Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., Phyllis, List:

GR: But on further reflection, it is quite clear what the 'type' of the
subway token is ...


I am likely belaboring the point now, but a subway token is *not *a token
in the semeiotic sense, and its type is *not *a type in the semeiotic
sense. The English *term *"subway token" is a type, and each
*individual *instance
where and when "subway token" is written, spoken, thought of, or otherwise
embodied is a token of that type.

GR: ... but what is the 'type' (and object) of your unexpressed thought?


The type is whatever definitely significant form is embodied by the
unexpressed thought-token, whether words in a language, an image, a
diagram, etc. The object is whatever the unexpressed thought-token *denotes*,
i.e., that which it is *about*.

GR: Or is the first unexpressed thought more like a dream? The fact of the
dream is real, but the content of it isn't (quite; but surely more so than
the dream, I would expect).


Even though the events that take place in a dream are not real, the dream
itself is still an *actual *thought-token. After all, the events that take
place in a fictional narrative are not real, but the spoken or written
story is still an *actual *text-token.

GR: What if it were a random, yet highly original thought? A thought come
"out of the blue" as the expression has it.


It would still be a token of a type, an individual embodiment of a
definitely significant form; and it would still be about something other
than itself, namely, its object. It would also be a dynamical interpretant
of the (quasi-)mind that thinks it, which consists of all the signs that
have previously determined it--a system of connected signs that constitutes
one sign and thus can determine one such interpretant.

GR: Perhaps this is the sort of matter which can make one feel that it
might be better *to focus on the process of semiosis* rather than on the
terminology forged in semeiotic grammar.


I have gradually come to agree with James Liszka (
https://doi.org/10.1515/sem-2018-0089) that a concentration on *classifying
signs* is misplaced, and that it is indeed more fruitful to analyze
the *process of
semiosis*, especially having taken the position that the former are
discrete *entia rationis* while the latter is a real continuum. However, I
strongly believe that the proper use of the terminology forged in
speculative grammar is indispensable for that task, as demonstrated by the
recent on-List cases of misapplying the type/token distinction to *objects *of
signs rather than signs *themselves*.

GR: In addition, the terminology can become so complicated as to -- at
least at this stage of the development of Peirce's semeiotic -- to become a
possible impediment to considerations of acts of semiosis.


I agree, which is why I have tried to standardize some of the terminology
in my own usage where Peirce himself clearly was experimenting with various
alternatives, such as tone/token/type in lieu of the earlier
qualisign/sinsign/legisign and the later potisign/actisign/famisign.
Name/proposition/argument is another one, as opposed to term or rheme as
the first class, dicisign as the second, and seme/pheme/delome as the full
trichotomy. He is fairly consistent about immediate and dynamical for the
two objects and the first two interpretants, but I tend to use final for
the third interpretant rather than eventual, habitual, normal, or rational.

GR: I'm eager to explore it further.


Likewise, I am enjoying the conversation and look forward to further
exchanges. I hope that more List members will chime in as Jack, Jeff, Mike,
and now Phyllis already have.

PC: What about a thought expressed without language as, say, a piece of
music, a modern dance or an abstract piece of art?


These are excellent examples of signs embodied in *other *systems of
expression, which I have tried to keep in mind throughout the discussion
even though we have mostly been talking about written and spoken languages
so far. A handwritten or printed score, a live performance, an audio
recording, and even a person's internal recollection are all tokens of a
piece of music, arguably conforming to different types of the same sign and
obviously possessing very different tones.

GR: But in both linguistic and art creation, I am still unsettled on what
the *object* of that original sign is.


Artistic signs tend to be highly iconic, which entails that they are not so
much about denoting an object as about signifying an interpretant, namely,
producing certain *feelings* as their primary effects. Accordingly, I am
inclined to identify their creators' *intentions* as their objects, much
like the author's intention in the case of a text.

PC: So, while I agree with you that not much is written about the arts from
a Peircean perspective, it is a rich source for such study.


Indeed, much more could and should be said here, so I am very interested to
see what others will add to these initial remarks.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Phyllis Chiasson]

 My work in non-verbal inferencing patterns stems from the arts considered
in light of Peirce's phenomenology. So, while I agree with you that not
much is written about the arts from a Peircean perspective, it is a rich
source for such study.

On Fri, Nov 5, 2021, 3:09 PM Gary Richmond  wrote:

> Phyllis, Jon, Gary F, List,
>
> PC: What about a thought expressed without language as, say, a piece of
> music, a modern dance or an abstract piece of art?
>
> In my view it depends on whether the piece of music or dance or art object
> was 'reproduced' internally from something already 'composed', in which
> case I'd say it is a *token*; or if it is, shall we say, a 'spur of the
> moment' creation, then it is the original *sign *which may have
> tokens. But in both linguistic and art creation, I am still unsettled on
> what the *object* of that original sign is.
>
> And a related question: since there is obvious 'structure' even in, say,
> jazz improvisation (e.g., John Coltrans), or interpretive dance (Isadora
> Duncan), or 'action painting' (Jackson Pollock), structure that in almost
> all cases has its roots in previous study in the art form even if/when it
> diverges radically from its historically more conservative or established
> forms.
>
> I'm glad you've introduced the arts into this discussion, Phyllis, as
> there is a tendency among many -- if not most -- philosophers,
> semioticians, logicians, mathematicians, etc. -- to work and write as if
> *only* linguistic and mathematical signs were of interest and importance.
> And I've yet to be much impressed by what I've seen of work in semiotics in
> the arts (with a few notable exceptions, such as Martin Lefebvre) most of
> which is not grounded in Peircean but, rather, other schools of semiotics
> (again, then are exceptions, such as Claudio Guerri). But there may be work
> in these areas that I'm not aware of, especially as I've pretty much
> stopped looking for it.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
>
>
> “Let everything happen to you
> Beauty and terror
> Just keep going
> No feeling is final”
> ― Rainer Maria Rilke
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Nov 5, 2021 at 5:18 PM Phyllis Chiasson <
> phyllis.marie.chias...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> What about a thought expressed without language as, say, a piece of
>> music, a modern dance or an abstract piece of art?
>>
>> On Fri, Nov 5, 2021, 12:17 PM Gary Richmond 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Gary F, Jon, List,
>>>
>>> GF: "A thought I am hosting at the moment is certainly *embodied* here
>>> and now in a pattern of neural activity, whether I *utter* it or not,
>>> just as a spoken or written text is *embodied* in a pattern of sound
>>> waves or marks on a page. The only difference is that it is an
>>> *internal* sign, invisible to others. Does that disqualify it as a
>>> *token*? I would certainly hesitate to call it a *type*."
>>>
>>>
>>> That's an interesting question which I'm finding it somewhat difficult
>>> to answer. At first blush it seemed to me that the situation of that
>>> internal sign of your thought wouldn't be much different from, say, a
>>> subway token which was dropped and buried in the earth, not to be seen (or,
>>> for your thought, expressed} until/if ever uncovered (or, for you thought,
>>> expressed in language written or spoken).
>>>
>>> But on further reflection, it is quite clear what the 'type' of the
>>> subway token is; but what is the 'type' (and object) of your unexpressed
>>> thought?
>>>
>>> Or is the first unexpressed thought more like a dream? The fact of the
>>> dream is real, but the content of it isn't (quite; but surely more so than
>>> the dream, I would expect). I suppose if you were, say, to convey the dream
>>> to another, that would be a token of if. Is your internal thought something
>>> like that until it is written out or spoken of? If so, the original thought
>>> before being expressed in language doesn't seem exactly like a token.
>>>
>>> A similar question would follow, I think, if rather than being written
>>> or spoken by you that the thought were repeated only in another internal
>>> expression of the original thought, maybe in a somewhat more
>>> developed way..
>>>
>>> Jon wrote:
>>>
>>> JAS: I would say that [your internal thought] is indeed a token, because
>>> it is an *individual* embodiment of the sign. After all. . . an
>>> internal thought is a hypothetically discrete constituent--with boundaries
>>> that are marked off somewhat arbitrarily--of an ongoing continuous dialogue
>>> in which the utterer and interpreter are temporally sequential stages of
>>> the same (quasi-)mind.  the pattern of neural activity that embodies a
>>> thought-sign is an *actual *utterance just as much as the pattern of
>>> sound waves or marks on a page that embodies a spoken or written text.
>>>
>>>
>>> But I remain unclear as to what the 'sign' is which that 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Gary Richmond]

Phyllis, Jon, Gary F, List,

PC: What about a thought expressed without language as, say, a piece of
music, a modern dance or an abstract piece of art?

In my view it depends on whether the piece of music or dance or art object
was 'reproduced' internally from something already 'composed', in which
case I'd say it is a *token*; or if it is, shall we say, a 'spur of the
moment' creation, then it is the original *sign *which may have tokens. But
in both linguistic and art creation, I am still unsettled on what the
*object* of that original sign is.

And a related question: since there is obvious 'structure' even in, say,
jazz improvisation (e.g., John Coltrans), or interpretive dance (Isadora
Duncan), or 'action painting' (Jackson Pollock), structure that in almost
all cases has its roots in previous study in the art form even if/when it
diverges radically from its historically more conservative or established
forms.

I'm glad you've introduced the arts into this discussion, Phyllis, as there
is a tendency among many -- if not most -- philosophers, semioticians,
logicians, mathematicians, etc. -- to work and write as if *only*
linguistic and mathematical signs were of interest and importance. And I've
yet to be much impressed by what I've seen of work in semiotics in the arts
(with a few notable exceptions, such as Martin Lefebvre) most of which is
not grounded in Peircean but, rather, other schools of semiotics (again,
then are exceptions, such as Claudio Guerri). But there may be work in
these areas that I'm not aware of, especially as I've pretty much stopped
looking for it.

Best,

Gary R



“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Fri, Nov 5, 2021 at 5:18 PM Phyllis Chiasson <
phyllis.marie.chias...@gmail.com> wrote:

> What about a thought expressed without language as, say, a piece of music,
> a modern dance or an abstract piece of art?
>
> On Fri, Nov 5, 2021, 12:17 PM Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Gary F, Jon, List,
>>
>> GF: "A thought I am hosting at the moment is certainly *embodied* here
>> and now in a pattern of neural activity, whether I *utter* it or not,
>> just as a spoken or written text is *embodied* in a pattern of sound
>> waves or marks on a page. The only difference is that it is an *internal* 
>> sign,
>> invisible to others. Does that disqualify it as a *token*? I would
>> certainly hesitate to call it a *type*."
>>
>>
>> That's an interesting question which I'm finding it somewhat difficult to
>> answer. At first blush it seemed to me that the situation of that internal
>> sign of your thought wouldn't be much different from, say, a subway token
>> which was dropped and buried in the earth, not to be seen (or, for your
>> thought, expressed} until/if ever uncovered (or, for you thought, expressed
>> in language written or spoken).
>>
>> But on further reflection, it is quite clear what the 'type' of the
>> subway token is; but what is the 'type' (and object) of your unexpressed
>> thought?
>>
>> Or is the first unexpressed thought more like a dream? The fact of the
>> dream is real, but the content of it isn't (quite; but surely more so than
>> the dream, I would expect). I suppose if you were, say, to convey the dream
>> to another, that would be a token of if. Is your internal thought something
>> like that until it is written out or spoken of? If so, the original thought
>> before being expressed in language doesn't seem exactly like a token.
>>
>> A similar question would follow, I think, if rather than being written or
>> spoken by you that the thought were repeated only in another internal
>> expression of the original thought, maybe in a somewhat more
>> developed way..
>>
>> Jon wrote:
>>
>> JAS: I would say that [your internal thought] is indeed a token, because
>> it is an *individual* embodiment of the sign. After all. . . an internal
>> thought is a hypothetically discrete constituent--with boundaries that are
>> marked off somewhat arbitrarily--of an ongoing continuous dialogue in which
>> the utterer and interpreter are temporally sequential stages of the same
>> (quasi-)mind.  the pattern of neural activity that embodies a thought-sign
>> is an *actual *utterance just as much as the pattern of sound waves or
>> marks on a page that embodies a spoken or written text.
>>
>>
>> But I remain unclear as to what the 'sign' is which that original thought
>> is an alleged 'token' of? And what is its object? What if it were a random,
>> yet highly original thought? A thought come "out of the blue" as the
>> expression has it. Certainly I agree with Jon that "the pattern of
>> neural activity that embodies a thought-sign is an *actual *utterance
>> just as much as the pattern of sound waves or marks on a page that embodies
>> a spoken or written text," and so the same 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Phyllis Chiasson]

What about a thought expressed without language as, say, a piece of music,
a modern dance or an abstract piece of art?

On Fri, Nov 5, 2021, 12:17 PM Gary Richmond  wrote:

> Gary F, Jon, List,
>
> GF: "A thought I am hosting at the moment is certainly *embodied* here
> and now in a pattern of neural activity, whether I *utter* it or not,
> just as a spoken or written text is *embodied* in a pattern of sound
> waves or marks on a page. The only difference is that it is an *internal* 
> sign,
> invisible to others. Does that disqualify it as a *token*? I would
> certainly hesitate to call it a *type*."
>
>
> That's an interesting question which I'm finding it somewhat difficult to
> answer. At first blush it seemed to me that the situation of that internal
> sign of your thought wouldn't be much different from, say, a subway token
> which was dropped and buried in the earth, not to be seen (or, for your
> thought, expressed} until/if ever uncovered (or, for you thought, expressed
> in language written or spoken).
>
> But on further reflection, it is quite clear what the 'type' of the subway
> token is; but what is the 'type' (and object) of your unexpressed thought?
>
> Or is the first unexpressed thought more like a dream? The fact of the
> dream is real, but the content of it isn't (quite; but surely more so than
> the dream, I would expect). I suppose if you were, say, to convey the dream
> to another, that would be a token of if. Is your internal thought something
> like that until it is written out or spoken of? If so, the original thought
> before being expressed in language doesn't seem exactly like a token.
>
> A similar question would follow, I think, if rather than being written or
> spoken by you that the thought were repeated only in another internal
> expression of the original thought, maybe in a somewhat more
> developed way..
>
> Jon wrote:
>
> JAS: I would say that [your internal thought] is indeed a token, because
> it is an *individual* embodiment of the sign. After all. . . an internal
> thought is a hypothetically discrete constituent--with boundaries that are
> marked off somewhat arbitrarily--of an ongoing continuous dialogue in which
> the utterer and interpreter are temporally sequential stages of the same
> (quasi-)mind.  the pattern of neural activity that embodies a thought-sign
> is an *actual *utterance just as much as the pattern of sound waves or
> marks on a page that embodies a spoken or written text.
>
>
> But I remain unclear as to what the 'sign' is which that original thought
> is an alleged 'token' of? And what is its object? What if it were a random,
> yet highly original thought? A thought come "out of the blue" as the
> expression has it. Certainly I agree with Jon that "the pattern of neural
> activity that embodies a thought-sign is an *actual *utterance just as
> much as the pattern of sound waves or marks on a page that embodies a
> spoken or written text," and so the same questions just above might be
> put to, especially, the verbal expression of that "highly original thought."
>
> Perhaps this is the sort of matter which can make one feel that it might
> be better *to focus on the process of semiosis* rather than on the
> terminology forged in semeiotic grammar. On the other hand, it would seem
> that for the purposes of developing a scientific semeiotic that we require
> such terminology to even speak about semiosis with other semioticians, to
> discuss semiosis generally, or individual examples of semiosis, etc. The
> danger, as I'm beginning to see it, is the possibility of getting 'lost' in
> the terminology, to see individual trees rather than the forest, so to
> speak. In addition, the terminology can become so complicated as to -- at
> least at this stage of the development of Peirce's semeiotic -- to become a
> possible impediment to considerations of acts of semiosis. I doubt that few
> would say that there aren't major challenges in dealing with Peirce's
> semeiotic terminology as it develops over the course of his logical life.
>
> I am only today grappling with the intriguing question you posed, Gary F,
> and just a few minutes ago read Jon's post, so all of this is still quite
> unsettled in my thinking. I'm eager to explore it further.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
>
>
>
> “Let everything happen to you
> Beauty and terror
> Just keep going
> No feeling is final”
> ― Rainer Maria Rilke
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Nov 5, 2021 at 9:16 AM  wrote:
>
>> Jon, Gary R, List,
>>
>> Thanks for correcting my mistake about tokens, which somehow slipped by
>> my internal editor.
>>
>> JAS: the three words in different languages are only tokens where they
>> are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those *individual *instances
>> is governed by the *general *type to which it conforms. However,
>> individual *humans *are not 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F, Jon, List,

GF: "A thought I am hosting at the moment is certainly *embodied* here and
now in a pattern of neural activity, whether I *utter* it or not, just as a
spoken or written text is *embodied* in a pattern of sound waves or marks
on a page. The only difference is that it is an *internal* sign, invisible
to others. Does that disqualify it as a *token*? I would certainly hesitate
to call it a *type*."


That's an interesting question which I'm finding it somewhat difficult to
answer. At first blush it seemed to me that the situation of that internal
sign of your thought wouldn't be much different from, say, a subway token
which was dropped and buried in the earth, not to be seen (or, for your
thought, expressed} until/if ever uncovered (or, for you thought, expressed
in language written or spoken).

But on further reflection, it is quite clear what the 'type' of the subway
token is; but what is the 'type' (and object) of your unexpressed thought?

Or is the first unexpressed thought more like a dream? The fact of the
dream is real, but the content of it isn't (quite; but surely more so than
the dream, I would expect). I suppose if you were, say, to convey the dream
to another, that would be a token of if. Is your internal thought something
like that until it is written out or spoken of? If so, the original thought
before being expressed in language doesn't seem exactly like a token.

A similar question would follow, I think, if rather than being written or
spoken by you that the thought were repeated only in another internal
expression of the original thought, maybe in a somewhat more
developed way..

Jon wrote:

JAS: I would say that [your internal thought] is indeed a token, because it
is an *individual* embodiment of the sign. After all. . . an internal
thought is a hypothetically discrete constituent--with boundaries that are
marked off somewhat arbitrarily--of an ongoing continuous dialogue in which
the utterer and interpreter are temporally sequential stages of the same
(quasi-)mind.  the pattern of neural activity that embodies a thought-sign
is an *actual *utterance just as much as the pattern of sound waves or
marks on a page that embodies a spoken or written text.


But I remain unclear as to what the 'sign' is which that original thought
is an alleged 'token' of? And what is its object? What if it were a random,
yet highly original thought? A thought come "out of the blue" as the
expression has it. Certainly I agree with Jon that "the pattern of neural
activity that embodies a thought-sign is an *actual *utterance just as much
as the pattern of sound waves or marks on a page that embodies a spoken or
written text," and so the same questions just above might be put to,
especially, the verbal expression of that "highly original thought."

Perhaps this is the sort of matter which can make one feel that it might be
better *to focus on the process of semiosis* rather than on the terminology
forged in semeiotic grammar. On the other hand, it would seem that for the
purposes of developing a scientific semeiotic that we require such
terminology to even speak about semiosis with other semioticians, to
discuss semiosis generally, or individual examples of semiosis, etc. The
danger, as I'm beginning to see it, is the possibility of getting 'lost' in
the terminology, to see individual trees rather than the forest, so to
speak. In addition, the terminology can become so complicated as to -- at
least at this stage of the development of Peirce's semeiotic -- to become a
possible impediment to considerations of acts of semiosis. I doubt that few
would say that there aren't major challenges in dealing with Peirce's
semeiotic terminology as it develops over the course of his logical life.

I am only today grappling with the intriguing question you posed, Gary F,
and just a few minutes ago read Jon's post, so all of this is still quite
unsettled in my thinking. I'm eager to explore it further.

Best,

Gary R




“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Fri, Nov 5, 2021 at 9:16 AM  wrote:

> Jon, Gary R, List,
>
> Thanks for correcting my mistake about tokens, which somehow slipped by my
> internal editor.
>
> JAS: the three words in different languages are only tokens where they
> are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those *individual *instances
> is governed by the *general *type to which it conforms. However,
> individual *humans *are not tokens of the type "man" as a *word *in
> English, the type "homo" as a *word *in Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as
> a *word *in Greek; instead, they are the *dynamical objects* of those
> signs.
>
> GF: As Gary R confirmed, it is the written or spoken *word* that is a
> token. It would follow that the three words in the different languages are
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

GF: It would follow that the three words in the different languages are
*subtypes*, not tokens, of the more general type which Peirce referred to
as “the same sign.” This implies a hierarchy of *types *but not of *tokens*.


I agree, although I prefer to use "type" for what you are calling a
"subtype" and "sign" for what you are calling "the more general type." That
way, the hierarchy has exactly four distinct levels--*tones *as
indefinitely significant characters possessed by *tokens*, each of which is
an individual instance governed by and conforming to a *type*, which is a
definitely significant form within a particular language or other system of
*signs*, each of which encompasses multiple types that are at least
approximate translations of each other.

GF: A thought I am hosting at the moment is certainly *embodied *here and
now in a pattern of neural activity, whether I *utter *it or not, just as a
spoken or written text is *embodied *in a pattern of sound waves or marks
on a page. The only difference is that it is an *internal *sign, invisible
to others. Does that disqualify it as a *token*?


I would say that it is indeed a token, because it is an *individual*
embodiment of the sign. After all, as we have discussed previously, an
internal thought is a hypothetically discrete constituent--with boundaries
that are marked off somewhat arbitrarily--of an ongoing continuous dialogue
in which the utterer and interpreter are temporally sequential stages of
the same (quasi-)mind. In other words, the pattern of neural activity that
embodies a thought-sign is an *actual *utterance just as much as the
pattern of sound waves or marks on a page that embodies a spoken or written
text.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Nov 5, 2021 at 8:16 AM  wrote:

> Jon, Gary R, List,
>
> Thanks for correcting my mistake about tokens, which somehow slipped by my
> internal editor.
>
> JAS: the three words in different languages are only tokens where they
> are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those *individual *instances
> is governed by the *general *type to which it conforms. However,
> individual *humans *are not tokens of the type "man" as a *word *in
> English, the type "homo" as a *word *in Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as
> a *word *in Greek; instead, they are the *dynamical objects* of those
> signs.
>
> GF: As Gary R confirmed, it is the written or spoken *word* that is a
> token. It would follow that the three words in the different languages are
> *subtypes*, not tokens, of the more general type which Peirce referred to
> as “the same sign.” This implies a hierarchy of *types* but not of
> *tokens*.
>
> I wonder, though, whether the term “token” can only apply to *external *signs.
> In his October 1995 *Monist* article, Peirce referred to “A sign (under
> which designation I place every kind of thought, and not alone external
> signs)” (CP 5.447, EP2:350). A thought I am hosting at the moment is
> certainly *embodied* here and now in a pattern of neural activity,
> whether I *utter* it or not, just as a spoken or written text is
> *embodied* in a pattern of sound waves or marks on a page. The only
> difference is that it is an *internal* sign, invisible to others. Does
> that disqualify it as a *token*? I would certainly hesitate to call it a
> *type*.
>
> Gary f.
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jeff, List:

This is another example of incorrectly applying Peirce's semeiotic
terminology of "type" and "token" to the *objects *of signs rather than to
signs *themselves*. Just as an individual man is *not *a token of the type
"man" as a word in English, the individual philosophers called by the names
Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle are *not "*paradigms of token individuals."
Instead, they are the *dynamical *objects of those three names, which are
tokens of types whenever and wherever they are *actually *written, spoken,
thought of, or otherwise embodied.

In a draft letter to Lady Welby (EP 2:484-489, 1908), Peirce gives the
trichotomies for classifying a sign according to its *dynamical *object as
abstractive/concretive/collective, its *immediate *object as
descriptive/designative/copulant, and the sign *itself *as (tentatively)
potisign/actisign/famisign rather than tone/token/type. He further posits
that all famisigns are collective copulants, while actisigns can also be
collective designatives or concretive designatives. Hence, the English word
"man" as a *type *is a collective copulant, and when a *token *of "man" or
a proper name like "Socrates" is used to denote an *individual *man, it is
a concretive designative.

As for quantification, Francesco Bellucci observes that some of Peirce's
earlier taxonomies associate it directly with the *immediate *object as
vague/singular/general (*Peirce's Speculative Grammar: Logic as Semiotics*,
section 8.1.1). "Greek philosophers" is a collective copulant type, so a
quantifier must be added to identify which *individual* member of that
collection is the dynamical object of an *individual *token of that
type. "*Some
*Greek philosopher" reserves the choice of that individual for the utterer,
"*this *Greek philosopher" indicates that individual within the context of
the utterance, and "*any *Greek philosopher" allows the interpreter to
choose that individual.

"Most Greek philosophers" is a bit trickier, since it ostensibly denotes an
indefinite *collection *of members within the entire collection of Greek
philosophers--which presumably encompasses all past, present, and future
Greek philosophers unless stipulated otherwise by the utterer. I suggest
reformulating the proposition accordingly--"for any Greek philosopher, it
is probable that he/she dies before age 100." The dynamical *object *is
thus whatever individual Greek philosopher is chosen by the interpreter,
and the immediate *interpretant *in accordance with the definition of
"probable" is that if an infinite series of such individuals were to be
randomly chosen, then more than half of them would die before age 100.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 6:18 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Gary F, JAS, List,
>
> The points made about types and tokens are interesting.
>
> Consider an inductive argument.
>
>1. Socrates is a Greek philosopher, and he died at age 71.
>2. Plato is a Greek philosopher, and he died at age 80.
>3. Aristotle is a Greek philosopher, and he died at age 62.
>4. Therefore, it is probable that most Greek philosophers die before
>age 100.
>
> In this argument, the philosophers called by the names Socrates, Plato and
> Aristotle are all paradigms of token individuals.
>
> What about "most Greek philosophers?" In logical terms, we take a
> class--Greek philosophers--and then we quantify over it. The quantifier,
> Peirce points out, takes many individuals and treats them as a collection.
> We can, for the purposes of expressing the conclusion in the Beta system of
> the EG, treat that collection as an individual having the character of an
> existing group.
>
> What is the status of the collection when we include the "it is probable
> that" and express the conclusion in the Gamma system of the EG? If we don't
> restrict the group to individuals who lived in the past, but include
> possible living Greek philosophers who have not yet died, then what should
> we say about "most Greek philosophers"? Type or token? General kind or
> group of particular individuals? How about a group that includes future
> Greek philosophers not yet born?
>
> We can, for various purposes, restrict our attention in different ways.
> This is, after all, the function of indices--including the quantifiers
> employed in natural languages.
>
> My suggestion is that we use the formal systems of the EGs as mathematical
> tools for clarifying hypotheses in the philosophical theory of logic. If
> our aim in a critical logic is to give explanations of function of the
> terms and propositions in the argument so as to explain the grounds of the
> validity of the reasoning, then I suspect we'd better take some care to
> sort out the relationships between the quantifiers and modal operators in
> the inductive 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[gnox]

Jon, Gary R, List,

Thanks for correcting my mistake about tokens, which somehow slipped by my 
internal editor.

JAS: the three words in different languages are only tokens where they are 
actually written or spoken, and each of those individual instances is governed 
by the general type to which it conforms. However, individual humans are not 
tokens of the type "man" as a word in English, the type "homo" as a word in 
Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as a word in Greek; instead, they are the 
dynamical objects of those signs.

GF: As Gary R confirmed, it is the written or spoken word that is a token. It 
would follow that the three words in the different languages are subtypes, not 
tokens, of the more general type which Peirce referred to as “the same sign.” 
This implies a hierarchy of types but not of tokens.

I wonder, though, whether the term “token” can only apply to external signs. In 
his October 1995 Monist article, Peirce referred to “A sign (under which 
designation I place every kind of thought, and not alone external signs)” (CP 
5.447, EP2:350). A thought I am hosting at the moment is certainly embodied 
here and now in a pattern of neural activity, whether I utter it or not, just 
as a spoken or written text is embodied in a pattern of sound waves or marks on 
a page. The only difference is that it is an internal sign, invisible to 
others. Does that disqualify it as a token? I would certainly hesitate to call 
it a type.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 4-Nov-21 18:24
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

 

Gary F., List:

 

Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of speculative 
grammar is that only an individual embodiment of a sign is a token. 
Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that only an 
individual organism is properly called a token. Genus and species are both 
types, which correspond to different levels of generality that are at least 
somewhat arbitrary.

 

Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens where they are 
actually written or spoken, and each of those individual instances is governed 
by the general type to which it conforms. However, individual humans are not 
tokens of the type "man" as a word in English, the type "homo" as a word in 
Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as a word in Greek; instead, they are the 
dynamical objects of those signs.

 

Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs" is simply 
"sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is why the 
ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable.

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt   
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt  

 

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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Helmut Raulien]

Gary, Gary, Jon, list,

 

I think, being either an animal or a human does not make something either a sign or an object, but the context does.

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

 05. November 2021 um 06:52 Uhr
 "Gary Richmond" 
wrote:

 
















Jon A.S., Gary F, List,

 


JAS: Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of speculative grammar is that only an individual embodiment of a sign is a token (emphasis added, GR).

GR: I personally think that this is indisputable as there is more than sufficient textual support for this claim. One clear, oft repeated example:

 




















A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as occurring just when and where it does, such as this or that word on a single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to call a Token. (Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism, CP 4.537, 1906) 




















 

JAS: Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that only an individual organism is properly called a token.

GR: This follows from the above.

 

JAS: Genus and species are both types, which correspond to different levels of generality that are at least somewhat arbitrary.

GR: I agree that genus and species are types; and that they "are at least somewhat arbitrary" is clear from a consideration of the history of biological classification. Take this remark from the Wikipedia article on 'genus': 

 






















The composition of a genus is determined by taxonomists. The standards for genus classification are not strictly codified, so different authorities often produce different classifications for genera.






















 

Something similar is true for 'species': see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Species

 

JAS: Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens where they are actually written or spoken, and each of those individual instances is governed by the general type to which it conforms.

GR: This follows from the first statement above and the Peirce quotation offered, that "only an individual embodiment of a sign is a token."

 

JAS: However, individual humans are not tokens of the type "man" as a word in English, the type "homo" as a word in Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as a word in Greek; instead, they are the dynamical objects of those signs (emphasis added, GR).

GR: I agree. This is an important distinction: namely, individual humans, biologically vs the type, "man" or "human," mere words. Let's not conflate the two.

 

JAS: Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs" is simply "sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is why the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable.

GR: I agree that "the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable." Take, as supporting this notion the following, very late quotation:

 





























CSP: . . .we apply this word “sign” to everything recognizable whether to our outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination, provided only it calls up some feeling, effort, or thought. . . (The Art of Reasoning Elucidated, MS [R] 678:23, 1910)





























 

Perhaps it comes from my personal sense that at least some things regarding what Peirce thought, ought to be and can be quasi-settled (the principle of fallibility requires the 'quasi-' here) So, I would say that from the standpoint of what Peirce meant (at least in the context of semeiotic grammar), what has been presented above (by JAS) regarding 'token', 'type', 'sign', all of this seems to me as if it ought to be quasi-settled (the principle of fallibility requires the 'quasi-' here too).

 

At moments like this a question in my mind recurs: regarding what Peirce thought and wrote: Are there any terms and their accompanying meanings which are truly irrefutable? I personally think that there are such terms and ideas. And one of these is that "within the context of speculative grammar. . . only an individual embodiment of a sign is a token."

 

Best.

 

Gary R

















 

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York





 





























 


On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 6:24 PM Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:



Gary F., List:

 


Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of speculative grammar is that only an individual embodiment of a sign is a token. Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that only an individual organism is properly called a token. Genus and species are both types, which correspond to different levels of generality that 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Mike Bergman]

Hi All,

This is a frequent question, between token and type, in knowledge 
representation systems. Of course, the answer to this question is 
context. When talking about a thing or its attributes, token is your 
choice. When talking about external relationships or group membership, 
type is your choice. Sometimes, for the same given thing, either might 
be appropriate, again depending on context.


A real advance in the second version of the OWL language, one of the W3C 
standards, was to enable a metamodeling technique called 'punning'. 
Depending on context, the same 'thing' may be either a class (type) or 
instance (individual) [1]. I think Charlie would approve, but I do not 
have song and verse to cite for that immediately at hand.


Mike

[1] 
https://www.mkbergman.com/2286/knowledge-representation-is-a-tricky-business/


On 11/5/2021 12:52 AM, Gary Richmond wrote:

Jon A.S., Gary F, List,

JAS: Again, my understanding of the terminology /within the context of 
speculative grammar/ is that only an /individual /embodiment of a sign 
is a token (emphasis added, GR).
GR: I personally think that this is indisputable as there is more than 
sufficient textual support for this claim. One clear, oft repeated 
example:


A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to
that one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some
single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing being
significant only as occurring just when and where it does, such as
this or that word on a single line of a single page of a single
copy of a book, I will venture to call a /Token/. (Prolegomena to
an Apology for Pragmaticism, CP 4.537, 1906)


JAS: Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that 
only an /individual /organism is properly called a token.

GR: This follows from the above.

JAS: Genus and species are both types, which correspond to different 
levels of generality that are at least somewhat arbitrary.
GR: I agree that genus and species are types; and that they "are at 
least somewhat arbitrary" is clear from a consideration of the history 
of biological classification. Take this remark from the Wikipedia 
article on 'genus':


The composition of a genus is determined by taxonomists
. The standards
for genus classification are not strictly codified, so different
authorities often produce different classifications for genera.


Something similar is true for 'species': see: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Species


JAS: Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens 
where they are /actually/ written or spoken, and each of those 
/individual /instances is governed by the /general /type to which it 
conforms.
GR: This follows from the first statement above and the Peirce 
quotation offered, that "only an /individual /embodiment of a sign is 
a token."


JAS: However, /individual *humans* are not tokens of the type "man" as 
a word in English/, the type "homo" as a /word /in Latin, or the type 
"ἄνθρωπος" as a /word /in Greek; instead, they are the /dynamical 
objects/ of those signs (emphasis added, GR).
GR: I agree. This is an important distinction: namely, individual 
humans, biologically vs the type, "man" or "human," mere words. Let's 
not conflate the two.


JAS: Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of 
signs" is simply "sign," the one type that encompasses all other 
types, which is why the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be 
unavoidable.
GR: I agree that "the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be 
unavoidable." Take, as supporting this notion the following, very late 
quotation:


CSP: . . .we apply this word “sign” to everything recognizable
whether to our outward senses or to our inward feeling and
imagination, provided only it calls up some feeling, effort, or
thought. . . (The Art of Reasoning Elucidated, MS [R] 678:23, 1910)


Perhaps it comes from my personal sense that at least some things 
regarding what Peirce thought, ought to be and /can be/ quasi-settled 
(the principle of fallibility requires the 'quasi-' here) So, I would 
say that from the standpoint of what Peirce meant (/at least/ in the 
context of semeiotic grammar), what has been presented above (by JAS) 
regarding 'token', 'type', 'sign', all of this seems to me as if it 
ought to be quasi-settled (the principle of fallibility requires the 
'quasi-' here too).


At moments like this a question in my mind recurs: regarding what 
Peirce thought and wrote: Are there /any/ terms and their accompanying 
meanings which are truly irrefutable? I personally think that there 
are such terms and ideas. And one of these is that "/within the 
context of speculative grammar/. . . only an /individual /embodiment 
of a sign is a token."


Best.

Gary R



  “Let everything happen to you
  Beauty and terror
  Just keep going
  No feeling is final”
  ― 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Gary Richmond]

List,

To follow up on the message I just sent out:

When I first came to live in NYC, and for several decades after, when you
wanted to take the subway you would go to a booth and purchase
subway 'tokens'. Each subway token was a token (in Peircean terms) of
the *type*, 'that object which will get you a single ride on the subway'. GR
“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Fri, Nov 5, 2021 at 1:52 AM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon A.S., Gary F, List,
>
> JAS: Again, my understanding of the terminology *within the context of
> speculative grammar* is that only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is
> a token (emphasis added, GR).
> GR: I personally think that this is indisputable as there is more than
> sufficient textual support for this claim. One clear, oft repeated example:
>
> A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that
> one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at
> any one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as
> occurring just when and where it does, such as this or that word on a
> single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to
> call a *Token*. (Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism, CP 4.537,
> 1906)
>
>
> JAS: Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that only
> an *individual *organism is properly called a token.
> GR: This follows from the above.
>
> JAS: Genus and species are both types, which correspond to different
> levels of generality that are at least somewhat arbitrary.
> GR: I agree that genus and species are types; and that they "are at least
> somewhat arbitrary" is clear from a consideration of the history of
> biological classification. Take this remark from the Wikipedia article on
> 'genus':
>
> The composition of a genus is determined by taxonomists
> . The standards for
> genus classification are not strictly codified, so different authorities
> often produce different classifications for genera.
>
>
> Something similar is true for 'species': see:
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Species
>
> JAS: Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens
> where they are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those
> *individual *instances is governed by the *general *type to which it
> conforms.
> GR: This follows from the first statement above and the Peirce quotation
> offered, that "only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is a token."
>
> JAS: However, *individual humans are not tokens of the type "man" as
> a word in English*, the type "homo" as a *word *in Latin, or the type
> "ἄνθρωπος" as a *word *in Greek; instead, they are the *dynamical objects* of
> those signs (emphasis added, GR).
> GR: I agree. This is an important distinction: namely, individual humans,
> biologically vs the type, "man" or "human," mere words. Let's not conflate
> the two.
>
> JAS: Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs"
> is simply "sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is
> why the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable.
> GR: I agree that "the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be
> unavoidable." Take, as supporting this notion the following, very late
> quotation:
>
> CSP: . . .we apply this word “sign” to everything recognizable whether to
> our outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination, provided only
> it calls up some feeling, effort, or thought. . . (The Art of Reasoning
> Elucidated, MS [R] 678:23, 1910)
>
>
> Perhaps it comes from my personal sense that at least some things
> regarding what Peirce thought, ought to be and *can be* quasi-settled
> (the principle of fallibility requires the 'quasi-' here) So, I would say
> that from the standpoint of what Peirce meant (*at least* in the context
> of semeiotic grammar), what has been presented above (by JAS) regarding
> 'token', 'type', 'sign', all of this seems to me as if it ought to be
> quasi-settled (the principle of fallibility requires the 'quasi-' here too).
>
> At moments like this a question in my mind recurs: regarding what Peirce
> thought and wrote: Are there *any* terms and their accompanying meanings
> which are truly irrefutable? I personally think that there are such terms
> and ideas. And one of these is that "*within the context of speculative
> grammar*. . . only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is a token."
>
> Best.
>
> Gary R
>
> “Let everything happen to you
> Beauty and terror
> Just keep going
> No feeling is final”
> ― Rainer Maria Rilke
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 6:24 PM Jon Alan