List, To follow up on the message I just sent out:
When I first came to live in NYC, and for several decades after, when you wanted to take the subway you would go to a booth and purchase subway 'tokens'. Each subway token was a token (in Peircean terms) of the *type*, 'that object which will get you a single ride on the subway'. GR “Let everything happen to you Beauty and terror Just keep going No feeling is final” ― Rainer Maria Rilke *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Fri, Nov 5, 2021 at 1:52 AM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon A.S., Gary F, List, > > JAS: Again, my understanding of the terminology *within the context of > speculative grammar* is that only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is > a token (emphasis added, GR). > GR: I personally think that this is indisputable as there is more than > sufficient textual support for this claim. One clear, oft repeated example: > > A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that > one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at > any one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as > occurring just when and where it does, such as this or that word on a > single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to > call a *Token*. (Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism, CP 4.537, > 1906) > > > JAS: Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that only > an *individual *organism is properly called a token. > GR: This follows from the above. > > JAS: Genus and species are both types, which correspond to different > levels of generality that are at least somewhat arbitrary. > GR: I agree that genus and species are types; and that they "are at least > somewhat arbitrary" is clear from a consideration of the history of > biological classification. Take this remark from the Wikipedia article on > 'genus': > > The composition of a genus is determined by taxonomists > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taxonomy_(biology)>. The standards for > genus classification are not strictly codified, so different authorities > often produce different classifications for genera. > > > Something similar is true for 'species': see: > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Species > > JAS: Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens > where they are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those > *individual *instances is governed by the *general *type to which it > conforms. > GR: This follows from the first statement above and the Peirce quotation > offered, that "only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is a token." > > JAS: However, *individual humans are not tokens of the type "man" as > a word in English*, the type "homo" as a *word *in Latin, or the type > "ἄνθρωπος" as a *word *in Greek; instead, they are the *dynamical objects* of > those signs (emphasis added, GR). > GR: I agree. This is an important distinction: namely, individual humans, > biologically vs the type, "man" or "human," mere words. Let's not conflate > the two. > > JAS: Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs" > is simply "sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is > why the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable. > GR: I agree that "the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be > unavoidable." Take, as supporting this notion the following, very late > quotation: > > CSP: . . .we apply this word “sign” to everything recognizable whether to > our outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination, provided only > it calls up some feeling, effort, or thought. . . (The Art of Reasoning > Elucidated, MS [R] 678:23, 1910) > > > Perhaps it comes from my personal sense that at least some things > regarding what Peirce thought, ought to be and *can be* quasi-settled > (the principle of fallibility requires the 'quasi-' here) So, I would say > that from the standpoint of what Peirce meant (*at least* in the context > of semeiotic grammar), what has been presented above (by JAS) regarding > 'token', 'type', 'sign', all of this seems to me as if it ought to be > quasi-settled (the principle of fallibility requires the 'quasi-' here too). > > At moments like this a question in my mind recurs: regarding what Peirce > thought and wrote: Are there *any* terms and their accompanying meanings > which are truly irrefutable? I personally think that there are such terms > and ideas. And one of these is that "*within the context of speculative > grammar*. . . only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is a token." > > Best. > > Gary R > > “Let everything happen to you > Beauty and terror > Just keep going > No feeling is final” > ― Rainer Maria Rilke > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > > > > > > > On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 6:24 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Gary F., List: >> >> Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of >> speculative grammar is that only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is >> a token. Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that >> only an *individual *organism is properly called a token. Genus and >> species are both types, which correspond to different levels of generality >> that are at least somewhat arbitrary. >> >> Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens where >> they are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those *individual >> *instances >> is governed by the *general *type to which it conforms. However, >> individual *humans *are not tokens of the type "man" as a *word *in >> English, the type "homo" as a *word *in Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as >> a *word *in Greek; instead, they are the *dynamical objects* of those >> signs. >> >> Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs" is >> simply "sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is why >> the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 9:31 AM <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Jon, list, >>> >>> JAS: I acknowledge that your usage seems to be more consistent with >>> Peirce's various taxonomies for sign classification, in which every sign is >>> *either *a type or a token (or a tone). However, mine is grounded in >>> the idea that every type can (and usually does) have multiple tokens … >>> >>> GF: I think the problem here is that the type/token *relation*, like >>> the general/specific relation, can apply to several levels in a hierarchic >>> or holarchic classification system, so that the reference is relative to >>> the level in the hierarchy. For instance, in biological classification, the >>> *genus* is type and the *species* is token, but the *species* is also >>> the type of which an individual organism of that species is token (and >>> there can be other levels intermediate between those two!). >>> >>> Likewise when Peirce says that “Man, *homo*, ἄνθρωπος are the same >>> sign’ (MS 9), the “sign” is the type of which the three terms are tokens; >>> but the three terms are also types of which individual humans are tokens. >>> And if we use the term “individual” in logical strictness, we can say that >>> Philip is the type of which Philip drunk and Philip sober are individual >>> tokens. Is there a *top type* (*Archetype? Metatype?) *in the holarchy >>> of signs? The universe as sign, perhaps? I don’t know, but I would say that >>> it’s *signs* all the way down. So I’d rather not use the word *sign* to >>> refer to several specific levels of generality at once. >>> >>> By the way, some years ago I did a slideshow >>> <https://gnusystems.ca/Type.pdf> dealing with the etymology and history >>> of the word “type,” in connection with a Peirce text where he uses the >>> Greek form τύπος in reference to the “copulation” of Form and Matter in >>> semiosis. The text is included in *Turning Signs* here >>> <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/gld.htm#x29>, in a passage leading up to a >>> discussion of the “categories.” >>> >>> Gary f. >>> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . >> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to >> [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the >> message and nothing in the body. More at >> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; >> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >> >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
