Re: computationalism and supervenience
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jone swrites: What I meant was, if a computer program can be associated with consciousness, then a rigid and deterministic computer program can also be associated with consciousness - That doesn't follow. Comutationalists don't have to believe any old programme is conscious. It might be the case that only an indeterministic one will do. A deterministic programme could be exposed as a programme in a Turing Test. Then you're saying something strange and non-physical happens to explain why a program is conscious on the first run when it passes the Turing test but not on the second run when it deterministically repeats all the physical states of the first run in response to a recording of your keystrokes from the first run. It was never conscious, and if anyonw concludede it was on the first run, they were mistaken. The TT is a rule-of-thumb for detecting, it does not magically endow consciousness. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computationalism and supervenience
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: [quoting Russell Standish] The Game of Life is known to be Turing complete. However, I do not think any arrangement of dots in GoL could be conscious. Rather there is an arrangement that implements a universal dovetailer. The UD is quite possibly enough to emulate the full Multiverse (this is sort of where Bruno's partail results are pointing), which we know contain conscious processes. [quoting SP] That's putting it inversely compared to my (naive) understanding of how the UD works. I would have said (a) some programs are associated with consciousness (b) the UD emulates all programs (c) hence, the UD emulates all the conscious programs In particular, I would have said that some sequence of frames in GoL is associated with a particular consciousness that can interact with the universe providing the substrate of its implementation, because we can observe the patterns, maybe even link them to real world events. That is a strange passage. Are you saying that the links would be a) causal b) coincidental c) there is no difference between a) and b). The links would be causal in the normal sense of the word, i.e. the computer running GoL is an electronic device following the laws of physics, and we could link its output to real world events in the usual way that we interface with electronic computers. But the GoL is fairy self-contained. Only the starting sate could be supplied as an input. But if it supposed to be emulating a UD, that fixes the starting state, and if the UD is supposed to be gnerating a multiverse, what need does it have of external inputs ? This does not necessarily mean that the consciousness is caused by or supervenes on the pattern of dots, any more that the number 3 is caused by or supervenes on a collection of 3 objects. If anything, it could be the other way around: the GoL pattern supervenes on, or is isomorphic with, the consciousness which resides in Platonia. Well, this is the whole problem we have been discussing these past few weeks. The computer exhibits intelligent behaviour and we conclude that it is probably conscious. The physical states of the computer are clearly the cause of its behaviour, and the means whereby we can observe it or interact with it, but is it correct to say that the physical states are the cause of its *consciousness*? If physicalism is correct, only physical states exist, so yes. At first glance, the answer is yes. But what about a computer which goes through exactly the same physical states as part of a recording, as discussed in my other posts? It won't be exactly the same state, since dispositions and counterfactuals have a physical basis. If you say this is not conscious, you have a problem, because identical electrical activity in the computer's circuitry would then on one occasion cause consciousness and on another occasion not. It all depends on what you mean by activity. The total physical state will be different. If you say it is conscious, then you have to allow that a recording or an inputless machine can be conscious, something many computationalists are loathe to do. That depends whether they are consciousness-computationalists or cognition-computationalists. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: computationalism and supervenience
Brent Meeker writes: What I meant was, if a computer program can be associated with consciousness, then a rigid and deterministic computer program can also be associated with consciousness - leaving aside the question of how exactly the association occurs. For example, suppose I have a conversation with a putatively conscious computer program as part of a Turing test, and the program passes, convincing me and everyone else that it has been conscious during the test. Then, I start up the program again with no memory saved from the first run, but this time I play it a recording of my voice from the first test. The program will go through exactly the same resposes as during the first run, but this time to an external observer who saw the first run the program's responses will be no more surprising that my questions on the recording of my voice. The program itself won't know what's coming and it might even think it is being clever by throwing is some unpredictable answers to prove how free and human-like it really is. I don't think there is any basis for saying it is conscious during the first run but not during the second. I also don't think it helps to say that its responses *would* have been different even on the second run had its input been different, because that is true of any record player or automaton. I think it does help; or at least it makes a difference. I think you illegitmately move the boundary between the thing supposed to be conscious (I'd prefer intelligent, because I think intelligence requires counterfactuals, but I'm not sure about consciousness) and its environment in drawing that conclusion. The question is whether the *recording* is conscious. It has no input. But then you say it has counterfactuals because the output of a *record player* would be different with a different input. One might well say that a record player has intelligence - of a very low level. But a record does not. Perhaps there is a difference between intelligence and consciousness. Intelligence must be defined operationally, as you have suggested, which involves the intelligent agent interacting with the environment. A computer hardwired with input is not a very useful device from the point of view of an observer, displaying no more intelligence than a film of the screen would. However, useless though it might be, I don't see why the computer should not be conscious with the hardwired input if it is conscious with the same input on a particular run from a variable environment. If the experiment were set up properly, it would be impossible for the computer to know where the input was coming from. Another way to look at it would be to say that intelligence is relative to an environment but consciousness is absolute. This is in keeping with the fact that intelligent behaviour is third person observable but consciousness is not. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: computationalism and supervenience
Brent Meeker writes: I'm responsible for a misunderstanding if you thought I meant recording in the usual sense of the word, i.e. a copy of a limited subset (sound or video, for example) of a subject's attributes over a period of time. What I intended was a copy of all of the subject's attributes, but constrained so that it will run the same way over and over, like an automaton. For example, if you have an elaborate computer game with characters with whom you can interact so they pass the Turing test, you can record the whole session, including your keyboard inputs, and play it a second time. The computer goes through exactly the same states the second time around, but it really has no choice: the recording constrains its behaviour as rigidly as a video tape constrains the behaviour of the video player and TV (actually more rigidly, since there is always some variation between runs with analogue systems). Would you say that the characters in the game are conscious on the first run but not on the second? Stathis Papaioannou I think this turns on the referent of the characters. If it means the sequence of computer states that represents the characters in that game - no. If it means the programs that represent the characters, programs that would have responded differently had circumstances been different, then - yes. At least that's the theory that consciousness depends on counterfactuals. That's the the theory that I'm disputing. There seems to me to be no good reason for it. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Peter Jones writes: Matter is a bare substrate with no properties of its own. The question may well be asked at this point: what roles does it perform ? Why not dispense with matter and just have bundles of properties -- what does matter add to a merely abstract set of properties? The answer is that not all bundles of posible properties are instantiated, that they exist. What does it mean to say something exists ? ..exists is a meaningful predicate of concepts rather than things. The thing must exist in some sense to be talked about. But if it existed full, a statement like Nessie doesn't exist would be a contradiction ...it would amout to the existing thign Nessie doesnt exist. However, if we take that the some sense in which the subject of an ...exists predicate exists is only initially as a concept, we can then say whether or not the concept has something to refer to. Thus Bigfoot exists would mean the concept 'Bigfoot' has a referent. What matter adds to a bundle of properties is existence. A non-existent bundle of properties is a mere concept, a mere possibility. Thus the concept of matter is very much tied to the idea of contingency or somethingism -- the idea that only certain possible things exist. But even existence can be defined as a bundle of properties. If I am wondering whether the pencil on my desk exists I can look at it, pick it up, tap it and so on. If my hand passes through it when I try to pick it up then maybe it is just an illusion. If it passes all the tests I put it through then by definition it exists. If I want to claim that some other object exists, like Nessie, what I actually mean is that it exists *in the same way as this pencil exists*. The pencil is the gold standard: there is no other, more profound standard of existence against which it can be measured. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: computationalism and supervenience
Peter Jones writes: That doesn't follow. Comutationalists don't have to believe any old programme is conscious. It might be the case that only an indeterministic one will do. A deterministic programme could be exposed as a programme in a Turing Test. Then you're saying something strange and non-physical happens to explain why a program is conscious on the first run when it passes the Turing test but not on the second run when it deterministically repeats all the physical states of the first run in response to a recording of your keystrokes from the first run. It was never conscious, and if anyonw concludede it was on the first run, they were mistaken. The TT is a rule-of-thumb for detecting, it does not magically endow consciousness. Are you suggesting that of two very similar programs, one containing a true random number generator and the other a pseudorandom number generator, only the former could possibly be conscious? I suppose it is possible, but I see no reason to believe that it is true. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computationalism and supervenience
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: It was never conscious, and if anyonw concludede it was on the first run, they were mistaken. The TT is a rule-of-thumb for detecting, it does not magically endow consciousness. Are you suggesting that of two very similar programs, one containing a true random number generator and the other a pseudorandom number generator, only the former could possibly be conscious? Do you think someone would judge a system to be conscious in a TT if it gave predictable responses ? How accurate is the TT as a guide ? What else is there ? suppose it is possible, but I see no reason to believe that it is true. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: computationalism and supervenience
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP): This does not necessarily mean that the consciousness is caused by or supervenes on the pattern of dots, any more that the number 3 is caused by or supervenes on a collection of 3 objects. If anything, it could be the other way around: the GoL pattern supervenes on, or is isomorphic with, the consciousness which resides in Platonia. Well, this is the whole problem we have been discussing these past few weeks. The computer exhibits intelligent behaviour and we conclude that it is probably conscious. The physical states of the computer are clearly the cause of its behaviour, and the means whereby we can observe it or interact with it, but is it correct to say that the physical states are the cause of its *consciousness*? If physicalism is correct, only physical states exist, so yes. At first glance, the answer is yes. But what about a computer which goes through exactly the same physical states as part of a recording, as discussed in my other posts? It won't be exactly the same state, since dispositions and counterfactuals have a physical basis. A classical computer is perfectly deterministic - it wouldn't be much use as a computer if were not. If it is provided with the same inputs, it will go through the same sequence of physical states. On run no. 1 it could be provided with input from a human, or a true random number generator, for example one based on radioactive decay. On run no. 2 it could be provided with a recording of the input from run no. 1, so that we know exactly what the computer's responses will be, as surely as we know what the behaviour of a tape recording or a clockwork mechanism will be. If you say this is not conscious, you have a problem, because identical electrical activity in the computer's circuitry would then on one occasion cause consciousness and on another occasion not. It all depends on what you mean by activity. The total physical state will be different. No, it will be exactly the same. The same keystrokes or voice commands are entered the second time around from a recording. If you say it is conscious, then you have to allow that a recording or an inputless machine can be conscious, something many computationalists are loathe to do. That depends whether they are consciousness-computationalists or cognition-computationalists. It's consciousness which is the more problematic. Many cognitive scientists have traditionally eschewed consciousness as unreal, unimportant or too difficult to study. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Peter Jones writes: And there's no way to prove we aren't computer-simulated... Right! So if you claimed we were living in a computer simulation because you liked the sound of it, that would be a metaphysical position. It would still be a metaphsyical claim if I had a very good arguemnt. It is metaphysical either way because of its content, not because of the way it is argued. If Democritus came up with the idea that everything was made of atoms because he liked the sound of it that would have been a metaphysical position, even if happened to be true, because it would only have been true *by luck*, not because there was some good reason to believe it was true. If Democritus had come up with a good reason for his atomic theory, that would then have been science, not metaphysics. Empiricism is still metaphysical. We have different working definitions of metaphysical. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computationalism and supervenience
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes (quoting SP): This does not necessarily mean that the consciousness is caused by or supervenes on the pattern of dots, any more that the number 3 is caused by or supervenes on a collection of 3 objects. If anything, it could be the other way around: the GoL pattern supervenes on, or is isomorphic with, the consciousness which resides in Platonia. Well, this is the whole problem we have been discussing these past few weeks. The computer exhibits intelligent behaviour and we conclude that it is probably conscious. The physical states of the computer are clearly the cause of its behaviour, and the means whereby we can observe it or interact with it, but is it correct to say that the physical states are the cause of its *consciousness*? If physicalism is correct, only physical states exist, so yes. At first glance, the answer is yes. But what about a computer which goes through exactly the same physical states as part of a recording, as discussed in my other posts? It won't be exactly the same state, since dispositions and counterfactuals have a physical basis. A classical computer is perfectly deterministic - it wouldn't be much use as a computer if were not. If it is provided with the same inputs, it will go through the same sequence of physical states. But here it is not the computation itself that is recorded, just the input that drives it. On run no. 1 it could be provided with input from a human, or a true random number generator, for example one based on radioactive decay. On run no. 2 it could be provided with a recording of the input from run no. 1, so that we know exactly what the computer's responses will be, as surely as we know what the behaviour of a tape recording or a clockwork mechanism will be. That doesn't prove that a recording is the same as a a computation. What you are talking about is a computation driven by a recording. If you say this is not conscious, you have a problem, because identical electrical activity in the computer's circuitry would then on one occasion cause consciousness and on another occasion not. It all depends on what you mean by activity. The total physical state will be different. No, it will be exactly the same. The same keystrokes or voice commands are entered the second time around from a recording. If you say it is conscious, then you have to allow that a recording or an inputless machine can be conscious, something many computationalists are loathe to do. That depends whether they are consciousness-computationalists or cognition-computationalists. It's consciousness which is the more problematic. Many cognitive scientists have traditionally eschewed consciousness as unreal, unimportant or too difficult to study. You haven't shown that a recording per se must have consciousness. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: computationalism and supervenience
Peter Jones writes: It was never conscious, and if anyonw concludede it was on the first run, they were mistaken. The TT is a rule-of-thumb for detecting, it does not magically endow consciousness. Are you suggesting that of two very similar programs, one containing a true random number generator and the other a pseudorandom number generator, only the former could possibly be conscious? Do you think someone would judge a system to be conscious in a TT if it gave predictable responses ? How accurate is the TT as a guide ? What else is there ? The fact that people feel they are not responding to inputs in a deterministic way does not necessarily mean that it is true. You could put a computer program through a TT and be completely surprised by its quirky and imaginative responses - then run the program a second time with the same inputs and get exactly the same responses. There are those who argue that human cognition is fundamentally different from classical computers due to quantum randomness, but even if this is the case there is no reason to believe that it is necessarily the case. Brains would have evolved to give rise to appropriate survival- enhancing behaviour, which precludes random or erratic behaviour. A degree of unpredictability would have to be present in order to avoid predators or catch prey, but unpredictable does not necessarily mean random: it just has to be beyond the capabilities of the predators or prey to predict. The unpredictability could result from the effect of classical chaos, or simply from the complexity of the behaviour which is in fact perfectly deterministic. No true randomness is needed. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: computationalism and supervenience
Peter Jones writes: A classical computer is perfectly deterministic - it wouldn't be much use as a computer if were not. If it is provided with the same inputs, it will go through the same sequence of physical states. But here it is not the computation itself that is recorded, just the input that drives it. On run no. 1 it could be provided with input from a human, or a true random number generator, for example one based on radioactive decay. On run no. 2 it could be provided with a recording of the input from run no. 1, so that we know exactly what the computer's responses will be, as surely as we know what the behaviour of a tape recording or a clockwork mechanism will be. That doesn't prove that a recording is the same as a a computation. What you are talking about is a computation driven by a recording. That's right, but with a fixed input the computer follows a perfectly deterministic course, like a clockwork mechanism, however many times we repeat the run. Moreover, if we consider the recording of the input as hardwired into the computer, it does not interact with its environment. So we have the possibility that a perfectly deterministic physical system that does not interact with its environment may be conscious. And since the computer may be built and programmed in an arbitrarily complex way, because any physical system can be mapped onto any computation with the appropriate mapping rules, we have the possibility that any physical system could be implementing any computation. That would be a trivial result given that we are unable to interact with such a computer and would never be able to use it or recognise it as a computer - except that such a computer can be conscious, self-aware in its own segregated virtual world. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computationalism and supervenience
Stathis Papaioannou writes: That's right, but with a fixed input the computer follows a perfectly deterministic course, like a clockwork mechanism, however many times we repeat the run. Moreover, if we consider the recording of the input as hardwired into the computer, it does not interact with its environment. So we have the possibility that a perfectly deterministic physical system that does not interact with its environment may be conscious. And since the computer may be built and programmed in an arbitrarily complex way, because any physical system can be mapped onto any computation with the appropriate mapping rules, we have the possibility that any physical system could be implementing any computation. That would be a trivial result given that we are unable to interact with such a computer and would never be able to use it or recognise it as a computer - except that such a computer can be conscious, self-aware in its own segregated virtual world. NCS: If the computer is conscious I don't see how it could be a deterministic or predictable physical system. To me, consciousness means it is self-aware, capable of modifying its responses, and therefore not predictable. What are the ingredients of a conscious computer ? Perhaps one essential component is a central processing unit that depends on quantum randomness to arrive at a decision when other factors balance out. -- This message has been scanned for viruses and dangerous content by MailScanner, and is believed to be clean. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computationalism and supervenience
Norman Samish wrote: And since the computer may be built and programmed in an arbitrarily complex way, because any physical system can be mapped onto any computation with the appropriate mapping rules, That isn't a fact. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computationalism and supervenience
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: A classical computer is perfectly deterministic - it wouldn't be much use as a computer if were not. If it is provided with the same inputs, it will go through the same sequence of physical states. But here it is not the computation itself that is recorded, just the input that drives it. On run no. 1 it could be provided with input from a human, or a true random number generator, for example one based on radioactive decay. On run no. 2 it could be provided with a recording of the input from run no. 1, so that we know exactly what the computer's responses will be, as surely as we know what the behaviour of a tape recording or a clockwork mechanism will be. That doesn't prove that a recording is the same as a a computation. What you are talking about is a computation driven by a recording. That's right, but with a fixed input the computer follows a perfectly deterministic course, like a clockwork mechanism, however many times we repeat the run. Moreover, if we consider the recording of the input as hardwired into the computer, it does not interact with its environment. So we have the possibility that a perfectly deterministic physical system that does not interact with its environment may be conscious. That depends on what you mean by environment. In any case, the counterfactuals are still there. And since the computer may be built and programmed in an arbitrarily complex way, because any physical system can be mapped onto any computation with the appropriate mapping rules, That is not a fact. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computationalism and supervenience
Stathis: I am not 'debating' your position, just musing about expressions. You made a very interesting passage below: SP: ...Perhaps there is a difference between intelligence and consciousness. Intelligence must be defined operationally, as you have suggested, which involves the intelligent agent interacting with the environment. A computer hardwired with input is not a very useful device from the point of view of an observer, displaying no more intelligence than a film of the screen would JM: What I sense in your discussion with Peter, a certain group of qualia has been picked (computer input) and argued about it being consciousness. Irrespective of other qualia findable in systems outside that circle, which e.g. in 'human consciousness have their input. A limited model quality is matched to a wider background of interactions and assigned to the generalized concept. Speaking about intelligence may be an improvement: in my wording it requires (beside considerable knowledge-base - memory) an elasticity of the mind, to ponder the features according to (counterfactual? I am not so familiar with the term) contradictory 'arguments' and finding one outcome, not necessarily the obvious. In this activity the 'mind' includes 'more' than just the 'data fed into a computer' and may provide a different entailment from a (limitedly) 'conscious' (Turing?) machine. In your earlier post you wrote: SP: .There are those who argue that human cognition is fundamentally different from classical computers due to quantum randomness, but even if this is the case there is no reason to believe that it is necessarily the case. Brains would have evolved to give rise to appropriate survival-enhancing behaviour, which precludes random or erratic behaviour. A degree of unpredictability would have to be present in order to avoid predators or catch prey, but unpredictable does not necessarily mean random: it just has to be beyond the capabilities of the predators or prey to predict. The unpredictability could result from the effect of classical chaos, or simply from the complexity of the behaviour which is in fact perfectly deterministic. No true randomness is needed JM: I dislike the term 'Q-randomness' for 2 reasons: 1. randomness is not part of a totally interconnected deterministic world in which every change is triggered by the movement of the totality (my vision), and 2. the quantum refers to a linear reductionist mathematical science in which no randomness is feasible and nonlinear counterfactuals are not contemplated (In My Unprofessional Opinion) as ARE included in the (live?) human cognition. Unpredictability by whom? you mention the participants, but it may be a characteristic theoretically noted. Read on. (Classical?) chaos IMO is a feature not (yet?) explained by our cognition in the reductionist sciences. Like :emergence. Once we learn more, it becomes unchaos. (Or: the emergence: a regular result). So some model-terms we use are ambiguous and incomplete, yet we draw 'definite' (generalized) conclusions from them. (cf my previous post to Brent about 'model'). The best John Mikes - Original Message - From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Brent Meeker everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Saturday, August 26, 2006 7:17 AM Subject: RE: computationalism and supervenience Brent Meeker writes: What I meant was, if a computer program can be associated with consciousness, then a rigid and deterministic computer program can also be associated with consciousness - leaving aside the question of how exactly the association occurs. For example, suppose I have a conversation with a putatively conscious computer program as part of a Turing test, and the program passes, convincing me and everyone else that it has been conscious during the test. Then, I start up the program again with no memory saved from the first run, but this time I play it a recording of my voice from the first test. The program will go through exactly the same resposes as during the first run, but this time to an external observer who saw the first run the program's responses will be no more surprising that my questions on the recording of my voice. The program itself won't know what's coming and it might even think it is being clever by throwing is some unpredictable answers to prove how free and human-like it really is. I don't think there is any basis for saying it is conscious during the first run but not during the second. I also don't think it helps to say that its responses *would* have been different even on the second run had its input been different, because that is true of any record player or automaton. I think it does help; or at least it makes a difference. I think you illegitmately move the boundary between the thing supposed to be conscious (I'd prefer intelligent, because I think intelligence requires counterfactuals, but I'm not sure about consciousness) and its
Re: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: Matter is a bare substrate with no properties of its own. The question may well be asked at this point: what roles does it perform ? Why not dispense with matter and just have bundles of properties -- what does matter add to a merely abstract set of properties? The answer is that not all bundles of posible properties are instantiated, that they exist. What does it mean to say something exists ? ..exists is a meaningful predicate of concepts rather than things. The thing must exist in some sense to be talked about. But if it existed full, a statement like Nessie doesn't exist would be a contradiction ...it would amout to the existing thign Nessie doesnt exist. However, if we take that the some sense in which the subject of an ...exists predicate exists is only initially as a concept, we can then say whether or not the concept has something to refer to. Thus Bigfoot exists would mean the concept 'Bigfoot' has a referent. What matter adds to a bundle of properties is existence. A non-existent bundle of properties is a mere concept, a mere possibility. Thus the concept of matter is very much tied to the idea of contingency or somethingism -- the idea that only certain possible things exist. But even existence can be defined as a bundle of properties. If I am wondering whether the pencil on my desk exists I can look at it, pick it up, tap it and so on. If my hand passes through it when I try to pick it up then maybe it is just an illusion. Maybe it's a holographic projection - in which case the projection (a certain state of photons) does exist, and other people can see it. Even an illusion must exist as some brain process. I understand Peters objection to regarding a mere bundle of properties as existent. But I don't understand why one needs a propertyless substrate. Why not just say that some bundles of properties are instantiated and some aren't. Anyway, current physical theory is that there is a material substrate which has properties, e.g. energy, spin, momentum,... If it passes all the tests I put it through then by definition it exists. If I want to claim that some other object exists, like Nessie, what I actually mean is that it exists *in the same way as this pencil exists*. The pencil is the gold standard: there is no other, more profound standard of existence against which it can be measured. I agree. But the gold standard is not just that you see and touch that pencil - you might be hallucinating. And you can't see an electron, or even a microbe. So what exists or not is a matter of adopting a model of the world; and the best models take account of a consistent theory of instruments as well as direct perception. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computationalism and supervenience
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: What I meant was, if a computer program can be associated with consciousness, then a rigid and deterministic computer program can also be associated with consciousness - leaving aside the question of how exactly the association occurs. For example, suppose I have a conversation with a putatively conscious computer program as part of a Turing test, and the program passes, convincing me and everyone else that it has been conscious during the test. Then, I start up the program again with no memory saved from the first run, but this time I play it a recording of my voice from the first test. The program will go through exactly the same resposes as during the first run, but this time to an external observer who saw the first run the program's responses will be no more surprising that my questions on the recording of my voice. The program itself won't know what's coming and it might even think it is being clever by throwing is some unpredictable answers to prove how free and human-like it really is. I don't think there is any basis for saying it is conscious during the first run but not during the second. I also don't think it helps to say that its responses *would* have been different even on the second run had its input been different, because that is true of any record player or automaton. I think it does help; or at least it makes a difference. I think you illegitmately move the boundary between the thing supposed to be conscious (I'd prefer intelligent, because I think intelligence requires counterfactuals, but I'm not sure about consciousness) and its environment in drawing that conclusion. The question is whether the *recording* is conscious. It has no input. But then you say it has counterfactuals because the output of a *record player* would be different with a different input. One might well say that a record player has intelligence - of a very low level. But a record does not. Perhaps there is a difference between intelligence and consciousness. Intelligence must be defined operationally, as you have suggested, which involves the intelligent agent interacting with the environment. A computer hardwired with input is not a very useful device from the point of view of an observer, displaying no more intelligence than a film of the screen would. However, useless though it might be, I don't see why the computer should not be conscious with the hardwired input if it is conscious with the same input on a particular run from a variable environment. If the experiment were set up properly, it would be impossible for the computer to know where the input was coming from. Another way to look at it would be to say that intelligence is relative to an environment but consciousness is absolute. This is in keeping with the fact that intelligent behaviour is third person observable but consciousness is not. Stathis Papaioannou Good point. I think I agree. My functional view of consciousness is that it's a filter that puts together a story about what's important to remember. It's needed for learning and hence for intelligence of higher order - but it's a subsystem of intelligence in general. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computationalism and supervenience
Norman Samish wrote: Stathis Papaioannou writes: That's right, but with a fixed input the computer follows a perfectly deterministic course, like a clockwork mechanism, however many times we repeat the run. Moreover, if we consider the recording of the input as hardwired into the computer, it does not interact with its environment. So we have the possibility that a perfectly deterministic physical system that does not interact with its environment may be conscious. And since the computer may be built and programmed in an arbitrarily complex way, because any physical system can be mapped onto any computation with the appropriate mapping rules, we have the possibility that any physical system could be implementing any computation. That would be a trivial result given that we are unable to interact with such a computer and would never be able to use it or recognise it as a computer - except that such a computer can be conscious, self-aware in its own segregated virtual world. NCS: If the computer is conscious I don't see how it could be a deterministic or predictable physical system. To me, consciousness means it is self-aware, capable of modifying its responses, Capable of modifying its repsonse in different cirumstances. There's no reason to suppose it must be capable of different responses given exactly the same circumstances (including memory states). and therefore not predictable. Being not predictable is quite easy to acheive even for completely deterministic systems, e.g. the three-body problem, the weather. What are the ingredients of a conscious computer ? Perhaps one essential component is a central processing unit that depends on quantum randomness to arrive at a decision when other factors balance out. I don't think there's any reason to suppoose quantum randomness plays a role in human consciousness - and there are some reasons to think it doesn't, e.g. see Tegmarks paper. There is plenty of environmental noise to prevent Buridan's ass from starving. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: evidence blindness
the fact that intelligent behaviour is third person observable but consciousness is not. Stathis Papaioannou OK. Let me get this straight. Scientist A stares at something, say X, with consciousness. A sees X. Scientist A posits evidence of X from a third person viewpoint. Scientist A confers with Scientist B. Scientist B then goes and stares at X and agrees. Both of these people use consciousness to come to this conclusion. Explicit Conclusion : Yep, theres an X! Yet there's no evidence of consciousness? that which literally enabled the entire process? There is an assumption at work SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE and CONTENTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS Are NOT identities. When you 'stare' at anything at all you have evidence of consciousness. It's what gives you the ability to 'stare' in the first place. It's blaring at you from every facet of your being. Without consciousness you would never have had anything to bring to a discussion in the first place. Yes, when you stare at a brain you don't 'see' conciousness but holy smoke you have evidence blaring by the act of seeing the brain at all! Cheers Colin Hales --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: evidence blindness
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: the fact that intelligent behaviour is third person observable but consciousness is not. Stathis Papaioannou OK. Let me get this straight. Scientist A stares at something, say X, with consciousness. A sees X. Scientist A posits evidence of X from a third person viewpoint. Scientist A confers with Scientist B. Scientist B then goes and stares at X and agrees. Both of these people use consciousness to come to this conclusion. Explicit Conclusion : Yep, theres an X! Yet there's no evidence of consciousness? that which literally enabled the entire process? There is an assumption at work SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE and CONTENTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS Are NOT identities. When you 'stare' at anything at all you have evidence of consciousness. A SIDWINDER missile 'stares' at the exhaust of a jet aircraft. Does that make it conscious? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: evidence blindness
-Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything- [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Brent Meeker Sent: Sunday, August 27, 2006 9:49 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: evidence blindness Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: the fact that intelligent behaviour is third person observable but consciousness is not. Stathis Papaioannou OK. Let me get this straight. Scientist A stares at something, say X, with consciousness. A sees X. Scientist A posits evidence of X from a third person viewpoint. Scientist A confers with Scientist B. Scientist B then goes and stares at X and agrees. Both of these people use consciousness to come to this conclusion. Explicit Conclusion : Yep, theres an X! Yet there's no evidence of consciousness? that which literally enabled the entire process? There is an assumption at work SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE and CONTENTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS Are NOT identities. When you 'stare' at anything at all you have evidence of consciousness. A SIDWINDER missile 'stares' at the exhaust of a jet aircraft. Does that make it conscious? This is a mind-blowingly irrelevant diversion into the usual weeds that fails to comprehend the most basic proposition about ourselves by an assumption which is plain wrong. You presume that the missile stares and then attribute it to humans as equivalent. Forget the bloody missile. I am talking about YOU. The evidence you have about YOU within YOU. Take a look at your hand. That presentation of your hand is one piece of content in a visual field (scene). Mind is literally and only a collection of (rather spectacular) phenomenal scenes. Something (within your brain material) generates the visual field in which there is a hand. You could cognise the existence of a hand _without_ that scene (this is what blindsight patients can do - very very badly, but they can do it). But you don't. No, nature goes to a hell of a lot of trouble to create that fantastic image. You have the scene. Take note of it. It gives you ALL your scientific evidence. This is an intrinsically private scene and you can't be objective without it! You would have nothing to be objective about. PROOF Close your eyes and tell me you can be more scientific about your hand than you could with them open. This is so obvious. To say consciousness is not observable is completely absolutely wrong. We observe consciousness permanently. It's all we ever do! It's just not within the phenomenal fields, it IS the phenomenal fields. Got it? Colin Hales --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computationalism and supervenience
On Fri, Aug 25, 2006 at 04:48:01PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: The UD is quite possibly enough to emulate the full Multiverse (this is sort of where Bruno's partail results are pointing), which we know contain conscious processes. Of course a non-computationalist will say that it contains only zombie. A non-computationalist will believe that the Multiverse contains conscious processes (if they believe in a Multiverse at all). However, they may disagree that the Multiverse is Turing emulable. Personally, I am open to the statement that the Multiverse is Turing emulable, even if each history within the MV is definitely not. Does the former statement make me a computationalist? Now I have a problem with the assertion the UD emulates the full Multiverse. This is because, a priori, with comp, by the UDA, the comp-physical laws will emerge from the first person (plural) computations and their The comp-physical laws (indeed the physical ones) are 1st person plural things, and in themselves not Turing emulable. But the ensemble as described by Schroedingers equation is deterministic and reversible. Why shouldn't this be Turing emulable in your scheme? So am I computationalist? On the most obvious level, no. However, considering the above perhaps I am Bruno's sort of computationalist with a very deep level of replacement (ie switching entire realities). OK, that looks like what I was saying. Confused? That would make two of us. Ah? Why? You seemed quite coherent here ... Confused because I don't think that switching entire realities counts as surviving the Yes Doctor experiment. I do actually subscribe to the view that it is possible to replace my brain with appropriately configured silicon wires, but because of the Maudlin/movie-graph argument, such an artifical brain must be sensitive to quantum randomness. This is a non-computationalist Yes, Doctor proposition. On a slightly incidental note, I was wondering your thoughts of a possible paradox in your argument. Since COMP predicts COMP-immortality, the doctor may as well make a recording of your brain and put it in the filing cabinet to gather dust, as you will survive in Plato's heaven anyway. Furthermore, you could just say No doctor, and still survive through COMP-immortality. It would seem that Pascal's wager should have you saying No doctor (if the point was to survive terminal illness, anyway). Cheers -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 () UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: evidence blindness
Colin, Stathis, Brent, 1. I think we need to distinguish a cybernetic, self-adjusting system like a sidewinder missile, from an inference-processing, self-_redesigning_ system like an intelligent being (well, not redesigning itself biologically, at least as of now). Somehow we're code-unbound to some sufficient extent that, as a result, we can test our representations, interpretations, our systems, habits, and codes of representation and interpretation, rather than leaving that task entirely to biological evolution which tends to punish bad interpretations by removal of the interpreter from the gene pool. There's something more than represented objects (sources), the representations (encodings), and the interpretations (decodings). This something more is the recipient, to whom falls any task of finding redundancies and inconsistencies between the message (or message set) and the rest of the world, such that the recipient -- I'm unsure how to put this -- is the one, or stands as the one, who deals with the existential consequences and for whom tests by subjection to existential consequences are meaningful; the recipient is in a sense a figuration of existential consequences as bearing upon the system's design. It's from a design-testing viewpoint that one re-designs the communication system itself; the recipient role in that sense is the role which includes the role of the evolutionator (as CA's governor might call it). In other words, the recipient is, in logical terms, the recognizer, the (dis-)verifier, the (dis-)corroborator, etc., and verification (using verification as the forest term for the various trees) is that something more than object, representation, interpretation. Okay, so far I'm just trying to distinguish an intelligence from a possibly quite vegetable-level information processs with a pre-programmed menu of feedback-based responses and behavior adjustments. 2. Verificatory bases are nearest us, while the entities laws by appeal to which we explain things, tend to be farther farther from us. I mean, that Colin has a point. There's an explanatory order (or sequence) of being and a verificatory order (sequence) of knowledge. Among the empirical, special sciences (physical, material, biological, human/social), physics comes first in the order of being, the order in which we explain things by appeal to entities, laws, etc., out there. But the order whereby we know things is the opposite; there human/social studies come first, and physics comes last. That is not the usual way in which we order those sciences, but it is the usual way in which we order a lot of maths when we put logic (deductive theory of logic) and structures of order (and conditions for applicability of mathematical induction) before other fields -- that's the ordering according to the bases on which we know things. The point is, that the ultimate explanatory object tends to be what's furthest from us; the ultimate verificatory basis tends to be what's nearest to us (at least within a given family of research fields -- logic and order structures are studies of reason and reason's crackups; extremization problems in analysis seem to be at an opposite pole). Well, in the end, nearest to us means _us_, in our personal experiences. Now, I'm not talking in general about deductively certain knowledge or verification, but just about those bases on which we gain sufficient assurance to act (not to mention believe reports coming from one area in research while not putting too much stock in reports coming from another). We are our own ultimate points of reference. Quine talks somewhere about dispensing with proper names and using a coordinate system spread out over the known universe. Which universe? The one we're in. As a practical matter, the best answer to the question which planet is Earth is the one we're on. What's more, we do have experiences bearing upon our experiences. We get into that sort of multi-layered reflexivity -- and I don't mean just in an abstract intellectual way. Experiences vary in directness, firmness, reliability, etc., among other things. In these senses and more, Colin is right. One unmoors oneself from personal experience only at grave risk. 3. The problem is that it seems possible to distinguish verification, verificatory experience, etc., from consciousness. We learn sometimes unconsciously, we infer conclusively yet sometimes unconsciously, etc., we test and verify sometimes unconsciously, non-deliberately, etc. Reasoning is what we can call conscious inference. Testing doesn't have to be fully conscious and deliberate any more than interpretation does. The point is, is the system of a nature to learn from that which tests the system's character, its design, structure, habits, etc.? Learn, revise itself, etc., consciously or unconsciously. Any time one enters a situation with conjectures, expectations, understandings, memories, one
Re: computationalism and supervenience
On Sat, Aug 26, 2006 at 10:01:36PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Are you suggesting that of two very similar programs, one containing a true random number generator and the other a pseudorandom number generator, only the former could possibly be conscious? I suppose it is possible, but I see no reason to believe that it is true. Stathis Papaioannou I think this is what Maudlin's argument tells us. Is it that so preposterous to you? I thought I had another argument based on creativity, but it seems pseduo RNG programs can be creative, provided the RNG is cryptic enough. Cheers -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 () UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computationalism and supervenience
On Sat, Aug 26, 2006 at 01:57:07PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: What are the ingredients of a conscious computer ? Perhaps one essential component is a central processing unit that depends on quantum randomness to arrive at a decision when other factors balance out. I don't think there's any reason to suppoose quantum randomness plays a role in human consciousness - and there are some reasons to think it doesn't, e.g. see Tegmarks paper. There is plenty of environmental noise to prevent Buridan's ass from starving. Brent Meeker Tegmark's paper looked specifically at quantum computing as a model for consciousness (ie Penrose's suggestion), and the requirements of quantum coherent states. He didn't look at quantum noise effects. There is evidence in the form of brains being structured to behave chaotically (in the classical deterministic chaos sense) (see Walter Freeman's work). This has the effect of amplifying randomness at the molecular (thermal) level, which ultimately depends on quantum randomness, to the macroscopic brain level. This may be coincidental, but I think not. Your PC is engineered to avoid the effects of chaos to prevent this very thing occurring. Why wouldn't nature do the same thing unless it were deliberately trying to exploit randomness? Cheers -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 () UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computationalism and supervenience
Russell Standish wrote: On Sat, Aug 26, 2006 at 01:57:07PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: What are the ingredients of a conscious computer ? Perhaps one essential component is a central processing unit that depends on quantum randomness to arrive at a decision when other factors balance out. I don't think there's any reason to suppoose quantum randomness plays a role in human consciousness - and there are some reasons to think it doesn't, e.g. see Tegmarks paper. There is plenty of environmental noise to prevent Buridan's ass from starving. Brent Meeker Tegmark's paper looked specifically at quantum computing as a model for consciousness (ie Penrose's suggestion), and the requirements of quantum coherent states. He didn't look at quantum noise effects. There is evidence in the form of brains being structured to behave chaotically (in the classical deterministic chaos sense) (see Walter Freeman's work). This has the effect of amplifying randomness at the molecular (thermal) level, which ultimately depends on quantum randomness, to the macroscopic brain level. This may be coincidental, but I think not. Your PC is engineered to avoid the effects of chaos to prevent this very thing occurring. Why wouldn't nature do the same thing unless it were deliberately trying to exploit randomness? In nature there's no reason to depend on amplifying quantum randomness - there's plenty of random environmental input to keep our brains from getting stuck in loops. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: evidence blindness
Dear Benjamin and folks, Your words capture a whole bunch of valuable stuff. In a project to define a comprehensive standard for 'scientific method' it would be very useful input. The particulars involved here, however, are about the basic reality that all scientific behaviour is grounded in consciousness (phenomenal fields). Indeed this is literally _mandated_ by scientists. If we cannot introduce the studied behaviour into phenomenal fields (even via instruments and tortuous inference trails re causality) we are told in no uncertain terms that we are not being scientific, you cannot be doing sciencego see the metaphysics dept over there. This oddity in science is quite amazing and so incredibly obvious that I sometimes wonder about the sanity of scientists. Is it a club or a professional discipline? We: a) demand evidence _within_ consciousness on pain of being declared unscientific and then b) declare that no scientific evidence exists for consciousness because consciousness can't render consciousness visible within consciousness? when consciousness is the entire and only originating source of evidence! Once again I say: SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE And PHENOMENAL _CONTENTS_ Are not identities. There is more evidence for consciousness than anything else. It's just not phenomenal _contents_. It's the phenomenal fields themselves. This is the only message I have here. I have a whole pile of suggestions as to what to do about it...but it's too huge to insert and won't make any difference if this basic reality is not recognised. This increase in scope of scientific evidence gives license for a change in scientific behaviour. Scientific behaviour includes more than is currently recognised. The net result is that we have permission as scientists to carefully go places previously thought 'unscientific'. Having done so those places should be able to predict mechanisms for consciousness consistent with the evidence consciousness provides... that's all. And remember this fact simply doesn't matter in normal day to day science until you try and do a scientific study of the scientific evidence generator (consciousness). Then all hell breaks loose and your busted beliefs about the nature of scientific evidence are exposed for what they are. We need to get used to the idea. This is a brute fact and there's nothing else to say on the matter... I just wish that I'd stop constantly coming across signs of the aberrant beliefs in scientific discoursenot just here on this list but all around meso pervasive and s wrong. Colin Hales --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computationalism and supervenience
On Sat, Aug 26, 2006 at 08:28:06PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: In nature there's no reason to depend on amplifying quantum randomness - there's plenty of random environmental input to keep our brains from getting stuck in loops. Prevention of loops is not the only use of randomness. Also mentioned have been creativity and lack of predictability, particularly for social species (Machiavellian intelligence). Perhaps there is insufficient randomness coming in through our senses for these latter tasks, and so brains need to exploit amplification of synaptic randomness. What would be interesting is to see the results of similar studies to Freemans on human brains replicated for simpler creatures such as ants. Ants do not need to be creative, nor need Machiavellian intelligence (due to their interesting haploid breeding structure). Are ant's brains similarly tuned for chaos, or are they far more deterministic in operation? -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 () UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: evidence blindness
Colin Hales wrote: -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything- [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Brent Meeker Sent: Sunday, August 27, 2006 9:49 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: evidence blindness Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: the fact that intelligent behaviour is third person observable but consciousness is not. Stathis Papaioannou OK. Let me get this straight. Scientist A stares at something, say X, with consciousness. A sees X. Scientist A posits evidence of X from a third person viewpoint. Scientist A confers with Scientist B. Scientist B then goes and stares at X and agrees. Both of these people use consciousness to come to this conclusion. Explicit Conclusion : Yep, theres an X! Yet there's no evidence of consciousness? that which literally enabled the entire process? There is an assumption at work SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE and CONTENTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS Are NOT identities. When you 'stare' at anything at all you have evidence of consciousness. A SIDWINDER missile 'stares' at the exhaust of a jet aircraft. Does that make it conscious? This is a mind-blowingly irrelevant diversion into the usual weeds that fails to comprehend the most basic proposition about ourselves by an assumption which is plain wrong. You presume that the missile stares and then attribute it to humans as equivalent. Forget the bloody missile. I am talking about YOU. The evidence you have about YOU within YOU. Take a look at your hand. That presentation of your hand is one piece of content in a visual field (scene). Mind is literally and only a collection of (rather spectacular) phenomenal scenes. Something (within your brain material) generates the visual field in which there is a hand. You could cognise the existence of a hand _without_ that scene (this is what blindsight patients can do - very very badly, but they can do it). But you don't. No, nature goes to a hell of a lot of trouble to create that fantastic image. You have the scene. Take note of it. It gives you ALL your scientific evidence. This is an intrinsically private scene and you can't be objective without it! You would have nothing to be objective about. PROOF Close your eyes and tell me you can be more scientific about your hand than you could with them open. This is so obvious. To say consciousness is not observable is completely absolutely wrong. We observe consciousness permanently. It's all we ever do! It's just not within the phenomenal fields, it IS the phenomenal fields. Got it? Colin Hales Most of the time I'm observing something else. When I try to observe consciouness, I find I am instead thinking of this or that particular thing, and not consciousness itself. Consciousness can only be consciousness *of* something. Got that? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: evidence blindness
Most of the time I'm observing something else. When I try to observe consciouness, I find I am instead thinking of this or that particular thing, and not consciousness itself. Consciousness can only be consciousness *of* something. Got that? Brent Meeker Absolutely. Intrinsic intentionality is what phenomenal fields do. Brilliantly. but. That's not what my post was about. I'm talking about the evidence provided by the very existence of phenomenal fields _at all_. Blindsighted people have cognition WITHOUT the phenomenal scene. The cognition and the phenomenal aspects are 2 separate sets of physics intermixed. You can have one without the other. Consider your current perception of the neutrinos and cosmic rays showering you. That's what a blindsighted scientist would have in relation to visible light = No phenomenal field. They can guess where things are and sometimes get it right because of pre-occipital hardwiring. The phenomenal scene itself, regardless of its contents (aboutness, intentionality whatever) is evidence of the universe's capacity for generation of phenomenal fields!. phenomenal fields that...say... have missiles in them?...that allow you to see email forums on your PC?.that create problematic evidentiary regimes tending to make those using phenomenal fields for evidence incapable of seeing it, like the hand in front of your face? :-) If we open up a cranium, if the universe was literally made of the appearances provided by phenomenal fields...we would see them! We do not. This is conclusive empirical proof the universe is not made of the contents of the appearance-generating system (and, for that matter, anything derived by using it). It is made of something that can generate appearances in the right circumstances (and not in the vision system of the blindsighted). Those circumstances exist in brain material (and not in your left kneecap!). Consciousness is not invisible. It is the single, only visible thing there is. To say consciousness is invisible whilst using it is to accept X as true from someone screaming X is true!, yet at the same time denying that anyone said anything! That this is donewhen the truth of the existence of an utterance is more certain than that which was uttered. How weird is that?! I'd like everyone on this list to consider the next time anyone says consciousness is invisible to realise that that is completely utterly wrong and that as a result of thinking like that, valuable evidence as to the nature of the universe is being discarded for no reason other than habit and culture and discipline blindness. Colin Hales --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: computationalism and supervenience
Norman Samish writes: Stathis Papaioannou writes: That's right, but with a fixed input the computer follows a perfectly deterministic course, like a clockwork mechanism, however many times we repeat the run. Moreover, if we consider the recording of the input as hardwired into the computer, it does not interact with its environment. So we have the possibility that a perfectly deterministic physical system that does not interact with its environment may be conscious. And since the computer may be built and programmed in an arbitrarily complex way, because any physical system can be mapped onto any computation with the appropriate mapping rules, we have the possibility that any physical system could be implementing any computation. That would be a trivial result given that we are unable to interact with such a computer and would never be able to use it or recognise it as a computer - except that such a computer can be conscious, self-aware in its own segregated virtual world. NCS: If the computer is conscious I don't see how it could be a deterministic or predictable physical system. To me, consciousness means it is self-aware, capable of modifying its responses, and therefore not predictable. What are the ingredients of a conscious computer ? Perhaps one essential component is a central processing unit that depends on quantum randomness to arrive at a decision when other factors balance out. Being self-aware, capable of modifying its responses, and therefore unpredictable does not mean an entity is not deterministic. A naturally evolved intelligent entity only needs to be unpredictable from the point of view of predators and prey. Tossing a coin gives unpredictable results as far as we are concerned, but that does not mean the outcome is not perfectly deterministic. Unpredictability can result from the effect of classical chaos, or simply from the inadequacy of the intelligent entity trying to make the prediction. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Brent meeker writes: But even existence can be defined as a bundle of properties. If I am wondering whether the pencil on my desk exists I can look at it, pick it up, tap it and so on. If my hand passes through it when I try to pick it up then maybe it is just an illusion. Maybe it's a holographic projection - in which case the projection (a certain state of photons) does exist, and other people can see it. Even an illusion must exist as some brain process. I understand Peters objection to regarding a mere bundle of properties as existent. But I don't understand why one needs a propertyless substrate. Why not just say that some bundles of properties are instantiated and some aren't. Anyway, current physical theory is that there is a material substrate which has properties, e.g. energy, spin, momentum,... Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties is just a working assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out that if we dig into quarks very deeply there is nothing substantial there at all, but solid matter will still be solid matter, because it is defined by its properties, not by some mysterious raw physical substrate. If it passes all the tests I put it through then by definition it exists. If I want to claim that some other object exists, like Nessie, what I actually mean is that it exists *in the same way as this pencil exists*. The pencil is the gold standard: there is no other, more profound standard of existence against which it can be measured. I agree. But the gold standard is not just that you see and touch that pencil - you might be hallucinating. And you can't see an electron, or even a microbe. So what exists or not is a matter of adopting a model of the world; and the best models take account of a consistent theory of instruments as well as direct perception. By gold standard I did not mean just direct sensory experience, but every possible empirical test or measurement. A hallucination is a hallucination because other people don't see it, it does not register on a photograph, and so on. A hallucination which passed every possible reality test would not be a hallucination. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
