Jeff, List: This is another example of incorrectly applying Peirce's semeiotic terminology of "type" and "token" to the *objects *of signs rather than to signs *themselves*. Just as an individual man is *not *a token of the type "man" as a word in English, the individual philosophers called by the names Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle are *not "*paradigms of token individuals." Instead, they are the *dynamical *objects of those three names, which are tokens of types whenever and wherever they are *actually *written, spoken, thought of, or otherwise embodied.
In a draft letter to Lady Welby (EP 2:484-489, 1908), Peirce gives the trichotomies for classifying a sign according to its *dynamical *object as abstractive/concretive/collective, its *immediate *object as descriptive/designative/copulant, and the sign *itself *as (tentatively) potisign/actisign/famisign rather than tone/token/type. He further posits that all famisigns are collective copulants, while actisigns can also be collective designatives or concretive designatives. Hence, the English word "man" as a *type *is a collective copulant, and when a *token *of "man" or a proper name like "Socrates" is used to denote an *individual *man, it is a concretive designative. As for quantification, Francesco Bellucci observes that some of Peirce's earlier taxonomies associate it directly with the *immediate *object as vague/singular/general (*Peirce's Speculative Grammar: Logic as Semiotics*, section 8.1.1). "Greek philosophers" is a collective copulant type, so a quantifier must be added to identify which *individual* member of that collection is the dynamical object of an *individual *token of that type. "*Some *Greek philosopher" reserves the choice of that individual for the utterer, "*this *Greek philosopher" indicates that individual within the context of the utterance, and "*any *Greek philosopher" allows the interpreter to choose that individual. "Most Greek philosophers" is a bit trickier, since it ostensibly denotes an indefinite *collection *of members within the entire collection of Greek philosophers--which presumably encompasses all past, present, and future Greek philosophers unless stipulated otherwise by the utterer. I suggest reformulating the proposition accordingly--"for any Greek philosopher, it is probable that he/she dies before age 100." The dynamical *object *is thus whatever individual Greek philosopher is chosen by the interpreter, and the immediate *interpretant *in accordance with the definition of "probable" is that if an infinite series of such individuals were to be randomly chosen, then more than half of them would die before age 100. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 6:18 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Gary F, JAS, List, > > The points made about types and tokens are interesting. > > Consider an inductive argument. > > 1. Socrates is a Greek philosopher, and he died at age 71. > 2. Plato is a Greek philosopher, and he died at age 80. > 3. Aristotle is a Greek philosopher, and he died at age 62. > 4. Therefore, it is probable that most Greek philosophers die before > age 100. > > In this argument, the philosophers called by the names Socrates, Plato and > Aristotle are all paradigms of token individuals. > > What about "most Greek philosophers?" In logical terms, we take a > class--Greek philosophers--and then we quantify over it. The quantifier, > Peirce points out, takes many individuals and treats them as a collection. > We can, for the purposes of expressing the conclusion in the Beta system of > the EG, treat that collection as an individual having the character of an > existing group. > > What is the status of the collection when we include the "it is probable > that" and express the conclusion in the Gamma system of the EG? If we don't > restrict the group to individuals who lived in the past, but include > possible living Greek philosophers who have not yet died, then what should > we say about "most Greek philosophers"? Type or token? General kind or > group of particular individuals? How about a group that includes future > Greek philosophers not yet born? > > We can, for various purposes, restrict our attention in different ways. > This is, after all, the function of indices--including the quantifiers > employed in natural languages. > > My suggestion is that we use the formal systems of the EGs as mathematical > tools for clarifying hypotheses in the philosophical theory of logic. If > our aim in a critical logic is to give explanations of function of the > terms and propositions in the argument so as to explain the grounds of the > validity of the reasoning, then I suspect we'd better take some care to > sort out the relationships between the quantifiers and modal operators in > the inductive reasoning. > > This kind of concern, I believe, should be controlling when it comes to > better understanding the classification of different kinds of signs in a > theory of speculative grammar as types or tokens. > --Jeff > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 >
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