Hi All,

This is a frequent question, between token and type, in knowledge representation systems. Of course, the answer to this question is context. When talking about a thing or its attributes, token is your choice. When talking about external relationships or group membership, type is your choice. Sometimes, for the same given thing, either might be appropriate, again depending on context.

A real advance in the second version of the OWL language, one of the W3C standards, was to enable a metamodeling technique called 'punning'. Depending on context, the same 'thing' may be either a class (type) or instance (individual) [1]. I think Charlie would approve, but I do not have song and verse to cite for that immediately at hand.

Mike

[1] https://www.mkbergman.com/2286/knowledge-representation-is-a-tricky-business/

On 11/5/2021 12:52 AM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Jon A.S., Gary F, List,

JAS: Again, my understanding of the terminology /within the context of speculative grammar/ is that only an /individual /embodiment of a sign is a token (emphasis added, GR). GR: I personally think that this is indisputable as there is more than sufficient textual support for this claim. One clear, oft repeated example:

    A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to
    that one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some
    single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing being
    significant only as occurring just when and where it does, such as
    this or that word on a single line of a single page of a single
    copy of a book, I will venture to call a /Token/. (Prolegomena to
    an Apology for Pragmaticism, CP 4.537, 1906)


JAS: Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that only an /individual /organism is properly called a token.
GR: This follows from the above.

JAS: Genus and species are both types, which correspond to different levels of generality that are at least somewhat arbitrary. GR: I agree that genus and species are types; and that they "are at least somewhat arbitrary" is clear from a consideration of the history of biological classification. Take this remark from the Wikipedia article on 'genus':

    The composition of a genus is determined by taxonomists
    <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taxonomy_(biology)>. The standards
    for genus classification are not strictly codified, so different
    authorities often produce different classifications for genera.


Something similar is true for 'species': see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Species

JAS: Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens where they are /actually/ written or spoken, and each of those /individual /instances is governed by the /general /type to which it conforms. GR: This follows from the first statement above and the Peirce quotation offered, that "only an /individual /embodiment of a sign is a token."

JAS: However, /individual *humans* are not tokens of the type "man" as a word in English/, the type "homo" as a /word /in Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as a /word /in Greek; instead, they are the /dynamical objects/ of those signs (emphasis added, GR). GR: I agree. This is an important distinction: namely, individual humans, biologically vs the type, "man" or "human," mere words. Let's not conflate the two.

JAS: Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs" is simply "sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is why the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable. GR: I agree that "the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable." Take, as supporting this notion the following, very late quotation:

    CSP: . . .we apply this word “sign” to everything recognizable
    whether to our outward senses or to our inward feeling and
    imagination, provided only it calls up some feeling, effort, or
    thought. . . (The Art of Reasoning Elucidated, MS [R] 678:23, 1910)


Perhaps it comes from my personal sense that at least some things regarding what Peirce thought, ought to be and /can be/ quasi-settled (the principle of fallibility requires the 'quasi-' here) So, I would say that from the standpoint of what Peirce meant (/at least/ in the context of semeiotic grammar), what has been presented above (by JAS) regarding 'token', 'type', 'sign', all of this seems to me as if it ought to be quasi-settled (the principle of fallibility requires the 'quasi-' here too).

At moments like this a question in my mind recurs: regarding what Peirce thought and wrote: Are there /any/ terms and their accompanying meanings which are truly irrefutable? I personally think that there are such terms and ideas. And one of these is that "/within the context of speculative grammar/. . . only an /individual /embodiment of a sign is a token."

Best.

Gary R



  “Let everything happen to you
  Beauty and terror
  Just keep going
  No feeling is final”
  ― Rainer Maria Rilke

*
*
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*
*





On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 6:24 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote:

    Gary F., List:

    Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of
    speculative grammar is that only an /individual /embodiment of a
    sign is a token. Accordingly, in biological classification, it
    seems to me that only an /individual /organism is properly called
    a token. Genus and species are both types, which correspond to
    different levels of generality that are at least somewhat arbitrary.

    Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens
    where they are /actually/ written or spoken, and each of those
    /individual /instances is governed by the /general /type to which
    it conforms. However, individual /humans /are not tokens of the
    type "man" as a /word /in English, the type "homo" as a /word /in
    Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as a /word /in Greek; instead, they
    are the /dynamical objects/ of those signs.

    Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of
    signs" is simply "sign," the one type that encompasses all other
    types, which is why the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be
    unavoidable.

    Regards,

    Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
    Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
    www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
    <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> -
    twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

    On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 9:31 AM <[email protected]> wrote:

        Jon, list,

        JAS: I acknowledge that your usage seems to be more consistent
        with Peirce's various taxonomies for sign classification, in
        which every sign is /either /a type or a token (or a tone).
        However, mine is grounded in the idea that every type can (and
        usually does) have multiple tokens …

        GF: I think the problem here is that the type/token
        /relation/, like the general/specific relation, can apply to
        several levels in a hierarchic or holarchic classification
        system, so that the reference is relative to the level in the
        hierarchy. For instance, in biological classification, the
        /genus/ is type and the /species/ is token, but the /species/
        is also the type of which an individual organism of that
        species is token (and there can be other levels intermediate
        between those two!).

        Likewise when Peirce says that “Man, /homo/, ἄνθρωπος are the
        same sign’ (MS 9), the “sign” is the type of which the three
        terms are tokens; but the three terms are also types of which
        individual humans are tokens. And if we use the term
        “individual” in logical strictness, we can say that Philip is
        the type of which Philip drunk and Philip sober are individual
        tokens. Is there a /top type/ (/Archetype? Metatype?) /in the
        holarchy of signs? The universe as sign, perhaps? I don’t
        know, but I would say that it’s /signs/ all the way down. So
        I’d rather not use the word /sign/ to refer to several
        specific levels of generality at once.

        By the way, some years ago I did a slideshow
        <https://gnusystems.ca/Type.pdf> dealing with the etymology
        and history of the word “type,” in connection with a Peirce
        text where he uses the Greek form τύπος in reference to the
        “copulation” of Form and Matter in semiosis. The text is
        included in /Turning Signs/ here
        <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/gld.htm#x29>, in a passage leading
        up to a discussion of the “categories.”

        Gary f.

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