Re: A Good Silly Question

[Stephen P. King]

On 2/20/2012 5:28 PM, John Mikes wrote:

Craig:
where has that "primordial singularity" come from? and what "expansion"?
I like to use terms beyond hearsay or fantasy. (Of course MY narrative 
is fantasy based on hearsay, - B U T

it makes sense in its cosequences, I think.)
John M

On Mon, Feb 20, 2012 at 7:40 AM, Craig Weinberg > wrote:


On Feb 20, 4:30 am, Kim Jones mailto:kimjo...@ozemail.com.au>> wrote:
> Probably. From a friend of mine on Facebook: "Is it possible
that the notion of the universe expanding is really an illusion
based on the fact that WE are shrinking?"
>
> Perhaps this idea might be used as a "stepping-stone" to a
better idea. Go on, have a laugh if you want but tell me why this
cannot be in any sense possible. Conversely, tell me why it might
be possible if you think so.
>
> Kim Jones

I think that is not only possible, but I think that it has to be the
case. I call my cosmological origin myth 'The Big Diffraction' rather
than the Big Bang for just that reason. If spacetime is created by the
expansion of the primordial singularity, then that means that there
was neither space nor time before the moment of 'expansion'. Therefore
we, and everything in the entire universe was, is, and always will be
physically within the event horizon of the big bang. It cannot be
expanding outside of its own event horizon, so it is space and time
which are surging inward, or within-ward.

We see it as an expansion and forward arrow of time, but that would
make sense since that would be the perspective of a subjective
experience within the spacetime implosion. Objectively, it is the
ratio between mass and space in the universe which is shrinking as
more space is created through the passage of more time (or time is
created through the multiplication of space). The shrinking mass ratio
can also be thought of as energy's entropic exhaust. Events/
experiences build significance (meaning, sequence) and kick out
entropy (space). This is what the universe is; a testing ground for
significance vehicles.

Craig

--


Hi All,

Question: Assuming COMP and all its implications are true, what 
does it tell us about the appearance of an "initial singularity" and 
"expansion"? I am trying to understand what is the motivation for 
Arithmetic bases Realism to have a physical world. I will tentatively 
accept Bruno's idea but a question keeps nagging at me: Why bother with 
an appearence?


Onward!

Stephen

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Re: A Good Silly Question

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 20, 5:28 pm, John Mikes  wrote:
> Craig:
> where has that "primordial singularity" come from?

"Where" is a question which arises as a consequence of the
diffraction. It is like asking what is north of the north pole.
Causality breaks down in the undiffracted singularity.

> and what "expansion"?

The expansion of distance between celestial objects.

Craig

> I like to use terms beyond hearsay or fantasy. (Of course MY narrative is
> fantasy based on hearsay, - B U T
> it makes sense in its cosequences, I think.)
> John M
>

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Re: The free will function

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 20, 2:53 pm, acw  wrote:
> On 2/20/2012 18:37, Craig Weinberg wrote:> On Feb 20, 10:32 am, 
> acw  wrote:
> >> On 2/20/2012 13:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:>  On Feb 19, 11:57 pm, 
> >> 1Zwrote:
>  On Feb 20, 4:41 am, Craig Weinbergwrote:
> >> ..
>  Believable falsehoods are falsehoods and convincing illusions
>  still aren't reality
>
> >>> It doesn't matter if they believe in the simulation or not, the belief
> >>> itself is only possible because of the particular reality generated by
> >>> the program. Comp precludes the possibility of contacting any truer
> >>> reality than the simulation.
>
> >> If those observers are generally intelligent and capable of
> >> Turing-equivalent computation, they might theorize about many things,
> >> true or not. Just like we do, and just like we can't know if we're right.
>
> > Right, but true = a true reflection of the simulation. If I make a
> > simulation where I regularly stop the program and make miraculous
> > changes, then the most intelligent observers might rightly conclude
> > that there is an omnipotent entity capable of performing miracles.
> > That would be the truth of that simulation.
>
> They might end up with a "simulation hypothesis" being more plausible
> than "pure chance" if there was evidence for it, such as non-reducible
> high-level behavior indicating intelligence and not following any
> obvious lower-level physical laws. However, 'omnipotent' is not the
> right word here. I already explained why before - in COMP, you can
> always escape the simulation, even if this is not always obvious from
> the 3p of the one doing the simulation.

Escape it maybe to a universal arithmetic level, but I still can't get
out of the software and into the world of the hardware.

>> Our Gods may know better too. What I am saying is that Comp + MWI +
> >>> Anthropic principle guarantees an infinite number of universes in
> >>> which some entity can program machines to worship them *correctly* as
> >>> *their* Gods.
>
> >> That's more difficult than you'd think. In COMP, you identify local
> >> physics and your body with an infinity of lower-level machines which
> >> happen to be simulating *you* correctly (where *you* would be the
> >> structures required for your mind to work consistently). A simulation of
> >> a digital physics universe may implement some such observers *once* or
> >> maybe multiple times if you go for the extra effort, but never in *all*
> >> the cases (which are infinite).
>
> > As long as it happens in any universe under MWI, then there must be an
> > infinity of variations stemming from that universe, and under the
> > anthropic principle, there is always a chance that you are living in a
> > simulation within one such universe.
>
> I was just assuming COMP, which is a bit wider than MWI, but should
> contain a variant compatible with it. In COMP, it's highly likely you're
> living in a simulation, but you're also living in more "primitive" forms
> (such as directly in the UD) - your 1p is contained in an infinity of
> machines. You would only care if some of those happen to be a simulation
> if the one doing the simulation modifies the program/data or entangles
> it with his history, or merely provides a continuation for you in his
> world, however any such continuations in digital physics interventionist
> simulations would be low-measure.

Whether you care or not is a different issue from whether or not you
can tell the difference if you did want to.

>> If such a programmer decides to
> >> intervene in his simulation, that wouldn't affect all the other machines
> >> implementing said simulation and said observers(for example in
> >> arithmetic or in some UD running somewhere),
>
> > That depends entirely on what kind of intervention the programmer
> > chooses. If she wants to make half of the population turn blue, she
> > can, and then when the sim is turned back on, everyone gasps and
> > proclaims a miracle of Biblical proportions.
>
> I wasn't talking about the multiple observers in the simulation, but
> merely that an observer, with which we identify with his 1p is
> implemented by an infinity of machines (!), only some part of that
> correspond to someone simulating them. If someone decides to modify the
> simulation at some point, then only a small fraction of those 1p's would
> diverge from the usual local laws-of-physics and becme entangled with
> the laws of those doing the simulation - such continuations would be
> low-measure.

How does that apply to my example though? Are you saying I can't turn
everyone blue in my sim? That they wouldn't be impressed? I don't get
it.

>> however a small part of the
> >> simulations containing observers will now be only implemented by the
> >> physics of the upper programmer's universe (and become entangled with
> >> them),
>
> > Not sure what you mean. Are you suggesting that the programmer of Pac
> > Man can't reprogram it for zero gravity? Or for a Non-Euclidean
> > 

Re: The free will function

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 20, 2:48 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> Sorry, I resend this because there was a little mistake:
>
> On 20 Feb 2012, at 14:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > On Feb 19, 11:57 pm, 1Z  wrote:
> >> On Feb 20, 4:41 am, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>
> >>> Why would Gods be supernatural?
>
> >> Why would bachelors be married?
>
> > That's begging the question. There is no logical basis to claim
> > that
> > the word supernatural precludes omnipotent control over machines
> > from
> > being an inevitable outcome of MWI. Supernatural is folk
> > terminology.
> > It has no relevance in determining phenomenological possibility in
> > MWI.
>
>  I don;t have to agree that essentiallytechnological
>  control means "god" or "supernaural">
>
> >>> You don't have to agree, but if you are being honest you would
> >>> have to
> >>> admit that it's irrational. If I can stop your universe, make
> >>> changes
> >>> to your mind, your memory, your environment, the laws of your
> >>> universe
> >>> and then start it back up, how does that not make me your God?
>
> >> You are natural.
>
> > How do you know? Comp says we can't know whether we are artificial
> > simulation or not.
>
> I am sorry, but I think this is false. I would say that comp says that
> we are in infinitely many simulations at once, from a third person
> point of view on the first person points of view. This leads to
> verifiable (empirically) constraints.

How does that relate to the issue of simulation though? Any internally
consistent simulation is verifiable within the simulation. Are you
saying there is a way to see through all simulations and know the
ultimate host universe?


>
> With comp we are in a complex "matrix" whose existence is deducible
> from the existence of universal numbers, whose existence is deducible
> from numbers and their two fist basic simple laws of + and *.

Ok, but if I am running on an Apple 6000 computer in a furniture store
in Teaneck, NJ, how are + and * going to help me know where that is?
Even if I could, how would I know that New Jersey wasn't just part of
the simulation?

>
>
>
> >> You can fire a horse through the air usign a giant
> >> catapuilt, but I don't have to agree it's Pegasus.
>
> > No but you have to agree that it is possible to believe that it is a
> > Pegasus, and that is all that is required.
>
> >>> If comp is true, then when we create
> >>> AI beings over which we will have power to stop, start, and
> >>> reprogram
> >>> their minds as well as their perceived universes, who will we
> >>> be to
> >>> them other than Gods?
>
> >> But we are natural so they would be wrong.
>
> > They wouldn't and couldn't know they were wrong though.
>
>  So? Is appearance reality?
>
> >>> That is what comp says.
>
> >> Bruno;s theory or the Computational Theory of Mind.
>
> > Both. What would be the meaning of any form of computationalism
> > without the notion of computational realism?
>
> Peter alludes to the fact that most materialist ignores the
> incompatibility between comp and weak materialism, including
> physicalism. This shows just the gap between computer scientist,
> philosopher of mind, and physicists, together with the usual
> authoritative dogma in the field.

That's all beside the point though. My argument is simple. If comp is
true, then programmers are, in a sense, gods.

>
>
>
> >>> The simulation is reality as far as the
> >>> simulatees are concerned.
>
> >> And if they are wrong, it still isn't the
> >> real reality.
>
> > It doesn't matter if they are right or wrong, the simulation is still
> > their reality.
>
> Not really. Peter is right, here. The physical reality is not a
> simulation, unless we discover that it violate the material modal
> logical (arithmetically based) hypostases.

What does that mean for the universe which I live in that runs on the
Apple computer in New Jersey? I'm saying that my reality is whatever
Skyrim Matrix program that is the world I interact with but now you
seem to be saying that my physical reality is the physical inside of
the computer? Or is it New Jersey?

>
> > Pac Man could believe that he is Bugs Bunny but the
> > possibility of that belief is generated by the simulation logic behind
> > Pac Man. For Pac Man, the Pac Man game is the real reality. That is
> > what comp is all about - proving that our experience of the universe
> > is indistinguishable from a simulation of that same experience.
>
> You miss the first person indeterminacy. From the first person
> perspective, viewed in the theory from some third person point of
> view, the subject 'belongs' to an infinite set of computations, which
> ask for compromise between the little numbers and the big numbers.

Sorry, I don't understand how that relates to my point, nor do I
understand how infinite computations collectively decide to become a
set, ask for compromises, or take ownership of a subject.

>
>
>
> >> You seem to be argui

Re: A Good Silly Question

[John Mikes]

Craig:
where has that "primordial singularity" come from? and what "expansion"?
I like to use terms beyond hearsay or fantasy. (Of course MY narrative is
fantasy based on hearsay, - B U T
it makes sense in its cosequences, I think.)
John M

On Mon, Feb 20, 2012 at 7:40 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> On Feb 20, 4:30 am, Kim Jones  wrote:
> > Probably. From a friend of mine on Facebook: "Is it possible that the
> notion of the universe expanding is really an illusion based on the fact
> that WE are shrinking?"
> >
> > Perhaps this idea might be used as a "stepping-stone" to a better idea.
> Go on, have a laugh if you want but tell me why this cannot be in any sense
> possible. Conversely, tell me why it might be possible if you think so.
> >
> > Kim Jones
>
> I think that is not only possible, but I think that it has to be the
> case. I call my cosmological origin myth 'The Big Diffraction' rather
> than the Big Bang for just that reason. If spacetime is created by the
> expansion of the primordial singularity, then that means that there
> was neither space nor time before the moment of 'expansion'. Therefore
> we, and everything in the entire universe was, is, and always will be
> physically within the event horizon of the big bang. It cannot be
> expanding outside of its own event horizon, so it is space and time
> which are surging inward, or within-ward.
>
> We see it as an expansion and forward arrow of time, but that would
> make sense since that would be the perspective of a subjective
> experience within the spacetime implosion. Objectively, it is the
> ratio between mass and space in the universe which is shrinking as
> more space is created through the passage of more time (or time is
> created through the multiplication of space). The shrinking mass ratio
> can also be thought of as energy's entropic exhaust. Events/
> experiences build significance (meaning, sequence) and kick out
> entropy (space). This is what the universe is; a testing ground for
> significance vehicles.
>
> Craig
>
> --
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Re: A Good Silly Question

[John Mikes]

Kim, I have my doubts: Hubble's ingenious idea that the 'redshift' means
slowing down frequencies, eo ipso (???) a receding lightsource from us is
fine, just not the possible sole answer to the phenomenon. Light passing
gravitational/magnetic fields may suffer similar decay allegedly, yet the
popularity of the expanding universe with its10thousands of experiments -
all in positive sense with instruments fabricated to show such
expansion-related changes - became a more binding obsession since 1922 in
the conventional physical thinking than was the Flat Earth.
When I mentioned "other" factors possibly causing redshift to MIT prof. G.
she said one word: "HOAX" (that was in 1997 - Nashua Internt'l Symp. on
Complexity).
That was BEFORE I composed my 'narrative' how the unequal Multiverse
occurred and dissipated.  (I call it a 'narrative' - not a theory).
I don't see what effect of OUR shrinking might cause a slow-down in
frequency?
John Mikes



On Mon, Feb 20, 2012 at 4:30 AM, Kim Jones  wrote:

> Probably. From a friend of mine on Facebook: "Is it possible that the
> notion of the universe expanding is really an illusion based on the fact
> that WE are shrinking?"
>
> Perhaps this idea might be used as a "stepping-stone" to a better idea. Go
> on, have a laugh if you want but tell me why this cannot be in any sense
> possible. Conversely, tell me why it might be possible if you think so.
>
> Kim Jones
>
> --
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Re: The thermodynamics of computation

[Russell Standish]

On Mon, Feb 20, 2012 at 07:33:13PM +0100, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> 
> I have nothing against Adami's book as such. His description of his
> software avida and his experiments with it are okay. My point was
> about his claim that his work has something to do with
> thermodynamics. It is definitely not. The thermodynamic entropy is
> not there. The quotes from the book displays this pretty clear.
> 
> You have written about "an analogous role". I would not object if

Chris uses the word analogy to connect mutation and temperature. But
not between information and entropy.

> you say that there is an analogy between the thermodynamic entropy
> and information. Yet, I am against the statement that the
> thermodynamic entropy is information and I believe that I have given
> many examples that show this. Thermodynamic entropy is not
> subjective and not context dependent*, so my claim is that Adami
> does not understand what the thermodynamic entropy is. He has never
> taken a class in experimental thermodynamics, this is the problem.
> 

I can't speak for Chris, but somehow I doubt that very much.

> * I would accept the notation that the entropy is context dependent
> in a sense that its definition depends on the thermodynamics theory.
> If we change the theory, then the entropy could have some other
> meaning. But it seems not what you have meant.
> 


It is true that in thermodynamics, there is usually little argument
about what the macroscopic variables are. As a consequence, entropy is
essentially an objective quantity, and the context fades into the
background.

But even between (micro-/grand-) canonical ensembles, there are subtle
differences between what macroscopic variables are significant, hence
difference between the entropies, which vanish in the thermodynamic
limit.


-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: The thermodynamics of computation

[meekerdb]

On 2/20/2012 12:02 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 20.02.2012 19:54 meekerdb said the following:

On 2/20/2012 10:33 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 19.02.2012 22:13 Russell Standish said the following:

On Sun, Feb 19, 2012 at 11:21:01AM -0500, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Feb 19, 2012 at 5:32 AM, Evgenii
Rudnyi wrote:




If one well defines a thought experiment with the
Maxwell's demon, then

it is quite clear that such thing does not exist. Why then
to spend on it so much time?



Maxwell's demon is possible in classical physics and it was
not clear that quantum mechanics made it impossible until 1929
when Leo Szilard proved that to be the case. And understanding
just why it can not exist aids in understanding the
relationship between energy information entropy and
reversibility. Maxwell's demon was the starting point for Rolf
Landauer's discovery in 1960 that erasing information always
requires energy and increases entropy because it's
thermodynamically irreversible.



Good answer John. Does anyone want to pick on Evgeni's comments
about Chris Adami's book?

It weird, because Chris's book gives some of the bext examples
of the application of statistical physics to artificial life. In
particular, his observation that mutation should play an
analogous role to temperature in an evolutionary process, and
that several evolutionary regimes exist as mutation is varied,
corresponding to phase transitions in materials.


I have nothing against Adami's book as such. His description of his
 software avida and his experiments with it are okay. My point was
 about his claim that his work has something to do with
thermodynamics. It is definitely not. The thermodynamic entropy is
not there. The quotes from the book displays this pretty clear.

You have written about "an analogous role". I would not object if
you say that there is an analogy between the thermodynamic entropy
and information. Yet, I am against the statement that the
thermodynamic entropy is information and I believe that I have
given many examples that show this.


What you are overlooking is that information is *about* things. So
entropy in thermodynamics is information about the system's location
in phase space. That's what connects "information" and "work" and
"temperature". Entropy in communication theory is about the location
of a message in message space. It's a different application of the
same concept. The two overlap when considering the minimum free
energy requirements of a physical realization of a computation - but
existing computers operate far above those minimums so the overlap is
only of theoretical interest.


What is left is to apply your concept to examples in practice. Then it would be more 
clear what you mean. Let me repeat just one question that you have not answered yet (but 
I believe that I have given much more examples and they have not been worked out).


The only example of the entropy used by engineers in informatics has been given by Jason 
and I will quote him below. Could you please tell me, the thermodynamic entropy of what 
is discussed in his example?


I am ready to learn the meaning of information in thermodynamics. Please just explain it 
by means of practical examples. 



The link I sent below works out the entropy of an ideal gas using information. You keep 
asking for "practical examples" but that's like asking for practical examples of 
calculating molecular reaction free energy from quantum mechanics.  It is very difficult 
because it depends on the electron energy levels.  It has been done in a few simple (not 
necessarily practical) cases as a proof of principle.  But it is not the way engineering 
or chemistry is done because it is both easier and more reliable to measure them.  But 
that doesn't mean that they don't have energy or that the concept of energy doesn't 
apply.  No one calculates the strength of steel from carbon and iron atomic bonds and 
crystal structure either.  But that doesn't mean the strength of steel is a separate, 
independent property.


I personally do not see thermodynamics in the Jason's work. Please just explain what I 
am missing.



On 03.02.2012 00:14 Jason Resch said the following:

…
> Evgenii,
>
> Sure, I could give a few examples as this somewhat intersects with my
> line of work.
>
> The NIST 800-90 recommendation (
> http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90A/SP800-90A.pdf )
> for random number generators is a document for engineers implementing
> secure pseudo-random number generators.  An example of where it is
> important is when considering entropy sources for seeding a random
> number generator.  If you use something completely random, like a
> fair coin toss, each toss provides 1 bit of entropy.  The formula is
> -log2(predictability).  With a coin flip, you have at best a .5
> chance of correctly guessing it, and -log2(.5) = 1.  If you used a
> die roll, then each die roll would provide -log2(1/6) = 2.58 bits of
> entropy.  The ability to measure unpredicta

Re: The thermodynamics of computation

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 20.02.2012 19:54 meekerdb said the following:

On 2/20/2012 10:33 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 19.02.2012 22:13 Russell Standish said the following:

On Sun, Feb 19, 2012 at 11:21:01AM -0500, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Feb 19, 2012 at 5:32 AM, Evgenii
Rudnyi wrote:




If one well defines a thought experiment with the
Maxwell's demon, then

it is quite clear that such thing does not exist. Why then
to spend on it so much time?



Maxwell's demon is possible in classical physics and it was
not clear that quantum mechanics made it impossible until 1929
when Leo Szilard proved that to be the case. And understanding
just why it can not exist aids in understanding the
relationship between energy information entropy and
reversibility. Maxwell's demon was the starting point for Rolf
Landauer's discovery in 1960 that erasing information always
requires energy and increases entropy because it's
thermodynamically irreversible.



Good answer John. Does anyone want to pick on Evgeni's comments
about Chris Adami's book?

It weird, because Chris's book gives some of the bext examples
of the application of statistical physics to artificial life. In
particular, his observation that mutation should play an
analogous role to temperature in an evolutionary process, and
that several evolutionary regimes exist as mutation is varied,
corresponding to phase transitions in materials.


I have nothing against Adami's book as such. His description of his
 software avida and his experiments with it are okay. My point was
 about his claim that his work has something to do with
thermodynamics. It is definitely not. The thermodynamic entropy is
not there. The quotes from the book displays this pretty clear.

You have written about "an analogous role". I would not object if
you say that there is an analogy between the thermodynamic entropy
and information. Yet, I am against the statement that the
thermodynamic entropy is information and I believe that I have
given many examples that show this.


What you are overlooking is that information is *about* things. So
entropy in thermodynamics is information about the system's location
in phase space. That's what connects "information" and "work" and
"temperature". Entropy in communication theory is about the location
of a message in message space. It's a different application of the
same concept. The two overlap when considering the minimum free
energy requirements of a physical realization of a computation - but
existing computers operate far above those minimums so the overlap is
only of theoretical interest.


What is left is to apply your concept to examples in practice. Then it 
would be more clear what you mean. Let me repeat just one question that 
you have not answered yet (but I believe that I have given much more 
examples and they have not been worked out).


The only example of the entropy used by engineers in informatics has 
been given by Jason and I will quote him below. Could you please tell 
me, the thermodynamic entropy of what is discussed in his example?


I am ready to learn the meaning of information in thermodynamics. Please 
just explain it by means of practical examples. I personally do not see 
thermodynamics in the Jason's work. Please just explain what I am missing.


On 03.02.2012 00:14 Jason Resch said the following:

…
> Evgenii,
>
> Sure, I could give a few examples as this somewhat intersects with my
> line of work.
>
> The NIST 800-90 recommendation (
> http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90A/SP800-90A.pdf )
> for random number generators is a document for engineers implementing
> secure pseudo-random number generators.  An example of where it is
> important is when considering entropy sources for seeding a random
> number generator.  If you use something completely random, like a
> fair coin toss, each toss provides 1 bit of entropy.  The formula is
> -log2(predictability).  With a coin flip, you have at best a .5
> chance of correctly guessing it, and -log2(.5) = 1.  If you used a
> die roll, then each die roll would provide -log2(1/6) = 2.58 bits of
> entropy.  The ability to measure unpredictability is necessary to
> ensure, for example, that a cryptographic key is at least as
> difficult to predict the random inputs that went into generating it
> as it would be to brute force the key.
>
> In addition to security, entropy is also an important concept in the
> field of data compression.  The amount of entropy in a given bit
> string represents the theoretical minimum number of bits it takes to
> represent the information.  If 100 bits contain 100 bits of entropy,
> then there is no compression algorithm that can represent those 100
> bits with fewer than 100 bits.  However, if a 100 bit string contains
> only 50 bits of entropy, you could compress it to 50 bits.  For
> example, let’s say you had 100 coin flips from an unfair coin.  This
> unfair coin comes up heads 90% of the time.  Each flip represents
> -log2(.9) = 0.152 bits of entropy.

Re: The free will function

[acw]

On 2/20/2012 18:37, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Feb 20, 10:32 am, acw  wrote:

On 2/20/2012 13:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:>  On Feb 19, 11:57 pm, 
1Zwrote:

On Feb 20, 4:41 am, Craig Weinbergwrote:

..

Believable falsehoods are falsehoods and convincing illusions
still aren't reality



It doesn't matter if they believe in the simulation or not, the belief
itself is only possible because of the particular reality generated by
the program. Comp precludes the possibility of contacting any truer
reality than the simulation.


If those observers are generally intelligent and capable of
Turing-equivalent computation, they might theorize about many things,
true or not. Just like we do, and just like we can't know if we're right.


Right, but true = a true reflection of the simulation. If I make a
simulation where I regularly stop the program and make miraculous
changes, then the most intelligent observers might rightly conclude
that there is an omnipotent entity capable of performing miracles.
That would be the truth of that simulation.

They might end up with a "simulation hypothesis" being more plausible 
than "pure chance" if there was evidence for it, such as non-reducible 
high-level behavior indicating intelligence and not following any 
obvious lower-level physical laws. However, 'omnipotent' is not the 
right word here. I already explained why before - in COMP, you can 
always escape the simulation, even if this is not always obvious from 
the 3p of the one doing the simulation.

Our Gods may know better too. What I am saying is that Comp + MWI +

Anthropic principle guarantees an infinite number of universes in
which some entity can program machines to worship them *correctly* as
*their* Gods.


That's more difficult than you'd think. In COMP, you identify local
physics and your body with an infinity of lower-level machines which
happen to be simulating *you* correctly (where *you* would be the
structures required for your mind to work consistently). A simulation of
a digital physics universe may implement some such observers *once* or
maybe multiple times if you go for the extra effort, but never in *all*
the cases (which are infinite).


As long as it happens in any universe under MWI, then there must be an
infinity of variations stemming from that universe, and under the
anthropic principle, there is always a chance that you are living in a
simulation within one such universe.

I was just assuming COMP, which is a bit wider than MWI, but should 
contain a variant compatible with it. In COMP, it's highly likely you're 
living in a simulation, but you're also living in more "primitive" forms 
(such as directly in the UD) - your 1p is contained in an infinity of 
machines. You would only care if some of those happen to be a simulation 
if the one doing the simulation modifies the program/data or entangles 
it with his history, or merely provides a continuation for you in his 
world, however any such continuations in digital physics interventionist 
simulations would be low-measure.

If such a programmer decides to
intervene in his simulation, that wouldn't affect all the other machines
implementing said simulation and said observers(for example in
arithmetic or in some UD running somewhere),


That depends entirely on what kind of intervention the programmer
chooses. If she wants to make half of the population turn blue, she
can, and then when the sim is turned back on, everyone gasps and
proclaims a miracle of Biblical proportions.

I wasn't talking about the multiple observers in the simulation, but 
merely that an observer, with which we identify with his 1p is 
implemented by an infinity of machines (!), only some part of that 
correspond to someone simulating them. If someone decides to modify the 
simulation at some point, then only a small fraction of those 1p's would 
diverge from the usual local laws-of-physics and becme entangled with 
the laws of those doing the simulation - such continuations would be 
low-measure.

however a small part of the
simulations containing observers will now be only implemented by the
physics of the upper programmer's universe (and become entangled with
them),


Not sure what you mean. Are you suggesting that the programmer of Pac
Man can't reprogram it for zero gravity? Or for a Non-Euclidean
Salvador Dali melting clock wormhole version? What effect would a
physical universe have on a simulated universe if comp were true,
beyond impacting the ability of the simulation to function as
intended?

What I'm saying is that if those observers within the simulation have 
1p's (if COMP is true), then they are implemented by infinitely many 
simulations, only a few corresponding to your particular Matrix Lord, 
thus the probability that the ML would affect them is very low, however 
not null. In the sense that if you were in such a world, and someone 
happened to be simulating your physics and then suddenly decided to 
change something in it, then the chance that you 

Re: The free will function

[Bruno Marchal]

On 20 Feb 2012, at 14:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:


On Feb 19, 11:57 pm, 1Z  wrote:

On Feb 20, 4:41 am, Craig Weinberg  wrote:


Why would Gods be supernatural?



Why would bachelors be married?


That's begging the question. There is no logical basis to claim  
that
the word supernatural precludes omnipotent control over machines  
from
being an inevitable outcome of MWI. Supernatural is folk  
terminology.

It has no relevance in determining phenomenological possibility in
MWI.



I don;t have to agree that essentiallytechnological
control means "god" or "supernaural">


You don't have to agree, but if you are being honest you would  
have to
admit that it's irrational. If I can stop your universe, make  
changes
to your mind, your memory, your environment, the laws of your  
universe

and then start it back up, how does that not make me your God?


You are natural.


How do you know? Comp says we can't know whether we are artificial
simulation or not.


I am sorry, but I think this is false. I would say that comp says that  
we are in infinitely many simulations at once, from a third person  
point of view on the first person points of view. This leads to  
verifiable (empirically) constraints.


With comp we are in a complex "matrix" whose existence is deducible  
from the existence of universal numbers, whose existence is deducible  
from numbers and their two fist basic simple laws of + and *.


Bruno







You can fire a horse through the air usign a giant
catapuilt, but I don't have to agree it's Pegasus.


No but you have to agree that it is possible to believe that it is a
Pegasus, and that is all that is required.




If comp is true, then when we create
AI beings over which we will have power to stop, start, and  
reprogram
their minds as well as their perceived universes, who will we  
be to

them other than Gods?



But we are natural so they would be wrong.



They wouldn't and couldn't know they were wrong though.



So? Is appearance reality?



That is what comp says.


Bruno;s theory or the Computational Theory of Mind.


Both. What would be the meaning of any form of computationalism
without the notion of computational realism?


Peter alludes to the fact that most materialist ignores the  
incompatibility between comp and weak materialism, including  
physicalism. This shows just the gap between computer scientist,  
philosopher of mind, and physicists, together with the usual  
authoritative dogma in the field.









The simulation is reality as far as the
simulatees are concerned.


And if they are wrong, it still isn't the
real reality.


It doesn't matter if they are right or wrong, the simulation is still
their reality.


Not really. Peter is right, here. The physical reality is not a  
simulation, unless we discover that it violate the material modal  
logical (arithmetically based) hypostases.






Pac Man could believe that he is Bugs Bunny but the
possibility of that belief is generated by the simulation logic behind
Pac Man. For Pac Man, the Pac Man game is the real reality. That is
what comp is all about - proving that our experience of the universe
is indistinguishable from a simulation of that same experience.



You miss the first person indeterminacy. From the first person  
perspective, viewed in the theory from some third person point of  
view, the subject 'belongs' to an infinite set of computations, which  
ask for compromise between the little numbers and the big numbers.







You seem to be arguing
appearance=reality on the premise that
opinion=truth.


Not at all. I think that you are injecting that because you need me to
be wrong. Comp implies that appearance is not the whole reality, but
the possibility of an appearance arises from the whole reality, which
is in fact a logical program.


Hmm... reality will be the result of the indeterminacy. We can bet,  
thanks to QM, and quasi-already comp, on a first person sharable  
winning computation sheaf.










Appearances may not reflect the truest level
of the simulation, but appearances all reflect some believable
representation of the simulation's function.


Believable falsehoods are falsehoods and convincing illusions
still aren't reality


It doesn't matter if they believe in the simulation or not, the belief
itself is only possible because of the particular reality generated by
the program. Comp precludes the possibility of contacting any truer
reality than the simulation.


Comp confront each machine with reality, all the "time". But then  
there is the reality of lies, and this has to be taken into account,  
but with comp, there is a sense to say that the reality cannot lie to  
you. Just extract comp from arithmetic, and compare it with your local  
reality. Roughly speaking, if it differ, it means that you are not at  
stage 0 of the comp reality, you are relatively failed, but this you  
can be aware of. Comp makes the physically real more real, and more  
solid, and we can test if the degre

Re: The thermodynamics of computation

[meekerdb]

On 2/20/2012 10:33 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 19.02.2012 22:13 Russell Standish said the following:

On Sun, Feb 19, 2012 at 11:21:01AM -0500, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Feb 19, 2012 at 5:32 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi
wrote:




If one well defines a thought experiment with the Maxwell's
demon, then

it is quite clear that such thing does not exist. Why then to
spend on it so much time?



Maxwell's demon is possible in classical physics and it was not
clear that quantum mechanics made it impossible until 1929 when Leo
Szilard proved that to be the case. And understanding just why it
can not exist aids in understanding the relationship between energy
information entropy and reversibility. Maxwell's demon was the
starting point for Rolf Landauer's discovery in 1960 that erasing
information always requires energy and increases entropy because
it's thermodynamically irreversible.



Good answer John. Does anyone want to pick on Evgeni's comments
about Chris Adami's book?

It weird, because Chris's book gives some of the bext examples of
the application of statistical physics to artificial life. In
particular, his observation that mutation should play an analogous
role to temperature in an evolutionary process, and that several
evolutionary regimes exist as mutation is varied, corresponding to
phase transitions in materials.


I have nothing against Adami's book as such. His description of his software avida and 
his experiments with it are okay. My point was about his claim that his work has 
something to do with thermodynamics. It is definitely not. The thermodynamic entropy is 
not there. The quotes from the book displays this pretty clear.


You have written about "an analogous role". I would not object if you say that there is 
an analogy between the thermodynamic entropy and information. Yet, I am against the 
statement that the thermodynamic entropy is information and I believe that I have given 
many examples that show this.


What you are overlooking is that information is *about* things.  So entropy in 
thermodynamics is information about the system's location in phase space.  That's what 
connects "information" and "work" and "temperature".  Entropy in communication theory is 
about the location of a message in message space.  It's a different application of the 
same concept.  The two overlap when considering the minimum free energy requirements of a 
physical realization of a computation - but existing computers operate far above those 
minimums so the overlap is only of theoretical interest.


Thermodynamic entropy is not subjective and not context dependent*, so my claim is that 
Adami does not understand what the thermodynamic entropy is. He has never taken a class 
in experimental thermodynamics, this is the problem.


I'm beginning to think you have never taken a class in statistical mechanics.  There's a 
good online course here:


http://farside.ph.utexas.edu/teaching/sm1/lectures/lectures.html

Those particularly relevant to this thread start at

http://farside.ph.utexas.edu/teaching/sm1/lectures/node61.html

and go through the next six or seven.

Brent



* I would accept the notation that the entropy is context dependent in a sense that its 
definition depends on the thermodynamics theory. If we change the theory, then the 
entropy could have some other meaning. But it seems not what you have meant.


Evgenii




This phenomena I have observed in my own evolutionary experiments.
Plus, it appears to be correlated to Mark Bedau's evolutionary
classes.

This is the paper I usually refer to, although his ideas have
evolved somewhat since 1998:

M. A. Bedau, E. Snyder, N. H. Packard. 1998. A Classification of
Long-Term Evolutionary Dynamics. In C. Adami, R. Belew, H. Kitano,
and C. Taylor, eds., Artificial Life VI, pp. 228-237. Cambridge: MIT
Press. Also published as Working Paper No.98-03-025, Santa Fe
Institute, Santa Fe, NM.

http://people.reed.edu/~mab/publications/papers/alife6.pdf








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Re: The free will function

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 20, 10:32 am, acw  wrote:
> On 2/20/2012 13:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:> On Feb 19, 11:57 pm, 
> 1Z  wrote:
> >> On Feb 20, 4:41 am, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> ..
> >> Believable falsehoods are falsehoods and convincing illusions
> >> still aren't reality
>
> > It doesn't matter if they believe in the simulation or not, the belief
> > itself is only possible because of the particular reality generated by
> > the program. Comp precludes the possibility of contacting any truer
> > reality than the simulation.
>
> If those observers are generally intelligent and capable of
> Turing-equivalent computation, they might theorize about many things,
> true or not. Just like we do, and just like we can't know if we're right.

Right, but true = a true reflection of the simulation. If I make a
simulation where I regularly stop the program and make miraculous
changes, then the most intelligent observers might rightly conclude
that there is an omnipotent entity capable of performing miracles.
That would be the truth of that simulation.

> Our Gods may know better too. What I am saying is that Comp + MWI +
> > Anthropic principle guarantees an infinite number of universes in
> > which some entity can program machines to worship them *correctly* as
> > *their* Gods.
>
> That's more difficult than you'd think. In COMP, you identify local
> physics and your body with an infinity of lower-level machines which
> happen to be simulating *you* correctly (where *you* would be the
> structures required for your mind to work consistently). A simulation of
> a digital physics universe may implement some such observers *once* or
> maybe multiple times if you go for the extra effort, but never in *all*
> the cases (which are infinite).

As long as it happens in any universe under MWI, then there must be an
infinity of variations stemming from that universe, and under the
anthropic principle, there is always a chance that you are living in a
simulation within one such universe.

> If such a programmer decides to
> intervene in his simulation, that wouldn't affect all the other machines
> implementing said simulation and said observers(for example in
> arithmetic or in some UD running somewhere),

That depends entirely on what kind of intervention the programmer
chooses. If she wants to make half of the population turn blue, she
can, and then when the sim is turned back on, everyone gasps and
proclaims a miracle of Biblical proportions.

> however a small part of the
> simulations containing observers will now be only implemented by the
> physics of the upper programmer's universe (and become entangled with
> them),

Not sure what you mean. Are you suggesting that the programmer of Pac
Man can't reprogram it for zero gravity? Or for a Non-Euclidean
Salvador Dali melting clock wormhole version? What effect would a
physical universe have on a simulated universe if comp were true,
beyond impacting the ability of the simulation to function as
intended?

> possibly meaning a reduction in measure, however the probability
> of ending up in such a simulation is very low and as time passes it
> becomes less and less likely that said observers would keep on remaining
> in that simulation - if they die or malfunction (that's just one
> example), there will be continuations for them which are no longer
> supported by the upper programmer's physics.

The observers would have no capacity to detect continuity errors
unless they were given that functionality. Pac Man doesn't know if I
hack in there and turn the cherries to a turnip.

> There can never be correct
> worship of some "Matrix Lord"/"Administrator"/... as they are not what
> is responsible for such observers being conscious, at best such
> programmers are only responsible for finding some particular program and
> increasing its measure with respect to the programmer's universe. Of
> course, if such a programmer wants to "lift" some beings from his
> simulation to run in his universe, he could do that and those would be
> valid continuations for the being living in that simulation. Running a
> physics simulation is akin to looking into a window, not to an act of
> universe creation, even if it may look like that from the simulator's
> perspective.

With the right tools and drugs, your brain will prove to you that you
are a shoe, and you will believe it. If had the capacity to stop,
start, and edit your experience, I could make that belief last the
rest of your life and make the universe you experience validate that
belief. It would therefore be as true for you as anything has ever
been true for anyone.This is the unavoidable implication of comp. I of
course think it's false because experience cannot be simulated.
Computation supervenes on experience, not the other way around. We use
computation, our brains use computation, but it is experiences they
are computing, not numbers.

>
>  "Did  say those mushrooms were nutiritios? Silly me, i mean
>  poisonous".
>
> >>> Poisonous is a t

Re: The thermodynamics of computation

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 19.02.2012 22:13 Russell Standish said the following:

On Sun, Feb 19, 2012 at 11:21:01AM -0500, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Feb 19, 2012 at 5:32 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi
wrote:




If one well defines a thought experiment with the Maxwell's
demon, then

it is quite clear that such thing does not exist. Why then to
spend on it so much time?



Maxwell's demon is possible in classical physics and it was not
clear that quantum mechanics made it impossible until 1929 when Leo
Szilard proved that to be the case. And understanding just why it
can not exist aids in understanding the relationship between energy
information entropy and reversibility. Maxwell's demon was the
starting point for Rolf Landauer's discovery in 1960 that erasing
information always requires energy and increases entropy because
it's thermodynamically irreversible.



Good answer John. Does anyone want to pick on Evgeni's comments
about Chris Adami's book?

It weird, because Chris's book gives some of the bext examples of
the application of statistical physics to artificial life. In
particular, his observation that mutation should play an analogous
role to temperature in an evolutionary process, and that several
evolutionary regimes exist as mutation is varied, corresponding to
phase transitions in materials.


I have nothing against Adami's book as such. His description of his 
software avida and his experiments with it are okay. My point was about 
his claim that his work has something to do with thermodynamics. It is 
definitely not. The thermodynamic entropy is not there. The quotes from 
the book displays this pretty clear.


You have written about "an analogous role". I would not object if you 
say that there is an analogy between the thermodynamic entropy and 
information. Yet, I am against the statement that the thermodynamic 
entropy is information and I believe that I have given many examples 
that show this. Thermodynamic entropy is not subjective and not context 
dependent*, so my claim is that Adami does not understand what the 
thermodynamic entropy is. He has never taken a class in experimental 
thermodynamics, this is the problem.


* I would accept the notation that the entropy is context dependent in a 
sense that its definition depends on the thermodynamics theory. If we 
change the theory, then the entropy could have some other meaning. But 
it seems not what you have meant.


Evgenii




This phenomena I have observed in my own evolutionary experiments.
Plus, it appears to be correlated to Mark Bedau's evolutionary
classes.

This is the paper I usually refer to, although his ideas have
evolved somewhat since 1998:

M. A. Bedau, E. Snyder, N. H. Packard. 1998. A Classification of
Long-Term Evolutionary Dynamics. In C. Adami, R. Belew, H. Kitano,
and C. Taylor, eds., Artificial Life VI, pp. 228-237. Cambridge: MIT
Press. Also published as Working Paper No.98-03-025, Santa Fe
Institute, Santa Fe, NM.

http://people.reed.edu/~mab/publications/papers/alife6.pdf






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Re: The free will function

[1Z]

On Feb 20, 4:48 pm, John Mikes  wrote:
> Peter,
> why do you think - if there are indeed many universes - that they are
> identical and like ours?

It isn't a question of what I think.
There are different multiversal theories. Some say all
the universes are bound by a set of physical laws,
some say otherwise.

> As a matter of fact: what would you call "a universe"? the image of the
> 2012 cosmology (or 1879?)
> I believe there is more to the cosmos than so far experienced. I try to
> give room for additional info.
> And: "universes" (whatever they may be) are not restricted to that ONE
> pattern we - sort of - pretend
> to know about.
>
> Shouldn't we open up our mind?
>
> John Mikes

Maybe all multiversal theories are wrong and there is one univese. Is
your mind
open to that?

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Re: The free will function

[John Clark]

On Sun, Feb 19, 2012 at 11:52 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> There could an infinite number of the Many Worlds with all kinds of Gods.
>

But then why did you say "There is something that prevents infinite
nonsense universes"? How did you find this out, did you somehow check on
every one of those infinite number of Many Worlds to see?

 John K Clark

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Re: The free will function

[John Clark]

On Sun, Feb 19, 2012  Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> >> If the physicists at CERN announced that all life including human life
>> was created by the Klogknee Field but didn't even attempt to explain how it
>> had done this miraculous thing would you be satisfied? I wouldn't be.
>>
> > They will name it the Higgs instead, and then you will be satisfied.
>
That is a foolish remark. The Higgs, if it exists, can't even explain
gravity much less life or mathematics or why God exists or why there is
something rather than nothing.

> > Species = life. Nothing in the Origin of Species pertains to anything
> outside of biology.
>
I don't see your point. And by the way, Lee Smolin has a very interesting
cosmological theory involving many worlds, Darwin's ideas, and black holes.

> > God isn't a theory, it is a character in a story.
>
Yes, and the Hebrew god Yahweh in the old testament is the most unpleasant
character in all of fiction.

> > It does not address explanation, it specifically makes explanation
> irrelevant in favor of identification with the miraculous.
>
Yes, and that is the reason religion is so evil, or at least the most
important reason.

> > Like it or not
>
Not.

> > religion is the universal dynamo which generates civilization.
>
Religion certainly played a important part in the history of civilization,
so have intestinal parasites.

> > if we literally believe that all we are is molecular processes,
>
Shakespeare's life work is a finite sequence of ASCII characters and there
is no doubt about that, but that's not the only way to describe what his
life's work is. One way to describe what we are is that we are what a
finite amalgamation of molecular processes do, but that's not the only way
to describe what we are. And if you literally believe that all you are is a
immaterial soul why would that make you feel better and get you out of this
sad existential funk of yours?

> > then there could be no reason to prefer any one set of processes or
> outcomes over another.
>
I don't follow, those very molecular processes cause you to prefer one
outcome over another.

> > There would be no difference between one opinion and another or one
> person and another.
>
There would be if there were differences in those molecular processes
between one individual and another, and of course in the real world there
always are differences.

> >>> I don't see that it would be a problem for God to make physics
>>>
>> >> Great, so how did He do it? I'm all ears!
>>
> >Let there be Physics!
>


Don't be obtuse, bullshit explanations like that allowed religion to get a
foothold in unthinking people. I want a real explanation. I want to know
how God made physics. I also want to know why God always existed rather
than always not existed.

> > You misunderstand the purpose of religion. It isn't supposed to explain
> anything
>
I see, religion isn't supposed to make sense, In that it is successful. And
they try to peddle the idea that the more ridiculous your beliefs are the
more virtuous you are because that means the more faith you must have. And
faith, they want you to accept as being obvious without even thinking about
it, is a good thing.

> > it is supposed to unify human beings
>
More people have been murdered for religious reasons that any other single
cause,

> > to a common sense and motive for political purposes.
>
So you think religion is a useful lie. I disagree, I find nothing useful in
it. Religion is a parasite, its a virus of the mind.

> >>>   randomness becomes another name for God.
>>>
>> >>  Yet another example of someone willing to abandon the idea of God but
>> not the 3 letter word "G-O-D".
>>
> > Huh? We can call it R-A-N-D-O-M-N-E-S-S if you prefer.
>
Thank you, I do much prefer that because otherwise when I say "I don't
believe in God" people will think I don't believe in randomness. If "God",
or any other word, can mean anything at all then the word is of no use to
anyone at all.

> > There is something that prevents infinite nonsense universes
>
I have no way of knowing if infinite nonsense universes exist or not.

> > It is symmetry and relation. Sensitivity. Being. Experience.
>
This is a very good example of a very bad explanation. It would be far
better and certainly more honest to simply say "I don't understand why the
world is the way it is nor does anybody else". And the worst part is if you
keep repeating bullshit explanations like this eventually you might
actually start to believe it when you really don't, and that is a recipe
for stagnation.

John K Clark

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Re: Quantum Computing breakthrough

[Bruno Marchal]

On 20 Feb 2012, at 06:22, Kim Jones wrote:


http://www.smh.com.au/technology/sci-tech/nanotransistor-breakthrough-to-offer-billion-times-faster-computer-20120220-1thqk.html



Wonderful!

Not sure how they will entangle or superpose large set of registers,  
but that might be possible, at low temperature, or by squeezing the  
device somehow.


Anyway, that's already giant steps toward very powerful classical  
computers, and it is closer to quantum computation indeed, nobody  
knows to what that will lead, but that is what makes it so interesting.


Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The free will function

[John Mikes]

Peter,
why do you think - if there are indeed many universes - that they are
identical and like ours?
As a matter of fact: what would you call "a universe"? the image of the
2012 cosmology (or 1879?)
I believe there is more to the cosmos than so far experienced. I try to
give room for additional info.
And: "universes" (whatever they may be) are not restricted to that ONE
pattern we - sort of - pretend
to know about.

Shouldn't we open up our mind?

John Mikes

On Sun, Feb 19, 2012 at 2:19 PM, 1Z  wrote:

>
>
> On Feb 19, 4:52 pm, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> > On Feb 18, 5:36 pm, Richard Ruquist  wrote:
> >
> > > It is with some trepidation that I enter into this discussion, but I
> would
> > > like to suggest that if MWI is true, where MWI is the Many Worlds
> > > Interpretation of quantum mechanics, which is where every quantum
> state in
> > > every particle interaction is realized in one parallel world/universe
> or
> > > another, then there is no need for a god.
> >
> > Why not? There could an infinite number of the Many Worlds with all
> > kinds of Gods.
> >
> > Craig
>
> QM based MWI woildn't suggest that the supernatural occurs in any
> universe. Are you
>
> familiar with Tegmark's classification?
>
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Re: The free will function

[1Z]

On Feb 20, 3:32 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 20 Feb 2012, at 09:59, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Feb 20, 6:52 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> >> On 20 Feb 2012, at 05:20, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>> On Feb 20, 4:10 am, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>  On Feb 19, 10:57 pm, meekerdb  wrote:
>  Comp says that any UM's
>  experience is indistinguishable from primitive physics, right?
>
> >>> Computaionalism or Bruno's comp?
>
> >> We have already discussed this. Comp, as I use it, is a much weaker
> >> hypothesis than most forms of CTM,
>
> > 
>
> ?
>
>
>
> >> given that comp allows the
> >> substitution level to be arbitrarily low, and is based on the notion
> >> of generalized brain. So comp's logical consequences are
> >> automatically
> >> lifted on all forms of CTM, which presuppose some high subst. level.
>
> >> Now comp makes almost all (not any) UMs' physics identical.
>
> > That is not a weak assumption. In CTM, there is just physics, not
> > one physics for each UTM,
>
> ?
> That's exactly what I am saying above.


No it's the opposite. One global physics is a weaker, simpler ontology
than multiple solipsistic physicses.

> > and
> > there is a physical hardware platform at level 0.
>
> A level 0 that nobody has ever seen, nor even defined or use in
> physics.

Occam;s razor says we should assume what we see is level 0.

> And which comp shows to be the bullet preventing progress in
> fundamental cognitive science.



> >> Computationalism is just epistemologically incompatible with
> >> materialism (weak materialism).
>
> > According to a string of controversial arguments.
>
> You have already acknowledge that there is no error in UDA1-7,

I never said anything of the kind.

> and
> when I asked you about the UDA-8 (MGA), you did not mention an error,
> but make a confession of faith in Primitive Matter instead. Then I
> asked you to define it, and I am still waiting for a reply making sense.
>
> > Not according
> > to computationalists, 99% of whom have have never questioned computers
> > and brains are
> > made of matter.
>
> Give me definition and proof. Physicists acknowledge the fuzziness of
> the notion of matter, even with the MWI, even more with any candidate
> for marrying GR and QM.

Not being able to define matter and disbelieving in it are two
very different issues.

> It is true that almost all computationalist philosophers believe in
> matter, but they are unaware of both computer science and of the UDA
> reasoning.

Lucky them. The UDA argument rests on Platonism. Non Patonists
are fully entitled to disregard it. Others might wish to treat it
as a reductio of Platonism.

> They are just following Aristotle metaphysics, which is
> itself a regression to the pre-platonist time, which extrapolated
> naturally from our animal sensations and survival programs or engrams.

Whatever.

> Anyway, argument of majority have zero value in science.

The majority get to define meanings. What they mean by
computationalism
is 180 degrees aways from what your mean. You should choose another
word.

> It will be simpler for you to find a flaw in MGA than trying to define
> matter, I think.

1)  a little does not equal none
2) redefine computation so that comptuational states must be causally
connected.
3) Given a choice between materalism and CTM, keep materialism, a la
Maudlin.

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Re: The free will function

[Bruno Marchal]

On 20 Feb 2012, at 09:59, 1Z wrote:




On Feb 20, 6:52 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 20 Feb 2012, at 05:20, 1Z wrote:




On Feb 20, 4:10 am, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

On Feb 19, 10:57 pm, meekerdb  wrote:
Comp says that any UM's
experience is indistinguishable from primitive physics, right?



Computaionalism or Bruno's comp?


We have already discussed this. Comp, as I use it, is a much weaker
hypothesis than most forms of CTM,





?





given that comp allows the
substitution level to be arbitrarily low, and is based on the notion
of generalized brain. So comp's logical consequences are  
automatically

lifted on all forms of CTM, which presuppose some high subst. level.

Now comp makes almost all (not any) UMs' physics identical.


That is not a weak assumption. In CTM, there is just physics, not
one physics for each UTM,


?
That's exactly what I am saying above.



and
there is a physical hardware platform at level 0.


A level 0 that nobody has ever seen, nor even defined or use in  
physics. And which comp shows to be the bullet preventing progress in  
fundamental cognitive science.







Computationalism is just epistemologically incompatible with
materialism (weak materialism).


According to a string of controversial arguments.


You have already acknowledge that there is no error in UDA1-7, and  
when I asked you about the UDA-8 (MGA), you did not mention an error,  
but make a confession of faith in Primitive Matter instead. Then I  
asked you to define it, and I am still waiting for a reply making sense.





Not according
to computationalists, 99% of whom have have never questioned computers
and brains are
made of matter.


Give me definition and proof. Physicists acknowledge the fuzziness of  
the notion of matter, even with the MWI, even more with any candidate  
for marrying GR and QM.


It is true that almost all computationalist philosophers believe in  
matter, but they are unaware of both computer science and of the UDA  
reasoning. They are just following Aristotle metaphysics, which is  
itself a regression to the pre-platonist time, which extrapolated  
naturally from our animal sensations and survival programs or engrams.  
Anyway, argument of majority have zero value in science.


It will be simpler for you to find a flaw in MGA than trying to define  
matter, I think.
I thought you did eventually grasp the point. Please make yours  
clearer. If you have a precise physicalist theory compatible with comp  
you should be able to find an invalid step in UDA.


Bruno






We could say that comp makes the
notion of primitive matter supernatural.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: The free will function

[acw]

On 2/20/2012 13:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Feb 19, 11:57 pm, 1Z  wrote:

On Feb 20, 4:41 am, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

..

Believable falsehoods are falsehoods and convincing illusions
still aren't reality


It doesn't matter if they believe in the simulation or not, the belief
itself is only possible because of the particular reality generated by
the program. Comp precludes the possibility of contacting any truer
reality than the simulation.

If those observers are generally intelligent and capable of 
Turing-equivalent computation, they might theorize about many things, 
true or not. Just like we do, and just like we can't know if we're right.

Our Gods may know better too. What I am saying is that Comp + MWI +
Anthropic principle guarantees an infinite number of universes in
which some entity can program machines to worship them *correctly* as
*their* Gods.

That's more difficult than you'd think. In COMP, you identify local 
physics and your body with an infinity of lower-level machines which 
happen to be simulating *you* correctly (where *you* would be the 
structures required for your mind to work consistently). A simulation of 
a digital physics universe may implement some such observers *once* or 
maybe multiple times if you go for the extra effort, but never in *all* 
the cases (which are infinite). If such a programmer decides to 
intervene in his simulation, that wouldn't affect all the other machines 
implementing said simulation and said observers(for example in 
arithmetic or in some UD running somewhere), however a small part of the 
simulations containing observers will now be only implemented by the 
physics of the upper programmer's universe (and become entangled with 
them), possibly meaning a reduction in measure, however the probability 
of ending up in such a simulation is very low and as time passes it 
becomes less and less likely that said observers would keep on remaining 
in that simulation - if they die or malfunction (that's just one 
example), there will be continuations for them which are no longer 
supported by the upper programmer's physics. There can never be correct 
worship of some "Matrix Lord"/"Administrator"/... as they are not what 
is responsible for such observers being conscious, at best such 
programmers are only responsible for finding some particular program and 
increasing its measure with respect to the programmer's universe. Of 
course, if such a programmer wants to "lift" some beings from his 
simulation to run in his universe, he could do that and those would be 
valid continuations for the being living in that simulation. Running a 
physics simulation is akin to looking into a window, not to an act of 
universe creation, even if it may look like that from the simulator's 
perspective.



"Did  say those mushrooms were nutiritios? Silly me, i mean
poisonous".



Poisonous is a term with a more literal meaning. 'Natural' has no
place in MWI, comp, or the anthropic principle. I'm surprised that you
would use it. I thought most people here were on board with comp's
view that silicon machines could be no less natural as conscious
agents than living organisms.


What we are arguing about is the supernatural.


No. What you are arguing about is the supernatural. What I am arguing
about are gods (entities with absolute superiority or omnipotence over
the subordinate entities who inhabit the simulations they create) and
their inevitability in MWI.

Except there is no omnipotence. The default meaning of the word is 
inconsistent, thus it's an impossible property. You can't change the 
truth of mathematical sentences. Physical omnipotence? Possible, but as 
I said before, it's very low probability to find yourself in an universe 
ruled by an interventionist "god", at least in COMP, due to 
1p-indeterminacy. For such a god to have complete control over you, he'd 
have toto handle all counterfactuals, which is not possible due to 
Rice's theorem. The only thing such a being can do is feel like he is in 
control when he modifies a simulation, he can't control all possible 
continuations observers in his simulation can take. If he wants to more 
directly affect them, he'd have to be on an even footing them with - in 
the same universe or in a simulation in which he has more direct 
participation, and then he'd no longer be omnipotent.

You
do not rescue the supernatural by rendering the natural
meaningless.


Why not? Besides, as I keep saying, I am not trying to rescue the
supernatural, I am pointing out that God is not supernatural at all,
it is an accurate description of the relationship between the
programmer and the programmed.

Yes, but for a 'programmed' to have an 1p, it has to be an ensemble of 
computations, yours being just a few finite ones in an infinite 
ensemble. Even if one can be confused/tricked for a finite amount of 
time about this, you can never be confused forever.




Why do you think the programmer's reality is any more real? Maybe he
is a pr

Re: COMP theology

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Feb 2012, at 16:37, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


On 19.02.2012 15:52 Bruno Marchal said the following:
...

Both Cantor and Gödel used the word theology

...

Could you please cite these works?




Search the for the text "mathematics, theology and the infinite" by  
Joseph Dauben
I have lost my examplar, but I think the following paperback might be  
the same book, with another title:


http://www.amazon.com/Georg-Cantor-Joseph-W-Dauben/dp/book-citations/0691024472

Concerning Godel I was alluding to its formalization, in the modal  
logic S5 (S4 + <>p -> [ ] <> p), of Anselmus Ontological Argument for  
the existence of God. You will easily find it with a research engine  
on the net. Note that some people wrote "Anselm" for "Anselmus.





By the way, recently I have listened to the course Theorien der  
Wahrheit (Theories of truth) by Prof Hoenen. Among other works he  
has discussed Logische Untersuchungen (Logical Investigations) by  
Gottlob Frege and his famous das dritte Reich (the third Reich, no  
doubt has nothing to do with Hitler).


The theology as such has been mentioned as well, as Prof Hoenen has  
paid a lot of attention to Anselm von Canterbury, Über die Wahrheit  
(On Truth). Prof Hoenen has shown that many other works has been  
influenced (directly or indirectly) by Anselm.


OK. Interesting.

Note that Gödel's proof is not available for the Löbian machine, and  
it is a mystery for me why Gödel took the system S5, given that such a  
system formalizes the old Leibniz-Hilbert type of pre-Gödelian  
philosophy. This does not mean that it might not be possible to make  
the proof available, with some change to the machine's first person  
(axiomatized by S4Grz).





The list of considered texts in the course is here

http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/01/theorien-der-wahrheit.html



Interesting texts, but progresses have been made, I would say.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The free will function

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 19, 11:57 pm, 1Z  wrote:
> On Feb 20, 4:41 am, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>
> > > > > > Why would Gods be supernatural?
>
> > > > > Why would bachelors be married?
>
> > > > That's begging the question. There is no logical basis to claim that
> > > > the word supernatural precludes omnipotent control over machines from
> > > > being an inevitable outcome of MWI. Supernatural is folk terminology.
> > > > It has no relevance in determining phenomenological possibility in
> > > > MWI.
>
> > > I don;t have to agree that essentiallytechnological
> > > control means "god" or "supernaural">
>
> > You don't have to agree, but if you are being honest you would have to
> > admit that it's irrational. If I can stop your universe, make changes
> > to your mind, your memory, your environment, the laws of your universe
> > and then start it back up, how does that not make me your God?
>
> You are natural.

How do you know? Comp says we can't know whether we are artificial
simulation or not.

>You can fire a horse through the air usign a giant
> catapuilt, but I don't have to agree it's Pegasus.

No but you have to agree that it is possible to believe that it is a
Pegasus, and that is all that is required.

>
> > > > > > If comp is true, then when we create
> > > > > > AI beings over which we will have power to stop, start, and 
> > > > > > reprogram
> > > > > > their minds as well as their perceived universes, who will we be to
> > > > > > them other than Gods?
>
> > > > > But we are natural so they would be wrong.
>
> > > > They wouldn't and couldn't know they were wrong though.
>
> > > So? Is appearance reality?
>
> > That is what comp says.
>
> Bruno;s theory or the Computational Theory of Mind.

Both. What would be the meaning of any form of computationalism
without the notion of computational realism?

>
> >The simulation is reality as far as the
> > simulatees are concerned.
>
> And if they are wrong, it still isn't the
> real reality.

It doesn't matter if they are right or wrong, the simulation is still
their reality. Pac Man could believe that he is Bugs Bunny but the
possibility of that belief is generated by the simulation logic behind
Pac Man. For Pac Man, the Pac Man game is the real reality. That is
what comp is all about - proving that our experience of the universe
is indistinguishable from a simulation of that same experience.

> You seem to be arguing
> appearance=reality on the premise that
> opinion=truth.

Not at all. I think that you are injecting that because you need me to
be wrong. Comp implies that appearance is not the whole reality, but
the possibility of an appearance arises from the whole reality, which
is in fact a logical program.

>
> > Appearances may not reflect the truest level
> > of the simulation, but appearances all reflect some believable
> > representation of the simulation's function.
>
> Believable falsehoods are falsehoods and convincing illusions
> still aren't reality

It doesn't matter if they believe in the simulation or not, the belief
itself is only possible because of the particular reality generated by
the program. Comp precludes the possibility of contacting any truer
reality than the simulation.

>
> > > > It doesn't
> > > > matter who you call 'natural'.
>
> > > It matters a great deal what you call anything.
>
> > It would if the word natural had some relevant meaning, but even in
> > food labeling, that term is notoriously vague. Natural means anything
> > that exists. Natural plastic comes from natural petrochemicals.
>
> If you know yourself to be natural, you cannot regard
> your creations as supernatural. The denizens of a sim
> might regard their programmer as God, but he knows better.

Our Gods may know better too. What I am saying is that Comp + MWI +
Anthropic principle guarantees an infinite number of universes in
which some entity can program machines to worship them *correctly* as
*their* Gods.

>
> > > "Did  say those mushrooms were nutiritios? Silly me, i mean
> > > poisonous".
>
> > Poisonous is a term with a more literal meaning. 'Natural' has no
> > place in MWI, comp, or the anthropic principle. I'm surprised that you
> > would use it. I thought most people here were on board with comp's
> > view that silicon machines could be no less natural as conscious
> > agents than living organisms.
>
> What we are arguing about is the supernatural.

No. What you are arguing about is the supernatural. What I am arguing
about are gods (entities with absolute superiority or omnipotence over
the subordinate entities who inhabit the simulations they create) and
their inevitability in MWI.

> You
> do not rescue the supernatural by rendering the natural
> meaningless.

Why not? Besides, as I keep saying, I am not trying to rescue the
supernatural, I am pointing out that God is not supernatural at all,
it is an accurate description of the relationship between the
programmer and the programmed.

>
> > > > Now who is arguing a special case for
> > > > natively e

Re: A Good Silly Question

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 20, 4:30 am, Kim Jones  wrote:
> Probably. From a friend of mine on Facebook: "Is it possible that the notion 
> of the universe expanding is really an illusion based on the fact that WE are 
> shrinking?"
>
> Perhaps this idea might be used as a "stepping-stone" to a better idea. Go 
> on, have a laugh if you want but tell me why this cannot be in any sense 
> possible. Conversely, tell me why it might be possible if you think so.
>
> Kim Jones

I think that is not only possible, but I think that it has to be the
case. I call my cosmological origin myth 'The Big Diffraction' rather
than the Big Bang for just that reason. If spacetime is created by the
expansion of the primordial singularity, then that means that there
was neither space nor time before the moment of 'expansion'. Therefore
we, and everything in the entire universe was, is, and always will be
physically within the event horizon of the big bang. It cannot be
expanding outside of its own event horizon, so it is space and time
which are surging inward, or within-ward.

We see it as an expansion and forward arrow of time, but that would
make sense since that would be the perspective of a subjective
experience within the spacetime implosion. Objectively, it is the
ratio between mass and space in the universe which is shrinking as
more space is created through the passage of more time (or time is
created through the multiplication of space). The shrinking mass ratio
can also be thought of as energy's entropic exhaust. Events/
experiences build significance (meaning, sequence) and kick out
entropy (space). This is what the universe is; a testing ground for
significance vehicles.

Craig

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A Good Silly Question

[Kim Jones]

Probably. From a friend of mine on Facebook: "Is it possible that the notion of 
the universe expanding is really an illusion based on the fact that WE are 
shrinking?"

Perhaps this idea might be used as a "stepping-stone" to a better idea. Go on, 
have a laugh if you want but tell me why this cannot be in any sense possible. 
Conversely, tell me why it might be possible if you think so. 

Kim Jones

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Re: The free will function

[1Z]

On Feb 20, 6:52 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 20 Feb 2012, at 05:20, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
> > On Feb 20, 4:10 am, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> >> On Feb 19, 10:57 pm, meekerdb  wrote:
> >> Comp says that any UM's
> >> experience is indistinguishable from primitive physics, right?
>
> > Computaionalism or Bruno's comp?
>
> We have already discussed this. Comp, as I use it, is a much weaker
> hypothesis than most forms of CTM,



> given that comp allows the
> substitution level to be arbitrarily low, and is based on the notion
> of generalized brain. So comp's logical consequences are automatically
> lifted on all forms of CTM, which presuppose some high subst. level.
>
> Now comp makes almost all (not any) UMs' physics identical.

That is not a weak assumption. In CTM, there is just physics, not
one physics for each UTM, and
there is a physical hardware platform at level 0.

> Computationalism is just epistemologically incompatible with
> materialism (weak materialism).

According to a string of controversial arguments. Not according
to computationalists, 99% of whom have have never questioned computers
and brains are
made of matter.

>We could say that comp makes the
> notion of primitive matter supernatural.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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