Helmut, List, Whatever you or Edwina may think, whatever the 'truth' of the matter may prove to be (if any such proof were possible, which I greatly doubt), Peirce wrote *this* (embedded in an argument which makes his position-- that there is a Platonic cosmos from which this, shall we say, Aristotelian one issues--quite clear).
Peirce: "[A]ll this, be it remembered, *is not of the order of the existing universe,* but is merely a Platonic world of which we are, therefore, to conceive that there are many, both coordinated and subordinated to one another until *finally one of these Platonic worlds is differentiated the particular actual universe of existence in which we happen to be*." (RLT, 263, emphasis added). The immediate question as I see it is: How did Peirce conceive of this matter? I would highly recommend that anyone looking into that question read carefully RLT, esp. 261-264. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 3:52 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: > Edwina, list, > I my humble (being a layman about all these things) opinion, I agree with > Edwina, because the big bang is said to have been a singularity, and I > guess, that "singularity" is not only a matter of physics, but of > everything, such as philosophy, black boards, metaphysical meanings of > metaphors, whatever. So there can not be a "pre" of it, the less as the big > bang is said to be not only the origin of space, but of time too. Lest you > suggest a meta-time, in a meta-universe, but then the problem of beginning > is merely postponed to that: Did the meta-universe come from a > meta-big-bang? I only have two possible explanations for this problem of > origin/beginning: Either there was no beginning/creation, and no big bang > (I had supposed a multi-bubble-universe some weeks ago) , or there is a > circle of creation, like: A creates B, B creates C, C creates A. But this > would mean, that creation is atemporal, otherwise it would not work. But I > like it, and maybe it is good for some quite funny science-fiction story. > But perhaps it is not far fetched: Creation is everywhere, is "God", and it > forms circular attractors of recreation. Stop! This is getting weird, I > have to think some more about it first. > Best, > Helmut > > 04. November 2016 um 19:44 Uhr > "Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca> > > Gary R - again, it is my strong sense that I am accurately representing > Peirce's views on this issue. I don't see that I disagree with him at all - > but I do disagree with you and Jon on this issue [and, obviously, on > theistic issues as well]. > > That is - I don't see a Nothing, which is to say, the *pre* BigBang > world, as a set of Platonic worlds. If this were the case, then, it would > not be nothing but would be sets of ideal potentialities. Instead, it is > nothing, 'pure zero', pure freedom, no variety of Platonic worlds which > after all, establish different perspectives, it is "absolutely undefined > and unlimited possibility' ...not a SET of Platonic worlds. [1.412, 6.217]. > > Then, with the BigBang, this set up the Blackboard 'the original vague > potentiality' and moved into that set of multiple possible Platonic worlds > within the phase of Firstness and Secondness. At this time, these 'bits' > were without habits [Thirdness] - that's what provides them with their > potentiality; it is possible that many chalkmarks appeared..... "Many such > reacting systems may spring up in the original continuum; and each of these > may itself acts as a first line from which a larger system may be built, in > which it in turn will merge its individuality" 6.207. *This is POST * > BigBang. > > With these multiple sets - the universe could have gone anywhere; some of > those 'bits' could have dissipated; others could have emerged; some could > have stayed. But THEN - came the development of habits, Thirdness - and > these habits established our particular world rather than one of the other > 'Platonic worlds'. *By chance* [tychasm], habits developed within ONE > TYPE of 'Platonic world'...and the others, I presume, dissolved, as our > particular universe took over. > > The multiple Platonic worlds are not pre BigBang, in my reading, but post. > And Thirdness quickly isolated and privileged one 'Set' - which then became > our particular universe. > > Therefore, I equally don't read Peirce as having the three categories > 'existential' in the pre BigBang phase; my reading is that these three > categories, which are fundamental laws of matter/mind...emerged WITH the > emergence of matter/mind...and are not separate from it. > > Therefore - you and Jon, and others, may certainly reject my reading of > Peirce, just as I reject yours and Jon's - but, I don't think we are at the > stage where we can definitely say that only ONE reading is The Accurate > One. I offer my reading; some on the list may agree; some may not. That is > as far as a scholarly list can go, I think. > > Edwina > > > > > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Sent:* Friday, November 04, 2016 1:55 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology) > > Edwina, Jon S, List, > > I certainly do not intend to get into a long (or even a short) discussion > with you, Edwina, on this as both your position and Jon's (and mine) have > been rather thoroughly and repeatedly articulated. I must say, however, > that I do not see your "reading" of the blackboard passages as 'fair > minded' at all, but rather it seems to me to impose your own conceptual > framework on Peirce's very different one. > > For example, at RLT, 263, in the midst of the long and complex blackboard > discussion, RLT, 261-4, which blackboard Peirce himself refers to as "a > sort of Diagram of the original vague potentiality," RLT, 261), he comments > (and I've pointed to this passage before): > > > "[A]ll this, be it remembered, *is not of the order of the existing > universe,* but is merely a Platonic world of which we are, therefore, to > conceive that there are many, both coordinated and subordinated to one > another until *finally one of these Platonic worlds is differentiated the > particular actual universe of existence in which we happen to be*." (RLT, > 263, emphasis added). > > > Now you may disagree with Peirce in this matter, but this is what he > wrote--the blackboard diagram would seem to represent what he no doubt > believed to be the character of the cosmos *before* "one of these > Platonic worlds is differentiated the particular actual universe of > existence in which we happen to be," that is, before what corresponds to > the Big Bang. > > It is my strong sense that Jon has consistently accurately presented > Peirce's views as they appear in the 1898 lecture, and that your remarks > *contra* his do not represent Peirce's clearly articulated views (as, for > example, given in the quotation above), but rather your own. They seem to > me less an interpretation than a misreading of Peirce, one which your > conceptual framework apparently requires. > > Best, > > Gary R > > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690* > > On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 1:03 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: >> >> Gary R, list: >> >> Well, I consider myself a 'fair-minded reader of Peirce' and I certainly >> don't agree with Jon S's view that the blackboard is pre-Big Bang and that >> the three Categories are pre-Big Bang, with Thirdness primordial. >> >> Of course the blackboard is a metaphor - set out as a diagram...but that >> diagram is a metaphor of what we assume is that 'original vague >> potentiality or at any rate of some early stage of its determination'. >> 6.203. As I said in my earlier post today, my reading is that this >> blackboard is POST Big Bang, which is why it is a 'continuum of some >> indefinite multitude of dimensions'. 6.203. This is NOT the same as the >> pre Big Bang Zeroness - which is NOTHING. >> >> And by 'continuum', I certainly don't see this as Thirdness, for >> Thirdness is a continuum of *some particular habits*, not just a >> 'continuum and certainly not of 'indefinite multitude of dimensions. The >> very nature of Thirdness is its function to constrain novelty and insert >> morphological habits. >> >> As for quibbling about whether the chalk mark is a point or a line - >> that's irrelevant. It is a unique 'bit' of matter/mind - that is >> differentiated from what-it-is-not ["the limit between the black surface >> and the white surface} 6.203]. It's the differentiation from >> 'what-it-is-not' that is important, for this is obviously Secondness. >> >> The first chalkmark exhibits only Firstness [its novel appearance] and >> Secondness [its differentiation from the blackness] but would only exhibit >> Thirdness if it stayed 'as it is' and if other chalkmarks appear and they >> develop common habits of formation. As Peirce notes 'However, the mark is a >> mere accident, and as such may be erased. It will not interfere with >> another mark drawn in quite another way. There need be no consistency >> between the two. But no further progress beyond this can be made, until a >> mark with *stay* for a little while; that is, until some beginning of a >> *habit* has been established by virtue of which the accident acquires >> some incipient staying quality, some tendency toward consistency. This >> habit is a generalizing tendency" 6.204. >> >> The three categories are fundamental laws of nature; their origin is with >> nature - which includes the physico-chemical as well as biological realms. >> Therefore - I disagree that they are pre-BigBang. I read Peirce that they >> originate, as natural laws, with the BigBang's potentiality. >> >> Edwina >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> >> *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >> *Sent:* Friday, November 04, 2016 12:27 PM >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's >> Cosmology) >> >> Jon S, Edwina, List, >> >> Jon wrote: >> >> >> - >> - The Big Bang corresponds to our existing universe being >> differentiated out of one of these "Platonic worlds" (CP 6.208) as "a >> discontinuous mark" (NEM 4:345, RLT:162) on the whiteboard. >> >> Consequently, the blackboard--which precedes the whiteboard, and is the >> source of its continuity--*cannot *be post-Big Bang; and the three >> Categories *must *be pre-Big Bang, with Thirdness primordial among them. >> >> >> Minus your addition of the notion of a whiteboard--which additon I think >> is quite helpful in representing the "Aggregations of merged chalk marks >> represent[ing] "reacting systems" that aggregate further into "Platonic >> worlds" (CP 6.206-208"--this is certainly the way I have always seen >> Peirce's blackboard discussion and, I believe, a fair minded reader must >> see it (whether or not they agree with Peirce here). As I wrote just >> yesterday, in the blackboard *diagram*--*not* a metaphor (I stand >> corrected)--"Peirce seems not at all to be considering the semiosic >> universe we inhabit, but *the conditions* *for any, perhaps many, >> possible universe(s) to arise*." >> >> Thanks especially for succinctly putting the argumentation into bullet >> points (including pointers to the exact passages in CP 6.203-208), this >> constituting an excellent summary of Peirce's 1898 argument. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> >> [image: Gary Richmond] >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> *C 745* >> *718 482-5690* >> >> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 11:56 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> Edwina, List: >>> >>> I could post a lengthy rebuttal, but it would basically just repeat what >>> I have already laid out in considerable detail in this thread and the >>> others associated with Peirce's Cosmology, so I will spare everyone >>> (including myself) the dissertation. I will simply reiterate a few quick >>> points about the blackboard illustration. >>> >>> - The blackboard is "a sort of diagram" (CP 6.203), not a metaphor; >>> this means that it *embodies *the significant *relations *among the >>> parts of whatever it represents. >>> - The blackboard "is a continuum of two dimensions" that represents >>> "a continuum of some indefinite multitude of dimensions" (CP 6.203); and >>> a >>> continuum is a paradigmatic manifestation of Thirdness. >>> - The chalk mark is not a point, or even a line; it is a *surface*, >>> and its continuity is entirely derived from and dependent on that of the >>> underlying blackboard (CP 6.203). >>> - The chalk mark exhibits all three Categories (CP >>> 6.203&205)--Firstness (whiteness), Secondness (boundary between black and >>> white), and Thirdness (continuity). >>> - Aggregations of merged chalk marks represent "reacting systems" >>> that aggregate further into "Platonic worlds" (CP 6.206-208), each of >>> which >>> I call a "whiteboard." >>> - The Big Bang corresponds to our existing universe being >>> differentiated out of one of these "Platonic worlds" (CP 6.208) as "a >>> discontinuous mark" (NEM 4:345, RLT:162) on the whiteboard. >>> >>> Consequently, the blackboard--which precedes the whiteboard, and is the >>> source of its continuity--*cannot *be post-Big Bang; and the three >>> Categories *must *be pre-Big Bang, with Thirdness primordial among them. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 7:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Gary, list - yes, I think that both tone and repetition are getting >>>> tiresome, to say the least. >>>> >>>> I'm not sure what you mean by your suggestion of differentiating the >>>> 'early cosmos' from 'this our existential one' *contra* an >>>> Aristotelian one 'once there exists a particular three category semiosic >>>> universe'. >>>> >>>> 1) My confusion comes from my own view that our 'existential cosmos' IS >>>> a three category semiosic universe. That is, my view is that the three >>>> categories only emerge within the existentiality of the matter/mind >>>> universe. There are no categories before this 'Big Bang' or whatever began >>>> our universe. >>>> >>>> That is, in the pre-universe, "We start, then, with nothing, pure >>>> zero'....This pure zero is the nothing of not having been >>>> born......boundless freedom". 6.217. My reading of this is that this pure >>>> zero is NOT the same as Firstness, because, my reading of Firstness is that >>>> it is an embedded state of feeling, which means, that its nature is to >>>> express a quality of some form of matter/mind. Redness; heat; coldness.... >>>> Therefore, my reading of this pre-universe state is that it was, as Peirce >>>> notes "unbounded potentiality'. This "Nothingness of boundless freedom >>>> 6.219..."is not, in my view, the same as the logic of freedom or >>>> possibility [which is Firstness]. >>>> >>>> "What immediately resulted was that unbounded potentiality became >>>> potentiality of this or that sort - that is ,of some *quality*' >>>> 6.220. Now - my reading is that the unbounded Nothing [which again, is >>>> NOT Firstness or Thirdness]...suddenly moved into Firstness. >>>> >>>> Again, 'the zero of bare possibility, by evolutionary logic, leapt into >>>> the *unit* of some quality" 6.220. So again, the zero of nothing >>>> moved into Firstness, where 'something is possible/Red is something; >>>> therefore Red is possible'. 6.220. Again - the zero of bare possibility is >>>> NOT Firstness or Thirdness. It is Nothing. Then..it moved into being >>>> 'embedded' within matter - as Firstness....where *something* is >>>> possible. Not unbounded possibility but *something* is possible. This >>>> is already constrained possibility, very different from the 'zero of >>>> boundless possibility'. >>>> >>>> 2) His next phase seems to be, following the basic 'vague to the >>>> definite' 6.191, from a 'vague potentiality; and that either is or is >>>> followed by a continuum of forms having a multitude of dimensions too great >>>> for the individuals dimensions to be distinct" 6.196. These would be >>>> differentiated units in Secondness [and Firstness]. Then, habits of >>>> relations or Thirdness begin...and this vast multitude is 'contracted'. >>>> "The general indefinite potentiality became limited and heterogeneous" >>>> 6.199. >>>> >>>> 3) With regard to the blackboard metaphor, my reading of it is that the >>>> blackboard refers to 'the original vague potentiality, or at any rate of >>>> some stage of its determination' 6.203. My reading is that this >>>> blackboard is POST Big Bang. The blackboard is NOT the 'zero of bare >>>> possibility'. Instead, it is POST Big Bang - and suddenly, a singular point >>>> appears - that chalk line. [I'll leave out Peirce-as-God having drawn it]. >>>> As a point, it has *identity*, that continuity-of-being that Peirce >>>> refers to ['There is a certain element of continuity in this line" >>>> 6.203]..This is a unit in Secondness. >>>> >>>> The white chalk line appears within the act of Firstness, but is, in >>>> itself, operating ALSO within the mode of Secondness - because it is >>>> discrete and distinct. >>>> >>>> And then, habits or Thirdness, that generalizing tendency, develops. >>>> NOTE - Thirdness did not pre-exist on its own; it develops as the discrete >>>> units appear within Firstness and Secondness. That is, Thirdness is >>>> embedded within the existentialities of matter operating within Firstness >>>> and Secondness. It 'feeds and works' within these individual 'bits'...and >>>> develops generalizing laws. >>>> >>>> That's how I see this metaphor. >>>> >>>> Edwina >>>> >>>> ----- Original Message ----- >>>> *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> >>>> *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >>>> *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 11:46 PM >>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's >>>> Cosmology) >>>> >>>> Jon, Edwina, Clark, List, >>>> >>>> Perhaps this back and forth--especially the tone and tendency towards >>>> repetition--has gotten "tiresome" for some readers as well as the most >>>> active participants. >>>> >>>> I had hoped my suggestion a while back of a Platonic cosmos *pre*-the >>>> Big Bang (note: of course I completely agree with Clark that one shouldn't >>>> really bring such very much later notions into the picture, which is why I >>>> used the modifier "loosely" when I last referred to it--but what language >>>> *do* we have to distinguish the early cosmos Peirce describes in the >>>> last lecture of the 1898 *Reasoning and the Logic of Things* from *this, >>>> our,* existential one?) *contra* a more Aristotelian cosmos once there >>>> *exists* a, shall we say, *particular* three category semiosic >>>> universe might be helpful in moving this discussion forward. So, my >>>> question: Are these two different? If so, how so? If not, why not? >>>> >>>> One thing I would be very interested in is what Edwina, Clark, and >>>> others make of the final 1898 lecture, esp. the blackboard metaphor. Here, >>>> as I interpret it, Peirce seems not at all to be considering the semiosic >>>> universe we inhabit, but *the conditions* *for any, perhaps many, >>>> possible universe(s) to arise*. Unlike the Neglected Argument essay, >>>> there is no explicit mention of God here, and Peirce seems to be making a >>>> purely scientific hypothesis. So, perhaps, dropping the God-talk for a >>>> moment, what is Peirce attempting in RLT? >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> >>>> Gary R >>>> >>>> [image: Gary Richmond] >>>> >>>> *Gary Richmond* >>>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>>> *Communication Studies* >>>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>>> *C 745* >>>> *718 482-5690* >>>> >>>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 8:06 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >>>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Edwina, List: >>>>> >>>>> Lest we get bogged down any further in yet another tiresome exegetical >>>>> battle, I will simply say that I find almost nothing in your last post to >>>>> be consistent with my understanding of Peirce's own thought. I once again >>>>> leave it to the List community to decide which of us--if either of us--has >>>>> demonstrated the more accurate interpretation. >>>>> >>>>> Regards, >>>>> >>>>> Jon >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 6:50 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Jon - as Clark has been trying to point out, you and I are locked in >>>>>> terminological difficulties. Your insistence that YOUR use is identical >>>>>> with that of Peirce's use - is simply your own opinion. >>>>>> >>>>>> My reading of Peirce is that all three categorical modes only >>>>>> function within Relations. Firstness is NOT 'real' in the sense of it >>>>>> being a generality [ie., the reality of the laws of Thirdness] and it >>>>>> does >>>>>> *exist* as a *state* of 'existentiality; i.e., as a quality, a >>>>>> feeling, an openness, BUT, this state *is itself an experience, >>>>>> entire in itself*, and as such, it *exists* within that experience >>>>>> of its fullness. There is no such thing as an unembodied Firstness! Since >>>>>> it is a *state of experience*, then, it must be embodied. It is >>>>>> simply 'complete', so to speak and not open to the Otherness of analysis >>>>>> or >>>>>> reaction. >>>>>> >>>>>> You confine 'existence' to Secondness - which is, I feel, too narrow >>>>>> an understanding of the three categories and of the term 'existence'. >>>>>> >>>>>> I disagree that 'pure nothing' is Firstness and Secondness in the >>>>>> absence of Thirdness. I agree that without Thirdness - it would be chaos, >>>>>> but i don't see this as PURE nothing. After all, 'the original chaos, >>>>>> therefore, where there was no regularity, was in effect a state of mere >>>>>> indeterminacy, in which nothing existed or really happened". 1. 411. My >>>>>> reading of that, is that there was no matter in a mode of Firstness or >>>>>> Secondness in this 'original chaos' - no 'existences' and no 'feelings'. >>>>>> Nothing. >>>>>> >>>>>> Now - of course, and as usual, you can disagree with me. >>>>>> >>>>>> Edwina >>>>>> >>>>>> ----- Original Message ----- >>>>>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >>>>>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>>>>> *Cc:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> >>>>>> *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 7:25 PM >>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's >>>>>> Cosmology) >>>>>> >>>>>> Edwina, List: >>>>>> >>>>>> Once again, I find your use of terminology inconsistent with >>>>>> Peirce's. Firstness is real, but does not exist. It has no Relations, >>>>>> because any Relation requires Secondness. "Pure nothing" is the chaos of >>>>>> Firstness and Secondness in the absence of Thirdness. Accepting any >>>>>> matter >>>>>> of fact--such as the origin of our existing universe--as inexplicable is >>>>>> unacceptable, because it blocks the way of inquiry. Nothing new here, >>>>>> so I >>>>>> will leave it at that. >>>>>> >>>>>> Regards, >>>>>> >>>>>> Jon >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 5:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think that 'actualization' and 'cause' are two entirely different >>>>>>> actions. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> With regard to Firstness, I see it, as a spontaneous *state* *of >>>>>>> existence* which *might* then act upon/be reacted to.., in the >>>>>>> 'fullness of this state'. The point of all the categories is that they >>>>>>> operate within Relations; they are not isolate in themselves. >>>>>>> Firstness, as >>>>>>> that *spontaneous state of existence* [which might dissipate in a >>>>>>> nanosecond if it doesn't *bond/relate* to another entity]...can >>>>>>> provide a novel form of existence. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> For example, a spontaneous mutation of a cell *might* be accepted >>>>>>> by other cells and might become part of the organism's nature. Or, >>>>>>> *might >>>>>>> not* be accepted and its energy-content would dissipate. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Or, a novel mode of transportation [*Uber*] might suddenly develop >>>>>>> and might spread to other domains. Or, like many a new invention - it >>>>>>> might >>>>>>> disappear in a month. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The causality of Firstness is the Relations that the novelty ir >>>>>>> provides has on other organisms/entities. It can actually cause/effect >>>>>>> changes in the larger system. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Yes, I see the universe as self-emergent and self-organizing - and >>>>>>> refer to 1.412 for the Peircean outline of these actions. But I don't >>>>>>> see >>>>>>> this as a transition from Firstness to Secondness, for I don't consider >>>>>>> that the pre-universe was in any categorical mode [ie, not in a mode of >>>>>>> Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness. It was simply nothing]. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Certainly, the 'somehow', i.e., the bridge between 'nothing' and >>>>>>> 'something' is not explained beyond a 'chance flash'. But because there >>>>>>> is >>>>>>> no explanation, does not mean that I can or even should come up with >>>>>>> one - >>>>>>> certainly, science hasn't been able to do so, and since I'm an atheist, >>>>>>> then, I'm not going to offer a self-organized belief in god as having >>>>>>> been >>>>>>> First Cause. I simply don't know. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Edwina >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ----- Original Message ----- >>>>>>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >>>>>>> *To:* Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> >>>>>>> *Cc:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> >>>>>>> *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 5:59 PM >>>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's >>>>>>> Cosmology) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Clark, List: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Your points, as usual, are well-taken. Is it helpful at all to >>>>>>> refer to "actualization," rather than "cause"? Edwina's position, as I >>>>>>> understand it, is that our existing universe is not only >>>>>>> self-*organizing >>>>>>> *but also self-*generating *or self-*originating*; as Houser put it >>>>>>> in his introduction to EP 1, "Somehow, the possibility or potentiality >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> the chaos is self-actualizing." This is the crucial transition from >>>>>>> Firstness (possibility) to Secondness (actuality), and the word >>>>>>> "somehow" >>>>>>> reflects the fact that Houser's attempt to summarize Peirce's cosmology >>>>>>> effectively leaves this step unexplained. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Regards, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:29 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Nov 3, 2016, at 1:50 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >>>>>>>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ET: Of course I didn't mean an individual [human or god] force by >>>>>>>> the term of 'chance'!. I find that Jon jumps to disagree with me as a >>>>>>>> matter of habit. Either that, or his tendency to read in a literal >>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>> leads him to such conclusions. I meant 'chance or Firstness or >>>>>>>> spontaneity >>>>>>>> as a causal force - and there's plenty of comments in Peirce on just >>>>>>>> this >>>>>>>> state. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> No, I understood exactly what you meant. My disagreement is that I >>>>>>>> take "chance" (in Peirce's usage) to be freedom or spontaneity, rather >>>>>>>> than >>>>>>>> randomness or inexplicability; and it is certainly not something that >>>>>>>> could >>>>>>>> ever be "a causal force." I even quoted Peirce to support this view, >>>>>>>> but >>>>>>>> you refer to my "tendency to read in a literal manner" as if it were a >>>>>>>> bad >>>>>>>> thing! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Again I think we’re all talking past one an other by equivocating >>>>>>>> over the term ‘cause.’ In a certain cause pure freedom or spontaneity >>>>>>>> isn’t causal and in an other sense it must be. Effectively each >>>>>>>> firstness >>>>>>>> is its own unmoved mover. The problem is that making sense of >>>>>>>> causality at >>>>>>>> all when little is necessary and most things are underdetermined is >>>>>>>> problematic. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think causality is problematic for a variety of other reasons >>>>>>>> too. For instance in terms of physics we could oppose the classic >>>>>>>> Newtonian >>>>>>>> formulation of mechanics in terms of forces and masses to the >>>>>>>> Hamiltonian >>>>>>>> or Lagrangian forms. They’re mathematically equivalent yet >>>>>>>> metaphysically >>>>>>>> quite conceptually different. The Hamiltonian is the evolution of the >>>>>>>> wave >>>>>>>> function (what in quantum mechanics becomes the Dirac or Schrodinger >>>>>>>> equation) and it’s hard to make sense of causality in terms of it. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Likewise again turning to Duns Scotus we have classic arguments >>>>>>>> against causality being continuous. (Basically part of the same >>>>>>>> extended >>>>>>>> argument I linked to earlier for a first cause) For Peirce where any >>>>>>>> sign >>>>>>>> can be divided it’s worth asking if we have causality at all. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Despite these problems of causality we all use the term causality. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> He referenced the same series of articles in what was probably his >>>>>>>> very first draft of "A Neglected Argument" (1908), and made a few other >>>>>>>> comments about it that are relevant to this discussion. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> CSP: I there contended that the laws of nature, and, indeed, all >>>>>>>> experiential laws, have been results of evolution, being (such was my >>>>>>>> original hypothesis,) developments out of utterly causeless >>>>>>>> determinations >>>>>>>> of single events, under a certain universal tendency toward >>>>>>>> habit-forming >>>>>>>> ... But during the long years which have elapsed since the hypothesis >>>>>>>> first >>>>>>>> suggested itself to me, it may naturally be supposed that faulty >>>>>>>> features >>>>>>>> of the original hypothesis have been brought [to] my attention by >>>>>>>> others >>>>>>>> and have struck me in my own meditations. Dr. Edward Montgomery >>>>>>>> remarked >>>>>>>> that my theory was not so much evolutionary as it was emanational; and >>>>>>>> Professor Ogden Rood pointed out that there must have been some >>>>>>>> original >>>>>>>> tendency to take habits which did not arise according to my hypothesis; >>>>>>>> while I myself was most struck by the difficulty of so explaining the >>>>>>>> law >>>>>>>> of sequence in time, if I proposed to make all laws develope from >>>>>>>> single >>>>>>>> events; since an event already supposes Time. (R 842, emphasis added) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think this might be better read as there being no cause *for* >>>>>>>> firstness >>>>>>>> not that firstness can’t be seen a not causal. Again I suspect we’re >>>>>>>> talking past one an other again but the mere fact firstness can be an >>>>>>>> element in a triadic sign more or less entails a certain sense of >>>>>>>> causation. (Although I prefer Peirce’s term determination although >>>>>>>> that too >>>>>>>> has the genealogy in problematic metaphysical understanding) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I should add that this problem of language for this foundational >>>>>>>> event isn’t new. You see similar debates in late antiquity over >>>>>>>> whether the >>>>>>>> platonic One is one or ought to be considered two emanation steps. >>>>>>>> While >>>>>>>> I’ll confess to finding such matters idle talk there’s usually a >>>>>>>> logical >>>>>>>> reason for the analaysis. (Much like the whole disparaged “how many >>>>>>>> angels >>>>>>>> could dance on a pin” makes sense in the context of the debates over >>>>>>>> kinds >>>>>>>> in medieval scholasticism) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/ >>> peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/ >> peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > ------------------------------ > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" > or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should > go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to > PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" > in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/ > peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
