Edwina, Helmut, Jon S, Jeff, John, Clark, List, In a passage preceding the one I recently quoted twice, Peirce writes:
[A]s a rule the continuum has been derived from a more general continuum, a continnum of higher generality. >From this point of view we must suppose that the existing universe with all its arbitrary secondness is an offshoot from, or an arbitrary determination, of a world of ideas, a Platonic world [. . .] [Note: *not* an existential world but "a world of ideas, a Platonic world."] If that is correct, we cannot suppose the process of derivation, a process which extends from before time and from before logic, we cannot suppose that it began elsewhere than in the utter vagueness of completely undetermined and dimensionless potentiality. [Note: "before time" in "utter vagueness" not of nothing but of "completely undetermined and dimensionsless potentiality."] The evolutionary process is, therefore, not a mere evolution of the *existing universe*, but rather a process by which the very Platonic forms themselves have become or are becoming developed. [Note: the topic here is of an evolutionary process *not *merely "of the *existing universe,*" emphasis in the original.] We shall naturally suppose, of course, that existence is a stage of evolution. *This existence* is presumably but a special *existence*. We need not suppose that every form needs for its evolution to emerge into this world, but only that it needs to enter into *some* theater of reactions of which it is one. [Note: *This existence* is presumably but a special *existence;"* further*, *consider the language he uses of the possibility of emerging *not* into this world--our Universe--but merely "*some* theater of reactions"--I have commented elsewhere that this suggests a possibly multi-universe theory. GR] The evolution of forms begins, or at any rate, has for an early stage of it, a vague potentiaility, and that either is or is followed by a continuum of forms having a multitude of dimensions too great for the individual dimensions to be distinct. It must be a contraction of the vagueness of that potentiality of *everything in general and of nothing in particular* that the world of forms comes forth. [emphasis added, RLT, 259] So, as I read this, it is not here a matter of 'nothing at all' as Edwina claims, but the "potentiality of everything in general and nothing in paritcular" that is still but merely the ground from which, *not* this *existential world*, but "the world of forms" can emerge. I'd call that *way *pre-Big Bang. One can, I suppose, try to position these comments within the procrustean bed of *our* special, existential, post-Big Bang world in which Edwina would try to fit it, but to me such a reading flies in the face of this passage, the one I was earlier quoting, the whole of this lecture, and much else that Peirce wrote (including, the N.A.) Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 7:26 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Gary R, Helmut: > > The question is: Are the Platonic worlds BEFORE or AFTER the so-called Big > Bang? I read them as AFTER while Gary R and Jon S read them as BEFORE. In > my reading, before the BigBang, there was Nothing, not even Platonic > worlds. But after, there were multiple 'chalk marks' - but only ONE set > began to take habits and became dominant, while the others dissipated. > > I don't think that this dispute can be 'settled' because we do read the > texts differently, but I do think that we on the list should be aware that > there are different views on this issue. > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Sent:* Friday, November 04, 2016 4:04 PM > *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's > Cosmology) > > Helmut, List, > > Whatever you or Edwina may think, whatever the 'truth' of the matter may > prove to be (if any such proof were possible, which I greatly doubt), > Peirce wrote *this* (embedded in an argument which makes his position-- > that there is a Platonic cosmos from which this, shall we say, Aristotelian > one issues--quite clear). > > Peirce: "[A]ll this, be it remembered, *is not of the order of the > existing universe,* but is merely a Platonic world of which we are, > therefore, to conceive that there are many, both coordinated and > subordinated to one another until *finally one of these Platonic worlds > is differentiated the particular actual universe of existence in which we > happen to be*." (RLT, 263, emphasis added). > > > The immediate question as I see it is: How did Peirce conceive of this > matter? I would highly recommend that anyone looking into that question > read carefully RLT, esp. 261-264. > > Best, > > Gary R > > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 3:52 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: > >> Edwina, list, >> I my humble (being a layman about all these things) opinion, I agree with >> Edwina, because the big bang is said to have been a singularity, and I >> guess, that "singularity" is not only a matter of physics, but of >> everything, such as philosophy, black boards, metaphysical meanings of >> metaphors, whatever. So there can not be a "pre" of it, the less as the big >> bang is said to be not only the origin of space, but of time too. Lest you >> suggest a meta-time, in a meta-universe, but then the problem of beginning >> is merely postponed to that: Did the meta-universe come from a >> meta-big-bang? I only have two possible explanations for this problem of >> origin/beginning: Either there was no beginning/creation, and no big bang >> (I had supposed a multi-bubble-universe some weeks ago) , or there is a >> circle of creation, like: A creates B, B creates C, C creates A. But this >> would mean, that creation is atemporal, otherwise it would not work. But I >> like it, and maybe it is good for some quite funny science-fiction story. >> But perhaps it is not far fetched: Creation is everywhere, is "God", and it >> forms circular attractors of recreation. Stop! This is getting weird, I >> have to think some more about it first. >> Best, >> Helmut >> >> 04. November 2016 um 19:44 Uhr >> "Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca> >> >> Gary R - again, it is my strong sense that I am accurately representing >> Peirce's views on this issue. I don't see that I disagree with him at all - >> but I do disagree with you and Jon on this issue [and, obviously, on >> theistic issues as well]. >> >> That is - I don't see a Nothing, which is to say, the *pre* BigBang >> world, as a set of Platonic worlds. If this were the case, then, it would >> not be nothing but would be sets of ideal potentialities. Instead, it is >> nothing, 'pure zero', pure freedom, no variety of Platonic worlds which >> after all, establish different perspectives, it is "absolutely undefined >> and unlimited possibility' ...not a SET of Platonic worlds. [1.412, 6.217]. >> >> Then, with the BigBang, this set up the Blackboard 'the original vague >> potentiality' and moved into that set of multiple possible Platonic worlds >> within the phase of Firstness and Secondness. At this time, these 'bits' >> were without habits [Thirdness] - that's what provides them with their >> potentiality; it is possible that many chalkmarks appeared..... "Many such >> reacting systems may spring up in the original continuum; and each of these >> may itself acts as a first line from which a larger system may be built, in >> which it in turn will merge its individuality" 6.207. *This is POST * >> BigBang. >> >> With these multiple sets - the universe could have gone anywhere; some of >> those 'bits' could have dissipated; others could have emerged; some could >> have stayed. But THEN - came the development of habits, Thirdness - and >> these habits established our particular world rather than one of the other >> 'Platonic worlds'. *By chance* [tychasm], habits developed within ONE >> TYPE of 'Platonic world'...and the others, I presume, dissolved, as our >> particular universe took over. >> >> The multiple Platonic worlds are not pre BigBang, in my reading, but >> post. And Thirdness quickly isolated and privileged one 'Set' - which then >> became our particular universe. >> >> Therefore, I equally don't read Peirce as having the three categories >> 'existential' in the pre BigBang phase; my reading is that these three >> categories, which are fundamental laws of matter/mind...emerged WITH the >> emergence of matter/mind...and are not separate from it. >> >> Therefore - you and Jon, and others, may certainly reject my reading of >> Peirce, just as I reject yours and Jon's - but, I don't think we are at the >> stage where we can definitely say that only ONE reading is The Accurate >> One. I offer my reading; some on the list may agree; some may not. That is >> as far as a scholarly list can go, I think. >> >> Edwina >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> >> *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >> *Sent:* Friday, November 04, 2016 1:55 PM >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's >> Cosmology) >> >> Edwina, Jon S, List, >> >> I certainly do not intend to get into a long (or even a short) discussion >> with you, Edwina, on this as both your position and Jon's (and mine) have >> been rather thoroughly and repeatedly articulated. I must say, however, >> that I do not see your "reading" of the blackboard passages as 'fair >> minded' at all, but rather it seems to me to impose your own conceptual >> framework on Peirce's very different one. >> >> For example, at RLT, 263, in the midst of the long and complex blackboard >> discussion, RLT, 261-4, which blackboard Peirce himself refers to as "a >> sort of Diagram of the original vague potentiality," RLT, 261), he comments >> (and I've pointed to this passage before): >> >> >> "[A]ll this, be it remembered, *is not of the order of the existing >> universe,* but is merely a Platonic world of which we are, therefore, >> to conceive that there are many, both coordinated and subordinated to one >> another until *finally one of these Platonic worlds is differentiated >> the particular actual universe of existence in which we happen to be*." >> (RLT, 263, emphasis added). >> >> >> Now you may disagree with Peirce in this matter, but this is what he >> wrote--the blackboard diagram would seem to represent what he no doubt >> believed to be the character of the cosmos *before* "one of these >> Platonic worlds is differentiated the particular actual universe of >> existence in which we happen to be," that is, before what corresponds to >> the Big Bang. >> >> It is my strong sense that Jon has consistently accurately presented >> Peirce's views as they appear in the 1898 lecture, and that your remarks >> *contra* his do not represent Peirce's clearly articulated views (as, >> for example, given in the quotation above), but rather your own. They seem >> to me less an interpretation than a misreading of Peirce, one which your >> conceptual framework apparently requires. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> >> [image: Gary Richmond] >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> *C 745* >> *718 482-5690* >> >> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 1:03 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> wrote: >>> >>> Gary R, list: >>> >>> Well, I consider myself a 'fair-minded reader of Peirce' and I certainly >>> don't agree with Jon S's view that the blackboard is pre-Big Bang and that >>> the three Categories are pre-Big Bang, with Thirdness primordial. >>> >>> Of course the blackboard is a metaphor - set out as a diagram...but that >>> diagram is a metaphor of what we assume is that 'original vague >>> potentiality or at any rate of some early stage of its determination'. >>> 6.203. As I said in my earlier post today, my reading is that this >>> blackboard is POST Big Bang, which is why it is a 'continuum of some >>> indefinite multitude of dimensions'. 6.203. This is NOT the same as the >>> pre Big Bang Zeroness - which is NOTHING. >>> >>> And by 'continuum', I certainly don't see this as Thirdness, for >>> Thirdness is a continuum of *some particular habits*, not just a >>> 'continuum and certainly not of 'indefinite multitude of dimensions. The >>> very nature of Thirdness is its function to constrain novelty and insert >>> morphological habits. >>> >>> As for quibbling about whether the chalk mark is a point or a line - >>> that's irrelevant. It is a unique 'bit' of matter/mind - that is >>> differentiated from what-it-is-not ["the limit between the black surface >>> and the white surface} 6.203]. It's the differentiation from >>> 'what-it-is-not' that is important, for this is obviously Secondness. >>> >>> The first chalkmark exhibits only Firstness [its novel appearance] and >>> Secondness [its differentiation from the blackness] but would only exhibit >>> Thirdness if it stayed 'as it is' and if other chalkmarks appear and they >>> develop common habits of formation. As Peirce notes 'However, the mark is a >>> mere accident, and as such may be erased. It will not interfere with >>> another mark drawn in quite another way. There need be no consistency >>> between the two. But no further progress beyond this can be made, until a >>> mark with *stay* for a little while; that is, until some beginning of a >>> *habit* has been established by virtue of which the accident acquires >>> some incipient staying quality, some tendency toward consistency. This >>> habit is a generalizing tendency" 6.204. >>> >>> The three categories are fundamental laws of nature; their origin is >>> with nature - which includes the physico-chemical as well as biological >>> realms. Therefore - I disagree that they are pre-BigBang. I read Peirce >>> that they originate, as natural laws, with the BigBang's potentiality. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> ----- Original Message ----- >>> *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> >>> *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >>> *Sent:* Friday, November 04, 2016 12:27 PM >>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's >>> Cosmology) >>> >>> Jon S, Edwina, List, >>> >>> Jon wrote: >>> >>> >>> - >>> - The Big Bang corresponds to our existing universe being >>> differentiated out of one of these "Platonic worlds" (CP 6.208) as "a >>> discontinuous mark" (NEM 4:345, RLT:162) on the whiteboard. >>> >>> Consequently, the blackboard--which precedes the whiteboard, and is the >>> source of its continuity--*cannot *be post-Big Bang; and the three >>> Categories *must *be pre-Big Bang, with Thirdness primordial among them. >>> >>> >>> Minus your addition of the notion of a whiteboard--which additon I think >>> is quite helpful in representing the "Aggregations of merged chalk marks >>> represent[ing] "reacting systems" that aggregate further into "Platonic >>> worlds" (CP 6.206-208"--this is certainly the way I have always seen >>> Peirce's blackboard discussion and, I believe, a fair minded reader must >>> see it (whether or not they agree with Peirce here). As I wrote just >>> yesterday, in the blackboard *diagram*--*not* a metaphor (I stand >>> corrected)--"Peirce seems not at all to be considering the semiosic >>> universe we inhabit, but *the conditions* *for any, perhaps many, >>> possible universe(s) to arise*." >>> >>> Thanks especially for succinctly putting the argumentation into bullet >>> points (including pointers to the exact passages in CP 6.203-208), this >>> constituting an excellent summary of Peirce's 1898 argument. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R >>> >>> >>> [image: Gary Richmond] >>> >>> *Gary Richmond* >>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>> *Communication Studies* >>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>> *C 745* >>> *718 482-5690* >>> >>> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 11:56 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> Edwina, List: >>>> >>>> I could post a lengthy rebuttal, but it would basically just repeat >>>> what I have already laid out in considerable detail in this thread and the >>>> others associated with Peirce's Cosmology, so I will spare everyone >>>> (including myself) the dissertation. I will simply reiterate a few quick >>>> points about the blackboard illustration. >>>> >>>> - The blackboard is "a sort of diagram" (CP 6.203), not a metaphor; >>>> this means that it *embodies *the significant *relations *among the >>>> parts of whatever it represents. >>>> - The blackboard "is a continuum of two dimensions" that represents >>>> "a continuum of some indefinite multitude of dimensions" (CP 6.203); >>>> and a >>>> continuum is a paradigmatic manifestation of Thirdness. >>>> - The chalk mark is not a point, or even a line; it is a *surface*, >>>> and its continuity is entirely derived from and dependent on that of the >>>> underlying blackboard (CP 6.203). >>>> - The chalk mark exhibits all three Categories (CP >>>> 6.203&205)--Firstness (whiteness), Secondness (boundary between black >>>> and >>>> white), and Thirdness (continuity). >>>> - Aggregations of merged chalk marks represent "reacting systems" >>>> that aggregate further into "Platonic worlds" (CP 6.206-208), each of >>>> which >>>> I call a "whiteboard." >>>> - The Big Bang corresponds to our existing universe being >>>> differentiated out of one of these "Platonic worlds" (CP 6.208) as "a >>>> discontinuous mark" (NEM 4:345, RLT:162) on the whiteboard. >>>> >>>> Consequently, the blackboard--which precedes the whiteboard, and is the >>>> source of its continuity--*cannot *be post-Big Bang; and the three >>>> Categories *must *be pre-Big Bang, with Thirdness primordial among >>>> them. >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon >>>> >>>> >>>> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 7:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Gary, list - yes, I think that both tone and repetition are getting >>>>> tiresome, to say the least. >>>>> >>>>> I'm not sure what you mean by your suggestion of differentiating the >>>>> 'early cosmos' from 'this our existential one' *contra* an >>>>> Aristotelian one 'once there exists a particular three category semiosic >>>>> universe'. >>>>> >>>>> 1) My confusion comes from my own view that our 'existential cosmos' >>>>> IS a three category semiosic universe. That is, my view is that the three >>>>> categories only emerge within the existentiality of the matter/mind >>>>> universe. There are no categories before this 'Big Bang' or whatever began >>>>> our universe. >>>>> >>>>> That is, in the pre-universe, "We start, then, with nothing, pure >>>>> zero'....This pure zero is the nothing of not having been >>>>> born......boundless freedom". 6.217. My reading of this is that this >>>>> pure >>>>> zero is NOT the same as Firstness, because, my reading of Firstness is >>>>> that >>>>> it is an embedded state of feeling, which means, that its nature is to >>>>> express a quality of some form of matter/mind. Redness; heat; >>>>> coldness.... >>>>> Therefore, my reading of this pre-universe state is that it was, as Peirce >>>>> notes "unbounded potentiality'. This "Nothingness of boundless freedom >>>>> 6.219..."is not, in my view, the same as the logic of freedom or >>>>> possibility [which is Firstness]. >>>>> >>>>> "What immediately resulted was that unbounded potentiality became >>>>> potentiality of this or that sort - that is ,of some *quality*' >>>>> 6.220. Now - my reading is that the unbounded Nothing [which again, is >>>>> NOT Firstness or Thirdness]...suddenly moved into Firstness. >>>>> >>>>> Again, 'the zero of bare possibility, by evolutionary logic, leapt >>>>> into the *unit* of some quality" 6.220. So again, the zero of >>>>> nothing moved into Firstness, where 'something is possible/Red is >>>>> something; therefore Red is possible'. 6.220. Again - the zero of bare >>>>> possibility is NOT Firstness or Thirdness. It is Nothing. Then..it moved >>>>> into being 'embedded' within matter - as Firstness....where >>>>> *something* is possible. Not unbounded possibility but *something* is >>>>> possible. This is already constrained possibility, very different from the >>>>> 'zero of boundless possibility'. >>>>> >>>>> 2) His next phase seems to be, following the basic 'vague to the >>>>> definite' 6.191, from a 'vague potentiality; and that either is or is >>>>> followed by a continuum of forms having a multitude of dimensions too >>>>> great >>>>> for the individuals dimensions to be distinct" 6.196. These would be >>>>> differentiated units in Secondness [and Firstness]. Then, habits of >>>>> relations or Thirdness begin...and this vast multitude is 'contracted'. >>>>> "The general indefinite potentiality became limited and heterogeneous" >>>>> 6.199. >>>>> >>>>> 3) With regard to the blackboard metaphor, my reading of it is that >>>>> the blackboard refers to 'the original vague potentiality, or at any rate >>>>> of some stage of its determination' 6.203. My reading is that this >>>>> blackboard is POST Big Bang. The blackboard is NOT the 'zero of bare >>>>> possibility'. Instead, it is POST Big Bang - and suddenly, a singular >>>>> point >>>>> appears - that chalk line. [I'll leave out Peirce-as-God having drawn it]. >>>>> As a point, it has *identity*, that continuity-of-being that Peirce >>>>> refers to ['There is a certain element of continuity in this line" >>>>> 6.203]..This is a unit in Secondness. >>>>> >>>>> The white chalk line appears within the act of Firstness, but is, in >>>>> itself, operating ALSO within the mode of Secondness - because it is >>>>> discrete and distinct. >>>>> >>>>> And then, habits or Thirdness, that generalizing tendency, develops. >>>>> NOTE - Thirdness did not pre-exist on its own; it develops as the discrete >>>>> units appear within Firstness and Secondness. That is, Thirdness is >>>>> embedded within the existentialities of matter operating within Firstness >>>>> and Secondness. It 'feeds and works' within these individual 'bits'...and >>>>> develops generalizing laws. >>>>> >>>>> That's how I see this metaphor. >>>>> >>>>> Edwina >>>>> >>>>> ----- Original Message ----- >>>>> *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> >>>>> *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >>>>> *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 11:46 PM >>>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's >>>>> Cosmology) >>>>> >>>>> Jon, Edwina, Clark, List, >>>>> >>>>> Perhaps this back and forth--especially the tone and tendency towards >>>>> repetition--has gotten "tiresome" for some readers as well as the most >>>>> active participants. >>>>> >>>>> I had hoped my suggestion a while back of a Platonic cosmos *pre*-the >>>>> Big Bang (note: of course I completely agree with Clark that one shouldn't >>>>> really bring such very much later notions into the picture, which is why I >>>>> used the modifier "loosely" when I last referred to it--but what language >>>>> *do* we have to distinguish the early cosmos Peirce describes in the >>>>> last lecture of the 1898 *Reasoning and the Logic of Things* from *this, >>>>> our,* existential one?) *contra* a more Aristotelian cosmos once >>>>> there *exists* a, shall we say, *particular* three category semiosic >>>>> universe might be helpful in moving this discussion forward. So, my >>>>> question: Are these two different? If so, how so? If not, why not? >>>>> >>>>> One thing I would be very interested in is what Edwina, Clark, and >>>>> others make of the final 1898 lecture, esp. the blackboard metaphor. Here, >>>>> as I interpret it, Peirce seems not at all to be considering the semiosic >>>>> universe we inhabit, but *the conditions* *for any, perhaps many, >>>>> possible universe(s) to arise*. Unlike the Neglected Argument essay, >>>>> there is no explicit mention of God here, and Peirce seems to be making a >>>>> purely scientific hypothesis. So, perhaps, dropping the God-talk for a >>>>> moment, what is Peirce attempting in RLT? >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> >>>>> Gary R >>>>> >>>>> [image: Gary Richmond] >>>>> >>>>> *Gary Richmond* >>>>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>>>> *Communication Studies* >>>>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>>>> *C 745* >>>>> *718 482-5690* >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 8:06 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >>>>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Edwina, List: >>>>>> >>>>>> Lest we get bogged down any further in yet another tiresome >>>>>> exegetical battle, I will simply say that I find almost nothing in your >>>>>> last post to be consistent with my understanding of Peirce's own thought. >>>>>> I once again leave it to the List community to decide which of us--if >>>>>> either of us--has demonstrated the more accurate interpretation. >>>>>> >>>>>> Regards, >>>>>> >>>>>> Jon >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 6:50 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Jon - as Clark has been trying to point out, you and I are locked in >>>>>>> terminological difficulties. Your insistence that YOUR use is identical >>>>>>> with that of Peirce's use - is simply your own opinion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> My reading of Peirce is that all three categorical modes only >>>>>>> function within Relations. Firstness is NOT 'real' in the sense of it >>>>>>> being a generality [ie., the reality of the laws of Thirdness] and it >>>>>>> does >>>>>>> *exist* as a *state* of 'existentiality; i.e., as a quality, a >>>>>>> feeling, an openness, BUT, this state *is itself an experience, >>>>>>> entire in itself*, and as such, it *exists* within that experience >>>>>>> of its fullness. There is no such thing as an unembodied Firstness! >>>>>>> Since >>>>>>> it is a *state of experience*, then, it must be embodied. It is >>>>>>> simply 'complete', so to speak and not open to the Otherness of >>>>>>> analysis or >>>>>>> reaction. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> You confine 'existence' to Secondness - which is, I feel, too narrow >>>>>>> an understanding of the three categories and of the term 'existence'. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I disagree that 'pure nothing' is Firstness and Secondness in the >>>>>>> absence of Thirdness. I agree that without Thirdness - it would be >>>>>>> chaos, >>>>>>> but i don't see this as PURE nothing. After all, 'the original chaos, >>>>>>> therefore, where there was no regularity, was in effect a state of mere >>>>>>> indeterminacy, in which nothing existed or really happened". 1. 411. My >>>>>>> reading of that, is that there was no matter in a mode of Firstness or >>>>>>> Secondness in this 'original chaos' - no 'existences' and no 'feelings'. >>>>>>> Nothing. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Now - of course, and as usual, you can disagree with me. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Edwina >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ----- Original Message ----- >>>>>>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >>>>>>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>>>>>> *Cc:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> >>>>>>> *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 7:25 PM >>>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's >>>>>>> Cosmology) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Edwina, List: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Once again, I find your use of terminology inconsistent with >>>>>>> Peirce's. Firstness is real, but does not exist. It has no Relations, >>>>>>> because any Relation requires Secondness. "Pure nothing" is the chaos >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> Firstness and Secondness in the absence of Thirdness. Accepting any >>>>>>> matter >>>>>>> of fact--such as the origin of our existing universe--as inexplicable is >>>>>>> unacceptable, because it blocks the way of inquiry. Nothing new here, >>>>>>> so I >>>>>>> will leave it at that. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Regards, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Jon >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 5:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think that 'actualization' and 'cause' are two entirely different >>>>>>>> actions. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> With regard to Firstness, I see it, as a spontaneous *state* *of >>>>>>>> existence* which *might* then act upon/be reacted to.., in the >>>>>>>> 'fullness of this state'. The point of all the categories is that they >>>>>>>> operate within Relations; they are not isolate in themselves. >>>>>>>> Firstness, as >>>>>>>> that *spontaneous state of existence* [which might dissipate in a >>>>>>>> nanosecond if it doesn't *bond/relate* to another entity]...can >>>>>>>> provide a novel form of existence. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> For example, a spontaneous mutation of a cell *might* be accepted >>>>>>>> by other cells and might become part of the organism's nature. Or, >>>>>>>> *might >>>>>>>> not* be accepted and its energy-content would dissipate. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Or, a novel mode of transportation [*Uber*] might suddenly develop >>>>>>>> and might spread to other domains. Or, like many a new invention - it >>>>>>>> might >>>>>>>> disappear in a month. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The causality of Firstness is the Relations that the novelty ir >>>>>>>> provides has on other organisms/entities. It can actually cause/effect >>>>>>>> changes in the larger system. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Yes, I see the universe as self-emergent and self-organizing - and >>>>>>>> refer to 1.412 for the Peircean outline of these actions. But I don't >>>>>>>> see >>>>>>>> this as a transition from Firstness to Secondness, for I don't consider >>>>>>>> that the pre-universe was in any categorical mode [ie, not in a mode of >>>>>>>> Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness. It was simply nothing]. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Certainly, the 'somehow', i.e., the bridge between 'nothing' and >>>>>>>> 'something' is not explained beyond a 'chance flash'. But because >>>>>>>> there is >>>>>>>> no explanation, does not mean that I can or even should come up with >>>>>>>> one - >>>>>>>> certainly, science hasn't been able to do so, and since I'm an atheist, >>>>>>>> then, I'm not going to offer a self-organized belief in god as having >>>>>>>> been >>>>>>>> First Cause. I simply don't know. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Edwina >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ----- Original Message ----- >>>>>>>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >>>>>>>> *To:* Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> >>>>>>>> *Cc:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> >>>>>>>> *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 5:59 PM >>>>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's >>>>>>>> Cosmology) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Clark, List: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Your points, as usual, are well-taken. Is it helpful at all to >>>>>>>> refer to "actualization," rather than "cause"? Edwina's position, as I >>>>>>>> understand it, is that our existing universe is not only >>>>>>>> self-*organizing >>>>>>>> *but also self-*generating *or self-*originating*; as Houser put >>>>>>>> it in his introduction to EP 1, "Somehow, the possibility or >>>>>>>> potentiality >>>>>>>> of the chaos is self-actualizing." This is the crucial transition from >>>>>>>> Firstness (possibility) to Secondness (actuality), and the word >>>>>>>> "somehow" >>>>>>>> reflects the fact that Houser's attempt to summarize Peirce's cosmology >>>>>>>> effectively leaves this step unexplained. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Regards, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>>>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>>>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:29 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Nov 3, 2016, at 1:50 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >>>>>>>>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ET: Of course I didn't mean an individual [human or god] force by >>>>>>>>> the term of 'chance'!. I find that Jon jumps to disagree with me as a >>>>>>>>> matter of habit. Either that, or his tendency to read in a literal >>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>> leads him to such conclusions. I meant 'chance or Firstness or >>>>>>>>> spontaneity >>>>>>>>> as a causal force - and there's plenty of comments in Peirce on just >>>>>>>>> this >>>>>>>>> state. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> No, I understood exactly what you meant. My disagreement is that >>>>>>>>> I take "chance" (in Peirce's usage) to be freedom or spontaneity, >>>>>>>>> rather >>>>>>>>> than randomness or inexplicability; and it is certainly not something >>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> could ever be "a causal force." I even quoted Peirce to support this >>>>>>>>> view, >>>>>>>>> but you refer to my "tendency to read in a literal manner" as if it >>>>>>>>> were a >>>>>>>>> bad thing! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Again I think we’re all talking past one an other by equivocating >>>>>>>>> over the term ‘cause.’ In a certain cause pure freedom or spontaneity >>>>>>>>> isn’t causal and in an other sense it must be. Effectively each >>>>>>>>> firstness >>>>>>>>> is its own unmoved mover. The problem is that making sense of >>>>>>>>> causality at >>>>>>>>> all when little is necessary and most things are underdetermined is >>>>>>>>> problematic. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I think causality is problematic for a variety of other reasons >>>>>>>>> too. For instance in terms of physics we could oppose the classic >>>>>>>>> Newtonian >>>>>>>>> formulation of mechanics in terms of forces and masses to the >>>>>>>>> Hamiltonian >>>>>>>>> or Lagrangian forms. They’re mathematically equivalent yet >>>>>>>>> metaphysically >>>>>>>>> quite conceptually different. The Hamiltonian is the evolution of the >>>>>>>>> wave >>>>>>>>> function (what in quantum mechanics becomes the Dirac or Schrodinger >>>>>>>>> equation) and it’s hard to make sense of causality in terms of it. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Likewise again turning to Duns Scotus we have classic arguments >>>>>>>>> against causality being continuous. (Basically part of the same >>>>>>>>> extended >>>>>>>>> argument I linked to earlier for a first cause) For Peirce where any >>>>>>>>> sign >>>>>>>>> can be divided it’s worth asking if we have causality at all. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Despite these problems of causality we all use the term causality. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> He referenced the same series of articles in what was probably his >>>>>>>>> very first draft of "A Neglected Argument" (1908), and made a few >>>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>>> comments about it that are relevant to this discussion. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> CSP: I there contended that the laws of nature, and, indeed, all >>>>>>>>> experiential laws, have been results of evolution, being (such was my >>>>>>>>> original hypothesis,) developments out of utterly causeless >>>>>>>>> determinations >>>>>>>>> of single events, under a certain universal tendency toward >>>>>>>>> habit-forming >>>>>>>>> ... But during the long years which have elapsed since the hypothesis >>>>>>>>> first >>>>>>>>> suggested itself to me, it may naturally be supposed that faulty >>>>>>>>> features >>>>>>>>> of the original hypothesis have been brought [to] my attention by >>>>>>>>> others >>>>>>>>> and have struck me in my own meditations. Dr. Edward Montgomery >>>>>>>>> remarked >>>>>>>>> that my theory was not so much evolutionary as it was emanational; and >>>>>>>>> Professor Ogden Rood pointed out that there must have been some >>>>>>>>> original >>>>>>>>> tendency to take habits which did not arise according to my >>>>>>>>> hypothesis; >>>>>>>>> while I myself was most struck by the difficulty of so explaining the >>>>>>>>> law >>>>>>>>> of sequence in time, if I proposed to make all laws develope from >>>>>>>>> single >>>>>>>>> events; since an event already supposes Time. (R 842, emphasis added) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I think this might be better read as there being no cause *for* >>>>>>>>> firstness >>>>>>>>> not that firstness can’t be seen a not causal. Again I suspect we’re >>>>>>>>> talking past one an other again but the mere fact firstness can be an >>>>>>>>> element in a triadic sign more or less entails a certain sense of >>>>>>>>> causation. (Although I prefer Peirce’s term determination although >>>>>>>>> that too >>>>>>>>> has the genealogy in problematic metaphysical understanding) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I should add that this problem of language for this foundational >>>>>>>>> event isn’t new. You see similar debates in late antiquity over >>>>>>>>> whether the >>>>>>>>> platonic One is one or ought to be considered two emanation steps. >>>>>>>>> While >>>>>>>>> I’ll confess to finding such matters idle talk there’s usually a >>>>>>>>> logical >>>>>>>>> reason for the analaysis. (Much like the whole disparaged “how many >>>>>>>>> angels >>>>>>>>> could dance on a pin” makes sense in the context of the debates over >>>>>>>>> kinds >>>>>>>>> in medieval scholasticism) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>> >>>> ----------------------------- >>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------ >>> >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> ------------------------------ >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce >> -l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" >> or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should >> go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 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