Re: Consciousness Easy, Zombies Hard
On 16 Jan 2012, at 07:52, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/1/16 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com On Jan 15, 3:07 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2012/1/14 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com Thought I'd throw this out there. If computationalism argues that zombies can't exist, therefore anything that we cannot distinguish from a conscious person must be conscious, that also means that it is impossible to create something that acts like a person which is not a person. Zombies are not Turing emulable. No, zombies *that are persons in every aspect* are impossible. Not only not turing emulable... they are absurd. If you define them that way then the word has no meaning. What is a person in every aspect that is not at all a person? The *only thing* a zombie lacks is consciousness... every other aspects of a persons, it has it. That is right. People should not confuse the Hollywood zombie and the philosophical zombie which are 3p-identical to human person, but lack any 1-p perspective. Note also that Turing invented his test to avoid the philosophical hard issue of consciousness. In a nutshell Turing defines consciousness by having an intelligent behavior. The Turing test is equivalent with a type of no zombie principle. It is like saying that if zombie exist, you have to treat them as human being, because we cannot know if they are zombie. The only way the term has meaning is when it is used to define something that appears to be a person in every way to an outside observer (and that would ultimately have to be a human observer) but has no interior experience. That is not absurd at all, and in fact describes animation, puppetry, and machine intelligence. Puppetries, animations do not act like a person. They act like puppetries, animations. A philosophical zombie *acts like a person but lacks consciousness*. Exactly. Bruno If we run the zombie argument backwards then, at what substitution level of zombiehood does a (completely possible) simulated person become an (non-Turing emulable) unconscious puppet? How bad of a simulation does it have to be before becoming an impossible zombie? This to me reveals an absurdity of arithmetic realism. Pinocchio the boy is possible to simulate mechanically, but Pinocchio the puppet is impossible. You conflate two (mayve more) notions of zombie... the only one important in the zombie argument is this: something that act like a person in every aspects*** but nonetheless is not conscious... If it is indeed what you mean, then could you devise a test that could show that the zombie indeed lacks consciousness (remember that *by definition* you cannot tell apart the zombie and a real conscious person). No, I think that I have a workable and useful notion of zombie. I'm not sure how the definition you are trying use is meaningful. It seems like a straw man of the zombie issue. We already know that subjectivity is private, what we don't know is whether that means that simulations automatically acquire consciousness or not. The zombie issue is not to show that we can't imagine a person without subjectivity and see that as evidence that subjectivity must inherently arise from function. My point is that it also must mean that we cannot stop inanimate objects from acquiring consciousness if they are a sufficiently sophisticated simulation. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: An analogy for Qualia
On 14 Jan 2012, at 19:00, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Jan 14, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: OK, but today we avoid the expression computable number. Why? Seems to me that quite a large number of people still use the term. A computable number is a real number that can be computed to any finite amount of digits by a Turing Machine, however most irrational numbers, nearly all in fact, are NOT computable . So the sort of numbers computers or the human mind deals in can not be the only thing that is fundamental because most numbers can not be derived from them. All natural number are computable Yes, but very few numbers are natural numbers. But in computability theory we have only natural numbers. A real number like PI or e is modeled by a total computable function from N to N. It makes things simpler. there is no real theory of computability for the real numbers. There are no equivalent to the Church Turing thesis for them. And with comp we don't need any ontological numbers other than the natural numbers. The whole of analysis and physics is eventually made espistemological (number's ideas). With mechanism it is absolutely indifferent which fundamental finite object we admit. If by mechanism you mean determinism then your remarks are irrelevant because we don't live in a deterministic universe, and even the natural numbers are not finite. No. By mechanism I mean the idea that the brain (or whatever needed for consciousness) is Turing emulable. This shows immediately (UDA1-3) that we live in a non deterministic reality. Non determinism is a simple consequence of mechanism, which arise from self-duplication. There is no way consciousness can have a direct Darwinian advantage so it must be a byproduct of something that does have that virtue, and the obvious candidate is intelligence. I disagree. Consciousness has a darwinian role in the very origin of the physical realm. If Evolution can't see something then it can't select for it, and it can't see consciousness in others any better than we can, just like us all it can see is behavior. I am talking on the Evolution of the physical laws. You have to follow the whole UDA to understand the special and crucial role of consciousness. Physical reality arise from the communicable first plural part of the consciousness flux existing in elementary arithmetic as a whole. I know this is not obvious at all. That's why it is a non trivial discovery. It makes physics a branch of mathematical computer science (alias number theory). By number I always mean natural number. like relative universal self-speedin I don't know what that means. It means making your faculty of decision, with respect to your most probable environment, more quick. In other words thinking fast. The fastest signals in the human brain move at a about 100 meters per second and many are far slower, the fastest signals in a computer move at 300,000,000 meters per second. That's why consciousness plays a key role. Any slow universal machine can be arbitrarily speed up, on almost all its inputs, by change of software. This is Blum speed-up theorem. Universal machine can always been optimized by change of software only, and one way to do that is allowing the machine to believe in non provable propositions. That's why biological evolution selected conscious machine. They know much more than what they can communicate, and eventually get puzzled by such knowledge. BTW I tend to use competence for what you call intelligence. Intelligence requires consciousness in my approach and definitions. Competence needs some amount of intelligence, but it has a negative feedback on intelligence. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Question about PA and 1p
On 14 Jan 2012, at 18:51, David Nyman wrote: On 14 January 2012 16:50, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: The problem is that mathematics cannot represent matter other than by invariance with respect to time, etc. absent an interpreter. Sure, but do you mean to say that the interpreter must be physical? I don't see why. And yet, as you say, the need for interpretation is unavoidable. Now, my understanding of Bruno, after some fairly close questioning (which may still leave me confused, of course) is that the elements of his arithmetical ontology are strictly limited to numbers (or their equivalent) + addition and multiplication. This emerged during discussion of macroscopic compositional principles implicit in the interpretation of micro-physical schemas; principles which are rarely understood as being epistemological in nature. Hence, strictly speaking, even the ascription of the notion of computation to arrangements of these bare arithmetical elements assumes further compositional principles and therefore appeals to some supplementary epistemological interpretation. In other words, any bare ontological schema, uninterpreted, is unable, from its own unsupplemented resources, to actualise whatever higher-level emergents may be implicit within it. But what else could deliver that interpretation/actualisation? What could embody the collapse of ontology and epistemology into a single actuality? Could it be that interpretation is finally revealed only in the conscious merger of these two polarities? Actually you can define computation, even universal machine, by using only addition and multiplication. So universal machine exists in elementary arithmetic in the same sense as in the existence of prime number. All the Bp and Dp are pure arithmetical sentences. What cannot be defined is Bp p, and we need to go out of the mind of the machine, and out of arithmetic, to provide the meaning, and machines can do that too. So, in arithmetic, you can find true statement about machine going outside of arithmetic. It is here that we have to be careful of not doing Searle's error of confusing levels, and that's why the epistemology internal in arithmetic can be bigger than arithmetic. Arithmetic itself does not believe in that epistemology, but it believes in numbers believing in them. Whatever you believe in will not been automatically believed by God, but God will always believe that you do believe in them. Bruno David Hi Bruno, You seem to not understand the role that the physical plays at all! This reminds me of an inversion of how most people cannot understand the way that math is abstract and have to work very hard to understand notions like in principle a coffee cup is the same as a doughnut. On 1/14/2012 6:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Jan 2012, at 18:24, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi Bruno, On 1/13/2012 4:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Stephen, On 13 Jan 2012, at 00:58, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi Bruno, On 1/12/2012 1:01 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Jan 2012, at 19:35, acw wrote: On 1/11/2012 19:22, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi, I have a question. Does not the Tennenbaum Theorem prevent the concept of first person plural from having a coherent meaning, since it seems to makes PA unique and singular? In other words, how can multiple copies of PA generate a plurality of first person since they would be an equivalence class. It seems to me that the concept of plurality of 1p requires a 3p to be coherent, but how does a 3p exist unless it is a 1p in the PA sense? Onward! Stephen My understanding of 1p plural is merely many 1p's sharing an apparent 3p world. That 3p world may or may not be globally coherent (it is most certainly locally coherent), and may or may not be computable, typically I imagine it as being locally computed by an infinity of TMs, from the 1p. At least one coherent 3p foundation exists as the UD, but that's something very different from the universe a structural realist would believe in (for example, 'this universe', or the MWI multiverse). So a coherent 3p foundation always exists, possibly an infinity of them. The parts (or even the whole) of the 3p foundation should be found within the UD. As for PA's consciousness, I don't know, maybe Bruno can say a lot more about this. My understanding of consciousness in Bruno's theory is that an OM(Observer Moment) corresponds to a Sigma-1 sentence. You can ascribe a sort of local consciousness to the person living, relatively to you, that Sigma_1 truth, but the person itself is really related to all the proofs (in Platonia) of that sentences (roughly speaking). OK, but that requires that I have a justification for a belief in Platonia. The closest that I can get to Platonia is something like the class of all verified proofs (which supervenes on some form of physical process.) You need just to believe that in
Re: JOINING Post and On measure alteration mechanisms and other practical tests for COMP
On 15 Jan 2012, at 00:17, Russell Standish wrote: On Sat, Jan 07, 2012 at 07:02:52AM +0200, acw wrote: On 1/6/2012 18:57, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Jan 2012, at 11:02, acw wrote: Thanks for replying. I was worried my post was too big and few people will bother reading it due to size. I hope to read your opinion on the viability of the experiment I presented in my original post. Any chance you could break it up into smaller digestible pieces? That would be good idea. read it twice, and generate too much comments in my head, and none seems to address the point. Now i am more busy, so acw will need to be patient I grasp his idea. To Bruno Marchal: Do you plan on ever publishing your thesis in english? My french is a bit rusty and it would take a rather long time to walk through it, however I did read the SANE and CCQ papers, as well as a few others. I think that SANE is enough, although some people pushes me to submit to some more public journal. It is not yet clear if physicist or logician will understand. Physicists asks the good questions but don't have the logical tools. Logicians have the right tools, but are not really interested in the applied question. By tradition modern logicians despise their philosophical origin. Some personal contingent problems slow me down, too. Don't want to bore you with this. If it's sufficient, I'll just have to read the right books to better understand AUDA, as it is now, I understood some parts, but also had trouble connecting some ideas in the AUDA. Maybe I should write a book. There is, on my url, a long version of the thesis in french: conscience et mécanisme, with all details, but then it is 700 pages long, and even there, non-logician does not grasp the logic. It is a pity but such kind of work reveals the abyssal gap between logicians and physicists, and the Penrose misunderstanding of Gödel's theorem has frightened the physicists to even take any look further. To defend the thesis it took me more time to explain elementary logic and computer science than philosophy of mind. A book would surely appeal to a larger audience, but a paper which only mentions the required reading could also be enough, although in the latter case fewer people would be willing to spend the time to understand it. There is a project underway to translate Secret de l'amibe into English, which IMHO is an even better introduction to the topic than Bruno's theses (a lot of technical detail has been supressed to make the central ideas digestible). We're about half way through at present - its a volunteer project though, so it will probably be another year or so before it is done/ Thanks to Russell and Kim. Does anyone have a complete downloadable archive of this mailing list, besides the web-accessible google groups or nabble one? Google groups seems to badly group posts together and generates some duplicates for older posts. I agree. Google groups are not practical. The first old archive were very nice (Escribe); but like with all software, archiving get worst with time. nabble is already better, and I don't know if there are other one. Note also that the everything list, maintained by Wei Dai, is a list lasting since a long time, so that the total archive must be rather huge. Thanks to Wei Dai to maintain the list, despite the ASSA people (Hal Finney, Wei Dai in some post, Schmidhuber, ...) seems to have quit after losing the argument with the RSSA people. Well, to be sure Russell Standish still use ASSA, it seems to me, and I have always defended the idea that ASSA is indeed not completely non sensical, although it concerns more the geography than the physics, in the comp frame. If someone from those early times still has the posts, it might be nice if they decided to post an archive (such as a mailer spool). For large Usenet groups, it's not unusual for people to have personal archives, even from 1980's and earlier. I have often thought this would be a very useful resource - sadly I never kept my own archive. It would probably be a good idea to webbot / spider to download the contents of the archives as they currently exist. That might be useful. Especially with things like NDAA, SOPA, etc. Looks like deeper threats than usual accumulate on the free world. I had no idea that was the reason I don't seem them post anymore(when I was looking at older posts, I saw they used to post here). For most people, the everything list is a side interest, and other priorities and interests will interfere with particpation. Bruno is one of the few people who has dedicated his life to this topic, so one shouldn't be too surprised if other people leave the list out of exhaustion :). In cognitive science, many confuse science and philosophy. I like philosophy but it is not my job. I don't defend any truth, but only attempt to criticize invalid arguments. As for losing the RSSA
Re: An analogy for Qualia
On 15 Jan 2012, at 09:13, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: What about the Turing test for a person in that state to check if he still has consciousness? As I said in another post, the very idea of the Turing test consists in avoiding completely the notion of consciousness. I do disagree with Turing on this. We can build a theory of consciousness, including, like with comp, a theory having refutable consequences. Turing was still influenced by Vienna-like positivism. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: An analogy for Qualia
On 15 Jan 2012, at 18:14, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Jan 14, 2012 at 1:56 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: How would you generalize the Turing Test for consciousness? By doing the exact same thing we do when we evaluate our fellow human beings, assume that there is a direct link between intelligent behavior and consciousness. I agree with this. But we cannot test directly consciousness and intelligence. We can measure and evaluate competence, but it is domain dependent, and unrelated to intelligence and consciousness. Local zombie *can* exist. Any intelligent or conscious behavior can be ascribed to something not conscious, for a short period of time. When one of our fellow creatures is drowsy they don't behave very intelligently and we assume they are less conscious than they were when they where taking a calculus exam. And when they are in a deep sleep, under anesthesia, or dead they behave even less intelligently and we assume (even though there is no proof) that their consciousness is similarly effected. With comp we can show that consciousness is never effected, but the relative manifestation of consciousness can be effected. Again, this is counter-intuitive. The brain seems gifted in making us believe in unconsciousness, but that is an illusion bring by dissociative subroutine, or even chemicals. It is weird, and I doubt it to be true, but with comp, consciousness is an inescapable prison. You can hope only for relative amnesia. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Consciousness Easy, Zombies Hard
On 15 Jan 2012, at 19:33, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Jan 14, 2012 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: If computationalism argues that zombies can't exist, therefore anything that we cannot distinguish from a conscious person must be conscious, that also means that it is impossible to create something that acts like a person which is not a person. Zombies are not Turing emulable. Maybe. Zombie behavior is certainly Turing emulable but you are asking more than that and there is no way to prove what you want to know because it hinges on one important question: how can you tell if a zombie is a zombie? Brains are not my favorite meal but I don't think dietary preference or even unsightly skin blemishes are a good test for consciousness; I believe zombies have little if any consciousness because, at least as depicted in the movies, zombies act really really dumb. But maybe the film industry is inflicting an unfair stereotype on a persecuted minority and there are good hard working zombies out there who you don't hear about that write love poetry and teach at Harvard, if so then I think those zombies are conscious even if I would still find a polite excuse to decline their invitation to dinner. This to me reveals an absurdity of arithmetic realism. Pinocchio the boy is possible to simulate mechanically, but Pinocchio the puppet is impossible. Doesn't that strike anyone else as an obvious deal breaker? I find nothing absurd about that and neither did Evolution. The parts of our brain that so dramatically separate us from other animals, the parts that deal with language and long term planing and mathematics took HUNDREDS of times longer to evolve than the parts responsible for intense emotion like pleasure, pain, fear, hate, jealousy and love. And why do you think it is that in this group and elsewhere everybody and their brother is pushing their own General Theory of Consciousness but nobody even attempts a General Theory of Intelligence? There are general theory of learning, like those of Case and Smith, Blum, Osherson, etc. But they are necessarily non constructive. They are not usable neither for building AI, nor for verifying if something is intelligent. It shows that Intelligence (competence) is an intrinsic hard subject with many non-comparable degrees of intelligence. Intelligence is not programmable. It is only self-programmable, and it interests nobody, except philosophers and theologians. When machine will be intelligent, we will send them in camps or jails. Intelligence leads to dissidence. We pretend appreciating intelligence, but we invest a lost in preventing it, in both children and machine. The reason is that theorizing about the one is easy but theorizing about the other is hard, hellishly hard, and because when intelligence theories fail they fail with a loud thud that is obvious to all, but one consciousness theory works as well, or as badly, as any other. See the work of Case and Smith. It is not well know because it is based on theoretical computer science (recursion theory) which is not well known. Those are definite interesting result there, even if not applicable. The non-union theorem of Blum shows that there is something uncomputably much more intelligent than a machine: a couple of machine. The theory is super-non-linear. Consciousness theories are easy because there are no facts they need to explain, What? With comp, not only you have to explain the qualia, but it has been proved that you have to explain the quanta as well, and this without assuming a physical reality. but there is an astronomical number of things that need to be explained to understand how intelligence works. Not really. It is just that intelligent things organize themselves in non predictable way, at all. The basic are simple (addition and multiplication) but the consequences are not boundable. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Question about PA and 1p
On 16 January 2012 10:04, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Actually you can define computation, even universal machine, by using only addition and multiplication. So universal machine exists in elementary arithmetic in the same sense as in the existence of prime number. That may be, but we were discussing interpretation. As you say above: YOU can define computation, even universal machine, by using only addition and multiplication (my emphasis). But this is surely, as you are wont to say, too quick. Firstly, in what sense can numbers in simple arithmetical relation define THEMSELVES as computation, or indeed as anything else than what they simply are? I think that the ascription of self-interpretation to a bare ontology is superficial; it conceals an implicit supplementary appeal to epistemology, and indeed to a self. Hence it appears that some perspectival union of epistemology and ontology is a prerequisite of interpretation. David On 14 Jan 2012, at 18:51, David Nyman wrote: On 14 January 2012 16:50, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: The problem is that mathematics cannot represent matter other than by invariance with respect to time, etc. absent an interpreter. Sure, but do you mean to say that the interpreter must be physical? I don't see why. And yet, as you say, the need for interpretation is unavoidable. Now, my understanding of Bruno, after some fairly close questioning (which may still leave me confused, of course) is that the elements of his arithmetical ontology are strictly limited to numbers (or their equivalent) + addition and multiplication. This emerged during discussion of macroscopic compositional principles implicit in the interpretation of micro-physical schemas; principles which are rarely understood as being epistemological in nature. Hence, strictly speaking, even the ascription of the notion of computation to arrangements of these bare arithmetical elements assumes further compositional principles and therefore appeals to some supplementary epistemological interpretation. In other words, any bare ontological schema, uninterpreted, is unable, from its own unsupplemented resources, to actualise whatever higher-level emergents may be implicit within it. But what else could deliver that interpretation/actualisation? What could embody the collapse of ontology and epistemology into a single actuality? Could it be that interpretation is finally revealed only in the conscious merger of these two polarities? Actually you can define computation, even universal machine, by using only addition and multiplication. So universal machine exists in elementary arithmetic in the same sense as in the existence of prime number. All the Bp and Dp are pure arithmetical sentences. What cannot be defined is Bp p, and we need to go out of the mind of the machine, and out of arithmetic, to provide the meaning, and machines can do that too. So, in arithmetic, you can find true statement about machine going outside of arithmetic. It is here that we have to be careful of not doing Searle's error of confusing levels, and that's why the epistemology internal in arithmetic can be bigger than arithmetic. Arithmetic itself does not believe in that epistemology, but it believes in numbers believing in them. Whatever you believe in will not been automatically believed by God, but God will always believe that you do believe in them. Bruno David Hi Bruno, You seem to not understand the role that the physical plays at all! This reminds me of an inversion of how most people cannot understand the way that math is abstract and have to work very hard to understand notions like in principle a coffee cup is the same as a doughnut. On 1/14/2012 6:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Jan 2012, at 18:24, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi Bruno, On 1/13/2012 4:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Stephen, On 13 Jan 2012, at 00:58, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi Bruno, On 1/12/2012 1:01 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Jan 2012, at 19:35, acw wrote: On 1/11/2012 19:22, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi, I have a question. Does not the Tennenbaum Theorem prevent the concept of first person plural from having a coherent meaning, since it seems to makes PA unique and singular? In other words, how can multiple copies of PA generate a plurality of first person since they would be an equivalence class. It seems to me that the concept of plurality of 1p requires a 3p to be coherent, but how does a 3p exist unless it is a 1p in the PA sense? Onward! Stephen My understanding of 1p plural is merely many 1p's sharing an apparent 3p world. That 3p world may or may not be globally coherent (it is most certainly locally coherent), and may or may not be computable, typically I imagine it as being locally computed by an infinity of TMs, from the 1p. At least one coherent 3p foundation exists as the UD, but that's something
Re: Consciousness Easy, Zombies Hard
On Mon, Jan 16, 2012 at 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Consciousness theories are easy because there are no facts they need to explain What? With comp, not only you have to explain the qualia With ANY theory of consciousness you have to explain qualia, and every consciousness theory does as well or as badly as any other in doing that. but it has been proved that you have to explain the quanta as well, I don't know what that means. and this without assuming a physical reality. But I do know that assuming reality does not seem to be a totally outrageous assumption. but there is an astronomical number of things that need to be explained to understand how intelligence works. Not really. It is just that [...] If you know how intelligence works you can make a super intelligent computer right now and you're well on your way to becoming a trillionaire. It seems to me that when discussing this very complex subject people use the phrase it's just a bit too much. intelligent things organize themselves in non predictable way, at all. The basic are simple (addition and multiplication) That's like saying I know how to cure cancer, it's basically simple, just arrange the atoms in cancer cells so that they are no longer cancerous. It's easy to learn the fundamentals of Chess, the rules of the game, but that does not mean you understand all the complexities and subtleties of it and are now a grandmaster. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Consciousness Easy, Zombies Hard
On Sun, Jan 15, 2012 at 7:20 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: I think that I have a workable and useful notion of zombie. Then I would very much like to hear what it is. What really grabbed my attention is that you said it was workable and useful, so whatever notion you have it can't include things like zombies are conscious but or zombies are NOT conscious but because I have no way to directly test for consciousness so such a notion would not be workable or useful to me. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Consciousness Easy, Zombies Hard
On Jan 16, 11:23 am, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Jan 15, 2012 at 7:20 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: I think that I have a workable and useful notion of zombie. Then I would very much like to hear what it is. What really grabbed my attention is that you said it was workable and useful, so whatever notion you have it can't include things like zombies are conscious but or zombies are NOT conscious but because I have no way to directly test for consciousness so such a notion would not be workable or useful to me. Zombie describes something which seems like it could be conscious from the outside (ie to a human observer) but actually is not. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Consciousness Easy, Zombies Hard
Craig, Do you have an opinion regarding the possibility of Strong AI, and the other questions I posed in my earlier post? Thanks, Jason On Mon, Jan 16, 2012 at 10:50 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On Jan 16, 11:23 am, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Jan 15, 2012 at 7:20 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: I think that I have a workable and useful notion of zombie. Then I would very much like to hear what it is. What really grabbed my attention is that you said it was workable and useful, so whatever notion you have it can't include things like zombies are conscious but or zombies are NOT conscious but because I have no way to directly test for consciousness so such a notion would not be workable or useful to me. Zombie describes something which seems like it could be conscious from the outside (ie to a human observer) but actually is not. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Question about PA and 1p
On 16 Jan 2012, at 15:32, David Nyman wrote: On 16 January 2012 10:04, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Actually you can define computation, even universal machine, by using only addition and multiplication. So universal machine exists in elementary arithmetic in the same sense as in the existence of prime number. That may be, but we were discussing interpretation. As you say above: YOU can define computation, even universal machine, by using only addition and multiplication (my emphasis). Not just ME. A tiny part of arithmetic can too. All universal numbers can do that. No need of first person notion. All this can be shown in a 3p way. Indeed, in arithmetic. Even without the induction axioms, so that we don't need Löbian machine. The existence of the UD for example, is a theorem of (Robinson) arithmetic. Now, that kinds of truth are rather long and tedious to show. This was shown mainly by Gödel in his 1931 paper (for rich Löbian theories). It is called arithmetization of meta-mathematics. I will try to explain the salt of it without being too much technical below. But this is surely, as you are wont to say, too quick. Firstly, in what sense can numbers in simple arithmetical relation define THEMSELVES as computation, or indeed as anything else than what they simply are? Here you ask a more difficult question. Nevertheless it admits a positive answer. I think that the ascription of self-interpretation to a bare ontology is superficial; it conceals an implicit supplementary appeal to epistemology, and indeed to a self. But can define a notion of 3-self in arithmetic. Then to get the 1- self, we go at the meta-level and combine it with the notion of arithmetical truth. That notion is NOT definable in arithmetic, but that is a good thing, because it will explain why the notion of first person, and of consciousness, will not be definable by machine. Hence it appears that some perspectival union of epistemology and ontology is a prerequisite of interpretation. OK. But the whole force of comp comes from the fact that you can define a big part of that epistemology using only the elementary ontology. Let us agree on what we mean by defining something in arithmetic (or in the arithmetical language). The arithmetical language is the first order (predicate) logic with equality(=), so that it has the usual logical connectives (, V, -, ~ (and, or, implies, not), and the quantifiers E and A, (it exists and for all), together with the special arithmetical symbols 0, s + and *. To illustrate an arithmetical definition, let me give you some definitions of simple concepts. We can define the arithmetical relation x = y (x is less than or equal to y). Indeed x = y if and only if Ez(x+z = y) We can define x y (x is strictly less than y) by Ez((x+z) + s(0) = y) We can define (x divide y) by Ez(x*z = y) Now we can define (x is a prime number) by Az[ (x ≠ 1) and ((z divide x) - ((z = 1) or (z = x))] Which should be seen as a macro abbreviation of Az(~(x = s(0)) ((Ey(x*y = x) - (z = 1) V (z = x)). Now I tell you that we can define, exactly in that manner, the notion of universal number, computations, proofs, etc. In particular any proposition of the form phi_i(j) = k can be translated in arithmetic. A famous predicate due to Kleene is used for that effect . A universal number u can be defined by the relation AxAy(phi_u(x,y) = phi_x(y)), with x,y being a computable bijection from NXN to N. Like metamathematics can be arithmetized, theoretical computer science can be arithmetized. The interpretation is not done by me, but by the true relation between the numbers. 4 6 because it is true that Ez(s(s(s(s(0+z + s(0) = s(s(s(s(s(s(0)) ). That is true. Such a z exists, notably z = s(0). Likewize, assuming comp, the reason why you are conscious here and now is that your relative computational state exists, together with the infinitely many computations going through it. Your consciousness is harder to tackle, because it will refer more explicitly on that truth, like in the Bp p Theatetical trick. I do not need an extra God or observer of arithmetical truth, to interpret some number relation as computations, because the numbers, relatively to each other, already do that task. From their view, to believe that we need some extra-interpreter, would be like to believe that if your own brain is not observed by someone, it would not be conscious. Let me say two or three words on the SELF. Basically, it is very simple. You don't need universal numbers, nor super rich environment. You need an environment (machine, number) capable of duplicating, or concatenating piece of code. I usually sing this: If D(x) gives the description of x(x), then D(D) gives the description of DD. This belongs to the diagonalization family, and can be used to proves the existence of programs
Re: Consciousness Easy, Zombies Hard
On 16 Jan 2012, at 17:08, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Jan 16, 2012 at 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Consciousness theories are easy because there are no facts they need to explain What? With comp, not only you have to explain the qualia With ANY theory of consciousness you have to explain qualia, Correct. and every consciousness theory does as well or as badly as any other in doing that. So you believe that the theory according to which consciousness is a gift by a creationist God is as bad as the theory according to which consciousness is related to brain activity? but it has been proved that you have to explain the quanta as well, I don't know what that means. It means that 1) the quanta does not exist primitively but emerge, in the comp case, from number relations. 2) that physicalism is false, and that you have to derive the physical laws from those number relations. More exactly you have to derive the beliefs in the physical laws from those number relations. and this without assuming a physical reality. But I do know that assuming reality does not seem to be a totally outrageous assumption. Sure. But I was talking on the assumption of a primitively physical reality. That is shown, by the UD Argument, not be working when we assume that we are digitalisable machine. It is not outrageous, it is useless, non sensical, wrong with the usual Occam razor, in the same sense that it is wrong that invisible horse pulling cars would be the real reason why car moves. but there is an astronomical number of things that need to be explained to understand how intelligence works. Not really. It is just that [...] If you know how intelligence works you can make a super intelligent computer right now and you're well on your way to becoming a trillionaire. It seems to me that when discussing this very complex subject people use the phrase it's just a bit too much. You seem quite unfair. I was saying, in completo: It is just that intelligent things organize themselves in non predictable way, at all. The it just was not effective, and that was my point! This means that indeed we can write simple program leading to intelligence, but I can hardly be trillionnaire with that because they might need incompressible long time to show intelligence. Better to use nature's trick to copy from what has already been done. My whole point is that intelligence is not a constructive concept, like consciousness you cannot define it. You can define competence, and competence leads already itself to many non constructive notions and comparisons. The details are tricky and there is a very large litterature in theoretical artificial intelligence and learning theories. Simple programs leading to intelligence are grow, diverse, and multiply as much as possible in big but finite environment. or help yourself, etc. The UD can also be see as a little programs leading to the advent of intelligence (assuming mechanism), but not in a necessarily tractable way. We discuss in a context where the goal is not to do artificial intelligence engineering, but the goal is to find a theory of everything, including persons, consciousness, etc. intelligent things organize themselves in non predictable way, at all. The basic are simple (addition and multiplication) That's like saying I know how to cure cancer, it's basically simple, just arrange the atoms in cancer cells so that they are no longer cancerous. It's easy to learn the fundamentals of Chess, the rules of the game, but that does not mean you understand all the complexities and subtleties of it and are now a grandmaster. OK. That was my point. I never pretended to even know what intelligence really is. You should not mock the trivial points I make, because they are used in a non completely trivial way to show that the assumption of mechanism makes physics a branch of number theory (which is a key point in the search of a theory of everything). A reasoning made clear = a succession of trivial points. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Consciousness Easy, Zombies Hard
On Mon, Jan 16, 2012 at 11:50 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: I think that I have a workable and useful notion of zombie. [...] Zombie describes something which seems like it could be conscious from the outside (ie to a human observer) but actually is not. As I have absolutely no way of directly determining if a zombie is actually conscious or actually is not then despite your claim your notion is neither workable or useful. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Consciousness Easy, Zombies Hard
Hi, My $.02. I am reminded of the argument in Matrix Philosophy that if we cannot argue that our experiences are *not* simulations then we might as well bet that they are. While I have found that there are upper bounds on computational based content via logical arguments such as David Deutsch'sCANTGOTO http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Fabric_of_Reality and Carlton Caves http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0304083' research on computational resources, it seems to me that we have sufficient evidence to argue that if it is possible for a being to have 1p associated with it, then we might as well bet that they do. So I am betting that zombies do not exist. One simply cannot remain an agnostic on this issue. Onward! Stephen On 1/16/2012 1:27 PM, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Jan 16, 2012 at 11:50 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com mailto:whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: I think that I have a workable and useful notion of zombie. [...] Zombie describes something which seems like it could be conscious from the outside (ie to a human observer) but actually is not. As I have absolutely no way of directly determining if a zombie is actually conscious or actually is not then despite your claim your notion is neither workable or useful. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Consciousness Easy, Zombies Hard
On Mon, Jan 16, 2012 at 1:08 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: So you believe that the theory according to which consciousness is a gift by a creationist God is as bad as the theory according to which consciousness is related to brain activity? If creationists could explain consciousness then I would be a creationists, but they can not. Brain activity does not explain consciousness either. I don't know how but I believe as certainly as I believe anything that intelligence causes consciousness. I believe this not because I can prove it but because I simply could not function if I thought I was the only conscious being in the universe. the quanta does not exist primitively but emerge, in the comp case, from number relations. What sort of numbers, computable numbers or the far more common non-computable numbers? And what sort of relations.? This means that indeed we can write simple program leading to intelligence I don't know what that simple program could be, but I have already given a example of a simple program leading to emotion. My whole point is that intelligence is not a constructive concept, like consciousness you cannot define it. Intelligence is problem solving; not a perfect definition by any means but far far better than any known definition of consciousness. Examples are better than definitions anyway, intelligence is what Einstein did and consciousness is what I am. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Consciousness Easy, Zombies Hard
On Jan 16, 12:15 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Craig, Do you have an opinion regarding the possibility of Strong AI, and the other questions I posed in my earlier post? Sorry Jason, I didn't see your comment earlier. On Jan 15, 2:45 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Jan 14, 2012 at 9:39 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: wrote: Thought I'd throw this out there. If computationalism argues that zombies can't exist, I think the two ideas zombies are impossible and computationalism are independent. Where you might say they are related is that a disbelief in zombies yields a strong argument for computationalism. I don't think that it's possible to say that any two ideas 'are' independent from each other. Okay. Perhaps 'independent' was not an ideal term, but computationalism is at least not dependent on an argument against zombies, as far as I am aware. What computationlism does depend on though is the same view of consciousness that zombies would disqualify. All ideas can be related through semantic association, however distant. As far as your point though, of course I see the opposite relation - while admitting even the possibility of zombies suggests computationalism is founded on illusion., but a disbelief in zombies gives no more support for computationalism than it does for materialism or panpsychism. If one accepts that zombies are impossible, then to reject computationalism requires also rejecting the possibility of Strong AI (https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Strong_AI). What I'm saying is that if one accepts that zombies are impossible, then to accept computationalism requires accepting that *all* AI is strong already. therefore anything that we cannot distinguish from a conscious person must be conscious, that also means that it is impossible to create something that acts like a person which is not a person. Zombies are not Turing emulable. I think there is a subtle difference in meaning between it is impossible to create something that acts like a person which is not a person and saying Zombies are not Turing emulable. It is important to remember that the non-possibility of zombies doesn't imply a particular person or thing cannot be emulated, rather it means there is a particular consequence of certain Turing emulations which is unavoidable, namely the consciousness/mind/person. That's true, in the sense that emulable can only refer to a specific natural and real process being emulated rather than a fictional one. You have a valid point that the word emulable isn't the best term, but it's a red herring since the point I was making is that it would not be possible to avoid creating sentience in any sufficiently sophisticated cartoon, sculpture, or graphic representation of a person. Call it emulation, simulation, synthesis, whatever, the result is the same. I think you and I have different mental models for what is entailed by emulation, simulation, synthesis. Cartoons, sculptures, recordings, projections, and so on, don't necessarily compute anything (or at least, what they might depict as being computed can have little or no relation to what is actually computed by said cartoon, sculpture, recording, projection... For actual computation you need counterfactuals conditions. A cartoon depicting an AND gate is not required to behave as a genuine AND gate would, and flashing a few frames depicting what such an AND gate might do is not equivalent to the logical decision of an AND gate. I understand what you think I mean, but you're strawmanning my point. An AND gate is a generalizable concept. We know that. It's logic can be enacted in many (but not every) different physical forms. If we built the Lego AND mechanism seen here: http://goldfish.ikaruga.co.uk/andnor.html# and attached each side to a an effector which plays a cartoon of a semiconductor AND gate, then you would have a cartoon which is simulates an AND gate. The cartoon would be two separate cartoons in reality, and the logic between them would be entirely inferred by the audience, but this apparatus could be interpreted by the audience as a functional simulation. The audience can jump to the conclusion that the cartoon is a semiconductor AND gate. This is all that Strong AI will ever be. Computationalism assumes that consciousness is a generalizable concept, but we don't know that is true. My view is that it is not true, since we know that computation itself is not even generalizable to all physical forms. You can't build a computer without any solid materials. You can't build it out of uncontrollable living organisms. There are physical constraints even on what can function as a simple AND gate. It has no existence in a vacuum or a liquid or gas. Just as basic logic functions are impossible under those ordinary physically disorganized
Re: Consciousness Easy, Zombies Hard
On Jan 16, 1:42 pm, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: Hi, My $.02. I am reminded of the argument in Matrix Philosophy that if we cannot argue that our experiences are *not* simulations then we might as well bet that they are. While I have found that there are upper bounds on computational based content via logical arguments such as David Deutsch'sCANTGOTO http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Fabric_of_Reality and Carlton Caves http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0304083' research on computational resources, it seems to me that we have sufficient evidence to argue that if it is possible for a being to have 1p associated with it, then we might as well bet that they do. So I am betting that zombies do not exist. One simply cannot remain an agnostic on this issue. Onward! Stephen I think the problem is that the zombie has the 1p of whatever is doing the computation, not of the living cells and organs of a living person. I think everything has a 1p experience, it's just that human 1p is a lot different from the 1p of out zoological, biological, chemical, and physical subselves. A zombie talks the talk, but it doesn't walk the walk. It's just a puppet which walks some other walk which it has no awareness of. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Consciousness Easy, Zombies Hard
On 1/16/2012 2:02 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Jan 16, 1:42 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote: Hi, My $.02. I am reminded of the argument in Matrix Philosophy that if we cannot argue that our experiences are *not* simulations then we might as well bet that they are. While I have found that there are upper bounds on computational based content via logical arguments such as David Deutsch'sCANTGOTO http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Fabric_of_Reality and Carlton Caves http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0304083' research on computational resources, it seems to me that we have sufficient evidence to argue that if it is possible for a being to have 1p associated with it, then we might as well bet that they do. So I am betting that zombies do not exist. One simply cannot remain an agnostic on this issue. Onward! Stephen I think the problem is that the zombie has the 1p of whatever is doing the computation, not of the living cells and organs of a living person. I think everything has a 1p experience, it's just that human 1p is a lot different from the 1p of out zoological, biological, chemical, and physical subselves. A zombie talks the talk, but it doesn't walk the walk. It's just a puppet which walks some other walk which it has no awareness of. Craig Hi Craig, The 1p is something that can have differences in degree not in kind thus your argument is a bit off. Zombies simply do not exist. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Question about PA and 1p
On 16 January 2012 18:08, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I do not need an extra God or observer of arithmetical truth, to interpret some number relation as computations, because the numbers, relatively to each other, already do that task. From their view, to believe that we need some extra-interpreter, would be like to believe that if your own brain is not observed by someone, it would not be conscious. I'm unclear from the above - and indeed from the rest of your comments - whether you are defining interpretation in a purely 3p way, or whether you are implicitly placing it in a 1-p framework - e.g. where you say above From their view. If you do indeed assume that numbers can have such views, then I see why you would say that they interpret themselves, because adopting the 1p view is already to invoke a kind of emergence of number-epistemology. But such an emergence is still only a manner of speaking from OUR point of view, in that I can rephrase what you say above thus: From their view, to believe that THEY need some extra-interpreter... without taking such a point of view in any literal sense. Are you saying that consciousness somehow elevates number-epistemology into strong emergence, such that their point of view and self-interpretation become indistinguishable from my own? David On 16 Jan 2012, at 15:32, David Nyman wrote: On 16 January 2012 10:04, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Actually you can define computation, even universal machine, by using only addition and multiplication. So universal machine exists in elementary arithmetic in the same sense as in the existence of prime number. That may be, but we were discussing interpretation. As you say above: YOU can define computation, even universal machine, by using only addition and multiplication (my emphasis). Not just ME. A tiny part of arithmetic can too. All universal numbers can do that. No need of first person notion. All this can be shown in a 3p way. Indeed, in arithmetic. Even without the induction axioms, so that we don't need Löbian machine. The existence of the UD for example, is a theorem of (Robinson) arithmetic. Now, that kinds of truth are rather long and tedious to show. This was shown mainly by Gödel in his 1931 paper (for rich Löbian theories). It is called arithmetization of meta-mathematics. I will try to explain the salt of it without being too much technical below. But this is surely, as you are wont to say, too quick. Firstly, in what sense can numbers in simple arithmetical relation define THEMSELVES as computation, or indeed as anything else than what they simply are? Here you ask a more difficult question. Nevertheless it admits a positive answer. I think that the ascription of self-interpretation to a bare ontology is superficial; it conceals an implicit supplementary appeal to epistemology, and indeed to a self. But can define a notion of 3-self in arithmetic. Then to get the 1-self, we go at the meta-level and combine it with the notion of arithmetical truth. That notion is NOT definable in arithmetic, but that is a good thing, because it will explain why the notion of first person, and of consciousness, will not be definable by machine. Hence it appears that some perspectival union of epistemology and ontology is a prerequisite of interpretation. OK. But the whole force of comp comes from the fact that you can define a big part of that epistemology using only the elementary ontology. Let us agree on what we mean by defining something in arithmetic (or in the arithmetical language). The arithmetical language is the first order (predicate) logic with equality(=), so that it has the usual logical connectives (, V, -, ~ (and, or, implies, not), and the quantifiers E and A, (it exists and for all), together with the special arithmetical symbols 0, s + and *. To illustrate an arithmetical definition, let me give you some definitions of simple concepts. We can define the arithmetical relation x = y (x is less than or equal to y). Indeed x = y if and only if Ez(x+z = y) We can define x y (x is strictly less than y) by Ez((x+z) + s(0) = y) We can define (x divide y) by Ez(x*z = y) Now we can define (x is a prime number) by Az[ (x ≠ 1) and ((z divide x) - ((z = 1) or (z = x))] Which should be seen as a macro abbreviation of Az(~(x = s(0)) ((Ey(x*y = x) - (z = 1) V (z = x)). Now I tell you that we can define, exactly in that manner, the notion of universal number, computations, proofs, etc. In particular any proposition of the form phi_i(j) = k can be translated in arithmetic. A famous predicate due to Kleene is used for that effect . A universal number u can be defined by the relation AxAy(phi_u(x,y) = phi_x(y)), with x,y being a computable bijection from NXN to N. Like metamathematics can be arithmetized, theoretical computer science can be arithmetized. The interpretation is not done by
Re: Consciousness Easy, Zombies Hard
On Jan 16, 2:22 pm, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: Hi Craig, The 1p is something that can have differences in degree not in kind thus your argument is a bit off. Zombies simply do not exist. The degree of 1p is always qualitative though, that's how it's different from 3p. This text is a zombie of my thoughts and intentions. You see my meaning in it, but it has no meaning by itself. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Consciousness Easy, Zombies Hard
Hi Craig, On that we agree. Onward! Stephen On 1/16/2012 3:33 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Jan 16, 2:22 pm, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote: Hi Craig, The 1p is something that can have differences in degree not in kind thus your argument is a bit off. Zombies simply do not exist. The degree of 1p is always qualitative though, that's how it's different from 3p. This text is a zombie of my thoughts and intentions. You see my meaning in it, but it has no meaning by itself. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Consciousness Easy, Zombies Hard
On Mon, Jan 16, 2012 at 12:57 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On Jan 16, 12:15 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Craig, Do you have an opinion regarding the possibility of Strong AI, and the other questions I posed in my earlier post? Sorry Jason, I didn't see your comment earlier. On Jan 15, 2:45 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Jan 14, 2012 at 9:39 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: wrote: Thought I'd throw this out there. If computationalism argues that zombies can't exist, I think the two ideas zombies are impossible and computationalism are independent. Where you might say they are related is that a disbelief in zombies yields a strong argument for computationalism. I don't think that it's possible to say that any two ideas 'are' independent from each other. Okay. Perhaps 'independent' was not an ideal term, but computationalism is at least not dependent on an argument against zombies, as far as I am aware. What computationlism does depend on though is the same view of consciousness that zombies would disqualify. All ideas can be related through semantic association, however distant. As far as your point though, of course I see the opposite relation - while admitting even the possibility of zombies suggests computationalism is founded on illusion., but a disbelief in zombies gives no more support for computationalism than it does for materialism or panpsychism. If one accepts that zombies are impossible, then to reject computationalism requires also rejecting the possibility of Strong AI ( https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Strong_AI). What I'm saying is that if one accepts that zombies are impossible, then to accept computationalism requires accepting that *all* AI is strong already. Strong AI is an AI capable of any task that a human is capable of. I am not aware of any AI that fits this definition. therefore anything that we cannot distinguish from a conscious person must be conscious, that also means that it is impossible to create something that acts like a person which is not a person. Zombies are not Turing emulable. I think there is a subtle difference in meaning between it is impossible to create something that acts like a person which is not a person and saying Zombies are not Turing emulable. It is important to remember that the non-possibility of zombies doesn't imply a particular person or thing cannot be emulated, rather it means there is a particular consequence of certain Turing emulations which is unavoidable, namely the consciousness/mind/person. That's true, in the sense that emulable can only refer to a specific natural and real process being emulated rather than a fictional one. You have a valid point that the word emulable isn't the best term, but it's a red herring since the point I was making is that it would not be possible to avoid creating sentience in any sufficiently sophisticated cartoon, sculpture, or graphic representation of a person. Call it emulation, simulation, synthesis, whatever, the result is the same. I think you and I have different mental models for what is entailed by emulation, simulation, synthesis. Cartoons, sculptures, recordings, projections, and so on, don't necessarily compute anything (or at least, what they might depict as being computed can have little or no relation to what is actually computed by said cartoon, sculpture, recording, projection... For actual computation you need counterfactuals conditions. A cartoon depicting an AND gate is not required to behave as a genuine AND gate would, and flashing a few frames depicting what such an AND gate might do is not equivalent to the logical decision of an AND gate. I understand what you think I mean, but you're strawmanning my point. An AND gate is a generalizable concept. We know that. It's logic can be enacted in many (but not every) different physical forms. If we built the Lego AND mechanism seen here: http://goldfish.ikaruga.co.uk/andnor.html# This page did not load for me.. and attached each side to a an effector which plays a cartoon of a semiconductor AND gate, then you would have a cartoon which is simulates an AND gate. The cartoon would be two separate cartoons in reality, and the logic between them would be entirely inferred by the audience, but this apparatus could be interpreted by the audience as a functional simulation. The audience can jump to the conclusion that the cartoon is a semiconductor AND gate. This is all that Strong AI will ever be. Computationalism assumes that consciousness is a generalizable concept, but we don't know that is true. My view is that it is not true, since we know that computation itself is not even generalizable to all
Re: Consciousness Easy, Zombies Hard
On Jan 16, 10:26 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Mon, Jan 16, 2012 at 12:57 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On Jan 16, 12:15 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Craig, Do you have an opinion regarding the possibility of Strong AI, and the other questions I posed in my earlier post? Sorry Jason, I didn't see your comment earlier. On Jan 15, 2:45 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Jan 14, 2012 at 9:39 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: wrote: Thought I'd throw this out there. If computationalism argues that zombies can't exist, I think the two ideas zombies are impossible and computationalism are independent. Where you might say they are related is that a disbelief in zombies yields a strong argument for computationalism. I don't think that it's possible to say that any two ideas 'are' independent from each other. Okay. Perhaps 'independent' was not an ideal term, but computationalism is at least not dependent on an argument against zombies, as far as I am aware. What computationlism does depend on though is the same view of consciousness that zombies would disqualify. All ideas can be related through semantic association, however distant. As far as your point though, of course I see the opposite relation - while admitting even the possibility of zombies suggests computationalism is founded on illusion., but a disbelief in zombies gives no more support for computationalism than it does for materialism or panpsychism. If one accepts that zombies are impossible, then to reject computationalism requires also rejecting the possibility of Strong AI ( https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Strong_AI). What I'm saying is that if one accepts that zombies are impossible, then to accept computationalism requires accepting that *all* AI is strong already. Strong AI is an AI capable of any task that a human is capable of. I am not aware of any AI that fits this definition. What I'm saying though is that computationalism implies that whatever task is being done by AI that a human can also do is the same. If AI can print the letters 'y-e-s', then it must be no different from person answering yes. What I'm saying is that makes all AI strong, just incomplete. therefore anything that we cannot distinguish from a conscious person must be conscious, that also means that it is impossible to create something that acts like a person which is not a person. Zombies are not Turing emulable. I think there is a subtle difference in meaning between it is impossible to create something that acts like a person which is not a person and saying Zombies are not Turing emulable. It is important to remember that the non-possibility of zombies doesn't imply a particular person or thing cannot be emulated, rather it means there is a particular consequence of certain Turing emulations which is unavoidable, namely the consciousness/mind/person. That's true, in the sense that emulable can only refer to a specific natural and real process being emulated rather than a fictional one. You have a valid point that the word emulable isn't the best term, but it's a red herring since the point I was making is that it would not be possible to avoid creating sentience in any sufficiently sophisticated cartoon, sculpture, or graphic representation of a person. Call it emulation, simulation, synthesis, whatever, the result is the same. I think you and I have different mental models for what is entailed by emulation, simulation, synthesis. Cartoons, sculptures, recordings, projections, and so on, don't necessarily compute anything (or at least, what they might depict as being computed can have little or no relation to what is actually computed by said cartoon, sculpture, recording, projection... For actual computation you need counterfactuals conditions. A cartoon depicting an AND gate is not required to behave as a genuine AND gate would, and flashing a few frames depicting what such an AND gate might do is not equivalent to the logical decision of an AND gate. I understand what you think I mean, but you're strawmanning my point. An AND gate is a generalizable concept. We know that. It's logic can be enacted in many (but not every) different physical forms. If we built the Lego AND mechanism seen here: http://goldfish.ikaruga.co.uk/andnor.html# This page did not load for me.. Weird. Can you see a pic from it? http://goldfish.ikaruga.co.uk/legopics/newand11.jpg and attached each side to a an effector which plays a cartoon of a semiconductor AND gate, then you would have a cartoon which is simulates an AND gate. The cartoon would be two separate cartoons in reality, and the
Re: Consciousness Easy, Zombies Hard
On Mon, Jan 16, 2012 at 10:29 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On Jan 16, 10:26 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Mon, Jan 16, 2012 at 12:57 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Jan 16, 12:15 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Craig, Do you have an opinion regarding the possibility of Strong AI, and the other questions I posed in my earlier post? Sorry Jason, I didn't see your comment earlier. On Jan 15, 2:45 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Jan 14, 2012 at 9:39 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: wrote: Thought I'd throw this out there. If computationalism argues that zombies can't exist, I think the two ideas zombies are impossible and computationalism are independent. Where you might say they are related is that a disbelief in zombies yields a strong argument for computationalism. I don't think that it's possible to say that any two ideas 'are' independent from each other. Okay. Perhaps 'independent' was not an ideal term, but computationalism is at least not dependent on an argument against zombies, as far as I am aware. What computationlism does depend on though is the same view of consciousness that zombies would disqualify. All ideas can be related through semantic association, however distant. As far as your point though, of course I see the opposite relation - while admitting even the possibility of zombies suggests computationalism is founded on illusion., but a disbelief in zombies gives no more support for computationalism than it does for materialism or panpsychism. If one accepts that zombies are impossible, then to reject computationalism requires also rejecting the possibility of Strong AI ( https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Strong_AI). What I'm saying is that if one accepts that zombies are impossible, then to accept computationalism requires accepting that *all* AI is strong already. Strong AI is an AI capable of any task that a human is capable of. I am not aware of any AI that fits this definition. What I'm saying though is that computationalism implies that whatever task is being done by AI that a human can also do is the same. If AI can print the letters 'y-e-s', then it must be no different from person answering yes. What I'm saying is that makes all AI strong, just incomplete. therefore anything that we cannot distinguish from a conscious person must be conscious, that also means that it is impossible to create something that acts like a person which is not a person. Zombies are not Turing emulable. I think there is a subtle difference in meaning between it is impossible to create something that acts like a person which is not a person and saying Zombies are not Turing emulable. It is important to remember that the non-possibility of zombies doesn't imply a particular person or thing cannot be emulated, rather it means there is a particular consequence of certain Turing emulations which is unavoidable, namely the consciousness/mind/person. That's true, in the sense that emulable can only refer to a specific natural and real process being emulated rather than a fictional one. You have a valid point that the word emulable isn't the best term, but it's a red herring since the point I was making is that it would not be possible to avoid creating sentience in any sufficiently sophisticated cartoon, sculpture, or graphic representation of a person. Call it emulation, simulation, synthesis, whatever, the result is the same. I think you and I have different mental models for what is entailed by emulation, simulation, synthesis. Cartoons, sculptures, recordings, projections, and so on, don't necessarily compute anything (or at least, what they might depict as being computed can have little or no relation to what is actually computed by said cartoon, sculpture, recording, projection... For actual computation you need counterfactuals conditions. A cartoon depicting an AND gate is not required to behave as a genuine AND gate would, and flashing a few frames depicting what such an AND gate might do is not equivalent to the logical decision of an AND gate. I understand what you think I mean, but you're strawmanning my point. An AND gate is a generalizable concept. We know that. It's logic can be enacted in many (but not every) different physical forms. If we built the Lego AND mechanism seen here: http://goldfish.ikaruga.co.uk/andnor.html# This page did not load for me.. Weird. Can you see a pic from it? http://goldfish.ikaruga.co.uk/legopics/newand11.jpg Weird. I was