Jon, Gary R, List, Thanks for correcting my mistake about tokens, which somehow slipped by my internal editor.
JAS: the three words in different languages are only tokens where they are actually written or spoken, and each of those individual instances is governed by the general type to which it conforms. However, individual humans are not tokens of the type "man" as a word in English, the type "homo" as a word in Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as a word in Greek; instead, they are the dynamical objects of those signs. GF: As Gary R confirmed, it is the written or spoken word that is a token. It would follow that the three words in the different languages are subtypes, not tokens, of the more general type which Peirce referred to as “the same sign.” This implies a hierarchy of types but not of tokens. I wonder, though, whether the term “token” can only apply to external signs. In his October 1995 Monist article, Peirce referred to “A sign (under which designation I place every kind of thought, and not alone external signs)” (CP 5.447, EP2:350). A thought I am hosting at the moment is certainly embodied here and now in a pattern of neural activity, whether I utter it or not, just as a spoken or written text is embodied in a pattern of sound waves or marks on a page. The only difference is that it is an internal sign, invisible to others. Does that disqualify it as a token? I would certainly hesitate to call it a type. Gary f. From: [email protected] <[email protected]> On Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: 4-Nov-21 18:24 To: Peirce-L <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens Gary F., List: Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of speculative grammar is that only an individual embodiment of a sign is a token. Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that only an individual organism is properly called a token. Genus and species are both types, which correspond to different levels of generality that are at least somewhat arbitrary. Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens where they are actually written or spoken, and each of those individual instances is governed by the general type to which it conforms. However, individual humans are not tokens of the type "man" as a word in English, the type "homo" as a word in Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as a word in Greek; instead, they are the dynamical objects of those signs. Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs" is simply "sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is why the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
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