What about a thought expressed without language as, say, a piece of music, a modern dance or an abstract piece of art?
On Fri, Nov 5, 2021, 12:17 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary F, Jon, List, > > GF: "A thought I am hosting at the moment is certainly *embodied* here > and now in a pattern of neural activity, whether I *utter* it or not, > just as a spoken or written text is *embodied* in a pattern of sound > waves or marks on a page. The only difference is that it is an *internal* > sign, > invisible to others. Does that disqualify it as a *token*? I would > certainly hesitate to call it a *type*." > > > That's an interesting question which I'm finding it somewhat difficult to > answer. At first blush it seemed to me that the situation of that internal > sign of your thought wouldn't be much different from, say, a subway token > which was dropped and buried in the earth, not to be seen (or, for your > thought, expressed} until/if ever uncovered (or, for you thought, expressed > in language written or spoken). > > But on further reflection, it is quite clear what the 'type' of the subway > token is; but what is the 'type' (and object) of your unexpressed thought? > > Or is the first unexpressed thought more like a dream? The fact of the > dream is real, but the content of it isn't (quite; but surely more so than > the dream, I would expect). I suppose if you were, say, to convey the dream > to another, that would be a token of if. Is your internal thought something > like that until it is written out or spoken of? If so, the original thought > before being expressed in language doesn't seem exactly like a token. > > A similar question would follow, I think, if rather than being written or > spoken by you that the thought were repeated only in another internal > expression of the original thought, maybe in a somewhat more > developed way.. > > Jon wrote: > > JAS: I would say that [your internal thought] is indeed a token, because > it is an *individual* embodiment of the sign. After all. . . an internal > thought is a hypothetically discrete constituent--with boundaries that are > marked off somewhat arbitrarily--of an ongoing continuous dialogue in which > the utterer and interpreter are temporally sequential stages of the same > (quasi-)mind. the pattern of neural activity that embodies a thought-sign > is an *actual *utterance just as much as the pattern of sound waves or > marks on a page that embodies a spoken or written text. > > > But I remain unclear as to what the 'sign' is which that original thought > is an alleged 'token' of? And what is its object? What if it were a random, > yet highly original thought? A thought come "out of the blue" as the > expression has it. Certainly I agree with Jon that "the pattern of neural > activity that embodies a thought-sign is an *actual *utterance just as > much as the pattern of sound waves or marks on a page that embodies a > spoken or written text," and so the same questions just above might be > put to, especially, the verbal expression of that "highly original thought." > > Perhaps this is the sort of matter which can make one feel that it might > be better *to focus on the process of semiosis* rather than on the > terminology forged in semeiotic grammar. On the other hand, it would seem > that for the purposes of developing a scientific semeiotic that we require > such terminology to even speak about semiosis with other semioticians, to > discuss semiosis generally, or individual examples of semiosis, etc. The > danger, as I'm beginning to see it, is the possibility of getting 'lost' in > the terminology, to see individual trees rather than the forest, so to > speak. In addition, the terminology can become so complicated as to -- at > least at this stage of the development of Peirce's semeiotic -- to become a > possible impediment to considerations of acts of semiosis. I doubt that few > would say that there aren't major challenges in dealing with Peirce's > semeiotic terminology as it develops over the course of his logical life. > > I am only today grappling with the intriguing question you posed, Gary F, > and just a few minutes ago read Jon's post, so all of this is still quite > unsettled in my thinking. I'm eager to explore it further. > > Best, > > Gary R > > > > > “Let everything happen to you > Beauty and terror > Just keep going > No feeling is final” > ― Rainer Maria Rilke > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > > > > > > > On Fri, Nov 5, 2021 at 9:16 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Jon, Gary R, List, >> >> Thanks for correcting my mistake about tokens, which somehow slipped by >> my internal editor. >> >> JAS: the three words in different languages are only tokens where they >> are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those *individual *instances >> is governed by the *general *type to which it conforms. However, >> individual *humans *are not tokens of the type "man" as a *word *in >> English, the type "homo" as a *word *in Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as >> a *word *in Greek; instead, they are the *dynamical objects* of those >> signs. >> >> GF: As Gary R confirmed, it is the written or spoken *word* that is a >> token. It would follow that the three words in the different languages are >> *subtypes*, not tokens, of the more general type which Peirce referred >> to as “the same sign.” This implies a hierarchy of *types* but not of >> *tokens*. >> >> I wonder, though, whether the term “token” can only apply to *external >> *signs. >> In his October 1995 *Monist* article, Peirce referred to “A sign (under >> which designation I place every kind of thought, and not alone external >> signs)” (CP 5.447, EP2:350). A thought I am hosting at the moment is >> certainly *embodied* here and now in a pattern of neural activity, >> whether I *utter* it or not, just as a spoken or written text is >> *embodied* in a pattern of sound waves or marks on a page. The only >> difference is that it is an *internal* sign, invisible to others. Does >> that disqualify it as a *token*? I would certainly hesitate to call it a >> *type*. >> >> Gary f. >> >> >> >> *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]> >> *On Behalf Of *Jon Alan Schmidt >> *Sent:* 4-Nov-21 18:24 >> *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens >> >> >> >> Gary F., List: >> >> >> >> Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of >> speculative grammar is that only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is >> a token. Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that >> only an *individual *organism is properly called a token. Genus and >> species are both types, which correspond to different levels of generality >> that are at least somewhat arbitrary. >> >> >> >> Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens where >> they are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those *individual >> *instances >> is governed by the *general *type to which it conforms. However, >> individual *humans *are not tokens of the type "man" as a *word *in >> English, the type "homo" as a *word *in Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as >> a *word *in Greek; instead, they are the *dynamical objects* of those >> signs. >> >> >> >> Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs" is >> simply "sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is why >> the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable. >> >> >> >> Regards, >> >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> >> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >> >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . >> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to >> [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the >> message and nothing in the body. More at >> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; >> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
