Gary F, Jon, List, GF: "A thought I am hosting at the moment is certainly *embodied* here and now in a pattern of neural activity, whether I *utter* it or not, just as a spoken or written text is *embodied* in a pattern of sound waves or marks on a page. The only difference is that it is an *internal* sign, invisible to others. Does that disqualify it as a *token*? I would certainly hesitate to call it a *type*."
That's an interesting question which I'm finding it somewhat difficult to answer. At first blush it seemed to me that the situation of that internal sign of your thought wouldn't be much different from, say, a subway token which was dropped and buried in the earth, not to be seen (or, for your thought, expressed} until/if ever uncovered (or, for you thought, expressed in language written or spoken). But on further reflection, it is quite clear what the 'type' of the subway token is; but what is the 'type' (and object) of your unexpressed thought? Or is the first unexpressed thought more like a dream? The fact of the dream is real, but the content of it isn't (quite; but surely more so than the dream, I would expect). I suppose if you were, say, to convey the dream to another, that would be a token of if. Is your internal thought something like that until it is written out or spoken of? If so, the original thought before being expressed in language doesn't seem exactly like a token. A similar question would follow, I think, if rather than being written or spoken by you that the thought were repeated only in another internal expression of the original thought, maybe in a somewhat more developed way.. Jon wrote: JAS: I would say that [your internal thought] is indeed a token, because it is an *individual* embodiment of the sign. After all. . . an internal thought is a hypothetically discrete constituent--with boundaries that are marked off somewhat arbitrarily--of an ongoing continuous dialogue in which the utterer and interpreter are temporally sequential stages of the same (quasi-)mind. the pattern of neural activity that embodies a thought-sign is an *actual *utterance just as much as the pattern of sound waves or marks on a page that embodies a spoken or written text. But I remain unclear as to what the 'sign' is which that original thought is an alleged 'token' of? And what is its object? What if it were a random, yet highly original thought? A thought come "out of the blue" as the expression has it. Certainly I agree with Jon that "the pattern of neural activity that embodies a thought-sign is an *actual *utterance just as much as the pattern of sound waves or marks on a page that embodies a spoken or written text," and so the same questions just above might be put to, especially, the verbal expression of that "highly original thought." Perhaps this is the sort of matter which can make one feel that it might be better *to focus on the process of semiosis* rather than on the terminology forged in semeiotic grammar. On the other hand, it would seem that for the purposes of developing a scientific semeiotic that we require such terminology to even speak about semiosis with other semioticians, to discuss semiosis generally, or individual examples of semiosis, etc. The danger, as I'm beginning to see it, is the possibility of getting 'lost' in the terminology, to see individual trees rather than the forest, so to speak. In addition, the terminology can become so complicated as to -- at least at this stage of the development of Peirce's semeiotic -- to become a possible impediment to considerations of acts of semiosis. I doubt that few would say that there aren't major challenges in dealing with Peirce's semeiotic terminology as it develops over the course of his logical life. I am only today grappling with the intriguing question you posed, Gary F, and just a few minutes ago read Jon's post, so all of this is still quite unsettled in my thinking. I'm eager to explore it further. Best, Gary R “Let everything happen to you Beauty and terror Just keep going No feeling is final” ― Rainer Maria Rilke *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Fri, Nov 5, 2021 at 9:16 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, Gary R, List, > > Thanks for correcting my mistake about tokens, which somehow slipped by my > internal editor. > > JAS: the three words in different languages are only tokens where they > are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those *individual *instances > is governed by the *general *type to which it conforms. However, > individual *humans *are not tokens of the type "man" as a *word *in > English, the type "homo" as a *word *in Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as > a *word *in Greek; instead, they are the *dynamical objects* of those > signs. > > GF: As Gary R confirmed, it is the written or spoken *word* that is a > token. It would follow that the three words in the different languages are > *subtypes*, not tokens, of the more general type which Peirce referred to > as “the same sign.” This implies a hierarchy of *types* but not of > *tokens*. > > I wonder, though, whether the term “token” can only apply to *external *signs. > In his October 1995 *Monist* article, Peirce referred to “A sign (under > which designation I place every kind of thought, and not alone external > signs)” (CP 5.447, EP2:350). A thought I am hosting at the moment is > certainly *embodied* here and now in a pattern of neural activity, > whether I *utter* it or not, just as a spoken or written text is > *embodied* in a pattern of sound waves or marks on a page. The only > difference is that it is an *internal* sign, invisible to others. Does > that disqualify it as a *token*? I would certainly hesitate to call it a > *type*. > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]> *On > Behalf Of *Jon Alan Schmidt > *Sent:* 4-Nov-21 18:24 > *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens > > > > Gary F., List: > > > > Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of > speculative grammar is that only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is > a token. Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that > only an *individual *organism is properly called a token. Genus and > species are both types, which correspond to different levels of generality > that are at least somewhat arbitrary. > > > > Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens where > they are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those *individual > *instances > is governed by the *general *type to which it conforms. However, > individual *humans *are not tokens of the type "man" as a *word *in > English, the type "homo" as a *word *in Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as > a *word *in Greek; instead, they are the *dynamical objects* of those > signs. > > > > Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs" is > simply "sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is why > the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable. > > > > Regards, > > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
