Jon A.S., Gary F, List,
JAS: Again, my understanding of the terminology /within the context of
speculative grammar/ is that only an /individual /embodiment of a sign
is a token (emphasis added, GR).
GR: I personally think that this is indisputable as there is more than
sufficient textual support for this claim. One clear, oft repeated
example:
A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to
that one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some
single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing being
significant only as occurring just when and where it does, such as
this or that word on a single line of a single page of a single
copy of a book, I will venture to call a /Token/. (Prolegomena to
an Apology for Pragmaticism, CP 4.537, 1906)
JAS: Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that
only an /individual /organism is properly called a token.
GR: This follows from the above.
JAS: Genus and species are both types, which correspond to different
levels of generality that are at least somewhat arbitrary.
GR: I agree that genus and species are types; and that they "are at
least somewhat arbitrary" is clear from a consideration of the history
of biological classification. Take this remark from the Wikipedia
article on 'genus':
The composition of a genus is determined by taxonomists
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taxonomy_(biology)>. The standards
for genus classification are not strictly codified, so different
authorities often produce different classifications for genera.
Something similar is true for 'species': see:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Species
JAS: Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens
where they are /actually/ written or spoken, and each of those
/individual /instances is governed by the /general /type to which it
conforms.
GR: This follows from the first statement above and the Peirce
quotation offered, that "only an /individual /embodiment of a sign is
a token."
JAS: However, /individual *humans* are not tokens of the type "man" as
a word in English/, the type "homo" as a /word /in Latin, or the type
"ἄνθρωπος" as a /word /in Greek; instead, they are the /dynamical
objects/ of those signs (emphasis added, GR).
GR: I agree. This is an important distinction: namely, individual
humans, biologically vs the type, "man" or "human," mere words. Let's
not conflate the two.
JAS: Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of
signs" is simply "sign," the one type that encompasses all other
types, which is why the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be
unavoidable.
GR: I agree that "the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be
unavoidable." Take, as supporting this notion the following, very late
quotation:
CSP: . . .we apply this word “sign” to everything recognizable
whether to our outward senses or to our inward feeling and
imagination, provided only it calls up some feeling, effort, or
thought. . . (The Art of Reasoning Elucidated, MS [R] 678:23, 1910)
Perhaps it comes from my personal sense that at least some things
regarding what Peirce thought, ought to be and /can be/ quasi-settled
(the principle of fallibility requires the 'quasi-' here) So, I would
say that from the standpoint of what Peirce meant (/at least/ in the
context of semeiotic grammar), what has been presented above (by JAS)
regarding 'token', 'type', 'sign', all of this seems to me as if it
ought to be quasi-settled (the principle of fallibility requires the
'quasi-' here too).
At moments like this a question in my mind recurs: regarding what
Peirce thought and wrote: Are there /any/ terms and their accompanying
meanings which are truly irrefutable? I personally think that there
are such terms and ideas. And one of these is that "/within the
context of speculative grammar/. . . only an /individual /embodiment
of a sign is a token."
Best.
Gary R
“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke
*
*
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*
*
On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 6:24 PM Jon Alan Schmidt
<[email protected]> wrote:
Gary F., List:
Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of
speculative grammar is that only an /individual /embodiment of a
sign is a token. Accordingly, in biological classification, it
seems to me that only an /individual /organism is properly called
a token. Genus and species are both types, which correspond to
different levels of generality that are at least somewhat arbitrary.
Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens
where they are /actually/ written or spoken, and each of those
/individual /instances is governed by the /general /type to which
it conforms. However, individual /humans /are not tokens of the
type "man" as a /word /in English, the type "homo" as a /word /in
Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as a /word /in Greek; instead, they
are the /dynamical objects/ of those signs.
Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of
signs" is simply "sign," the one type that encompasses all other
types, which is why the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be
unavoidable.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 9:31 AM <[email protected]> wrote:
Jon, list,
JAS: I acknowledge that your usage seems to be more consistent
with Peirce's various taxonomies for sign classification, in
which every sign is /either /a type or a token (or a tone).
However, mine is grounded in the idea that every type can (and
usually does) have multiple tokens …
GF: I think the problem here is that the type/token
/relation/, like the general/specific relation, can apply to
several levels in a hierarchic or holarchic classification
system, so that the reference is relative to the level in the
hierarchy. For instance, in biological classification, the
/genus/ is type and the /species/ is token, but the /species/
is also the type of which an individual organism of that
species is token (and there can be other levels intermediate
between those two!).
Likewise when Peirce says that “Man, /homo/, ἄνθρωπος are the
same sign’ (MS 9), the “sign” is the type of which the three
terms are tokens; but the three terms are also types of which
individual humans are tokens. And if we use the term
“individual” in logical strictness, we can say that Philip is
the type of which Philip drunk and Philip sober are individual
tokens. Is there a /top type/ (/Archetype? Metatype?) /in the
holarchy of signs? The universe as sign, perhaps? I don’t
know, but I would say that it’s /signs/ all the way down. So
I’d rather not use the word /sign/ to refer to several
specific levels of generality at once.
By the way, some years ago I did a slideshow
<https://gnusystems.ca/Type.pdf> dealing with the etymology
and history of the word “type,” in connection with a Peirce
text where he uses the Greek form τύπος in reference to the
“copulation” of Form and Matter in semiosis. The text is
included in /Turning Signs/ here
<https://gnusystems.ca/TS/gld.htm#x29>, in a passage leading
up to a discussion of the “categories.”
Gary f.
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