[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Dear Joe, WOW! :) Thank you for the comments. Within Peirce's Systematic Philosophy, the scope of a visualization of Peirce's classes of signs, as I develop in my thesis, is grounded on mathematics (discrete or finite), assumes phenomenology (the cenopythagorean categories), and only touches upon Esthetics (only as a support for perception) and Speculative Grammar (only as a requisite for representation), without exploring them. This delimitation, although narrow, I belive is necessary, but it is clearly not suficient to study the historical implications and unfoldings of Peirce's Semiotics, which are outside it. However, due to the myriad of models and diagrams in the literature, each one stressing some dimensions of Peirce's work and assuming some premisses, sometimes in contradiction with others, the diagramatic sccafolds I propose are not only syntactical manipulations, but aim to establish some common ground within the community exactly to support the kind of work you are interested on. > I am much impressed by all that has been done graphically in representing > the sign classification system, and especially by Luis Merkle/s masterful > handling of it all in that part of his dissertation, as well as further > work > by others in Brazil and elsewhere as well, but my own interest in the > classification system is not with what can be learned from it by > manipulating graphical models of it but with understanding what use it > might > have when it comes to understanding how to apply it in the analysis and > understanding of distinctively philosophical problems such as have formed > the staple of philosophical concern from the time of the Greeks on. > I > wonder if anyone knows of any attempts to do that. In the early days of peirce-l list, back on 1993 or 1994, you developed some wonderful visualization of Peirce's concept of Icon, throughout his carreer.I was much impressed with that work too, which attempt to do exactly what you are interested. ;) Is that available? Thanks, Luiz --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Dear List: in respect for fund raising for the edition of CSP's papers, the Peirce Edition Project at Indianapolis is always in search of funds, Nathan Houser and everybody else there are working a lot for the work on the CSP's papers. more info can be found at their website: http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/ best cass. 2006/6/25, Frances Kelly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: Frances to Joe and others...There is a tendency for me to equate "immediate" or "immediacy" withall metaphysical quiddities and representamens that are not signs, aswell as with all categorical primaries and firstnesses or firsts and qualities that exist to sense, but especially to align them withrepresentamens that are signs within acts of semiosis.My reason for trying to do this semiotically and grammatically atleast is to make representamens seem consistent as being immediate representamens along with immediate objects and immediateinterpretants. The theoretical use this could have might includedifferentiating semiosic representamens that are signs fromsynechastic representamens that are not signs. There might then of course be no need to use immediacy as a label for "things" before"objects" or for representamens and phenomena outside semiosis.If for example a diagrammatic table where drawn to illustrate the structure of "grammatic" signs, it might hence be as follows.--immediaterepresentamens--immediate dynamic objects objects--immediate dynamic finalinterpretants interpretantsinterpretants-- This basic layout and usage of "immediate" for representamens seemsreasonable to me, but nothing could be found in Peircean writings yetto support the use of the term "immediate representamen" for some reason, other than as you explained earlier below.The structure of this diagrammatic table however is perhaps rough orvague. It is vertical and even upside down in regard to the usualstructure shown of trichotomies, so that there appears to be here three "immediate" firsts aligned to the left column and margin, yetonly one "final" third aligned to the right column and margin.If the table were flipped the other side up, then the top row would have three horizontal classes as firsts and the right column wouldhave three vertical classes as thirds, which only seems partlyconsistent with the trichotomic structure of categories. This problemmay simply go to the limits of graphic or visual diagrams, which after all are iconic and merely similar in form to their referred objects,and logically senseless in that icons can be neither false nor true.There is an implication here that all semiotic immediates are probably grammatic in stature and somewhat iconic in structure. Perhaps whenimmediates as say subicons or when icons and their diagrams becomedynamic objects or say dynamic object signs, aligned or connected moreso to or as designated hyposemic indexes, will they become somewhat logically sensible and thus must be either false or true.In any event, all representamens to me seem inherently andintrinsically immediate, whether they are synechastically not signs orsemiosically as signs, therefore labelling representamens as "immediate representamens" might more clearly assign or reassign themas being semiosic in the field and semiotic in the study.Joe wrote...The passage Jim found runs as follows:"It is usually admitted that there are two classes of mental representation, Immediate Representations or Sensations and MediateRepresentations or Conceptions."In the context in which that occurs, Peirce goes on to say:"The former are completely determinate or individual objects of thought; the latter are partially indeterminate or general objects."And he then goes on (in the next paragraph) to say:"But according to my theory of logic, since no pure sensations orindividual objects exist... ." I omit the rest of the long and complex sentence since it adds nothingto the point at issue, which is that he does not himself accept the"usually admitted" theory, which he contrasts as based on a different metaphysics than his. I cannot myself think of any reason why he wouldwant to use such a term. The word "icon" is after all his term for arepresenting entity which presents its object immediately in the sense that no distinction can be drawn between the iconic sign and that ofwhich it is an icon: they are numerically identical... (There is stilla formal distinction to be drawn between icon and object, in the sense that there is a difference between representing and being represented,but this does not entail that what represents and what is representedcannot be the same thing. Otherwise there would be no such thing asself-representation. But of course there is.) So of what use would there be for the term "immediate representation" where that isequivalent to "immediate sign" or
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Frances to Joe and others... There is a tendency for me to equate "immediate" or "immediacy" with all metaphysical quiddities and representamens that are not signs, as well as with all categorical primaries and firstnesses or firsts and qualities that exist to sense, but especially to align them with representamens that are signs within acts of semiosis. My reason for trying to do this semiotically and grammatically at least is to make representamens seem consistent as being immediate representamens along with immediate objects and immediate interpretants. The theoretical use this could have might include differentiating semiosic representamens that are signs from synechastic representamens that are not signs. There might then of course be no need to use immediacy as a label for "things" before "objects" or for representamens and phenomena outside semiosis. If for example a diagrammatic table where drawn to illustrate the structure of "grammatic" signs, it might hence be as follows. -- immediate representamens -- immediate dynamic objects objects -- immediate dynamic final interpretants interpretantsinterpretants -- This basic layout and usage of "immediate" for representamens seems reasonable to me, but nothing could be found in Peircean writings yet to support the use of the term "immediate representamen" for some reason, other than as you explained earlier below. The structure of this diagrammatic table however is perhaps rough or vague. It is vertical and even upside down in regard to the usual structure shown of trichotomies, so that there appears to be here three "immediate" firsts aligned to the left column and margin, yet only one "final" third aligned to the right column and margin. If the table were flipped the other side up, then the top row would have three horizontal classes as firsts and the right column would have three vertical classes as thirds, which only seems partly consistent with the trichotomic structure of categories. This problem may simply go to the limits of graphic or visual diagrams, which after all are iconic and merely similar in form to their referred objects, and logically senseless in that icons can be neither false nor true. There is an implication here that all semiotic immediates are probably grammatic in stature and somewhat iconic in structure. Perhaps when immediates as say subicons or when icons and their diagrams become dynamic objects or say dynamic object signs, aligned or connected more so to or as designated hyposemic indexes, will they become somewhat logically sensible and thus must be either false or true. In any event, all representamens to me seem inherently and intrinsically immediate, whether they are synechastically not signs or semiosically as signs, therefore labelling representamens as "immediate representamens" might more clearly assign or reassign them as being semiosic in the field and semiotic in the study. Joe wrote... The passage Jim found runs as follows: "It is usually admitted that there are two classes of mental representation, Immediate Representations or Sensations and Mediate Representations or Conceptions." In the context in which that occurs, Peirce goes on to say: "The former are completely determinate or individual objects of thought; the latter are partially indeterminate or general objects." And he then goes on (in the next paragraph) to say: "But according to my theory of logic, since no pure sensations or individual objects exist... ." I omit the rest of the long and complex sentence since it adds nothing to the point at issue, which is that he does not himself accept the "usually admitted" theory, which he contrasts as based on a different metaphysics than his. I cannot myself think of any reason why he would want to use such a term. The word "icon" is after all his term for a representing entity which presents its object immediately in the sense that no distinction can be drawn between the iconic sign and that of which it is an icon: they are numerically identical... (There is still a formal distinction to be drawn between icon and object, in the sense that there is a difference between representing and being represented, but this does not entail that what represents and what is represented cannot be the same thing. Otherwise there would be no such thing as self-representation. But of course there is.) So of what use would there be for the term "immediate representation" where that is equivalent to "immediate sign" or "immediate representamen"? It would only introduce an awkward expression of no distinctive use in his theoretical work with the negative potentiality of throwing it into confusion. That is why I am questioning your trying to do this. I don't understand what theoretical use it could have. Jim a
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Frances and list: The passage Jim found runs as follows: "It is usually admitted that there are two classes of mental representation, Immediate Representations or Sensations and Mediate Representations or Conceptions." In the context in which that occurs, Peirce goes on to say: "The former are completely determinate or individual objects of thought; the latter are partially indeterminate or general objects." And he then goes on (in the next paragraph) to say : "But according to my theory of logic, since no pure sensations or individual objects exist . . . ." I omit the rest of the long and complex sentence since it adds nothing to the point at issue, which is that he does not himself accept the "usually admitted" theory, which he contrasts as based on a different metaphysics than his. I cannot myself think of any reason why he would want to use such a term. The word "icon" is after all his term for a representing entity which presents its object immediately in the sense that no distinction can be drawn between the iconic sign and that of which it is an icon: they are numerically identical.. (There is still a formal distinction to be drawn between icon and object, in the sense that there is a difference between representing and being represented, but this does not entail that what represents and what is represented cannot be the same thing. Otherwise there would be no such thing as self-representation. But of course there is.) So of what use would there be for the term "immediate representation", where that is equivalent to "immediate sign" or "immediate representamen"? It would only introduce an awkward expression of no distinctive use in his theoretical work with the negative potentiality of throwing it into confusion. That is why I am questioning your trying to do this. I don't understand what theoretical use it could have. Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: "Frances Kelly" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Saturday, June 24, 2006 2:07 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Frances to Joe and Jim and others... No sources could be found by me in Peirce or on Peirce for the terms "immediate representamen" and "immediate sign" but my search continues. The terms "Immediate Representations" and "Mediate Representations" found in Peirce however do raise the further issue of some differences that Peirce might have held between representation and representamen, as well as some differences that he might also have held between representamen and sign. Joe queried... Where does Peirce talk about "immediate representamen" or "immediate sign"? I can't think of any use he would have for such a term. Jim answered... "It is usually admitted that there are two classes of mental representation, Immediate Representations or Sensations and Mediate Representations or Conceptions." - from Essential Peirce, Volume 1, page 106 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.3/374 - Release Date: 6/23/2006 -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.3/374 - Release Date: 6/23/2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Frances to Joe and Jim and others... No sources could be found by me in Peirce or on Peirce for the terms "immediate representamen" and "immediate sign" but my search continues. The terms "Immediate Representations" and "Mediate Representations" found in Peirce however do raise the further issue of some differences that Peirce might have held between representation and representamen, as well as some differences that he might also have held between representamen and sign. Joe queried... Where does Peirce talk about "immediate representamen" or "immediate sign"? I can't think of any use he would have for such a term. Jim answered... "It is usually admitted that there are two classes of mental representation, Immediate Representations or Sensations and Mediate Representations or Conceptions." - from Essential Peirce, Volume 1, page 106 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Dear Joe and Frances, This is not directly to your concerns but may be of some related interest: On page 106 of Volume 1 of the Essential Peirce (chapter 6 --On a New Class of Observations, Suggested by the Principles of Logic) I find the following Peirce QUOTE: "It is usually admited that there are two classes of mental representation, Immediate Representations or Sensations and Mediate Representations or Conceptions." CLOSE QUOTE The caps are not mine. Best wishes, Jim Piat Where does Peirce talk about an "immediate representamen" (or an "immediate sign")? I can't think of any use he would have for such a term. Joe Ransdell --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Gary Richmond wrote: ...btw, do you or anyone else know of any other place where he refers to 'sign' as a third?) I know only of this one, which I think may illuminate the passage being considered in so far as Peirce notes that "in genuine Thirdness, the first, the second, and the third are all three of the nature of thirds." CP 1.537 Now in genuine Thirdness, the first, the second, and the third are all three of the nature of thirds, or thought, while in respect to one another they are first, second, and third. this is almost a Lapalissade, what is Peirce saying here? nothing more than that in a triadic relation, there are three things, a first thing, a second thing and a third thing. (I'm using non-capitalized words for ordinals and the capitalized words 'First', 'Second', 'Third' to denote classes of relations or categories) Take any of these 3 things and they will mediate between the one (first) and the other (second). this is true of all 3 members of the relation, that is to say that all members are genuine Thirds in that they mediate between a first member and another member of the relation. which one *is* the first, which one *is* the second, which one *is* the third? the question makes no sense. Give me the relation, then I'll tell you which members, within the relation, is the first, the second and the third relate.. Now when a first thing among the three is considered in itself (i.e as a First *within the relation*), the second thing can then be considered as "other than" the first (i.e. as a Second in opposition to the first thing *still within the relation*), and the third thing is considered as mediating between the first and the second, (i.e in its role as a Third). There you have both the categories and the ordinals. order has no importance. Take any member of the relation, it will mediate between the other two. then there is the phenomenological nature of the elements that are in the relation, when we say, the sign is a quality (a First) or an existent (a Second) or a law (a Third), this is again different from what's described above. there are also different forms of connections between the elements of the relation (by Firstness, by Secondness, or by Thirdness) when describing the relations between the relates (S-O and S-I for instance) /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
PS I should have added this excerpt in relation to the TRICHOTOMIC passage as it reminds us that categorial Thirdness == mediation and that all three elements in a genuine trichotomic relationship mediate between the other two in some sense. CP 1.328 I. . .. Thirdness, in the sense of the category, is the same as mediation. For that reason, pure dyadism is an act of arbitrary will or of blind force; for if there is any reason, or law, governing it, that mediates between the two subjects and brings about their connection. The dyad is an individual fact, as it existentially is; and it has no generality in it. The being of a monadic quality is a mere potentiality, without existence. Existence is purely dyadic. and this one where we learn that "Thirdness. . .is only a synonym for Representation." CP 5.104 Now Thirdness is nothing but the character of an object which embodies Betweenness or Mediation in its simplest and most rudimentary form; and I use it as the name of that element of the phenomenon which is predominant wherever Mediation is predominant, and which reaches its fullness in Representation. CP 5.105 . Thirdness, as I use the term, is only a synonym for Representation, to which I prefer the less colored term because its suggestions are not so narrow and special as those of the word Representation. Now it is proper to say that a general principle that is operative in the real world is of the essential nature of a Representation and of a Symbol because its modus operandi is the same as that by which words produce physical effects. Nobody can deny that words do produce such effects. Take, for example, that sentence of Patrick Henry which, at the time of our Revolution, was repeated by every man to his neighbor: and this one in which we are reminded that in Peirce's thinking that "the three categories. . .have in truth [an] enormous importance for thought." CP 5.77 Fn P1 Para 1/3 p 52 Grant me that the three categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, or Quality, Reaction, and Representation, have in truth the enormous importance for thought that I attribute to them, and it would seem that no division of theories of metaphysics could surpass in importance a division based upon the consideration of what ones of the three categories each of different metaphysical systems have fully admitted as real constituents of nature. Gary Richmond wrote: Jim, Ben, List, Jim Piat wrote: Yes, but Peirce also wrote (chapter 20 Trichotomic of The Essential Peirce Vol 1 page 281 line two of paragraph two) that "A sign is a third mediating between the mind addressed and the object represented". So I find this confusing. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Jim, Ben, List, Jim Piat wrote: Yes, but Peirce also wrote (chapter 20 Trichotomic of The Essential Peirce Vol 1 page 281 line two of paragraph two) that "A sign is a third mediating between the mind addressed and the object represented". So I find this confusing. There are so many complexities in all this, Jim, that I am sure this must be an on-going discussion. But please forgive my earlier 'fresh' comment as these are issues which surely need to be addressed. As for the TRICHOTOMIC document (which I am very familiar with since it was one of the core documents--along with A Guess at the Riddle) which got me thinking about developing Peirce's applied science of trichotomic as trikonic, that is, in diagrammatic form. Now you can imagine that the very passage you refer to had me bug-eyed on first reading. I think, however, that one has to consider the various ways the term 'sign' is used in Peirce as he struggles as a 'backwoodsman' with his new science of semeiotic and its terminology. In the following excerpt, for example, which introduces a very famous passage defining the sign relationship, Peirce makes a point of distinguishing representamina from signs. Now there's been for sure a great deal of controversy about what this particular passage means. Peirce writes: CP 1.540 .. . . I must begin the examination of representation by defining representation a little more accurately. In the first place, as to my terminology, I confine the word representation to the operation of a sign or its relation to the object for the interpreter of the representation. The concrete subject that represents I call a sign or a representamen. I use these two words, sign and representamen, differently. As suggested, I can't say that his ensuing comments actually clarify this issue. But in any event they lead to the famous passage: CP 1.541 My definition of a representamen is as follows: A REPRESENTAMEN is a subject of a triadic relation TO a second, called its OBJECT, FOR a third, called its INTERPRETANT, this triadic relation being such that the REPRESENTAMEN determines its interpretant to stand in the same triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant. Now here it seem clear enough to at least some scholars (for example, Kelly Parker in his monograph on continuity in Peirce) that he is talking about a genuine triadic relationship in the categorial sense in which the representamen is a first (suspending for a moment the possible other ways in which 'sign' might be employed as in the TRICHOTOMIC passage you referred to--btw, do you or anyone else know of any other place where he refers to 'sign' as a third?) I know only of this one, which I think may illuminate the passage being considered in so far as Peirce notes that "in genuine Thirdness, the first, the second, and the third are all three of the nature of thirds." CP 1.537 Now in genuine Thirdness, the first, the second, and the third are all three of the nature of thirds, or thought, while in respect to one another they are first, second, and third. The first is thought in its capacity as mere possibility; that is, mere mind capable of thinking, or a mere vague idea. The second is thought playing the role of a Secondness, or event. That is, it is of the general nature of experience or information. The third is thought in its role as governing Secondness. It brings the information into the mind, or determines the idea and gives it body. It is informing thought, or cognition. But take away the psychological or accidental human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we see the operation of a sign. CP 1.538 Every sign stands for an object independent of itself; but it can only be a sign of that object in so far as that object is itself of the nature of a sign or thought. For the sign does not affect the object but is affected by it; so that the object must be able to convey thought, that is, must be of the nature of thought or of a sign. Every thought is a sign. But I won't say more about this passage just yet as I was just reminded of it and need to reflect more on it. But is is at least suggestive to me as to a way to possibly proceed. But continuing, why, you ask, should a sign be a first? Peirce suggests that the answer is because a representamen within this genuine triadic semeiotic relationship has a 'character' (early on, the ground)--now, character, quality, etc. are firstnesses: CP 1.564 . . . A very broad and important class of triadic characters [consists of] representations. A representation is that character of a thing by virtue of which, for the production of a certain mental effect, it may stand in place of another thing. The thing having this character I term a representamen, the mental effect, or thought, its interpretant, the thing for which it stands, its object. One sees that this trichotomic relationship will flow into and finally characterize even the very branches of logic as semeiotic so that Peirce writes: CP 2.
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Frances to Joseph and listers... The decagon table does not seem to deal with signs as representamens explicitly. The decagon of course does deal with immediate objects and dynamic objects and one immediate interpretant. If it did deal with representamens, it is reasonable to me that such representamens would be only immediate. It is my assumption furthermore that representamens in being primary and monadic are intrinsically only immediate, especially when compared or contrasted trichotomically with dyadic objects and triadic or tridential interpretants. My access to the Peircean writings is limited at present, so it is not known by me whether he used the actual term "immediate representamens" and even "immediate signs" or not. You obviously searched, but did not find the terms. If however representamens are presumptively held to always be immediate firsts within semiosis, then there agreeably would likely be no need for such a term as "immediate representamens" as long as no confusion arises due to the presumption. Nonetheless, this to me is the first time that a curiosity has arisen as to whether Peirce used such terms as "immediate representamens" or "immediate signs" and further even had a use for them. There may of course be uses of these terms by others in sources on Peirce and a quick search will be done at my end for them. Joseph mused... Where does Peirce talk about an "immediate representamen" (or an "immediate sign")? I can't think of any use he would have for such a term. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Benjamin, In the discourse below, I think the cause of your problems in reasoning are at least partly caused by misinterpretation of the qualisigns and further aspects of the sign you are talking about at that moment. Well actually that seems to be a logical conclusion, but I just want to say...think about it. Best would be by applying some abduction-retroduction process there. Make a clear division between a correlate and a non-correlate division of trichonomies. Whether the sign you talk about belongs to the first (correlate) or the second (non-correlate) when talking about it. Maybe, just maybe, CS Peirce is telling us that a sign itself can not be an actual existent or a law. Signs do not exist, or can not form a law, it are the "anothernesses" around and the way of applying the signs that can lead to an actual existen or a law. In that case, both first correlate and first non-correlate sign are indeed always/mostly a matter of first. In the CONTEXTS he is talking about. About this context, I would like to address some other phrase I saw in some other mail I received just now: " Yes, but Peirce also wrote (chapter 20 Trichotomic of The Essential Peirce Vol 1 page 281 line two of paragraph two) that "A sign is a third mediating between the mind addressed and the object represented". IF Peirce really says so and it would be the case in HIS theory of signs, then the sign here is another sign then the sign mentioned in places where he says a sign is first (correlate?) or a mode of firstness. I myself think it has to do with the context of thoughts and non-thoughts. But am not sure about that just some first thought of me without having read enough for proving it or so. Just mention this because it might be valuable for insight. Difference in context or the sign itself may be some other difference of course. Kind regards, Wilfred -Oorspronkelijk bericht- Van: Benjamin Udell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Verzonden: vrijdag 23 juni 2006 8:22 Aan: Peirce Discussion Forum Onderwerp: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Gary, Joe, list, Thank you but -- of course! -- I've run into a problem that has bothered far better scholars than me. Peirce: CP 2.238 238. Triadic relations are in three ways divisible by trichotomy, according as the First, the Second, or the Third Correlate, respectively, is a mere possibility, an actual existent, or a law. These three trichotomies, taken together, divide all triadic relations into ten classes [see footnote to 235]. These ten classes will have certain subdivisions according as the existent correlates are individual subjects or individual facts, and according as the correlates that are laws are general subjects, general modes of fact, or general modes of law. So I said, if the sign is a mere quality, then it's a qualisign, and that "raises the question" of what it would be if it were an actual existent or a law. But if the sign were an actual existent, that would just as well "raise the question" of what it would be if it were a quality or a law. And so forth. So I haven't really shown that the first trichotomy "arises" especially when First is a mere possibility, and the second trichotomy arises especially when the Second Correlate is an actual existent, and the third trichotomy arises especially when the Third Correlate is a law. Instead, well, yes, when the Third Correlate is a law, then the sign may be rheme, dicisign, or argument. But when the Second Correlate is an actual existent, I say its sign may be an icon or an index. And it goes downhill from there. Can I squeeze out a solution where I say, the Second Trichotomy doesn't arise "until" the Second Correlation is at least an actual existent, because othewise it is a mere possibility, to be represented only by a qualisign, and not even be distinct from the qualisign? Well, then why can't an iconic sinsign represent a mere possibility? Maybe because the possibility must have some actualized aspects, even if only very partial ones, in order for its qualisign to be embodied in an iconic sinsign. But then I'd have to work out a way where the interpretant isn't really distinct from sign & object unless the interpretant is a law (and is a legisign). I don't know about this direction. Now, let's see whether I over-interpreted the word "respectively." CP238. Triadic relations are in three ways divisible by trichotomy, according as the First, the Second, or the Third Correlate, respectively, is a mere possibility, an actual existent, or a law. "Triadic relations are in three ways divisible by trichotomy, according as the First, the Second, or the Third Correlate, respectively" = Respective trichotomies for the First, Second, Third correlates and that "respectively" does not further cross-reference such as to lead to "according as the
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Ben wrote: Aw Jim, you're a trouble maker! 66~~ *A _Sign_, or _Representamen_, is a First which stands in such genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its _Object_, as to be capable of detemining a Third, called its _Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.* ~~99 Dear Ben, Folks-- Yes, but Peirce also wrote (chapter 20 Trichotomic of The Essential Peirce Vol 1 page 281 line two of paragraph two) that "A sign is a third mediating between the mind addressed and the object represented". So I find this confusing. A Peircean categorical third is not a caterogical first. A first relates only to iself. There is firstness of thirdness but a third is not a first. In my understanding a sign is pre-eminently a third. Yet, Peirce obviously does say above that a sign is a First that stands in such a genuinely triadic relation to a second and so on. What do you make of this? I find it contradictory to speak of mere firstness functioning as thirdness. The quality of thirdness makes sense to me but firstness (as a Peircean category) in a triadic relation to secondness seems to me a contradiction. So I think we need to seek a different intepretation of Peirce when he say a sign is a First which stands in such genuine triadic relation to a second... Yes, all signs(which are thirds) are also firsts because they have qualities. Likewise all signs are seconds because they exist and have effects. But signs are neither mere Firsts nor mere Seconds. Furthermore, no First (as a mere first in Peirce's categorical sense) stand in triadic relations to anything because to stand in a triadic relation is the essence not of firstness but of thirdness. That's the line of thinking that leads me to believe Jean-Marc has a point -- at least in so far as the interpretation of this particular quote is concerned. The above notwithstanding, I do think Peirce meant for his three trichotomies of signs* to highlight to certain aspects of signs which to me are clearly related to his theory of catergories which I take to be the foundation of his theory of signs. In particular I think his first trichotomy forgrounds the quality of signs themselves as either hypotheticals, singulars or generals; the second trichotomy addresses the ways in which signs can refer to their objects by means of qualitative similarity, existential correlation, or convention; and the the third trichotomy addresses the fact that a sign can represent either a mere quality, an object or another sign. For me this suggest a three by three matrix of sign aspects based on Peirce's categories. As Joe cautions, Peirce's classifications of signs were a work in progress. All the more so for my own limited understanding of Peirce. * I'm working from Peirce's discussion "Three Trichotomies of Signs" as presented on page 101 of Justus Buchler's _Philosophical Writings of Peirce_ Best, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Where does Peirce talk about an "immediate representamen" (or an "immediate sign")? I can't think of any use he would have for such a term. Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: "Frances Kelly" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 9:17 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Frances to Ben and others... In the decadic table or model, the ten classes of signs seem to deal with immediate objects, and dynamic objects, and sparse selections of immediate and dynamic and final interpretants. The decagon does not seem to deal with immediate representamens whatsoever, except perhaps indirectly or subsequently through immediate objects. The first class of signs, posited as qualisigns and sinsigns and legisigns, deals with the immediate objects of a representamen, and probably not with the representamen or sign vehicle itself alone. My guess is that immediate representamen are posited as potisigns and actisigns and famsigns, but are removed from the decadic table or model of semiosis, likely for some reason of expediency by way of illustrating the correlation and interrelation of signs. The present condensed table or model of semiotics as offered in its many forms does seem to serve that basic purpose well enough. The second class of signs, posited as icons and indexes and symbols, deals with the dynamic objects of immediate interpretants, of which immediate rhemes are merely one class of interpretant and indeed only one class of immediate interpretant. The third class of signs, posited as rhemes and dicents and arguments, deals partly with those interpretants that are respectively immediate and dynamic and final. They are only a partial selection, because they are not all the interpretants that are offered in semiosis. They are however trichotomic exemplars of their respected categories, in that rhemes are the first of three immediate interpretants offered, and dicents are the second of three dynamic interpretants offered, and arguments are the third of three final interpretants offered. This condensation actually yields a diagonal layout, which is unusual for categorical trichotomies, which are usually horizontal. Nonetheless, even this architectonic scaffolding is not categorically consistent with the structured trichotomies of phenomena, in that there should be only one immediate class, but two dynamic classes, yet three final classes. The class members of such monadic firstness and dyadic secondness and triadic thirdness would also each fall under there own class holder, presumably of zeroness. It is my suspicion that all the interpretants posited for semiosis are not all of grammatics, the first of the three grand semiotic divisions before critics and rhetorics; and grammatics which is also the sole basis of the decagon. One thorn here for me then is whether all the subsequent signs of critics and rhetorics are indeed only various kinds of grammatic or other interpretants. Another thorn here for me is whether semiotics can be complete at least to some degree, for say nonhuman mechanisms or organisms or even for mature humans, if only the grammatic division of signs is present as information, to the exclusion of critics and grammatics in any particular situation of semiosis. This of course implies that making signs to some extent, and thus making the logic of signs to some extent, and thus making the ideal sought seem real to some extent, is not limited only to mature intelligent humans. If this speculation of mine is correct, then just what role the decadic table or model of signs is intended to fully play as a degenerate condensation of logical semiosis becomes unclear to me, and there surely must be an important role. Given what is now known of Peirce, it would not be reasonable to hold the decagon as confused. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.0/368 - Release Date: 6/16/2006 -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.0/368 - Release Date: 6/16/2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Benjamin Udell wrote: Aw Jim, you're a trouble maker! 66~~ *A _Sign_, or _Representamen_, is a First which stands in such genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its _Object_, as to be capable of detemining a Third, called its _Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.* ~~99 Normal English? With capitalization of the ordinals, no less? In English we would say a "given thing," "a second thing," etc. English is characterized by intransigent normalcy. So Peirce is going to use some capitalized ordinals without explicit referents, as if he were talking about Firsts, Seconds, & Thirds in the usual Peirce way, in order to say simply "something," "another thing," and "a third thing"? Peirce is complicated but he is not sadistic toward the reader. but that's exactly what Peirce says in 2.92: "A Sign is anything which is related to a Second thing, its Object, in respect to a Quality, in such a way as to bring a Third thing, its Interpretant, into relation to the same Object, and that in such a way as to bring a Fourth into relation to that Object in the same form, ad infinitum." in other texts Peirce simply wrote "a Second ..." dropping the noun which he probably thought was redundant and did not add any information. Sometimes he writes explicitly "Category the Second", or "of the nature of the Second" - in that case there is no ambiguity that this is the category that he's referring to. it is ironic that a Frenchman has to teach you Peirce's English, isn't it ? ;-) /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Joseph Ransdell wrote: Here is a verifying passage:, from the neglected Argument paper Peirce: CP 6.452 The word "God," so "capitalized" (as we Americans say), is the definable proper name, signifying Ens necessarium; in my belief Really creator of all three Universes of Experience. Some words shall herein be capitalized when used, not as vernacular, but as terms defined. Thus an "idea" is the substance of an actual unitary thought or fancy; but "Idea," nearer Plato's idea of {idea}, denotes anything whose Being consists in its mere capacity for getting fully represented, regardless of any person's faculty or impotence to represent it. Joe Ransdell Why not hit the "search" button again while you're at it? Here are some texts where Peirce capitalizes words, to refer to ordinals: CP 4.553 Convention the *Second;* Of the Matter of the Scripture, and the Modality P1 of the Phemes expressed. CP 4.567 The more scientific way would be to substitute for the *Second* and *Third* Permissions the following Permission: CP 6.472 The purpose of Deduction, that of collecting consequents of the hypothesis, having been sufficiently carried out, the inquiry enters upon its *Third* Stage CP 2.92 A Sign is anything which is related to* a Second thing*, its Object, in respect to a Quality, in such a way as to bring *a Third thing*, its Interpretant, into relation to the same Object, and that in such a way as to bring *a Fourth *into relation to that Object in the same form, ad infinitum. I don't see how anyone who understands English can claim that "a Second thing", "a Third thing" or "a Fourth" do not refer to ordinals but to categories. /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Gary Richmond wrote: Ben, list, It seems to me that you are quite right about the "distinctly un-English" use of the ordinals 'First', 'Second' and 'Third' by Peirce in the passages being considered. Capitalization is used for 'terms defined' as he writes, for example, at the beginning of the NA and elsewhere. You quoted Jean-Marc then commented: J-MO If the sign was a First as you commented on CP 2-274 according to the cenopythagorean category Firstness, how would you explain that the sign taken in itself can be a quality (a First), an existent (a Second) or of the nature of a law (a Third)? BU: It can be a First, a Second, etc., in various ways and respects. This is elementary stuff in Peirce. It/ is/ elementary stuff for /tout le monde /(excepting apparently a few) and for the very good reasons offered in your recent analysis, at least for those with minds open to 'see' (not to suggest that Jim's isn't open--but can he see? :-) I know at least 2 other people who don't think that this is elementary, and the ability to doubt is a requirement I think to gain knowledge. 1) Jon Awbrey with which you had a similar discussion on arisbe-l a year ago. http://stderr.org/pipermail/arisbe/2005-June/002802.html 2) R.Marty in 1997 on peirce-l (I found this mail in my archives, I doubt it is available anywhere though since the peirce-l messages were not archived at that time) = From: "marty" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sender: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Multiple recipients of list" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: Re:Back to the ground : putting in order the house? [...] Personally I choose Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness for the comprehension and Primans, secondans and tertians for the elements of the extension. Thus one avoids confusions with the words first, second and third used as ordinals, the major confusion occurring with CP 2-274 : ..quote.. A sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stand itself to the same Object. end of quote... It is clear that the sign isn't always a Priman (a First), otherwise how can we understand the classification of the signs in which the sign can be a priman, a secundan or a tertian? First , here, cannot be confused with "firstness"; using "priman" the confusion is not possible = /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Gary, Joe, list, Thank you but -- of course! -- I've run into a problem that has bothered far better scholars than me. Peirce: CP 2.238 238. Triadic relations are in three ways divisible by trichotomy, according as the First, the Second, or the Third Correlate, respectively, is a mere possibility, an actual existent, or a law. These three trichotomies, taken together, divide all triadic relations into ten classes [see footnote to 235]. These ten classes will have certain subdivisions according as the existent correlates are individual subjects or individual facts, and according as the correlates that are laws are general subjects, general modes of fact, or general modes of law. So I said, if the sign is a mere quality, then it's a qualisign, and that "raises the question" of what it would be if it were an actual existent or a law. But if the sign were an actual existent, that would just as well "raise the question" of what it would be if it were a quality or a law. And so forth. So I haven't really shown that the first trichotomy "arises" especially when First is a mere possibility, and the second trichotomy arises especially when the Second Correlate is an actual existent, and the third trichotomy arises especially when the Third Correlate is a law. Instead, well, yes, when the Third Correlate is a law, then the sign may be rheme, dicisign, or argument. But when the Second Correlate is an actual existent, I say its sign may be an icon or an index. And it goes downhill from there. Can I squeeze out a solution where I say, the Second Trichotomy doesn't arise "until" the Second Correlation is at least an actual existent, because othewise it is a mere possibility, to be represented only by a qualisign, and not even be distinct from the qualisign? Well, then why can't an iconic sinsign represent a mere possibility? Maybe because the possibility must have some actualized aspects, even if only very partial ones, in order for its qualisign to be embodied in an iconic sinsign. But then I'd have to work out a way where the interpretant isn't really distinct from sign & object unless the interpretant is a law (and is a legisign). I don't know about this direction. Now, let's see whether I over-interpreted the word "respectively." CP238. Triadic relations are in three ways divisible by trichotomy, according as the First, the Second, or the Third Correlate, respectively, is a mere possibility, an actual existent, or a law. "Triadic relations are in three ways divisible by trichotomy, according as the First, the Second, or the Third Correlate, respectively" = Respective trichotomies for the First, Second, Third correlates and that "respectively" does not further cross-reference such as to lead to "according as the First Correlate is a mere possibility, or as the Second Correlate is an actual existent, or as the Third Correlate is a law." That would have been a second "respectively" and Peirce might well then have used the word "respectively" a SECOND time. But then, the rheme/dicisign/argument trichotomy is made to depend on whether the interpretant (the Third Correlate) is a qualisign (quality-as-sign), a sinsign (an actually existent sign), or a legisign (a law-as-sign). And that seems not to work. The icon/index/symbol trichotomy sort of kind of works when it's seen as depending on the Second Correlate's being correlated _as_ quality, actual existent, or law. Suppose that in that manner I say that as the Third Correlate is correlated AS quality, actual existent, or law, it must be icon, index, or symbol, and therefore its interpreted sign is respectively rheme, dicisign, or argument. Why then isn't the First Correlate correlated AS quality, actual existent, or law, thereby giving us the icon/index/symbol division? After all, what's sauce for the Second and Third Correlates should be sauce for the First Correlate. I take solace in the thought that I'm not the only one to have run into problems with CP238. And now I've had the opportunity to review some recent peirce-l discussion touching on it. It doesn't end up affecting the question of categorial correlations in any way that I can see, nor the question of Peirce's intent of categorial correlations, which is clear, but it sure is a bump in the road. I think the wine has worn off too. Best, Ben Udell - Original Message - From: Gary Richmond To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 11:33 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Ben, list, It seems to me that you are quite right about the "distinctly un-English" use of the ordinals 'First', 'Second' and 'Third' by Peirce in the passages being considered. Capitalization
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Here is a verifying passage:, from the neglected Argument paper Peirce: CP 6.452 The word "God," so "capitalized" (as we Americans say), is the definable proper name, signifying Ens necessarium; in my belief Really creator of all three Universes of Experience. Some words shall herein be capitalized when used, not as vernacular, but as terms defined. Thus an "idea" is the substance of an actual unitary thought or fancy; but "Idea," nearer Plato's idea of {idea}, denotes anything whose Being consists in its mere capacity for getting fully represented, regardless of any person's faculty or impotence to represent it. Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: "Joseph Ransdell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 10:18 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) I agree, Ben. Peirce used capitalization to mark his use of a term as a technical one, a term of art. It is a common practice of his and I am certain that there is at least one place where he states this explicitly. Ill try to track down a verifying passage but it may be difficult to find. Joe Ransdell . - Original Message - From: "Benjamin Udell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 9:39 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Aw Jim, you're a trouble maker! >> 66~~ >> *A _Sign_, or _Representamen_, is a First which stands in such genuine >> triadic relation to a Second, called its _Object_, as to be capable of >> detemining a Third, called its _Interpretant, to assume the same triadic >> relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.* >> ~~99 Normal English? With capitalization of the ordinals, no less? In English we would say a "given thing," "a second thing," etc. English is characterized by intransigent normalcy. So Peirce is going to use some capitalized ordinals without explicit referents, as if he were talking about Firsts, Seconds, & Thirds in the usual Peirce way, in order to say simply "something," "another thing," and "a third thing"? Peirce is complicated but he is not sadistic toward the reader. The Sign's correlate, when no further specification is provided, is the Object. "On a New List of Categories": Secondness is reference to a correlate. The Object is the Correlate is the Second. "On a New List of Categories": Thirdness is reference to an interpretant. The Interpretant is the Third. Argh, Ben, on three glasses of wine - Original Message - From: "Jim Piat" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 10:12 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Dear Ben, Jean-Marc, list-- For what its worth, it also struck me that Peirce's use of the terms "first", "second" and "third" in the context cited by Jean-Marc is as Jean-Marc suggests merely a way of indicating the three elements involved when (A) Something --a sign, (B) stands for Something -an object, (C) to something -- an interpretant. I think it is mistaken to suppose a sign (as a function) is a example of a Peircean Firstness. A sign (as I understand the matter) is pre-eminently an example of Pericean Thirdness. OTOH is also seems to me (as Ben and others are suggesting) that Peirce's trichotomies of signs are in some fundamental way related to his categories and less arbitrary than it seems to me that Jean-Marc is suggesting. But I make both of the above comments mainly from the standpoint of an interested bystander who is both enjoying and learning from this interesting discussion which I hope will continue. That said, I am somewhat puzzled by what Peirce means when he refers to a sinsign as not actually functioning as a sign and yet having the characteristics of a sign. The only tentative explanation I can come up with is that for Peirce all that we conceive or experience (and thus all we can or do speak of ) are signs. So to speak of a quality is necessarily not to speak of a qaulity iself (because by defintions qualities are in or as themselves non existant) but to speak of the sign of a quality. IOWs a sinsign is something that stands for a quality that stands for something to something. And since this is more or less open forum I'd like to comment on a special interest of mine and that is the logic of disagreements but I will do that in a separate post. Best wishes, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.0/368 - Release Date: 6
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Ben, list, It seems to me that you are quite right about the "distinctly un-English" use of the ordinals 'First', 'Second' and 'Third' by Peirce in the passages being considered. Capitalization is used for 'terms defined' as he writes, for example, at the beginning of the NA and elsewhere. You quoted Jean-Marc then commented: J-MO If the sign was a First as you commented on CP 2-274 according to the cenopythagorean category Firstness, how would you explain that the sign taken in itself can be a quality (a First), an existent (a Second) or of the nature of a law (a Third)? BU: It can be a First, a Second, etc., in various ways and respects. This is elementary stuff in Peirce. It is elementary stuff for tout le monde (excepting apparently a few) and for the very good reasons offered in your recent analysis, at least for those with minds open to 'see' (not to suggest that Jim's isn't open--but can he see? :-) For even the creator of Formal Concept Analysis (what Marty refers to as "lattice-concepts theory" and upon which he bases his theory of representation) s embrace Peirce's category theory as this relates to his semeiotic including, and especially for him, the existential graphs. Wille--a prince amongst scholars, btw--hasn't written on Peirce much--with the exception of "Lectures on Contextual Logic of Relations" concerning EG & the reduction thesis, Burch's work, etc.-- but he does certainly read Peirce, thinks deeply about these issues, and is ready to discuss them at a very high level. For example (and just because the following encounter was brought to mind by the other Gary here referring to the Peircean elements in a book by Terrence Deacon) in a discussion with Aldo de Moor and me at the coffee break following Deacon's invited lecture at ICCS04, while applauding Deacon's bringing Peircean thinking into contemporary theory of evolution, Wille yet questioned Deacon's unteleological view of evolution in which human 'ends' fill "no adaptive needs" (Deacon, The Symbolic Species, 433). And as for Peirce's category theory, I can say unreservedly that Wille's comments in Kassel last summer (especially during the workshop I chaired and where I took my trikonic analysis a bit further) has convinced me that he at least concurs as to the categorial associations under discussion. But as for the whole of your long (but not too long) analysis of the categories in relation to certain fundamental facets of semeiotic (fundamental at the level of theoretical grammar at least), I can only say "Amen!" You've brought together some of the most important and in some cases seminal texts and an astute analysis which--however some might come to fault any of the details but which I so far do not--reveals an essential relationship between the categories and semeiotic structures at the level at which you were analyzing them. So I certainly can't see where Jim, for example, is 'coming from'. Peirce's "simple category theory" permeates his philosophy, and even and most especially his semeiotic. Gary Benjamin Udell wrote: Jean-Marc, list It is unfortunate that Peirce used the terms 'First', 'Second' and 'Third' in the place of ordinals when he used the same vocabulary for the categories. In the texts that you chose the terms do not refer to categories, they simply refer to 3 things presented in a given order, as in the English language, when you say: "first I will make some coffee", "secondly I will get some bread" and "thirdly I'll eat breakfast". No. Wrong. Referring to "a First" and "a Second" and "a Third" is _not_ normal English and certainly not normal written English. It distinctively coheres, rather glaringly to anybody fluent in English, with the specific sense lent to that set of forms by Peirce. Peirce's manner of using those ordinal words is so distinctly un-English that one sees whole discussions about Peirce which avoid quoting him saying such things, because it sounds strange in English. One cannot deduce from that that "making coffee" is firstness, "getting some bread" is secondness and that "eating breakfast" in thirdness If the sign was a First as you commented on CP 2-274 according to the cenopythagorean category Firstness, how would you explain that the sign taken in itself can be a quality (a First), an existent (a Second) or of the nature of a law (a Third)? It can be a First, a Second, etc., in various ways and respects. This is elementary stuff in Peirce. At this point, I honestly think that you are grasping at straws. I'm sorry, but it's over. Best, Ben Udell --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
I agree, Ben. Peirce used capitalization to mark his use of a term as a technical one, a term of art. It is a common practice of his and I am certain that there is at least one place where he states this explicitly. Ill try to track down a verifying passage but it may be difficult to find. Joe Ransdell . - Original Message - From: "Benjamin Udell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 9:39 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Aw Jim, you're a trouble maker! >> 66~~ >> *A _Sign_, or _Representamen_, is a First which stands in such genuine >> triadic relation to a Second, called its _Object_, as to be capable of >> detemining a Third, called its _Interpretant, to assume the same triadic >> relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.* >> ~~99 Normal English? With capitalization of the ordinals, no less? In English we would say a "given thing," "a second thing," etc. English is characterized by intransigent normalcy. So Peirce is going to use some capitalized ordinals without explicit referents, as if he were talking about Firsts, Seconds, & Thirds in the usual Peirce way, in order to say simply "something," "another thing," and "a third thing"? Peirce is complicated but he is not sadistic toward the reader. The Sign's correlate, when no further specification is provided, is the Object. "On a New List of Categories": Secondness is reference to a correlate. The Object is the Correlate is the Second. "On a New List of Categories": Thirdness is reference to an interpretant. The Interpretant is the Third. Argh, Ben, on three glasses of wine - Original Message ----- From: "Jim Piat" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 10:12 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Dear Ben, Jean-Marc, list-- For what its worth, it also struck me that Peirce's use of the terms "first", "second" and "third" in the context cited by Jean-Marc is as Jean-Marc suggests merely a way of indicating the three elements involved when (A) Something --a sign, (B) stands for Something -an object, (C) to something -- an interpretant. I think it is mistaken to suppose a sign (as a function) is a example of a Peircean Firstness. A sign (as I understand the matter) is pre-eminently an example of Pericean Thirdness. OTOH is also seems to me (as Ben and others are suggesting) that Peirce's trichotomies of signs are in some fundamental way related to his categories and less arbitrary than it seems to me that Jean-Marc is suggesting. But I make both of the above comments mainly from the standpoint of an interested bystander who is both enjoying and learning from this interesting discussion which I hope will continue. That said, I am somewhat puzzled by what Peirce means when he refers to a sinsign as not actually functioning as a sign and yet having the characteristics of a sign. The only tentative explanation I can come up with is that for Peirce all that we conceive or experience (and thus all we can or do speak of ) are signs. So to speak of a quality is necessarily not to speak of a qaulity iself (because by defintions qualities are in or as themselves non existant) but to speak of the sign of a quality. IOWs a sinsign is something that stands for a quality that stands for something to something. And since this is more or less open forum I'd like to comment on a special interest of mine and that is the logic of disagreements but I will do that in a separate post. Best wishes, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.0/368 - Release Date: 6/16/2006 -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.0/368 - Release Date: 6/16/2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Aw Jim, you're a trouble maker! >> 66~~ >> *A _Sign_, or _Representamen_, is a First which stands in such genuine >> triadic relation to a Second, called its _Object_, as to be capable of >> detemining a Third, called its _Interpretant, to assume the same triadic >> relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.* >> ~~99 Normal English? With capitalization of the ordinals, no less? In English we would say a "given thing," "a second thing," etc. English is characterized by intransigent normalcy. So Peirce is going to use some capitalized ordinals without explicit referents, as if he were talking about Firsts, Seconds, & Thirds in the usual Peirce way, in order to say simply "something," "another thing," and "a third thing"? Peirce is complicated but he is not sadistic toward the reader. The Sign's correlate, when no further specification is provided, is the Object. "On a New List of Categories": Secondness is reference to a correlate. The Object is the Correlate is the Second. "On a New List of Categories": Thirdness is reference to an interpretant. The Interpretant is the Third. Argh, Ben, on three glasses of wine - Original Message - From: "Jim Piat" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 10:12 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Dear Ben, Jean-Marc, list-- For what its worth, it also struck me that Peirce's use of the terms "first", "second" and "third" in the context cited by Jean-Marc is as Jean-Marc suggests merely a way of indicating the three elements involved when (A) Something --a sign, (B) stands for Something -an object, (C) to something -- an interpretant. I think it is mistaken to suppose a sign (as a function) is a example of a Peircean Firstness. A sign (as I understand the matter) is pre-eminently an example of Pericean Thirdness. OTOH is also seems to me (as Ben and others are suggesting) that Peirce's trichotomies of signs are in some fundamental way related to his categories and less arbitrary than it seems to me that Jean-Marc is suggesting. But I make both of the above comments mainly from the standpoint of an interested bystander who is both enjoying and learning from this interesting discussion which I hope will continue. That said, I am somewhat puzzled by what Peirce means when he refers to a sinsign as not actually functioning as a sign and yet having the characteristics of a sign. The only tentative explanation I can come up with is that for Peirce all that we conceive or experience (and thus all we can or do speak of ) are signs. So to speak of a quality is necessarily not to speak of a qaulity iself (because by defintions qualities are in or as themselves non existant) but to speak of the sign of a quality. IOWs a sinsign is something that stands for a quality that stands for something to something. And since this is more or less open forum I'd like to comment on a special interest of mine and that is the logic of disagreements but I will do that in a separate post. Best wishes, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Dear Ben, Jean-Marc, list-- For what its worth, it also struck me that Peirce's use of the terms "first", "second" and "third" in the context cited by Jean-Marc is as Jean-Marc suggests merely a way of indicating the three elements involved when (A) Something --a sign, (B) stands for Something -an object, (C) to something -- an interpretant. I think it is mistaken to suppose a sign (as a function) is a example of a Peircean Firstness. A sign (as I understand the matter) is pre-eminently an example of Pericean Thirdness. OTOH is also seems to me (as Ben and others are suggesting) that Peirce's trichotomies of signs are in some fundamental way related to his categories and less arbitrary than it seems to me that Jean-Marc is suggesting. But I make both of the above comments mainly from the standpoint of an interested bystander who is both enjoying and learning from this interesting discussion which I hope will continue. That said, I am somewhat puzzled by what Peirce means when he refers to a sinsign as not actually functioning as a sign and yet having the characteristics of a sign. The only tentative explanation I can come up with is that for Peirce all that we conceive or experience (and thus all we can or do speak of ) are signs. So to speak of a quality is necessarily not to speak of a qaulity iself (because by defintions qualities are in or as themselves non existant) but to speak of the sign of a quality. IOWs a sinsign is something that stands for a quality that stands for something to something. And since this is more or less open forum I'd like to comment on a special interest of mine and that is the logic of disagreements but I will do that in a separate post. Best wishes, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Frances to Ben and others... In the decadic table or model, the ten classes of signs seem to deal with immediate objects, and dynamic objects, and sparse selections of immediate and dynamic and final interpretants. The decagon does not seem to deal with immediate representamens whatsoever, except perhaps indirectly or subsequently through immediate objects. The first class of signs, posited as qualisigns and sinsigns and legisigns, deals with the immediate objects of a representamen, and probably not with the representamen or sign vehicle itself alone. My guess is that immediate representamen are posited as potisigns and actisigns and famsigns, but are removed from the decadic table or model of semiosis, likely for some reason of expediency by way of illustrating the correlation and interrelation of signs. The present condensed table or model of semiotics as offered in its many forms does seem to serve that basic purpose well enough. The second class of signs, posited as icons and indexes and symbols, deals with the dynamic objects of immediate interpretants, of which immediate rhemes are merely one class of interpretant and indeed only one class of immediate interpretant. The third class of signs, posited as rhemes and dicents and arguments, deals partly with those interpretants that are respectively immediate and dynamic and final. They are only a partial selection, because they are not all the interpretants that are offered in semiosis. They are however trichotomic exemplars of their respected categories, in that rhemes are the first of three immediate interpretants offered, and dicents are the second of three dynamic interpretants offered, and arguments are the third of three final interpretants offered. This condensation actually yields a diagonal layout, which is unusual for categorical trichotomies, which are usually horizontal. Nonetheless, even this architectonic scaffolding is not categorically consistent with the structured trichotomies of phenomena, in that there should be only one immediate class, but two dynamic classes, yet three final classes. The class members of such monadic firstness and dyadic secondness and triadic thirdness would also each fall under there own class holder, presumably of zeroness. It is my suspicion that all the interpretants posited for semiosis are not all of grammatics, the first of the three grand semiotic divisions before critics and rhetorics; and grammatics which is also the sole basis of the decagon. One thorn here for me then is whether all the subsequent signs of critics and rhetorics are indeed only various kinds of grammatic or other interpretants. Another thorn here for me is whether semiotics can be complete at least to some degree, for say nonhuman mechanisms or organisms or even for mature humans, if only the grammatic division of signs is present as information, to the exclusion of critics and grammatics in any particular situation of semiosis. This of course implies that making signs to some extent, and thus making the logic of signs to some extent, and thus making the ideal sought seem real to some extent, is not limited only to mature intelligent humans. If this speculation of mine is correct, then just what role the decadic table or model of signs is intended to fully play as a degenerate condensation of logical semiosis becomes unclear to me, and there surely must be an important role. Given what is now known of Peirce, it would not be reasonable to hold the decagon as confused. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Benjamin Udell wrote: Jean-Marc, list It is unfortunate that Peirce used the terms 'First', 'Second' and 'Third' in the place of ordinals when he used the same vocabulary for the categories. In the texts that you chose the terms do not refer to categories, they simply refer to 3 things presented in a given order, as in the English language, when you say: "first I will make some coffee", "secondly I will get some bread" and "thirdly I'll eat breakfast". No. Wrong. Referring to "a First" and "a Second" and "a Third" is _not_ normal English and certainly not normal written English. It distinctively coheres, rather glaringly to anybody fluent in English, with the specific sense lent to that set of forms by Peirce. Peirce's manner of using those ordinal words is so distinctly un-English that one sees whole discussions about Peirce which avoid quoting him saying such things, because it sounds strange in English. One cannot deduce from that that "making coffee" is firstness, "getting some bread" is secondness and that "eating breakfast" in thirdness If the sign was a First as you commented on CP 2-274 according to the cenopythagorean category Firstness, how would you explain that the sign taken in itself can be a quality (a First), an existent (a Second) or of the nature of a law (a Third)? It can be a First, a Second, etc., in various ways and respects. This is elementary stuff in Peirce. At this point, I honestly think that you are grasping at straws. I'm sorry, but it's over. Best, Ben Udell Ben, you know the song? A B C It's easy as, 1 2 3 As simple as, do re mi maybe you should consider the following definition, where Peirce to avoid any confusion with the categories uses the letters A, B, C. 1902 - NEM IV pp. 20 - 2. Parts of Carnegie Applications . ... Namely, a sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence with something, C, its object, as that in which itself stand to C// ... (source is http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/rsources/76defs/76defs.htm) why would A be firstness, B secondness and C thirdness? /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Jean-Marc, list > It is unfortunate that Peirce used the terms 'First', 'Second' and 'Third' in > the place of ordinals when he used the same vocabulary for the categories. > In the texts that you chose the terms do not refer to categories, they simply > refer to 3 things presented in a given order, as in the English language, > when you say: "first I will make some coffee", "secondly I will get some > bread" and "thirdly I'll eat breakfast". No. Wrong. Referring to "a First" and "a Second" and "a Third" is _not_ normal English and certainly not normal written English. It distinctively coheres, rather glaringly to anybody fluent in English, with the specific sense lent to that set of forms by Peirce. Peirce's manner of using those ordinal words is so distinctly un-English that one sees whole discussions about Peirce which avoid quoting him saying such things, because it sounds strange in English. > One cannot deduce from that that "making coffee" is firstness, "getting some > bread" is secondness and that "eating breakfast" in thirdness > If the sign was a First as you commented on CP 2-274 according to the > cenopythagorean category Firstness, how would you explain that the sign taken > in itself can be a quality (a First), an existent (a Second) or of the nature > of a law (a Third)? It can be a First, a Second, etc., in various ways and respects. This is elementary stuff in Peirce. At this point, I honestly think that you are grasping at straws. I'm sorry, but it's over. Best, Ben Udell --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
before answering, I'd like to comment on an obvious confusion (see below) Benjamin Udell wrote: [...] -- are defined by reference to the Sign, the Object, and the Interpretant, respectively. The Sign is the First, the Object is the Second, and the Interpretant is the Third. In CP227-229, which leads toward the discussion of the trichotomies: 66~~ *A _/Sign/_, or _/Representamen/_, is a First which stands in such genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its _/Object/_, as to be capable of detemining a Third, called its _/Interpretant/, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.* ~~99 So that settles that. [] 66~~ *A _/Sign/_, or _/Representamen/_, is a First which stands in such genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its _/Object/_, as to be capable of detemining a Third, called its _/Interpretant/, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.* ~~99 In the first trichotomy, the Sign or First is classed in terms of its own category. The first trichotomy is of the Sign or First classed in terms of _/its own/_ cenopythagorean category, _/irrespectively of/_ its Second or Object and _/irrespectively of/_ its Third or Interpretant. There's firstness. In the second trichotomy, the Sign or First is classed in terms of its relation to its Second. The second trichotomy is of the Sign or First classed in terms of the cenopythagorean category of that in _/respect or regard/_ of which it represents its Second or Object and _/irrespectively of/_ its Third or Interpretant. There's secondness. (If said respect/regard is of a quality, then the respect/regard is a ground.) In the third trichotomy, the Sign or First is classed in terms of its relation to its Third. The third trichotomy is of the Sign or First classed in terms of the cenopythagorean category in which its Third or Interpretant will represent the First or Sign as representing its Second or Object. There's thirdness. [...] Best, Ben Udell It is unfortunate that Peirce used the terms 'First', 'Second' and 'Third' in the place of ordinals when he used the same vocabulary for the categories. In the texts that you chose the terms do not refer to categories, they simply refer to 3 things presented in a given order, as in the English language, when you say: "first I will make some coffee", "secondly I will get some bread" and "thirdly I'll eat breakfast". One cannot deduce from that that "making coffee" is firstness, "getting some bread" is secondness and that "eating breakfast" in thirdness If the sign was a First as you commented on CP 2-274 according to the cenopythagorean category Firstness, how would you explain that the sign taken in itself can be a quality (a First), an existent (a Second) or of the nature of a law (a Third)? this is what I meant in a previous message: you are mixing the categories with ordinals. You have just confirmed my earlier intuition. /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Joseph Ransdell wrote: I was intending to warn Ben against adopting a bullying tone toward you, as his frustration seemed to be mounting. Perhaps a mistake on my part but a response in part to your own complaints about his tone, which you were construing as an attempt to silence you. Also I had been about to answer you with the same point that Ben made and didn't want to feel required to duplicate it. Joe OK, I searched the web for trichotomies + categories, found this article which I think is symptomatic of the risk entailed by mixing trichotomies with categories: http://www.chass.toronto.edu/french/as-sa/ASSA-No10/No10-A2.html I reads half-way through the article: = QUOTE == The first division of the three trichotomies is identical with Firstness and the representamen, and it consists of Qualisign, Sinsign and Legisign. It is worth noticing that the first trichotomy consists of (non)sign, i.e. signs which do not relate to anything; they are monadic and exist sui generis. But still, they form the basis for the creation of meaning. = END QUOTE == there is a confusion here: the first trichotomy is concerned with signs that *are* signs - it does not produce "would-be" signs or "non-signs" cut from all relations. this echoes what Bernard mentioned in a previous message, namely the false impression that classifications create objects when in reality these objects have no existence outside the context of the classification. /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
I was intending to warn Ben against adopting a bullying tone toward you, as his frustration seemed to be mounting. Perhaps a mistake on my part but a response in part to your own complaints about his tone, which you were construing as an attempt to silence you. Also I had been about to answer you with the same point that Ben made and didn't want to feel required to duplicate it. Joe . - Original Message - From: "Jean-Marc Orliaguet" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 1:18 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Joseph Ransdell wrote: > Ben: > > I don't think you or your position would lose any credibility by > letting Jean-Marc have the last word on the matter. > > Joe Ransdell That's unfair in my opionion. Being accused of not answering, I answer to Ben with counter-arguments and now the question should be shoved under the carpet ... /JM > - Original Message - > *From:* Benjamin Udell <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > *To:* Peirce Discussion Forum <mailto:peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu> > *Sent:* Wednesday, June 21, 2006 4:14 PM > *Subject:* [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) > > Jean-Marc: > > In reading Joe's response to you, I am reminded that you still > haven't taken a stand on the three main trichotomies and their > categorial correlations. If you do in fact understand the > correlations, you may feel that it destroys your argument to admit > that you understand them. But then it comes to the same thing. > > --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.0/368 - Release Date: 6/16/2006 -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.0/368 - Release Date: 6/16/2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Joseph Ransdell wrote: Ben: I don't think you or your position would lose any credibility by letting Jean-Marc have the last word on the matter. Joe Ransdell That's unfair in my opionion. Being accused of not answering, I answer to Ben with counter-arguments and now the question should be shoved under the carpet ... /JM - Original Message - *From:* Benjamin Udell <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]> *To:* Peirce Discussion Forum <mailto:peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu> *Sent:* Wednesday, June 21, 2006 4:14 PM *Subject:* [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Jean-Marc: In reading Joe's response to you, I am reminded that you still haven't taken a stand on the three main trichotomies and their categorial correlations. If you do in fact understand the correlations, you may feel that it destroys your argument to admit that you understand them. But then it comes to the same thing. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Ben: I don't think you or your position would lose any credibility by letting Jean-Marc have the last word on the matter. Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 4:14 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Jean-Marc: In reading Joe's response to you, I am reminded that you still haven't taken a stand on the three main trichotomies and their categorial correlations. If you do in fact understand the correlations, you may feel that it destroys your argument to admit that you understand them. But then it comes to the same thing. Then I caught this remark of yours: > Then Marty claimed that some of the trichotomies are redundant. (this is summarized in a mail dated 2006/06/16 sent to peirce-l which you most likely overlooked.) which would not yield to 66 classes of signs but only 28. Far from overlooking it, I responded to it, and am still awaiting Robert's reply. I append it directly below. Best, Ben Udell - Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Friday, June 16, 2006 12:28 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: redundancies of trichotomies Robert, list, > Bernard Morand mention in a message my assertion claimed in my book "L'alg¨bre des signes" according to many trichotomies among the 10 trichotomies are redundant. > Here are my arguments, exposed on the case of the trichotomie number IV concerning "the relation of the sign to the dynamic objet" : > By the trichotomy number I ( The sign itself, the mode of apprehension of the sign itself" ) we know the categorial membership of the sign ( 1, 2 or 3 ); by the trichotomy number III (the Mode of Being of the dynamical object)... Number III being abstractive/concretive/collective. >... by the trichotomy number III (the Mode of Being of the dynamical object) we know the categorial membership of the dynamic object (1,2 or 3). In view that the dynamical object determine the sign we have the following possibilities : > If the Mode of apprehension of the sign is 3, the Mode of Being of the Dynamical object is 3 and their relation is categorically determined by the pair (3,3). The sign is a symbol. > If the Mode of apprehension of the sign is 2, the Mode of Being of the Dynamical object is 3 or 2 and their relation is categorically determined by the pair (3,2) or by the pair (2,2). In both cases the sign is an index. (respectively legisign or sinsign) Trichotomy I, the Mode of apprehension, consists of 1. qualisign, 2. sinsign, and 3. legisign. If the Mode of apprehension is 2, then the sign is a sinsign. So the pair (3,2) is a collective sinsign and the pair (2,2) is a concretive sinsign. Yet you then say that (3,2) and (2,2) are, "respectively, legisign or sinsign." Also, the collective sinsign seems to be excluded by Peirce's "ususal" rules of sign-parametric combination. One of us seems to have gone wrong here. Your discussion is formulated rather abstractly, so I may well be the one who'se gone wrong. But would you clarify this? It seems like you meant to write some permutation of this. E.g., "If the Mode of Being of the Dynamical Object is 3, the Mode of apprehension of the sign is 3 or 2, and their relation is categorically determined by the pair (3,2) or by the pair (2,2). In both cases the sign is an index (respectively legisign or sinsign)." In that case (3,2) would be a (2) concretive (3) legisign and (2,2) would be a (2) concretive ([CORRECTED] 2) sinsign, and it would be allowed by the rules of sign-parametric combination, and would cohere with saying that the sign is respectively legisign or sinsign. But Peirce's parametric combination rules would seem to allow the concretive sinsign to be iconic rather than indexical. So, if you meant to refer to a concretive legisign and a concretive sinsign, then what rule of combining sign-parametric values are you using and on what basis do you rule out the apparently allowed iconic concretive sinsign? I'm not saying that it shouldn't be ruled out. But that's the step that renders Trichotomy IV redundant. The 10-ad of trichotomies which we're discussing is far from "canonical." But still, what are your ideas these regards? This is of interest to the question of whether you keep the arrangement whereby all symbols are copulant and none of them designative or descriptive. > If the Mode of apprehension of the sign is 1, the Mode of Being of the Dynamical object is 3 or 2 or 1 and their relation is categorically determined by the pair (3,1) or b
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Benjamin Udell wrote: Jean-Marc, You've evaded the question again. So, we can take your default as your tacit admission that you don't grasp even the appearance of the categorial correlations with the three trichotomies. I suppose that this tacit admission of yours is better than nothing, but it is really quite an astonishing admission for you to have made. It's not particularly illuminating of the philosophical topic when the interlocutor simply abandons the field, but I'll take the win. Best, Ben Udell Ben, this is not meant to get you angry or anything, but it is my right to have a different opinion. If it also differs from others' it is OK. The correlation that you mention -- if there is any -- is not used to derive the 10 classes. If there was a correlation it would be interesting but for aesthetic considerations. To take an example it is possible to derive 28 classes of signs on the basis of 6 or 10 trichotomies, without considering any correlation between the trichotomies and the categories. the most important aspect for deriving the classes are the relations of determination between S, O and I, and the phenomenology of these elements when considering all the possible modes of connections between them. This is where the categories are getting involved, including their degenerate modes. otherwise for the matter of associating any given trichotomy with a category I would associate it with thirdness, because a trichotomy always involves 3 things. And I would associate dichotomies with secondness, and non-divisibility with firstness, monads. /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Benjamin Udell wrote: Jean-Marc: In reading Joe's response to you, I am reminded that you still haven't taken a stand on the three main trichotomies and their categorial correlations. If you do in fact understand the correlations, you may feel that it destroys your argument to admit that you understand them. But then it comes to the same thing. I have answered to that already: there are no obvious correlations, this is a pure guess, an abduction of yours. That many people find it easy to draw a correlation does not mean that they are right. Indeed: - the first is the trichotomy of the sign in itself - the second is a trichotomy of the relation between the sign and its (dynamic) object - the third is a trichotomy of the relation between the sign and its (final) interpretant I don't see why you are claiming that the third trichotomy is associated to the third category more so than the second trichotomy is. What makes you think so? If you claim so, it is up to you to show why there is a correlation. It is not my task, it's yours, and in that case drawing powerpoints is not enough. You need to come with some deductive argument, not with a series of images in 3D. Now considering Joe's argument, to answer the post that you are referring to, according to which only 3 trichotomies would be representative of Peirce's view, and the rest would be speculation, I can reply to that argument that even though Peirce did not settle for an exact list of trichotomies he did not have any trouble considering that there were more than 3. He writes that very explicitly: == CP 8.343 ...* I base a recognition of ten respects in which Signs may be divided*. I do not say that these divisions are enough. But since *every one of them turns out to be a trichotomy*, it follows that in order to decide what classes of signs result from them, I have 310 or 59049, difficult questions to carefully consider; and therefore I will not undertake to carry my systematical division of signs any further, but will leave that for future explorers. == In writing that there is no mention that, since there are only three categories, there also ought to be only three trichotomies and not more. This only is enough to question the argument according to which you claim there is a correlation between the trichotomies and the categories. Are the 4th trichotomy and the 5th correlated with some fourthness or fifthness, etc ? I think that you are mixing trichotomies with triads, ordinals and with the categories. PS: Also please stop using such a childish language as "I'll take the win", "you lose the argument" ... it is your argument, not mine. /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
sign. Etc.) Best, Ben Udell > Whatever the case the trichotomie n¨ IV is enterely determined by the trichotomies I and III and consequently the distinction brought forth this trichotomie is not operative and I conclude that is redundant. > The same argument can be advanced for the trichotomies VII and IX, generally for the trichotomies concerning relations betwen elements of which the nature is otherwise know . > The case of tne trichotomie number X is different and I admit willingly that I don't see what can be a trichotomy of a triadic relation especially when I represent It by a branching Y. If anyone can give to me an idea on this matter I should be grateful to him... > Robert Marty http://robert.marty.perso.cegetel.net/ - Original Message - From: "Benjamin Udell" To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Friday, June 16, 2006 12:56 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: redundancies of trichotomies Robert, list,I wrote,"In that case (3,2) would be a (2) concretive (3) legisign and (2,2) would be a (2) concretive (3) sinsign,..."Things are confusing enough without my typos. I meant,"In that case (3,2) would be a (2) concretive (3) legisign and (2,2) would be a (2) concretive (2) sinsign,..."- Best, Ben Udell - Original Message - From: "Joseph Ransdell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" <peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu> Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 4:39 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Jean-Marc:What you say below suggests a chaos in Peirce's work and in the scholarship about it which does not exist, as regards this matter in question. I have said several times here and once quite recently that all talk about Peirce's work on the trichotomies past the three presented in the Syllabus of Logic of 1903 where the stuff about the ten sign classes first appears is about material in Peirce's notebooks which is very much of the nature of work in process that never reached even a provisionally satisfactory status in Peirce's own estimation. It cannot be talked about as if it is on par, as representing Peirce's view, with the material in the Syllabus where the first three trichotomies are developed systematically and were in fact made publicly available by Peirce.. So far as I know, no one who is aware of this in virtue either of studying the MS material themselves or hearing about how problematic it is from me or someone else disagrees with that, so far as I know. Ben's comments about the three trichotomy set which Peirce himself made publicly available are quite reasonable as a way of contrasting the present status of that with the unsettled status of the material in his notebooks. I am less concerned with defending Ben, though, than I am with there not being a misunderstanding about the present scholarly situation. There is no assumption, of course, that any settlement of opinion on any of this is definitive or absolute. .Joe Ransdell- Original Message - From: "Jean-Marc Orliaguet" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" <peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu>Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 12:48 PMSubject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)Benjamin Udell wrote:> Jean-Marc, list,>> I don't even agree in the end with Peirce's classification but it's pretty obvious that whether one partially or totally orders the 10 classes depends on the criteria. And it's pretty obvious that the trichotomies are ordered (or orderable) in a Peircean categorial way, specifically: the 1st trichotomy pertains to the sign's own category, the 2nd to the category in which the sign refers to its object, and the 3rd to the category in which the sign entails its interpretant. If one incorporates this ordering of the trichotomies into the ordering of the classes, then one ends with a complete ordering of the classes. One can also so prioritize as to arrive simply at the partially ordered lattice. This is at least partly a matter of whether one prioritizes the Peircean category of the trichotomy (the ordinality of the "parameter") or the Peircean category of the term IN the trichotomy (the ordinality of the "parametric value"). How does one decide? Well, one looks at it both ways, both ways have their illuminative aspects, so one ends up finally not choosing one way dispensing permanently with the other way. So there seems to be some optionality in how one orders these things. Jean-Marc, however, seems to believe that the ordering question is quite determinate, and leads inevitably to the partial ordering. He does this by dismissing without analyzing the certainly very categorial appearance of the ordering of the trichotomies. Certainly Peirce was quite conscious of this categorial structure of th
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Jean-Marc: What you say below suggests a chaos in Peirce's work and in the scholarship about it which does not exist, as regards this matter in question. I have said several times here and once quite recently that all talk about Peirce's work on the trichotomies past the three presented in the Syllabus of Logic of 1903 where the stuff about the ten sign classes first appears is about material in Peirce's notebooks which is very much of the nature of work in process that never reached even a provisionally satisfactory status in Peirce's own estimation. It cannot be talked about as if it is on par, as representing Peirce's view, with the material in the Syllabus where the first three trichotomies are developed systematically and were in fact made publicly available by Peirce.. So far as I know, no one who is aware of this in virtue either of studying the MS material themselves or hearing about how problematic it is from me or someone else disagrees with that, so far as I know. Ben's comments about the three trichotomy set which Peirce himself made publicly available are quite reasonable as a way of contrasting the present status of that with the unsettled status of the material in his notebooks. I am less concerned with defending Ben, though, than I am with there not being a misunderstanding about the present scholarly situation. There is no assumption, of course, that any settlement of opinion on any of this is definitive or absolute. . Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: "Jean-Marc Orliaguet" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 12:48 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Benjamin Udell wrote: > Jean-Marc, list, > > I don't even agree in the end with Peirce's classification but it's pretty > obvious that whether one partially or totally orders the 10 classes > depends on the criteria. And it's pretty obvious that the trichotomies are > ordered (or orderable) in a Peircean categorial way, specifically: > the 1st trichotomy pertains to the sign's own category, > the 2nd to the category in which the sign refers to its object, and > the 3rd to the category in which the sign entails its interpretant. > If one incorporates this ordering of the trichotomies into the ordering of > the classes, then one ends with a complete ordering of the classes. One > can also so prioritize as to arrive simply at the partially ordered > lattice. This is at least partly a matter of whether one prioritizes the > Peircean category of the trichotomy (the ordinality of the "parameter") or > the Peircean category of the term IN the trichotomy (the ordinality of the > "parametric value"). How does one decide? Well, one looks at it both ways, > both ways have their illuminative aspects, so one ends up finally not > choosing one way dispensing permanently with the other way. So there seems > to be some optionality in how one orders these things. Jean-Marc, however, > seems to believe that the ordering question is quite determinate, and > leads inevitably to the partial ordering. He does this by dismissing > without analyzing the certainly very categorial appearance of the ordering > of the trichotomies. Certainly Peirce was quite conscious of this > categorial structure of the trichotomies, since his 10-ad of trichotomies > is obviously an attempt to extend that structure. > > Where most Peirceans seem to regard this matter as settled and fairly > simple, Jean-Marc differs, which is his right. But I don't see in any of > this thread where Jean-Marc addresses what certainly appears to be a > Peircean categorial orderability of the trichotomies. Instead he has > merely asserted that they are like categories of male/female and > old/young, and he has not actually pursued a comparison of his example > with the Peircean trichotomies in order to argue for his counter-intuitive > assertion. So I think that we're still awaiting an argument. If this > argument is supposed to be in Robert Marty's book, then perhaps Jean-Marc > can summarize it. If Jean-Marc is unprepared to do that, perhaps Robert > can do it. > > Best, Ben Udell > > Which "Peirceans" are you thinking of? I'll tell you about the Peirceans, concerning the ordering of the trichotomies. First Peirce, among the Peirceans, gives over the years five different orderings of the trichotomies. Beginning with the triad (S, S-Od, S-If), then continuing with the 6 trichotomies (1904 and 1908) in different orders and the finally with the ten trichotomies (letter to Lady Welby 1908 and 8-344) yet again in different orders - This is summarized on page 231 of Marty's book. None of the or
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Lesser streets sometimes turn out to run along in between greater streets. Increase of resolution sometimes brings increased detail. When Peirce starts to take "degenerate" cases into account, more detail emerges. Why the trichotomies should succeed uniquely like integers, with no fractal-like wrinkles in between? That's not so different than saying that intermediate truth values should come after "T" & "F" rather than in between. Ben Udell I make a precision in case you still don't understand my point: if the 3 trichotomies (S, S-Od, S-If) are ordered in a given way, how can you claim that the order of the 3 trichotomies matters if it is changes when 3 or 6 other trichotomies are added? I think that this is a perfectly valid answer to your question. If you still don't grasp it I can draw a powerpoint. /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Jean-Marc Orliaguet wrote: Benjamin Udell wrote: Jean-Marc, I spoke of the three trichotomies, not the five or six or ten. If you don't address what's said, why do you bother sending posts to a place like peirce-l? If you do not address this structure, specifically, the 1st trichotomy pertains to the sign's own category, the 2nd to the category in which the sign refers to its object, and the 3rd to the category in which the sign entails its interpretant. then I think that you lose this argument by sheer default. Best, Ben UDell. the same three trichotomies that you mention also appear also in the 6 and the 10 trichotomies in a different order. you obviously don't understand what you are writing about. /JM I make a precision in case you still don't understand my point: if the 3 trichotomies (S, S-Od, S-If) are ordered in a given way, how can you claim that the order of the 3 trichotomies matters if it is changes when 3 or 6 other trichotomies are added? I think that this is a perfectly valid answer to your question. If you still don't grasp it I can draw a powerpoint. /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Jean-Marc, You've evaded the question again. So, we can take your default as your tacit admission that you don't grasp even the appearance of the categorial correlations with the three trichotomies. I suppose that this tacit admission of yours is better than nothing, but it is really quite an astonishing admission for you to have made. It's not particularly illuminating of the philosophical topic when the interlocutor simply abandons the field, but I'll take the win. Best, Ben Udell - Original Message - From: "Jean-Marc Orliaguet" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 2:19 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Benjamin Udell wrote: > Jean-Marc, > > I spoke of the three trichotomies, not the five or six or ten. If you don't > address what's said, why do you bother sending posts to a place like peirce-l? > If you do not address this structure, specifically, > > >> the 1st trichotomy pertains to the sign's own category, >> the 2nd to the category in which the sign refers to its object, and >> the 3rd to the category in which the sign entails its interpretant. >> > > then I think that you lose this argument by sheer default. > > Best, Ben UDell. > the same three trichotomies that you mention also appear also in the 6 and the 10 trichotomies in a different order. you obviously don't understand what you are writing about. /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Benjamin Udell wrote: Jean-Marc, I spoke of the three trichotomies, not the five or six or ten. If you don't address what's said, why do you bother sending posts to a place like peirce-l? If you do not address this structure, specifically, the 1st trichotomy pertains to the sign's own category, the 2nd to the category in which the sign refers to its object, and the 3rd to the category in which the sign entails its interpretant. then I think that you lose this argument by sheer default. Best, Ben UDell. the same three trichotomies that you mention also appear also in the 6 and the 10 trichotomies in a different order. you obviously don't understand what you are writing about. /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Jean-Marc, I spoke of the three trichotomies, not the five or six or ten. If you don't address what's said, why do you bother sending posts to a place like peirce-l? If you do not address this structure, specifically, > the 1st trichotomy pertains to the sign's own category, > the 2nd to the category in which the sign refers to its object, and > the 3rd to the category in which the sign entails its interpretant. then I think that you lose this argument by sheer default. Best, Ben UDell. - Original Message - From: "Jean-Marc Orliaguet" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 1:48 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Benjamin Udell wrote: > Jean-Marc, list, > > I don't even agree in the end with Peirce's classification but it's pretty > obvious that whether one partially or totally orders the 10 classes depends > on the criteria. And it's pretty obvious that the trichotomies are ordered > (or orderable) in a Peircean categorial way, specifically: > the 1st trichotomy pertains to the sign's own category, > the 2nd to the category in which the sign refers to its object, and > the 3rd to the category in which the sign entails its interpretant. > If one incorporates this ordering of the trichotomies into the ordering of > the classes, then one ends with a complete ordering of the classes. One can > also so prioritize as to arrive simply at the partially ordered lattice. This > is at least partly a matter of whether one prioritizes the Peircean category > of the trichotomy (the ordinality of the "parameter") or the Peircean > category of the term IN the trichotomy (the ordinality of the "parametric > value"). How does one decide? Well, one looks at it both ways, both ways have > their illuminative aspects, so one ends up finally not choosing one way > dispensing permanently with the other way. So there seems to be some > optionality in how one orders these things. Jean-Marc, however, seems to > believe that the ordering question is quite determinate, and leads inevitably > to the partial ordering. He does this by dismissing without analyzing the > certainly very categorial appearance of the ordering of the trichotomies. > Certainly Peirce was quite conscious of this categorial structure of the > trichotomies, since his 10-ad of trichotomies is obviously an attempt to > extend that structure. > > Where most Peirceans seem to regard this matter as settled and fairly simple, > Jean-Marc differs, which is his right. But I don't see in any of this thread > where Jean-Marc addresses what certainly appears to be a Peircean categorial > orderability of the trichotomies. Instead he has merely asserted that they > are like categories of male/female and old/young, and he has not actually > pursued a comparison of his example with the Peircean trichotomies in order > to argue for his counter-intuitive assertion. So I think that we're still > awaiting an argument. If this argument is supposed to be in Robert Marty's > book, then perhaps Jean-Marc can summarize it. If Jean-Marc is unprepared to > do that, perhaps Robert can do it. > > Best, Ben Udell > > Which "Peirceans" are you thinking of? I'll tell you about the Peirceans, concerning the ordering of the trichotomies. First Peirce, among the Peirceans, gives over the years five different orderings of the trichotomies. Beginning with the triad (S, S-Od, S-If), then continuing with the 6 trichotomies (1904 and 1908) in different orders and the finally with the ten trichotomies (letter to Lady Welby 1908 and 8-344) yet again in different orders - This is summarized on page 231 of Marty's book. None of the orderings are the same, by the way. This is for Peirce's account. Then two other authors Lieb (1977) and Kawama (1976) listed in the same table propose a different ordering of the 10 trichotomies. Marty also mentions on the same page that Jappy proposed a non-linear ordering of the trichotomies. Then Marty claimed that some of the trichotomies are redundant. (this is summarized in a mail dated 2006/06/16 sent to peirce-l which you most likely overlooked.) which would not yield to 66 classes of signs but only 28. Bernard Morand however claims that there is no redundancy and that each trichotomy is independent. is this what you call "settled and fairly simple"? I think you have a very simplified understanding of these issues. Best /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Benjamin Udell wrote: Jean-Marc, list, I don't even agree in the end with Peirce's classification but it's pretty obvious that whether one partially or totally orders the 10 classes depends on the criteria. And it's pretty obvious that the trichotomies are ordered (or orderable) in a Peircean categorial way, specifically: the 1st trichotomy pertains to the sign's own category, the 2nd to the category in which the sign refers to its object, and the 3rd to the category in which the sign entails its interpretant. If one incorporates this ordering of the trichotomies into the ordering of the classes, then one ends with a complete ordering of the classes. One can also so prioritize as to arrive simply at the partially ordered lattice. This is at least partly a matter of whether one prioritizes the Peircean category of the trichotomy (the ordinality of the "parameter") or the Peircean category of the term IN the trichotomy (the ordinality of the "parametric value"). How does one decide? Well, one looks at it both ways, both ways have their illuminative aspects, so one ends up finally not choosing one way dispensing permanently with the other way. So there seems to be some optionality in how one orders these things. Jean-Marc, however, seems to believe that the ordering question is quite determinate, and leads inevitably to the partial ordering. He does this by dismissing without analyzing the certainly very categorial appearance of the ordering of the trichotomies. Certainly Peirce was quite conscious of this categorial structure of the trichotomies, since his 10-ad of trichotomies is obviously an attempt to extend that structure. Where most Peirceans seem to regard this matter as settled and fairly simple, Jean-Marc differs, which is his right. But I don't see in any of this thread where Jean-Marc addresses what certainly appears to be a Peircean categorial orderability of the trichotomies. Instead he has merely asserted that they are like categories of male/female and old/young, and he has not actually pursued a comparison of his example with the Peircean trichotomies in order to argue for his counter-intuitive assertion. So I think that we're still awaiting an argument. If this argument is supposed to be in Robert Marty's book, then perhaps Jean-Marc can summarize it. If Jean-Marc is unprepared to do that, perhaps Robert can do it. Best, Ben Udell Which "Peirceans" are you thinking of? I'll tell you about the Peirceans, concerning the ordering of the trichotomies. First Peirce, among the Peirceans, gives over the years five different orderings of the trichotomies. Beginning with the triad (S, S-Od, S-If), then continuing with the 6 trichotomies (1904 and 1908) in different orders and the finally with the ten trichotomies (letter to Lady Welby 1908 and 8-344) yet again in different orders - This is summarized on page 231 of Marty's book. None of the orderings are the same, by the way. This is for Peirce's account. Then two other authors Lieb (1977) and Kawama (1976) listed in the same table propose a different ordering of the 10 trichotomies. Marty also mentions on the same page that Jappy proposed a non-linear ordering of the trichotomies. Then Marty claimed that some of the trichotomies are redundant. (this is summarized in a mail dated 2006/06/16 sent to peirce-l which you most likely overlooked.) which would not yield to 66 classes of signs but only 28. Bernard Morand however claims that there is no redundancy and that each trichotomy is independent. is this what you call "settled and fairly simple"? I think you have a very simplified understanding of these issues. Best /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Joe, list, I would add a heuristic value to the mnemonic value which Joe discusses. The diagrams can bring patterns to light which we might otherwise miss. I think that Gary will want to address this, but I'll resist the opportunity to steal his thunder. More generally, I think that Joe is asking a very fair "where's the beef?" kind of question, a generalized form of the question which I think Jerry Chandler asked only too narrowly, "why are these terms important to understanding human communication," to which I responded in part that their applicability would be much broader and include application in metaphysics. Where's the beef? It's not a question of whether the classes lack the "beef" of illuminative applicability, rather more a question of how much actual productive work has been done. One could point out that one obvious move to bring such work into relief, would be simply to point out where actual work in rhetoric, the rhetoric of politics, and in metaphysics, may be considered to be using the legisigns "qualisign, sinsign, legisign" and the rest, though in other vocabularies. That was partly what I was tending to do in my response to Jerry Chandler. After all, is not the classification of signs part of an organon, a toolbox? But pragmaticism is not merely a toolbox of tools neutral & inert till somebody exploits them, one way as good as another; it's not just the "hotel" or valet or whatever for various research fields. There is to exploit the dynamic of sign-classificational relations, with an eye to sign classes' 'form-generative' _content_. I think that Joe is getting at something like that. Best, Ben Udell - Original Message - From: "Joseph Ransdell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 12:23 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) The numbers can be ignored altogether as far as I am concerned, or one could use, say, the Greek alphabet instead of numbers or just leave the numbers off. All that is important for me is the class names and the understanding that it is presuppositiional from the top down, which could be shown by using down-pointing arrows for connective lines. The use I would have for the figure doesn't require that it have the properties required to transform it in the various ways graph theory requires. For my purposes its use is primarily as a mnemonic for remembering what presupposes what. so that if, in the process of analyzing a bit of discourse, say, one has identified something as being of this class or that one knows ipso facto that a sign of this or that other class is either presupposed by it or presupposes it, directly or indirectly.. I imagine the use of it to be that of being able to figure out what is going on in or going wrong with some actual bit of persuasive argumentation, in a very broad sense of argumentation in which even a work of visual art or a piece of music might be thought of as being constructed argumentatively, supposing one can make good on the prospect of being able to understand artworks\as arguments, coherent or incoherent. The application of this sort of thing to infrahuman life would be via the collapse of genuine into degenerate forms (in the special sense of "degeneracy" Peirce uses), the elimination of levels of reflection, and whatever other modifications are necessary to account for higher developments of life. This view of its use could conceivably be at odds with Peirce's own aims in devising graphical representations of the classes, which might require that the graphs have the properties you require of them because his aim was to be able to learn some things simply from manipulating the graphs in various ways. But it seems to me that something gets lost there. Perhaps something of great philosophical interest will result from the use of graph theory, but focus on what that might yield could be at the expense of what is lost by conforming to its constraints where there is no need to do so since all one needs is a graphical representation for mnemonic and other intuitional purposes. I am not at present aware of what may in fact have been accomplished philosophically with the use of graph theory, but I can imagine it being of interest for a great many other purposes which, for all I know, may be far more important than the philosophical ones. Moreover, I am not saying that what has been done has no philosophical interest but only that I am not myself aware of any such results from it -- and I lay no claim to being well informed about it, which I am not.. I \am just saying that what interests me does not seem to require anything more than I indicate above. Anyway, one thing that occurs to me when I note that Peirce's trek th
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
The numbers can be ignored altogether as far as I am concerned, or one could use, say, the Greek alphabet instead of numbers or just leave the numbers off. All that is important for me is the class names and the understanding that it is presuppositiional from the top down, which could be shown by using down-pointing arrows for connective lines. The use I would have for the figure doesn't require that it have the properties required to transform it in the various ways graph theory requires. For my purposes its use is primarily as a mnemonic for remembering what presupposes what. so that if, in the process of analyzing a bit of discourse, say, one has identified something as being of this class or that one knows ipso facto that a sign of this or that other class is either presupposed by it or presupposes it, directly or indirectly.. I imagine the use of it to be that of being able to figure out what is going on in or going wrong with some actual bit of persuasive argumentation, in a very broad sense of argumentation in which even a work of visual art or a piece of music might be thought of as being constructed argumentatively, supposing one can make good on the prospect of being able to understand artworks\as arguments, coherent or incoherent. The application of this sort of thing to infrahuman life would be via the collapse of genuine into degenerate forms (in the special sense of "degeneracy" Peirce uses), the elimination of levels of reflection, and whatever other modifications are necessary to account for higher developments of life. This view of its use could conceivably be at odds with Peirce's own aims in devising graphical representations of the classes, which might require that the graphs have the properties you require of them because his aim was to be able to learn some things simply from manipulating the graphs in various ways. But it seems to me that something gets lost there. Perhaps something of great philosophical interest will result from the use of graph theory, but focus on what that might yield could be at the expense of what is lost by conforming to its constraints where there is no need to do so since all one needs is a graphical representation for mnemonic and other intuitional purposes. I am not at present aware of what may in fact have been accomplished philosophically with the use of graph theory, but I can imagine it being of interest for a great many other purposes which, for all I know, may be far more important than the philosophical ones. Moreover, I am not saying that what has been done has no philosophical interest but only that I am not myself aware of any such results from it -- and I lay no claim to being well informed about it, which I am not.. I \am just saying that what interests me does not seem to require anything more than I indicate above. Anyway, one thing that occurs to me when I note that Peirce's trek through the presuppositional order in 2.254 through 2.263 begins with quality and ends with the argument is that it seems comparable to regarding thought in the Kantian way as a process of "unification of the manifold". as in the New List. If I understand Peirce correctly, he thinks of a quality as being a given unity and simplicity which is, however, also regardable, reflectively, as if it were an achieved unity -- the achievement being forgotten once completed -- brought about through a unification process which builds the given quality from a "manifold" of elements of synthesized qualia, themselves regardable as if they are the simplified results of still prior qualitative elements logically synthesized in the same way. Or looking at it the other way around, the completion of the argument yields a new quality -- the argument assumes the appearance of a new quality -- which may or may not play a similar role in a further synthesizing unification of the same sort, and so forth. In other words, there is something comparable in that sequence to the line of development one finds in the New List, though at a finer grained level of resolution, as it were. This is a lame description of what I am trying to draw attention to, intended only suggestively. That passage in CP 2 is not comparable in rigor to what happens in the New List. to be sure, but the progression does have a presuppositional complexity which seems comparable.. . Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: "Jean-Marc Orliaguet" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 1:20 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Joseph Ransdell wrote: > Jean-Marc says: > > I am surprised that you are claiming that the classes can be traversed > by a unique, "natural", ordered sequence from 1 to 10 while at the same > time you claim to have come up with a structure simil
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Jean-Marc, list, Let me add that, while I don't think that you will succeed in presenting the argument for which I think I've shown the need, my characterization of your assertions as being not yet an argument is not itself a mere rhetorical move. A few years ago, I said that you had not presented a strong enough argument as to why the term "triad" should be restricted to the threesome of tri-valently referring to one another and themselves, while "trichotomy" should be restricted to three-fold divisions of terms not related by references _to_ one another. If I recall correctly, I said I leaned toward the terminological distinction but that I wasn't convinced that it should be a hard and fast rule. You then presented to another peirce-lister a very strong argument, via substituting one of these words for the other in a passage by Peirce, showing that the passage then deteriorated into nonsense. That convinced me both of the distinction's value and of Peirce's own recognition of its value (though, if I recall correctly, I said nothing at the time because you seemed gratuitously passionate against your interlocutor), and since then I've adhered (or tried to adhere) to the distinction. In fact I think that acceptance of this terminological distinction has become pretty common, if not universal, on peirce-l. Basically, you won. I would still argue that each triad is also a trichotomy, but for most practical purposes of discussion, it's simpler to speak simply of triads versus trichotomies, and I once even suggested the term "triastic" to serve instead of 'trichotomy' as the genus where of 'trichotomy' (in the narrower sense) and 'triad' would be the species, but nobody seemed to like that word (I think it's a good candidate for the "three" word in the series "monistic, dualistic"). Best, Ben Udell - Original Message - From: "Benjamin Udell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 11:36 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Jean-Marc, list, I don't even agree in the end with Peirce's classification but it's pretty obvious that whether one partially or totally orders the 10 classes depends on the criteria. And it's pretty obvious that the trichotomies are ordered (or orderable) in a Peircean categorial way, specifically: the 1st trichotomy pertains to the sign's own category, the 2nd to the category in which the sign refers to its object, and the 3rd to the category in which the sign entails its interpretant. If one incorporates this ordering of the trichotomies into the ordering of the classes, then one ends with a complete ordering of the classes. One can also so prioritize as to arrive simply at the partially ordered lattice. This is at least partly a matter of whether one prioritizes the Peircean category of the trichotomy (the ordinality of the "parameter") or the Peircean category of the term IN the trichotomy (the ordinality of the "parametric value"). How does one decide? Well, one looks at it both ways, both ways have their illuminative aspects, so one ends up finally not choosing one way dispensing permanently with the other way. So there seems to be some optionality in how one orders these things. Jean-Marc, however, seems to believe that the ordering question is quite determinate, and leads inevitably to the partial ordering. He does this by dismissing without analyzing the certainly very categorial appearance of the ordering of the trichotomies. Certainly Peirce was quite conscious of this categorial structure of the trichotomies, since his 10-ad of trichotomies is obviously an attempt to extend that structure. Where most Peirceans seem to regard this matter as settled and fairly simple, Jean-Marc differs, which is his right. But I don't see in any of this thread where Jean-Marc addresses what certainly appears to be a Peircean categorial orderability of the trichotomies. Instead he has merely asserted that they are like categories of male/female and old/young, and he has not actually pursued a comparison of his example with the Peircean trichotomies in order to argue for his counter-intuitive assertion. So I think that we're still awaiting an argument. If this argument is supposed to be in Robert Marty's book, then perhaps Jean-Marc can summarize it. If Jean-Marc is unprepared to do that, perhaps Robert can do it. Best, Ben Udell - Original Message - From: "Jean-Marc Orliaguet" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 9:15 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) gnusystems wrote: > I'd like to second what Joe says here, > > [[
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Jean-Marc, list, I don't even agree in the end with Peirce's classification but it's pretty obvious that whether one partially or totally orders the 10 classes depends on the criteria. And it's pretty obvious that the trichotomies are ordered (or orderable) in a Peircean categorial way, specifically: the 1st trichotomy pertains to the sign's own category, the 2nd to the category in which the sign refers to its object, and the 3rd to the category in which the sign entails its interpretant. If one incorporates this ordering of the trichotomies into the ordering of the classes, then one ends with a complete ordering of the classes. One can also so prioritize as to arrive simply at the partially ordered lattice. This is at least partly a matter of whether one prioritizes the Peircean category of the trichotomy (the ordinality of the "parameter") or the Peircean category of the term IN the trichotomy (the ordinality of the "parametric value"). How does one decide? Well, one looks at it both ways, both ways have their illuminative aspects, so one ends up finally not choosing one way dispensing permanently with the other way. So there seems to be some optionality in how one orders these things. Jean-Marc, however, seems to believe that the ordering question is quite determinate, and leads inevitably to the partial ordering. He does this by dismissing without analyzing the certainly very categorial appearance of the ordering of the trichotomies. Certainly Peirce was quite conscious of this categorial structure of the trichotomies, since his 10-ad of trichotomies is obviously an attempt to extend that structure. Where most Peirceans seem to regard this matter as settled and fairly simple, Jean-Marc differs, which is his right. But I don't see in any of this thread where Jean-Marc addresses what certainly appears to be a Peircean categorial orderability of the trichotomies. Instead he has merely asserted that they are like categories of male/female and old/young, and he has not actually pursued a comparison of his example with the Peircean trichotomies in order to argue for his counter-intuitive assertion. So I think that we're still awaiting an argument. If this argument is supposed to be in Robert Marty's book, then perhaps Jean-Marc can summarize it. If Jean-Marc is unprepared to do that, perhaps Robert can do it. Best, Ben Udell - Original Message - From: "Jean-Marc Orliaguet" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 9:15 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) gnusystems wrote: > I'd like to second what Joe says here, > > [[ but my own interest in the classification system is not with what can be > learned from it by manipulating graphical models of it but with understanding > what use it might have when it comes to understanding how to apply it in the > analysis and understanding of distinctively philosophical problems such as > have formed the staple of philosophical concern from the time of the Greeks > on. I wonder if anyone knows of any attempts to do that. ]] > > Specifically, i'm wondering what this classification of signs can contribute > to the old but still vexed problem of characterizing the cognitive "gap" > between humans and other animals. One has to put "gap" in quotation marks > because no one seriously doubts the continuity of the evolutionary process > which has produced human cognition (though some see more "leaps" in the > process than others do). There has been some empirical progress on this > problem recently -- in fact i'm now reviewing a recent book on exactly that, > for the Journal of Consciousness Studies -- but interpreting the data remains > a problem of philosophical concern; and the same goes for the cognitive > development process of individual humans. The origin-of-language problem is > one aspect of this. > > In this light, Joe's (or any) ordinal numbering of Peirce's tenfold > classification looks much like a developmental sequence. Part of the > resemblance is that if we look at the two "ends" of the sequence, there's no > question about which is which. Adult humans are capable of handling > arguments, while human infants and adult monkeys are not; and i would presume > that qualisigns are implicit in sentience itself. But ordering the "steps" or > "stages" in between is much more problematic, both logically and empirically. > [...] precisely, there isn't a linear sequence connecting qualitative knowledge and symbolic knowledge. This is what the lattice structure tells you. There are several paths instead of a linear sequence between 1 and 10. this is described in
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
gnusystems wrote: I'd like to second what Joe says here, [[ but my own interest in the classification system is not with what can be learned from it by manipulating graphical models of it but with understanding what use it might have when it comes to understanding how to apply it in the analysis and understanding of distinctively philosophical problems such as have formed the staple of philosophical concern from the time of the Greeks on. I wonder if anyone knows of any attempts to do that. ]] Specifically, i'm wondering what this classification of signs can contribute to the old but still vexed problem of characterizing the cognitive "gap" between humans and other animals. One has to put "gap" in quotation marks because no one seriously doubts the continuity of the evolutionary process which has produced human cognition (though some see more "leaps" in the process than others do). There has been some empirical progress on this problem recently -- in fact i'm now reviewing a recent book on exactly that, for the Journal of Consciousness Studies -- but interpreting the data remains a problem of philosophical concern; and the same goes for the cognitive development process of individual humans. The origin-of-language problem is one aspect of this. In this light, Joe's (or any) ordinal numbering of Peirce's tenfold classification looks much like a developmental sequence. Part of the resemblance is that if we look at the two "ends" of the sequence, there's no question about which is which. Adult humans are capable of handling arguments, while human infants and adult monkeys are not; and i would presume that qualisigns are implicit in sentience itself. But ordering the "steps" or "stages" in between is much more problematic, both logically and empirically. [...] precisely, there isn't a linear sequence connecting qualitative knowledge and symbolic knowledge. This is what the lattice structure tells you. There are several paths instead of a linear sequence between 1 and 10. this is described in Marty's book - in the chapter about the correlation between the lattice and knowledge, epistemology, etc. There is also a comparison with Piaget's different stages of intellectual development. see the original article in: "S¨miotique de l'¨pist¨mologie" SEMIOSIS 10 (1978), Agis Verlag, Baden Baden, pp. 24-37 /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
I'd like to second what Joe says here, [[ but my own interest in the classification system is not with what can be learned from it by manipulating graphical models of it but with understanding what use it might have when it comes to understanding how to apply it in the analysis and understanding of distinctively philosophical problems such as have formed the staple of philosophical concern from the time of the Greeks on. I wonder if anyone knows of any attempts to do that. ]] Specifically, i'm wondering what this classification of signs can contribute to the old but still vexed problem of characterizing the cognitive "gap" between humans and other animals. One has to put "gap" in quotation marks because no one seriously doubts the continuity of the evolutionary process which has produced human cognition (though some see more "leaps" in the process than others do). There has been some empirical progress on this problem recently -- in fact i'm now reviewing a recent book on exactly that, for the Journal of Consciousness Studies -- but interpreting the data remains a problem of philosophical concern; and the same goes for the cognitive development process of individual humans. The origin-of-language problem is one aspect of this. In this light, Joe's (or any) ordinal numbering of Peirce's tenfold classification looks much like a developmental sequence. Part of the resemblance is that if we look at the two "ends" of the sequence, there's no question about which is which. Adult humans are capable of handling arguments, while human infants and adult monkeys are not; and i would presume that qualisigns are implicit in sentience itself. But ordering the "steps" or "stages" in between is much more problematic, both logically and empirically. And this is exactly where i wonder if semeiotic can clarify the questions about evolution and development. Also whether empirical studies of development or comparative psychology can throw some light on the proper order of sign classes. (Peirce was often skeptical that logic had anything to learn from psychology, but i think what he had in mind there was the limitations of psychological research in his time, and i think there's been some real progress since then in that respect.) Terrence Deacon's 1997 book on the origin of language, _The Symbolic Species_, used "symbolic" in a Peircean sense, and i've seen the icon/index/symbol trichotomy used in a few other studies of "consciousness"; but other than that, the semiotic approach hardly registers in "consciousness studies" at all. If anyone can bring a more detailed Peircean analysis to bear on this kind of philosophical problem, i'd be happy to hear of it. gary }Her untitled mamafesta memorialising the Mosthighest has gone by many names at disjointed times. [Finnegans Wake 104]{ gnusystems }{ Pam Jackson & Gary Fuhrman }{ Manitoulin University }{ [EMAIL PROTECTED] }{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/ }{ --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Bernard Morand wrote: Jean-Marc Orliaguet wrote: the classification is obtained in a deductive the way, but the sequence order is arbitrary. let us say I want to classify a group of people according to 2 divisions: - men / women (1st division) - under age / adult (2nd division) that's 4 classes, OK? if I consider the "men / women" division a first dichotomy and the "under age / adult" division the second dichotomy, are you saying that the classes of people are magically ordered just because of that choice? what are the order relations among the classes of signs? that the first question to answer before laying down the numerals /JM I think that your example funishes a good basis for reflexion Jean-Marc. And I am not sure you are right in this special case. A division among men and women is made on the basis of a discriminant, the sex. The other division is made on the age as a discriminant. But sex and age are two mutually independant attributes of people.What is aimed at is to distribute a stock of individuals among four pre-given classes. Observe in passing that the purpose is not to define what are men or women. This activity is what is called nowadays data analysis for which the attributes that make the division are let to the choice of the classifier. These attributes can be calculated in order to confer some nice or formal properties to the resulting classification but in a sense they are arbitrary (dependant on he who makes the classification). Note too that the potential list of candidate discriminants is infinite. I think that this is not what is at work with the classification of 1903. If words could convey good meanings in themselves I would say that it is much more a categorization than a classification. There are not individual signs in our hands in order to put them in the one box or the other. We have a set of characters which are structured according to the law of prescission (and not discrimination) and make a system. It is this law which gives a sense to the order of the trichotomies and which makes that the attributes used to make the classes are not mutually independant. For example if a sign has for its object an index, it cannot be an argument,but it can be a rheme a dicisign. The fact that such a categorization does not require any individual makes it dependant only on what Peirce sometimes calls the "formal structure" of the elements of thought and consciousness (CP 8.213). An important consequence is that such a classification enables to determine all what is possible (and thus impossible) contrary to the data analysis tradition which describes what exists. If I was to revive some old controversies, I would hold that Peirce was a precursor in structuralism :-). However a natural classification is based on genealogy and final cause for Peirce, two criteria that structuralism did not bother with. This is the reason why I was reproaching to Joe the use of plural in his figure for qualisigns, sinsigns, legisigns as if they were individual class members and not structural elements, as well as the separation of the classification into three sub-trees. In fact, it has no effect on the surrounding text but nevertheless I think that the presentation of the figure in itself can be misleading. It conveys an idea of the first trichotomy as being more material than formal (and also more decisive than the two others) On the status of classifications for Peirce, there would be something worth adding. He often makes a distinction between what he calls "natural classes" which are built from the formal structure of elements with "artificial classes" which are built for a special purpose. I think that his conception of artificial classification is very near from the approach taken by data analysis. I wonder whether the Welby classification was not an "artificial" one. Peirce had not the habit of confusing himself with his scientific study but here he says "MY second way of dividing signs". This puzzled me for several years. Bernard I would say that the only thing that one cannot divide further into categories is the monad. Everything else is subject to categorizations and thus to classifications. the result of a classification in the example above would yield the following classes: - man / of age - woman / of age - man / under age - woman / of age while the categorizations are the divisions: - man / woman - of age / under age then there are no determinations in this example to get back to the subject. I agree that the classifications involve all three aspects - not any one taken individually. One cannot separate legisign(s) from the iconic / indexical / symbolic aspects, etc. this is probably why one can read sometimes that there are theoretically 27 classes of signs by combination and only 10 are possible, which is a non-sense- as when one takes something abstract and ones makes it a concrete thing
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Joseph Ransdell wrote: Jean-Marc says: I am surprised that you are claiming that the classes can be traversed by a unique, "natural", ordered sequence from 1 to 10 while at the same time you claim to have come up with a structure similar to a lattice, these are contradictory assertions. REPLY: I made no such claim, I said there is an order and there is, most assuredly, an order, and that is not a matter of convention. It is an order of presupposition -- or, from another perspective, of internal complexity -- and it can be read from top to bottom in the lattice representation. Whether or to what extent it can be filled out further is something that has to be worked out laboriously by actually thinking the conceptions through, as distinct from manipulating graphical representations containing the names for the classes, If the word for the structure is not "lattice" please supply the correct one. I am referring to what Merkle calls by that name in his representation of Merrel's and Marty's versions of it. The one I came up with is identical with that one. I'll send it along in a separate message. The only important difference is that I gave the classes nicknames of my own. Joe Ransdell the numbers on the boxes (1, 2, 3, ...) that you wrote are purely conventional. since when you are calling a class '5' and another one '3' you imply that "5 is bigger than "3", which in a lattice it is not. you have to write 3-3-1, 3-3-2, 3-3-3, 1-2-3... to be correct. Check Marty's work for a correct presentation. /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Jean-Marc says: I am surprised that you are claiming that the classes can be traversed by a unique, "natural", ordered sequence from 1 to 10 while at the same time you claim to have come up with a structure similar to a lattice, these are contradictory assertions. REPLY: I made no such claim, I said there is an order and there is, most assuredly, an order, and that is not a matter of convention. It is an order of presupposition -- or, from another perspective, of internal complexity -- and it can be read from top to bottom in the lattice representation. Whether or to what extent it can be filled out further is something that has to be worked out laboriously by actually thinking the conceptions through, as distinct from manipulating graphical representations containing the names for the classes, If the word for the structure is not "lattice" please supply the correct one. I am referring to what Merkle calls by that name in his representation of Merrel's and Marty's versions of it. The one I came up with is identical with that one. I'll send it along in a separate message. The only important difference is that I gave the classes nicknames of my own. Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: "Jean-Marc Orliaguet" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Tuesday, June 20, 2006 4:27 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Joseph Ransdell wrote: > J-MO = Jean-Marc Orliaguet > JR = Joseph Ransdell > > J-M: > >> Also note that the various trichotomies are not ordered. It is purely a >> convention to call a trichotomy the first, second, or third trichotomy, >> etc. So deducing an ordering of the classes from that information only, >> as it has been done many times including on this list, is incorrect. >> > > JR: > >> It is not a matter of convention only: the three trichotomies are based >> on >> the difference between firstness, secondness, and thirdness, which is >> sufficient in itself to make the ordering of them as first, second, and >> third something having informative content of some possible importance. >> > > J-M: > yes, but this does no influence the results in any way, especially this > has nothing to do with ordering the classes. If one started with the > second trichotomy instead of the first, one would get let us say an > (index, sinsign, rheme) instead of a (sinsign, index, rheme) ... but in > a different order if one followed your method (3 would be 5 or something) > > no, really... the order relations between the classes of signs comes > from the internal relations of determination between the sign, object > and interpretant. That is totally independent of the way in which you > perform the trichotomies. > > REPLY BY JR: > The sequential order is not conventional. Peirce begins, in CP 2.254 with > the simplest possible sign, the qualisign, > which is so simple that its peculiar value as a sign can be due to nothing > other than what it is by hypothesis: sign and object are the same, thus it > can only be in icon when considered in relation to its object. That same > simplicity constrains it to be only a rheme by constraining its > interpretant > to being the only thing it can possibly be, the quality which is the sign > itself. > This is the first class of sign: the rhematic iconic qualisign. When we > get > to 2.263, nine paragraphs later, for the tenth class > of signs, we have traversed a path of continually increasing complexity > through the intervening eight classes. In what sense of complexity? I > couldn't describe informatively, at this time, what that sense is, but I > can > say that if you analyze what you have at the end of the process -- the > argument (i.e. argument symbolic legisign) -- you find that it involves an > instance of a sign class of the ninth class (the dicent symbol legisgn or, > for short, the proposition), which in turn involves an instance of the > eighth and an instance of the seventh, each of which involve signs of > still > prior classes, and so forth until you end at the beginning with the > qualisign involved. > ... > :Joe Ransdell > It increases in complexity, indeed but only for the first 2 and the last 2 classes in a comparable way (the one being involved in the other); apart from these there is no total order hence no "preferred" way to order the classes from 1 to 10. instead they are partially ordered in a lattice and finding counter-examples is easy: 1) the dicent indexical legisign involves and is involved in no rhematic symbol 2) the dicent sinsign involves and is involved in no rhematic indexical legisign 3) the indexical sinsign involves and is involved in no iconic legisign I
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Joseph Ransdell wrote: J-MO = Jean-Marc Orliaguet JR = Joseph Ransdell J-M: Also note that the various trichotomies are not ordered. It is purely a convention to call a trichotomy the first, second, or third trichotomy, etc. So deducing an ordering of the classes from that information only, as it has been done many times including on this list, is incorrect. JR: It is not a matter of convention only: the three trichotomies are based on the difference between firstness, secondness, and thirdness, which is sufficient in itself to make the ordering of them as first, second, and third something having informative content of some possible importance. J-M: yes, but this does no influence the results in any way, especially this has nothing to do with ordering the classes. If one started with the second trichotomy instead of the first, one would get let us say an (index, sinsign, rheme) instead of a (sinsign, index, rheme) ... but in a different order if one followed your method (3 would be 5 or something) no, really... the order relations between the classes of signs comes from the internal relations of determination between the sign, object and interpretant. That is totally independent of the way in which you perform the trichotomies. REPLY BY JR: The sequential order is not conventional. Peirce begins, in CP 2.254 with the simplest possible sign, the qualisign, which is so simple that its peculiar value as a sign can be due to nothing other than what it is by hypothesis: sign and object are the same, thus it can only be in icon when considered in relation to its object. That same simplicity constrains it to be only a rheme by constraining its interpretant to being the only thing it can possibly be, the quality which is the sign itself. This is the first class of sign: the rhematic iconic qualisign. When we get to 2.263, nine paragraphs later, for the tenth class of signs, we have traversed a path of continually increasing complexity through the intervening eight classes. In what sense of complexity? I couldn't describe informatively, at this time, what that sense is, but I can say that if you analyze what you have at the end of the process -- the argument (i.e. argument symbolic legisign) -- you find that it involves an instance of a sign class of the ninth class (the dicent symbol legisgn or, for short, the proposition), which in turn involves an instance of the eighth and an instance of the seventh, each of which involve signs of still prior classes, and so forth until you end at the beginning with the qualisign involved. ... :Joe Ransdell It increases in complexity, indeed but only for the first 2 and the last 2 classes in a comparable way (the one being involved in the other); apart from these there is no total order hence no "preferred" way to order the classes from 1 to 10. instead they are partially ordered in a lattice and finding counter-examples is easy: 1) the dicent indexical legisign involves and is involved in no rhematic symbol 2) the dicent sinsign involves and is involved in no rhematic indexical legisign 3) the indexical sinsign involves and is involved in no iconic legisign I am surprised that you are claiming that the classes can be traversed by a unique, "natural", ordered sequence from 1 to 10 while at the same time you claim to have come up with a structure similar to a lattice, these are contradictory assertions. /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
J-MO = Jean-Marc Orliaguet JR = Joseph Ransdell J-M: > Also note that the various trichotomies are not ordered. It is purely a > convention to call a trichotomy the first, second, or third trichotomy, > etc. So deducing an ordering of the classes from that information only, > as it has been done many times including on this list, is incorrect. JR: > It is not a matter of convention only: the three trichotomies are based on > the difference between firstness, secondness, and thirdness, which is > sufficient in itself to make the ordering of them as first, second, and > third something having informative content of some possible importance. J-M: yes, but this does no influence the results in any way, especially this has nothing to do with ordering the classes. If one started with the second trichotomy instead of the first, one would get let us say an (index, sinsign, rheme) instead of a (sinsign, index, rheme) ... but in a different order if one followed your method (3 would be 5 or something) no, really... the order relations between the classes of signs comes from the internal relations of determination between the sign, object and interpretant. That is totally independent of the way in which you perform the trichotomies. REPLY BY JR: The sequential order is not conventional. Peirce begins, in CP 2.254 with the simplest possible sign, the qualisign, which is so simple that its peculiar value as a sign can be due to nothing other than what it is by hypothesis: sign and object are the same, thus it can only be in icon when considered in relation to its object. That same simplicity constrains it to be only a rheme by constraining its interpretant to being the only thing it can possibly be, the quality which is the sign itself. This is the first class of sign: the rhematic iconic qualisign. When we get to 2.263, nine paragraphs later, for the tenth class of signs, we have traversed a path of continually increasing complexity through the intervening eight classes. In what sense of complexity? I couldn't describe informatively, at this time, what that sense is, but I can say that if you analyze what you have at the end of the process -- the argument (i.e. argument symbolic legisign) -- you find that it involves an instance of a sign class of the ninth class (the dicent symbol legisgn or, for short, the proposition), which in turn involves an instance of the eighth and an instance of the seventh, each of which involve signs of still prior classes, and so forth until you end at the beginning with the qualisign involved. I just now put in a few hours going through the chapter from Merkle's dissertation where he goes through, compares, and comments upon the many graphical representations of the sign concepts, including the various forms of the lattice structure of involvement which I described above, which is not constructed as a mere convention/ When I was working on this material myself I had constructed a representation of that as a lattice of involvement or presupposition of exactly the same form as that which Merrel and Marty had independently constructed, unknown to me, Merrel's apparently being before mine but I was unaware of it, and Marty's around the same time as mine but, again, not in my awareness. (His book was published around the time my attention was diverted from working further with that sort of thing, which dates from the time of a convention in Perpignan in 1989 where I recall learning that Marty had published his magnum opus, which I never read because I had another agenda from that time on in virtue of something that happened at that convention.) I mention all this because it is clearly unlikely that we would each have come up with that same peculiar lattice structure independently on the basis of independent decisions to so construct it as a matter of convention. There were logical necessities of involvement motivating it all the way. I am much impressed by all that has been done graphically in representing the sign classification system, and especially by Luis Merkle/s masterful handling of it all in that part of his dissertation, as well as further work by others in Brazil and elsewhere as well, but my own interest in the classification system is not with what can be learned from it by manipulating graphical models of it but with understanding what use it might have when it comes to understanding how to apply it in the analysis and understanding of distinctively philosophical problems such as have formed the staple of philosophical concern from the time of the Greeks on. I wonder if anyone knows of any attempts to do that. :Joe Ransdell -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.0/368 - Release Date: 6/16/2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Jean-Marc Orliaguet wrote: the classification is obtained in a deductive the way, but the sequence order is arbitrary. let us say I want to classify a group of people according to 2 divisions: - men / women (1st division) - under age / adult (2nd division) that's 4 classes, OK? if I consider the "men / women" division a first dichotomy and the "under age / adult" division the second dichotomy, are you saying that the classes of people are magically ordered just because of that choice? what are the order relations among the classes of signs? that the first question to answer before laying down the numerals /JM I think that your example funishes a good basis for reflexion Jean-Marc. And I am not sure you are right in this special case. A division among men and women is made on the basis of a discriminant, the sex. The other division is made on the age as a discriminant. But sex and age are two mutually independant attributes of people.What is aimed at is to distribute a stock of individuals among four pre-given classes. Observe in passing that the purpose is not to define what are men or women. This activity is what is called nowadays data analysis for which the attributes that make the division are let to the choice of the classifier. These attributes can be calculated in order to confer some nice or formal properties to the resulting classification but in a sense they are arbitrary (dependant on he who makes the classification). Note too that the potential list of candidate discriminants is infinite. I think that this is not what is at work with the classification of 1903. If words could convey good meanings in themselves I would say that it is much more a categorization than a classification. There are not individual signs in our hands in order to put them in the one box or the other. We have a set of characters which are structured according to the law of prescission (and not discrimination) and make a system. It is this law which gives a sense to the order of the trichotomies and which makes that the attributes used to make the classes are not mutually independant. For example if a sign has for its object an index, it cannot be an argument,but it can be a rheme a dicisign. The fact that such a categorization does not require any individual makes it dependant only on what Peirce sometimes calls the "formal structure" of the elements of thought and consciousness (CP 8.213). An important consequence is that such a classification enables to determine all what is possible (and thus impossible) contrary to the data analysis tradition which describes what exists. If I was to revive some old controversies, I would hold that Peirce was a precursor in structuralism :-). However a natural classification is based on genealogy and final cause for Peirce, two criteria that structuralism did not bother with. This is the reason why I was reproaching to Joe the use of plural in his figure for qualisigns, sinsigns, legisigns as if they were individual class members and not structural elements, as well as the separation of the classification into three sub-trees. In fact, it has no effect on the surrounding text but nevertheless I think that the presentation of the figure in itself can be misleading. It conveys an idea of the first trichotomy as being more material than formal (and also more decisive than the two others) On the status of classifications for Peirce, there would be something worth adding. He often makes a distinction between what he calls "natural classes" which are built from the formal structure of elements with "artificial classes" which are built for a special purpose. I think that his conception of artificial classification is very near from the approach taken by data analysis. I wonder whether the Welby classification was not an "artificial" one. Peirce had not the habit of confusing himself with his scientific study but here he says "MY second way of dividing signs". This puzzled me for several years. Bernard --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Joseph Ransdell wrote: Jean-Marc says: For the record, it must be added that a lot of the information found in this very exhaustive piece of work has readily been available to researchers since the 80s and before, including the work done by Robert Marty on lattices (see the chapter on 'partially ordered sets' for an overview of why the linear representation of the classes of signs from 1 to 10 is a bit of a problem... Also note that the various trichotomies are not ordered. It is purely a convention to call a trichotomy the first, second, or third trichotomy, etc. So deducing an ordering of the classes from that information only, as it has been done many times including on this list, is incorrect. REPLY: It is not a matter of convention only: the three trichotomies are based on the difference between firstness, secondness, and thirdness, which is sufficient in itself to make the ordering of them as first, second, and third something having informative content of some possible importance. yes, but this does no influence the results in any way, especially this has nothing to do with ordering the classes. If one started with the second trichotomy instead of the first, one would get let us say an (index, sinsign, rheme) instead of a (sinsign, index, rheme) ... but in a different order if one followed your method (3 would be 5 or something) no, really... the order relations between the classes of signs comes from the internal relations of determination between the sign, object and interpretant. That is totally independent of the way in which you perform the trichotomies. And I don't recall anyone deducing the ordering of the classes from that information only, though I may have overlooked such a demonstration. Could you be more specific about that? Peirce himself presents the ten classes in a certain sequence (CP 2.254-263) which is at least in large part deductive in character, though whether or not the deduction that occurs there is based on that information only depends upon what you mean by "that information only": what information, exactly? This is not nitpicking. The question of precisely what is going on there is an important one. Joe Ransdell the classification is obtained in a deductive the way, but the sequence order is arbitrary. let us say I want to classify a group of people according to 2 divisions: - men / women (1st division) - under age / adult (2nd division) that's 4 classes, OK? if I consider the "men / women" division a first dichotomy and the "under age / adult" division the second dichotomy, are you saying that the classes of people are magically ordered just because of that choice? what are the order relations among the classes of signs? that the first question to answer before laying down the numerals /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Jean-Marc says: For the record, it must be added that a lot of the information found in this very exhaustive piece of work has readily been available to researchers since the 80s and before, including the work done by Robert Marty on lattices (see the chapter on 'partially ordered sets' for an overview of why the linear representation of the classes of signs from 1 to 10 is a bit of a problem... Also note that the various trichotomies are not ordered. It is purely a convention to call a trichotomy the first, second, or third trichotomy, etc. So deducing an ordering of the classes from that information only, as it has been done many times including on this list, is incorrect. REPLY: It is not a matter of convention only: the three trichotomies are based on the difference between firstness, secondness, and thirdness, which is sufficient in itself to make the ordering of them as first, second, and third something having informative content of some possible importance. And I don't recall anyone deducing the ordering of the classes from that information only, though I may have overlooked such a demonstration. Could you be more specific about that? Peirce himself presents the ten classes in a certain sequence (CP 2.254-263) which is at least in large part deductive in character, though whether or not the deduction that occurs there is based on that information only depends upon what you mean by "that information only": what information, exactly? This is not nitpicking. The question of precisely what is going on there is an important one. Joe Ransdell -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.0/368 - Release Date: 6/16/2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Luis, Jean Marc, Ben, List, It would probably at this point be valuable for those who are not familiar with Marty's work (and who are not fluent in French as I certainly am not) to at least take a look at the Summary in English of his Foliated Semantic Networks: Concepts, Facts, Qualities posted at : http://www.univ-perp.fr/see/rch/lts/MARTY/semantic-ns/ The first page of the Summary is the Abstract of the paper and is copied below my signature while the entire Summary is of interest. Gary Foliated Semantic Networks: Concepts, Facts, Qualities by Robert Marty Abstract This paper suggests a general perception-based theory of representation within the framework of the phenomenology of C. S. Peirce (named by him "phaneroscopy") by means of the generalization of R. Wille’s basic lattice-concepts theory of objects and their attributes. We first summarize Peirce's main categorization of all n-adic relations into three fundamental kinds: Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness (i.e., relations requiring monads, dyads and triads, respectively, in their definitions). His "reduction thesis" reduces all relations of higher adicity into these three kinds. We then use elementary Category Theory to develop "relation-structures" of concepts, relations and higher order relations, based entirely on experienced simple "qualities of feeling." A relational algebra results which includes semantic nets as relation-structures. In terms of this algebra we use Peirce's "reduction theorem" in order to build a "foliation" of all conceptual/relational-structures by means of levels ("sheets") algebraically defined. This provides a canonical "normal form" for networks of n-adic relations. This can be done to existing semantic network formalisms to help make sense of phenomenologically confused components. Analogously to Wille's lattice-concepts theory connecting objects and attributes, we define "representation-contexts" connecting two corresponding classes of phenomena formalized in terms of Category Theory by diagrams in a category we call relational structures provided with natural transformations as morphisms. This leads us to a foliated conception of semantic networks with each concept and relation assigned to a particular phenomenological level. Thus a foliated network represents not only a state of things but also the mode of connection of the network with the state of things. One consequence of foliation is that we now have a method for relational subsumption using the generalization-hierarchy of relations. In addition to the insight afforded by this formal analysis, we also obtain a lattice of representation-relations which may be computationally used as an IS-A hierarchy sub-element for the purpose of automatic inference, in all subject-domains involving representation. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Cher JM, Ben and Gary, Thanks for the messages and comments. I guess I should comment that the work of Prof. Marty, as of many others, was key to the development of forth chapter of my PhD thesis. Jo¨o Queiroz and Priscila Farias did also very interesting related work. You are right when you say that a liner representation of of the classes can be a problem. Indeed, I would say that the correlation bewteen a triadic, hexadic, or decadic sign relation with the cenopythagorean categories always result in a partially ordered set. The use of a Hasse diagram, as of Marty's lattices, stress this point. However, it is well known in lattice theory that any partially ordered set can be sorted and listed, given a criteria to decide what to list first, when a decision is necessary. One of the problems is that this list is taken as the strictly ordered set, and not as a possible list of its elements. See Figure 4.27, at page 264, and the respective comments, of my thesis. Thanks, Luiz > Benjamin Udell wrote: >> Gary, Joe, list, >> >> I downloaded the chapter from Merkle's dissertation last night and it >> downloaded quite quickly compared to the daytime when the Internet is >> busier. What graphics! Very little in the way of my shadings, very >> much in the way of exactness and complexity. If somebody asked me to >> do a graphic with, for instance, over 700 relational lines in the >> right places, I'd promise nothing! Amazing stuff. And he brings >> together and compares quite a variety of arrangements of Peircean sign >> classes and related conceptions by various scholars. If the logical >> and mathematical structure across Peirce's signs interests you, hie >> thee to Merkle's chapter >> http://www.dainf.cefetpr.br/~merkle/thesis/CH4.pdf . I saved my copy >> to disk, that way I don't cause him (or his server) bandwidth charges >> by downloading it from his server any time I want to see it. >> >> Best, Ben Udell >> >> So far I've looked mainly at the graphics. > > > For the record, it must be added that a lot of the information found in > this very exhaustive piece of work has readily been available to > researchers since the 80s and before, including the work done by Robert > Marty on lattices (see the chapter on 'partially ordered sets' for an > overview of why the linear representation of the classes of signs from 1 > to 10 is a bit of a problem... > > Also note that the various trichotomies are not ordered. It is purely a > convention to call a trichotomy the first, second, or third trichotomy, > etc. So deducing an ordering of the classes from that information only, > as it has been done many times including on this list, is incorrect. > > /JM > > --- > Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Benjamin Udell wrote: Gary, Joe, list, I downloaded the chapter from Merkle's dissertation last night and it downloaded quite quickly compared to the daytime when the Internet is busier. What graphics! Very little in the way of my shadings, very much in the way of exactness and complexity. If somebody asked me to do a graphic with, for instance, over 700 relational lines in the right places, I'd promise nothing! Amazing stuff. And he brings together and compares quite a variety of arrangements of Peircean sign classes and related conceptions by various scholars. If the logical and mathematical structure across Peirce's signs interests you, hie thee to Merkle's chapter http://www.dainf.cefetpr.br/~merkle/thesis/CH4.pdf . I saved my copy to disk, that way I don't cause him (or his server) bandwidth charges by downloading it from his server any time I want to see it. Best, Ben Udell So far I've looked mainly at the graphics. For the record, it must be added that a lot of the information found in this very exhaustive piece of work has readily been available to researchers since the 80s and before, including the work done by Robert Marty on lattices (see the chapter on 'partially ordered sets' for an overview of why the linear representation of the classes of signs from 1 to 10 is a bit of a problem... Also note that the various trichotomies are not ordered. It is purely a convention to call a trichotomy the first, second, or third trichotomy, etc. So deducing an ordering of the classes from that information only, as it has been done many times including on this list, is incorrect. /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Gary, Joe, list, I downloaded the chapter from Merkle's dissertation last night and it downloaded quite quickly compared to the daytime when the Internet is busier. What graphics! Very little in the way of my shadings, very much in the way of exactness and complexity. If somebody asked me to do a graphic with, for instance, over 700 relational lines in the right places, I'd promise nothing! Amazing stuff. And he brings together and compares quite a variety of arrangements of Peircean sign classes and related conceptions by various scholars. If the logical and mathematical structure across Peirce's signs interests you, hie thee to Merkle's chapter http://www.dainf.cefetpr.br/~merkle/thesis/CH4.pdf . I saved my copy to disk, that way I don't cause him (or his server) bandwidth charges by downloading it from his server any time I want to see it. Best, Ben Udell So far I've looked mainly at the graphics. - Original Message - From: Gary Richmond To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Sunday, June 18, 2006 6:01 PMSubject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Ben, Joe, list, I would highly recommend for those interested in further exploring the themes of this discussion--and, yes, thanks very much to Joe, Ben and others for providing such a wealth of valuable information, diagrams, etc.--the fourth chapter of Luis Merkle's dissertation to which he recently posted a URL: http://www.dainf.cefetpr.br/~merkle/thesis/CH4.pdfespecially Sect. 4.4 (p 233 to the end of the section) and most especially his Figure 4.5 The 10 valid arrangements that satisfy the prescision constraint [the discussion discusses the connection between prescision and categoriality] which shows clearly how Peirce arrived at the numbering of the triangular diagram under consideration, Figure 4.7 Ternary tree of the 10 valid arrangements among the 27 explicating Figure 4.6 Peirce's arborescent diagram of the ten categories of triadic signs (which he used at Harvard in 1903 to illustrate and defend his classification of signs into 10 categories), as well as Peirce's triangular diagram, here Figure 4.8 Peirce's diagram depicting the affinities among the ten categories (with a very helpful insert labeled "Horizontal and vertical adjacency," and perhaps most especially Merkle's Figure 4.9 Collapse of the 10 valid arrangements into a triangular diagram. Merkle adds this gloss to this figure: By imagining the tree as enclosed in a parallelepiped, it is possible to collapse the existing planes into a single one. The result is a triangle with ten elements. Peirce used triangular diagrams to describe the affinities between categories. The collapse above enables an understanding of Peirce's diagrams in the light of ternary trees. I spent quite a bit of time with Merkle's thesis a while back when he first posted it (or parts of it) to the list, but was too involved in other projects at the time to get much into--if at all--on the list. Merkle's work seems to me to put a clear light on many of the points under consideration in this thread. However, one caveat: the file is huge and may take some considerable time to download. Although Merkle's primary interest seems to be informatics, Sect. 4.4 concentrates on sign relations in Peirce. Gary Benjamin Udell wrote: Joe, list, It will be interesting to find out what you thought was wrong about what the editors were saying. Again, thank you for your efforts in this! --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Ben, Joe, list, I would highly recommend for those interested in further exploring the themes of this discussion--and, yes, thanks very much to Joe, Ben and others for providing such a wealth of valuable information, diagrams, etc.--the fourth chapter of Luis Merkle's dissertation to which he recently posted a URL: http://www.dainf.cefetpr.br/~merkle/thesis/CH4.pdf especially Sect. 4.4 (p 233 to the end of the section) and most especially his Figure 4.5 The 10 valid arrangements that satisfy the prescision constraint [the discussion discusses the connection between prescision and categoriality] which shows clearly how Peirce arrived at the numbering of the triangular diagram under consideration, Figure 4.7 Ternary tree of the 10 valid arrangements among the 27 explicating Figure 4.6 Peirce's arborescent diagram of the ten categories of triadic signs (which he used at Harvard in 1903 to illustrate and defend his classification of signs into 10 categories), as well as Peirce's triangular diagram, here Figure 4.8 Peirce's diagram depicting the affinities among the ten categories (with a very helpful insert labeled "Horizontal and vertical adjacency," and perhaps most especially Merkle's Figure 4.9 Collapse of the 10 valid arrangements into a triangular diagram. Merkle adds this gloss to this figure: By imagining the tree as enclosed in a parallelepiped, it is possible to collapse the existing planes into a single one. The result is a triangle with ten elements. Peirce used triangular diagrams to describe the affinities between categories. The collapse above enables an understanding of Peirce's diagrams in the light of ternary trees. I spent quite a bit of time with Merkle's thesis a while back when he first posted it (or parts of it) to the list, but was too involved in other projects at the time to get much into--if at all--on the list. Merkle's work seems to me to put a clear light on many of the points under consideration in this thread. However, one caveat: the file is huge and may take some considerable time to download. Although Merkle's primary interest seems to be informatics, Sect. 4.4 concentrates on sign relations in Peirce. Gary Benjamin Udell wrote: Joe, list, It will be interesting to find out what you thought was wrong about what the editors were saying. Again, thank you for your efforts in this! --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Joe, list, It will be interesting to find out what you thought was wrong about what the editors were saying. Again, thank you for your efforts in this! So, putting things together, the only numbering by Peirce which we have consists in the ordinal English numbers which match the 10-box triangle at CP 2.264 and which are in the several pages just prior to CP 2.264. The relevant passage is in CP 2.233 through 2.272, and is derived from MS pages 540.2 through 540.23. From: "Joseph Ransdell" To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Friday, June 16, 2006 5:49 PM Subject: [peirce-l] representing the ten classes of signs (corrected) 66~ qualisigns icons rhemes (I)sinsigns indices rhemes (III)sinsigns indices dicisigns (IV)sinsigns icons rhemes (II)legisigns symbols rhemes (VIII)legisigns symbols dicents (IX)legisigns symbols arguments (X)legisigns indices rhemes (VI)legisigns indices dicents (VII)legisigns icons rhemes (V)That gives us Peirce's ordering both in the diagram of the ten-box triangle at CP 2.264, where Peirce inserts the Roman numerals in the boxes, and in the several pages just prior to that where he gives paragraph-long descriptions of each of the ten classes, wherein he does not use Roman numerals but does use ordinal English numbers (first, second, etc.). ~99 which gives us: 1st ~ rhematic iconic *qualisign* 2nd ~ rhematic *iconic sinsign* 3rd ~ *rhematic indexical sinsign* 4th ~ *dicent* indexical *sinsign* 5th ~ rhematic *iconic legisign* 6th ~ *rhematic indexical legisign* 7th ~ *dicent indexical legisign* 8th ~ *rhematic symbol* legisign 9th ~ *dicent symbol* legisign 10th ~ *argument* symbolic legisign Triangle at MS 540-17. CP 2.264 (I've added asterisks to indicate boldfacing, and tildes to help preserve spacing) ~ Rhematic ~~~ Rhematic ~~ *Rhematic* ~~ *Argument* ~~ Iconic *Iconic* ~~~ *Symbol* Symbolic *Qualisign* ~ *Legisign* ~~~ Legisign ~ Legisign ~~ Rhematic ~ *Rhematic* ~~~ *Dicent* ~~ *Iconic* ~ *Indexical* ~~~ *Symbol* ~~ *Sinsign* ~ *Legisign* Legisign ~ *Rhematic* ~~~ *Dicent* ~ *Indexical* ~~ *Indexical* ~~ *Sinsign* ~~~ *Legisign* ~~~ *Dicent* ~~~ Indexical ~~~ *Sinsign* One other note. As Steven Ericsson Zenith rightly pointed out, in the triangle of boxes in MS799.2 one doesn't see earlier numbers under _all_ the numbers despite how I described it. I should have said that I saw that as the pattern. What I actually seem to discern is: CURRENT:1 ~ 5 ~ 8 ~ 10~ 2 ~ 6 ~ 9~~ 3 ~ 7~~~ 4EARLIER:~~ 2 ~ 3 ~ 4~ 5 ~~ 8 The mark under the "2" is arguable not a "5"; it does seem very much like an earlier mark, and is consistent with a "5." One might also argue about the appearances of the supposed earlier "2" & "3". About the earlier "8" there is no doubt, and the earlier "4" seems pretty sure. Best, Ben Udell - Original Message - From: "Joseph Ransdell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" <peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu> Sent: Sunday, June 18, 2006 9:46 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Ben and list:As regards the question of which of the three images of the triangle of boxes in the manuscript material is the one which was actually relied upon by the editors of the Collected Papers for the image of it that appears at CP 2.264, it is reasonably certain that it is the second one, i.e. the one from MS page 540.17, that was used. The passage in the CP that begins at 2.233 and ends at 2.272 is derived from MS pages 540.2 through 540.23. (If there is any further question about the accuracy of Hartshorne and Weiss's transcription of Peirce's document, let me know what passage you have in mind and I can check it against the original Peirce MS and make a copy of that page of the MS and post it, too, if that seems desirable or necessary.)That seems to me to settle the matter of the origin of the Roman numerals: it is an artifact of the editorial work of Hartshorne and Weiss. In addition to what Ben says below, there is also what is said in the scribbled note at the bottom of page MS 540.17 towards the left bottom corner, which is by some later editor, who is saying that the rationale for the Roman numerals is to be found in the footnotes to CP 2.235 and 2.243, where Hartshorne and Weiss are giving their interpretation of the modal principles underlying the tenfold classification.. It may be more legible in the copy I have than in the copy I distributed. To be exact, it reads as follows: "[See [235] and [243] for explanation of t
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Ben and list: As regards the question of which of the three images of the triangle of boxes in the manuscript material is the one which was actually relied upon by the editors of the Collected Papers for the image of it that appears at CP 2.264, it is reasonably certain that it is the second one, i.e. the one from MS page 540.17, that was used. The passage in the CP that begins at 2.233 and ends at 2.272 is derived from MS pages 540.2 through 540.23. (If there is any further question about the accuracy of Hartshorne and Weiss's transcription of Peirce's document, let me know what passage you have in mind and I can check it against the original Peirce MS and make a copy of that page of the MS and post it, too, if that seems desirable or necessary.) That seems to me to settle the matter of the origin of the Roman numerals: it is an artifact of the editorial work of Hartshorne and Weiss. In addition to what Ben says below, there is also what is said in the scribbled note at the bottom of page MS 540.17 towards the left bottom corner, which is by some later editor, who is saying that the rationale for the Roman numerals is to be found in the footnotes to CP 2.235 and 2.243, where Hartshorne and Weiss are giving their interpretation of the modal principles underlying the tenfold classification.. It may be more legible in the copy I have than in the copy I distributed. To be exact, it reads as follows: "[See [235] and [243] for explanation of the roman numerals]" So it must be by some later editor, who is referring to what Hartshorne and Weiss did as editors of the CP. I remarked earlier in this discussion that I found a marginal note to myself in my copy of the CP, written many years ago when I was working with this material with some intensity, that I thought Hartshorne and Weiss were making some sort of mistake in their account of what Peirce is saying. I have not yet attempted to find out why I thought this is so, but I will try to do that now to see if there is anything in that.. Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: "Benjamin Udell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2006 1:45 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Looking at all three triangles, I get to feeling that it's unlikely that Pierce, having included no numbers in one triangle, would then in the other two triangles throw numbers in like afterthoughts and, in both triangles, change them, and begin and finish the numbers so that they looked a bit scattered and visually sloppy -- when he has written the sign class names with some care. Especially the MS540-17 triangle. I had noticed in the smaller graphic image of MS540-17 that the lettering looked careful, with serifs -- I thought it might even be medieval style. But in fact it was the bolding which Peirce did, which gave a medieval lookto some of the lettering when seen in the smaller, less-easy-to-read graphic image . I keep wanting to crack a joke here about Peirce being "not a profligate bolder" but showing here that "he was clearly not inexperienced at it ." Anyway, great work, Joe! Thanks for these images of Peirce's own writing. Best, Ben - Original Message - From: "Benjamin Udell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2006 2:01 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Image came through beautifully! Look carefully at the MS799.2 triangle of boxes and you can that the numbers are change from an earlier set of numbers. I originally thought that the little earlier numeral "8" was an extra numeral "3" CURRENT: 1 ~ 5 ~ 8 ~ 10 ~ 2 ~ 6 ~ 9 ~~ 3 ~ 7 ~~~ 4 EARLIER: 1 ~ 2 ~ 3 ~ 4 ~ 5 ~ 6 ~ 7 ~~ 8 ~ 9 ~~~ 10 Best, Ben --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.0/368 - Release Date: 6/16/2006 -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.0/368 - Release Date: 6/16/2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
I do not doubt the merit of the exercise - only the suggested source of funds. Individual scholars on well understood "tracks" can get funding from a variety of sources - or so I am led to believe. Project funding for something like this probably needs to come from within an institution that understands the merit. With respect, Steven Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen wrote: Well I am pretty sure that a better understanding of Peirce can and will lead to raising the standards of public education. It already has in some aspects of education. Think it would not be hard to make some convincing discourse about importance of Peirce's discourses for past and current and future society. Like I stated in previous mail, even if Bill Gates Foundation is not willing to help, there will probably be other sources. But, like I said, it would first be needed in my opinion to at least have real figures about costs for digitalization. Then some good preparation about what to say and how to say so (some good rhetoric) to get the money. And this is not about some arbitrary scholarly endeavors it is about very relevant philosophical material that will help lots of intellectuals to improve society and also education. I myself will also concentrate a lot on getting my PhD finished as soon as possible. And mention the relevance of CS Peirce's thoughts in it. This does not appear to be that helpful, but I just guess it will because of the huge relevance and impact of my findings. But well, we'll see ;-). Kind regards, Wilfred -Oorspronkelijk bericht- Van: Steven Ericsson Zenith [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Verzonden: zaterdag 17 juni 2006 23:36 Aan: Peirce Discussion Forum Onderwerp: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) My understanding is that this would not be a project within the bounds of those that interest the Gates Foundation. The focus there is on raising the standards of public education - not arbitrary scholarly endeavors. With respect, Steven Joseph Ransdell wrote: Wilfred says:: "I think we should ask the Bill Gates foundation for this! And also just mention the importance of this to be done wherever we can. Regarding the bill gates foundation, maybe he should first know then where the electronic switch idea originates from. But I guess we could give it a try, preferably with lots of names and tittles and so on to make things happen." That's an idea worth investigating, Wilfred, particularly in view of the fact that Bill Gates is presently retiring from active control of Microsoft and devoting himself exclusively to his and his wife's philanthropical concerns -- then, too, he was a student at Harvard -- and I will see to it that it is investigated. Foundations usually have an initial filtering system that can be checked out for possible entry into an inner sanctum where you might be permitted to make your case for support. It seems to be more the exception than the rule for them to leave it open enough for much in the way of purely scholarly projects to be capable of slipping through at this time, but there are ways of construing the interest which this particular project might have that might find some possibilities there. I'll see what I can find out about the prospects and let you know what I find out soon. Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: "Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2006 2:50 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) I think we should ask the Bill Gates foundation for this! And also just mention the importance of this to be done wherever we can. Regarding the bill gates foundation, maybe he should first know then where the electronic switch idea originates from. But I guess we could give it a try, preferably with lots of names and tittles and so on to make things happen. Kind regards, Wilfred -Oorspronkelijk bericht- Van: Joseph Ransdell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Verzonden: zaterdag 17 juni 2006 21:33 Aan: Peirce Discussion Forum Onderwerp: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Wilfred and the list: The MS pages reproduced here are from photocopies of photocopies of the manuscripts which constitute Peirce's Nachlass ("literary remains") insofar as Harvard has possession of them. They are located in the Harvard Library, not in the Philosophy Department, and there are 80,000 or more pages of them, still largely unpublished. (There are several tens of thousands of pages more than that elsewhere, by the say, but the bulk of the philosophical stuff is largely in the Harvard collections. Since a lot of the manuscripts have been rotting away for years, the librarians aren't eager for people to poke around in them and there has to be some special
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Well I am pretty sure that a better understanding of Peirce can and will lead to raising the standards of public education. It already has in some aspects of education. Think it would not be hard to make some convincing discourse about importance of Peirce's discourses for past and current and future society. Like I stated in previous mail, even if Bill Gates Foundation is not willing to help, there will probably be other sources. But, like I said, it would first be needed in my opinion to at least have real figures about costs for digitalization. Then some good preparation about what to say and how to say so (some good rhetoric) to get the money. And this is not about some arbitrary scholarly endeavors it is about very relevant philosophical material that will help lots of intellectuals to improve society and also education. I myself will also concentrate a lot on getting my PhD finished as soon as possible. And mention the relevance of CS Peirce's thoughts in it. This does not appear to be that helpful, but I just guess it will because of the huge relevance and impact of my findings. But well, we'll see ;-). Kind regards, Wilfred -Oorspronkelijk bericht- Van: Steven Ericsson Zenith [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Verzonden: zaterdag 17 juni 2006 23:36 Aan: Peirce Discussion Forum Onderwerp: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) My understanding is that this would not be a project within the bounds of those that interest the Gates Foundation. The focus there is on raising the standards of public education - not arbitrary scholarly endeavors. With respect, Steven Joseph Ransdell wrote: > Wilfred says:: > > "I think we should ask the Bill Gates foundation for this! > And also just mention the importance of this to be done wherever we can. > Regarding the bill gates foundation, maybe he should first know then where > the electronic switch idea originates from. But I guess we could give it a > try, preferably with lots of names and tittles and so on to make things > happen." > > That's an idea worth investigating, Wilfred, particularly in view of the > fact that Bill Gates is presently retiring from active control of Microsoft > and devoting himself exclusively to his and his wife's philanthropical > concerns -- then, too, he was a student at Harvard -- and I will see to it > that it is investigated. Foundations usually have an initial filtering > system that can be checked out for possible entry into an inner sanctum > where you might be permitted to make your case for support. It seems to be > more the exception than the rule for them to leave it open enough for much > in the way of purely scholarly projects to be capable of slipping through at > this time, but there are ways of construing the interest which this > particular project might have that might find some possibilities there. > I'll see what I can find out about the prospects and let you know what I > find out soon. > > Joe Ransdell > > > - Original Message - > From: "Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" > Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2006 2:50 PM > Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) > > > I think we should ask the Bill Gates foundation for this! > And also just mention the importance of this to be done wherever we can. > Regarding the bill gates foundation, maybe he should first know then where > the electronic switch idea originates from. But I guess we could give it a > try, preferably with lots of names and tittles and so on to make things > happen. > > Kind regards, > > Wilfred > > -----Oorspronkelijk bericht- > Van: Joseph Ransdell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Verzonden: zaterdag 17 juni 2006 21:33 > Aan: Peirce Discussion Forum > Onderwerp: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) > > Wilfred and the list: > > The MS pages reproduced here are from photocopies of photocopies of the > manuscripts which constitute Peirce's Nachlass ("literary remains") insofar > as Harvard has possession of them. They are located in the Harvard Library, > > not in the Philosophy Department, and there are 80,000 or more pages of > them, still largely unpublished. (There are several tens of thousands of > pages more than that elsewhere, by the say, but the bulk of the > philosophical stuff is largely in the Harvard collections. Since a lot of > the manuscripts have been rotting away for years, the librarians aren't > eager for people to poke around in them and there has to be some special and > > persuasive reason to get permission to do so at this time. > > They ought, of course, to be digitized with high res color cameras and > spec
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Yes, there is already a movement afoot and maybe more than one, and all of the things you mentioned are being considered or coming under consideration. If you'll give me two or three days to get some information together for you on this in a systematic way, I'll try to convey to you and others on the list who may be interested in this sort of project a definite idea of what is being and might be done and what you might be able to do to help and also to get your own ideas on this. It will take a collaborative effort to do it and there are indeed shortcuts that can be taken to get it moving, I believe. But bear with me for just a couple of days so I can figure out how to organize the discussion effectively without interfering with the normal discussion function of the list. I should say, perhaps, that the people at Harvard won't be of any special help at this particular time, but there are contacts with the Peirce Society that will be to the point. Joe Ransdell . - Original Message - From: "Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2006 3:12 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) So, who are the we who need how to get the money? I mean, are there already people working on getting things digitalized? SO yes, 80.000 pages is a lot. But I can hardly imagine it would cost more than 1 dollar per page or so to get it digitalized? And should be able to do that job within 2 years or so? With more people and some more equipment, some months?? Yes and maybe special lightning. But still not milliard dollar I suppose?? I think it is first of all needed to get exact figures about what such digitalization of only the Peirce pages at Harvard would cost. The camera's "we" would probably be able to just borrow or get from some good supplier of this stuff. And time to do so decreasing it to just put more persons on the job. I myself would be willing to think about ways to get this done. As it also interests me a lot. And it is just important that this happens as soon as possible. Does anyone here have contact info for the Charles Peirce Society. And any other foundation or society working on encouragement of study/communication of Charles Sander Peirce. And maybe some good contact address at Harvard, the people there responsible for the Peirce collection. Kind regards, Wilfred -Oorspronkelijk bericht- Van: Joseph Ransdell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Verzonden: zaterdag 17 juni 2006 21:33 Aan: Peirce Discussion Forum Onderwerp: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Wilfred and the list: The MS pages reproduced here are from photocopies of photocopies of the manuscripts which constitute Peirce's Nachlass ("literary remains") insofar as Harvard has possession of them. They are located in the Harvard Library, not in the Philosophy Department, and there are 80,000 or more pages of them, still largely unpublished. (There are several tens of thousands of pages more than that elsewhere, by the say, but the bulk of the philosophical stuff is largely in the Harvard collections. Since a lot of the manuscripts have been rotting away for years, the librarians aren't eager for people to poke around in them and there has to be some special and persuasive reason to get permission to do so at this time. They ought, of course, to be digitized with high res color cameras and special lighting that minimizes the effects of the scanning on them and plans are supposedly in the offing to do that -- along with a vast quantity of other holdings there in the library which they want to digitize. We may all be dead before they get around to it -- unless, of course, some benevolent patron with a spare million dollars or so does what he or she ought to be doing with his or her money; but you don't find a whole lot of them around these days who don't already have other things they want to support. Know anyone smart enough, wealthy enough, and moral enough to understand the value of doing this sort of thing for Peirce? If so let me know and I can assure you it will be done. Ask the U.S. government for it? Sorry, but what with the need for the manufacture and development of ever more fearsome weapons of mass destruction, for the financing of covert armies, and for the destruction of foreign governments in the interest of spreading freedom and religious salvation to the grateful survivors, American taxpayers -- or at least their supposed representatives -- aren't much inclined to support such frivolous enterprises as this at this time. But speaking less facetiously, the digitization of the MS material so that the originals can be retired from use and the digitized material made generally available is an enormous task, far more difficult than one might at first suppose. One complication that has to be taken into
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
For completeness: http://www.gatesfoundation.org/ForGrantSeekers/EligibilityAndGuidelines/ Steven Steven Ericsson Zenith wrote: My understanding is that this would not be a project within the bounds of those that interest the Gates Foundation. The focus there is on raising the standards of public education - not arbitrary scholarly endeavors. With respect, Steven Joseph Ransdell wrote: Wilfred says:: "I think we should ask the Bill Gates foundation for this! And also just mention the importance of this to be done wherever we can. Regarding the bill gates foundation, maybe he should first know then where the electronic switch idea originates from. But I guess we could give it a try, preferably with lots of names and tittles and so on to make things happen." That's an idea worth investigating, Wilfred, particularly in view of the fact that Bill Gates is presently retiring from active control of Microsoft and devoting himself exclusively to his and his wife's philanthropical concerns -- then, too, he was a student at Harvard -- and I will see to it that it is investigated. Foundations usually have an initial filtering system that can be checked out for possible entry into an inner sanctum where you might be permitted to make your case for support. It seems to be more the exception than the rule for them to leave it open enough for much in the way of purely scholarly projects to be capable of slipping through at this time, but there are ways of construing the interest which this particular project might have that might find some possibilities there. I'll see what I can find out about the prospects and let you know what I find out soon. Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: "Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2006 2:50 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) I think we should ask the Bill Gates foundation for this! And also just mention the importance of this to be done wherever we can. Regarding the bill gates foundation, maybe he should first know then where the electronic switch idea originates from. But I guess we could give it a try, preferably with lots of names and tittles and so on to make things happen. Kind regards, Wilfred -Oorspronkelijk bericht- Van: Joseph Ransdell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Verzonden: zaterdag 17 juni 2006 21:33 Aan: Peirce Discussion Forum Onderwerp: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Wilfred and the list: The MS pages reproduced here are from photocopies of photocopies of the manuscripts which constitute Peirce's Nachlass ("literary remains") insofar as Harvard has possession of them. They are located in the Harvard Library, not in the Philosophy Department, and there are 80,000 or more pages of them, still largely unpublished. (There are several tens of thousands of pages more than that elsewhere, by the say, but the bulk of the philosophical stuff is largely in the Harvard collections. Since a lot of the manuscripts have been rotting away for years, the librarians aren't eager for people to poke around in them and there has to be some special and persuasive reason to get permission to do so at this time. They ought, of course, to be digitized with high res color cameras and special lighting that minimizes the effects of the scanning on them and plans are supposedly in the offing to do that -- along with a vast quantity of other holdings there in the library which they want to digitize. We may all be dead before they get around to it -- unless, of course, some benevolent patron with a spare million dollars or so does what he or she ought to be doing with his or her money; but you don't find a whole lot of them around these days who don't already have other things they want to support. Know anyone smart enough, wealthy enough, and moral enough to understand the value of doing this sort of thing for Peirce? If so let me know and I can assure you it will be done. Ask the U.S. government for it? Sorry, but what with the need for the manufacture and development of ever more fearsome weapons of mass destruction, for the financing of covert armies, and for the destruction of foreign governments in the interest of spreading freedom and religious salvation to the grateful survivors, American taxpayers -- or at least their supposed representatives -- aren't much inclined to support such frivolous enterprises as this at this time. But speaking less facetiously, the digitization of the MS material so that the originals can be retired from use and the digitized material made generally available is an enormous task, far more difficult than one might at first suppose. One complication that has to be taken into account stems from the fact that the people who were supposed to take good car
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
My understanding is that this would not be a project within the bounds of those that interest the Gates Foundation. The focus there is on raising the standards of public education - not arbitrary scholarly endeavors. With respect, Steven Joseph Ransdell wrote: Wilfred says:: "I think we should ask the Bill Gates foundation for this! And also just mention the importance of this to be done wherever we can. Regarding the bill gates foundation, maybe he should first know then where the electronic switch idea originates from. But I guess we could give it a try, preferably with lots of names and tittles and so on to make things happen." That's an idea worth investigating, Wilfred, particularly in view of the fact that Bill Gates is presently retiring from active control of Microsoft and devoting himself exclusively to his and his wife's philanthropical concerns -- then, too, he was a student at Harvard -- and I will see to it that it is investigated. Foundations usually have an initial filtering system that can be checked out for possible entry into an inner sanctum where you might be permitted to make your case for support. It seems to be more the exception than the rule for them to leave it open enough for much in the way of purely scholarly projects to be capable of slipping through at this time, but there are ways of construing the interest which this particular project might have that might find some possibilities there. I'll see what I can find out about the prospects and let you know what I find out soon. Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: "Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2006 2:50 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) I think we should ask the Bill Gates foundation for this! And also just mention the importance of this to be done wherever we can. Regarding the bill gates foundation, maybe he should first know then where the electronic switch idea originates from. But I guess we could give it a try, preferably with lots of names and tittles and so on to make things happen. Kind regards, Wilfred -Oorspronkelijk bericht- Van: Joseph Ransdell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Verzonden: zaterdag 17 juni 2006 21:33 Aan: Peirce Discussion Forum Onderwerp: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Wilfred and the list: The MS pages reproduced here are from photocopies of photocopies of the manuscripts which constitute Peirce's Nachlass ("literary remains") insofar as Harvard has possession of them. They are located in the Harvard Library, not in the Philosophy Department, and there are 80,000 or more pages of them, still largely unpublished. (There are several tens of thousands of pages more than that elsewhere, by the say, but the bulk of the philosophical stuff is largely in the Harvard collections. Since a lot of the manuscripts have been rotting away for years, the librarians aren't eager for people to poke around in them and there has to be some special and persuasive reason to get permission to do so at this time. They ought, of course, to be digitized with high res color cameras and special lighting that minimizes the effects of the scanning on them and plans are supposedly in the offing to do that -- along with a vast quantity of other holdings there in the library which they want to digitize. We may all be dead before they get around to it -- unless, of course, some benevolent patron with a spare million dollars or so does what he or she ought to be doing with his or her money; but you don't find a whole lot of them around these days who don't already have other things they want to support. Know anyone smart enough, wealthy enough, and moral enough to understand the value of doing this sort of thing for Peirce? If so let me know and I can assure you it will be done. Ask the U.S. government for it? Sorry, but what with the need for the manufacture and development of ever more fearsome weapons of mass destruction, for the financing of covert armies, and for the destruction of foreign governments in the interest of spreading freedom and religious salvation to the grateful survivors, American taxpayers -- or at least their supposed representatives -- aren't much inclined to support such frivolous enterprises as this at this time. But speaking less facetiously, the digitization of the MS material so that the originals can be retired from use and the digitized material made generally available is an enormous task, far more difficult than one might at first suppose. One complication that has to be taken into account stems from the fact that the people who were supposed to take good care of his work after Peirce's death in 1914 -- the people in the philosophy department at Harvard -- savaged it dreadfully over the course of the many decades
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Wilfred says:: "I think we should ask the Bill Gates foundation for this! And also just mention the importance of this to be done wherever we can. Regarding the bill gates foundation, maybe he should first know then where the electronic switch idea originates from. But I guess we could give it a try, preferably with lots of names and tittles and so on to make things happen." That's an idea worth investigating, Wilfred, particularly in view of the fact that Bill Gates is presently retiring from active control of Microsoft and devoting himself exclusively to his and his wife's philanthropical concerns -- then, too, he was a student at Harvard -- and I will see to it that it is investigated. Foundations usually have an initial filtering system that can be checked out for possible entry into an inner sanctum where you might be permitted to make your case for support. It seems to be more the exception than the rule for them to leave it open enough for much in the way of purely scholarly projects to be capable of slipping through at this time, but there are ways of construing the interest which this particular project might have that might find some possibilities there. I'll see what I can find out about the prospects and let you know what I find out soon. Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: "Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2006 2:50 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) I think we should ask the Bill Gates foundation for this! And also just mention the importance of this to be done wherever we can. Regarding the bill gates foundation, maybe he should first know then where the electronic switch idea originates from. But I guess we could give it a try, preferably with lots of names and tittles and so on to make things happen. Kind regards, Wilfred -Oorspronkelijk bericht- Van: Joseph Ransdell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Verzonden: zaterdag 17 juni 2006 21:33 Aan: Peirce Discussion Forum Onderwerp: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Wilfred and the list: The MS pages reproduced here are from photocopies of photocopies of the manuscripts which constitute Peirce's Nachlass ("literary remains") insofar as Harvard has possession of them. They are located in the Harvard Library, not in the Philosophy Department, and there are 80,000 or more pages of them, still largely unpublished. (There are several tens of thousands of pages more than that elsewhere, by the say, but the bulk of the philosophical stuff is largely in the Harvard collections. Since a lot of the manuscripts have been rotting away for years, the librarians aren't eager for people to poke around in them and there has to be some special and persuasive reason to get permission to do so at this time. They ought, of course, to be digitized with high res color cameras and special lighting that minimizes the effects of the scanning on them and plans are supposedly in the offing to do that -- along with a vast quantity of other holdings there in the library which they want to digitize. We may all be dead before they get around to it -- unless, of course, some benevolent patron with a spare million dollars or so does what he or she ought to be doing with his or her money; but you don't find a whole lot of them around these days who don't already have other things they want to support. Know anyone smart enough, wealthy enough, and moral enough to understand the value of doing this sort of thing for Peirce? If so let me know and I can assure you it will be done. Ask the U.S. government for it? Sorry, but what with the need for the manufacture and development of ever more fearsome weapons of mass destruction, for the financing of covert armies, and for the destruction of foreign governments in the interest of spreading freedom and religious salvation to the grateful survivors, American taxpayers -- or at least their supposed representatives -- aren't much inclined to support such frivolous enterprises as this at this time. But speaking less facetiously, the digitization of the MS material so that the originals can be retired from use and the digitized material made generally available is an enormous task, far more difficult than one might at first suppose. One complication that has to be taken into account stems from the fact that the people who were supposed to take good care of his work after Peirce's death in 1914 -- the people in the philosophy department at Harvard -- savaged it dreadfully over the course of the many decades when they were its "stewards", leaving it in appalling disorder by the time it was finally rescued from them several decades after his death. Consequently, a major part of the problem in making that material generally available lies in the fact that it is st
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
So, who are the we who need how to get the money? I mean, are there already people working on getting things digitalized? SO yes, 80.000 pages is a lot. But I can hardly imagine it would cost more than 1 dollar per page or so to get it digitalized? And should be able to do that job within 2 years or so? With more people and some more equipment, some months?? Yes and maybe special lightning. But still not milliard dollar I suppose?? I think it is first of all needed to get exact figures about what such digitalization of only the Peirce pages at Harvard would cost. The camera's "we" would probably be able to just borrow or get from some good supplier of this stuff. And time to do so decreasing it to just put more persons on the job. I myself would be willing to think about ways to get this done. As it also interests me a lot. And it is just important that this happens as soon as possible. Does anyone here have contact info for the Charles Peirce Society. And any other foundation or society working on encouragement of study/communication of Charles Sander Peirce. And maybe some good contact address at Harvard, the people there responsible for the Peirce collection. Kind regards, Wilfred -Oorspronkelijk bericht- Van: Joseph Ransdell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Verzonden: zaterdag 17 juni 2006 21:33 Aan: Peirce Discussion Forum Onderwerp: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Wilfred and the list: The MS pages reproduced here are from photocopies of photocopies of the manuscripts which constitute Peirce's Nachlass ("literary remains") insofar as Harvard has possession of them. They are located in the Harvard Library, not in the Philosophy Department, and there are 80,000 or more pages of them, still largely unpublished. (There are several tens of thousands of pages more than that elsewhere, by the say, but the bulk of the philosophical stuff is largely in the Harvard collections. Since a lot of the manuscripts have been rotting away for years, the librarians aren't eager for people to poke around in them and there has to be some special and persuasive reason to get permission to do so at this time. They ought, of course, to be digitized with high res color cameras and special lighting that minimizes the effects of the scanning on them and plans are supposedly in the offing to do that -- along with a vast quantity of other holdings there in the library which they want to digitize. We may all be dead before they get around to it -- unless, of course, some benevolent patron with a spare million dollars or so does what he or she ought to be doing with his or her money; but you don't find a whole lot of them around these days who don't already have other things they want to support. Know anyone smart enough, wealthy enough, and moral enough to understand the value of doing this sort of thing for Peirce? If so let me know and I can assure you it will be done. Ask the U.S. government for it? Sorry, but what with the need for the manufacture and development of ever more fearsome weapons of mass destruction, for the financing of covert armies, and for the destruction of foreign governments in the interest of spreading freedom and religious salvation to the grateful survivors, American taxpayers -- or at least their supposed representatives -- aren't much inclined to support such frivolous enterprises as this at this time. But speaking less facetiously, the digitization of the MS material so that the originals can be retired from use and the digitized material made generally available is an enormous task, far more difficult than one might at first suppose. One complication that has to be taken into account stems from the fact that the people who were supposed to take good care of his work after Peirce's death in 1914 -- the people in the philosophy department at Harvard -- savaged it dreadfully over the course of the many decades when they were its "stewards", leaving it in appalling disorder by the time it was finally rescued from them several decades after his death. Consequently, a major part of the problem in making that material generally available lies in the fact that it is still badly disordered even now, after several more decades of attempts to sort it out with use of the photocopies. This is highly labor-intensive intellectual work. There are plans afoot for doing all of these and other things as well, but it requires money even to get a start on doing all of this. As I said, let us know if you know where to get it. Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: "Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2006 1:14 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Ok..so...are these actual original notes of Peirce to be found at Harvard? And can they
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) (Correction)
Sorry, on closer inspection that should read: 1. Rhematic, Icon 2. Rhematic, 3/5. Rhematic 4. Indexical 5/8. Legisign 6. 7. 8/3. 9. Legisign 10. Symbolic, Legisign 540.17 highlighs in the same locations: 1. Rhematic, Icon 2. Rhematic, 3/5. Rhematic 4. 5/8. Legisign 6. Indexical 7. 8/3. 9. Legisign 10. Symbolic, Legisign Steven Ericsson Zenith wrote: Jean-Marc, The reference is to the ink color - the brown colored text indicated in two ways - the rest is in red ink. The note maker appears to be identifying that Peirce used two colors of ink. The Brown ink calls out: 1. Rhematic, Icon 2. Rhematic, 3/8. 4. Indexical 5. Rhematic 6. Rhematic 7. 8/5. Legisign 9. Legisign 10. Symbolic, Legisign The numbering is unclear and appears to have been overwritten. I assume the arrows do not indicate relations of any kind. These color distinctions are reflected by the emboldened text in 540.17 and the bracketing in 540.27. With respect, Steven Jean-Marc Orliaguet wrote: Joseph Ransdell wrote: [image here] On the high-res picture it is clear that the annotations were added afterwards. Compare the line style of the figures and letters (1, 2, 3, ... B) with Peirce's thicker more irregular feather pen's style. The handwriting is differently too compared with other manuscripts. and why would Peirce write that some words have a brown color? /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
I think we should ask the Bill Gates foundation for this! And also just mention the importance of this to be done wherever we can. Regarding the bill gates foundation, maybe he should first know then where the electronic switch idea originates from. But I guess we could give it a try, preferably with lots of names and tittles and so on to make things happen. Kind regards, Wilfred -Oorspronkelijk bericht- Van: Joseph Ransdell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Verzonden: zaterdag 17 juni 2006 21:33 Aan: Peirce Discussion Forum Onderwerp: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Wilfred and the list: The MS pages reproduced here are from photocopies of photocopies of the manuscripts which constitute Peirce's Nachlass ("literary remains") insofar as Harvard has possession of them. They are located in the Harvard Library, not in the Philosophy Department, and there are 80,000 or more pages of them, still largely unpublished. (There are several tens of thousands of pages more than that elsewhere, by the say, but the bulk of the philosophical stuff is largely in the Harvard collections. Since a lot of the manuscripts have been rotting away for years, the librarians aren't eager for people to poke around in them and there has to be some special and persuasive reason to get permission to do so at this time. They ought, of course, to be digitized with high res color cameras and special lighting that minimizes the effects of the scanning on them and plans are supposedly in the offing to do that -- along with a vast quantity of other holdings there in the library which they want to digitize. We may all be dead before they get around to it -- unless, of course, some benevolent patron with a spare million dollars or so does what he or she ought to be doing with his or her money; but you don't find a whole lot of them around these days who don't already have other things they want to support. Know anyone smart enough, wealthy enough, and moral enough to understand the value of doing this sort of thing for Peirce? If so let me know and I can assure you it will be done. Ask the U.S. government for it? Sorry, but what with the need for the manufacture and development of ever more fearsome weapons of mass destruction, for the financing of covert armies, and for the destruction of foreign governments in the interest of spreading freedom and religious salvation to the grateful survivors, American taxpayers -- or at least their supposed representatives -- aren't much inclined to support such frivolous enterprises as this at this time. But speaking less facetiously, the digitization of the MS material so that the originals can be retired from use and the digitized material made generally available is an enormous task, far more difficult than one might at first suppose. One complication that has to be taken into account stems from the fact that the people who were supposed to take good care of his work after Peirce's death in 1914 -- the people in the philosophy department at Harvard -- savaged it dreadfully over the course of the many decades when they were its "stewards", leaving it in appalling disorder by the time it was finally rescued from them several decades after his death. Consequently, a major part of the problem in making that material generally available lies in the fact that it is still badly disordered even now, after several more decades of attempts to sort it out with use of the photocopies. This is highly labor-intensive intellectual work. There are plans afoot for doing all of these and other things as well, but it requires money even to get a start on doing all of this. As I said, let us know if you know where to get it. Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: "Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2006 1:14 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Ok..so...are these actual original notes of Peirce to be found at Harvard? And can they be reviewed by scholars? If so I would be interested to go there maybe some time and review it. Better to have seen it first hand. Peirce is getting my attention more and more :-) Is there actually some good overview of where to find what materials as original as possible notes and so on from Charles Sander Peirce? And any money available from institutions for thorough research? Wilfred -Oorspronkelijk bericht- Van: Benjamin Udell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Verzonden: zaterdag 17 juni 2006 20:02 Aan: Peirce Discussion Forum Onderwerp: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Image came through beautifully! Look carefully at the MS799.2 triangle of boxes and you can that the numbers are change from an earlier set of numbers. I originally thought that the little earlier numeral "8" was an e
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Jean-Marc, The reference is to the ink color - the brown colored text indicated in two ways - the rest is in red ink. The note maker appears to be identifying that Peirce used two colors of ink. The Brown ink calls out: 1. Rhematic, Icon 2. Rhematic, 3/8. 4. Indexical 5. Rhematic 6. Rhematic 7. 8/5. Legisign 9. Legisign 10. Symbolic, Legisign The numbering is unclear and appears to have been overwritten. I assume the arrows do not indicate relations of any kind. These color distinctions are reflected by the emboldened text in 540.17 and the bracketing in 540.27. With respect, Steven Jean-Marc Orliaguet wrote: Joseph Ransdell wrote: [image here] On the high-res picture it is clear that the annotations were added afterwards. Compare the line style of the figures and letters (1, 2, 3, ... B) with Peirce's thicker more irregular feather pen's style. The handwriting is differently too compared with other manuscripts. and why would Peirce write that some words have a brown color? /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Wilfred and the list: The MS pages reproduced here are from photocopies of photocopies of the manuscripts which constitute Peirce's Nachlass ("literary remains") insofar as Harvard has possession of them. They are located in the Harvard Library, not in the Philosophy Department, and there are 80,000 or more pages of them, still largely unpublished. (There are several tens of thousands of pages more than that elsewhere, by the say, but the bulk of the philosophical stuff is largely in the Harvard collections. Since a lot of the manuscripts have been rotting away for years, the librarians aren't eager for people to poke around in them and there has to be some special and persuasive reason to get permission to do so at this time. They ought, of course, to be digitized with high res color cameras and special lighting that minimizes the effects of the scanning on them and plans are supposedly in the offing to do that -- along with a vast quantity of other holdings there in the library which they want to digitize. We may all be dead before they get around to it -- unless, of course, some benevolent patron with a spare million dollars or so does what he or she ought to be doing with his or her money; but you don't find a whole lot of them around these days who don't already have other things they want to support. Know anyone smart enough, wealthy enough, and moral enough to understand the value of doing this sort of thing for Peirce? If so let me know and I can assure you it will be done. Ask the U.S. government for it? Sorry, but what with the need for the manufacture and development of ever more fearsome weapons of mass destruction, for the financing of covert armies, and for the destruction of foreign governments in the interest of spreading freedom and religious salvation to the grateful survivors, American taxpayers -- or at least their supposed representatives -- aren't much inclined to support such frivolous enterprises as this at this time. But speaking less facetiously, the digitization of the MS material so that the originals can be retired from use and the digitized material made generally available is an enormous task, far more difficult than one might at first suppose. One complication that has to be taken into account stems from the fact that the people who were supposed to take good care of his work after Peirce's death in 1914 -- the people in the philosophy department at Harvard -- savaged it dreadfully over the course of the many decades when they were its "stewards", leaving it in appalling disorder by the time it was finally rescued from them several decades after his death. Consequently, a major part of the problem in making that material generally available lies in the fact that it is still badly disordered even now, after several more decades of attempts to sort it out with use of the photocopies. This is highly labor-intensive intellectual work. There are plans afoot for doing all of these and other things as well, but it requires money even to get a start on doing all of this. As I said, let us know if you know where to get it. Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: "Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2006 1:14 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Ok..so...are these actual original notes of Peirce to be found at Harvard? And can they be reviewed by scholars? If so I would be interested to go there maybe some time and review it. Better to have seen it first hand. Peirce is getting my attention more and more :-) Is there actually some good overview of where to find what materials as original as possible notes and so on from Charles Sander Peirce? And any money available from institutions for thorough research? Wilfred -Oorspronkelijk bericht- Van: Benjamin Udell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Verzonden: zaterdag 17 juni 2006 20:02 Aan: Peirce Discussion Forum Onderwerp: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Image came through beautifully! Look carefully at the MS799.2 triangle of boxes and you can that the numbers are change from an earlier set of numbers. I originally thought that the little earlier numeral "8" was an extra numeral "3" CURRENT: 1 ~ 5 ~ 8 ~ 10 ~ 2 ~ 6 ~ 9 ~~ 3 ~ 7 ~~~ 4 EARLIER: 1 ~ 2 ~ 3 ~ 4 ~ 5 ~ 6 ~ 7 ~~ 8 ~ 9 ~~~ 10 Best, Ben --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.0/368 - Release Date: 16-6-2006 -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.0/368 - Release Date: 16-6-2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- No virus found in th
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Looking at all three triangles, I get to feeling that it's unlikely that Pierce, having included no numbers in one triangle, would then in the other two triangles throw numbers in like afterthoughts and, in both triangles, change them, and begin and finish the numbers so that they looked a bit scattered and visually sloppy -- when he has written the sign class names with some care. Especially the MS540-17 triangle. I had noticed in the smaller graphic image of MS540-17 that the lettering looked careful, with serifs -- I thought it might even be medieval style. But in fact it was the bolding which Peirce did, which gave a medieval lookto some of the lettering when seen in the smaller, less-easy-to-read graphic image . I keep wanting to crack a joke here about Peirce being "not a profligate bolder" but showing here that "he was clearly not inexperienced at it ." Anyway, great work, Joe! Thanks for these images of Peirce's own writing. Best, Ben - Original Message - From: "Benjamin Udell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2006 2:01 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Image came through beautifully! Look carefully at the MS799.2 triangle of boxes and you can that the numbers are change from an earlier set of numbers. I originally thought that the little earlier numeral "8" was an extra numeral "3" CURRENT: 1 ~ 5 ~ 8 ~ 10 ~ 2 ~ 6 ~ 9 ~~ 3 ~ 7 ~~~ 4 EARLIER: 1 ~ 2 ~ 3 ~ 4 ~ 5 ~ 6 ~ 7 ~~ 8 ~ 9 ~~~ 10 Best, Ben --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Ok..so...are these actual original notes of Peirce to be found at Harvard? And can they be reviewed by scholars? If so I would be interested to go there maybe some time and review it. Better to have seen it first hand. Peirce is getting my attention more and more :-) Is there actually some good overview of where to find what materials as original as possible notes and so on from Charles Sander Peirce? And any money available from institutions for thorough research? Wilfred -Oorspronkelijk bericht- Van: Benjamin Udell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Verzonden: zaterdag 17 juni 2006 20:02 Aan: Peirce Discussion Forum Onderwerp: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Image came through beautifully! Look carefully at the MS799.2 triangle of boxes and you can that the numbers are change from an earlier set of numbers. I originally thought that the little earlier numeral "8" was an extra numeral "3" CURRENT: 1 ~ 5 ~ 8 ~ 10 ~ 2 ~ 6 ~ 9 ~~ 3 ~ 7 ~~~ 4 EARLIER: 1 ~ 2 ~ 3 ~ 4 ~ 5 ~ 6 ~ 7 ~~ 8 ~ 9 ~~~ 10 Best, Ben --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.0/368 - Release Date: 16-6-2006 -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.0/368 - Release Date: 16-6-2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Joseph Ransdell wrote: [image here] On the high-res picture it is clear that the annotations were added afterwards. Compare the line style of the figures and letters (1, 2, 3, ... B) with Peirce's thicker more irregular feather pen's style. The handwriting is differently too compared with other manuscripts. and why would Peirce write that some words have a brown color? /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Image came through beautifully! Look carefully at the MS799.2 triangle of boxes and you can that the numbers are change from an earlier set of numbers. I originally thought that the little earlier numeral "8" was an extra numeral "3" CURRENT: 1 ~ 5 ~ 8 ~ 10 ~ 2 ~ 6 ~ 9 ~~ 3 ~ 7 ~~~ 4 EARLIER: 1 ~ 2 ~ 3 ~ 4 ~ 5 ~ 6 ~ 7 ~~ 8 ~ 9 ~~~ 10 Best, Ben --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com