'.
I disagree that 'pure nothing' is Firstness and Secondness in the
absence of Thirdness. I agree that without Thirdness - it would be chaos, but i
don't see this as PURE nothing. After all, 'the original chaos, therefore,
where there was no regularity, was in effect a state of mere indeterminacy, in
which nothing existed or really happened". 1. 411. My reading of that, is that
there was no matter in a mode of Firstness or Secondness in this 'original
chaos' - no 'existences' and no 'feelings'. Nothing.
Now - of course, and as usual, you can disagree with me.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 7:25 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's
Cosmology)
Edwina, List:
Once again, I find your use of terminology inconsistent with
Peirce's. Firstness is real, but does not exist. It has no Relations, because
any Relation requires Secondness. "Pure nothing" is the chaos of Firstness and
Secondness in the absence of Thirdness. Accepting any matter of fact--such as
the origin of our existing universe--as inexplicable is unacceptable, because
it blocks the way of inquiry. Nothing new here, so I will leave it at that.
Regards,
Jon
On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 5:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky
<tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
I think that 'actualization' and 'cause' are two entirely
different actions.
With regard to Firstness, I see it, as a spontaneous state of
existence which might then act upon/be reacted to.., in the 'fullness of this
state'. The point of all the categories is that they operate within Relations;
they are not isolate in themselves. Firstness, as that spontaneous state of
existence [which might dissipate in a nanosecond if it doesn't bond/relate to
another entity]...can provide a novel form of existence.
For example, a spontaneous mutation of a cell might be
accepted by other cells and might become part of the organism's nature. Or,
might not be accepted and its energy-content would dissipate.
Or, a novel mode of transportation [Uber] might suddenly
develop and might spread to other domains. Or, like many a new invention - it
might disappear in a month.
The causality of Firstness is the Relations that the novelty ir
provides has on other organisms/entities. It can actually cause/effect changes
in the larger system.
Yes, I see the universe as self-emergent and self-organizing -
and refer to 1.412 for the Peircean outline of these actions. But I don't see
this as a transition from Firstness to Secondness, for I don't consider that
the pre-universe was in any categorical mode [ie, not in a mode of Firstness,
Secondness or Thirdness. It was simply nothing].
Certainly, the 'somehow', i.e., the bridge between 'nothing'
and 'something' is not explained beyond a 'chance flash'. But because there is
no explanation, does not mean that I can or even should come up with one -
certainly, science hasn't been able to do so, and since I'm an atheist, then,
I'm not going to offer a self-organized belief in god as having been First
Cause. I simply don't know.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Clark Goble
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 5:59 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's
Cosmology)
Clark, List:
Your points, as usual, are well-taken. Is it helpful at all
to refer to "actualization," rather than "cause"? Edwina's position, as I
understand it, is that our existing universe is not only self-organizing but
also self-generating or self-originating; as Houser put it in his introduction
to EP 1, "Somehow, the possibility or potentiality of the chaos is
self-actualizing." This is the crucial transition from Firstness (possibility)
to Secondness (actuality), and the word "somehow" reflects the fact that
Houser's attempt to summarize Peirce's cosmology effectively leaves this step
unexplained.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:29 PM, Clark Goble
<cl...@lextek.com> wrote:
On Nov 3, 2016, at 1:50 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
<jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
ET: Of course I didn't mean an individual [human or god]
force by the term of 'chance'!. I find that Jon jumps to disagree with me as a
matter of habit. Either that, or his tendency to read in a literal manner leads
him to such conclusions. I meant 'chance or Firstness or spontaneity as a
causal force - and there's plenty of comments in Peirce on just this state.
No, I understood exactly what you meant. My disagreement
is that I take "chance" (in Peirce's usage) to be freedom or spontaneity,
rather than randomness or inexplicability; and it is certainly not something
that could ever be "a causal force." I even quoted Peirce to support this
view, but you refer to my "tendency to read in a literal manner" as if it were
a bad thing!
Again I think we’re all talking past one an other by
equivocating over the term ‘cause.’ In a certain cause pure freedom or
spontaneity isn’t causal and in an other sense it must be. Effectively each
firstness is its own unmoved mover. The problem is that making sense of
causality at all when little is necessary and most things are underdetermined
is problematic.
I think causality is problematic for a variety of other
reasons too. For instance in terms of physics we could oppose the classic
Newtonian formulation of mechanics in terms of forces and masses to the
Hamiltonian or Lagrangian forms. They’re mathematically equivalent yet
metaphysically quite conceptually different. The Hamiltonian is the evolution
of the wave function (what in quantum mechanics becomes the Dirac or
Schrodinger equation) and it’s hard to make sense of causality in terms of it.
Likewise again turning to Duns Scotus we have classic
arguments against causality being continuous. (Basically part of the same
extended argument I linked to earlier for a first cause) For Peirce where any
sign can be divided it’s worth asking if we have causality at all.
Despite these problems of causality we all use the term
causality.
He referenced the same series of articles in what was
probably his very first draft of "A Neglected Argument" (1908), and made a few
other comments about it that are relevant to this discussion.
CSP: I there contended that the laws of nature, and,
indeed, all experiential laws, have been results of evolution, being (such was
my original hypothesis,) developments out of utterly causeless determinations
of single events, under a certain universal tendency toward habit-forming ...
But during the long years which have elapsed since the hypothesis first
suggested itself to me, it may naturally be supposed that faulty features of
the original hypothesis have been brought [to] my attention by others and have
struck me in my own meditations. Dr. Edward Montgomery remarked that my theory
was not so much evolutionary as it was emanational; and Professor Ogden Rood
pointed out that there must have been some original tendency to take habits
which did not arise according to my hypothesis; while I myself was most struck
by the difficulty of so explaining the law of sequence in time, if I proposed
to make all laws develope from single events; since an event already supposes
Time. (R 842, emphasis added)
I think this might be better read as there being no cause
for firstness not that firstness can’t be seen a not causal. Again I suspect
we’re talking past one an other again but the mere fact firstness can be an
element in a triadic sign more or less entails a certain sense of causation.
(Although I prefer Peirce’s term determination although that too has the
genealogy in problematic metaphysical understanding)
I should add that this problem of language for this
foundational event isn’t new. You see similar debates in late antiquity over
whether the platonic One is one or ought to be considered two emanation steps.
While I’ll confess to finding such matters idle talk there’s usually a logical
reason for the analaysis. (Much like the whole disparaged “how many angels
could dance on a pin” makes sense in the context of the debates over kinds in
medieval scholasticism)
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