Jon, Gary R, List,

Thanks for correcting my mistake about tokens, which somehow slipped by my 
internal editor.

JAS: the three words in different languages are only tokens where they are 
actually written or spoken, and each of those individual instances is governed 
by the general type to which it conforms. However, individual humans are not 
tokens of the type "man" as a word in English, the type "homo" as a word in 
Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as a word in Greek; instead, they are the 
dynamical objects of those signs.

GF: As Gary R confirmed, it is the written or spoken word that is a token. It 
would follow that the three words in the different languages are subtypes, not 
tokens, of the more general type which Peirce referred to as “the same sign.” 
This implies a hierarchy of types but not of tokens.

I wonder, though, whether the term “token” can only apply to external signs. In 
his October 1995 Monist article, Peirce referred to “A sign (under which 
designation I place every kind of thought, and not alone external signs)” (CP 
5.447, EP2:350). A thought I am hosting at the moment is certainly embodied 
here and now in a pattern of neural activity, whether I utter it or not, just 
as a spoken or written text is embodied in a pattern of sound waves or marks on 
a page. The only difference is that it is an internal sign, invisible to 
others. Does that disqualify it as a token? I would certainly hesitate to call 
it a type.

Gary f.

 

From: [email protected] <[email protected]> On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 4-Nov-21 18:24
To: Peirce-L <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

 

Gary F., List:

 

Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of speculative 
grammar is that only an individual embodiment of a sign is a token. 
Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that only an 
individual organism is properly called a token. Genus and species are both 
types, which correspond to different levels of generality that are at least 
somewhat arbitrary.

 

Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens where they are 
actually written or spoken, and each of those individual instances is governed 
by the general type to which it conforms. However, individual humans are not 
tokens of the type "man" as a word in English, the type "homo" as a word in 
Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as a word in Greek; instead, they are the 
dynamical objects of those signs.

 

Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs" is simply 
"sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is why the 
ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable.

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>  
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> 

 

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