Gary F., List: GF: It would follow that the three words in the different languages are *subtypes*, not tokens, of the more general type which Peirce referred to as “the same sign.” This implies a hierarchy of *types *but not of *tokens*.
I agree, although I prefer to use "type" for what you are calling a "subtype" and "sign" for what you are calling "the more general type." That way, the hierarchy has exactly four distinct levels--*tones *as indefinitely significant characters possessed by *tokens*, each of which is an individual instance governed by and conforming to a *type*, which is a definitely significant form within a particular language or other system of *signs*, each of which encompasses multiple types that are at least approximate translations of each other. GF: A thought I am hosting at the moment is certainly *embodied *here and now in a pattern of neural activity, whether I *utter *it or not, just as a spoken or written text is *embodied *in a pattern of sound waves or marks on a page. The only difference is that it is an *internal *sign, invisible to others. Does that disqualify it as a *token*? I would say that it is indeed a token, because it is an *individual* embodiment of the sign. After all, as we have discussed previously, an internal thought is a hypothetically discrete constituent--with boundaries that are marked off somewhat arbitrarily--of an ongoing continuous dialogue in which the utterer and interpreter are temporally sequential stages of the same (quasi-)mind. In other words, the pattern of neural activity that embodies a thought-sign is an *actual *utterance just as much as the pattern of sound waves or marks on a page that embodies a spoken or written text. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Nov 5, 2021 at 8:16 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, Gary R, List, > > Thanks for correcting my mistake about tokens, which somehow slipped by my > internal editor. > > JAS: the three words in different languages are only tokens where they > are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those *individual *instances > is governed by the *general *type to which it conforms. However, > individual *humans *are not tokens of the type "man" as a *word *in > English, the type "homo" as a *word *in Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as > a *word *in Greek; instead, they are the *dynamical objects* of those > signs. > > GF: As Gary R confirmed, it is the written or spoken *word* that is a > token. It would follow that the three words in the different languages are > *subtypes*, not tokens, of the more general type which Peirce referred to > as “the same sign.” This implies a hierarchy of *types* but not of > *tokens*. > > I wonder, though, whether the term “token” can only apply to *external *signs. > In his October 1995 *Monist* article, Peirce referred to “A sign (under > which designation I place every kind of thought, and not alone external > signs)” (CP 5.447, EP2:350). A thought I am hosting at the moment is > certainly *embodied* here and now in a pattern of neural activity, > whether I *utter* it or not, just as a spoken or written text is > *embodied* in a pattern of sound waves or marks on a page. The only > difference is that it is an *internal* sign, invisible to others. Does > that disqualify it as a *token*? I would certainly hesitate to call it a > *type*. > > Gary f. >
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