Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

2018-06-20 Thread Brent Meeker



On 6/20/2018 9:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:24 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/19/2018 7:10 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:21 AM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 6/18/2018 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 9:57 PM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 6/17/2018 4:43 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On 17 June 2018 at 13:26,  mailto:agrayson2...@gmail.com>> wrote:


On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 10:15:05 AM UTC,
Jason wrote:



On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM,
mailto:agrays...@gmail.com>> wrote:



  why do you prefer the MWI compared to
the Transactional Interpretation?
I see both as absurd. so I prefer to
assume the wf is just epistemic, and/or
that we have some holes in the CI which
have yet to be resolved. AG

--



1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI" is just
the Schrodinger equation,
nothing else. (it doesn't say Schrodinger's
equation only applies sometimes,
or only at certain scales)

2. It explains more while assuming less (it
explains the appearance of
collapse, without having to assume it, thus
is preferred by Occam's razor)

3. Like every other successful physical
theory, it is linear, reversible
(time-symmetric), continuous, deterministic
and does not require faster than
light influences nor retrocausalities

4. Unlike single-universe or epistemic
interpretations, "WF is real" with
MWI is the only way we know how to explain
the functioning of quantum
computers (now up to 51 qubits)

5. Unlike copenhagen-type theories, it
attributes no special physical
abilities to observers or measurement devices

6. Most of all, theories of everything that
assume a reality containing
all possible observers and observations lead
directly to laws/postulates of
quantum mechanics (see Russell Standish's
Theory of Nothing, Chapter 7 and
Appendix D).

Given #6, we should revise our view. It is
not MWI and QM that should
convince us of many worlds, but rather the
assumption of many worlds (an
infinite and infinitely varied reality) that
gives us, and explains all the
weirdness of QM. This should overwhelmingly
convince us of MWI-type
everything theories over any single-universe
interpretation of quantum
mechanics, which is not only absurd, but
completely devoid of explanation.
With the assumption of a large reality, QM
is made explainable and
understandable: as a theory of observation
within an infinite reality.

Jason


You forgot #7. It asserts multiple, even
infinite copies of an observer,
replete with memories, are created when an
observer does a simple quantum
experiment. So IMO the alleged "cure" is
immensely worse than the disease,
CI, that is, just plain idiotic. AG

It is important to make the distinction between our
intuition and
common sense and actual formal reasoning. The former
can guide the
latter very successfully, but the history of science
teaches us that
this is not always the case. You don't provide an
argument, you just
present your gut feeling as if it were the same
thing as irrefutable
fact.


I think Scott Aaronson has the right attitude toward this:

https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=326
 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

2018-06-20 Thread Bruce Kellett

From: *Jason Resch* mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>>


On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:03 AM, Bruce Kellett 
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:



I find Baylock's exposition of counterfactual indefiniteness as
applied in MWI quite opaque. He makes the argument needlessly
complicated by considering a sequence of experiments with
non-aligned filters. Then analyses these by comparing to an
arbitrary 0º and 90º pair of orientations. When he does his
general analysis he gets four possible worlds as he should, but he
does not calculate the probabilities for these individually.
Rather, he relates the results back to the 0º and 90º
orientations. And then says that because no measurements were
actually made at these angles the lack of counterfactual
definiteness rules out the worlds in which the results do not
agree with the quantum predictions. This is quite confused. There
is no need to consider sequences of measurements at different
angles, one need consider only one set of such measurments and
calculate the resulting probabilities for each of the four
possible sets of results. By doing something quite peculiar,
Baylock does nothing more than confuse himself into error.


What specifically, is the error?


Opacity. There is no need for reference to violations of counterfactual 
definiteness, because no comparison with measurements that were 
possible, but not made, is ever necessary. The account that I have given 
only ever refers to measurements that are actually made.




We should concentrate on the simple case that I have presented,
where the polarizers are aligned by construction, and no reference
is made to measurements that are not made, but are assumed to have
definite outcomes (no violation of counterfactual defininteness
need be assumed). You have to be able to give a local account of
why certain combinations of results are not observed. You have
been unable to do this.


You agreed both photons are entangled to each other.

When you measure either of the photons, you too become entangled not 
only with that photon, but also with its pair.


Entanglement with the partner photon is the non-local effect. The pair 
is at a spacelike separation.


If someone measures it's partner photon, now you, the left photon, the 
right photon, and that other person are now all entangled with each other.


There are only two photons, but each has two possible polarizations. 
When you measure the polarization, you split into two branches, one for 
each possible result.  The partner photon reaches the other person on 
each of your branches, but if everything is purely local, the photon 
that is remotely measured cannot know which result you obtained (it 
cannot know which of your branches it is actually on), so it has 
indeterminate polarization, and when measured, there is necessarily 
equal probability for either result.


This means that the photon that is on the branch in which your photon 
passed the polarizer can either pass the remote polarizer, or be 
absorbed, with 50% probability for each. Similarly for the photon that 
is on the branch in which your photon was absorbed. The outcome by 
considering both branches is four possible worlds, one for each 
combination of 'pass' and 'absorb' results. Two of these worlds violate 
angular momentum conservation. How do you rule out these worlds with 
only local interactions?



(entanglement is nothing mysterious, it is equivalent to measurement).


Yes, but entanglement, being a local effect, can only spread at, or less 
than, the velocity of light. You cannot be entangled with your remote 
partner when he does his measurement, because you are space-like separated.


When nothing collapses, all you get are local effects, of information 
(in the form of particles or fields) moving through space time at 
light or sublight speeds.


That is the conclusion that you have not been able to establish. The 
Bell-like correlations actually have nothing to do with collapse or 
non-collapse. The entanglement is intrinsically non-local in either case.


You never observe the person who got the inconsistent measurement, nor 
ever hear their radio signal because you are entangled with the person 
who got the result consistent with your measurement.


But that entanglement is the non-local effect.

Look at it this way. The two measurements are made at space-like 
separation. If everything is local, the measurements must be 
independent. If the measurements are independent they cannot be 
correlated -- that is one possible operational definition of 
independence. Since the measurement results are known to be correlated, 
they cannot be independent. Since there can be no sub-luminal 
interaction between the two measurements, this correlation can only be a 
non-local effect. In the case that I have been discussing, quantum 
mechanics predicts 100% correlation. There is no way this can be 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

2018-06-20 Thread Brent Meeker



On 6/20/2018 9:42 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:17 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/19/2018 6:55 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:16 AM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 6/18/2018 4:09 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

It will take a lot of work under his approach, but I am
not aware of any other system proposed by anyone, which
even has a chance at this.


Penrose's gravity induced collapse has as good a chance as
Bruno's, 



At least Penrose has drawn a line in the sand, which can be
experimentally refuted. Though I don't see any motivation for any
collapse base theory since Everett provided an account of
collapse without having to assume it.  (Again this is like adding
appending motive demon theory, which is entirely superfluous and
adds whose sole motivation is to preserve the notion of collapse
as physically real rather than apparent)

and a better chance of predicting some surprising but true
physics. Some version of transactional QM also has a chance. 



Transactional QM is another complication of the theory, proposing
things we have no evidence for to explain things which have
already been explained from a much simpler theory.


You only think it's simpler because you close your eyes to the
last step in going from a FAPP diagonal reduced density matrix to
an actually diagonal reduced density matrix.  A step that is
perfectly equivalent to Bohr and Heisenberg's collapse postulate,
except it tells you where to hide the collapse.



Is the appearance of collapse not describable from the other postulates?


"Appearance" is a psychological concept.  So to decide what that means 
requires a theory of mind.  Most advocates of MWI want to say that 
getting the off-diagonal terms of the reduced density matrix "small 
enough" is enough to make it "appear" that the wf has collapsed.  But 
aside from this fuzziness there is the problem that in some other basis 
the cross-terms may not be small at all; hence the preferred basis 
problem?  Do our minds impose a preferred basis?  and why should 
different minds agree on it?


Brent



Jason
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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

2018-06-20 Thread Brent Meeker



On 6/20/2018 9:41 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:14 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/19/2018 6:42 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:01 AM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



On 6/18/2018 3:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


Block time plus MWI means universes aren't created,
they're all already there.


*Seems like super-determinism to me. You're making a
distinction with no difference. AG
*


Superdeterminism says you and a remote partner could decide
to use the digits of Pi to pseudorandomly select angles of
measurement in a Bell experiment, then decide to use the
digits of Euler's number. Yet somehow, the universe knew you
and your friend had this agreement to use these digits of
these constants,


You keep anthropomorphizing the universe to make
super-determinism sound ridiculous.  It's nothing more that
taking determinism completely seriously, no free will by
experimenters.  The choice of you and your friend was
determined by the past.  That's all determinism means.


It's not just me.  The first person who proposed this loophole
around Bell also immediately discarded it as ridiculous.  If
super-determinism means the same thing as determinism, why add
the "super-" qualifier?

Here is a write up


in scientific american about t'Hooft's idea:

*The dramatic version is that free will

 is
an illusion. Worse, actually. Even regular
determinism–without the “super”–subverts our sense of free
will. Through the laws of physics, you can trace every choice
you make to the arrangement of matter at the dawn of time.
Superdeterminism adds a twist of the knife. Not only is
everything you do preordained, the universe reaches into your
brain and stops you from doing an experiment that would
reveal its true nature. The universe is not just set up in
advance. It is set up in advance to fool you. As a conspiracy
theory, this leaves Roswell and the Priory of Sion in the dust.*



Yes, they explain that the "super" means Alice and Bob cannot make
independent spacelike decisions because their decisions are the
product of common events in the (distant) past and that product is
/*determined*/.



I sometimes can't tell if you're playing devil's advocate or not.




I've taken it one step further.  By using the digits of Pi or
Euler's number, it's not just reaching into your brain, since our
brain did not determine those digits. It requires a universe
setup in advance to know the digits of Pi,


Why is that a problem? The digits are determined and the choice to
use them is determined.  Bruno's theory requires "the universe to
know" the solutions to sets of Diophantine equations.



It requires only an independent existence of arithmetical truth.




and to take into account the knowledge that you are using the
digits of Pi to pseudorandomly set the angles of the measurement
devices, and produce statistics (that were super determined at
the time of the big bang) to fool you by reproducing the quantum
statistics with super-determined hidden variables.


Again with the anthropomorphizing.  The universe is just following
its deterministic laws; it's not fooling anybody.


It's fooling us into believing in non-locality QM when QM isn't really 
true.


In that sense super-determinism is self-defeating, to believe it means 
one is forced to discard the very theory it is meant to explain.  It 
is a bit like epiphenominalism that way.


You are so invested in MWI you think the purpose of theories is to 
explain it.







If you see super-determinism as nothing more than determinism I
think you are missing something.  This is a pre-established
harmony of the highest order, requiring a massive information
content per particle interaction


No, it certainly requires no more information than required to
define a block universe and potentially much less since all
results flow from the past, and being deterministic means it's
reversible, so the information content is fixed (as it is for SWE).


super-determinism is so ill-defined of a theory it is hardly worth 
debating.





(each particle has to contain knowledge, presumably up to and
including all other knowledge about the entire universe up to
that point).  For example:

1. Take the deep-field image from Nasa, or the CMB data from all
360 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

2018-06-20 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:47 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 6/19/2018 8:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Most of these objections to CI are answered by decoherence theory.
>>>
>>
>> I have no clue how to interpret decoherence with a collapse theory.
>>
>
> You use decoherence theory until you get to the reduced density matrix
> that is diagonal FAPP (or for all conscious purposes) and then you declare
> it is exactly diagonal and cut the other "worlds" loose.



What's the point of that last step, when decoherence explains why we don't
see those other branches?

Jason

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

2018-06-20 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:24 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 6/19/2018 7:10 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:21 AM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 6/18/2018 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 9:57 PM, Brent Meeker 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 6/17/2018 4:43 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>
 On 17 June 2018 at 13:26,   wrote:

>
> On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 10:15:05 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>   why do you prefer the MWI compared to the Transactional
>>> Interpretation?
>>> I see both as absurd. so I prefer to assume the wf is just
>>> epistemic, and/or
>>> that we have some holes in the CI which have yet to be resolved. AG
>>>
>>> --
>>>
>>
>>
>> 1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI" is just the Schrodinger equation,
>> nothing else. (it doesn't say Schrodinger's equation only applies
>> sometimes,
>> or only at certain scales)
>>
>> 2. It explains more while assuming less (it explains the appearance of
>> collapse, without having to assume it, thus is preferred by Occam's
>> razor)
>>
>> 3. Like every other successful physical theory, it is linear,
>> reversible
>> (time-symmetric), continuous, deterministic and does not require
>> faster than
>> light influences nor retrocausalities
>>
>> 4. Unlike single-universe or epistemic interpretations, "WF is real"
>> with
>> MWI is the only way we know how to explain the functioning of quantum
>> computers (now up to 51 qubits)
>>
>> 5. Unlike copenhagen-type theories, it attributes no special physical
>> abilities to observers or measurement devices
>>
>> 6. Most of all, theories of everything that assume a reality
>> containing
>> all possible observers and observations lead directly to
>> laws/postulates of
>> quantum mechanics (see Russell Standish's Theory of Nothing, Chapter
>> 7 and
>> Appendix D).
>>
>> Given #6, we should revise our view. It is not MWI and QM that should
>> convince us of many worlds, but rather the assumption of many worlds
>> (an
>> infinite and infinitely varied reality) that gives us, and explains
>> all the
>> weirdness of QM. This should overwhelmingly convince us of MWI-type
>> everything theories over any single-universe interpretation of quantum
>> mechanics, which is not only absurd, but completely devoid of
>> explanation.
>> With the assumption of a large reality, QM is made explainable and
>> understandable: as a theory of observation within an infinite reality.
>>
>> Jason
>>
>
> You forgot #7. It asserts multiple, even infinite copies of an
> observer,
> replete with memories, are created when an observer does a simple
> quantum
> experiment. So IMO the alleged "cure" is immensely worse than the
> disease,
> CI, that is, just plain idiotic. AG
>
 It is important to make the distinction between our intuition and
 common sense and actual formal reasoning. The former can guide the
 latter very successfully, but the history of science teaches us that
 this is not always the case. You don't provide an argument, you just
 present your gut feeling as if it were the same thing as irrefutable
 fact.

>>>
>>> I think Scott Aaronson has the right attitude toward this:
>>>
>>> https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=326
>>>
>>>
>> As such a strong believer in quantum computers (he's staked $100,000 of
>> his own money on the future construction of large scale quantum computers),
>> I would love to ask Scott Aaronson what he thinks about running a conscious
>> AI on such a quantum computer.  That trivially leads to "many worlds" at
>> least as seen by that AI.
>>
>>
>> If it's so trivial maybe you can explain it.
>>
>
> 1. A quantum computer is isolated from the environment so as to remain in
> a super position of many possible states.
> 2. Quantum computers are Turing universal, anything that can be programmed
> on a classical computer can be programmed on a quantum computer
> 3. Assuming Computational Theory of mind, a quantum computer can execute
> the same conscious program as "Brent Meeker's Brain"
> 4. The quantum computer can be arranged to entangle an unmeasured particle
> with Brent Meeker's quantum brain emulation,
> a) by feeding in spin up as an auditory tone in Brent Meeker's left
> auditory nerve
> b) by feeding in spin down as an auditory tone in Brent Meeker's right
> auditory nerve
> 5. The quantum brain simulation, being isolated from the environment,
> remains in a super position of the Brent Meeker brain emulation hearing an
> auditory tone in his left and right ears.
>
> You can repeat this process 30 times, with 30 different measurements of
> different electrons, and end up 

Re: Primary matter

2018-06-20 Thread Brent Meeker




On 6/11/2018 8:32 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Hi Telmo,



On 11 Jun 2018, at 13:53, Telmo Menezes  wrote:

Hi Bruno,

Sorry for the delay, had a friend visiting.


No problem. From tomorrow (Tuesday) to Friday, I have many oral exams (+ a 
conference in Nivelles, a city nearby). So take your time to comment and 
express the dissatisfaction.







Ah! Let me try to answer.Keep in mind that I assume elementary arithmetic and 
thus computations, etc.
(I am not sure I need YD here, but it can help).



- Why does consciousness even exist?

Consciousness is somehow the doubt between consistency and truth (<>p v p).

All universal number self introspecting meet this, and it is felt as 
immediately obvious, and thus true, and undoubtable, yet non rationally 
justifiable, and even non definable.

I follow your reasoning, from one of your recent articles. This leaves
me dissatisfied, but if I try to verbalize this dissatisfaction I feel
stuck in a loop. Perhaps this illustrates your point.


We might need to do some detour about what it would mean to explain 
consciousness, or matter.
I might ask myself if you are not asking too much, perhaps. Eventually, 
something has to remain unexplainable for reason of self-consisteny. I suspect 
it will be just where our intuition of numbers or combinators, or of the 
distinction finite/infinite comes from (assuming mechanism), or just why we 
trust the doctor!




It goes from the rough dissociated universal consciousness of Q to the 
elaborate self-consciousness of PA or ZF, or us.






Darwinism does not seem to require it.

It does. When the machine opts for <>p in the doubt between p and <>p, if it 
let it go, in some sense, it transforms itself into a more speedy and more efficacious 
machine, with respect to its most probable history.
So, consciousness brings a self-speedable ability, which is quite handy for 
self-moving being living in between a prey and a predator.

I'm not convinced. Consider a simple computer simulation where agents
are controlled by evolving rules. Agents can eat blue or red pills.
90% of the time blue pills give them energy and red pills cause
damage. 10% of the time the opposite happens. It is not possible to
know before eating a pill. Let's say the rule system evolves to make
the agents always eat blue pills and never red pills. Most of the time
this helps the agents, precisely because it assumes the most probable
histories. This is a simplified version of the sort of "decisions"
that evolution makes, and I would say that it is reasonable to assume
that our own evolutionary story consists of the accumulation of a
great number of such decisions. I still don't see how consciousness
makes a difference in such a mechanism.

The reason why consciousness makes the difference is not related to the 
environment, but is intrinsic to the machine itself.

I am aware to be quick on this, but the reason is a bit mathematically 
involved, and again, depends crucially of a discovery made by Gödel, and 
exposed in his paper “the length of proof”.

Gödel discovered the existence that if you have some essentially undecidable theory, like 
RA, PA, ZF, there are always undecidable sentences, like <>RA in RA, of <>ZF in 
ZF, etc, then if you add an undecidable sentence (in the theory T, say) to T, you get a 
theory which not only will prove infinitely more sentence than T, but that infinitely many 
proofs will be arbitrarily shorter in T+the undecidable sentence than the proof of it in T, 
making “somehow” T+the undecidable sentence much faster than T.

Even if the added sentence is false, we get that speeding-up


?? What does it mean that it is false?  I thought "true" was 
undefinable.  Do you mean it contradicts some theorem of T?  But in that 
case it would make T+the undecidable (false) sentence speed up the proof 
of every sentence.



(even for interesting sentences as Eric Vandenbussche convinced me (He thought 
that this was false, but eventually he proved that statement true).

Blum has got a similar result in computer science, and eventually Blum & 
Marquez characterised the spedable machine/set (he used the w_i instead of the 
phi_i), and he obtained the class of sub-creative set, which generalised the 
creative set (which correspond to the universal machine).
This means that if you take a slow universal machine, like the Babbage Machine, 
and a very efficacious machine, like a super-quantum computer, then you can by 
make the Babbage machine more rapid than the quantum computer on *almost* all 
inputs (= all except a finite number of exceptions), and even arbitrarily more 
rapid. Of course the “almost” limit seriously the applicability of that 
theorem, but in arithmetic, and for the FPI, that can play a rôle.

In particular, take a machine which observe itself, and as some inductive-inference 
ability. By Gödel, or G, the machine can prove that if she is consistent, then her 
consistency is not provable. The machine can also see that she never 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

2018-06-20 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:17 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 6/19/2018 6:55 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:16 AM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 6/18/2018 4:09 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>> It will take a lot of work under his approach, but I am not aware of any
>>> other system proposed by anyone, which even has a chance at this.
>>>
>>
>> Penrose's gravity induced collapse has as good a chance as Bruno's,
>
>
> At least Penrose has drawn a line in the sand, which can be experimentally
> refuted.  Though I don't see any motivation for any collapse base theory
> since Everett provided an account of collapse without having to assume it.
>  (Again this is like adding appending motive demon theory, which is
> entirely superfluous and adds whose sole motivation is to preserve the
> notion of collapse as physically real rather than apparent)
>
>
>> and a better chance of predicting some surprising but true physics. Some
>> version of transactional QM also has a chance.
>
>
> Transactional QM is another complication of the theory, proposing things
> we have no evidence for to explain things which have already been explained
> from a much simpler theory.
>
>
> You only think it's simpler because you close your eyes to the last step
> in going from a FAPP diagonal reduced density matrix to an actually
> diagonal reduced density matrix.  A step that is perfectly equivalent to
> Bohr and Heisenberg's collapse postulate, except it tells you where to hide
> the collapse.
>


Is the appearance of collapse not describable from the other postulates?

Jason

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

2018-06-20 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:14 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 6/19/2018 6:42 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:01 AM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 6/18/2018 3:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>> Block time plus MWI means universes aren't created, they're all already
 there.

>>>
>>>
>>> *Seems like super-determinism to me. You're making a distinction with no
>>> difference. AG *
>>>
>>
>> Superdeterminism says you and a remote partner could decide to use the
>> digits of Pi to pseudorandomly select angles of measurement in a Bell
>> experiment, then decide to use the digits of Euler's number. Yet somehow,
>> the universe knew you and your friend had this agreement to use these
>> digits of these constants,
>>
>>
>> You keep anthropomorphizing the universe to make super-determinism sound
>> ridiculous.  It's nothing more that taking determinism completely
>> seriously, no free will by experimenters.  The choice of you and your
>> friend was determined by the past.  That's all determinism means.
>>
>>
> It's not just me.  The first person who proposed this loophole around Bell
> also immediately discarded it as ridiculous.  If super-determinism means
> the same thing as determinism, why add the "super-" qualifier?
>
> Here is a write up
> 
> in scientific american about t'Hooft's idea:
>
> *The dramatic version is that free will
>  
> is
> an illusion. Worse, actually. Even regular determinism–without the
> “super”–subverts our sense of free will. Through the laws of physics, you
> can trace every choice you make to the arrangement of matter at the dawn of
> time. Superdeterminism adds a twist of the knife. Not only is everything
> you do preordained, the universe reaches into your brain and stops you from
> doing an experiment that would reveal its true nature. The universe is not
> just set up in advance. It is set up in advance to fool you. As a
> conspiracy theory, this leaves Roswell and the Priory of Sion in the dust.*
>
>
> Yes, they explain that the "super" means Alice and Bob cannot make
> independent spacelike decisions because their decisions are the product of
> common events in the (distant) past and that product is *determined*.
>


I sometimes can't tell if you're playing devil's advocate or not.


>
>
> I've taken it one step further.  By using the digits of Pi or Euler's
> number, it's not just reaching into your brain, since our brain did not
> determine those digits. It requires a universe setup in advance to know the
> digits of Pi,
>
>
> Why is that a problem? The digits are determined and the choice to use
> them is determined.  Bruno's theory requires "the universe to know" the
> solutions to sets of Diophantine equations.
>


It requires only an independent existence of arithmetical truth.


>
>
> and to take into account the knowledge that you are using the digits of Pi
> to pseudorandomly set the angles of the measurement devices, and produce
> statistics (that were super determined at the time of the big bang) to fool
> you by reproducing the quantum statistics with super-determined hidden
> variables.
>
>
> Again with the anthropomorphizing.  The universe is just following its
> deterministic laws; it's not fooling anybody.
>

It's fooling us into believing in non-locality QM when QM isn't really true.

In that sense super-determinism is self-defeating, to believe it means one
is forced to discard the very theory it is meant to explain.  It is a bit
like epiphenominalism that way.



>
>
> If you see super-determinism as nothing more than determinism I think you
> are missing something.  This is a pre-established harmony of the highest
> order, requiring a massive information content per particle interaction
>
>
> No, it certainly requires no more information than required to define a
> block universe and potentially much less since all results flow from the
> past, and being deterministic means it's reversible, so the information
> content is fixed (as it is for SWE).
>

super-determinism is so ill-defined of a theory it is hardly worth debating.


>
>
> (each particle has to contain knowledge, presumably up to and including
> all other knowledge about the entire universe up to that point).  For
> example:
>
> 1. Take the deep-field image from Nasa, or the CMB data from all 360
> degrees.
> 2. Use that as a seed to the Hash-DRBG (NIST defined deterministic random
> bit generator)
> 3. Use the output of the Hash DRBG to select the angles for each iteration
> of a Bell experiment
>
> Now each particle has to be aware of the entire arrangement of remote
> galaxies in a particular direction looked at by the Hubble Telescope, in
> order to properly establish a hidden variable at the time of its creation.

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

2018-06-20 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:03 AM, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> From: Jason Resch < jasonre...@gmail.com>
>
>
> On Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 7:26 PM, Bruce Kellett <
> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>
>> From: Jason Resch >
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 7:38 AM, Bruce Kellett <
>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>
>>> From: Jason Resch < jasonre...@gmail.com>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> In the EPR experiment, a pair of photons is created.  Each photon is in
>>> a super position of every possible polarization, and because it is created
>>> as a pair, it's dual in the superposed state always has exactly the
>>> opposite polarization (rotated 180 degrees).
>>>
>>>
>>> OK.
>>>
>>> When you perform a measurement of your left-traveling photon on Earth,
>>> you become entangled (correlated) with it, and all the possible states of
>>> that photon, when measured, leak into the room, starting with the measuring
>>> device, then your eyes, then your brain, then your notebook, etc. until now
>>> everything is in the room, and soon Earth is now in many states which
>>> contagiously spread from that photon.
>>>
>>>
>>> OK. Your result (and you) become entangled with your environment.
>>>
>>> Also, because the photon you measured was entangled (correlated) with
>>> its pair in the superposition, whatever result you measure for the photon's
>>> polarization tells you immediately what the polarization of its pair is (in
>>> your branch at least).  So any future communication you get from me on
>>> Pluto will necessarily align with the result you measured.
>>>
>>>
>>> This is where the mistake creeps in. My measurement tells me the
>>> polarization of the entangled photon in the branch in which my measurement
>>> was made. When you come to measure your entangled photon on Pluto, how do
>>> you know what branch my measurement was made in? You are at a spacelike
>>> separation from me, and completely independent. So I ask again, how come
>>> you assume that your measurement will be in the same branch as mine was?
>>>
>>
>> Let's make it more concrete and say there are only 360 possible
>> polarizations, each having an equal probability.
>>
>>
>> That is not a very good way to look at it. The photon is not in a
>> superposition of all possible polarization states. You cannot write the
>> photon wave function as such a superposition:
>>
>>  |psi> = Sum_i a_i |i> for i running over all 360 possibilities in
>> the case you outline.
>>
>> The most you can ever do is write the state as a superposition of the two
>> possible polarizations in any particular direction. Thus:
>>
>>|psi> = (|+> + |->), ignoring normalization factors.
>>
>> This can be written for |+> and |-> being the polarization eigenstates in
>> any chosen direction. But not all directions at once.
>>
>
>
> I see.
>
> Could you explain the point of error in the following paper?  I've
> excerpted the relevant sections if it helps your search.
>
> From: https://arxiv.org/pdf/0902.3827.pdf
>
> *According to quantum mechanics, whichever measurement is performed first
> collapses the entangled twin state superposition to a single polarization
> state that is identical for both photons.*
>
> *[...]*
>
>
> *If we wish to know what the probability is of getting the same
> measurement for photon 1, we need only figure out what the probability is
> for a photon with polarization along θ2 to pass through a filter oriented
> along θ1. This probability is easily calculated according to simple
> trigonometry. Any arbitrary linear polarization can be thought of as a
> superposition of polarization along the θ1 direction (which will pass
> through the filter) and perpendicular to the θ1 direction (which will be
> absorbed by the filter). For a wave polarized along the θ2 direction, the
> amplitude component along the θ1 direction is given by cos(θ2 − θ1), and
> the probability for transmission, given by the wave amplitude squared, is
> cos2 (θ2 − θ1). That is the prediction of quantum mechanics *
>
> *[...]*
>
>
> *The key is to allow more than one possibility for the potential result of
> a measurement. Orthodox quantum mechanics embraces this notion of multiple
> possibilities whenever a quantum state is in a superposition. In the
> absence of measurement (and collapse), there is no single definite
> potential result. Instead, there are many potential results represented by
> many components of the superposition. *
>
> *[...]*
>
>
> * It is possible to violate Bell’s inequality using either nonlocality or
> counterfactual indefiniteness alone, and there are examples of each
> approach. To better understand the role of counterfactual indefiniteness,
> it is instructive to examine an interpretation of quantum mechanics that
> relies solely on counterfactual indefiniteness to violate the inequality.
> One of the most popular of these is the “many worlds” interpretation. *
>
>
> I find Baylock's exposition of counterfactual indefiniteness as applied in
> MWI quite opaque. He makes the 

Re: Do we live within a Diophantine equation?

2018-06-20 Thread Brent Meeker




On 6/20/2018 6:30 PM, smitra wrote:

On 19-06-2018 23:22, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 6/18/2018 6:03 PM, smitra wrote:

On 17-06-2018 22:42, Jason Resch wrote:

Hi Lawrence,

Is the evolution of states of the wave function computable? If so then
the result of MRDP implies it is Diophantine.

Jason


Or you could try to see if QM could be a meta-theory that arises 
when you try to give a statistical description of the set of all 
these Diophantine sets. I tried to do something similar with the set 
of algorithms a few years ago, getting a half-baked result, some 
hints at how quantum field theory could arise from this.


You want to compute the probability that an observer that's encoded 
by some mathematical structure has some given information content. 
So, if you observe the outcome of an experiment, that's information 
in your brain.


Which is the QBism interpretation of QM.  If you take the view that QM
is about predicting and explaining what one will see, there's no point
in going further...the rest is metaphysics.

Brent



QM should then emerge as an effective theory and the correct 
interpretation should also follow.


?? QBism is an interpretation.

Brent



But your brain is supposed to be some mathematical structure and 
that then contains also that specific information about the outcome 
of the experiment. Probabilities should presumably be obtained by 
counting the number of states compatible with some observation, but 
we must then impose the restriction that we're only going to count 
states that correspond to some given observer making that 
observation. If observers are specified algorithms that are 
specified by a set of input and corresponding output states, then we 
must sum over all input and output states, that fit each other. This 
is mathematically inconvenient, one can replace such a summation by 
an unrestricted summation by including Kronecker delta factors:


delta_{r,s} = 0 if r is not equal to s, otherwise it is 1.

One can then write:

delta_{r,s} = Integral from 0 to 1 of Exp[2 pi i (r-s) theta] dtheta

One can then sum over the variables freely, but one is then left 
with integrations over many different theta variables. The idea is 
then that in the limit of a large number of variables you can work 
with coarse grained averages over the theta variables, you end up 
with something similar to the path integral formulation of QFT.


Saibal






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Re: Do we live within a Diophantine equation?

2018-06-20 Thread smitra

On 19-06-2018 23:22, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 6/18/2018 6:03 PM, smitra wrote:

On 17-06-2018 22:42, Jason Resch wrote:

Hi Lawrence,

Is the evolution of states of the wave function computable? If so 
then

the result of MRDP implies it is Diophantine.

Jason


Or you could try to see if QM could be a meta-theory that arises when 
you try to give a statistical description of the set of all these 
Diophantine sets. I tried to do something similar with the set of 
algorithms a few years ago, getting a half-baked result, some hints at 
how quantum field theory could arise from this.


You want to compute the probability that an observer that's encoded by 
some mathematical structure has some given information content. So, if 
you observe the outcome of an experiment, that's information in your 
brain.


Which is the QBism interpretation of QM.  If you take the view that QM
is about predicting and explaining what one will see, there's no point
in going further...the rest is metaphysics.

Brent



QM should then emerge as an effective theory and the correct 
interpretation should also follow.


But your brain is supposed to be some mathematical structure and that 
then contains also that specific information about the outcome of the 
experiment. Probabilities should presumably be obtained by counting 
the number of states compatible with some observation, but we must 
then impose the restriction that we're only going to count states that 
correspond to some given observer making that observation. If 
observers are specified algorithms that are specified by a set of 
input and corresponding output states, then we must sum over all input 
and output states, that fit each other. This is mathematically 
inconvenient, one can replace such a summation by an unrestricted 
summation by including Kronecker delta factors:


delta_{r,s} = 0 if r is not equal to s, otherwise it is 1.

One can then write:

delta_{r,s} = Integral from 0 to 1 of Exp[2 pi i (r-s) theta] dtheta

One can then sum over the variables freely, but one is then left with 
integrations over many different theta variables. The idea is then 
that in the limit of a large number of variables you can work with 
coarse grained averages over the theta variables, you end up with 
something similar to the path integral formulation of QFT.


Saibal




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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

2018-06-20 Thread agrayson2000


On Wednesday, June 20, 2018 at 11:04:20 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 2:22 PM, > 
> wrote:
>
> *>I found an old version of my resume and gave you the exact references, 
>> which you found without my help.*
>
>
> I have no idea what you're talking about. I looked and I could not find 2 
> scientific papers written by Alan Grayson or even one, and if they existed 
> I would have found them. But if you have an exact reference then lets hear 
> it.
>
>  > *The papers were published in reputable journals,*
>
>
> What was the name of those "reputable journals"? An even better question 
> is what the hell is your name? 
>
> *> The papers were written over 50 years ago, so when the subject first 
>> came up my memory was a little vague.*
>
>
> That's OK,  things have changed in the last 51 years and we now have a 
> thing called "Goodle", so if you tell me your name Mr. Google can find the 
> two papers you wrote with Carl Sagan in 3 seconds flat, if of course they 
> exist.
>
> >* So make the bet, or apologize​ and​ STFU. AG*
>
>
> I have absolutely nothing to apologize for, in the very unlikely event I 
> was wrong about you writing those papers it would be because you were lying 
> about who you were and the initials "AG" that you put in at the end of 
> every line does not stand for "Alan Grayson. I don't like it when people 
> lie to me, that's why I don't like Donald Trump and that's why I don't like 
> you.
>
> John K Clark
>

*Big talker; no guts. Won't put your money where your mouth is. Do us all a 
favor and cease your arrogant misinformed BS. Send a check for $5000 
payable to Brent Meeker. When it clears, I will send my check for the same 
amount, which will prove I wrote at least two papers with CS. There was a 
third paper which Carl might not have been a co-author. AG* 

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Re: Do we live within a Diophantine equation?

2018-06-20 Thread Jason Resch
On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 7:36 PM, John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 1:45 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> ​>>​
>>> No I'm not disputing that, but computational relations couldn't exist
>>> without computations, and computations couldn't exist without matter that
>>> obeys the laws of physics.
>>>
>>
>> ​>* ​*
>> *Why couldn't it be the other way around?  e.g. that mathematical
>> computations are what give us physics?*
>>
>
>
> If mathematics was more fundamental than physics then Intel would be a
> ridiculously unnecessary company and would have gone  bankrupt decades ago,
> but physics can clearly do things that mathematics can't and so the company
> is thriving
>
>

That doesn't follow.
It could be that:
Number relations -> Platonic computations -> Conscious Computations ->
Appearance of physical realities -> Appearance of physical entities
(including abacuses, computers, and chip companies we use to explore the
number relations)


> ​>​
>> *In other words, why do you place physics on such firmer ground than
>> mathematics?  Are you certain physics is primary, and not mathematics?  If
>> so, I would like to know the reason for this certainty.*
>>
>
> If neither matter nor physics existed but "1+1 =2" did then "1+1 =3" would
> exist too, one of those statement is fiction and one id nonfiction but the
> only difference between the 2 is the way physics treats matter, for example
> 2 merged hydrogen atoms behave differently in a gravitational field than 3
> do.
>

Is "1", "2", and "3" have any meaning, then "1+1 ~= 3".
If you think it can then you're using nonstandard defintions of "1", "3",
"+", or "=".


> The difference between truth and falsehood is that if you treat a
> falsehood as being true the drug you're taking won't work or you car won't
> start or your Turing Machine won't do what it is programmed to do, or in
> other words something will end up biting you in the ass. But without
> physics the consequences for being wrong would be exactly the same as the
> consequences for being right, none at all.
>

You're delving into absurdities (asserting that 1=0) in order to avoid
considering the possibility that arithmetical reality might be being more
fundamental than the reality we see.

You understand that we could be in a matrix type of simulation. Therefore
you must also understand that we cannot use our experiences to reliability
inform us of what the true/fundamental reality really is.  If you accept
the Church-Turing Thesis, then you know no program can ever determine what
machine is executing it.  If you accept multiple-realizability (which I
think you do) you understand that computers can be made of anything, so
long as it preserves the necessary relations.  Am I wrong about any of
these?

Jason

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

2018-06-20 Thread Brent Meeker




On 6/20/2018 2:37 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 03:09:37AM -0700, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:


On Wednesday, June 20, 2018 at 2:22:53 AM UTC, John Clark wrote:


On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 9:58 PM, >
wrote:
  


*​> ​I think you should admit that bringing up the energy change of a
photon in a quantum experiment being caused by the expansion of the
universe is just plain dumb.*


OK I admit it, saying a measured energy change found in a quantum
experiment was caused by the expansion of the universe would be dumb. So
its a good think I didn't say it.
  


*And Yes, I did write two scientific papers with Carl Sagan.*


​Bullshit​.
  

  
*Let's settle the question this way: we'll each send a check to Brent

Meeker, payable for $5000. Brent will then decide who is telling the truth
about my papers with Carl Sagan. Brent will then send $9000 to the winner
and keep $1000 for himself. If you don't agree, apologize and STFU. AG*


This situation is getting quite Kafka-esque.


HEY!  Butt out Russell.  I'm gonna make some money on this.

Brent
:-)

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Re: Do we live within a Diophantine equation?

2018-06-20 Thread John Clark
On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 1:45 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:

​>>​
>> No I'm not disputing that, but computational relations couldn't exist
>> without computations, and computations couldn't exist without matter that
>> obeys the laws of physics.
>>
>
> ​>* ​*
> *Why couldn't it be the other way around?  e.g. that mathematical
> computations are what give us physics?*
>


If mathematics was more fundamental than physics then Intel would be a
ridiculously unnecessary company and would have gone  bankrupt decades ago,
but physics can clearly do things that mathematics can't and so the company
is thriving


> ​>​
> *In other words, why do you place physics on such firmer ground than
> mathematics?  Are you certain physics is primary, and not mathematics?  If
> so, I would like to know the reason for this certainty.*
>

If neither matter nor physics existed but "1+1 =2" did then "1+1 =3" would
exist too, one of those statement is fiction and one id nonfiction but the
only difference between the 2 is the way physics treats matter, for example
2 merged hydrogen atoms behave differently in a gravitational field than 3
do. The difference between truth and falsehood is that if you treat a
falsehood as being true the drug you're taking won't work or you car won't
start or your Turing Machine won't do what it is programmed to do, or in
other words something will end up biting you in the ass. But without
physics the consequences for being wrong would be exactly the same as the
consequences for being right, none at all.

John K Clark

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

2018-06-20 Thread John Clark
On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 2:22 PM,  wrote:

*>I found an old version of my resume and gave you the exact references,
> which you found without my help.*


I have no idea what you're talking about. I looked and I could not find 2
scientific papers written by Alan Grayson or even one, and if they existed
I would have found them. But if you have an exact reference then lets hear
it.

 > *The papers were published in reputable journals,*


What was the name of those "reputable journals"? An even better question is
what the hell is your name?

*> The papers were written over 50 years ago, so when the subject first
> came up my memory was a little vague.*


That's OK,  things have changed in the last 51 years and we now have a
thing called "Goodle", so if you tell me your name Mr. Google can find the
two papers you wrote with Carl Sagan in 3 seconds flat, if of course they
exist.

>* So make the bet, or apologize​ and​ STFU. AG*


I have absolutely nothing to apologize for, in the very unlikely event I
was wrong about you writing those papers it would be because you were lying
about who you were and the initials "AG" that you put in at the end of
every line does not stand for "Alan Grayson. I don't like it when people
lie to me, that's why I don't like Donald Trump and that's why I don't like
you.

John K Clark

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Re: Primary matter

2018-06-20 Thread Brent Meeker




On 6/20/2018 4:51 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

Hi Bruno,


I follow your reasoning, from one of your recent articles. This leaves
me dissatisfied, but if I try to verbalize this dissatisfaction I feel
stuck in a loop. Perhaps this illustrates your point.


We might need to do some detour about what it would mean to explain 
consciousness, or matter.
I might ask myself if you are not asking too much, perhaps. Eventually, 
something has to remain unexplainable for reason of self-consisteny. I suspect 
it will be just where our intuition of numbers or combinators, or of the 
distinction finite/infinite comes from (assuming mechanism), or just why we 
trust the doctor!

I thought about it for some time. It seems that at a meta level, we
are always stuck in this situation of "give me one miracle for free
and everything else becomes explainable". The miracle can be matter,
or consciousness, or arithmetic.


Do you see that is just another form of my circle of virtuous 
explanation.  Start wherever you understand or accept the starting point 
and then you can go around the circle and get to everything else.


Brent

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

2018-06-20 Thread Russell Standish
On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 03:09:37AM -0700, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, June 20, 2018 at 2:22:53 AM UTC, John Clark wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 9:58 PM, > 
> > wrote:
> >  
> >
> >> *​> ​I think you should admit that bringing up the energy change of a 
> >> photon in a quantum experiment being caused by the expansion of the 
> >> universe is just plain dumb.*
> >
> >
> > OK I admit it, saying a measured energy change found in a quantum 
> > experiment was caused by the expansion of the universe would be dumb. So 
> > its a good think I didn't say it. 
> >  
> >
> >> *And Yes, I did write two scientific papers with Carl Sagan.*
> >
> >
> > ​Bullshit​.
> >  
> >
>  
> *Let's settle the question this way: we'll each send a check to Brent 
> Meeker, payable for $5000. Brent will then decide who is telling the truth 
> about my papers with Carl Sagan. Brent will then send $9000 to the winner 
> and keep $1000 for himself. If you don't agree, apologize and STFU. AG*
> 

This situation is getting quite Kafka-esque. 

-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

2018-06-20 Thread agrayson2000


On Wednesday, June 20, 2018 at 1:28:16 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 10:46 PM, > 
> wrote:
>
> *​> ​And Yes, I did write two scientific papers with Carl Sagan.*
>>>
>>>
>>> ​
>>> ​>>​
>>> Bullshit​.
>>>  
>>>
>>  
>
> >* How much money are you willing to wager? Put your money where your 
>> mouth is. It must be placed in an escrow account. AG*
>>
>  
> I can't do that because if I lose the bet I wouldn't know who to send the 
> money to, and if I win the bet I wouldn't know who to demand payment 
> from. I don't know who I'm talking to, I don't know you're real name. If 
> your claim is true then your other claim to be somebody named "Alan 
> Grayson" can not be true because nobody named Alan Grayson ever wrote a 
> paper with Carl Sagan. And you won't tell us what journal the papers were 
> published in, or their titles, or even what they were about. Why is that? I 
> can think of only 3 possibilities:
>
> 1) The papers were so bad you're embarrassed by them. But that seems 
> unlikely as Sagan was not in the habit of writing bad papers. By the way, 
> I'm not ashamed of my views so I always use my real name.
>
> 2) You’re so old dementia has kicked in and you’ve forgotten all details 
> about the papers and have even forgotten what your name is.
>
> 3) The papers do not exist.   
>
>  John K Clark
>

*You're a coward and a liar. In my last post I explained how we can deal 
with payment issues. Very simple. The papers were written over 50 years 
ago, so when the subject first came up my memory was a little vague. But I 
found an old version of my resume and gave you the exact references, which 
you found without my help. The papers were published in reputable journals, 
which attests to their quality. So make the bet, or apologize and STFU. AG *

>
>  
>

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Re: What the Earth looked like

2018-06-20 Thread 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List
Thanks... A nice visualization of plate tectonics  
 
  On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 8:12 AM, John Clark wrote:   
I like this, it shows you what the Earth looked like with an animated globe 
between now and 750 million years ago:
http://dinosaurpictures.org/ancient-earth#0

John K Clark

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Re: Do we live within a Diophantine equation?

2018-06-20 Thread Jason Resch
On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 10:56 AM, John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 1:06 AM, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> ​>* ​*
>> *I am not sure I am seeing  the relevance of your comments to what I
>> said.​ ​Are you disputing that computational relations are embodied by
>> statements concerning solutions to certain polynomial equations?*
>>
>
> No I'm not disputing that, but computational relations couldn't exist
> without computations, and computations couldn't exist without matter that
> obeys the laws of physics.
>

Why couldn't it be the other way around?  e.g. that mathematical
computations are what give us physics?
In other words, why do you place physics on such firmer ground than
mathematics?  Are you certain physics is primary, and not mathematics?  If
so, I would like to know the reason for this certainty.

Jason



>
>
>> ​>​
>>  *Do you believe "7 is prime" was true before any human mathematician
>> considered the question?*
>>
>
> ​
> Yes, but if there was ever a time when not even one thing existed, much
> less seven things, then you could assume 7 is prime and it would produce no
> contradictions or you could assume 7 is not prime and it would produce no
> contradictions either because the concept of “seven" would be meaningless
> as would the concept of “prime". Well... you could assume that except that
> if nothing existed then you wouldn't either so you couldn't assume anything
> nor could anybody else.
> ​
>
> John K Clark​
>
>
>
> --
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Re: Do we live within a Diophantine equation?

2018-06-20 Thread John Clark
On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 1:06 AM, Jason Resch  wrote:

​>* ​*
> *I am not sure I am seeing  the relevance of your comments to what I
> said.​ ​Are you disputing that computational relations are embodied by
> statements concerning solutions to certain polynomial equations?*
>

No I'm not disputing that, but computational relations couldn't exist
without computations, and computations couldn't exist without matter that
obeys the laws of physics.


> ​>​
>  *Do you believe "7 is prime" was true before any human mathematician
> considered the question?*
>

​
Yes, but if there was ever a time when not even one thing existed, much
less seven things, then you could assume 7 is prime and it would produce no
contradictions or you could assume 7 is not prime and it would produce no
contradictions either because the concept of “seven" would be meaningless
as would the concept of “prime". Well... you could assume that except that
if nothing existed then you wouldn't either so you couldn't assume anything
nor could anybody else.
​

John K Clark​

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What the Earth looked like

2018-06-20 Thread John Clark
I like this, it shows you what the Earth looked like with an animated globe
between now and 750 million years ago:
http://dinosaurpictures.org/ancient-earth#0

John K Clark

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

2018-06-20 Thread John Clark
On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 10:46 PM,  wrote:

*​> ​And Yes, I did write two scientific papers with Carl Sagan.*
>>
>>
>> ​
>> ​>>​
>> Bullshit​.
>>
>>
>

>* How much money are you willing to wager? Put your money where your mouth
> is. It must be placed in an escrow account. AG*
>

I can't do that because if I lose the bet I wouldn't know who to send the
money to, and if I win the bet I wouldn't know who to demand payment
from. I don't know who I'm talking to, I don't know you're real name. If
your claim is true then your other claim to be somebody named "Alan
Grayson" can not be true because nobody named Alan Grayson ever wrote a
paper with Carl Sagan. And you won't tell us what journal the papers were
published in, or their titles, or even what they were about. Why is that? I
can think of only 3 possibilities:

1) The papers were so bad you're embarrassed by them. But that seems
unlikely as Sagan was not in the habit of writing bad papers. By the way,
I'm not ashamed of my views so I always use my real name.

2) You’re so old dementia has kicked in and you’ve forgotten all details
about the papers and have even forgotten what your name is.

3) The papers do not exist.

 John K Clark

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Re: Do we live within a Diophantine equation?

2018-06-20 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 11:36 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 17 Jun 2018, at 02:18, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> In solving Hilbert's 10th problem
>  in the
> negative, the work of Martin Davis, Yuri Matiyasevich, Hilary Putnam and
> Julia Robinson culminated in 1970 with the MRDP theorem
> 
> which concludes:
>
> *Every computably enumerable set has a representation as a Diophantine
> equation  (an equation
> involving only integer coefficients and variables).*
>
> This shocked number theorists, because it meant simple equations involving
> nothing more than a few integer variables have the full power of Turing
> machines.  In fact, it was shown by Yuri Matiyasevich that a universal
> Diophantine equation can be made with as few as 9 unknowns.
>
> Some examples:
>
>- k is even if there exists a solution to: k - 2x = 0
>- k is a perfect square if there exists a solution to: k - x^2 = 0
>- k is a Fibonacci number if there exists a solution to: k^4 - k^2*x^2
>- x^4 - 1 = 0
>- (k+2) is a prime number if there exists a solution to the sum of: (these
>14 equations
>)
>- k is a LISP program having output n, if the equation having
>variables: k, n, x1, x2, x3 ... x2 (a polynomial having ~20,000
>variables ) has a solution.
>
> The universality of Diophantine equations means there are polynomial
> equations that compute things quite surprising, such as polynomials that
> have solutions of 0, IFF:
>
>- One of the variables "k" is a valid MP3 file.
>- One of the variables "k" is a JPEG image containing the image of a
>cat (where the equation implements the same computation as a neural network
>trained to recognize images of cats)
>- For two of the variables "y" and "x", "y" equals a state of a chess
>board after deep blue makes a move given a chess board with a state of "x".
>- For two of the variables "y" and "x", "y" equals the state of the
>Universal Dovetailer after performing "n" steps of execution.
>
>
> The last example seems to suggest to me, that pure arithmetical truth,
> concerning the solutions to equations, is identical to computation.  That
> is to say, certain mathematical statements carry with them (effectively)
> Turing machines, and their executions.
>
>
> Matiyazevic results is indeed quite impressive. It finishes an inquiry
> begun by Davis and Putnam with important progress by Julia Robinson, and
> eventually Matiyazevic got the proof, and its solved the 10th problem of
> Hilbert: there is no mechanical procedure to tell if a diophantine
> polynomial equation has a solution or not. (Assuming Church’s thesis, as
> Matiyzevic explains well in a ten page section in his book).
>
>
>
>
>
> Just as all solutions to the deep-blue implementing equation is equivalent
> to the computations that Deep blue makes when evaluating the board, and all
> solutions to the cat recognizing equation are equivalent to the processing
> done by the trained neural network, all solutions to the LISP equation are
> equivalent to the execution of every possible LISP program (including the
> UD).
>
> Does this our conscious experience might be a direct consequence of
> Diophantine equations?
>
>
> Yes. Although you could *equivalently* say that our conscious experience
> is a direct consequence of the combinators laws Kxy = x and Sxyz = xz(yz).
>


Do you have some references that you would recommend for someone wanting to
learn more about combinator laws and how they lead to universality?
Is the above the same thing as a Y-combinator, or some more specific
equation in lamda calculus or combinatorial logic? I wish to lean more.



> Which is certainly shorter than providing a degree 4 universal Diophantine
> equation, like below (I can’t resist):
>
> (unknowns range on the non negative integers (= 0 included)
> 31 unknowns: A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, S, T,
> W, Z, U, Y, Al, Ga, Et, Th, La, Ta, Ph, and two parameters:  Nu and X.
>
> X is in W_Nu iff   phi_Nu(X) stop if and only if
>
>
>
I don't quite follow what W_Nu is here.

I am guessing from the context that this means for a given machine/program
Nu, and input X, this equation has a solution IFF Nu halts given X as
input, but I am not sure what it means to say X is in W_Nu.


>
>
> Nu = ((ZUY)^2 + U)^2 + Y
>
> ELG^2 + Al = (B - XY)Q^2
>
> Qu = B^(5^60)
>
> La + Qu^4 = 1 + LaB^5
>
> Th +  2Z = B^5
>
> L = U + TTh
>
> E = Y + MTh
>
> N = Q^16
>
> R = [G + EQ^3 + LQ^5 + (2(E - ZLa)(1 + XB^5 + G)^4 + LaB^5 + +
> LaB^5Q^4)Q^4](N^2 -N)
>  + [Q^3 -BL + L + ThLaQ^3 + (B^5 - 2)Q^5] (N^2 - 1)
>
> P = 2W(S^2)(R^2)N^2
>
> (P^2)K^2 - K^2 + 1 = Ta^2
>
> 4(c - KSN^2)^2 + Et = K^2
>
> K = R + 1 + HP - H
>

Re: Primary matter

2018-06-20 Thread Telmo Menezes
Hi Bruno,

>> I follow your reasoning, from one of your recent articles. This leaves
>> me dissatisfied, but if I try to verbalize this dissatisfaction I feel
>> stuck in a loop. Perhaps this illustrates your point.
>
>
> We might need to do some detour about what it would mean to explain 
> consciousness, or matter.
> I might ask myself if you are not asking too much, perhaps. Eventually, 
> something has to remain unexplainable for reason of self-consisteny. I 
> suspect it will be just where our intuition of numbers or combinators, or of 
> the distinction finite/infinite comes from (assuming mechanism), or just why 
> we trust the doctor!

I thought about it for some time. It seems that at a meta level, we
are always stuck in this situation of "give me one miracle for free
and everything else becomes explainable". The miracle can be matter,
or consciousness, or arithmetic. I believe I have to accept this state
of affairs for the reason of self-consistency that you express above,
but I'm human and I still feel the curiosity. Epistemic limits are
hard to accept.

Could it even be that it doesn't make sense to say that materialism is
true or false, or that idealism is true or false and so on? I mean in
the same sense that the sun is not really the center of the solar
system (the center is just a human mental model), but assuming it
makes it simpler to describe the orbits. Perhaps assuming materialism
makes it easier to describe certain aspects of nature, while assuming
comp makes it easier to describe others, but in the end we always have
to sacrifice something. Model realism at the meta level...

>>> It goes from the rough dissociated universal consciousness of Q to the 
>>> elaborate self-consciousness of PA or ZF, or us.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
 Darwinism does not seem to require it.
>>>
>>> It does. When the machine opts for <>p in the doubt between p and <>p, if 
>>> it let it go, in some sense, it transforms itself into a more speedy and 
>>> more efficacious machine, with respect to its most probable history.
>>> So, consciousness brings a self-speedable ability, which is quite handy for 
>>> self-moving being living in between a prey and a predator.
>>
>> I'm not convinced. Consider a simple computer simulation where agents
>> are controlled by evolving rules. Agents can eat blue or red pills.
>> 90% of the time blue pills give them energy and red pills cause
>> damage. 10% of the time the opposite happens. It is not possible to
>> know before eating a pill. Let's say the rule system evolves to make
>> the agents always eat blue pills and never red pills. Most of the time
>> this helps the agents, precisely because it assumes the most probable
>> histories. This is a simplified version of the sort of "decisions"
>> that evolution makes, and I would say that it is reasonable to assume
>> that our own evolutionary story consists of the accumulation of a
>> great number of such decisions. I still don't see how consciousness
>> makes a difference in such a mechanism.
>
> The reason why consciousness makes the difference is not related to the 
> environment, but is intrinsic to the machine itself.
>
> I am aware to be quick on this, but the reason is a bit mathematically 
> involved, and again, depends crucially of a discovery made by Gödel, and 
> exposed in his paper “the length of proof”.
>
> Gödel discovered the existence that if you have some essentially undecidable 
> theory, like RA, PA, ZF, there are always undecidable sentences, like <>RA in 
> RA, of <>ZF in ZF, etc, then if you add an undecidable sentence (in the 
> theory T, say) to T, you get a theory which not only will prove infinitely 
> more sentence than T, but that infinitely many proofs will be arbitrarily 
> shorter in T+the undecidable sentence than the proof of it in T, making 
> “somehow” T+the undecidable sentence much faster than T.
>
> Even if the added sentence is false, we get that speeding-up (even for 
> interesting sentences as Eric Vandenbussche convinced me (He thought that 
> this was false, but eventually he proved that statement true).
>
> Blum has got a similar result in computer science, and eventually Blum & 
> Marquez characterised the spedable machine/set (he used the w_i instead of 
> the phi_i), and he obtained the class of sub-creative set, which generalised 
> the creative set (which correspond to the universal machine).

I am very interested in this but cannot find the reference... Can you give it?

> This means that if you take a slow universal machine, like the Babbage 
> Machine, and a very efficacious machine, like a super-quantum computer, then 
> you can by make the Babbage machine more rapid than the quantum computer on 
> *almost* all inputs (= all except a finite number of exceptions), and even 
> arbitrarily more rapid. Of course the “almost” limit seriously the 
> applicability of that theorem, but in arithmetic, and for the FPI, that can 
> play a rôle.

Very interesting, and I think related 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

2018-06-20 Thread agrayson2000


On Wednesday, June 20, 2018 at 2:22:53 AM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 9:58 PM, > 
> wrote:
>  
>
>> *​> ​I think you should admit that bringing up the energy change of a 
>> photon in a quantum experiment being caused by the expansion of the 
>> universe is just plain dumb.*
>
>
> OK I admit it, saying a measured energy change found in a quantum 
> experiment was caused by the expansion of the universe would be dumb. So 
> its a good think I didn't say it. 
>  
>
>> *And Yes, I did write two scientific papers with Carl Sagan.*
>
>
> ​Bullshit​.
>  
>
 
*Let's settle the question this way: we'll each send a check to Brent 
Meeker, payable for $5000. Brent will then decide who is telling the truth 
about my papers with Carl Sagan. Brent will then send $9000 to the winner 
and keep $1000 for himself. If you don't agree, apologize and STFU. AG*

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