Re: on formally indescribable merde
Sorry guys I am running behind in my replies Stephen Paul King wrote: > > [SPK] > > It is trivial to show that TM's can not give rise to consciousness for the simple > reason that consciousness is not "pre-specifiable" in its behaviour. Have you read > Peter Wegner's papers about this? I just got the paper I think I agree with what it says reading the abstract... I need a few days to read the whole thing. > > > I have reached almost the same conclusion, that our consciousness come about from > > an ensemble of more or less identical "points" or states in the plenitude and the > > "thickness" of this ensemble is a measure of the Heisenberg uncertainty. The > > difference is that you call them "computation." I view them more as instantaneous > > static entities which are logically connected to each other. Maybe we could > > resolve this issue by saying that I focus on the points of the graph and you, on > > the links :-) > > [SPK] > > Could you elaborate on the nature of this "logical connection?" As Bruno pointed out, this logical connection is is actually an ensemble of connections which are all consistent with the current state of the consciousness (machine). I am speculating that the size of the ensemble corresponds at the physical level to Planck's constant and at the logical level to the degree of incompleteness associated with the set of axioms or laws driving this consciousness or machine. George
Re: on formally indescribable merde
Extract from a web page I have about ghostscript, which can be obtained from http://www.cs.wisc.edu/~ghost/: Ghostscript is freeware postscript viewing and rendering software available for most platforms. The viewing software goes by different names on different operating systems. For Unix/VMS platforms, use gv, MSWindows use GSView and on MacOS, use Mac GS Viewer. You will need to configure your web browser so that the application/postscript MIME type will launch the postscript viewer when you click on a link. Typically, this under a heading ``Applications'' or ``Helpers'' in the preferences, or options panel of the browser. You may also use ghostscript to print postscript files on a wide variety of non-postscript printers, such as the cheap ink/bubble jet printers available today. Ghostscript will also handle PDF files, so you may wish to set your browser to use it for the application/pdf MIME type instead of using Adobe's Acroread software. The main advantage in doing this is the superior user interface of the viewer software. The main disadvantage is occasionally PDF documents are not compatible with ghostscript, but are with Acroread. Even more occasionally, however, PDF documents are incompatible with Acroread, but can be viewed with Ghostscript! George Levy wrote: > > Stephen Paul King wrote:[SPK] > > > It is trivial to show that TM's can not give rise to consciousness for the >simple > > reason that consciousness is not "pre-specifiable" in its behaviour. Have you read > > Peter Wegner's papers about this? > > and from a previous post: > [SPK] > > > I agree. But could you get into detail on the nature of "allowed"? > > What is the constraint? (I think that all that is needed is the weak anthropic >principle > > > but I could be missing something.) I think that we should consider the rule > > "All is allowed that is not Forbidden" (by logical contradiction) instead of the >usual > notion > > " All is forbidden that is not allowed" (by prespecification, e.g. a priori >algorithms) > > Peter Wegner has done a lot of research on this issue: > > > http://www.cs.brown.edu/~pw/papers/math1.ps > > > > I can't read his paper because my software doesn't accept PS File format... I have >Adobe > but this doesn't seem to help... Do you have any suggestions? > > George > Dr. Russell Standish Director High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967 UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965 Australia[EMAIL PROTECTED] Room 2075, Red Centrehttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
Re: on formally indescribable merde
Stephen Paul King wrote:[SPK] > It is trivial to show that TM's can not give rise to consciousness for the simple > reason that consciousness is not "pre-specifiable" in its behaviour. Have you read > Peter Wegner's papers about this? and from a previous post: [SPK] > I agree. But could you get into detail on the nature of "allowed"? > What is the constraint? (I think that all that is needed is the weak anthropic >principle > but I could be missing something.) I think that we should consider the rule > "All is allowed that is not Forbidden" (by logical contradiction) instead of the >usual notion > " All is forbidden that is not allowed" (by prespecification, e.g. a priori >algorithms) > Peter Wegner has done a lot of research on this issue: > http://www.cs.brown.edu/~pw/papers/math1.ps I can't read his paper because my software doesn't accept PS File format... I have Adobe but this doesn't seem to help... Do you have any suggestions? George
Re: on formally indescribable merde
Hi George, A few questions and comments... George Levy wrote: > Marchal wrote: > > > But COMP implies MWI (Note that Schmidhuber and me agree on that, > > >> but we disagree on what *are* the (many) worlds MW). > > > > More precisely: COMP implies MWI in two senses. > > > > 1) Everett's sense: SE + COMP gives MW. > > He really meant SE + No( privileged observer status) -> MW. One could argue then > that No(privileged observer status) is implied by COMP. > > > 2) COMP sense: COMP gives SE + MW (my thesis, look at my CC&Q paper) > > I agree that COMP implies first person indeterminacy but, as far as I know, it > does not predict Schoedinger Equation in all its splendor, including Planck's > constant which is a parameter in this equation. So would it be more accurate to > say COMP implies Indeterminacy + MW? > > > > > [BM] I pretend that with comp a world is a > > first person (plural) construct. [Schmidhuber] does not defined them but he > > associates > > them with their generating programs. Observers belongs to worlds, with > > Schmidhuber. I pretend with comp that observers's infered worlds are > > defined by the set of the consistent extensions. > > I assume "consistent extensions" means "logically consistent extensions of the > observers". In which case we agree fully on the meaning of worlds. Schmidhuber, > just like Mallah, is stuck with the third person perspective. [SPK] I agree, but it seems that people are "stuck" trying to define the first person perspective... > > [GL] >Again to clarify... the word "machine" means that consciousness arises > > from > > >simple (Turing-like) computations. This is the COMP hypothesis. > > > > [BM] In first approximation YES. In second approximation NOT REALLY. > > By comp I mean I survive with an artificial digital brain/body/universe. > > As a counter-intuitive conclusion, consciousness does not really > > supervenes on a computation but on an infinite cloud of "similar" > > computations existing in UD*. [SPK] It is trivial to show that TM's can not give rise to consciousness for the simple reason that consciousness is not "pre-specifiable" in its behaviour. Have you read Peter Wegner's papers about this? > I have reached almost the same conclusion, that our consciousness come about from > an ensemble of more or less identical "points" or states in the plenitude and the > "thickness" of this ensemble is a measure of the Heisenberg uncertainty. The > difference is that you call them "computation." I view them more as instantaneous > static entities which are logically connected to each other. Maybe we could > resolve this issue by saying that I focus on the points of the graph and you, on > the links :-) [SPK] Could you elaborate on the nature of this "logical connection?" > > [BM] Locally a brain/body/universe only makes it > > possible for a person (the one conscious) to accelerate himself > > relatively to its most probable possible extensions. Note that this gives > > a role to consciousness : self-speeding up abilities. > > And this is linked to another result by Godel. If you add an undecidable > > true statement to the theory (in which that sentence is undecidable), not > > only an infinity of new formula become decidable, but an infinity of > > provable formula get shorter proofs. > > > > You are accelerating too fast for me... I don't understand this at all. > > > > > >I am not sure I understand "shared computational histories". Why would past > > >computational states be relevant? A current state could be reached from > > >different past points (OMs) unless "merging" is not allowed > > > > Merging is allowed through amnesia. In some sense personal memories > > help you to stay into no merging histories. > > I smell a whiff of third person thinking. I'll say something, then I'll retract > it because I just don't have the words to say it straight. An observer in world A > who has a "false" memory (of something that did not happen in world A), is in > the same mental state as an observer in world B who has a true memory ( of > something that happended in world B). The two observers are in exactly identical > states, even though their "shared histories" are different. The point is that > their mental states are the same, they have the same consciousness, they are > really the same observer and they are really in the same world. > Now I can retract what I said. There is no world A and B and there is no shared > history. The important thing is only the current state of the observer(s). The > extensions to the observer are fuzzy. > > > [GL] >...Isn't the current state only of relevance? > > > > Relevance with respect to what? A state is not enough, you need a > > universal machine to support it. > > Precisely. With respect to us!. We are the machineit's a vicious circle...we > are self emergent...Not only is our world anthropically defined, but we ourselves > also are > > > It is more "sharing a common history" li
Re: on formally indescribable merde
It is no more a game than the rest of living. - Original Message - From: Scott D. Yelich <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: James Higgo <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Monday, March 12, 2001 10:00 PM Subject: Re: on formally indescribable merde > On Sun, 11 Mar 2001, James Higgo wrote: > > Scott: that was clearly ill-thought-out. Of course difference does not imply > > time, and of course this e-mail is not proof that there is a 'person' called > > James... > > Is this (just) a game to you? > > Scott > > >
Re: on formally indescribable merde
Marchal wrote: > But COMP implies MWI (Note that Schmidhuber and me agree on that, > >> but we disagree on what *are* the (many) worlds MW). > > More precisely: COMP implies MWI in two senses. > > 1) Everett's sense: SE + COMP gives MW. He really meant SE + No( privileged observer status) -> MW. One could argue then that No(privileged observer status) is implied by COMP. > 2) COMP sense: COMP gives SE + MW (my thesis, look at my CC&Q paper) I agree that COMP implies first person indeterminacy but, as far as I know, it does not predict Schoedinger Equation in all its splendor, including Planck's constant which is a parameter in this equation. So would it be more accurate to say COMP implies Indeterminacy + MW? > > [BM] I pretend that with comp a world is a > first person (plural) construct. [Schmidhuber] does not defined them but he > associates > them with their generating programs. Observers belongs to worlds, with > Schmidhuber. I pretend with comp that observers's infered worlds are > defined by the set of the consistent extensions. I assume "consistent extensions" means "logically consistent extensions of the observers". In which case we agree fully on the meaning of worlds. Schmidhuber, just like Mallah, is stuck with the third person perspective. > > [GL] >Again to clarify... the word "machine" means that consciousness arises > from > >simple (Turing-like) computations. This is the COMP hypothesis. > > [BM] In first approximation YES. In second approximation NOT REALLY. > By comp I mean I survive with an artificial digital brain/body/universe. > As a counter-intuitive conclusion, consciousness does not really > supervenes on a computation but on an infinite cloud of "similar" > computations existing in UD*. I have reached almost the same conclusion, that our consciousness come about from an ensemble of more or less identical "points" or states in the plenitude and the "thickness" of this ensemble is a measure of the Heisenberg uncertainty. The difference is that you call them "computation." I view them more as instantaneous static entities which are logically connected to each other. Maybe we could resolve this issue by saying that I focus on the points of the graph and you, on the links :-) > [BM] Locally a brain/body/universe only makes it > possible for a person (the one conscious) to accelerate himself > relatively to its most probable possible extensions. Note that this gives > a role to consciousness : self-speeding up abilities. > And this is linked to another result by Godel. If you add an undecidable > true statement to the theory (in which that sentence is undecidable), not > only an infinity of new formula become decidable, but an infinity of > provable formula get shorter proofs. > You are accelerating too fast for me... I don't understand this at all. > > >I am not sure I understand "shared computational histories". Why would past > >computational states be relevant? A current state could be reached from > >different past points (OMs) unless "merging" is not allowed > > Merging is allowed through amnesia. In some sense personal memories > help you to stay into no merging histories. I smell a whiff of third person thinking. I'll say something, then I'll retract it because I just don't have the words to say it straight. An observer in world A who has a "false" memory (of something that did not happen in world A), is in the same mental state as an observer in world B who has a true memory ( of something that happended in world B). The two observers are in exactly identical states, even though their "shared histories" are different. The point is that their mental states are the same, they have the same consciousness, they are really the same observer and they are really in the same world. Now I can retract what I said. There is no world A and B and there is no shared history. The important thing is only the current state of the observer(s). The extensions to the observer are fuzzy. > [GL] >...Isn't the current state only of relevance? > > Relevance with respect to what? A state is not enough, you need a > universal machine to support it. Precisely. With respect to us!. We are the machineit's a vicious circle...we are self emergent...Not only is our world anthropically defined, but we ourselves also are > It is more "sharing a common history" like the bifurcation W and M. > Biological multiplication gives a simple model of tree like > developpement where individuals share a long common history. The more you > leave the leaves (!) the more the histories are shared. This is an image > because both with comp and/or QM, we must take into account merging. > (I know you agree with that). > >From inside UD* (i.e. from the average first person point of view of > machines) I make the conjecture that there is no ultimate well-defined > trunk for these barnches and leaves. From the third person view there > is one which is just the trivial one: UD. > Your use of the w
Re: on formally indescribable merde
George Levy wrote: >> > GL: The MWI gives us the chance to go all the way >> >and places each "I" at the center. >> >> BM: How weird. That would have been a nice sum up of what I try to say; >> with COMP instead of MWI. > >Could you please elaborate. Why can't you just say it in the context of COMP? >Or maybe you can say it. I can say it indeed. With comp (or some weakening) I *must* say it. >> >> BM: But COMP implies MWI (Note that Schmidhuber and me agree on that, >> but we disagree on what *are* the (many) worlds MW). More precisely: COMP implies MWI in two senses. 1) Everett's sense: SE + COMP gives MW. 2) COMP sense: COMP gives SE + MW (my thesis, look at my CC&Q paper) > >This is interesting and I just want to clarify this in my mind... You say >that >you and Schmidhuber do not agree on the "size" of the MW...what it >includes... No. Basically we agree with the size of the "ontology". We disagree on the meaning of the word "world". I pretend that with comp a world is a first person (plural) construct. He does not defined them but he associates them with their generating programs. Observers belongs to worlds, with Schmidhuber. I pretend with comp that observers's infered worlds are defined by the set of the consistent extensions. I think at it as some kind of model (in the logician sense). I don't get classical (boolean) realities, but some sort of quantum one. >> Schmidhuber associate worlds to some programs, I associate >> worlds on machine's projection from shared computational histories >> The projection is first person plural. > >Again to clarify... the word "machine" means that consciousness arises from >simple (Turing-like) computations. This is the COMP hypothesis. In first approximation YES. In second approximation NOT REALLY. By comp I mean I survive with an artificial digital brain/body/universe. As a counter-intuitive conclusion, consciousness does not really supervenes on a computation but on an infinite cloud of "similar" computations existing in UD*. Locally a brain/body/universe only makes it possible for a person (the one conscious) to accelerate himself relatively to its most probable possible extensions. Note that this gives a role to consciousness : self-speeding up abilities. And this is linked to another result by Godel. If you add an undecidable true statement to the theory (in which that sentence is undecidable), not only an infinity of new formula become decidable, but an infinity of provable formula get shorter proofs. >I am not sure I understand "shared computational histories". Why would past >computational states be relevant? A current state could be reached from >different past points (OMs) unless "merging" is not allowed Merging is allowed through amnesia. In some sense personal memories help you to stay into no merging histories. There is something similar with quantum mechanics and the quantum eraser. Saibal Mitra proposes a similar idea in the discussion. >...Isn't the >current >state only of relevance? Relevance with respect to what? A state is not enough, you need a universal machine to support it. Now a single state defines its accessible consistent extensions in UD*, in that sense you are (platonically) right. State are relative, in both Everett or Comp. >In addition, "shared computational histories" seems >to imply that two people have "now" the same thought pattern. I was meaning *partially* shared computational histories. Like telepathic dreamers (if that exists!) or like a video game net where different persons interact with a program. >Do you mean that >a "world" is the view (of the plenitude) by two observers sharing a "common >frame of reference?" It is more "sharing a common history" like the bifurcation W and M. Biological multiplication gives a simple model of tree like developpement where individuals share a long common history. The more you leave the leaves (!) the more the histories are shared. This is an image because both with comp and/or QM, we must take into account merging. (I know you agree with that). >From inside UD* (i.e. from the average first person point of view of machines) I make the conjecture that there is no ultimate well-defined trunk for these barnches and leaves. From the third person view there is one which is just the trivial one: UD. >How is this frame of reference defined? All the histories are in the block comp universe (UD* or just platonic numberland). But they makes sense as "histories" only viewed by the machines inside. It is the main purpose of the UDA TE to explain that. Mathematical logic is needed for defining formally those inside views. >Should they have >the same thinking mechanism and laws of nature, but not necessarily the same >specific thoughts? Er... Yes like W and M. >(It's hard to know where to draw the line... It is *impossible* to draw the line with certainty and from a third person point of view. Of course if you feel pain or joy you can know it. >O
Re: on formally indescribable merde
On Sun, 11 Mar 2001, James Higgo wrote: > Scott: that was clearly ill-thought-out. Of course difference does not imply > time, and of course this e-mail is not proof that there is a 'person' called > James... Is this (just) a game to you? Scott
Re: on formally indescribable merde
Scott: that was clearly ill-thought-out. Of course difference does not imply time, and of course this e-mail is not proof that there is a 'person' called James... - Original Message - From: Scott D. Yelich <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: James Higgo <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Monday, March 12, 2001 3:25 AM Subject: Re: on formally indescribable merde > On Fri, 9 Mar 2001, James Higgo wrote: > > Of course, 'your' current OM, which includes reading this email, is > > unrelated to 'my current' OM. But since all OMs exist I can be sure that > > there will be an OM which includs 'I am Bruno and I am reading this merde'. > > You are James. > Bruno is Bruno. > > Why is James locked into the James OMs and Bruno locked into the Bruno > OMs? > > Why don't James OMs become Bruno OMs? > > You can say they do, somewhere... but that somewhere is not here. That > somewhere is the same somewhere where James will try to explain to me > why time doesn't exist -- but that somewhere is not here, therefore, > doesn't that provide for a definition of "I" ? > > James -- can there be difference without time? What I mean > is, as soon as there is difference, doesn't that demand > that time exist as well? > > Scott > > >
Re: on formally indescribable merde
James Higgo wrote: >Bruno, you are simply making assumptions which I consider unwarranted. >Belgium is one such assumption. Your intellect is a number-construction as >much as numbers are a construct of your intellect. I was *not* assuming Belgium. Perhaps it will be time to make our assumptions more transparent. >I consistently argue that asking why >rare things are rare is failing to understand anthropic reasoning. Where? But the problem is that white rabbits are NOT rare. We *see* them rarely, because 1) with QM most are destroyed by interference with "minus white rabbits"; 2) with George's plenitude they are rare because of consciousness (but this remain to be explained ...); 3) with comp, I have (just) isolated the mathematical framework for showing they are also destroyed by interference (and that is linked with deriving QM from comp). Bruno
Re: on formally indescribable merde
On Fri, 9 Mar 2001, James Higgo wrote: > Of course, 'your' current OM, which includes reading this email, is > unrelated to 'my current' OM. But since all OMs exist I can be sure that > there will be an OM which includs 'I am Bruno and I am reading this merde'. You are James. Bruno is Bruno. Why is James locked into the James OMs and Bruno locked into the Bruno OMs? Why don't James OMs become Bruno OMs? You can say they do, somewhere... but that somewhere is not here. That somewhere is the same somewhere where James will try to explain to me why time doesn't exist -- but that somewhere is not here, therefore, doesn't that provide for a definition of "I" ? James -- can there be difference without time? What I mean is, as soon as there is difference, doesn't that demand that time exist as well? Scott
Re: on formally indescribable merde
Saey whaet?
Re: on formally indescribable merde
Marchal wrote: > George Levy wrote: > > >> BM:..Positive integers exists. Nothing else. > > >This is a integercentric statement if I ever saw one. > > Oh ! George. You don't met Pythagore, or Xenocrate, ... > in the plenitude. Do you? > > >And Kroenecker was an old fuddy daddy. > > Old and even dead (here and now for sure). But fuddy ? > I don't know. What does fuddy mean? > I had to ask my daughter for the definition of fuddy It occurs only with daddy. A fuddy daddy is an old guy who is not "with it", slow mentally, and not fashionable probably the way she sees me > > Note that I don't appreciate what Kronecker (the man) > did to Cantor. Yes I was precisely referring to the treatment that Kronecker gave to Cantor. > > >The MWI gives us the chance to go all the way > >and places each "I" at the center. > > How weird. That would have been a nice sum up of what I try to say; > with COMP instead of MWI. Could you please elaborate. Why can't you just say it in the context of COMP? Or maybe you can say it. > > But COMP implies MWI (Note that Schmidhuber and me agree on that, > but we disagree on what *are* the (many) worlds MW). This is interesting and I just want to clarify this in my mind... You say that you and Schmidhuber do not agree on the "size" of the MW...what it includes... > Schmidhuber associate worlds to some programs, I associate > worlds on machine's projection from shared computational histories > The projection is first person plural. Again to clarify... the word "machine" means that consciousness arises from simple (Turing-like) computations. This is the COMP hypothesis. I am not sure I understand "shared computational histories" .Why would past computational states be relevant? A current state could be reached from different past points (OMs) unless "merging" is not allowed...Isn't the current state only of relevance? In addition, "shared computational histories" seems to imply that two people have "now" the same thought pattern. Do you mean that a "world" is the view (of the plenitude) by two observers sharing a "common frame of reference?" How is this frame of reference defined? Should they have the same thinking mechanism and laws of nature, but not necessarily the same specific thoughts? (It's hard to know where to draw the line... One could argue that two different people sharing the same laws of nature and thinking mechanisms, but having different specific thoughts will perceive different worlds...) Why the word "projection?" George
Re: on formally indescribable merde
Bruno, you are simply making assumptions which I consider unwarranted. Belgium is one such assumption. Your intellect is a number-construction as much as numbers are a construct of your intellect. As for the flying (not white - this will confuse readers of the FAQ even more than they need to be) rabbits, I consistently argue that asking why rare things are rare is failing to understand anthropic reasoning. James - Original Message - From: Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Saturday, March 10, 2001 4:40 PM Subject: Re: on formally indescribable merde > > I comment again George Levy for making > clearer where I disagree with James Higgo's last Post. > >* * * > > > I wrote: > > << George Levy wrote: > >>> BM:..Positive integers exists. Nothing else. > >>This is a integercentric statement if I ever saw one. > >BM: Oh ! George. You don't met Pythagore, or Xenocrate, ... >in the plenitude. Do you? >> > >* * * > > I should have answered: "Of course it is a > an integercentric statement!". > > After all godel numbering makes immaterial program > number like and a slightly poetical version of the > turing-tropic view (turing-centric) view is that > I am a number. > And here we are not a long way from Xenocrate definition of > the soul: "a number which moves itself". (Like a > practionners of comp can live if you remember the TEs) > > But of course "I am a number" taken literaly, is a > category mistake. From the third person point of view > I am much more like a cloud of numbers spreading in > a cloud of "real/complex" numbers. From a first person > point of you I am, obviously, a person, your servitor :-) > > >* * * > > James Higgo wrote: > > >Wat am I? Obviously, 'I' am an Observer-Moment. > > This is the same category mistake. You are no more an > Observer-Moment than I am a number. Those are intellectual > constructions. I am sure that if by chance you travel > to Brussels, I will offer you a cup of coffee. Why would I > ever offer a cup of coffee to an observer-moment ? > And how would I? The time to prepare the coffee and > you, dear observer-moment, disappear ... > > >This > >current OM, including writing this email, is not related > >to 'remembered' OMs except in that the 'remembered' OMs do > >happen to exist. > > So the 'remembered' relation (whatever it is) create a > link between observer-moments, isn't it? I need no more links > than that. > > >There is no"I" that was one OM and then > >'became' this OM. The block universe is static. > > I agree with both sentences. comp's block universe is UD* > > >Of course, 'your' current OM, which includes reading this email, is > >unrelated to 'my current' OM. > > I hope not. Why ? > > >But since all OMs exist I can be sure that > >there will be an OM which includs 'I am Bruno and I am reading this merde'. > > Of course. There is an infinity of such OM in UD*. > > I think we are disagreing mostly on pedagogy. Isn't it? > > To make that OM-sort of enlightment third person accessible (science), > we must still explain the rarity of the OM 'I am Bruno and I am > reading this merde in company of ten thousand white rabbits'. > > With comp there is a logical road to enlightment, modulo open > mathematical questions. > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal > > > >
Re: on formally indescribable merde
I comment again George Levy for making clearer where I disagree with James Higgo's last Post. * * * I wrote: << George Levy wrote: >> BM:..Positive integers exists. Nothing else. >This is a integercentric statement if I ever saw one. BM: Oh ! George. You don't met Pythagore, or Xenocrate, ... in the plenitude. Do you? >> * * * I should have answered: "Of course it is a an integercentric statement!". After all godel numbering makes immaterial program number like and a slightly poetical version of the turing-tropic view (turing-centric) view is that I am a number. And here we are not a long way from Xenocrate definition of the soul: "a number which moves itself". (Like a practionners of comp can live if you remember the TEs) But of course "I am a number" taken literaly, is a category mistake. From the third person point of view I am much more like a cloud of numbers spreading in a cloud of "real/complex" numbers. From a first person point of you I am, obviously, a person, your servitor :-) * * * James Higgo wrote: >Wat am I? Obviously, 'I' am an Observer-Moment. This is the same category mistake. You are no more an Observer-Moment than I am a number. Those are intellectual constructions. I am sure that if by chance you travel to Brussels, I will offer you a cup of coffee. Why would I ever offer a cup of coffee to an observer-moment ? And how would I? The time to prepare the coffee and you, dear observer-moment, disappear ... >This >current OM, including writing this email, is not related >to 'remembered' OMs except in that the 'remembered' OMs do >happen to exist. So the 'remembered' relation (whatever it is) create a link between observer-moments, isn't it? I need no more links than that. >There is no"I" that was one OM and then >'became' this OM. The block universe is static. I agree with both sentences. comp's block universe is UD* >Of course, 'your' current OM, which includes reading this email, is >unrelated to 'my current' OM. I hope not. Why ? >But since all OMs exist I can be sure that >there will be an OM which includs 'I am Bruno and I am reading this merde'. Of course. There is an infinity of such OM in UD*. I think we are disagreing mostly on pedagogy. Isn't it? To make that OM-sort of enlightment third person accessible (science), we must still explain the rarity of the OM 'I am Bruno and I am reading this merde in company of ten thousand white rabbits'. With comp there is a logical road to enlightment, modulo open mathematical questions. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal
Re: on formally indescribable merde
John Mikes wrote >Bruno, in my American dictionary it is 'feces' (plurale tantum), (merde) in >a >not-so-vulgar fashion (I guess, English is my 5th). >Any White Rabbit has real feces, on the level how it is real at all. >Imaginary White Rabbits may have white one. Thank you very much John for correcting my faecetious question to Jaecques Maellaeh. Aere you sure imaginaery White Raebbits maey haeve white faeces? Bruno PS I am posting this from ae paeraellel universe. Aepologies for the noise on the line!
Re: on formally indescribable merde
"Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> asks March 10, 2001 9:24 AM Subject: Re: on formally indescribable merde (SNIP the topical part) > > >>> >So does it mean feces? [JM] > >>> > >>> You mean faeces ? [BM] > >>> > >> > >>Are faeces real ? > > Are white rabbit's faeces real? > > Bruno > Bruno, in my American dictionary it is 'feces' (plurale tantum), (merde) in a not-so-vulgar fashion (I guess, English is my 5th). Any White Rabbit has real feces, on the level how it is real at all. Imaginary White Rabbits may have white one. John Mikes > > > > > > > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal > > >
Re: on formally indescribable merde
George Levy wrote: >> BM:..Positive integers exists. Nothing else. >This is a integercentric statement if I ever saw one. Oh ! George. You don't met Pythagore, or Xenocrate, ... in the plenitude. Do you? >And Kroenecker was an old fuddy daddy. Old and even dead (here and now for sure). But fuddy ? I don't know. What does fuddy mean? Note that I don't appreciate what Kronecker (the man) did to Cantor. And I love Cantor, for it is the first who gives rather strong glimpse on the bigness of the first person plenitude. Cantor call it INCONSISTENZ (modulo german orthograph) >If I was a negative number I would be deepely offended! I have some negative number friends. >Why not say >negative number exist and nothing else? Because when I say that, most people, from almost all universes, ask me "why *negative* number?" I take natural numbers because without natural numbers (or things recursively isomorphic to them) I cannot get them, and with them I got all the rest. You can see them as my "base" for the (first person) plenitude. >In fact all you need is the null >set to >begin the number description. >The set comprising the null set could represent >one. That set which holds the "null set" and the "one set" could represent >"two," >and so on... Yes but then I need sets, and if I take sets I take much more. Also there are a lot of non equivalent theories for sets, and each such theories are very rich and have a lot of non equivalent models. >Even with the null set I have my doubt. Why not use the Not(null set) >. which >is the plenitude eh??? :-) Classical logics can be used to get the whole universe (model of your standart set theory) from the null set with an intersection. The "not" can only be used in a subset. (I will not insist here). That is formal game. To define intersection axiomatically you need a theory and this one gives you all the universes (all the model of your theory). It is really Church thesis which refutes the traditional refutation of Pythagore idea that "everything are numbers or "ratio" between numbers". (cf. appendices of my thesis). >> It is true that physics and science has evolved through the abandon >> of the first person (Galileo, Einstein). > >Wow! Hold it. Be careful. One could argue that the opposite has actually >happened. In a conjugate fashion to the objective movement, the >abandonment of a >geocentric system forced us to view each individual observer as the center >of the >universe. You know I agree. >>With Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, Einstein we have moved toward >>a full >>relativistic point of view. You know I definitely agree. >The MWI gives us the chance to go all the way >and >places each "I" at the center. How weird. That would have been a nice sum up of what I try to say; with COMP instead of MWI. But COMP implies MWI (Note that Schmidhuber and me agree on that, but we disagree on what *are* the (many) worlds MW). Schmidhuber associate worlds to some programs, I associate worlds on machine's projection from shared computational histories The projection is first person plural. >The trend is actually to accept the first >person >point of view! A welcome trend. But that is not a reason to forget the third person. In fact, the sentence " to accept the first person point of view" seems to me ambiguous. It could mean "let us listen to people's personal believes" But there is a risk of inflation of information and it is natural to ask to the people to make these belief the more communicable possible. One way of doing that is science. To limit oneself to verifiable third person statement. And then, here is the ambiguity, we can, with hypothesis like COMP, "accept the first person point of view" as a subject matter of science, by elaborating third person discourse on the first person. Of course, we must locally agree on definition of what the first person is. >>> >So does it mean feces? [JM] >>> >>> You mean faeces ? [BM] >>> >> >>Are faeces real ? Are white rabbit's faeces real? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal
Re: on formally indescribable merde
That's what happens when you can't let go of the idea of self. - Original Message - From: Michael Rosefield <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: James Higgo <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Thursday, March 08, 2001 7:24 PM Subject: Re: on formally indescribable merde > > From: "James Higgo" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > > So what is it, this mystical soul, that 'transits' OMs? > > The more I think about this, the more I end up running around in circles > > I think the transit is just a hypothetical one; _if_ OMa iterated to OMb, it > would be consistent. > > However, I cannot help but feel that consciousness isn't an instantaneous > thing. Vague, I know, but it does seem to be a process. Only when OM's are > linked together do they make "sense". I think perhaps we don't need to throw > out time; a Many Worlds type static universe is, perhaps, simpler to > implement than the minds it contains. > > Damn, I wish _I_ made sense > > > >
Re: on formally indescribable merde
Want am I? Obviously, 'I' am an Observer-Moment. This current OM, including writing this email, is not related to 'remembered' OMs except in that the 'remembered' OMs do happen to exist. There is no"I" that was one OM and then 'became' this OM. The block universe is static. Of course, 'your' current OM, which includes reading this email, is unrelated to 'my current' OM. But since all OMs exist I can be sure that there will be an OM which includs 'I am Bruno and I am reading this merde'. James - Original Message - From: Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Friday, March 09, 2001 12:03 PM Subject: Re: on formally indescribable merde > James Higgo wrote: > > > >So what is it, this mystical soul, that 'transits' OMs? > > > This mystical soul that transits is the person. > The person, with its first, second and third person aspects. > > We have had a discussion on that and I guess we aknowledge > our reciprocal misunderstanding, no?. > > But of course we have to come back on that point. > > I confess I am quite a naive believer in person. I believe > in Kurt Godel, Agatha Christie and Mickey Mouse. They are exemple > of person (thought the last one probably lacks personal first person > attribute ...). > > What are you, if you are not a person? Are you Robot 21? > In that case you win the turing test and the "person rights" > applies to you (as person's interdictions). > > I believe so much in persons and person-ness, that it is > by attributing personhood to the lobian machine that I have been > able to interview it > (+ its truth theory "G*", but note that I don't attribute > personhood to the guardian angel). > > I also show in some sense that the universal machine, if > looking introspectively to the border of its personhood, > will see the roots of *everything*. And that's a TOE. > > And then persons are important once you take comp. > You know I use grand mother psychology, also called folk > psychology in the very definition of comp. > > I really don't understand why you want eliminate souls, > persons, consciousness, and what would that mean? > Of course those things are essentially first person, like > matters ... Ontologically you know I take only numbers, > and *then* I derive a phenomenology of persons, matters, > many worlds, Hilbert space, etc. You cannot say person > does not exists, you can say it is an illusion, and then > explain the trick: how the illusion appears. > > >Bruno, I'm of the Liebnitz school: each OM is independent and unrelated to > >another except in that it will, of course, share certain characteristics. > >It's bound to, as all OMs exist. What is the relevance of 'entangled > >histories'? > > OMs would be Leibnitz's Monads? Perhaps. > > The entangled histories exists by comp. I cannot eliminate them, > no more can I eliminate the prime numbers. > > Actually entangled stories make possible > for people to share "solid dreams". It is the entanglement of stories > which transforms the solipsistic first person computational > indeterminacy into sharable quantum-like first person *plural* > computational indeterminacy. Entanglement of stories entails the > duplication of the population of (virtual) machines in UD*, this > gives eventually a computationalist decoherence preventing > explosion of the set of white rabbits. > > Michael Rosefield wrote (to James Higgo): > > >Damn, I wish _I_ made sense > > Thanks to incompleteness _I_ makes sense ... in more than one way > for machines. > A never fully satisfied _I_, though. That's its (godelian) price. > > Bruno > > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal > > > >
Re: on formally indescribable merde
James Higgo wrote: >So what is it, this mystical soul, that 'transits' OMs? This mystical soul that transits is the person. The person, with its first, second and third person aspects. We have had a discussion on that and I guess we aknowledge our reciprocal misunderstanding, no?. But of course we have to come back on that point. I confess I am quite a naive believer in person. I believe in Kurt Godel, Agatha Christie and Mickey Mouse. They are exemple of person (thought the last one probably lacks personal first person attribute ...). What are you, if you are not a person? Are you Robot 21? In that case you win the turing test and the "person rights" applies to you (as person's interdictions). I believe so much in persons and person-ness, that it is by attributing personhood to the lobian machine that I have been able to interview it (+ its truth theory "G*", but note that I don't attribute personhood to the guardian angel). I also show in some sense that the universal machine, if looking introspectively to the border of its personhood, will see the roots of *everything*. And that's a TOE. And then persons are important once you take comp. You know I use grand mother psychology, also called folk psychology in the very definition of comp. I really don't understand why you want eliminate souls, persons, consciousness, and what would that mean? Of course those things are essentially first person, like matters ... Ontologically you know I take only numbers, and *then* I derive a phenomenology of persons, matters, many worlds, Hilbert space, etc. You cannot say person does not exists, you can say it is an illusion, and then explain the trick: how the illusion appears. >Bruno, I'm of the Liebnitz school: each OM is independent and unrelated to >another except in that it will, of course, share certain characteristics. >It's bound to, as all OMs exist. What is the relevance of 'entangled >histories'? OMs would be Leibnitz's Monads? Perhaps. The entangled histories exists by comp. I cannot eliminate them, no more can I eliminate the prime numbers. Actually entangled stories make possible for people to share "solid dreams". It is the entanglement of stories which transforms the solipsistic first person computational indeterminacy into sharable quantum-like first person *plural* computational indeterminacy. Entanglement of stories entails the duplication of the population of (virtual) machines in UD*, this gives eventually a computationalist decoherence preventing explosion of the set of white rabbits. Michael Rosefield wrote (to James Higgo): >Damn, I wish _I_ made sense Thanks to incompleteness _I_ makes sense ... in more than one way for machines. A never fully satisfied _I_, though. That's its (godelian) price. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal
Re: on formally indescribable merde
> From: "James Higgo" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > So what is it, this mystical soul, that 'transits' OMs? The more I think about this, the more I end up running around in circles I think the transit is just a hypothetical one; _if_ OMa iterated to OMb, it would be consistent. However, I cannot help but feel that consciousness isn't an instantaneous thing. Vague, I know, but it does seem to be a process. Only when OM's are linked together do they make "sense". I think perhaps we don't need to throw out time; a Many Worlds type static universe is, perhaps, simpler to implement than the minds it contains. Damn, I wish _I_ made sense
Re: on formally indescribable merde
So what is it, this mystical soul, that 'transits' OMs? - Original Message - From: George Levy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Thursday, March 08, 2001 5:34 AM Subject: Re: on formally indescribable merde > > > James Higgo wrote: > > > Another point: come on guys, explain how one OM 'becomes' another. If it > > becomes another then 'both OMs' are 'OM1 that becomes OM2 at (internal) time > > t'. Put up or shut up about this 'transiting', which is the core of he QTI > > debate. > > > > James > > > > This reminds me of Zeno's paradox How can achilles go from point A to point > C since he must go through point B1, B2 B3... first.. The fact is that Achilles > has, at any point, a velocity vector. At each point, he is "transiting." At > each point he has the perception of movement even though each single point does > not describe a whole trajectory. > > George > >
Re: on formally indescribable merde
James Higgo wrote: > Another point: come on guys, explain how one OM 'becomes' another. If it > becomes another then 'both OMs' are 'OM1 that becomes OM2 at (internal) time > t'. Put up or shut up about this 'transiting', which is the core of he QTI > debate. > > James > This reminds me of Zeno's paradox How can achilles go from point A to point C since he must go through point B1, B2 B3... first.. The fact is that Achilles has, at any point, a velocity vector. At each point, he is "transiting." At each point he has the perception of movement even though each single point does not describe a whole trajectory. George
Re: on formally indescribable merde
Bruno, I'm of the Liebnitz school: each OM is independent and unrelated to another except in that it will, of course, share certain characteristics. It's bound to, as all OMs exist. What is the relevance of 'entangled histories'? Another point: come on guys, explain how one OM 'becomes' another. If it becomes another then 'both OMs' are 'OM1 that becomes OM2 at (internal) time t'. Put up or shut up about this 'transiting', which is the core of he QTI debate. James - Original Message - From: Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Wednesday, March 07, 2001 1:57 PM Subject: Re: on formally indescribable merde > Jacques Mallah wrote: > > >I'm a quantum platonist :) > > Laugh if you want but one day we will be obliged to > put clearly our ontological carts on the table, if only to > satisfy Hal Ruhl in his (long term) search for an > *everything* faq :-) > > Well, let me recall you mine: numbers. (natural numbers, > positive integers). > > Kronecker said "God creates the natural numbers, all the > rest has been created by humans" (or something similar to that) > > My favorite current paraphrasing of it is: > > God creates the natural numbers, all the rest are dreamed > by universal machines (numbers). > > All the rest: from the negative numbers to your servitor :-) > > Note that dreams are first person phenomena. > > Some dreams are partially shared because there are entangled with > deep computational histories. A continuum of histories > which makes first person plural discours possible, which > makes rich nich of local third personne realities : worlds, > universes, multiverses, multimultiverses, and well beyond. > > Godel's theorem implies that arithmetic seen from inside > seems *very* big. To be sure, there isn't one drop of > Cantor Paradise which could not help us to measure this internal > bigness "feeling". > > Even George's plenitude seems ridiculously tiny in comparison. > (Sorry George for this 100% easy and incorrect but funny argument). > > And I am a classical platonist about the truth on numbers and > their relations, definable or relatively definable ... > > My scientific (third person) ontology = numbers and their relations. > > But then I accept intensional interpretations, which adds > in my set of "ontological truth" the whole of computer science, > provability logics, ... and ... you and me. > > First person ontology includes the physical laws and you, and me. > I hope it is first person plural. With comp, QM (MW) gives > empirical evidences we share a deep computational history. > > > >You're the one who tried to distinguish it as "a concrete UD". > > Yes, but only for the sake of an argument. It helps those who still > believe in a magical concrete universe to abandon that belief or > to abandon comp! > > >I take it, from your above statement, that you do not object to my use > >of the term "implemented". It seems that, in fact, your claim that while I > >have a problem because I need a precise definition of "implementation", you > >supposedly don't, was totally groundless. > > Implementation must be some sort of relative computations. > > > >It's hard to define "existance", isn't it? > > No. Positive integers exists. Nothing else. > I have no problem if you want more, but in general I don't need it. > The "right"frontier is somehow arbitrary. > I *do* "abus de langage" like saying Hilbert Space exists. > But it just means that (some) numbers find Hilbert space useful for > classifying the apparent computational histories their are > apparently going through. > > >Certainly, I would say that > >whatever structure is responsible for my own thoughts must exist in this > >sense. I only distinguish a "strong sense" from the weaker sense used in > >mathematics, which basically just means self-consistent. > > Consistency is an attribute of theories or machines or talking ducks, > not of mathematical object like numbers. Your use of "basically" > hide a confusion between an object and a machine's conception of that > object. > > >> And why do you want to classify as physical any mathematical > >> structures. > > > >That's the "everything" idea, that all math exists, and that > >the physics > >we see is just a subset of that TOE. > > Yes, but why any mathematical structures? > When I say that the number 439 exists, I mean it exists > with its fellow 438 and 440 i
Re: on formally indescribable merde
Marchal wrote: > ..Positive integers exists. Nothing else. This is a integercentric statement if I ever saw one. And Kroenecker was an old fuddy daddy. If I was a negative number I would be deepely offended! Why not say negative number exist and nothing else? In fact all you need is the null set to begin the number description. The set comprising the null set could represent one. That set which holds the "null set" and the "one set" could represent "two," and so on... Even with the null set I have my doubt. Why not use the Not(null set) . which is the plenitude eh??? :-) > Jacques Mallah wrote > >Leave Everett alone, he is dead and can't defend himself against your > >abuse of his name. > Who said Everett is dead? Or Elvis as a matter of fact? Have you checked the plenitude? > > Now I have the definitive evidence that you or your ancestor are > french, Monsieur Jacques Mallah, le roi Lion. Oui, je suis d'accord!!! :-) > > >In any case, we see once again that the fabled "first person point of > >view" has absolutely nothing to do with the subject under discussion. > > It is true that physics and science has evolved through the abandon > of the first person (Galileo, Einstein). Wow! Hold it. Be careful. One could argue that the opposite has actually happened. In a conjugate fashion to the objective movement, the abandonment of a geocentric system forced us to view each individual observer as the center of the universe. With Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, Einstein we have moved toward a full relativistic point of view. The MWI gives us the chance to go all the way and places each "I" at the center. The trend is actually to accept the first person point of view! Jacques Mallah wrote > >Anything real can be stated in objective terms. Real? Hard to define what is real. > > >>Some time ago "merde" was considered as very vulgar, but since then > >>it has been overthrown by "shit", or worse ... "Merde" seems almost > >>polite in comparison. > > > >So does it mean feces? > > You mean faeces ? > Are faeces real ? George
Re: on formally indescribable merde
Jacques Mallah wrote: >I'm a quantum platonist :) Laugh if you want but one day we will be obliged to put clearly our ontological carts on the table, if only to satisfy Hal Ruhl in his (long term) search for an *everything* faq :-) Well, let me recall you mine: numbers. (natural numbers, positive integers). Kronecker said "God creates the natural numbers, all the rest has been created by humans" (or something similar to that) My favorite current paraphrasing of it is: God creates the natural numbers, all the rest are dreamed by universal machines (numbers). All the rest: from the negative numbers to your servitor :-) Note that dreams are first person phenomena. Some dreams are partially shared because there are entangled with deep computational histories. A continuum of histories which makes first person plural discours possible, which makes rich nich of local third personne realities : worlds, universes, multiverses, multimultiverses, and well beyond. Godel's theorem implies that arithmetic seen from inside seems *very* big. To be sure, there isn't one drop of Cantor Paradise which could not help us to measure this internal bigness "feeling". Even George's plenitude seems ridiculously tiny in comparison. (Sorry George for this 100% easy and incorrect but funny argument). And I am a classical platonist about the truth on numbers and their relations, definable or relatively definable ... My scientific (third person) ontology = numbers and their relations. But then I accept intensional interpretations, which adds in my set of "ontological truth" the whole of computer science, provability logics, ... and ... you and me. First person ontology includes the physical laws and you, and me. I hope it is first person plural. With comp, QM (MW) gives empirical evidences we share a deep computational history. >You're the one who tried to distinguish it as "a concrete UD". Yes, but only for the sake of an argument. It helps those who still believe in a magical concrete universe to abandon that belief or to abandon comp! >I take it, from your above statement, that you do not object to my use >of the term "implemented". It seems that, in fact, your claim that while I >have a problem because I need a precise definition of "implementation", you >supposedly don't, was totally groundless. Implementation must be some sort of relative computations. >It's hard to define "existance", isn't it? No. Positive integers exists. Nothing else. I have no problem if you want more, but in general I don't need it. The "right"frontier is somehow arbitrary. I *do* "abus de langage" like saying Hilbert Space exists. But it just means that (some) numbers find Hilbert space useful for classifying the apparent computational histories their are apparently going through. >Certainly, I would say that >whatever structure is responsible for my own thoughts must exist in this >sense. I only distinguish a "strong sense" from the weaker sense used in >mathematics, which basically just means self-consistent. Consistency is an attribute of theories or machines or talking ducks, not of mathematical object like numbers. Your use of "basically" hide a confusion between an object and a machine's conception of that object. >> And why do you want to classify as physical any mathematical >> structures. > >That's the "everything" idea, that all math exists, and that >the physics >we see is just a subset of that TOE. Yes, but why any mathematical structures? When I say that the number 439 exists, I mean it exists with its fellow 438 and 440 in Platon Heaven. Of course 439 can incarnate itself in a deeper computational history like being the number of pages of your current favorite novel. You cannot just say physical = mathematical. I agree of course, but it is not obvious. It is part of our work to make that clear. In particular, in that case, we must be able to prove F = ma, or SE. What I say is that we have the following reduction with comp: physicalness emerges (in some Darwinian/turing-tropic way) from the psychological, which also emerges (in the *same* Darwinian/turing-tropic) from numbers and their relations. > We use "physical" to refer to the structure that we guess exists in the >strong sense. If you believe in the AUH, then the distinction disappears. >Most people don't. The distinction disappears ontologically only, but the appearance of the distinction does not disappear and must be explained. > Of course, we can also use it to refer to things directly related to >what we are seeing. This leads to statements like "the branch of the >wavefunction that I see is physically real, while the rest aren't". I don't >like that kind of statement. I am glad with that! But why a wave function ? remember you cannot answer that we infere it from observation. It would not be purely "mathematical" in that case. >>Tegmark, like Everett, *do* distinguish the first and third person, whi
Re: on formally indescribable merde
From: Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >Jacques Mallah wrote: > >Sorry, that doesn't help. What do you mean by a "real actual" one? >What other kind is there, a fake one? Either it exists, or not. > >OK. In that sense we agree that the DU exist. I am glad to see that you are >a classical platonist. An intuitionist would'nt accept the idea that >something exist ... or not. I'm a quantum platonist :) > > Of course, in your macintosh example, the UD was itself implemented by >some other mathematical structure - your "local decor". Does that matter? > >A big part of my reasoning is that it *doesn't matter* indeed. For most >people this is a difficulty. You're the one who tried to distinguish it as "a concrete UD". I take it, from your above statement, that you do not object to my use of the term "implemented". It seems that, in fact, your claim that while I have a problem because I need a precise definition of "implementation", you supposedly don't, was totally groundless. > >Actually, I would say that any mathematical structure that has real >existance (in the strong sense) should be called "physical". I do not know >of any better definition for "physical existance". > >What is that strong sense of existence? It's hard to define "existance", isn't it? Certainly, I would say that whatever structure is responsible for my own thoughts must exist in this sense. I only distinguish a "strong sense" from the weaker sense used in mathematics, which basically just means self-consistent. >And why do you want to classify as physical any mathematical structures. That's the "everything" idea, that all math exists, and that the physics we see is just a subset of that TOE. >If you do that (a little like Tegmark) you are obliged to explain how we >feel a difference between physicalness and mathematicalness We use "physical" to refer to the structure that we guess exists in the strong sense. If you believe in the AUH, then the distinction disappears. Most people don't. Of course, we can also use it to refer to things directly related to what we are seeing. This leads to statements like "the branch of the wavefunction that I see is physically real, while the rest aren't". I don't like that kind of statement. >Tegmark, like Everett, *do* distinguish the first and third person, which >helps to make sense of that idea. Leave Everett alone, he is dead and can't defend himself against your abuse of his name. I'm sure that, otherwise, he would find my approach to be the logical next step for the MWI. >The physical would be some mathematical structures sufficiently rich for >having "inside point of views" (through SAS point of views for exemple). >The physical point of view (pov) would correspond to these internal pov. It sounds more like you want to say that the "view" seen by a conscious observer-moment is his "physical world view". If so, this has absolutely nothing to do with your terms "first person vs. 3rd person views" as it has nothing to do with time evolution or measure. I don't like to call a thought's view his physical world view, but I might call it "his effective physical world view". (Ever notice how the main change that is needed in using the English language, to make it correct, is to preface almost every word with "effective"?) > >So, your objection is irrelevant. You do believe a UD implements other >computations. > > > > Sure. Yes. UD implements all computations, and even all implementations >of all computations. Great. So you need a precise definition of "implementation" in order to find the measure distribution. So much for your claim not to need it. > > >>Actuality is a first person concept. > > > > > > I have no clue as to what you mean. > > > > In Newtonian Physics one could imagine some third person time (objective >time), but since relativity I guess most believe that time is either a >parameter or do refer to some relative measurement done by an observer. Time as a "parameter" is exactly the same idea as Newtonian time. Even those who refer to measurements done by observers do so in objective or "3rd person" terms. (If an observer does measurement X, he sees Y. That's a perfectly objective statement.) Since, after all, there can never be any other kind of terms! > > "Actuality", "modern", "here", "now", "there", "elsewhere", are words >with meaning dependent of the locutor. Indexicals, as the philosophers call >them. I would agree for the other terms, but "actuality" has the opposite meaning. It refers to the reality that exists. > > Most are true or false only from a first person point of view. They are words, not statements, so they are neither true nor false. The truth of the statement "Bob is here" depends on the location of the speaker. If I said it, it would _mean_ "Bob is where Jack is" and would be objectively false. If you are with Bob, you will
