Le Samedi 18 Mars 2006 01:58, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
> Ground them operationally, then. Real things have real properties and
> unreal
> things don't. Real properties can be observed empirically. Primeness
> then is not
> a real property.
>
I have to ask you one more time, but I'll reverse th
Le Samedi 18 Mars 2006 01:58, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
> Ground them operationally, then. Real things have real properties and
> unreal
> things don't. Real properties can be observed empirically. Primeness
> then is not
> a real property.
I'll take another stupid example to try to explain my
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Georges Quénot wrote:
>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>>> Since I don't adopt the premise that everything is
>>> mathematical,
>> I would like to clarify just that point. I understood that
>> you do not adopt it (and whatever your reasons I have to
>> respect the fact). B
Georges Quénot wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >
> > Georges Quénot wrote:
> >> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >>> Since I don't adopt the premise that everything is
> >>> mathematical,
> >> I would like to clarify just that point. I understood that
> >> you do not adopt it (and whatever your rea
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Le Samedi 18 Mars 2006 01:58, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
> > Ground them operationally, then. Real things have real properties and
> > unreal
> > things don't. Real properties can be observed empirically. Primeness
> > then is not
> > a real property.
> >
>
> I have to a
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Georges Quénot wrote:
>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>>> Georges Quénot wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Since I don't adopt the premise that everything is
> mathematical,
I would like to clarify just that point. I understood that
you do not adopt
Georges Quénot wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >
> > Georges Quénot wrote:
> >
> >> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >>> Georges Quenot wrote:
> >>>
> That "[The universe] has real existence, as opposed to the
> other mathematical objects which are only abstract." is what
> I called
Brent Meeker wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >
> > Georges Quénot wrote:
> >
> >>[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >>
> >>>Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> >>>
> >>>
> What properties of the multiverse would render only one mathematical
> object
> real and others abstract...
> >>>
> >>>A non-ma
Georges Quénot wrote:
>
> 1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of
> equations of which a "Harry Potter universe" includes
> a counterpart of you.
I meant:
1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of
equations of which a "Harry Potter universe" including
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Georges Quénot wrote:
>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>>> Georges Quénot wrote:
>>>
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Georges Quenot wrote:
>
>> That "[The universe] has real existence, as opposed to the
>> other mathematical objects which are only abstract.
Le 17-mars-06, à 16:32, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
> I don't agree. I think you slip from "minds can be implemented on more
> than one kind of hardware" to "minds do not need any kind of hardware".
I slip? Where ?
I take care of precisely not doing that, mainly through UDA *plus* the
movie g
Le 15-mars-06, à 17:51, Georges Quenot a écrit :
>
>>> *If* comp is true. I am not sure of that.
>>
>> Me too. But it is the theory I am studying. Also comp provides some
>> neat "etalon philosophy" to compare with other theories. The advantage
>> of comp (which I recall includes Church thesis)
Le 17-mars-06, à 20:27, Hal Finney a écrit :
>
> John M writes:
>> 1. do we have a REAL argument against solipsism?
>
> Let me express how solipsism can be analyzed in the model where
> physical
> reality is part of mathematical reality.
>
> Let us adopt Bruno's UDA perspective: the Universal D
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le Samedi 18 Mars 2006 01:58, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Ground them operationally, then. Real things have real properties and
unreal
things don't. Real properties can be observed empirically. Primeness
then is not
a real property.
I have to ask
Georges Quénot wrote:
> Georges Quénot wrote:
> >
> > 1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of
> > equations of which a "Harry Potter universe" includes
> > a counterpart of you.
>
> I meant:
>
> 1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of
> equations of which
George Levy wrote:
> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> >Le Samedi 18 Mars 2006 01:58, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
> >
> >
> >>Ground them operationally, then. Real things have real properties and
> >>unreal
> >>things don't. Real properties can be observed empirically. Primeness
> >>then is not
> >>a re
On Fri, Mar 17, 2006 at 04:55:37PM -0800, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> > > [...] Maps are isomorphic to
> > > territories, but are not territories.
> >
> > Well. Territories *are* maps. Just a very specific type
> > of map but maps anyway.
>
> err...no they are not. You can't grow potatoes in a
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Georges Quénot wrote:
>>
>> 1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of
>>equations of which a "Harry Potter universe" including
>>a counterpart of you would be a solution.
>
> 1) Any configuration of material bodies can be represented as a some
>
But the tape can also hold an encoding of the Turing machine to
perform the interpretation. This is the essence of the "compiler
theorem". One can simply iterate this process such that there is no
"concrete" machine interpreting the tape. I think this is another way
of putting the UDA.
Cheers
O
Are you saying that a tape of infinite length, with infinite digits, is not
Turing emulable?
I don't understand how the 'compiler theorem' makes a 'concrete' machine
unnecessary. I agree that the tape can contain an encoding of the Turing
machine - as well as anything else that's describable.
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