Gary R, Helmut:
The question is: Are the Platonic worlds BEFORE or AFTER the so-called Big
Bang? I read them as AFTER while Gary R and Jon S read them as BEFORE. In my
reading, before the BigBang, there was Nothing, not even Platonic worlds. But
after, there were multiple 'chalk marks' - but only ONE set began to take
habits and became dominant, while the others dissipated.
I don't think that this dispute can be 'settled' because we do read the texts
differently, but I do think that we on the list should be aware that there are
different views on this issue.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Gary Richmond
To: Peirce-L
Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 4:04 PM
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Helmut, List,
Whatever you or Edwina may think, whatever the 'truth' of the matter may
prove to be (if any such proof were possible, which I greatly doubt), Peirce
wrote this (embedded in an argument which makes his position-- that there is a
Platonic cosmos from which this, shall we say, Aristotelian one issues--quite
clear).
Peirce: "[A]ll this, be it remembered, is not of the order of the existing
universe, but is merely a Platonic world of which we are, therefore, to
conceive that there are many, both coordinated and subordinated to one another
until finally one of these Platonic worlds is differentiated the particular
actual universe of existence in which we happen to be." (RLT, 263, emphasis
added).
The immediate question as I see it is: How did Peirce conceive of this
matter? I would highly recommend that anyone looking into that question read
carefully RLT, esp. 261-264.
Best,
Gary R
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 3:52 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
Edwina, list,
I my humble (being a layman about all these things) opinion, I agree with
Edwina, because the big bang is said to have been a singularity, and I guess,
that "singularity" is not only a matter of physics, but of everything, such as
philosophy, black boards, metaphysical meanings of metaphors, whatever. So
there can not be a "pre" of it, the less as the big bang is said to be not only
the origin of space, but of time too. Lest you suggest a meta-time, in a
meta-universe, but then the problem of beginning is merely postponed to that:
Did the meta-universe come from a meta-big-bang? I only have two possible
explanations for this problem of origin/beginning: Either there was no
beginning/creation, and no big bang (I had supposed a multi-bubble-universe
some weeks ago) , or there is a circle of creation, like: A creates B, B
creates C, C creates A. But this would mean, that creation is atemporal,
otherwise it would not work. But I like it, and maybe it is good for some quite
funny science-fiction story. But perhaps it is not far fetched: Creation is
everywhere, is "God", and it forms circular attractors of recreation. Stop!
This is getting weird, I have to think some more about it first.
Best,
Helmut
04. November 2016 um 19:44 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca>
Gary R - again, it is my strong sense that I am accurately representing
Peirce's views on this issue. I don't see that I disagree with him at all - but
I do disagree with you and Jon on this issue [and, obviously, on theistic
issues as well].
That is - I don't see a Nothing, which is to say, the pre BigBang world, as
a set of Platonic worlds. If this were the case, then, it would not be nothing
but would be sets of ideal potentialities. Instead, it is nothing, 'pure
zero', pure freedom, no variety of Platonic worlds which after all, establish
different perspectives, it is "absolutely undefined and unlimited possibility'
...not a SET of Platonic worlds. [1.412, 6.217].
Then, with the BigBang, this set up the Blackboard 'the original vague
potentiality' and moved into that set of multiple possible Platonic worlds
within the phase of Firstness and Secondness. At this time, these 'bits' were
without habits [Thirdness] - that's what provides them with their potentiality;
it is possible that many chalkmarks appeared..... "Many such reacting systems
may spring up in the original continuum; and each of these may itself acts as a
first line from which a larger system may be built, in which it in turn will
merge its individuality" 6.207. This is POST BigBang.
With these multiple sets - the universe could have gone anywhere; some of
those 'bits' could have dissipated; others could have emerged; some could have
stayed. But THEN - came the development of habits, Thirdness - and these habits
established our particular world rather than one of the other 'Platonic
worlds'. By chance [tychasm], habits developed within ONE TYPE of 'Platonic
world'...and the others, I presume, dissolved, as our particular universe took
over.
The multiple Platonic worlds are not pre BigBang, in my reading, but post.
And Thirdness quickly isolated and privileged one 'Set' - which then became our
particular universe.
Therefore, I equally don't read Peirce as having the three categories
'existential' in the pre BigBang phase; my reading is that these three
categories, which are fundamental laws of matter/mind...emerged WITH the
emergence of matter/mind...and are not separate from it.
Therefore - you and Jon, and others, may certainly reject my reading of
Peirce, just as I reject yours and Jon's - but, I don't think we are at the
stage where we can definitely say that only ONE reading is The Accurate One. I
offer my reading; some on the list may agree; some may not. That is as far as a
scholarly list can go, I think.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Gary Richmond
To: Peirce-L
Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 1:55 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Edwina, Jon S, List,
I certainly do not intend to get into a long (or even a short) discussion
with you, Edwina, on this as both your position and Jon's (and mine) have been
rather thoroughly and repeatedly articulated. I must say, however, that I do
not see your "reading" of the blackboard passages as 'fair minded' at all, but
rather it seems to me to impose your own conceptual framework on Peirce's very
different one.
For example, at RLT, 263, in the midst of the long and complex blackboard
discussion, RLT, 261-4, which blackboard Peirce himself refers to as "a sort of
Diagram of the original vague potentiality," RLT, 261), he comments (and I've
pointed to this passage before):
"[A]ll this, be it remembered, is not of the order of the existing
universe, but is merely a Platonic world of which we are, therefore, to
conceive that there are many, both coordinated and subordinated to one another
until finally one of these Platonic worlds is differentiated the particular
actual universe of existence in which we happen to be." (RLT, 263, emphasis
added).
Now you may disagree with Peirce in this matter, but this is what he
wrote--the blackboard diagram would seem to represent what he no doubt believed
to be the character of the cosmos before "one of these Platonic worlds is
differentiated the particular actual universe of existence in which we happen
to be," that is, before what corresponds to the Big Bang.
It is my strong sense that Jon has consistently accurately presented
Peirce's views as they appear in the 1898 lecture, and that your remarks contra
his do not represent Peirce's clearly articulated views (as, for example, given
in the quotation above), but rather your own. They seem to me less an
interpretation than a misreading of Peirce, one which your conceptual framework
apparently requires.
Best,
Gary R
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 1:03 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
wrote:
Gary R, list:
Well, I consider myself a 'fair-minded reader of Peirce' and I
certainly don't agree with Jon S's view that the blackboard is pre-Big Bang and
that the three Categories are pre-Big Bang, with Thirdness primordial.
Of course the blackboard is a metaphor - set out as a diagram...but
that diagram is a metaphor of what we assume is that 'original vague
potentiality or at any rate of some early stage of its determination'. 6.203.
As I said in my earlier post today, my reading is that this blackboard is POST
Big Bang, which is why it is a 'continuum of some indefinite multitude of
dimensions'. 6.203. This is NOT the same as the pre Big Bang Zeroness - which
is NOTHING.
And by 'continuum', I certainly don't see this as Thirdness, for
Thirdness is a continuum of some particular habits, not just a 'continuum and
certainly not of 'indefinite multitude of dimensions. The very nature of
Thirdness is its function to constrain novelty and insert morphological habits.
As for quibbling about whether the chalk mark is a point or a line -
that's irrelevant. It is a unique 'bit' of matter/mind - that is differentiated
from what-it-is-not ["the limit between the black surface and the white
surface} 6.203]. It's the differentiation from 'what-it-is-not' that is
important, for this is obviously Secondness.
The first chalkmark exhibits only Firstness [its novel appearance] and
Secondness [its differentiation from the blackness] but would only exhibit
Thirdness if it stayed 'as it is' and if other chalkmarks appear and they
develop common habits of formation. As Peirce notes 'However, the mark is a
mere accident, and as such may be erased. It will not interfere with another
mark drawn in quite another way. There need be no consistency between the two.
But no further progress beyond this can be made, until a mark with stay for a
little while; that is, until some beginning of a habit has been established by
virtue of which the accident acquires some incipient staying quality, some
tendency toward consistency. This habit is a generalizing tendency" 6.204.
The three categories are fundamental laws of nature; their origin is
with nature - which includes the physico-chemical as well as biological realms.
Therefore - I disagree that they are pre-BigBang. I read Peirce that they
originate, as natural laws, with the BigBang's potentiality.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Gary Richmond
To: Peirce-L
Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 12:27 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's
Cosmology)
Jon S, Edwina, List,
Jon wrote:
a..
a.. The Big Bang corresponds to our existing universe being
differentiated out of one of these "Platonic worlds" (CP 6.208) as "a
discontinuous mark" (NEM 4:345, RLT:162) on the whiteboard.
Consequently, the blackboard--which precedes the whiteboard, and is
the source of its continuity--cannot be post-Big Bang; and the three Categories
must be pre-Big Bang, with Thirdness primordial among them.
Minus your addition of the notion of a whiteboard--which additon I
think is quite helpful in representing the "Aggregations of merged chalk marks
represent[ing] "reacting systems" that aggregate further into "Platonic worlds"
(CP 6.206-208"--this is certainly the way I have always seen Peirce's
blackboard discussion and, I believe, a fair minded reader must see it (whether
or not they agree with Peirce here). As I wrote just yesterday, in the
blackboard diagram--not a metaphor (I stand corrected)--"Peirce seems not at
all to be considering the semiosic universe we inhabit, but the conditions for
any, perhaps many, possible universe(s) to arise."
Thanks especially for succinctly putting the argumentation into
bullet points (including pointers to the exact passages in CP 6.203-208), this
constituting an excellent summary of Peirce's 1898 argument.
Best,
Gary R
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 11:56 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt
<jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
Edwina, List:
I could post a lengthy rebuttal, but it would basically just repeat
what I have already laid out in considerable detail in this thread and the
others associated with Peirce's Cosmology, so I will spare everyone (including
myself) the dissertation. I will simply reiterate a few quick points about the
blackboard illustration.
a.. The blackboard is "a sort of diagram" (CP 6.203), not a
metaphor; this means that it embodies the significant relations among the parts
of whatever it represents.
b.. The blackboard "is a continuum of two dimensions" that
represents "a continuum of some indefinite multitude of dimensions" (CP 6.203);
and a continuum is a paradigmatic manifestation of Thirdness.
c.. The chalk mark is not a point, or even a line; it is a
surface, and its continuity is entirely derived from and dependent on that of
the underlying blackboard (CP 6.203).
d.. The chalk mark exhibits all three Categories (CP
6.203&205)--Firstness (whiteness), Secondness (boundary between black and
white), and Thirdness (continuity).
e.. Aggregations of merged chalk marks represent "reacting
systems" that aggregate further into "Platonic worlds" (CP 6.206-208), each of
which I call a "whiteboard."
f.. The Big Bang corresponds to our existing universe being
differentiated out of one of these "Platonic worlds" (CP 6.208) as "a
discontinuous mark" (NEM 4:345, RLT:162) on the whiteboard.
Consequently, the blackboard--which precedes the whiteboard, and is
the source of its continuity--cannot be post-Big Bang; and the three Categories
must be pre-Big Bang, with Thirdness primordial among them.
Regards,
Jon
On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 7:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky
<tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
Gary, list - yes, I think that both tone and repetition are
getting tiresome, to say the least.
I'm not sure what you mean by your suggestion of differentiating
the 'early cosmos' from 'this our existential one' contra an Aristotelian one
'once there exists a particular three category semiosic universe'.
1) My confusion comes from my own view that our 'existential
cosmos' IS a three category semiosic universe. That is, my view is that the
three categories only emerge within the existentiality of the matter/mind
universe. There are no categories before this 'Big Bang' or whatever began our
universe.
That is, in the pre-universe, "We start, then, with nothing, pure
zero'....This pure zero is the nothing of not having been born......boundless
freedom". 6.217. My reading of this is that this pure zero is NOT the same as
Firstness, because, my reading of Firstness is that it is an embedded state of
feeling, which means, that its nature is to express a quality of some form of
matter/mind. Redness; heat; coldness.... Therefore, my reading of this
pre-universe state is that it was, as Peirce notes "unbounded potentiality'.
This "Nothingness of boundless freedom 6.219..."is not, in my view, the same
as the logic of freedom or possibility [which is Firstness].
"What immediately resulted was that unbounded potentiality became
potentiality of this or that sort - that is ,of some quality' 6.220. Now - my
reading is that the unbounded Nothing [which again, is NOT Firstness or
Thirdness]...suddenly moved into Firstness.
Again, 'the zero of bare possibility, by evolutionary logic,
leapt into the unit of some quality" 6.220. So again, the zero of nothing
moved into Firstness, where 'something is possible/Red is something; therefore
Red is possible'. 6.220. Again - the zero of bare possibility is NOT Firstness
or Thirdness. It is Nothing. Then..it moved into being 'embedded' within matter
- as Firstness....where something is possible. Not unbounded possibility but
something is possible. This is already constrained possibility, very different
from the 'zero of boundless possibility'.
2) His next phase seems to be, following the basic 'vague to the
definite' 6.191, from a 'vague potentiality; and that either is or is followed
by a continuum of forms having a multitude of dimensions too great for the
individuals dimensions to be distinct" 6.196. These would be differentiated
units in Secondness [and Firstness]. Then, habits of relations or Thirdness
begin...and this vast multitude is 'contracted'. "The general indefinite
potentiality became limited and heterogeneous" 6.199.
3) With regard to the blackboard metaphor, my reading of it is
that the blackboard refers to 'the original vague potentiality, or at any rate
of some stage of its determination' 6.203. My reading is that this blackboard
is POST Big Bang. The blackboard is NOT the 'zero of bare possibility'.
Instead, it is POST Big Bang - and suddenly, a singular point appears - that
chalk line. [I'll leave out Peirce-as-God having drawn it]. As a point, it has
identity, that continuity-of-being that Peirce refers to ['There is a certain
element of continuity in this line" 6.203]..This is a unit in Secondness.
The white chalk line appears within the act of Firstness, but is,
in itself, operating ALSO within the mode of Secondness - because it is
discrete and distinct.
And then, habits or Thirdness, that generalizing tendency,
develops. NOTE - Thirdness did not pre-exist on its own; it develops as the
discrete units appear within Firstness and Secondness. That is, Thirdness is
embedded within the existentialities of matter operating within Firstness and
Secondness. It 'feeds and works' within these individual 'bits'...and develops
generalizing laws.
That's how I see this metaphor.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Gary Richmond
To: Peirce-L
Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 11:46 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's
Cosmology)
Jon, Edwina, Clark, List,
Perhaps this back and forth--especially the tone and tendency
towards repetition--has gotten "tiresome" for some readers as well as the most
active participants.
I had hoped my suggestion a while back of a Platonic cosmos
pre-the Big Bang (note: of course I completely agree with Clark that one
shouldn't really bring such very much later notions into the picture, which is
why I used the modifier "loosely" when I last referred to it--but what language
do we have to distinguish the early cosmos Peirce describes in the last lecture
of the 1898 Reasoning and the Logic of Things from this, our, existential one?)
contra a more Aristotelian cosmos once there exists a, shall we say, particular
three category semiosic universe might be helpful in moving this discussion
forward. So, my question: Are these two different? If so, how so? If not, why
not?
One thing I would be very interested in is what Edwina, Clark,
and others make of the final 1898 lecture, esp. the blackboard metaphor. Here,
as I interpret it, Peirce seems not at all to be considering the semiosic
universe we inhabit, but the conditions for any, perhaps many, possible
universe(s) to arise. Unlike the Neglected Argument essay, there is no explicit
mention of God here, and Peirce seems to be making a purely scientific
hypothesis. So, perhaps, dropping the God-talk for a moment, what is Peirce
attempting in RLT?
Best,
Gary R
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 8:06 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
<jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
Edwina, List:
Lest we get bogged down any further in yet another tiresome
exegetical battle, I will simply say that I find almost nothing in your last
post to be consistent with my understanding of Peirce's own thought. I once
again leave it to the List community to decide which of us--if either of
us--has demonstrated the more accurate interpretation.
Regards,
Jon
On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 6:50 PM, Edwina Taborsky
<tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
Jon - as Clark has been trying to point out, you and I are
locked in terminological difficulties. Your insistence that YOUR use is
identical with that of Peirce's use - is simply your own opinion.
My reading of Peirce is that all three categorical modes
only function within Relations. Firstness is NOT 'real' in the sense of it
being a generality [ie., the reality of the laws of Thirdness] and it does
exist as a state of 'existentiality; i.e., as a quality, a feeling, an
openness, BUT, this state is itself an experience, entire in itself, and as
such, it exists within that experience of its fullness. There is no such thing
as an unembodied Firstness! Since it is a state of experience, then, it must be
embodied. It is simply 'complete', so to speak and not open to the Otherness of
analysis or reaction.
You confine 'existence' to Secondness - which is, I feel,
too narrow an understanding of the three categories and of the term
'existence'.
I disagree that 'pure nothing' is Firstness and Secondness
in the absence of Thirdness. I agree that without Thirdness - it would be
chaos, but i don't see this as PURE nothing. After all, 'the original chaos,
therefore, where there was no regularity, was in effect a state of mere
indeterminacy, in which nothing existed or really happened". 1. 411. My
reading of that, is that there was no matter in a mode of Firstness or
Secondness in this 'original chaos' - no 'existences' and no 'feelings'.
Nothing.
Now - of course, and as usual, you can disagree with me.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 7:25 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was
Peirce's Cosmology)
Edwina, List:
Once again, I find your use of terminology inconsistent
with Peirce's. Firstness is real, but does not exist. It has no Relations,
because any Relation requires Secondness. "Pure nothing" is the chaos of
Firstness and Secondness in the absence of Thirdness. Accepting any matter of
fact--such as the origin of our existing universe--as inexplicable is
unacceptable, because it blocks the way of inquiry. Nothing new here, so I
will leave it at that.
Regards,
Jon
On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 5:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky
<tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
I think that 'actualization' and 'cause' are two
entirely different actions.
With regard to Firstness, I see it, as a spontaneous
state of existence which might then act upon/be reacted to.., in the 'fullness
of this state'. The point of all the categories is that they operate within
Relations; they are not isolate in themselves. Firstness, as that spontaneous
state of existence [which might dissipate in a nanosecond if it doesn't
bond/relate to another entity]...can provide a novel form of existence.
For example, a spontaneous mutation of a cell might be
accepted by other cells and might become part of the organism's nature. Or,
might not be accepted and its energy-content would dissipate.
Or, a novel mode of transportation [Uber] might
suddenly develop and might spread to other domains. Or, like many a new
invention - it might disappear in a month.
The causality of Firstness is the Relations that the
novelty ir provides has on other organisms/entities. It can actually
cause/effect changes in the larger system.
Yes, I see the universe as self-emergent and
self-organizing - and refer to 1.412 for the Peircean outline of these actions.
But I don't see this as a transition from Firstness to Secondness, for I don't
consider that the pre-universe was in any categorical mode [ie, not in a mode
of Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness. It was simply nothing].
Certainly, the 'somehow', i.e., the bridge between
'nothing' and 'something' is not explained beyond a 'chance flash'. But because
there is no explanation, does not mean that I can or even should come up with
one - certainly, science hasn't been able to do so, and since I'm an atheist,
then, I'm not going to offer a self-organized belief in god as having been
First Cause. I simply don't know.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Clark Goble
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 5:59 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was
Peirce's Cosmology)
Clark, List:
Your points, as usual, are well-taken. Is it helpful
at all to refer to "actualization," rather than "cause"? Edwina's position, as
I understand it, is that our existing universe is not only self-organizing but
also self-generating or self-originating; as Houser put it in his introduction
to EP 1, "Somehow, the possibility or potentiality of the chaos is
self-actualizing." This is the crucial transition from Firstness (possibility)
to Secondness (actuality), and the word "somehow" reflects the fact that
Houser's attempt to summarize Peirce's cosmology effectively leaves this step
unexplained.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran
Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:29 PM, Clark Goble
<cl...@lextek.com> wrote:
On Nov 3, 2016, at 1:50 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
<jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
ET: Of course I didn't mean an individual [human
or god] force by the term of 'chance'!. I find that Jon jumps to disagree with
me as a matter of habit. Either that, or his tendency to read in a literal
manner leads him to such conclusions. I meant 'chance or Firstness or
spontaneity as a causal force - and there's plenty of comments in Peirce on
just this state.
No, I understood exactly what you meant. My
disagreement is that I take "chance" (in Peirce's usage) to be freedom or
spontaneity, rather than randomness or inexplicability; and it is certainly not
something that could ever be "a causal force." I even quoted Peirce to support
this view, but you refer to my "tendency to read in a literal manner" as if it
were a bad thing!
Again I think we’re all talking past one an other
by equivocating over the term ‘cause.’ In a certain cause pure freedom or
spontaneity isn’t causal and in an other sense it must be. Effectively each
firstness is its own unmoved mover. The problem is that making sense of
causality at all when little is necessary and most things are underdetermined
is problematic.
I think causality is problematic for a variety of
other reasons too. For instance in terms of physics we could oppose the classic
Newtonian formulation of mechanics in terms of forces and masses to the
Hamiltonian or Lagrangian forms. They’re mathematically equivalent yet
metaphysically quite conceptually different. The Hamiltonian is the evolution
of the wave function (what in quantum mechanics becomes the Dirac or
Schrodinger equation) and it’s hard to make sense of causality in terms of it.
Likewise again turning to Duns Scotus we have
classic arguments against causality being continuous. (Basically part of the
same extended argument I linked to earlier for a first cause) For Peirce where
any sign can be divided it’s worth asking if we have causality at all.
Despite these problems of causality we all use the
term causality.
He referenced the same series of articles in what
was probably his very first draft of "A Neglected Argument" (1908), and made a
few other comments about it that are relevant to this discussion.
CSP: I there contended that the laws of nature,
and, indeed, all experiential laws, have been results of evolution, being (such
was my original hypothesis,) developments out of utterly causeless
determinations of single events, under a certain universal tendency toward
habit-forming ... But during the long years which have elapsed since the
hypothesis first suggested itself to me, it may naturally be supposed that
faulty features of the original hypothesis have been brought [to] my attention
by others and have struck me in my own meditations. Dr. Edward Montgomery
remarked that my theory was not so much evolutionary as it was emanational; and
Professor Ogden Rood pointed out that there must have been some original
tendency to take habits which did not arise according to my hypothesis; while I
myself was most struck by the difficulty of so explaining the law of sequence
in time, if I proposed to make all laws develope from single events; since an
event already supposes Time. (R 842, emphasis added)
I think this might be better read as there being no
cause for firstness not that firstness can’t be seen a not causal. Again I
suspect we’re talking past one an other again but the mere fact firstness can
be an element in a triadic sign more or less entails a certain sense of
causation. (Although I prefer Peirce’s term determination although that too has
the genealogy in problematic metaphysical understanding)
I should add that this problem of language for this
foundational event isn’t new. You see similar debates in late antiquity over
whether the platonic One is one or ought to be considered two emanation steps.
While I’ll confess to finding such matters idle talk there’s usually a logical
reason for the analaysis. (Much like the whole disparaged “how many angels
could dance on a pin” makes sense in the context of the debates over kinds in
medieval scholasticism)
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