Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-12-04 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Thu, Dec 5, 2019 at 10:44 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> On 12/3/2019 1:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> This absurd conclusion depends only on the single world assumption, it's a 
> consequence of the non-existence of counterfactuals. Clearly actions as a 
> response to counterfactual inputs must be relevant for consciousness,
>
> It's not clear to me.  How can there be a response to an input ("input" to 
> what) that doesn't occur?  And why would such a response be anything but 
> crazy?
>
> Why necessarily crazy? If you can prove this, you refute Mechanism.
>
>
> Wow, I didn't expect it to be so easy.  I have a dog.   If my dog died I'd
> get another dog.  My dog didn't die today.  The counterfact then is that my
> dog did die today.  So responding the counterfact I get another dog.  The
> same thing eventuates tomorrow.  Soon my neighbors report me to the
> authorites and when I explain this to the judge he mandates psychiatric
> care.
>
> Hence Mechanism is false.
>

I think the point Bruno is making is that consciousness requires
"counterfactual correctness", by which he appears to mean that
consciousness must be such that if the inputs are changed
(counterfactually), then the output must also change. This hypothesis --
that consciousness requires this "counterfactuall correctness" -- was
introduced ad hoc in order to protect the movie graph argument. If we take
the sequence of states through which a computation proceeds to give a
particular conscious experience and reproduce exactly those states on a
film or something similar, then running through those states will reproduce
the same conscious experience. They want to avoid this conclusion, so they
impose the restriction that the sequence of state must be "counterfactually
correct", i.e., it must respond differently to different input -- which the
movie graph, being fixed, clearly cannot.

That this ad hoc manoeuvre does not prove anything about consciousness was
shown by Maudlin in his "Olympia" argument. One can restore counterfactual
correctness by additional ad hoc additions to the graph, without altering
the fact that the movie record still reproduces the conscious experience.
The "competition" is irrelevant to consciousness in this case.

Bruce

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-12-04 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Wed, Dec 4, 2019 at 9:33 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 3 Dec 2019, at 23:06, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
> On Tue, Dec 3, 2019 at 8:03 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>> On 3 Dec 2019, at 03:18, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>
>> My brain currently has only one state.
>>
>> How do you know that? How could you know that.
>>
>
> It is a pretty good hypothesis.
>
>> Other states may be consistent with my current conscious state, but these
>> do not exist. The idea that I am a superposition of all brain states
>> consistent with my consciousness is just idle speculation. How would you
>> ever prove such a thing?
>>
>> We cannot prove the existence of a physical universe, and if we assume
>> mechanism, we cannot see how a universe could choose one state against the
>> infinitely many others which lead to the same consciousness.
>>
>
> The answer is simple. Do not assume mechanism. Then the physical universe
> is what it is,
>
>
> In which theory of mind? Once you assume non-mechanism, you need to give
> your theory of mind, and explain how it allows a unique universe.
>

No I don't. It is only in your mind that such a thing is necessary. Science
does not need to explain everything before it gets started. A theory of
mind can develop in the normal course of science -- it is not an a priori
requirement.

In fact, quantum mechanics has moved resolutely in the direction of
eliminating any requirement of mind, measurement, or observers as
fundamentals for the theory. Consequently mechanism, postulating that the
physical universe arises out of the statistics over all consistent
extensions of the computations underlying consciousness, is going in
completely the wrong direction. By making consciousness central to your
theory, you are destroying all possibility of an objective science. Putting
the observer as a central element of the theory is what went wrong with the
Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics. The elimination of the
personal, the mind, and the observer is central to modern physics.

Bruce

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Re: Are Real Numbers Really Real?

2019-12-04 Thread Lawrence Crowell
On Wednesday, December 4, 2019 at 4:29:03 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, December 4, 2019 at 2:31:08 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>> On Wednesday, December 4, 2019 at 1:53:39 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 4, 2019 at 11:14 AM Lawrence Crowell <
>>> goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> *>>> The entire notion of quantum states and events as localized in 
>> regions of space is not entirely applicable. What symmetries exist with 
>> these quantum states or field are then not tied to local geometry.*
>>
>
> >> OK, but if quantum states are to explain local geometry, and that 
> is the entire point because that is all that experimenters can see, then 
> the reverse can not be true, local geometry must be tied to quantum 
> states. 
>

 *> I guess this is not quite clear to me. Largely the quantum states 
 that form spacetime are quantum gravitation states.*

>>>
>>> It seems to me if quantum gravitational states form spacetime, and if 
>>> spacetime is smooth and continuous as the Gamma Ray Burst evidence seems to 
>>> show, then 2 distinct points that are less than a Planck Length apart must 
>>> correspond to 2 distinct quantum gravitational states.  Am I wrong?
>>>
>>
>> No it is not possible to know. If you localize a quantum bit to a Planck 
>> length it is in a black hole. If you try to localize two qubits arbitrarily 
>> closely they caon only be within 2 Planck areas, if on a horizon,or in two 
>> Planck volumes if in the bulk. A Planck volume is V_p = (4π/3)ℓ_p^3.So 
>> if you try to localize a field is less than two Planck volumes, or within a 
>> length 1.26ℓ_p there is a loss of any information about them.
>>  
>>
>>>
>>> >> So if the Gamma Ray Burst results hold up and spacetime really is 
> smooth and continuous then, would it be correct to say there are a 
> infinite 
> (not just astronomically large) number of quantum symmetries and the 
> Planck 
> Length and the Planck Time have no physical significance, they are just 
> numbers in units of time and space that for no particular reason 
> happen to pop out when you mathematically play around with the constants 
> of 
> nature in certain ways?
>

 *> The number of quantum states are Virasoro, which is in principle 
 infinite. However, because the cosmological horizon can only bound a 
 finite 
 number of such states, as is the case with a black hole with entropy S = 
 A/4ℓ_p^2, the number of physical states is bounded above. As a result the 
 Virasoro algebra has high frequency modes that are mathematically 
 possible, 
 but not physically accessed.*

>>>
>>> Then although mathematically infinite as far as physics is concerned 
>>> there are only a finite number of quantum gravitational states, but if 
>>> quantum states produces spacetime then why does the Gamma Ray Burst results 
>>> say spacetime is smooth and continuous? Can 2 points that are arbitrarily 
>>> close to each other have any physical meaning, does physics need Real 
>>> Numbers or not?  
>>>
>>
>> The gamma ray burst data just tells us that different wavelengths of 
>> photons have no dispersion. the G(p,p') = 1/(4π(|p - p'|^2 - m^2)) predicts 
>> different dispersons for different wavelengths of light. Over distances of 
>> billions of light years this would be significant. Nothing of this sort was 
>> observed. This means there is no "foaminess" or discreteness to spacetime. 
>> This is down to a scale of ℓ_p/50, the last I checked.
>>  
>>
>>>  
>>>
 *> A Hilbert space H that contains H_a and H_b is not equal to H_a×H_b. 
 Any unitary transformation between H_a and H_b defines a boundary if we 
 trace over one of these so S_a = tr_bS = -kTr_b[ρlog(ρ)] and similarly for 
 S_b. We have removed the off-diagonal terms. We then can define this as a 
 boundary, aka holographic screen or horizon, between sets of entangled 
 states. This then defines a form of geometry. The transformation between 
 H_a and H_b can just as well be time evolution with a boundary that 
 separates two temporal regions. The Taub-NUT spacetime has this 
 characteristic as does the region between the spacelike region outside the 
 inner horizon of a black hole and the mysterious region inside.*

>>>
>>> You seem to be saying space may not be fundamental but time is. Would 
>>> that be a fair representation of your views?
>>>
>>
>> I tried to indicate that both space and time are emergent.
>>
>> LC
>>  
>>
>
>
> But everything you wrote is in the vocabulary of space+time.
>
> Even "wave*length"*.
>
> @philipthrift 
>

This is in reference to the propagation of photons. It illustrates that 
spacetime is not made of chunks or finite elements. Spacetime is smooth. 
However, it is an epiphenomenology of quantum entanglement.

LC 

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-12-04 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List



On 12/3/2019 1:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

This absurd conclusion depends only on the single world assumption, it's a 
consequence of the non-existence of counterfactuals. Clearly actions as a 
response to counterfactual inputs must be relevant for consciousness,

It's not clear to me.  How can there be a response to an input ("input" to 
what) that doesn't occur?  And why would such a response be anything but crazy?

Why necessarily crazy? If you can prove this, you refute Mechanism.


Wow, I didn't expect it to be so easy.  I have a dog.   If my dog died 
I'd get another dog.  My dog didn't die today.  The counterfact then is 
that my dog did die today.  So responding the counterfact I get another 
dog.  The same thing eventuates tomorrow.  Soon my neighbors report me 
to the authorites and when I explain this to the judge he mandates 
psychiatric care.


Hence Mechanism is false.

Brent

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Re: Superdeterminism in comics

2019-12-04 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, December 4, 2019 at 4:43:35 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Wed, Dec 4, 2019 at 10:48 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
>
>> On 11 Nov 2019, at 12:45, Bruce Kellett > 
>> wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, Nov 11, 2019 at 8:18 PM Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> That is the whole point of realism. To believe in things despite we can 
>>> not access to them. The belief that reality is bigger than the reality we 
>>> can personally observe.
>>>
>>
>> That is not scientific realism -- that is metaphysical mysticism.
>>
>>
>> Hmm… You *can* say that, but then you need to assess that your invocation 
>> of physical brain is such metaphysical mysticism. The point is that this 
>> version of metaphysical mysticism is incompatible with the mechanist 
>> assumption.
>>
>
> It is not a metaphysical to believe in the existence of a physical brain 
> underlying our conscious minds -- it is the result of solid scientific 
> evidence. If it is incompatible with the mechanist assumption, then that is 
> because the mechanist assumption is useless rubbish.
>
>
>
> Evolution has precisely nothing to do with it. The preferred basis is 
>> determined by quantum Darwinism 
>>
>>
>> You can’t invoke quantum mechanics when using Mechanism, unless you 
>> explain why the quantum formalism emerges from the statistics on all 
>> computations (realised in arithmetic) seen from inside (a notion handled by 
>> the self-referential logic, but some thought experience can give the main 
>> ideas without delving too much in the provability logics).
>>
>
>
> I can invoke quantum mechanics when doing physics. The trouble with your 
> rubric "the quantum formalism emerges from the statistics on all 
> computations seen from the inside..." is that is precisely meaningless. You 
> have never given any indication of what "The statistics on all 
> computations" might mean. How do you select "all computations", and what 
> "statistics" do you use on them? And what might that give you, if anything?
>
> Your grand promises have never actually delivered anything, Bruno. You 
> seem to think that you can lay down the law about quantum mechanics, but 
> you have no idea how to get even the Schroedinger equation from your 
> "statistics over computations". Until you can actually produce something 
> that even vaguely approaches an account of the physical world we see around 
> us, you can be safely ignored. 
>
> Bruce
>




Something close:

*The universal path integral supports a quantum theory of the universe in 
which the world that we see around us arises out of the interference 
between all computable structures.*

The universal path integral
Seth Lloyd 
, Olaf 
Dreyer 

(Submitted on 12 Feb 2013)

Path integrals represent a powerful route to quantization: they calculate 
probabilities by summing over classical configurations of variables such as 
fields, assigning each configuration a phase equal to the action of that 
configuration. This paper defines a universal path integral, which sums 
over all computable structures. This path integral contains as 
sub-integrals all possible computable path integrals, including those of 
field theory, the standard model of elementary particles, discrete models 
of quantum gravity, string theory, etc. The universal path integral 
possesses a well-defined measure that guarantees its finiteness, together 
with a method for extracting probabilities for observable quantities. The 
universal path integral supports a quantum theory of the universe in which 
the world that we see around us arises out of the interference between all 
computable structures.

Comments: 10 pages, plain TeX
Subjects: Quantum Physics (quant-ph)
Cite as: arXiv:1302.2850  [quant-ph]
  (or arXiv:1302.2850v1  [quant-ph] for 
this version)

@philipthrift

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Re: Superdeterminism in comics

2019-12-04 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Wed, Dec 4, 2019 at 10:48 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 11 Nov 2019, at 12:45, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
> On Mon, Nov 11, 2019 at 8:18 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> That is the whole point of realism. To believe in things despite we can
>> not access to them. The belief that reality is bigger than the reality we
>> can personally observe.
>>
>
> That is not scientific realism -- that is metaphysical mysticism.
>
>
> Hmm… You *can* say that, but then you need to assess that your invocation
> of physical brain is such metaphysical mysticism. The point is that this
> version of metaphysical mysticism is incompatible with the mechanist
> assumption.
>

It is not a metaphysical to believe in the existence of a physical brain
underlying our conscious minds -- it is the result of solid scientific
evidence. If it is incompatible with the mechanist assumption, then that is
because the mechanist assumption is useless rubbish.



Evolution has precisely nothing to do with it. The preferred basis is
> determined by quantum Darwinism
>
>
> You can’t invoke quantum mechanics when using Mechanism, unless you
> explain why the quantum formalism emerges from the statistics on all
> computations (realised in arithmetic) seen from inside (a notion handled by
> the self-referential logic, but some thought experience can give the main
> ideas without delving too much in the provability logics).
>


I can invoke quantum mechanics when doing physics. The trouble with your
rubric "the quantum formalism emerges from the statistics on all
computations seen from the inside..." is that is precisely meaningless. You
have never given any indication of what "The statistics on all
computations" might mean. How do you select "all computations", and what
"statistics" do you use on them? And what might that give you, if anything?

Your grand promises have never actually delivered anything, Bruno. You seem
to think that you can lay down the law about quantum mechanics, but you
have no idea how to get even the Schroedinger equation from your
"statistics over computations". Until you can actually produce something
that even vaguely approaches an account of the physical world we see around
us, you can be safely ignored.

Bruce

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Re: Are Real Numbers Really Real?

2019-12-04 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, December 4, 2019 at 2:31:08 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Wednesday, December 4, 2019 at 1:53:39 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Dec 4, 2019 at 11:14 AM Lawrence Crowell <
>> goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> *>>> The entire notion of quantum states and events as localized in 
> regions of space is not entirely applicable. What symmetries exist with 
> these quantum states or field are then not tied to local geometry.*
>

 >> OK, but if quantum states are to explain local geometry, and that 
 is the entire point because that is all that experimenters can see, then 
 the reverse can not be true, local geometry must be tied to quantum 
 states. 

>>>
>>> *> I guess this is not quite clear to me. Largely the quantum states 
>>> that form spacetime are quantum gravitation states.*
>>>
>>
>> It seems to me if quantum gravitational states form spacetime, and if 
>> spacetime is smooth and continuous as the Gamma Ray Burst evidence seems to 
>> show, then 2 distinct points that are less than a Planck Length apart must 
>> correspond to 2 distinct quantum gravitational states.  Am I wrong?
>>
>
> No it is not possible to know. If you localize a quantum bit to a Planck 
> length it is in a black hole. If you try to localize two qubits arbitrarily 
> closely they caon only be within 2 Planck areas, if on a horizon,or in two 
> Planck volumes if in the bulk. A Planck volume is V_p = (4π/3)ℓ_p^3.So if 
> you try to localize a field is less than two Planck volumes, or within a 
> length 1.26ℓ_p there is a loss of any information about them.
>  
>
>>
>> >> So if the Gamma Ray Burst results hold up and spacetime really is 
 smooth and continuous then, would it be correct to say there are a 
 infinite 
 (not just astronomically large) number of quantum symmetries and the 
 Planck 
 Length and the Planck Time have no physical significance, they are just 
 numbers in units of time and space that for no particular reason 
 happen to pop out when you mathematically play around with the constants 
 of 
 nature in certain ways?

>>>
>>> *> The number of quantum states are Virasoro, which is in principle 
>>> infinite. However, because the cosmological horizon can only bound a finite 
>>> number of such states, as is the case with a black hole with entropy S = 
>>> A/4ℓ_p^2, the number of physical states is bounded above. As a result the 
>>> Virasoro algebra has high frequency modes that are mathematically possible, 
>>> but not physically accessed.*
>>>
>>
>> Then although mathematically infinite as far as physics is concerned 
>> there are only a finite number of quantum gravitational states, but if 
>> quantum states produces spacetime then why does the Gamma Ray Burst results 
>> say spacetime is smooth and continuous? Can 2 points that are arbitrarily 
>> close to each other have any physical meaning, does physics need Real 
>> Numbers or not?  
>>
>
> The gamma ray burst data just tells us that different wavelengths of 
> photons have no dispersion. the G(p,p') = 1/(4π(|p - p'|^2 - m^2)) predicts 
> different dispersons for different wavelengths of light. Over distances of 
> billions of light years this would be significant. Nothing of this sort was 
> observed. This means there is no "foaminess" or discreteness to spacetime. 
> This is down to a scale of ℓ_p/50, the last I checked.
>  
>
>>  
>>
>>> *> A Hilbert space H that contains H_a and H_b is not equal to H_a×H_b. 
>>> Any unitary transformation between H_a and H_b defines a boundary if we 
>>> trace over one of these so S_a = tr_bS = -kTr_b[ρlog(ρ)] and similarly for 
>>> S_b. We have removed the off-diagonal terms. We then can define this as a 
>>> boundary, aka holographic screen or horizon, between sets of entangled 
>>> states. This then defines a form of geometry. The transformation between 
>>> H_a and H_b can just as well be time evolution with a boundary that 
>>> separates two temporal regions. The Taub-NUT spacetime has this 
>>> characteristic as does the region between the spacelike region outside the 
>>> inner horizon of a black hole and the mysterious region inside.*
>>>
>>
>> You seem to be saying space may not be fundamental but time is. Would 
>> that be a fair representation of your views?
>>
>
> I tried to indicate that both space and time are emergent.
>
> LC
>  
>


But everything you wrote is in the vocabulary of space+time.

Even "wave*length"*.

@philipthrift 

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-12-04 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, December 4, 2019 at 2:05:21 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
>
>
>> https://www.theguardian.com/books/2011/jan/09/soul-dust-nicholas-humphrey-review
>>  
>>
>
>> *we do, after all, know something about the intrinsic nature of matter, 
>> over and above everything we know in knowing the equations of physics. Why? 
>> Because we know the intrinsic nature of consciousness and consciousness is 
>> a form of matter.*
>
>
>
>


> I don't think mind (intelligence + consciousness) is a form of matter 
> anymore than fast is a form of racing car, mind is what a form of matter 
> does when it is organized in certain ways. 
>


The form that a racing car takes when it's going 120 m,p.h.: We say that 
form is fast. 

In any case, the contrary to what he said before this is mind-matter 
dualism.

@philipthrift

>
>  

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Re: Are Real Numbers Really Real?

2019-12-04 Thread Lawrence Crowell
On Wednesday, December 4, 2019 at 1:53:39 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Wed, Dec 4, 2019 at 11:14 AM Lawrence Crowell  > wrote:
>
> *>>> The entire notion of quantum states and events as localized in 
 regions of space is not entirely applicable. What symmetries exist with 
 these quantum states or field are then not tied to local geometry.*

>>>
>>> >> OK, but if quantum states are to explain local geometry, and that is 
>>> the entire point because that is all that experimenters can see, then the 
>>> reverse can not be true, local geometry must be tied to quantum states. 
>>>
>>
>> *> I guess this is not quite clear to me. Largely the quantum states that 
>> form spacetime are quantum gravitation states.*
>>
>
> It seems to me if quantum gravitational states form spacetime, and if 
> spacetime is smooth and continuous as the Gamma Ray Burst evidence seems to 
> show, then 2 distinct points that are less than a Planck Length apart must 
> correspond to 2 distinct quantum gravitational states.  Am I wrong?
>

No it is not possible to know. If you localize a quantum bit to a Planck 
length it is in a black hole. If you try to localize two qubits arbitrarily 
closely they caon only be within 2 Planck areas, if on a horizon,or in two 
Planck volumes if in the bulk. A Planck volume is V_p = (4π/3)ℓ_p^3.So if 
you try to localize a field is less than two Planck volumes, or within a 
length 1.26ℓ_p there is a loss of any information about them.
 

>
> >> So if the Gamma Ray Burst results hold up and spacetime really is 
>>> smooth and continuous then, would it be correct to say there are a infinite 
>>> (not just astronomically large) number of quantum symmetries and the Planck 
>>> Length and the Planck Time have no physical significance, they are just 
>>> numbers in units of time and space that for no particular reason happen 
>>> to pop out when you mathematically play around with the constants of nature 
>>> in certain ways?
>>>
>>
>> *> The number of quantum states are Virasoro, which is in principle 
>> infinite. However, because the cosmological horizon can only bound a finite 
>> number of such states, as is the case with a black hole with entropy S = 
>> A/4ℓ_p^2, the number of physical states is bounded above. As a result the 
>> Virasoro algebra has high frequency modes that are mathematically possible, 
>> but not physically accessed.*
>>
>
> Then although mathematically infinite as far as physics is concerned there 
> are only a finite number of quantum gravitational states, but if quantum 
> states produces spacetime then why does the Gamma Ray Burst results say 
> spacetime is smooth and continuous? Can 2 points that are arbitrarily close 
> to each other have any physical meaning, does physics need Real Numbers or 
> not?  
>

The gamma ray burst data just tells us that different wavelengths of 
photons have no dispersion. the G(p,p') = 1/(4π(|p - p'|^2 - m^2)) predicts 
different dispersons for different wavelengths of light. Over distances of 
billions of light years this would be significant. Nothing of this sort was 
observed. This means there is no "foaminess" or discreteness to spacetime. 
This is down to a scale of ℓ_p/50, the last I checked.
 

>  
>
>> *> A Hilbert space H that contains H_a and H_b is not equal to H_a×H_b. 
>> Any unitary transformation between H_a and H_b defines a boundary if we 
>> trace over one of these so S_a = tr_bS = -kTr_b[ρlog(ρ)] and similarly for 
>> S_b. We have removed the off-diagonal terms. We then can define this as a 
>> boundary, aka holographic screen or horizon, between sets of entangled 
>> states. This then defines a form of geometry. The transformation between 
>> H_a and H_b can just as well be time evolution with a boundary that 
>> separates two temporal regions. The Taub-NUT spacetime has this 
>> characteristic as does the region between the spacelike region outside the 
>> inner horizon of a black hole and the mysterious region inside.*
>>
>
> You seem to be saying space may not be fundamental but time is. Would that 
> be a fair representation of your views?
>

I tried to indicate that both space and time are emergent.

LC
 

>
> John K Clark
>

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Re: Are Real Numbers Really Real?

2019-12-04 Thread Lawrence Crowell
On Wednesday, December 4, 2019 at 12:08:01 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/4/2019 2:50 AM, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Tuesday, December 3, 2019 at 8:32:43 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 3, 2019 at 8:02:29 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote: 
>>>
>>> For symmetry protected quantum states, which are local entanglements, 
>>> they are local because the symmetry or group action is generally covariant. 
>>> This covariant property enforces what we think of as space and time. 
>>>
>>> LC
>>>
>>>
>
>> It's reasonable that space and time precedes symmetry. We get symmetries 
>> from spacial measurements.
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>
> An observer witnessing a black hole emit Hawking radiation discovers that 
> while quantum states are approaching the event horizon they also appear as 
> hawking radiation removed from the black hole. The entire notion of quantum 
> states and events as localized in regions of space is not entirely 
> applicable. 
>
>
> Right.  So how can they "approach the event horizon"?  How can they move 
> through space when they are not even localized? 
>
> Brent
>
>
The fields approaching the horizon are in a nonlocal superposition with 
itself far removed. The catch though is this persists even after a 
measurement meant to localize the particle-field. In a funny way the field 
is both in a superposition of two configurations and equivalently the 
entanglement of two field amplitudes.

LC
 

> What symmetries exist with these quantum states or field are then not tied 
> to local geometry. Local geometry is something that emerges instead from 
> the symmetries of quantum fields. This is because they are quantum 
> gravitational. The quantum fields approaching the event horizon, or on the 
> stretched horizon are pure Planck oscillator modes.
>
> Two gravitons that scatter either do so as a 4 point interaction, similar 
> to a φ^4 field theory, or they merge to form a black hole in a 3-point 
> interaction so the quantum BH decays via a 3-point interaction into 
> gravitons. There is no procedure for determining which of these amplitudes 
> occurs, and in fact they both do. QM is odd that way. As a result there is 
> no fundamental meaning to their being some point where a gauge action 
> occurs.
>
> As Arkani Hamed puts it, "Space must die."
>
> LC
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> 
> .
>
>
>

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-12-04 Thread John Clark
>
> https://www.theguardian.com/books/2011/jan/09/soul-dust-nicholas-humphrey-review
>
>

> *we do, after all, know something about the intrinsic nature of matter,
> over and above everything we know in knowing the equations of physics. Why?
> Because we know the intrinsic nature of consciousness and consciousness is
> a form of matter.*


John K Clark

I don't think mind (intelligence + consciousness) is a form of matter
anymore than fast is a form of racing car, mind is what a form of matter
does when it is organized in certain ways.













>
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>
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> .
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Re: Are Real Numbers Really Real?

2019-12-04 Thread John Clark
On Wed, Dec 4, 2019 at 11:14 AM Lawrence Crowell <
goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> wrote:

*>>> The entire notion of quantum states and events as localized in regions
>>> of space is not entirely applicable. What symmetries exist with these
>>> quantum states or field are then not tied to local geometry.*
>>>
>>
>> >> OK, but if quantum states are to explain local geometry, and that is
>> the entire point because that is all that experimenters can see, then the
>> reverse can not be true, local geometry must be tied to quantum states.
>>
>
> *> I guess this is not quite clear to me. Largely the quantum states that
> form spacetime are quantum gravitation states.*
>

It seems to me if quantum gravitational states form spacetime, and if
spacetime is smooth and continuous as the Gamma Ray Burst evidence seems to
show, then 2 distinct points that are less than a Planck Length apart must
correspond to 2 distinct quantum gravitational states.  Am I wrong?

>> So if the Gamma Ray Burst results hold up and spacetime really is smooth
>> and continuous then, would it be correct to say there are a infinite (not
>> just astronomically large) number of quantum symmetries and the Planck
>> Length and the Planck Time have no physical significance, they are just
>> numbers in units of time and space that for no particular reason happen
>> to pop out when you mathematically play around with the constants of nature
>> in certain ways?
>>
>
> *> The number of quantum states are Virasoro, which is in principle
> infinite. However, because the cosmological horizon can only bound a finite
> number of such states, as is the case with a black hole with entropy S =
> A/4ℓ_p^2, the number of physical states is bounded above. As a result the
> Virasoro algebra has high frequency modes that are mathematically possible,
> but not physically accessed.*
>

Then although mathematically infinite as far as physics is concerned there
are only a finite number of quantum gravitational states, but if quantum
states produces spacetime then why does the Gamma Ray Burst results say
spacetime is smooth and continuous? Can 2 points that are arbitrarily close
to each other have any physical meaning, does physics need Real Numbers or
not?


> *> A Hilbert space H that contains H_a and H_b is not equal to H_a×H_b.
> Any unitary transformation between H_a and H_b defines a boundary if we
> trace over one of these so S_a = tr_bS = -kTr_b[ρlog(ρ)] and similarly for
> S_b. We have removed the off-diagonal terms. We then can define this as a
> boundary, aka holographic screen or horizon, between sets of entangled
> states. This then defines a form of geometry. The transformation between
> H_a and H_b can just as well be time evolution with a boundary that
> separates two temporal regions. The Taub-NUT spacetime has this
> characteristic as does the region between the spacelike region outside the
> inner horizon of a black hole and the mysterious region inside.*
>

You seem to be saying space may not be fundamental but time is. Would that
be a fair representation of your views?

John K Clark

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Re: Are Real Numbers Really Real?

2019-12-04 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List



On 12/4/2019 8:14 AM, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
But this can be nonlocally correlated in both space and time as an 
observer finds quantum modes on the BH and outside as Hawking radiation.


What can "nonlocal" in time mean?...at two different times, but the same 
place?  That's what "local" means.


Brent

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Re: Are Real Numbers Really Real?

2019-12-04 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List



On 12/4/2019 2:50 AM, Lawrence Crowell wrote:

On Tuesday, December 3, 2019 at 8:32:43 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Tuesday, December 3, 2019 at 8:02:29 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell
wrote:

For symmetry protected quantum states, which are local
entanglements, they are local because the symmetry or group
action is generally covariant. This covariant property
enforces what we think of as space and time.

LC



It's reasonable that space and time precedes symmetry. We get
symmetries from spacial measurements.

@philipthrift


An observer witnessing a black hole emit Hawking radiation discovers 
that while quantum states are approaching the event horizon they also 
appear as hawking radiation removed from the black hole. The entire 
notion of quantum states and events as localized in regions of space 
is not entirely applicable.


Right.  So how can they "approach the event horizon"?  How can they move 
through space when they are not even localized?


Brent

What symmetries exist with these quantum states or field are then not 
tied to local geometry. Local geometry is something that emerges 
instead from the symmetries of quantum fields. This is because they 
are quantum gravitational. The quantum fields approaching the event 
horizon, or on the stretched horizon are pure Planck oscillator modes.


Two gravitons that scatter either do so as a 4 point interaction, 
similar to a φ^4 field theory, or they merge to form a black hole in a 
3-point interaction so the quantum BH decays via a 3-point interaction 
into gravitons. There is no procedure for determining which of these 
amplitudes occurs, and in fact they both do. QM is odd that way. As a 
result there is no fundamental meaning to their being some point where 
a gauge action occurs.


As Arkani Hamed puts it, "Space must die."

LC
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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-12-04 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 12/4/2019 2:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I am a scientist, and I like Mechanism, not because I would think it 
is true, but because the mind-body problem becomes a mathematical 
problem (extracting physics from intensional arithmetic/computer 
science), and we can already test the proposition physics (and it fits 
rather well).


But nothing has been extracted.  It's like saying you like the God 
theory because it explains everything, we just have to figure out why 
God did things the way He did.


Brent

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Re: Are Real Numbers Really Real?

2019-12-04 Thread Lawrence Crowell
On Wednesday, December 4, 2019 at 7:44:06 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Wed, Dec 4, 2019 at 5:50 AM Lawrence Crowell  > wrote:
>  
>
>> *> The entire notion of quantum states and events as localized in regions 
>> of space is not entirely applicable. What symmetries exist with these 
>> quantum states or field are then not tied to local geometry.*
>>
>
> OK, but if quantum states are to explain local geometry, and that is the 
> entire point because that is all that experimenters can see, then the 
> reverse can not be true, local geometry must be tied to quantum states. 
>

I guess this is not quite clear to me. Largely the quantum states that form 
spacetime are quantum gravitation states.
 

>
> > Local geometry is something that emerges instead from the symmetries of 
>> quantum fields. This is because they are quantum gravitational.
>>
>
> So if the Gamma Ray Burst results hold up and spacetime really is smooth 
> and continuous then, would it be correct to say there are a infinite (not 
> just astronomically large) number of quantum symmetries and the Planck 
> Length and the Planck Time have no physical significance, they are just 
> numbers in units of time and space that for no particular reason happen 
> to pop out when you mathematically play around with the constants of nature 
> in certain ways?
>

The number of quantum states are Virasoro, which is in principle infinite. 
However, because the cosmological horizon can only bound a finite number of 
such states, as is the case with a black hole with entropy S = A/4ℓ_p^2, 
the number of physical states is bounded above. As a result the Virasoro 
algebra has high frequency modes that are mathematically possible, but not 
physically accessed. Virasoro states are those of the bosonic string and we 
may think of a black hole as a very large high mode string that wraps 
around the Planck region above the horizon. The largest a black hole could 
become is equal to all the mass in the observable universe. That in turn is 
finite because beyond the cosmological horizon mass can't be accessed. 
 

>
> *> As Arkani Hamed puts it, "Space must die."*
>>
>
> What about time, can space really be separated from it despite what 
> Minkowski said? Time features prominently in Schrödinger's Equation, 
> Dirac's Equation and even Feynman diagrams; you're going to have to go back 
> to square one and rewrite the entirety of Quantum Mechanics without any 
> reference to space or time, and that would be a massive job that I'm not 
> certain could be done, I'm not even certain there would be any point in 
> doing so, it would certainly make Quantum Mechanics far harder to use and 
> its not exactly easy now.
>

A Hilbert space H that contains H_a and H_b is not equal to H_a×H_b. Any 
unitary transformation between H_a and H_b defines a boundary if we trace 
over one of these so S_a = tr_bS = -kTr_b[ρlog(ρ)] and similarly for S_b. 
We have removed the off-diagonal terms. We then can define this as a 
boundary, aka holographic screen or horizon, between sets of entangled 
states. This then defines a form of geometry. The transformation between 
H_a and H_b can just as well be time evolution with a boundary that 
separates two temporal regions. The Taub-NUT spacetime has this 
characteristic as does the region between the spacelike region outside the 
inner horizon of a black hole and the mysterious region inside.
 

>  
>
>> * > The quantum fields approaching the event horizon, or on the stretched 
>> horizon are pure Planck oscillator modes.*
>>
>
> But a Planck oscillator is something that absorbs or emits energy only in 
> amounts which are integer multiples of Planck's constant times the 
> frequency of the oscillator, however frequency is the number of repeating 
> events per unit of TIME.
>

But this can be nonlocally correlated in both space and time as an observer 
finds quantum modes on the BH and outside as Hawking radiation.

LC 

>
>
>  John K Clark
>

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Re: Are Real Numbers Really Real?

2019-12-04 Thread John Clark
On Wed, Dec 4, 2019 at 5:50 AM Lawrence Crowell <
goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> wrote:


> *> The entire notion of quantum states and events as localized in regions
> of space is not entirely applicable. What symmetries exist with these
> quantum states or field are then not tied to local geometry.*
>

OK, but if quantum states are to explain local geometry, and that is the
entire point because that is all that experimenters can see, then the
reverse can not be true, local geometry must be tied to quantum states.

> Local geometry is something that emerges instead from the symmetries of
> quantum fields. This is because they are quantum gravitational.
>

So if the Gamma Ray Burst results hold up and spacetime really is smooth
and continuous then, would it be correct to say there are a infinite (not
just astronomically large) number of quantum symmetries and the Planck
Length and the Planck Time have no physical significance, they are just
numbers in units of time and space that for no particular reason happen to
pop out when you mathematically play around with the constants of nature in
certain ways?

*> As Arkani Hamed puts it, "Space must die."*
>

What about time, can space really be separated from it despite what
Minkowski said? Time features prominently in Schrödinger's Equation,
Dirac's Equation and even Feynman diagrams; you're going to have to go back
to square one and rewrite the entirety of Quantum Mechanics without any
reference to space or time, and that would be a massive job that I'm not
certain could be done, I'm not even certain there would be any point in
doing so, it would certainly make Quantum Mechanics far harder to use and
its not exactly easy now.


> * > The quantum fields approaching the event horizon, or on the stretched
> horizon are pure Planck oscillator modes.*
>

But a Planck oscillator is something that absorbs or emits energy only in
amounts which are integer multiples of Planck's constant times the
frequency of the oscillator, however frequency is the number of repeating
events per unit of TIME.

 John K Clark

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Re: Superdeterminism in comics

2019-12-04 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, December 4, 2019 at 5:42:23 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Nov 2019, at 10:58, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
> If reality is pure "information" (as a lot of physicists today seem to 
> believe, and that belief is required for Many Worlds), than copying 
> (branching) is free.
>
>
> But many physicists who claim that there is only information usually think 
> about quantum information, and they takes this (physical) notion for 
> granted. It is still a form of materialism, as it assumes some quantum 
> formalism, instead of deriving it from arithmetic (or from any universal 
> machinery) as it should.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>


Basically "quantum formalism" [ 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/quantum-field-theory/ ] is just a lot of 
goofing around with complex numbers instead of real numbers. It's still 
numbers.

And that "they [physicists] takes this (physical) notion for granted" 
doesn't seem right, as you watch many of them in the media talk.

@philipthrift

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-12-04 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 28 Nov 2019, at 16:51, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 9:43 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
>  
> >> In Everett's theory it's easy to specify exactly what the bet is about 
> >> because after its all over it's clear who has won,
> 
> > In each branch. But that is the case in the WM classical duplication too.
> 
> No it is not. In the duplicating machine case even after it's all over it's 
> not at all clear who has won because I hear 2 equally loud and equally valid 
> voices demanding that they deserve to receive the title "you”. 


That is right, and it is nice to listen to them both, as you should (given the 
definition of first person), and when you listen to each of them, you realise 
that they know perfectly who they are. The guy in W says “I find myself clearly 
in W, and could not have guessed this in H”, and the guy in M says "“I find 
myself clearly in M, and could not have guessed this in H”.




> in the Everett case it's clear who won because I hear only one voice that 
> claims to be Mr. You.


Then you need to enter the cut-and-read box. In W you will only one voice, and 
in M too.






> 
> >> there is only one person around who has inherited the grand title of "you”.
> 
> > Same in W, and same in M,
> 
> Right, it's the same except there are 2 people around instead of one; or to 
> put it another way, it's about as far from "the same" as you can get.

It is the same “same” as I will remain the same guy after I finish this 
sentence.




>  
> > except for irrelevant detail (provably irrelevant with mechanism).
> 
> With mechanism! That's your standard catch phrase you use whenever you get 
> into trouble,


It is my working hypothesis (and your’s, as you have already "said yes" to a 
doctor).





> but mechanism just says natural phenomena should be explained by reference to 
> matter

Not at all, or you invoke a non digital-mechanist hypothesis. Once you assume 
you survive a physical brain digital transplant, you can no more invoke a god 
(be it an irreducible matter or a superman in the sky) to identify your 
consciousness with any particular body appearance in arithmetic. You need not 
just a physical universe, but a physical universe + a non-dogital-mechanist 
theory of mind.





> and the laws of motion, and I don't know what proof you're referring to, I 
> hope it's not the silly one with wall to wall personal pronouns and a 
> personal pronoun duplicating machine.
> 
> >> and nobody can make a bet if nobody can pin down exactly what the bet is 
> >> suposed to be about.
> 
> > I bet one dollar with you that you will [...]
> 
> Since "you" duplicating machines are involved that's all that needs to be 
> said, that's enough information to know NOT to make the bet because John 
> Clark refuses to make a bet when John Clark doesn't know exactly, or even 
> approximately, what the hell the bet is.

Just enter the cut-read box. That’s how I discover the first person *plural* as 
my boss wanted me to use the bet procedure for defining the notion of 
probability (he was against the frequentist definition). He got immediately the 
point, and get also the important difference between first person singular and 
the first person plural. The arithmetical entanglement is provided by this 
simple acts: accompanying the candidate in the read-cut box.




> 
> > The prediction is on the first person feeling,
> 
> And because a first person feeling duplicating machine is involved there is 
> no such thing as THE first person feeling.

Of course there is. We just cannot predict which one we live, but it still 
exist, unless you die in the duplicating process.



> 
> > There is nothing as THE first person experience in general. But there is 
> > something like THE first person experience relative to the outcome of the 
> > experience.
> 
> No there is not. The experience had 2 outcomes so it is only meaningful to 
> talk about A first person experience.

The outcome here are the first person experience, and with mechanism, it 
remains clear that in this duplication experience, both lives only one first 
person experience, and obviously, any prediction of the particular place would 
be refuted by one guy, and so cannot do. But both confirms that they got “THE” 
experience. It is as relative than in Everett relative state.




>  
> > Assuming he bet W, the one in W will won, but Mechanism asks us to listen 
> > to both for evaluating the correct prediction. We want both to be correct.
> 
> The bet was what one and only one city will you end up seeing, if both are 
> correct then neither won because the bet was just stupid.


Well, if in Helsinki you bet W, then the fact that the W guy refuted it shows 
that we can lost the bet, locally and indexically, as expected for a notion of 
first person.

Bruno



> 
> John K Clark
> 
> 
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Re: Superdeterminism in comics

2019-12-04 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 11 Nov 2019, at 12:45, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Mon, Nov 11, 2019 at 8:18 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> On 10 Nov 2019, at 22:24, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>> On Sun, Nov 10, 2019 at 11:22 PM Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>> On 7 Nov 2019, at 22:58, Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>>> On Fri, Nov 8, 2019 at 8:53 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> >> > wrote:
>>> ISTM that creates problem for defining a point where one of the 
>>> probabilities becomes actualized.  MWI tries to avoid this by supposing 
>>> that all probabilities are "actualized" in the sense of becoming orthogonal 
>>> subspaces.  There are some problems with this too, but I see the attraction.
>>> 
>>> You can always find problems with any approach. What I particularly dislike 
>>> about MW advocates (like Sean Carroll) is that they are dishonest about the 
>>> number of assumptions they have to make to get the SWE to "fly". 
>>> Particularly over the preferred basis problem and Born rule. Zurek comes 
>>> closer, and he effectively dismisses the "other branches" as a convenient 
>>> fiction. If these other branches play no effective role in explaining our 
>>> experience, then why have them there?
>> 
>> How could some terms in a wave expansion disappear without assuming some non 
>> unitary collapse of some sort?
>> 
>> I did not say that they disappeared: merely that they do not play any role 
>> in explaining our experience.
> 
> Then you agree with the, or some, form of the Many-Histories/World theory.
> 
>> If you can point to any such role, then fine. But I doubt that you can do 
>> this.
> 
> That is the whole point of realism. To believe in things despite we can not 
> access to them. The belief that reality is bigger than the reality we can 
> personally observe.
> 
> That is not scientific realism -- that is metaphysical mysticism.

Hmm… You *can* say that, but then you need to assess that your invocation of 
physical brain is such metaphysical mysticism. The point is that this version 
of metaphysical mysticism is incompatible with the mechanist assumption.




>>  
>> There is no preferred basis, only personal basis to be able to interact 
>> locally in between us.
>> 
>> Again you appear to ignore the primary role of science is in explaining our 
>> experience. In our experience, there most certainly is a preferred basis -- 
>> the world around us has not dissolved into the "mush" that Schroedinger 
>> feared so much. If there is only a "personal basis", explain to me why your 
>> personal basis does not include superpositions of live and dead cats.
> 
> For exactly the same reason that when I am duplicated in Washington and 
> Moscow, I don’t feel personally to be in both cities at once.
> 
> So you are in the Washington/Moscow basis -- not the( W+/- M) basis. That is 
> a preferred basis.
> The linearity of the evolution of the wave + the linearity of the tensor 
> product entails that if a robot observe a cat in the state a + d, and this 
> with a ad-measuring device, he ends up into a robot observing the evolution 
> of a cat which is alive, and a robot observing the evolution of a cat which 
> is dead.
> 
> That is exactly the definition of a preferred basis -- which you appear to 
> want to deny even exists.
> Once we have a body, evolution has chosen the “preferred base”, but it does 
> not play a fundamental role in the fundamental equation.
> 
> Evolution has precisely nothing to do with it. The preferred basis is 
> determined by quantum Darwinism

You can’t invoke quantum mechanics when using Mechanism, unless you explain why 
the quantum formalism emerges from the statistics on all computations (realised 
in arithmetic) seen from inside (a notion handled by the self-referential 
logic, but some thought experience can give the main ideas without delving too 
much in the provability logics).



> acting on the normal physical interactions between quantum objects. Being 
> human or sentient is totally irrelevant.. The preferred basis plays a 
> fundamental role in the explanation of the world as we perceive it -- we do 
> not directly perceive Hilbert space. And explaining our experience is the aim 
> of science -- other things fall into the realm of metaphysics, which is not 
> science.

Then you should not invoke your ontological commitment in a physical universe 
that you present as irreducible. You contradict yourself here.

Bruno



> 
> Bruce
> 
> We need some base to have a perspective, like in Mechanist philosophy of mind 
> we need some universal machinery to be able to talk on all of them.
> 
> Bruno
> 
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Re: Superdeterminism in comics

2019-12-04 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 11 Nov 2019, at 10:58, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, November 11, 2019 at 3:18:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 10 Nov 2019, at 22:24, Bruce Kellett > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> On Sun, Nov 10, 2019 at 11:22 PM Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>> On 7 Nov 2019, at 22:58, Bruce Kellett > 
>> wrote:
>>> On Fri, Nov 8, 2019 at 8:53 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> > wrote:
>>> ISTM that creates problem for defining a point where one of the 
>>> probabilities becomes actualized.  MWI tries to avoid this by supposing 
>>> that all probabilities are "actualized" in the sense of becoming orthogonal 
>>> subspaces.  There are some problems with this too, but I see the attraction.
>>> 
>>> You can always find problems with any approach. What I particularly dislike 
>>> about MW advocates (like Sean Carroll) is that they are dishonest about the 
>>> number of assumptions they have to make to get the SWE to "fly". 
>>> Particularly over the preferred basis problem and Born rule. Zurek comes 
>>> closer, and he effectively dismisses the "other branches" as a convenient 
>>> fiction. If these other branches play no effective role in explaining our 
>>> experience, then why have them there?
>> 
>> How could some terms in a wave expansion disappear without assuming some non 
>> unitary collapse of some sort?
>> 
>> I did not say that they disappeared: merely that they do not play any role 
>> in explaining our experience.
> 
> Then you agree with the, or some, form of the Many-Histories/World theory.
> 
> 
> 
>> If you can point to any such role, then fine. But I doubt that you can do 
>> this.
> 
> That is the whole point of realism. To believe in things despite we can not 
> access to them. The belief that reality is bigger than the reality we can 
> personally observe.
> 
> 
> 
>>  
>> There is no preferred basis, only personal basis to be able to interact 
>> locally in between us.
>> 
>> Again you appear to ignore the primary role of science is in explaining our 
>> experience. In our experience, there most certainly is a preferred basis -- 
>> the world around us has not dissolved into the "mush" that Schroedinger 
>> feared so much. If there is only a "personal basis", explain to me why your 
>> personal basis does not include superpositions of live and dead cats.
> 
> 
> For exactly the same reason that when I am duplicated in Washington and 
> Moscow, I don’t feel personally to be in both cities at once.
> 
> The linearity of the evolution of the wave + the linearity of the tensor 
> product entails that if a robot observe a cat in the state a + d, and this 
> with a ad-measuring device, he ends up into a robot observing the evolution 
> of a cat which is alive, and a robot observing the evolution of a cat which 
> is dead. 
> 
> Once we have a body, evolution has chosen the “preferred base”, but it does 
> not play a fundamental role in the fundamental equation. We need some base to 
> have a perspective, like in Mechanist philosophy of mind we need some 
> universal machinery to be able to talk on all of them.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> If reality is pure "information" (as a lot of physicists today seem to 
> believe, and that belief is required for Many Worlds), than copying 
> (branching) is free.

But many physicists who claim that there is only information usually think 
about quantum information, and they takes this (physical) notion for granted. 
It is still a form of materialism, as it assumes some quantum formalism, 
instead of deriving it from arithmetic (or from any universal machinery) as it 
should.


> 
> But if all is matter, then there cannot be Many Worlds - or Many "You”s.

I don’t know what is matter, nor what is a “world”. That is why I work on this.

Bruno


> 
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Re: Superdeterminism in comics

2019-12-04 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 28 Nov 2019, at 15:49, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> 
> On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 8:14 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> >> Then what one and only one city do "you" personally feel to be in?
>  
> > In the third person view on the first person view, you can say [...]
> 
> What about the first person view of the third person view of the first person 
> view? And what about the third person view of the first person view of the 
> third person view of the first person view? And what about….

Intuitively, that is rather simple, although a long nesting of such will be as 
hard as a nesting of quantifiers in logic.
Technically you can treat this by working in the polymodal logic G, where you 
can define [1]p by [0]p & p, with [0] being Gödel’s arithmetical predicate of 
provability. The first person view of the third person view of the first person 
view is given by [1][0][1]p, which becomes  [0]{[0]([0]p & p) & ([0]p & p)} & 
{[0]([0]p & p) & ([0]p & p)}.




> 
> >> If you can not clearly answer that question,
> 
> > The clear answer is the prediction I have made in Helsinki: with certainty, 
> > I will [...]  
>  
> By casually throwing in the personal pronoun "I" in a thought experiment that 
> contains a "I" duplicating machine you have already demonstrated you are 
> unable to clearly answer the question.  

You have claim this without ever saying what is unclear, except that you missed 
the distinction in the question, which is strange because in other context you 
show to understand it. 



> 
> > [...] feel to be in only one city, but I cannot predict which one among 
> > Washington and Moscow.
> 
> Forget prediction!! Even AFTER the experiment is long over you STILL can not 
> answer the question "what city did you turn out to see?" and the reason you 
> can't answer it is because it contains the personal pronoun "you"; and if 
> personal pronoun duplicating machines are involved that means it is not a 
> question at all, it's just gibberish with a question mark at the end.  
> 
> If you can't even clearly say what happened yesterday then you can't have had 
> been expected to make a clear prediction on the day before yesterday about 
> what would happen the next day.

See my previous answer, just sent some minutes ago.

Bruno


> 
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Re: Superdeterminism in comics

2019-12-04 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 28 Nov 2019, at 17:22, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 10:01 AM Quentin Anciaux  > wrote:
> 
> >>Forget prediction!! Even AFTER the experiment is long over you STILL can 
> >>not answer the question "what city did you turn out to see?"
> 
> > Wait... what ? Sure you can, if you are the one who ended up in moscow... 
> > you answer moscow and write it in the diary... if you're the one who end up 
> > in washington, you answer washington. Easy.
> 
> OK, but then what did the correct answer to the question asked the day before 
> yesterday in Helsinki turn out to be? What one and only one city did "you" 
> end up seeing yesterday, was it Washington or Moscow? 
> 
> What can be predicted is that the man that sees Moscow will turn from the 
> Helsinki Man into the Moscow Man, and the man that sees Washington will turn 
> from the Helsinki Man into the Washington Man. This banality is what Bruno 
> calls first person indeterminacy.

Almost. Mechanism predicts that you will see only one city, for the same reason 
that you can predict with certainty that you will have a cup of coffee. Indeed 
“seing one city” will be true in both places, like drinking the cup of coffee. 
What you cannot predict in Helsinki is the particular city you will feel to end 
in.

I agree that this is still rather banal, but if you agree now, you can move to 
the next step, and eventually grasp that when we assume mechanism, the physical 
laws have to emerge from the statistics on all computations. Then the math 
explains a testable quantum aspect of nature from this, so we can say that, 
thanks to (Everett-like) formulation of QM, nature confirms the mechanist 
theory of mind. 

Bruno




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> 
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Re: Stochastic spacetime

2019-12-04 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, December 4, 2019 at 5:04:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 30 Nov 2019, at 00:40, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everyth...@googlegroups.com > wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11/29/2019 2:38 PM, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Tue, Nov 26, 2019 at 9:03 PM Lawrence Crowell  > wrote:
>
> *> data on the arrival times of photons of different wavelengths from 
>> burstars indicates spacetime is incredibly smooth. It is smoother than the 
>> Planck scale by 1:50. There is no foam, graininess or discontinuous 
>> properties at all. Nottale scale relativity implies there is a fractal 
>> structure to spacetime that defines different properties at different 
>> scales. What is found empirically is nothing of the sort; spacetime has no 
>> preferred structure on any scale. It is smooth. *
>
>
> If the Planck Length and the Planck Time have no physical significance 
> then perhaps the reason a Quantum Theory of Gravity has been so hard to 
> find is that such a theory does not exist. Perhaps we should try messing 
> with Quantum Mechanics to make it fit in with General Relativity rather 
> than the other way around.
>
>
> Or push the entropic theory of gravity, which might go well with the 
> entanglement theory of spacetime.
>
>
> That seems more plausible than messing with quantum mechanics. The problem 
> with the attempts to change the quantum theory is that it makes everything 
> worst if we want to keep it as a good approximation. Sternberg (and plaza 
> in this list) have shown rather convincingly that a slight 
> “delinearisation” of QM makes the many universes even more real, as they 
> not only can interfere, but also can interact (making both GR false, but 
> also violating the laws of thelmrmodynamic. I doubt that we can change the 
> quantum base of physics, and indeed, it becomes a necessity when we assume 
> mechanism, meaning that we would need a non-mechanist theory of mind, also.
>
> Bruno
>




An example of "entanglement theory of spacetime" is path integrals on 
stochastic metric spaces:

https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/2399-6528/aaa851

@philipthrift

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Re: Stochastic spacetime

2019-12-04 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 30 Nov 2019, at 00:40, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 11/29/2019 2:38 PM, John Clark wrote:
>> On Tue, Nov 26, 2019 at 9:03 PM Lawrence Crowell 
>> mailto:goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com>> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> > data on the arrival times of photons of different wavelengths from 
>> > burstars indicates spacetime is incredibly smooth. It is smoother than the 
>> > Planck scale by 1:50. There is no foam, graininess or discontinuous 
>> > properties at all. Nottale scale relativity implies there is a fractal 
>> > structure to spacetime that defines different properties at different 
>> > scales. What is found empirically is nothing of the sort; spacetime has no 
>> > preferred structure on any scale. It is smooth. 
>> 
>> If the Planck Length and the Planck Time have no physical significance then 
>> perhaps the reason a Quantum Theory of Gravity has been so hard to find is 
>> that such a theory does not exist. Perhaps we should try messing with 
>> Quantum Mechanics to make it fit in with General Relativity rather than the 
>> other way around.
> 
> Or push the entropic theory of gravity, which might go well with the 
> entanglement theory of spacetime.

That seems more plausible than messing with quantum mechanics. The problem with 
the attempts to change the quantum theory is that it makes everything worst if 
we want to keep it as a good approximation. Sternberg (and plaza in this list) 
have shown rather convincingly that a slight “delinearisation” of QM makes the 
many universes even more real, as they not only can interfere, but also can 
interact (making both GR false, but also violating the laws of thelmrmodynamic. 
I doubt that we can change the quantum base of physics, and indeed, it becomes 
a necessity when we assume mechanism, meaning that we would need a 
non-mechanist theory of mind, also.

Bruno


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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-12-04 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, December 3, 2019 at 9:06:07 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/3/2019 6:36 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
> The opposite of experiential realism.
>
> • A Defense of Experiential Realism: The Need to take 
> 
>Phenomenological Reality on its own Terms 
> 
>
>
> One wonders what Klein thinks including subjectivity would look like.  
> Every example he gives is based on someone report subjective feelings...but 
> reports are objective.
>
> Brent
>



The subjective/objective distinction is a big rabbit hole to fall into a 
mind/matter dualism. There is only matter; experiences are material 
entities:

One thing we do know about matter is that when you put some very 
common-or-garden elements (carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, sodium, potassium, 
etc) together in the way in which they're put together in brains, you get 
consciousness like ours – a wholly physical phenomenon. (It's happening to 
you right now.) And this means that we do, after all, know something about 
the intrinsic nature of matter, over and above everything we know in 
knowing the equations of physics. Why? Because we know the intrinsic nature 
of consciousness and consciousness is a form of matter.

https://www.theguardian.com/books/2011/jan/09/soul-dust-nicholas-humphrey-review
 

@philipthrift

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Re: Are Real Numbers Really Real?

2019-12-04 Thread Lawrence Crowell
On Tuesday, December 3, 2019 at 8:32:43 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, December 3, 2019 at 8:02:29 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>> For symmetry protected quantum states, which are local entanglements, 
>> they are local because the symmetry or group action is generally covariant. 
>> This covariant property enforces what we think of as space and time.
>>
>> LC
>>
>>

> It's reasonable that space and time precedes symmetry. We get symmetries 
> from spacial measurements.
>
> @philipthrift
>

An observer witnessing a black hole emit Hawking radiation discovers that 
while quantum states are approaching the event horizon they also appear as 
hawking radiation removed from the black hole. The entire notion of quantum 
states and events as localized in regions of space is not entirely 
applicable. What symmetries exist with these quantum states or field are 
then not tied to local geometry. Local geometry is something that emerges 
instead from the symmetries of quantum fields. This is because they are 
quantum gravitational. The quantum fields approaching the event horizon, or 
on the stretched horizon are pure Planck oscillator modes.

Two gravitons that scatter either do so as a 4 point interaction, similar 
to a φ^4 field theory, or they merge to form a black hole in a 3-point 
interaction so the quantum BH decays via a 3-point interaction into 
gravitons. There is no procedure for determining which of these amplitudes 
occurs, and in fact they both do. QM is odd that way. As a result there is 
no fundamental meaning to their being some point where a gauge action 
occurs.

As Arkani Hamed puts it, "Space must die."

LC

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-12-04 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 3 Dec 2019, at 23:06, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Tue, Dec 3, 2019 at 8:03 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> On 3 Dec 2019, at 03:18, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>> My brain currently has only one state.
> How do you know that? How could you know that.
> 
> It is a pretty good hypothesis.
>> Other states may be consistent with my current conscious state, but these do 
>> not exist. The idea that I am a superposition of all brain states consistent 
>> with my consciousness is just idle speculation. How would you ever prove 
>> such a thing?
> We cannot prove the existence of a physical universe, and if we assume 
> mechanism, we cannot see how a universe could choose one state against the 
> infinitely many others which lead to the same consciousness.
> 
> The answer is simple. Do not assume mechanism. Then the physical universe is 
> what it is,

In which theory of mind? Once you assume non-mechanism, you need to give your 
theory of mind, and explain how it allows a unique universe.



> and your brain, being part of it, is what it is. No need to choose anything.

You need to choose a non-mechanist theory of mind. You are back to complete 
ignorance. Note that Mechanism can be weakened a lot (like with Oracular Turing 
machine) without changing the nature of the problem. Indeed, once you assume 
some infinities, the complexity of the problem grows, even just its formulation.
I am a scientist, and I like Mechanism, not because I would think it is true, 
but because the mind-body problem becomes a mathematical problem (extracting 
physics from intensional arithmetic/computer science), and we can already test 
the proposition physics (and it fits rather well).



> 
>  
>  Of course, this should not be a problem for a non-mechanist, except that he 
> has to provide its non-mechanist theory of mind, and still explain the role 
> of the (not finitely descriptible) substrate in generating its consciousness.
> 
> So why should that be a problem? My non-mechanist theory of mind is that mind 
> is what brains do.

That is not a theory. How do you explain the qualia and their non rational 
communicability. To use the ontological (metaphysical) assumption of a primary 
physical universe to explain mind is not better than to assume a god. It 
explains nothing. You need a *testable*(refutable)  theory of mind. 



> Why should I need to explain the role of the substrate in generating 
> consciousness? I simply have to do normal science and explore the 
> relationship between my physical brain and my conscious experience. Maybe 
> difficult, but no 
> insurmountable conceptual issues. Your problems here are all of your own 
> making.

The Mechanist hypothesis is the older hypothesis in science and metaphysics. 
Darwinism use it. Molecular biology confirms it. To assume non-mechanism is 
usually done by religious literalist and their explanation is purely magical. I 
am not sure you are aware of the difficulties of the mind-body problem. At 
least you don’t use Mechanism to hide it, like many materialist. I will wait 
for your theory of mind.
And then I will wait for your explanation of why there is a physical universe, 
something that mechanism explains entirely (and I don’t know any theory 
succeeding in that task). It explains also why the laws of physics have a 
mathematical shape.

Bruno




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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-12-04 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 3 Dec 2019, at 09:58, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, December 3, 2019 at 2:39:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 29 Nov 2019, at 22:59, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, November 29, 2019 at 2:49:17 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>> On Friday, November 29, 2019 at 12:33:26 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> In any case, in the case of MWI, in the types of examples Sean Carroll talks 
>> about, here's a concrete case:
>> 
>> In one branch, Sean Carroll goes out for a jog around the park.
>> 
>> In another branch, Sean Carroll; stays home and takes a nap. 
>> 
>> I don't see how the two Seans (running, napping) are in "superposition", or 
>> how Sean's energy is distributed to and within these two worlds.
>> 
>> @philipthrift
>> 
>> It really is not so much that a person is in a superposition than the 
>> quantum particles and states that compose them are.
>> 
>> LC 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> In the MWI branch world Jog where Sean is jogging and in the branch world 
>> Nap where Sean is napping, the jogging-Sean particles in Jog and the 
>> napping-Sean particles in Nap are in superposition. 
>> 
>> Then there is another branching of Jog where Sean is hit by a car 
>> Jog-HitByCar and one where he isn't Jog-NotHitByCar. Particles in 
>> superpositions: Nap, Jog, Jog-HitByCar, Jog-NotHitByCar, ...
>> 
>> This seems like it should make no sense.
> 
> Yet, that happens in the arithmetical reality. So it certainly makes sense, 
> up to verify this regularly (the theory might be false). It is 
> counter-intuitive, but there is no contradiction, and it is the simpler way 
> to reconcile mind and matter, and the observations.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> This proves my point that Many Worlds can only work in a pure informational 
> (or arithmetical) reality.
> 
> The Many Worlders are (like Sean Carroll) anti-materialists - in the sense 
> that they think everything is information (or quantum information).


Quantum information is, or should be, digital information seen from the 
“material modes of self-reference”, and this is confirmed so far. It is a 
typical physical thing, and as such it emerges from the first person view in 
arithmetic (which are typically NOT arithmetical). Sean Carroll miss the point 
that the Wave itself must be explained by Mechanism (a classical notion).

Bruno


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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-12-04 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 3 Dec 2019, at 09:51, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, December 2, 2019 at 10:21:53 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
>  The reason is that many different 
> quasi-classical brain states will be consistent with that thought...not 
> only different quantum superpositions. 
> 
> 
> Brent 
> 
> 
> 
> Doesn't Penrose think that there cannot be thoughts (no such things as real 
> non-zombie thoughts like we experience in our brains) without quantum 
> mechanical stuff going on? :)


Penrose assumes explicitly the negation of Mechanism (and implicitly the 
existence of a primary physical universe). 
He argues against Mechanism by using a notoriously invalid argument based on a 
misunderstanding of Gödel theorem. 
In his second book, Penrose corrected his use of Gödel (going from the invalid 
"Gödel’s incompleteness shows that we are not machine", to the valid (and “well 
known”) Gödel’s incompleteness shows that we cannot know which machine we could 
be, assuming we (our body) are machines (which provides the technic to define 
the first person using incompleteness). Emil Post foresaw all this already in 
the 1920s.

Penrose has unfortunately enlarged the gap between logicians and physicists.

Bruno



> 
> @philipthrift 
> 
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