Gary F., List:

GF: It would follow that the three words in the different languages are
*subtypes*, not tokens, of the more general type which Peirce referred to
as “the same sign.” This implies a hierarchy of *types *but not of *tokens*.


I agree, although I prefer to use "type" for what you are calling a
"subtype" and "sign" for what you are calling "the more general type." That
way, the hierarchy has exactly four distinct levels--*tones *as
indefinitely significant characters possessed by *tokens*, each of which is
an individual instance governed by and conforming to a *type*, which is a
definitely significant form within a particular language or other system of
*signs*, each of which encompasses multiple types that are at least
approximate translations of each other.

GF: A thought I am hosting at the moment is certainly *embodied *here and
now in a pattern of neural activity, whether I *utter *it or not, just as a
spoken or written text is *embodied *in a pattern of sound waves or marks
on a page. The only difference is that it is an *internal *sign, invisible
to others. Does that disqualify it as a *token*?


I would say that it is indeed a token, because it is an *individual*
embodiment of the sign. After all, as we have discussed previously, an
internal thought is a hypothetically discrete constituent--with boundaries
that are marked off somewhat arbitrarily--of an ongoing continuous dialogue
in which the utterer and interpreter are temporally sequential stages of
the same (quasi-)mind. In other words, the pattern of neural activity that
embodies a thought-sign is an *actual *utterance just as much as the
pattern of sound waves or marks on a page that embodies a spoken or written
text.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Nov 5, 2021 at 8:16 AM <[email protected]> wrote:

> Jon, Gary R, List,
>
> Thanks for correcting my mistake about tokens, which somehow slipped by my
> internal editor.
>
> JAS: the three words in different languages are only tokens where they
> are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those *individual *instances
> is governed by the *general *type to which it conforms. However,
> individual *humans *are not tokens of the type "man" as a *word *in
> English, the type "homo" as a *word *in Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as
> a *word *in Greek; instead, they are the *dynamical objects* of those
> signs.
>
> GF: As Gary R confirmed, it is the written or spoken *word* that is a
> token. It would follow that the three words in the different languages are
> *subtypes*, not tokens, of the more general type which Peirce referred to
> as “the same sign.” This implies a hierarchy of *types* but not of
> *tokens*.
>
> I wonder, though, whether the term “token” can only apply to *external *signs.
> In his October 1995 *Monist* article, Peirce referred to “A sign (under
> which designation I place every kind of thought, and not alone external
> signs)” (CP 5.447, EP2:350). A thought I am hosting at the moment is
> certainly *embodied* here and now in a pattern of neural activity,
> whether I *utter* it or not, just as a spoken or written text is
> *embodied* in a pattern of sound waves or marks on a page. The only
> difference is that it is an *internal* sign, invisible to others. Does
> that disqualify it as a *token*? I would certainly hesitate to call it a
> *type*.
>
> Gary f.
>
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