Gary R - again, it is my strong sense that I am accurately representing
Peirce's views on this issue. I don't see that I disagree with him at all - but
I do disagree with you and Jon on this issue [and, obviously, on theistic
issues as well].
That is - I don't see a Nothing, which is to say, the pre BigBang world, as a
set of Platonic worlds. If this were the case, then, it would not be nothing
but would be sets of ideal potentialities. Instead, it is nothing, 'pure
zero', pure freedom, no variety of Platonic worlds which after all, establish
different perspectives, it is "absolutely undefined and unlimited possibility'
...not a SET of Platonic worlds. [1.412, 6.217].
Then, with the BigBang, this set up the Blackboard 'the original vague
potentiality' and moved into that set of multiple possible Platonic worlds
within the phase of Firstness and Secondness. At this time, these 'bits' were
without habits [Thirdness] - that's what provides them with their potentiality;
it is possible that many chalkmarks appeared..... "Many such reacting systems
may spring up in the original continuum; and each of these may itself acts as a
first line from which a larger system may be built, in which it in turn will
merge its individuality" 6.207. This is POST BigBang.
With these multiple sets - the universe could have gone anywhere; some of those
'bits' could have dissipated; others could have emerged; some could have
stayed. But THEN - came the development of habits, Thirdness - and these habits
established our particular world rather than one of the other 'Platonic
worlds'. By chance [tychasm], habits developed within ONE TYPE of 'Platonic
world'...and the others, I presume, dissolved, as our particular universe took
over.
The multiple Platonic worlds are not pre BigBang, in my reading, but post. And
Thirdness quickly isolated and privileged one 'Set' - which then became our
particular universe.
Therefore, I equally don't read Peirce as having the three categories
'existential' in the pre BigBang phase; my reading is that these three
categories, which are fundamental laws of matter/mind...emerged WITH the
emergence of matter/mind...and are not separate from it.
Therefore - you and Jon, and others, may certainly reject my reading of Peirce,
just as I reject yours and Jon's - but, I don't think we are at the stage where
we can definitely say that only ONE reading is The Accurate One. I offer my
reading; some on the list may agree; some may not. That is as far as a
scholarly list can go, I think.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Gary Richmond
To: Peirce-L
Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 1:55 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Edwina, Jon S, List,
I certainly do not intend to get into a long (or even a short) discussion
with you, Edwina, on this as both your position and Jon's (and mine) have been
rather thoroughly and repeatedly articulated. I must say, however, that I do
not see your "reading" of the blackboard passages as 'fair minded' at all, but
rather it seems to me to impose your own conceptual framework on Peirce's very
different one.
For example, at RLT, 263, in the midst of the long and complex blackboard
discussion, RLT, 261-4, which blackboard Peirce himself refers to as "a sort of
Diagram of the original vague potentiality," RLT, 261), he comments (and I've
pointed to this passage before):
"[A]ll this, be it remembered, is not of the order of the existing
universe, but is merely a Platonic world of which we are, therefore, to
conceive that there are many, both coordinated and subordinated to one another
until finally one of these Platonic worlds is differentiated the particular
actual universe of existence in which we happen to be." (RLT, 263, emphasis
added).
Now you may disagree with Peirce in this matter, but this is what he
wrote--the blackboard diagram would seem to represent what he no doubt believed
to be the character of the cosmos before "one of these Platonic worlds is
differentiated the particular actual universe of existence in which we happen
to be," that is, before what corresponds to the Big Bang.
It is my strong sense that Jon has consistently accurately presented Peirce's
views as they appear in the 1898 lecture, and that your remarks contra his do
not represent Peirce's clearly articulated views (as, for example, given in the
quotation above), but rather your own. They seem to me less an interpretation
than a misreading of Peirce, one which your conceptual framework apparently
requires.
Best,
Gary R
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 1:03 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
Gary R, list:
Well, I consider myself a 'fair-minded reader of Peirce' and I certainly
don't agree with Jon S's view that the blackboard is pre-Big Bang and that the
three Categories are pre-Big Bang, with Thirdness primordial.
Of course the blackboard is a metaphor - set out as a diagram...but that
diagram is a metaphor of what we assume is that 'original vague potentiality or
at any rate of some early stage of its determination'. 6.203. As I said in my
earlier post today, my reading is that this blackboard is POST Big Bang, which
is why it is a 'continuum of some indefinite multitude of dimensions'. 6.203.
This is NOT the same as the pre Big Bang Zeroness - which is NOTHING.
And by 'continuum', I certainly don't see this as Thirdness, for Thirdness
is a continuum of some particular habits, not just a 'continuum and certainly
not of 'indefinite multitude of dimensions. The very nature of Thirdness is its
function to constrain novelty and insert morphological habits.
As for quibbling about whether the chalk mark is a point or a line - that's
irrelevant. It is a unique 'bit' of matter/mind - that is differentiated from
what-it-is-not ["the limit between the black surface and the white surface}
6.203]. It's the differentiation from 'what-it-is-not' that is important, for
this is obviously Secondness.
The first chalkmark exhibits only Firstness [its novel appearance] and
Secondness [its differentiation from the blackness] but would only exhibit
Thirdness if it stayed 'as it is' and if other chalkmarks appear and they
develop common habits of formation. As Peirce notes 'However, the mark is a
mere accident, and as such may be erased. It will not interfere with another
mark drawn in quite another way. There need be no consistency between the two.
But no further progress beyond this can be made, until a mark with stay for a
little while; that is, until some beginning of a habit has been established by
virtue of which the accident acquires some incipient staying quality, some
tendency toward consistency. This habit is a generalizing tendency" 6.204.
The three categories are fundamental laws of nature; their origin is with
nature - which includes the physico-chemical as well as biological realms.
Therefore - I disagree that they are pre-BigBang. I read Peirce that they
originate, as natural laws, with the BigBang's potentiality.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Gary Richmond
To: Peirce-L
Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 12:27 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Jon S, Edwina, List,
Jon wrote:
a.. The Big Bang corresponds to our existing universe being
differentiated out of one of these "Platonic worlds" (CP 6.208) as "a
discontinuous mark" (NEM 4:345, RLT:162) on the whiteboard.
Consequently, the blackboard--which precedes the whiteboard, and is the
source of its continuity--cannot be post-Big Bang; and the three Categories
must be pre-Big Bang, with Thirdness primordial among them.
Minus your addition of the notion of a whiteboard--which additon I think
is quite helpful in representing the "Aggregations of merged chalk marks
represent[ing] "reacting systems" that aggregate further into "Platonic worlds"
(CP 6.206-208"--this is certainly the way I have always seen Peirce's
blackboard discussion and, I believe, a fair minded reader must see it (whether
or not they agree with Peirce here). As I wrote just yesterday, in the
blackboard diagram--not a metaphor (I stand corrected)--"Peirce seems not at
all to be considering the semiosic universe we inhabit, but the conditions for
any, perhaps many, possible universe(s) to arise."
Thanks especially for succinctly putting the argumentation into bullet
points (including pointers to the exact passages in CP 6.203-208), this
constituting an excellent summary of Peirce's 1898 argument.
Best,
Gary R
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 11:56 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt
<jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
Edwina, List:
I could post a lengthy rebuttal, but it would basically just repeat
what I have already laid out in considerable detail in this thread and the
others associated with Peirce's Cosmology, so I will spare everyone (including
myself) the dissertation. I will simply reiterate a few quick points about the
blackboard illustration.
a.. The blackboard is "a sort of diagram" (CP 6.203), not a metaphor;
this means that it embodies the significant relations among the parts of
whatever it represents.
b.. The blackboard "is a continuum of two dimensions" that represents
"a continuum of some indefinite multitude of dimensions" (CP 6.203); and a
continuum is a paradigmatic manifestation of Thirdness.
c.. The chalk mark is not a point, or even a line; it is a surface,
and its continuity is entirely derived from and dependent on that of the
underlying blackboard (CP 6.203).
d.. The chalk mark exhibits all three Categories (CP
6.203&205)--Firstness (whiteness), Secondness (boundary between black and
white), and Thirdness (continuity).
e.. Aggregations of merged chalk marks represent "reacting systems"
that aggregate further into "Platonic worlds" (CP 6.206-208), each of which I
call a "whiteboard."
f.. The Big Bang corresponds to our existing universe being
differentiated out of one of these "Platonic worlds" (CP 6.208) as "a
discontinuous mark" (NEM 4:345, RLT:162) on the whiteboard.
Consequently, the blackboard--which precedes the whiteboard, and is the
source of its continuity--cannot be post-Big Bang; and the three Categories
must be pre-Big Bang, with Thirdness primordial among them.
Regards,
Jon
On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 7:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
wrote:
Gary, list - yes, I think that both tone and repetition are getting
tiresome, to say the least.
I'm not sure what you mean by your suggestion of differentiating the
'early cosmos' from 'this our existential one' contra an Aristotelian one 'once
there exists a particular three category semiosic universe'.
1) My confusion comes from my own view that our 'existential cosmos'
IS a three category semiosic universe. That is, my view is that the three
categories only emerge within the existentiality of the matter/mind universe.
There are no categories before this 'Big Bang' or whatever began our universe.
That is, in the pre-universe, "We start, then, with nothing, pure
zero'....This pure zero is the nothing of not having been born......boundless
freedom". 6.217. My reading of this is that this pure zero is NOT the same as
Firstness, because, my reading of Firstness is that it is an embedded state of
feeling, which means, that its nature is to express a quality of some form of
matter/mind. Redness; heat; coldness.... Therefore, my reading of this
pre-universe state is that it was, as Peirce notes "unbounded potentiality'.
This "Nothingness of boundless freedom 6.219..."is not, in my view, the same
as the logic of freedom or possibility [which is Firstness].
"What immediately resulted was that unbounded potentiality became
potentiality of this or that sort - that is ,of some quality' 6.220. Now - my
reading is that the unbounded Nothing [which again, is NOT Firstness or
Thirdness]...suddenly moved into Firstness.
Again, 'the zero of bare possibility, by evolutionary logic, leapt
into the unit of some quality" 6.220. So again, the zero of nothing moved into
Firstness, where 'something is possible/Red is something; therefore Red is
possible'. 6.220. Again - the zero of bare possibility is NOT Firstness or
Thirdness. It is Nothing. Then..it moved into being 'embedded' within matter -
as Firstness....where something is possible. Not unbounded possibility but
something is possible. This is already constrained possibility, very different
from the 'zero of boundless possibility'.
2) His next phase seems to be, following the basic 'vague to the
definite' 6.191, from a 'vague potentiality; and that either is or is followed
by a continuum of forms having a multitude of dimensions too great for the
individuals dimensions to be distinct" 6.196. These would be differentiated
units in Secondness [and Firstness]. Then, habits of relations or Thirdness
begin...and this vast multitude is 'contracted'. "The general indefinite
potentiality became limited and heterogeneous" 6.199.
3) With regard to the blackboard metaphor, my reading of it is that
the blackboard refers to 'the original vague potentiality, or at any rate of
some stage of its determination' 6.203. My reading is that this blackboard is
POST Big Bang. The blackboard is NOT the 'zero of bare possibility'. Instead,
it is POST Big Bang - and suddenly, a singular point appears - that chalk line.
[I'll leave out Peirce-as-God having drawn it]. As a point, it has identity,
that continuity-of-being that Peirce refers to ['There is a certain element of
continuity in this line" 6.203]..This is a unit in Secondness.
The white chalk line appears within the act of Firstness, but is, in
itself, operating ALSO within the mode of Secondness - because it is discrete
and distinct.
And then, habits or Thirdness, that generalizing tendency, develops.
NOTE - Thirdness did not pre-exist on its own; it develops as the discrete
units appear within Firstness and Secondness. That is, Thirdness is embedded
within the existentialities of matter operating within Firstness and
Secondness. It 'feeds and works' within these individual 'bits'...and develops
generalizing laws.
That's how I see this metaphor.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Gary Richmond
To: Peirce-L
Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 11:46 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's
Cosmology)
Jon, Edwina, Clark, List,
Perhaps this back and forth--especially the tone and tendency
towards repetition--has gotten "tiresome" for some readers as well as the most
active participants.
I had hoped my suggestion a while back of a Platonic cosmos pre-the
Big Bang (note: of course I completely agree with Clark that one shouldn't
really bring such very much later notions into the picture, which is why I used
the modifier "loosely" when I last referred to it--but what language do we have
to distinguish the early cosmos Peirce describes in the last lecture of the
1898 Reasoning and the Logic of Things from this, our, existential one?) contra
a more Aristotelian cosmos once there exists a, shall we say, particular three
category semiosic universe might be helpful in moving this discussion forward.
So, my question: Are these two different? If so, how so? If not, why not?
One thing I would be very interested in is what Edwina, Clark, and
others make of the final 1898 lecture, esp. the blackboard metaphor. Here, as I
interpret it, Peirce seems not at all to be considering the semiosic universe
we inhabit, but the conditions for any, perhaps many, possible universe(s) to
arise. Unlike the Neglected Argument essay, there is no explicit mention of God
here, and Peirce seems to be making a purely scientific hypothesis. So,
perhaps, dropping the God-talk for a moment, what is Peirce attempting in RLT?
Best,
Gary R
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 8:06 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
<jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
Edwina, List:
Lest we get bogged down any further in yet another tiresome
exegetical battle, I will simply say that I find almost nothing in your last
post to be consistent with my understanding of Peirce's own thought. I once
again leave it to the List community to decide which of us--if either of
us--has demonstrated the more accurate interpretation.
Regards,
Jon
On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 6:50 PM, Edwina Taborsky
<tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
Jon - as Clark has been trying to point out, you and I are
locked in terminological difficulties. Your insistence that YOUR use is
identical with that of Peirce's use - is simply your own opinion.
My reading of Peirce is that all three categorical modes only
function within Relations. Firstness is NOT 'real' in the sense of it being a
generality [ie., the reality of the laws of Thirdness] and it does exist as a
state of 'existentiality; i.e., as a quality, a feeling, an openness, BUT, this
state is itself an experience, entire in itself, and as such, it exists within
that experience of its fullness. There is no such thing as an unembodied
Firstness! Since it is a state of experience, then, it must be embodied. It is
simply 'complete', so to speak and not open to the Otherness of analysis or
reaction.
You confine 'existence' to Secondness - which is, I feel, too
narrow an understanding of the three categories and of the term 'existence'.
I disagree that 'pure nothing' is Firstness and Secondness in
the absence of Thirdness. I agree that without Thirdness - it would be chaos,
but i don't see this as PURE nothing. After all, 'the original chaos,
therefore, where there was no regularity, was in effect a state of mere
indeterminacy, in which nothing existed or really happened". 1. 411. My
reading of that, is that there was no matter in a mode of Firstness or
Secondness in this 'original chaos' - no 'existences' and no 'feelings'.
Nothing.
Now - of course, and as usual, you can disagree with me.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 7:25 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's
Cosmology)
Edwina, List:
Once again, I find your use of terminology inconsistent with
Peirce's. Firstness is real, but does not exist. It has no Relations, because
any Relation requires Secondness. "Pure nothing" is the chaos of Firstness and
Secondness in the absence of Thirdness. Accepting any matter of fact--such as
the origin of our existing universe--as inexplicable is unacceptable, because
it blocks the way of inquiry. Nothing new here, so I will leave it at that.
Regards,
Jon
On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 5:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky
<tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
I think that 'actualization' and 'cause' are two entirely
different actions.
With regard to Firstness, I see it, as a spontaneous state
of existence which might then act upon/be reacted to.., in the 'fullness of
this state'. The point of all the categories is that they operate within
Relations; they are not isolate in themselves. Firstness, as that spontaneous
state of existence [which might dissipate in a nanosecond if it doesn't
bond/relate to another entity]...can provide a novel form of existence.
For example, a spontaneous mutation of a cell might be
accepted by other cells and might become part of the organism's nature. Or,
might not be accepted and its energy-content would dissipate.
Or, a novel mode of transportation [Uber] might suddenly
develop and might spread to other domains. Or, like many a new invention - it
might disappear in a month.
The causality of Firstness is the Relations that the
novelty ir provides has on other organisms/entities. It can actually
cause/effect changes in the larger system.
Yes, I see the universe as self-emergent and
self-organizing - and refer to 1.412 for the Peircean outline of these actions.
But I don't see this as a transition from Firstness to Secondness, for I don't
consider that the pre-universe was in any categorical mode [ie, not in a mode
of Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness. It was simply nothing].
Certainly, the 'somehow', i.e., the bridge between
'nothing' and 'something' is not explained beyond a 'chance flash'. But because
there is no explanation, does not mean that I can or even should come up with
one - certainly, science hasn't been able to do so, and since I'm an atheist,
then, I'm not going to offer a self-organized belief in god as having been
First Cause. I simply don't know.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Clark Goble
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 5:59 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was
Peirce's Cosmology)
Clark, List:
Your points, as usual, are well-taken. Is it helpful at
all to refer to "actualization," rather than "cause"? Edwina's position, as I
understand it, is that our existing universe is not only self-organizing but
also self-generating or self-originating; as Houser put it in his introduction
to EP 1, "Somehow, the possibility or potentiality of the chaos is
self-actualizing." This is the crucial transition from Firstness (possibility)
to Secondness (actuality), and the word "somehow" reflects the fact that
Houser's attempt to summarize Peirce's cosmology effectively leaves this step
unexplained.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran
Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:29 PM, Clark Goble
<cl...@lextek.com> wrote:
On Nov 3, 2016, at 1:50 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
<jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
ET: Of course I didn't mean an individual [human or
god] force by the term of 'chance'!. I find that Jon jumps to disagree with me
as a matter of habit. Either that, or his tendency to read in a literal manner
leads him to such conclusions. I meant 'chance or Firstness or spontaneity as a
causal force - and there's plenty of comments in Peirce on just this state.
No, I understood exactly what you meant. My
disagreement is that I take "chance" (in Peirce's usage) to be freedom or
spontaneity, rather than randomness or inexplicability; and it is certainly not
something that could ever be "a causal force." I even quoted Peirce to support
this view, but you refer to my "tendency to read in a literal manner" as if it
were a bad thing!
Again I think we’re all talking past one an other by
equivocating over the term ‘cause.’ In a certain cause pure freedom or
spontaneity isn’t causal and in an other sense it must be. Effectively each
firstness is its own unmoved mover. The problem is that making sense of
causality at all when little is necessary and most things are underdetermined
is problematic.
I think causality is problematic for a variety of other
reasons too. For instance in terms of physics we could oppose the classic
Newtonian formulation of mechanics in terms of forces and masses to the
Hamiltonian or Lagrangian forms. They’re mathematically equivalent yet
metaphysically quite conceptually different. The Hamiltonian is the evolution
of the wave function (what in quantum mechanics becomes the Dirac or
Schrodinger equation) and it’s hard to make sense of causality in terms of it.
Likewise again turning to Duns Scotus we have classic
arguments against causality being continuous. (Basically part of the same
extended argument I linked to earlier for a first cause) For Peirce where any
sign can be divided it’s worth asking if we have causality at all.
Despite these problems of causality we all use the term
causality.
He referenced the same series of articles in what was
probably his very first draft of "A Neglected Argument" (1908), and made a few
other comments about it that are relevant to this discussion.
CSP: I there contended that the laws of nature, and,
indeed, all experiential laws, have been results of evolution, being (such was
my original hypothesis,) developments out of utterly causeless determinations
of single events, under a certain universal tendency toward habit-forming ...
But during the long years which have elapsed since the hypothesis first
suggested itself to me, it may naturally be supposed that faulty features of
the original hypothesis have been brought [to] my attention by others and have
struck me in my own meditations. Dr. Edward Montgomery remarked that my theory
was not so much evolutionary as it was emanational; and Professor Ogden Rood
pointed out that there must have been some original tendency to take habits
which did not arise according to my hypothesis; while I myself was most struck
by the difficulty of so explaining the law of sequence in time, if I proposed
to make all laws develope from single events; since an event already supposes
Time. (R 842, emphasis added)
I think this might be better read as there being no
cause for firstness not that firstness can’t be seen a not causal. Again I
suspect we’re talking past one an other again but the mere fact firstness can
be an element in a triadic sign more or less entails a certain sense of
causation. (Although I prefer Peirce’s term determination although that too has
the genealogy in problematic metaphysical understanding)
I should add that this problem of language for this
foundational event isn’t new. You see similar debates in late antiquity over
whether the platonic One is one or ought to be considered two emanation steps.
While I’ll confess to finding such matters idle talk there’s usually a logical
reason for the analaysis. (Much like the whole disparaged “how many angels
could dance on a pin” makes sense in the context of the debates over kinds in
medieval scholasticism)
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