Re: Re: imaginary numbers in comp
Hi Stephen P. King I believe that all or much of the brain calculations are done aurally, phonetically. That has to be since we have to be able to understand and create vocal language. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/15/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-14, 11:52:52 Subject: Re: imaginary numbers in comp On 9/14/2012 6:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi John Clark The difference is that a computer has no intelligence, cannot deal with qualia, and is not alive. Dear Roger, You are assuming ab initio that a computer has no capacity whatsoever of reflecting upon its computations and to possible be able to report on its meditation. You might say that you are intelligent exactly because you assume that you have this capacity. My brain has all of these features in spades. ibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: John Clark Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-13, 13:15:54 Subject: Re: imaginary numbers in comp On Thu, Sep 13, 2012 at 12:11 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: I reject comp, because it cannot access feelings or qualities And you have deduced this by using the nothing but fallacy: even the largest computer is nothing but a collection of on and off switches. Never mind that your brain is nothing but a collection of molecules rigorously obeying the laws of physics. ? John K Clark ? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: imaginary numbers in comp
On 9/15/2012 8:44 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King I believe that all or much of the brain calculations are done aurally, phonetically. That has to be since we have to be able to understand and create vocal language. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net mailto:rclo...@verizon.net 9/15/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function. Dear Roger, I agree with you but what happens if the parts of the brain that implement the aural type computations are miswired? You get dyslexia, a condition that I am very familiar with as I have it. I process ideas visually and proprioceptively. Ideas have a look and feel to them that cannot be exactly translated into words... - Receiving the following content - *From:* Stephen P. King mailto:stephe...@charter.net *Receiver:* everything-list mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-09-14, 11:52:52 *Subject:* Re: imaginary numbers in comp On 9/14/2012 6:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi John Clark The difference is that a computer has no intelligence, cannot deal with qualia, and is not alive. Dear Roger, You are assuming ab initio that a computer has no capacity whatsoever of reflecting upon its computations and to possible be able to report on its meditation. You might say that you are intelligent exactly because you assume that you have this capacity. My brain has all of these features in spades. ibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: John Clark Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-13, 13:15:54 Subject: Re: imaginary numbers in comp On Thu, Sep 13, 2012 at 12:11 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: I reject comp, because it cannot access feelings or qualities And you have deduced this by using the nothing but fallacy: even the largest computer is nothing but a collection of on and off switches. Never mind that your brain is nothing but a collection of molecules rigorously obeying the laws of physics. ? John K Clark -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: imaginary numbers in comp
Hi John Clark Right. The problem with the Chinese Room argument is that there is no way to generate a reasonable answer. 9/14/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: John Clark Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-13, 15:58:20 Subject: Re: imaginary numbers in comp On Thu, Sep 13, 2012 at 1:38 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: This is the symbol grounding problem pointed out by Searle's Chinese Room I've said it before I'll say it again,? Searle's Chinese Room is the single stupidest thought experiment ever devised by the mind of man. Of course even the best of us can have a brain fart from time to time, but Searle baked this turd pie decades ago and apparently he still thinks its quite clever, and thus I can only conclude that John Searle is as dumb as his room.? ? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: imaginary numbers in comp
On 13 Sep 2012, at 22:08, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, September 13, 2012 3:58:21 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Sep 13, 2012 at 1:38 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: This is the symbol grounding problem pointed out by Searle's Chinese Room I've said it before I'll say it again, Searle's Chinese Room is the single stupidest thought experiment ever devised by the mind of man. Of course even the best of us can have a brain fart from time to time, but Searle baked this turd pie decades ago and apparently he still thinks its quite clever, and thus I can only conclude that John Searle is as dumb as his room. The only way that you can think that it's stupid is if you don't understand it. It's the same thing as Leibniz Mill. His particulars may be a bit more elaborate than they need to be, but the point he makes is the same that has been made before by many others: The map is not the territory. The menu is not the meal. To my mind, the fact that you have particular animus toward the Chinese Room can only be because on some level you know that it is a relatively simple way of proving something that you are in deep denial about. Why else would it bother you in particular? Are there other philosophical arguments that bother you like this? I am with Clark on this, Craig. Searle either begs the question or confuses a program with the machine running the program. Dennett and Hofstadter explains this already very well in Mind's I. It is the same error as believing that RA can think like PA when emulating PA. But when RA emulates PA, it is like when I emulate another program, or Einstein's brain, I don't become that other program, nor do I become Einstein, in such case. It is again a confusion of level. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: imaginary numbers in comp
Hi John Clark The difference is that a computer has no intelligence, cannot deal with qualia, and is not alive. My brain has all of these features in spades. ibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: John Clark Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-13, 13:15:54 Subject: Re: imaginary numbers in comp On Thu, Sep 13, 2012 at 12:11 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: I reject comp, because it cannot access feelings or qualities And you have deduced this by using the nothing but fallacy: even the largest computer is nothing but a collection of on and off switches. Never mind that your brain is nothing but a collection of molecules rigorously obeying the laws of physics. ? John K Clark ? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: imaginary numbers in comp
Hi Craig Weinberg I agree. But I never say never. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/14/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-13, 12:11:51 Subject: Re: imaginary numbers in comp This is why I reject comp, because it cannot access feelings or qualities, whereas feelings can and do access arithmetic (even directly as rhythm, music, some forms of visual art, etc). Because we know about feelings, we can project that knowledge on top of arithmetic ideas and conceive of 'numbers which are fundamentally unlike numbers' which metaphorically can remind of us the contrast between logic and feeling. There are some interesting ways to use that and explore concepts like imaginary numbers with that in mind which I do think can yield worthwhile results when we unpack them and reapply them as metaphors for subjectivity. The problem is that arithmetic is the opposite of feeling. Machines are the opposite of living beings. Subjective numbers then are like a Moon that treats the Sun like a Moon'. Craig On Thursday, September 13, 2012 11:45:53 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: Hi everything-list Since human thought and perception consists of both a logical quantitative or objective component as well as a feelings-spiritual qualitative or subjective components, would it make any sense to do comp using complex numbers, where the real part is the objective part of the mental the imaginary part is the subjective part of the mental ? Isn't there an intuitive mathematics ? Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net 9/13/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/YbsU-sTenVgJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: imaginary numbers in comp
On 9/14/2012 6:14 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi John Clark Right. The problem with the Chinese Room argument is that there is no way to generate a reasonable answer. Hi Roger, The Chinese room argument is flawed becuase it does not consider the distinction of levels of meaningfulness. 9/14/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function. - Receiving the following content - *From:* John Clark mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com *Receiver:* everything-list mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-09-13, 15:58:20 *Subject:* Re: imaginary numbers in comp On Thu, Sep 13, 2012 at 1:38 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com mailto:whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: This is the symbol grounding problem pointed out by Searle's Chinese Room I've said it before I'll say it again,? Searle's Chinese Room is the single stupidest thought experiment ever devised by the mind of man. Of course even the best of us can have a brain fart from time to time, but Searle baked this turd pie decades ago and apparently he still thinks its quite clever, and thus I can only conclude that John Searle is as dumb as his room.? ? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: imaginary numbers in comp
On 9/14/2012 6:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Sep 2012, at 22:08, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, September 13, 2012 3:58:21 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Sep 13, 2012 at 1:38 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: This is the symbol grounding problem pointed out by Searle's Chinese Room I've said it before I'll say it again, Searle's Chinese Room is the single stupidest thought experiment ever devised by the mind of man. Of course even the best of us can have a brain fart from time to time, but Searle baked this turd pie decades ago and apparently he still thinks its quite clever, and thus I can only conclude that John Searle is as dumb as his room. The only way that you can think that it's stupid is if you don't understand it. It's the same thing as Leibniz Mill. His particulars may be a bit more elaborate than they need to be, but the point he makes is the same that has been made before by many others: The map is not the territory. The menu is not the meal. To my mind, the fact that you have particular animus toward the Chinese Room can only be because on some level you know that it is a relatively simple way of proving something that you are in deep denial about. Why else would it bother you in particular? Are there other philosophical arguments that bother you like this? I am with Clark on this, Craig. Searle either begs the question or confuses a program with the machine running the program. Dennett and Hofstadter explains this already very well in Mind's I. It is the same error as believing that RA can think like PA when emulating PA. But when RA emulates PA, it is like when I emulate another program, or Einstein's brain, I don't become that other program, nor do I become Einstein, in such case. It is again a confusion of level. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ Dear Bruno, I agree with you. What you are pointing out is that one needs a discordant system to distinguish the levels that are involved. More often than not we run into problems because a pair of different levels are considered to be the same level by the person that does not understand the difference. This is called flattening. -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: imaginary numbers in comp
On 9/14/2012 6:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi John Clark The difference is that a computer has no intelligence, cannot deal with qualia, and is not alive. Dear Roger, You are assuming ab initio that a computer has no capacity whatsoever of reflecting upon its computations and to possible be able to report on its meditation. You might say that you are intelligent exactly because you assume that you have this capacity. My brain has all of these features in spades. ibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: John Clark Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-13, 13:15:54 Subject: Re: imaginary numbers in comp On Thu, Sep 13, 2012 at 12:11 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: I reject comp, because it cannot access feelings or qualities And you have deduced this by using the nothing but fallacy: even the largest computer is nothing but a collection of on and off switches. Never mind that your brain is nothing but a collection of molecules rigorously obeying the laws of physics. ? John K Clark ? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: imaginary numbers in comp
On Thu, Sept 13, 2012 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: The menu is not the meal. In other words X is not X and that is perfectly true, use and mention are indeed not the same, but they are closely related. To my mind, the fact that you have particular animus toward the Chinese Room can only be because on some level you know that it is a relatively simple way of proving something that you are in deep denial about. Why else would it bother you in particular? Searle's Chinese Room bothers me because it is so fabulously DUMB! What makes it so idiotic is its conclusion: The funny little man doesn't understand anything therefore the entire Chinese Room doesn't understand anything. Dumb dumb dumb. Searle doesn't even attempt to explain why if there is understanding anywhere it must be centered on the silly little man, apparently he's such a crumby philosopher it never even occurred to him that he's assuming the very thing he's trying to prove!! Even Aristotle never did anything that stupid. You could easily get rid of the little man altogether and replace him with a 1950's punch card sorting machine, it would be slow but mush faster than the man and produce fewer errors, and in such a situation I would agree that the punch card machine was not conscious, and I would also agree that a very very small part of a system, any system, does not have all the properties of the entire system. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: imaginary numbers in comp
On Fri, Sep 14, 2012 at 11:25 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Sept 13, 2012 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: The menu is not the meal. In other words X is not X and that is perfectly true, use and mention are indeed not the same, but they are closely related. To my mind, the fact that you have particular animus toward the Chinese Room can only be because on some level you know that it is a relatively simple way of proving something that you are in deep denial about. Why else would it bother you in particular? Searle's Chinese Room bothers me because it is so fabulously DUMB! What makes it so idiotic is its conclusion: The funny little man doesn't understand anything therefore the entire Chinese Room doesn't understand anything. Dumb dumb dumb. Searle doesn't even attempt to explain why if there is understanding anywhere it must be centered on the silly little man, apparently he's such a crumby philosopher it never even occurred to him that he's assuming the very thing he's trying to prove!! Even Aristotle never did anything that stupid. You could easily get rid of the little man altogether and replace him with a 1950's punch card sorting machine, it would be slow but mush faster than the man and produce fewer errors, and in such a situation I would agree that the punch card machine was not conscious, and I would also agree that a very very small part of a system, any system, does not have all the properties of the entire system. Exactly. It is no different than concluding that brains cannot understand anything because inter-atomic forces do not understand anything. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: imaginary numbers in comp
This is why I reject comp, because it cannot access feelings or qualities, whereas feelings can and do access arithmetic (even directly as rhythm, music, some forms of visual art, etc). Because we know about feelings, we can project that knowledge on top of arithmetic ideas and conceive of 'numbers which are fundamentally unlike numbers' which metaphorically can remind of us the contrast between logic and feeling. There are some interesting ways to use that and explore concepts like imaginary numbers with that in mind which I do think can yield worthwhile results when we unpack them and reapply them as metaphors for subjectivity. The problem is that arithmetic is the opposite of feeling. Machines are the opposite of living beings. Subjective numbers then are like a Moon that treats the Sun like a Moon'. Craig On Thursday, September 13, 2012 11:45:53 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: Hi everything-list Since human thought and perception consists of both a logical quantitative or objective component as well as a feelings-spiritual qualitative or subjective components, would it make any sense to do comp using complex numbers, where the real part is the objective part of the mental the imaginary part is the subjective part of the mental ? Isn't there an intuitive mathematics ? Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net javascript: 9/13/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/YbsU-sTenVgJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: imaginary numbers in comp
On 13 Sep 2012, at 17:44, Roger Clough wrote: Hi everything-list Since human thought and perception consists of both a logical quantitative or objective component as well as a feelings-spiritual qualitative or subjective components, would it make any sense to do comp using complex numbers, where the real part is the objective part of the mental the imaginary part is the subjective part of the mental This is pleasant but far stretched. You might appreciate the imaginary time (t' = it) making relativity euclidian (instead of Minkowskian), but the relation between subject and physical time is too much speculative for me, especially that I am currently doubting the old link between consciousness and subjective time. Comp cannot use infinite objects, but you can do it with rational complex numbers, or rational octonions, it is most plausibly as much Turing universal. But real numbers are not, so an embedding of a number structure in another does not necessarily preserve the Turing universality. ? Isn't there an intuitive mathematics ? We can argue that intuitionist mathematics, and constructive mathematics, or the abandon of the third excluded middle lead to a more intuitive mathematics. It is the logic and math of a self which extends itself, as opposed to the self open to meet the non constructive other, when you free the third excluded middle. But in arithmetic that chnages nothing, as the intuitionist can translate the other by the use of the double negation. In comp, that intuitive solipsist first person is given by the Bp p variants of Gödel's Bp. You should (aslo) study more logic before restructing math to the quantitative. I doubt this already for topology, and certainly for logic and model theory. It is a confusion of the syntax and its possible interpretations, a process already studied in logic. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/13/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: imaginary numbers in comp
On Thu, Sep 13, 2012 at 12:11 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: I reject comp, because it cannot access feelings or qualities And you have deduced this by using the nothing but fallacy: even the largest computer is nothing but a collection of on and off switches. Never mind that your brain is nothing but a collection of molecules rigorously obeying the laws of physics. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: imaginary numbers in comp
On Thursday, September 13, 2012 1:15:56 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Sep 13, 2012 at 12:11 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: I reject comp, because it cannot access feelings or qualities And you have deduced this by using the nothing but fallacy: even the largest computer is nothing but a collection of on and off switches. Never mind that your brain is nothing but a collection of molecules rigorously obeying the laws of physics. Not at all. From my perspective, it's obviously you who assumes that the brain is nothing but a collection of molecules. I don't assume at all that computers are limited by our description of them, just as stuffed animals I'm sure contain microcosmic worlds of styrofoam and dust mites, thermodynamic interiorities of God-know-what sorts of qualitative experiences. What I don't assume is that a Beanie Baby of a dragon is actually having the experience that we imagine a dragon should have. This is the symbol grounding problem pointed out by Searle's Chinese Room, the China Brain, and Leibniz Mill Argument, and which I demonstrate easily by saying These words do not refer to themselves. or This sentence does not speak English. It's hard for me to understand why this seems obscure to anyone who is familiar with these issues, but at this point I suspect it is like color blindness or gender orientation. To review: My understanding is that the word computer does not refer to any real system, but rather it is a concept about how real systems can be controlled. It's like saying 'storyteller'. There is nothing that it is made of or experiences that it has. Experience depends on real interactions of matter, energy, space, and time, which are experienced as perception and participation. You can't park a real car (human experience) in a map of a parking lot (computer simulation). I understand completely that it is thrilling to imagine that the map is actually the reality, and the car is only a figment of the statistical model of 'parkingness', and I agree that this way of looking at things gives us useful insights and control, but it is ultimately a catastrophic failure when taken literally and applied to living beings - as bad as religious ideology. Craig John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/8zltLcw-fq8J. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: imaginary numbers in comp
On 9/13/2012 1:38 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, September 13, 2012 1:15:56 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Sep 13, 2012 at 12:11 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: I reject comp, because it cannot access feelings or qualities And you have deduced this by using the nothing but fallacy: even the largest computer is nothing but a collection of on and off switches. Never mind that your brain is nothing but a collection of molecules rigorously obeying the laws of physics. Not at all. From my perspective, it's obviously you who assumes that the brain is nothing but a collection of molecules. I don't assume at all that computers are limited by our description of them, just as stuffed animals I'm sure contain microcosmic worlds of styrofoam and dust mites, thermodynamic interiorities of God-know-what sorts of qualitative experiences. What I don't assume is that a Beanie Baby of a dragon is actually having the experience that we imagine a dragon should have. This is the symbol grounding problem pointed out by Searle's Chinese Room, the China Brain, and Leibniz Mill Argument, and which I demonstrate easily by saying These words do not refer to themselves. or This sentence does not speak English. It's hard for me to understand why this seems obscure to anyone who is familiar with these issues, but at this point I suspect it is like color blindness or gender orientation. To review: My understanding is that the word computer does not refer to any real system, but rather it is a concept about how real systems can be controlled. It's like saying 'storyteller'. There is nothing that it is made of or experiences that it has. Experience depends on real interactions of matter, energy, space, and time, which are experienced as perception and participation. You can't park a real car (human experience) in a map of a parking lot (computer simulation). I understand completely that it is thrilling to imagine that the map is actually the reality, and the car is only a figment of the statistical model of 'parkingness', and I agree that this way of looking at things gives us useful insights and control, but it is ultimately a catastrophic failure when taken literally and applied to living beings - as bad as religious ideology. Craig John K Clark What would be the logical complement of nothing but _? Could it be: All except ___? -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: imaginary numbers in comp
On Thu, Sep 13, 2012 at Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: would it make any sense to do comp using complex numbers, where the real part is the objective part of the mental the imaginary part is the subjective part of the mental The names real and imaginary are unfortunate because imaginary numbers are no more subjective than real numbers, but for historical reasons I guess we're stuck with those names. From a physics perspective think of the real numbers as dealing with magnitudes and the imaginary numbers as dealing in rotations in two dimensions; that's why if you want to talk about speed the real numbers are sufficient but if you want to talk about velocity you need the imaginary numbers too because velocity has both a magnitude and a direction. The square root of negative one is essential if mathematically you want to calculate how things rotate. It you pair up a Imaginary Number(i) and a regular old Real Number you get a Complex Number, and you can make a one to one relationship between the way Complex numbers add subtract multiply and divide and the way things move in a two dimensional plane, and that is enormously important. Or you could put it another way, regular numbers that most people are familiar with just have a magnitude, but complex numbers have a magnitude AND a direction. Many thought the square root of negative one (i) didn't have much practical use until about 1860 when Maxwell used them in his famous equations to figure out how Electromagnetism worked. Today nearly all quantum mechanical equations have ani in them somewhere, and it might not be going too far to say that is the source of quantum weirdness. The Schrodinger equation is deterministic and describes the quantum wave function, but that function is an abstraction and is unobservable, to get something you can see you must square the wave function and that gives you the probability you will observe a particle at any spot; but Schrodinger's equation has an i in it and that means very different quantum wave functions can give the exact same probability distribution when you square it; remember with i you get weird stuff like i^2=i^6 =-1 and i^4=i^100=1. All the rotational properties can be derived from Euler's Identity: e^i*PI +1 =0 . John K Clark John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: imaginary numbers in comp
On Thu, Sep 13, 2012 at 1:38 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: This is the symbol grounding problem pointed out by Searle's Chinese Room I've said it before I'll say it again, Searle's Chinese Room is the single stupidest thought experiment ever devised by the mind of man. Of course even the best of us can have a brain fart from time to time, but Searle baked this turd pie decades ago and apparently he still thinks its quite clever, and thus I can only conclude that John Searle is as dumb as his room. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: imaginary numbers in comp
We might as well just use ordered pairs of integers or rational numbers. On Thursday, September 13, 2012 8:45:53 AM UTC-7, rclough wrote: Hi everything-list Since human thought and perception consists of both a logical quantitative or objective component as well as a feelings-spiritual qualitative or subjective components, would it make any sense to do comp using complex numbers, where the real part is the objective part of the mental the imaginary part is the subjective part of the mental ? Isn't there an intuitive mathematics ? Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net javascript: 9/13/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/fKAoBO2j5nkJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
