List,

To follow up on the message I just sent out:

When I first came to live in NYC, and for several decades after, when you
wanted to take the subway you would go to a booth and purchase
subway 'tokens'. Each subway token was a token (in Peircean terms) of
the *type*, 'that object which will get you a single ride on the subway'. GR
“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Fri, Nov 5, 2021 at 1:52 AM Gary Richmond <[email protected]>
wrote:

> Jon A.S., Gary F, List,
>
> JAS: Again, my understanding of the terminology *within the context of
> speculative grammar* is that only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is
> a token (emphasis added, GR).
> GR: I personally think that this is indisputable as there is more than
> sufficient textual support for this claim. One clear, oft repeated example:
>
> A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that
> one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at
> any one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as
> occurring just when and where it does, such as this or that word on a
> single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to
> call a *Token*. (Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism, CP 4.537,
> 1906)
>
>
> JAS: Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that only
> an *individual *organism is properly called a token.
> GR: This follows from the above.
>
> JAS: Genus and species are both types, which correspond to different
> levels of generality that are at least somewhat arbitrary.
> GR: I agree that genus and species are types; and that they "are at least
> somewhat arbitrary" is clear from a consideration of the history of
> biological classification. Take this remark from the Wikipedia article on
> 'genus':
>
> The composition of a genus is determined by taxonomists
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taxonomy_(biology)>. The standards for
> genus classification are not strictly codified, so different authorities
> often produce different classifications for genera.
>
>
> Something similar is true for 'species': see:
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Species
>
> JAS: Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens
> where they are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those
> *individual *instances is governed by the *general *type to which it
> conforms.
> GR: This follows from the first statement above and the Peirce quotation
> offered, that "only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is a token."
>
> JAS: However, *individual humans are not tokens of the type "man" as
> a word in English*, the type "homo" as a *word *in Latin, or the type
> "ἄνθρωπος" as a *word *in Greek; instead, they are the *dynamical objects* of
> those signs (emphasis added, GR).
> GR: I agree. This is an important distinction: namely, individual humans,
> biologically vs the type, "man" or "human," mere words. Let's not conflate
> the two.
>
> JAS: Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs"
> is simply "sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is
> why the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable.
> GR: I agree that "the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be
> unavoidable." Take, as supporting this notion the following, very late
> quotation:
>
> CSP: . . .we apply this word “sign” to everything recognizable whether to
> our outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination, provided only
> it calls up some feeling, effort, or thought. . . (The Art of Reasoning
> Elucidated, MS [R] 678:23, 1910)
>
>
> Perhaps it comes from my personal sense that at least some things
> regarding what Peirce thought, ought to be and *can be* quasi-settled
> (the principle of fallibility requires the 'quasi-' here) So, I would say
> that from the standpoint of what Peirce meant (*at least* in the context
> of semeiotic grammar), what has been presented above (by JAS) regarding
> 'token', 'type', 'sign', all of this seems to me as if it ought to be
> quasi-settled (the principle of fallibility requires the 'quasi-' here too).
>
> At moments like this a question in my mind recurs: regarding what Peirce
> thought and wrote: Are there *any* terms and their accompanying meanings
> which are truly irrefutable? I personally think that there are such terms
> and ideas. And one of these is that "*within the context of speculative
> grammar*. . . only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is a token."
>
> Best.
>
> Gary R
>
> “Let everything happen to you
> Beauty and terror
> Just keep going
> No feeling is final”
> ― Rainer Maria Rilke
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 6:24 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>
> wrote:
>
>> Gary F., List:
>>
>> Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of
>> speculative grammar is that only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is
>> a token. Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that
>> only an *individual *organism is properly called a token. Genus and
>> species are both types, which correspond to different levels of generality
>> that are at least somewhat arbitrary.
>>
>> Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens where
>> they are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those *individual 
>> *instances
>> is governed by the *general *type to which it conforms. However,
>> individual *humans *are not tokens of the type "man" as a *word *in
>> English, the type "homo" as a *word *in Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as
>> a *word *in Greek; instead, they are the *dynamical objects* of those
>> signs.
>>
>> Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs" is
>> simply "sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is why
>> the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 9:31 AM <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>>> Jon, list,
>>>
>>> JAS: I acknowledge that your usage seems to be more consistent with
>>> Peirce's various taxonomies for sign classification, in which every sign is
>>> *either *a type or a token (or a tone). However, mine is grounded in
>>> the idea that every type can (and usually does) have multiple tokens …
>>>
>>> GF: I think the problem here is that the type/token *relation*, like
>>> the general/specific relation, can apply to several levels in a hierarchic
>>> or holarchic classification system, so that the reference is relative to
>>> the level in the hierarchy. For instance, in biological classification, the
>>> *genus* is type and the *species* is token, but the *species* is also
>>> the type of which an individual organism of that species is token (and
>>> there can be other levels intermediate between those two!).
>>>
>>> Likewise when Peirce says that “Man, *homo*, ἄνθρωπος are the same
>>> sign’ (MS 9), the “sign” is the type of which the three terms are tokens;
>>> but the three terms are also types of which individual humans are tokens.
>>> And if we use the term “individual” in logical strictness, we can say that
>>> Philip is the type of which Philip drunk and Philip sober are individual
>>> tokens. Is there a *top type* (*Archetype? Metatype?) *in the holarchy
>>> of signs? The universe as sign, perhaps? I don’t know, but I would say that
>>> it’s *signs* all the way down. So I’d rather not use the word *sign* to
>>> refer to several specific levels of generality at once.
>>>
>>> By the way, some years ago I did a slideshow
>>> <https://gnusystems.ca/Type.pdf> dealing with the etymology and history
>>> of the word “type,” in connection with a Peirce text where he uses the
>>> Greek form τύπος in reference to the “copulation” of Form and Matter in
>>> semiosis. The text is included in *Turning Signs* here
>>> <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/gld.htm#x29>, in a passage leading up to a
>>> discussion of the “categories.”
>>>
>>> Gary f.
>>>
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>
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