Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Ben Udell]

Jeff, all,

Peirce also pursued nonions (a 9-version /á la/ quaternions, octonions, 
etc.), over which he got into a public priority dispute with Sylvester.


https://www.google.com/search?q=%22nonions%22+%22peirce%22+%22sylvester%22

https://www.google.com/search?q=%22nonions%22+%22A+Communication+from+Mr.+Peirce%22

Best, Ben

*On 9/3/2019 3:28 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: *

[]

Cayley–Dickson algebras properties Algebra  Dimen‐
sionOrdered Multiplication properties   Nontriv.
zero
divisors
Commu‐
tative  Associ‐
ative   Alter‐
native  Power-
assoc.
Real numbers1   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Complex num.2   No  Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Quaternions 4   No  No  Yes Yes Yes No
Octonions   8   No  No  No  Yes Yes No
Sedenions   16  No  No  No  No  Yes Yes

This chart is from: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cayley%E2%80%93Dickson_construction


[]


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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

GR:  What are the implications of this 'correction' re: dimension for
Peirce's model/diagram of the earliest Universe as interpreted by you?


It is actually consistent with my understanding that Peirce endorsed my
option #2--continuous space-time has a definite number of discrete
dimensions; it is "a figure of lower dimensionality" in the original
continuum.

It also prompted me to learn more about Mitchell and his concept of
*logical* dimensions.  For anyone interested, I recommend Randell R.
Dipert's 1994 article in *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*,
"The Life and Logical Contributions of O. H. Mitchell, Peirce's Gifted
Student" (https://www.jstor.org/stable/40320486).

Finally, some further exploration of Peirce's writings led me to one of his
discussions about Existential Graphs in the 1903 Lowell Lectures, which
includes some interesting remarks about continuity and dimensionality.

CSP:  But I ask you to imagine all the true propositions to have been
formulated; and since facts blend into one another, it can only be in a
continuum that we can conceive this to be done. This continuum must clearly
have more dimensions than a surface or even than a solid; and we will
suppose it to be plastic, so that it can be deformed in all sorts of ways
without the continuity and connection of parts being ever ruptured. Of this
continuum the blank sheet of assertion may be imagined to be a photograph.
When we find out that a proposition is true, we can place it wherever we
please on the sheet, because we can imagine the original continuum, which
is plastic, to be so deformed as to bring any number of propositions to any
places on the sheet we may choose. (CP 4.512)


The continuum of true propositions has more than three dimensions, and the
blank sheet of assertion is a two-dimensional representation of any
selected portion of it.  Peirce initially compared it to a photograph, but
went on to suggest that "a map of such a photograph" (CP 4.513) is an even
better analogy.

CSP:  By taking time enough I could develop this idea much further, and
render it clearer; but it would not be worth while, for I only mention it
to prepare you for the idea of quite different kinds of sheets in the gamma
part of the system. These sheets represent altogether different universes
with which our discourse has to do. (CP 4.514)


Different sheets represent different universes of discourse.  Peirce later
introduced different *tinctures* as an alternative way of representing
different modal universes on the *same* sheet (cf. CP 4.553-554; 1906).

CSP (continued):  In the Johns Hopkins *Studies in Logic*--I printed a note
of several pages on the universe of qualities--*marks*, as I then called
them. But I failed to see that I was then wandering quite beyond the bounds
of the logic of relations proper. For the relations of which the so-called
"logic of relatives" treats are *existential* relations, which the
nonexistence of either relate or correlate reduces to nullity. Now,
*qualities* are not, properly speaking, individuals. All the qualities you
actually have ever thought of might, no doubt, be counted, since you have
only been alive for a certain number of hundredths of seconds, and it
requires more than a hundredth of a second actually to have any thought.
But all the qualities, any one of which you readily can think of, are
certainly innumerable; and all that might be thought of exceed, I am
convinced, all multitude whatsoever. For they are mere logical
possibilities, and possibilities are general, and no multitude can exhaust
the narrowest kind of a general. Nevertheless, within limitations, which
include most ordinary purposes, qualities may be treated as individuals. At
any rate, however, they form an entirely different universe of existence.
It is a universe of logical possibility. (CP 4.514)


The blank (and untinctured) sheet of assertion represents the universe of
*actuality*, and accordingly the relations depicted on it "are *existential*
relations" between *individuals*.  However, the continuum of qualities
constitutes "a universe of logical possibility" that is "entirely
different," because "*qualities* are not, properly speaking,
individuals."  Nevertheless,
for "most ordinary purposes, qualities may be treated as individuals."  As
such, presumably the universe of qualities *could* likewise be represented
by a two-dimensional sheet (or tincture).

CSP (continued):  As we have seen, although the universe of existential
fact can only be conceived as mapped upon a surface by each point of the
surface representing a vast expanse of fact, yet we can conceive the facts
[as] sufficiently separated upon the map for all our purposes; and in the
same sense the entire universe of logical possibilities might be conceived
to be mapped upon a surface. Nevertheless, in order to represent to our
minds the relation between the universe of possibilities and the universe
of actual existent facts, if we are going 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, List,


JAS: . . . as Pietarinen comments, "Peirce also makes the observation that
the notion of dimension does not imply that the geometry of logical space
is metric. If we have dimension, we already have a topological space
(topical geometry, topology, topics) that is not subject to measurement"
(p. 209).  This means that I was wrong to dismiss Peirce's statement in the
Century Dictionary definition of "dimension" that "it has become usual, in
mathematics, to express the number of ways of spread of a figure by saying
that it has two, three, or *n* dimensions, although the idea of measurement
is quite extraneous to the fact expressed."  Apparently he was there
referring *specifically *to the concept as employed in topical geometry,
such that measurement is *not* intrinsic to the relevant sense of the term
after all.  I thus stand corrected.


What are the implications of this 'correction' re: dimension for Peirce's
model/diagram of the earliest Universe as interpreted by you?

Best,

Gary R

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*




On Fri, Aug 30, 2019 at 9:27 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> This post has a twofold purpose--first, to "bump" the one below, in case
> it got overlooked in the flurry of other exchanges over the last 24 hours,
> including the "distraction" about real possibilities; and second, to
> introduce some additional remarks by Peirce about the concept of
> *dimension*, which shed further light on how he defined it.  A few months
> ago, we discussed a passage in "The Bed-Rock Beneath Pragmaticism" where he
> suggested that the three Modalities are "different dimensions of the
> logical Universe" (R 300:80[37]; 1908) and attributed this way of thinking
> to his former student, O. H. Mitchell.  Here is how the latter introduced
> it in his chapter, "On a New Algebra of Logic," in the 1883 book that
> Peirce edited, *Studies in Logic. By Members of the Johns Hopkins
> University*.
>
> OHM:  The relation implied by a proposition may be conceived as concerning
> "all of" or "some of" the universe of class terms. In the first case the
> proposition is called universal; in the second, particular. The relation
> may be conceived as permanent or as temporary; that is, as lasting during
> the whole of a given quantity of time, limited or unlimited,--the Universe
> of Time,--or as lasting for only a (definite or indefinite) portion of it.
> A proposition may then be said to be universal or particular in time. The
> universe of relation is thus two-dimensional, so to speak; that is, a
> relation exists *among *the objects in the universe of class terms *during
> *the universe of time. (pp. 73-74).
>
>
> Mitchell went on to discuss "Propositions of Two Dimensions" in some
> detail (pp. 87-95), but only briefly touched on "Propositions of more than
> two dimensions."  For three dimensions ...
>
> OHM:  The logic of such propositions is a "hyper" logic, somewhat
> analogous to the geometry of "hyper" space. In the same way the logic of a
> universe of relation of four or more dimensions could be considered. The
> rules of inference would be exactly similar to those already given. (pp.
> 95-96).
>
>
> Peirce again cited Mitchell in his definition of "dimension" within his
> entry on "Exact Logic" in Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and
> Psychology*.
>
> CSP:  An element or respect of extension of a logical universe of such a
> nature that the same term which is individual in one such element of
> extension is not so in another. Thus, we may consider different persons as
> individual in one respect, while they may be divisible in respect to time,
> and in respect to different admissible hypothetical states of things, etc.
> This is to be widely distinguished from different universes, as, for
> example, of things and of characters, where any given individual belonging
> to one cannot belong to another. The conception of a multidimensional
> logical universe is one of the fecund conceptions which exact logic owes to
> O. H. Mitchell. (CP 3.624; 1901)
>
>
> In his 2006 book, *Signs of Logic:  Peircean Themes on the Philosophy of
> Language, Games, and Communication*, Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen transcribes a
> portion of Peirce's original draft entry on "Modality" for the same work,
> which is considerably different from what ultimately appeared in the
> published version.  It mentions "Professor Mitchell's idea of a
> multidimensional logical universe," elaborating as follows.
>
> CSP:  A logical universe of two or more dimensions must not be confounded
> with two or more logical universes. When we consider, in addition to the
> usual limited universe of individual subjects, also a limited universe of
> marks, we have two logical universes. That which is contained in the one is
> not contained in the other. But if, in addition to the universe of
> subjects, we conceive each of these as enduri

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

This post has a twofold purpose--first, to "bump" the one below, in case it
got overlooked in the flurry of other exchanges over the last 24 hours,
including the "distraction" about real possibilities; and second, to
introduce some additional remarks by Peirce about the concept of *dimension*,
which shed further light on how he defined it.  A few months ago, we
discussed a passage in "The Bed-Rock Beneath Pragmaticism" where he
suggested that the three Modalities are "different dimensions of the
logical Universe" (R 300:80[37]; 1908) and attributed this way of thinking
to his former student, O. H. Mitchell.  Here is how the latter introduced
it in his chapter, "On a New Algebra of Logic," in the 1883 book that
Peirce edited, *Studies in Logic. By Members of the Johns Hopkins
University*.

OHM:  The relation implied by a proposition may be conceived as concerning
"all of" or "some of" the universe of class terms. In the first case the
proposition is called universal; in the second, particular. The relation
may be conceived as permanent or as temporary; that is, as lasting during
the whole of a given quantity of time, limited or unlimited,--the Universe
of Time,--or as lasting for only a (definite or indefinite) portion of it.
A proposition may then be said to be universal or particular in time. The
universe of relation is thus two-dimensional, so to speak; that is, a
relation exists *among *the objects in the universe of class terms *during *the
universe of time. (pp. 73-74).


Mitchell went on to discuss "Propositions of Two Dimensions" in some detail
(pp. 87-95), but only briefly touched on "Propositions of more than two
dimensions."  For three dimensions ...

OHM:  The logic of such propositions is a "hyper" logic, somewhat analogous
to the geometry of "hyper" space. In the same way the logic of a universe
of relation of four or more dimensions could be considered. The rules of
inference would be exactly similar to those already given. (pp. 95-96).


Peirce again cited Mitchell in his definition of "dimension" within his
entry on "Exact Logic" in Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and
Psychology*.

CSP:  An element or respect of extension of a logical universe of such a
nature that the same term which is individual in one such element of
extension is not so in another. Thus, we may consider different persons as
individual in one respect, while they may be divisible in respect to time,
and in respect to different admissible hypothetical states of things, etc.
This is to be widely distinguished from different universes, as, for
example, of things and of characters, where any given individual belonging
to one cannot belong to another. The conception of a multidimensional
logical universe is one of the fecund conceptions which exact logic owes to
O. H. Mitchell. (CP 3.624; 1901)


In his 2006 book, *Signs of Logic:  Peircean Themes on the Philosophy of
Language, Games, and Communication*, Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen transcribes a
portion of Peirce's original draft entry on "Modality" for the same work,
which is considerably different from what ultimately appeared in the
published version.  It mentions "Professor Mitchell's idea of a
multidimensional logical universe," elaborating as follows.

CSP:  A logical universe of two or more dimensions must not be confounded
with two or more logical universes. When we consider, in addition to the
usual limited universe of individual subjects, also a limited universe of
marks, we have two logical universes. That which is contained in the one is
not contained in the other. But if, in addition to the universe of
subjects, we conceive each of these as enduring through more or less time,
so that on the one hand, each subject exists through part or all of time,
and on the other hand, in each instant of time there exist a part or all of
the subjects, we are considering a logical universe of two dimensions, and
the same terms have their place in both. The word *dimension* is here
applied with perfect propriety; for were we to restrict it to cases in
which measurement could be applied, we should be forced to abandon its use
in topical geometry, to which no mathematician (and it is a mathematical
word) would consent. (R 1147:267-268[Modality 1-2]; c. 1901)


The first few sentences echo Mitchell's words, but as Pietarinen comments,
"Peirce also makes the observation that the notion of dimension does not
imply that the geometry of logical space is metric. If we have dimension,
we already have a topological space (topical geometry, topology, topics)
that is not subject to measurement" (p. 209).  This means that I was wrong
to dismiss Peirce's statement in the Century Dictionary definition of
"dimension" that "it has become usual, in mathematics, to express the
number of ways of spread of a figure by saying that it has two, three, or
*n* dimensions, although the idea of measurement is quite extraneous to the
fact expressed."  Apparently he was there referring *specific

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

I apologize for the (unintended) distraction.  What I was trying to
emphasize was not that all possibilities are real, but rather that the
reality of a possibility does not depend upon its eventual actualization.
Again, according to Peirce, the *only *requirement for something to be real
is that it is as it is regardless of what any individual mind or finite
group of minds thinks about it.  I *think *we agree on these two points, so
we can get back to more relevant discussions.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Fri, Aug 30, 2019 at 12:16 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> JAS: Peirce clearly affirmed that *some *possibilities are real, not
> merely "potentially real"; that is why Max Fisch called him "a
> three-category realist" as of 1897.  In fact, there are real possibilities
> that *never *become actualized, such as the resistance to scratching of a
> diamond that burns up before ever being tested.  "Indeed, it is the reality
> of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist upon"
> (CP 5.453, EP 2:354; 1905).
>
>
> I note your italicizing 'some' in the first sentence above. I will
> continue to suggest that if one claims that at the very 'earliest' stages
> of a proto-Universe *perhaps *coming into being (there are many factors
> at work--see the quotations below), where* all *Platonic possibilities
> are real (which I think you're claiming), then Peirce's notion that *some*
> possibilities are real becomes utterly meaningless.
>
> Max Fisch's comment about Peirce being a "three-category realist" refers,
> as I  believe Robert Lane's conception does as well, to *some *possibilities
> being real in *this* Universe (yes, *in this universe *the unscratched
> diamond has the characters which it has whether you or I, etc.)  But I'd
> conjecture that at best one might say, regarding a proto-Universe, is that 
> *some
> *of the Platonic possibilities are real in that situation--they really
> *could *come into being. But not all of them. (I suppose that they are
> real enough if in some other possible universe they should come into being;
> still, I doubt that all of them ever would, but only God knows).
>
> GR: And here we are reminded that Peirce has his own "multi-universes"
> theory:
>
> At the same time all this, be it remembered, *is not of the order of the
> existing universe, but is merely a Platonic world, of which we are,
> therefore, to conceive that there are many*, both coordinated and
> subordinated to one another; *until finally out of one of these Platonic
> worlds is differentiated the particular actual universe of existence in
> which we happen to be*. CP 6.208
>
>
> If there are many Platonic worlds (perhaps even an infinite number of
> them, as Peirce suggests elsewhere), let alone an infinity of possibles
> ostensibly inhabiting the sum total of these Platonic worlds (of course,
> all very loose language for that earliest stage of *some *one universe
> potentially coming into being), then I think it strains the idea of "real
> possible" to apply this expression to even those which do *not* 'stick'
> in order to 'combine' in ways which result in a universe, ours in the case
> under consideration. Those which are "unselected" seem to me not to be real
> possibles since they are excluded in the creation of *this *universe and
> could never be realized.
>
> Here is the passage above with the surrounding paragraphs.
>
> Many such reacting systems may spring up in the original continuum; and
> each of these may itself act as a first line from which a larger system may
> be built, in which it in turn will merge its individuality. CP 6.207
>
>  At the same time all this, be it remembered, is not of the order of the
> existing universe, but is merely a Platonic world, of which we are,
> therefore, to conceive that there are many, both coordinated and
> subordinated to one another; until finally out of one of these Platonic
> worlds is differentiated the particular actual universe of existence in
> which we happen to be. CP 6.208
>
> There is, therefore, every reason in logic why this here universe should
> be replete with accidental characters, for each of which, in its
> particularity, there is no other reason than that it is one of the ways in
> which the original vague potentiality has happened to get differentiated.
> CP 6.209
>
>
> Again,  even in this earliest stage of the cosmos, it would seem to me
> that some possibles -- but not all -- are real. If all are real, then the
> idea of 'real possibles' as applying in our universe (as Peirce applies the
> concept) becomes meaning.
>
> I think we may be straining the notion of "real possibles" here, and I
> really think that it is possibly not all that important -- we may just be
> playing with words here. So I'll cede the last word in the matter to you as
> I've rather forgotten what the thrust of my earlier posts in this thread
> was given this distraction.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, List,

JAS: Peirce clearly affirmed that *some *possibilities are real, not merely
"potentially real"; that is why Max Fisch called him "a three-category
realist" as of 1897.  In fact, there are real possibilities that *never *become
actualized, such as the resistance to scratching of a diamond that burns up
before ever being tested.  "Indeed, it is the reality of some possibilities
that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist upon" (CP 5.453, EP 2:354;
1905).


I note your italicizing 'some' in the first sentence above. I will continue
to suggest that if one claims that at the very 'earliest' stages of a
proto-Universe *perhaps *coming into being (there are many factors at
work--see the quotations below), where* all *Platonic possibilities are
real (which I think you're claiming), then Peirce's notion that *some*
possibilities are real becomes utterly meaningless.

Max Fisch's comment about Peirce being a "three-category realist" refers,
as I  believe Robert Lane's conception does as well, to *some *possibilities
being real in *this* Universe (yes, *in this universe *the unscratched
diamond has the characters which it has whether you or I, etc.)  But I'd
conjecture that at best one might say, regarding a proto-Universe, is
that *some
*of the Platonic possibilities are real in that situation--they really
*could *come into being. But not all of them. (I suppose that they are real
enough if in some other possible universe they should come into being;
still, I doubt that all of them ever would, but only God knows).

GR: And here we are reminded that Peirce has his own "multi-universes"
theory:

At the same time all this, be it remembered, *is not of the order of the
existing universe, but is merely a Platonic world, of which we are,
therefore, to conceive that there are many*, both coordinated and
subordinated to one another; *until finally out of one of these Platonic
worlds is differentiated the particular actual universe of existence in
which we happen to be*. CP 6.208


If there are many Platonic worlds (perhaps even an infinite number of them,
as Peirce suggests elsewhere), let alone an infinity of possibles
ostensibly inhabiting the sum total of these Platonic worlds (of course,
all very loose language for that earliest stage of *some *one universe
potentially coming into being), then I think it strains the idea of "real
possible" to apply this expression to even those which do *not* 'stick' in
order to 'combine' in ways which result in a universe, ours in the case
under consideration. Those which are "unselected" seem to me not to be real
possibles since they are excluded in the creation of *this *universe and
could never be realized.

Here is the passage above with the surrounding paragraphs.

Many such reacting systems may spring up in the original continuum; and
each of these may itself act as a first line from which a larger system may
be built, in which it in turn will merge its individuality. CP 6.207

 At the same time all this, be it remembered, is not of the order of the
existing universe, but is merely a Platonic world, of which we are,
therefore, to conceive that there are many, both coordinated and
subordinated to one another; until finally out of one of these Platonic
worlds is differentiated the particular actual universe of existence in
which we happen to be. CP 6.208

There is, therefore, every reason in logic why this here universe should be
replete with accidental characters, for each of which, in its
particularity, there is no other reason than that it is one of the ways in
which the original vague potentiality has happened to get differentiated.
CP 6.209


Again,  even in this earliest stage of the cosmos, it would seem to me that
some possibles -- but not all -- are real. If all are real, then the idea
of 'real possibles' as applying in our universe (as Peirce applies the
concept) becomes meaning.

I think we may be straining the notion of "real possibles" here, and I
really think that it is possibly not all that important -- we may just be
playing with words here. So I'll cede the last word in the matter to you as
I've rather forgotten what the thrust of my earlier posts in this thread
was given this distraction.

Best,

Gary R



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*




On Fri, Aug 30, 2019 at 11:56 AM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> Thank you for clarifying.  As Peirce stated in the first Additament to "A
> Neglected Argument" ...
>
> CSP:  In that state of absolute nility, in or out of time, that is, before
> or after the evolution of time, there must then have been a tohu-bohu of
> which nothing whatever affirmative or negative was true universally.  There
> must have been, therefore, a little of everything conceivable. (CP 6.490;
> 1908)
>
>
> And as he said in the published article itself ...
>
> CSP:  Of the three Universes of Experience familiar to us all, the 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

Thank you for clarifying.  As Peirce stated in the first Additament to "A
Neglected Argument" ...

CSP:  In that state of absolute nility, in or out of time, that is, before
or after the evolution of time, there must then have been a tohu-bohu of
which nothing whatever affirmative or negative was true universally.  There
must have been, therefore, a little of everything conceivable. (CP 6.490;
1908)


And as he said in the published article itself ...

CSP:  Of the three Universes of Experience familiar to us all, the first
comprises all mere Ideas, those airy nothings to which the mind of poet,
pure mathematician, or another *might *give local habitation and a name
within that mind. Their very airy-nothingness, the fact that their Being
consists in mere capability of getting thought, not in anybody's Actually
thinking them, saves their Reality. (CP 6.455, EP 2:435; 1908)


What makes an Idea real is its "mere capability of getting thought," and
the situation "before" the beginning of our existing universe was "a little
of everything conceivable."  Calling these inexhaustible possibilities
"real" just means that they are as they are regardless of what any *individual
*mind or *finite *group of minds thinks about them; it does not preclude
them from being as they are because of how an *infinite *mind conceives
them.

CSP:  The general indefinite potentiality became limited and heterogeneous.
Those who express the idea to themselves by saying that the Divine Creator
determined so and so may be incautiously clothing the idea in a garb that
is open to criticism, but it is, after all, substantially the only
philosophical answer to the problem. Namely, they represent the ideas as
springing into a preliminary stage of being by their own inherent
firstness. But so springing up, they do not spring up isolated; for if they
did, nothing could unite them. They spring up in reaction upon one another,
and thus into a kind of existence. This reaction and this existence these
persons call the mind of God. (CP 6.199, RLT 259; 1898)


This *preliminary* kind of existence is obviously not what we mean by "our
existing universe," so I still find it misleading to suggest that there
"are possibilities which [only] become real qualities when they are
embodied in existential things."  On the contrary, they must *first *be
real possibilities/qualities in order to be *capable *of such existential
embodiment.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Thu, Aug 29, 2019 at 11:44 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> You quoted me then disagreed with my suggestion.
>
>
> GR:  It seems to me that possibles (1ns) are potentially real enough in
> the ur-continuity (3ns). Continuity as 3ns involves 1ns as those, shall we
> say, "selected" possibilities which *will *ultimately be realized as the
> qualities which *can* come into existence. That is, they are
> possibilities which become real qualities when they are embodied in
> existential things (2ns).
>
>
> JAS: I disagree.  Peirce clearly affirmed that *some *possibilities are
> real, not merely "potentially real"; that is why Max Fisch called him "a
> three-category realist" as of 1897.  In fact, there are real possibilities
> that *never *become actualized, such as the resistance to scratching of a
> diamond that burns up before ever being tested.  "Indeed, it is the reality
> of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist upon"
> (CP 5.453, EP 2:354; 1905).
>
>
> I think that you are confusing apples ('before' this, our, existential
> Universe) with oranges ('after' the creation of this Universe).
>
> While I certainly do agree that "there are real possibilities that never
> become actualized," yet even your example of the scratching of a diamond
> occurs, *necessarily* I would say, in the created, the existential
> universe, and not the one "before time is." ('after' creation).
>
> As I quoted Peirce:
>
>
> At the same time all this, be it remembered, is not of the order of the
> existing universe, but is merely a Platonic world, of which we are,
> therefore, to conceive that there are many, both coordinated and
> subordinated to one another; until finally out of one of these Platonic
> worlds is differentiated the particular actual universe of existence in
> which we happen to be. CP 6.208
>
>
> The real possibles that are *not* 'chosen' from the Platonic world are
> 'real' only in a quite peculiar sense that has little or nothing to do with
> "real possibilities that *never *become actualized" in out existential
> world. One really ought to rather strictly distinguish what I thought we
> were discussing, that world in which neither matter nor time exists, from
> the actual existential world we inhabit. Only after there is an existent
> word is it possible to speak of "real possibilities that *never *become
> actualized." Perhaps only for the Scriber can know of such "real"
> possibilities *before* time and space are.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jeff, List:

JD:  In saying that points i and j represent discontinuities in A and B, I
would not draw the conclusion that those points are no longer parts of the
continuous lines A and B.


I disagree.  Points are *never *parts of *any *continuous figure *in itself*,
because they are of *lower *dimensionality than the whole.

CSP:  On the whole, therefore, I think we must say that continuity is the
relation of the parts of an unbroken space or time. The precise definition
is still in doubt; but Kant's definition, that a continuum is that of which
every part has itself parts of the same kind, seems to be correct. This
must not be confounded (as Kant himself confounded it) with infinite
divisibility, but implies that a line, for example, contains no points
until the continuity is broken by marking the points. In accordance with
this it seems necessary to say that a continuum, where it is continuous and
unbroken, contains no definite parts; that its parts are created in the act
of defining them and the precise definition of them breaks the continuity.
(CP 6.168; c. 1903-1904)


The act of defining the points *breaks *the continuity, setting up two
possible interpretations.

CSP:  ... I can announce that I have, in the interval, taken a considerable
stride toward the solution of the question of continuity, having at length
clearly and minutely analyzed my own conception of a *perfect continuum* as
well as that of an *imperfect continuum*, that is, a continuum having *topical
singularities*, or places of lower dimensionality where it is interrupted
or divides ... If in an otherwise unoccupied continuum a figure of lower
dimensionality be constructed--such as an oval line on a spheroidal or
anchor-ring surface--either that figure is a part of the continuum or it is
not. If it is, it is a topical singularity, and according to my concept of
continuity, is a breach of continuity. If it is not, it constitutes no
objection to my view that all the parts of a perfect continuum have the
same dimensionality as the whole. (CP 4.642; 1908 May 26)


If the discrete points i and j are treated as *parts *of the lines A and B,
then they are *topical singularities*, which makes A and B *imperfect
*continua.
The only way to maintain the specified initial condition that they are *perfect
*continua is to acknowledge that the discrete points i and j are *not *parts
of the lines A and B.

JD:  But it does not follow that, considered in terms of the general rules
that are the bases of the generation of the loops, that the loops are no
longer continuous lines. There is continuity on A in the lower diagram
because there is a continuous path around A passing through i and j.


Those are not *Peirce's *rules, at least under his late topical theory.  A
continuous line is not *generated *by the motion of a discrete point; this
is a "bottom-up" approach.  Instead, the continuous line is the more
fundamental reality, and discrete points are arbitrarily "marked off" on
it; this is a "top-down" approach.

JD:  As far as I can see, Peirce is making the point that the
discontinuities are a product of the token diagram with the intersecting
loops--considered as existing sorts of things.


When reasoning upon any diagram *token*, we prescind the abstract relations
from the concrete representation.  Consequently, what matters is not
whether the *drawn *figures are still continuous, but whether the
corresponding *types *remain continuous under the hypothesis of their
intersection.  They do, unless and until we *choose *to define those
points, which *breaks *the continuity.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Aug 29, 2019 at 11:21 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Jon S, List,
>
> Jon:  I take Peirce to be saying that the *only *real parts of a perfect
> continuum are potential parts.  Any part that is *actualized *is a
> topical singularity that *interrupts *the continuum, rendering it
> *imperfect*.  The actualized part is still *real*, of course, but it is
> no longer a material part of the continuum.
>
> Jeff:  Consider the following diagrams drawn, let us say, on a
> 2-dimensional topological space.
>
>
> In saying that points i and j represent discontinuities in A and B, I
> would not draw the conclusion that those  points are no longer parts of
> the continuous lines A and B. Peirce is making the point that i and j, as
> points that are  now noted on the lower diagram, but not the upper, are now
> determinate points that are made determinate by  the act of making the
> intersections--and no longer just possible but indeterminate points.
> Peirce is drawing on the fact that i and j do represent discontinuities
> in what was once continuous. But it does not follow that, considered in
> terms of the general rules that are the bases of the generation of the
> loops, that the

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jeff, List:

I am well aware of Peirce's advocacy of "hyperbolic" philosophy, and used
that term myself in the very first post of this thread, stating that it
"posits complete indeterminacy in the infinite past and complete regularity
in the infinite future; not as *actual *states, but as *ideal *limits."  My
question remains unanswered, though; if the downward-pointing apex of the
triangle is the *beginning*, then what would correspond to the *end*--of
cognition, or of inquiry, or of the universe?  Is there really a *limit *to
the growth of thought, or of knowledge, or of concrete reasonableness, such
that this diagram *only *models the (indefinite) beginning?  Or is it
relevant that the base of the triangle endlessly becomes wider?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Aug 29, 2019 at 10:51 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Jon S, List,
>
> Jon:  If the downward-pointing apex of the triangle is the *beginning*,
> then what would correspond to the *end*--of cognition, or of inquiry, or
> of the universe?
>
> Jeff: See Peirce's remarks about the three frameworks one might adopt with
> respect to the beginning and ending points of inquiry:
>
> In regard to the principle of movement, three philosophies are possible.
>
> 1. Elliptic philosophy. Starting-point and stopping-point are not even
> ideal. Movement of nature recedes from no point, advances towards no
> point, has no definite tendency, but only flits from position to position.
>
>
>
> 2. Parabolic philosophy. Reason or nature develops itself according to one 
> universal
> formula; but the point toward which that development tends is the very same
> nothingness from which it advances.
>
>
>
> 3. Hyperbolic philosophy. Reason marches from premisses to conclusion; nature
> has ideal end different from its origin. CP 6.582
>
> In the context of the hyperbolic philosophy, the absolute is conceived to
> two parts of a hyperbola. The starting point of inquiry concerning some
> general fact is a point on one part of the hyperbola. The ending point of
> inquiry concerning that general fact is a point on the other hyperbola.
> Just as "reason marches from premisses to conclusion" for the community of
> inquirers, so too does nature have an ideal end different from its (ideal)
> origin. Unlike other treats of the conception of infinity which takes it to
> be a characteristic of a series with no end, the conception of infinity in
> projective space is a real (if ideal) part of that space.
>
> On my reading of Peirce's account of measurement, it is analogous to his
> account of classification. Natural classes pick out real general facts.
> Similarly, natural forms of measurement pick out real metrical properties
> in those facts.
>
> Here is a more conjectural suggestion that seems to follow from this point
> about the reality of metrical properties in the universe at our time. Early
> in the evolution of the universe, the cosmos had real topological
> characteristics--but probably did not have projective or metrical
> properties. There was no dominant system of homoloids in space, just as
> lengths and angles were not preserved under movements involving
> translation, reflection or rotation in space. Over time, projective
> proportions were realized in the real laws governing the universe. Later
> on, metrical relations of various kinds (e.g., ordinal and ratio scales)
> came to be realized in the governing laws.
>
> --Jeff
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
>
>>

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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Gary Richmond]

re tracing seems to converge as
> things head off infinitely far in each direction. It is a mistake, however,
> to think that it actually does converge at some definite point in that
> series. In this case, I think a better analogy than a function in
> calculus is the conception of the absolute in projective geometry. It is
> better because the idea of convergence is a matter of proportion involving
> continuous magnitudes that may have an indeterminate metrical character.
> Proportions are preserved, but not scalar values.
>
>
> As far as I can see, Peirce appears to be drawing on the ideas of the
> beginning and ending points of inquiry--as those are worked out in a
> speculative rhetoric (methodeutic)--and he is treated them as principles
> having an objective character in his metaphysical cosmology. The analogy
> is:  (A) the starting point of inquiry is to (B) the origin of all things
> as (C) the ending point of inquiry is to (D) the end of all things.
> So, A:B::C:D. Similarly, A:C::B:D.
>
>
> As Peirce suggests in "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties...", the
> starting point of a process of cognition can be thought of as triangle
> touching the surface of water in a glass. The starting point of
> inquiry--the tip of the triangle--is a kind of limiting idea.
>
>
> --Jeff
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
>
>
> --
> *From:* Gary Richmond 
> *Sent:* Thursday, August 29, 2019 4:50 PM
> *To:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang
>
> Jeff, Jon, List,
>
> Jeff concluded:
>
> JD: In saying that the dimensions of space, time and quality were
> potential and not actual, I do not take him to be saying that the
> dimensions were not real. Possibles may, on Peirce's account, be real
> things.
>
>
> It seems to me that possibles (1ns) are potentially real enough in the
> ur-continuity (3ns). Continuity as 3ns involves 1ns as those, shall we say,
> "selected" possibilities which *will *ultimately be realized as the
> qualities which *can* come into existence. That is, they are
> possibilities which become real qualities when they are embodied in
> existential things (2ns).
>
> JD: I take this starting point, which is explicated in terms of
> a conception of vague potentiality, as a kind of limiting idea. One thing
> he is trying to accomplish in clarifying such a limiting idea is to arrive
> at something that doesn't call out for further explanation. If someone
> asks, why does the original vague potentiality have the characteristics it
> does? His answer is:  that doesn't need a further explanation.
>
>
> I would question your use of the expression "a kind of limiting idea"
> here. Beyond limiting "further explanation" (which sounds like a very
> un-Peircean as Peirce's methodology argues against such a cessation of
> inquiry). Would you explain what you mean by "limiting idea" here (unless
> all you mean is that Peirce wholly uncharacteristically intended to stop
> further inquiry into the matter)?
>
> And the question "why does the original vague potentiality have the
> characteristics it does" doesn't seem to me to catch the richness of the
> analogy, the blackboard diagram. In Peirce's presentaiton the blackboard
> per se represents *only *what I've termed the ur-continuity *upon which *these
> "possibles" will be drawn, chosen, as it were, from an infinite number of
> possibilities. As Jon has commented, that* something* is scribed upon the
> blackboard suggests that there is a scriber (it may not be able to avoid
> theology in *that* interpretation, although I don't think it's the only
> one possible--although it should be recalled that Peirce was a theist), and
> out of these unlimited possibilities only some were scribed. Peirce writes
> of our existing world's origins:
>
> . . .we must suppose that as a rule the continuum has been derived from a
> more general continuum, a continuum of higher generality.
>
> From this point of view we must suppose that the existing universe, with
> all its arbitrary secondness, is an offshoot from, or an arbitrary
> determination of, a world of ideas, a Platonic world. . . CP 6.191- 92
>
>
> Again, there was "a Platonic world" 'before', so to speak, the existing
> world came into being:
>
> The evolutionary process is, therefore, not a mere evolution of the
> existing universe, but rather a process by which the very Platonic forms
> themselves have become or are becoming developed. CP

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Gary Richmond]

 be a Cosmogonic Philosophy. It
>> would suppose that in the beginning -- infinitely remote -- there was a
>> chaos of unpersonalized feeling, which being without connection or
>> regularity would properly be without existence. This feeling, sporting
>> here and there in pure arbitrariness, would have started the germ of a
>> generalizing tendency. Its other sportings would be evanescent, but this 
>> would
>> have a growing virtue. Thus, the tendency to habit would be started; and
>> from this, with the other principles of evolution, all the regularities
>> of the universe would be evolved. At any time, however, an element of
>> pure chance survives and will remain until the world becomes an
>> absolutely perfect, rational, and symmetrical system, in which mind is
>> at last crystallized in the infinitely distant future. (CP 6.32-33)
>>
>> The idea of our cosmos starting in a condition of absolute chaos of
>> unpersonalized feeling, and then ending in a state of absolutely perfect
>> order seem to be limiting sorts of ideas. As with an asymptotic function in
>> calculus, we can see that the series we are tracing seems to converge as
>> things head off infinitely far in each direction. It is a mistake, however,
>> to think that it actually does converge at some definite point in that
>> series. In this case, I think a better analogy than a function in
>> calculus is the conception of the absolute in projective geometry. It is
>> better because the idea of convergence is a matter of proportion involving
>> continuous magnitudes that may have an indeterminate metrical character.
>> Proportions are preserved, but not scalar values.
>>
>> As far as I can see, Peirce appears to be drawing on the ideas of the
>> beginning and ending points of inquiry--as those are worked out in a
>> speculative rhetoric (methodeutic)--and he is treated them as principles
>> having an objective character in his metaphysical cosmology. The analogy
>> is:  (A) the starting point of inquiry is to (B) the origin of all things
>> as (C) the ending point of inquiry is to (D) the end of all things.
>> So, A:B::C:D. Similarly, A:C::B:D.
>>
>> As Peirce suggests in "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties...", the
>> starting point of a process of cognition can be thought of as triangle
>> touching the surface of water in a glass. The starting point of
>> inquiry--the tip of the triangle--is a kind of limiting idea.
>>
>> --Jeff
>> Jeffrey Downard
>> Associate Professor
>> Department of Philosophy
>> Northern Arizona University
>> (o) 928 523-8354
>>
>> --
>> *From:* Gary Richmond 
>> *Sent:* Thursday, August 29, 2019 4:50 PM
>> *To:* Peirce-L
>> *Subject:* Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang
>>
>> Jeff, Jon, List,
>>
>> Jeff concluded:
>>
>> JD: In saying that the dimensions of space, time and quality were
>> potential and not actual, I do not take him to be saying that the
>> dimensions were not real. Possibles may, on Peirce's account, be real
>> things.
>>
>>
>> It seems to me that possibles (1ns) are potentially real enough in the
>> ur-continuity (3ns). Continuity as 3ns involves 1ns as those, shall we say,
>> "selected" possibilities which *will *ultimately be realized as the
>> qualities which *can* come into existence. That is, they are
>> possibilities which become real qualities when they are embodied in
>> existential things (2ns).
>>
>> JD: I take this starting point, which is explicated in terms of
>> a conception of vague potentiality, as a kind of limiting idea. One thing
>> he is trying to accomplish in clarifying such a limiting idea is to arrive
>> at something that doesn't call out for further explanation. If someone
>> asks, why does the original vague potentiality have the characteristics it
>> does? His answer is:  that doesn't need a further explanation.
>>
>>
>> I would question your use of the expression "a kind of limiting idea"
>> here. Beyond limiting "further explanation" (which sounds like a very
>> un-Peircean as Peirce's methodology argues against such a cessation of
>> inquiry). Would you explain what you mean by "limiting idea" here (unless
>> all you mean is that Peirce wholly uncharacteristically intended to stop
>> further inquiry into the matter)?
>>
>> And the question "why does the original vague potentiality have the
>> characteristics it does" doesn't seem to me to catc

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon S, List,


Jon:  I take Peirce to be saying that the only real parts of a perfect 
continuum are potential parts.  Any part that is actualized is a topical 
singularity that interrupts the continuum, rendering it imperfect.  The 
actualized part is still real, of course, but it is no longer a material part 
of the continuum.


Jeff:  Consider the following diagrams drawn, let us say, on a 2-dimensional 
topological space.


[cid:b6d8d2cc-e881-4e06-91c3-87ef7742a3af]


In saying that points i and j represent discontinuities in A and B, I would not 
draw the conclusion that those  points are no longer parts of the continuous 
lines A and B. Peirce is making the point that i and j, as points that are  now 
noted on the lower diagram, but not the upper, are now determinate points that 
are made determinate by  the act of making the intersections--and no longer 
just possible but indeterminate points. Peirce is drawing on the fact that i 
and j do represent discontinuities in what was once continuous. But it does not 
follow that, considered in terms of the general rules that are the bases of the 
generation of the loops, that the loops are no longer continuous lines. There 
is continuity on A in the lower diagram because there is a continuous path 
around A passing through i and j. At the same time, there is now an option for 
a particle tracing a path around A to deviate from the continuous path and to 
move to a path around B.


As far as I can see, Peirce is making the point that the discontinuities are a 
product of the token diagram with the intersecting loops--considered as 
existing sorts of things. The same sort of point can be made about the loops in 
the upper diagram. With respect to the blank sheet on which they were drawn, 
the token instances of the loops created a discontinuity in the sheet. There is 
now a part of the surface internal to the loop and a part that is external. 
Having said that, the underlying sheet is still being generated by a general 
rule, and that rule gives the sheets its inherent continuity--which is what 
enables us to move things around on it via processes of transformation (yet 
further general rules).


Well, it is getting too late for me to think very clearly, so I'd better stop 
here.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Thursday, August 29, 2019 8:22:43 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

Jeff, Gary R., List:

Supplementing what I just posted ...

JD:  On my reading of the last lecture of RLT, I think it is an error to 
suggest that he is making measurement intrinsic to the definition of those 
dimensions of either time, space or quality.

I said that measurement seems intrinsic to most of the definitions for 
"dimension," "dimensional," and "dimensionality" that Peirce provided in the 
Century Dictionary.  I then suggested that the familiar notions associated with 
these words might not apply once we adopt a "top-down" synthetic approach, 
rather than a "bottom-up" analytic approach.  Although Peirce was still very 
much in his "supermultitudinous" phase in 1898, I think that there are already 
hints of his eventual shift to the topical theory in that last lecture.

JD:  In saying that the dimensions of space, time and quality were potential 
and not actual, I do not take him to be saying that the dimensions were not 
real.

I agree.  In fact, I take Peirce to be saying that the only real parts of a 
perfect continuum are potential parts.  Any part that is actualized is a 
topical singularity that interrupts the continuum, rendering it imperfect.  The 
actualized part is still real, of course, but it is no longer a material part 
of the continuum.

GR:  It seems to me that possibles (1ns) are potentially real enough in the 
ur-continuity (3ns). Continuity as 3ns involves 1ns as those, shall we say, 
"selected" possibilities which will ultimately be realized as the qualities 
which can come into existence. That is, they are possibilities which become 
real qualities when they are embodied in existential things (2ns).

I disagree.  Peirce clearly affirmed that some possibilities are real, not 
merely "potentially real"; that is why Max Fisch called him "a three-category 
realist" as of 1897.  In fact, there are real possibilities that never become 
actualized, such as the resistance to scratching of a diamond that burns up 
before ever being tested.  "Indeed, it is the reality of some possibilities 
that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist upon" (CP 5.453, EP 2:354; 1905).

JD:  One thing he is trying to accomplish in clarifying such a limiting idea is 
to arrive at something that doesn't call out for further explanation.

GR:  I would question your use

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon S, List,


Jon:  If the downward-pointing apex of the triangle is the beginning, then what 
would correspond to the end--of cognition, or of inquiry, or of the universe?


Jeff: See Peirce's remarks about the three frameworks one might adopt with 
respect to the beginning and ending points of inquiry:


In regard to the principle of movement, three philosophies are possible.



1. Elliptic philosophy. Starting-point and stopping-point are not even ideal. 
Movement of nature recedes from no point, advances towards no point, has no 
definite tendency, but only flits from position to position.



2. Parabolic philosophy. Reason or nature develops itself according to one 
universal formula; but the point toward which that development tends is the 
very same nothingness from which it advances.



3. Hyperbolic philosophy. Reason marches from premisses to conclusion; nature 
has ideal end different from its origin. CP 6.582


In the context of the hyperbolic philosophy, the absolute is conceived to two 
parts of a hyperbola. The starting point of inquiry concerning some general 
fact is a point on one part of the hyperbola. The ending point of inquiry 
concerning that general fact is a point on the other hyperbola. Just as "reason 
marches from premisses to conclusion" for the community of inquirers, so too 
does nature have an ideal end different from its (ideal) origin. Unlike other 
treats of the conception of infinity which takes it to be a characteristic of a 
series with no end, the conception of infinity in projective space is a real 
(if ideal) part of that space.


On my reading of Peirce's account of measurement, it is analogous to his 
account of classification. Natural classes pick out real general facts. 
Similarly, natural forms of measurement pick out real metrical properties in 
those facts.


Here is a more conjectural suggestion that seems to follow from this point 
about the reality of metrical properties in the universe at our time. Early in 
the evolution of the universe, the cosmos had real topological 
characteristics--but probably did not have projective or metrical properties. 
There was no dominant system of homoloids in space, just as lengths and angles 
were not preserved under movements involving translation, reflection or 
rotation in space. Over time, projective proportions were realized in the real 
laws governing the universe. Later on, metrical relations of various kinds 
(e.g., ordinal and ratio scales) came to be realized in the governing laws.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Thursday, August 29, 2019 8:22:43 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

Jeff, Gary R., List:

Supplementing what I just posted ...

JD:  On my reading of the last lecture of RLT, I think it is an error to 
suggest that he is making measurement intrinsic to the definition of those 
dimensions of either time, space or quality.

I said that measurement seems intrinsic to most of the definitions for 
"dimension," "dimensional," and "dimensionality" that Peirce provided in the 
Century Dictionary.  I then suggested that the familiar notions associated with 
these words might not apply once we adopt a "top-down" synthetic approach, 
rather than a "bottom-up" analytic approach.  Although Peirce was still very 
much in his "supermultitudinous" phase in 1898, I think that there are already 
hints of his eventual shift to the topical theory in that last lecture.

JD:  In saying that the dimensions of space, time and quality were potential 
and not actual, I do not take him to be saying that the dimensions were not 
real.

I agree.  In fact, I take Peirce to be saying that the only real parts of a 
perfect continuum are potential parts.  Any part that is actualized is a 
topical singularity that interrupts the continuum, rendering it imperfect.  The 
actualized part is still real, of course, but it is no longer a material part 
of the continuum.

GR:  It seems to me that possibles (1ns) are potentially real enough in the 
ur-continuity (3ns). Continuity as 3ns involves 1ns as those, shall we say, 
"selected" possibilities which will ultimately be realized as the qualities 
which can come into existence. That is, they are possibilities which become 
real qualities when they are embodied in existential things (2ns).

I disagree.  Peirce clearly affirmed that some possibilities are real, not 
merely "potentially real"; that is why Max Fisch called him "a three-category 
realist" as of 1897.  In fact, there are real possibilities that never become 
actualized, such as the resistance to scratching of a diamond that burns up 
before ever being tested.  "Indeed, it is the reality of some possibiliti

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

nto being?" I take most major philosophers to
> recognize a need to address the question:  what is the origin of all
> things. How will it end? A range of answers have been considered by the
> likes of Plato and Aristotle, Hume and Kant, Quine to Plantinga.
>
>
> Some say that the history of the cosmos goes back in time with no
> beginning, and that it will continue without end. Others say that it had a
> beginning and that it will have an end in time. Empirically minded
> philosophers have argued that metaphysical questions of this sort have no
> positive answers--one way or the other--that can be put to the test. Kant
> considers these opposing answers to be antinomies in the Dialectic of the
> first *Critique. *He suggests that we are lead by Reason to address
> questions concerning the absolute--and that we need to tease out where
> Reason might be leading us astray.
>
>
> I take Peirce's explorations in the last lecture of RLT to be entirely
> consonant with what he says here:
>
>
> Chance is First, Law is Second, the tendency to take habits is Third.†4
> Mind is First, Matter is Second, Evolution is Third. Such are the
> materials out of which chiefly a philosophical theory ought to be built,
> in order to represent the state of knowledge to which the nineteenth century 
> has
> brought us. Without going into other important questions of philosophical 
> architectonic,
> we can readily foresee what sort of a metaphysics would appropriately be
> constructed from those conceptions. Like some of the most ancient and some
> of the most recent speculations it would be a Cosmogonic Philosophy. It
> would suppose that in the beginning -- infinitely remote -- there was a
> chaos of unpersonalized feeling, which being without connection or
> regularity would properly be without existence. This feeling, sporting
> here and there in pure arbitrariness, would have started the germ of a
> generalizing tendency. Its other sportings would be evanescent, but this would
> have a growing virtue. Thus, the tendency to habit would be started; and
> from this, with the other principles of evolution, all the regularities
> of the universe would be evolved. At any time, however, an element of
> pure chance survives and will remain until the world becomes an
> absolutely perfect, rational, and symmetrical system, in which mind is at
> last crystallized in the infinitely distant future. (CP 6.32-33)
>
> The idea of our cosmos starting in a condition of absolute chaos of
> unpersonalized feeling, and then ending in a state of absolutely perfect
> order seem to be limiting sorts of ideas. As with an asymptotic function in
> calculus, we can see that the series we are tracing seems to converge as
> things head off infinitely far in each direction. It is a mistake, however,
> to think that it actually does converge at some definite point in that
> series. In this case, I think a better analogy than a function in
> calculus is the conception of the absolute in projective geometry. It is
> better because the idea of convergence is a matter of proportion involving
> continuous magnitudes that may have an indeterminate metrical character.
> Proportions are preserved, but not scalar values.
>
> As far as I can see, Peirce appears to be drawing on the ideas of the
> beginning and ending points of inquiry--as those are worked out in a
> speculative rhetoric (methodeutic)--and he is treated them as principles
> having an objective character in his metaphysical cosmology. The analogy
> is:  (A) the starting point of inquiry is to (B) the origin of all things
> as (C) the ending point of inquiry is to (D) the end of all things.
> So, A:B::C:D. Similarly, A:C::B:D.
>
> As Peirce suggests in "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties...", the
> starting point of a process of cognition can be thought of as triangle
> touching the surface of water in a glass. The starting point of
> inquiry--the tip of the triangle--is a kind of limiting idea.
>
> --Jeff
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
>
> --
> *From:* Gary Richmond 
> *Sent:* Thursday, August 29, 2019 4:50 PM
> *To:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang
>
> Jeff, Jon, List,
>
> Jeff concluded:
>
> JD: In saying that the dimensions of space, time and quality were
> potential and not actual, I do not take him to be saying that the
> dimensions were not real. Possibles may, on Peirce's account, be real
> things.
>
>
> It seems to me that possibles (1ns) are potentially real enough in the
> ur-continuity (3ns). Continuity as 3ns involves 1ns as those, shall we say,

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

GR:  Are you suggesting that it is* only* in the aboriginal (from Latin
 *ab
 origine
 --*“from the
beginning”) continuum that
there are *no discrete dimensions*?


In order to answer this question, I will begin by quoting a little-known
passage that I have excerpted several times over the past few months,
including just a few days ago in this thread.

CSP:  In the first place, then, I do not call a line, or a surface, or
anything else, continuous unless every part of it that is homogeneous in
dimensionality with the whole and is marked off in the simplest way is, in
respect to the connexions of its parts, precisely like every other such
part; although, if the whole has but a finite number of interruptions, I do
call it "continuous in its uninterrupted portions." In the next place, I
conceive that a Continuum has, IN ITSELF, no definite parts, although to
endow it with definite parts of no matter what multitude, and even parts of
lesser dimensionality down to absolute simplicity, it is only necessary
that these should be marked off, and although even the operation of thought
suffices to impart an approach to definiteness of parts of any multitude we
please.*
*This indubitably proves that the possession of parts by a continuum is not
a real character of it. For the real is that whose being one way or another
does not depend upon how individual persons may imagine it to be. (R S-30
[Copy T:5-6]; c. 1906)


Although it has never appeared in the secondary literature--presumably
because of the obscurity of the manuscript, which received a
"supplementary" number from Robin--I consider it to be Peirce's clearest
definition of his late topical conception of continuity, because I think
that it elaborates helpfully on a subsequent one that is commonly cited.

CSP:  If in an otherwise unoccupied continuum a figure of lower
dimensionality be constructed--such as an oval line on a spheroidal or
anchor-ring surface--either that figure is a part of the continuum or it is
not. If it is, it is a topical singularity, and according to my concept of
continuity, is a breach of continuity. If it is not, it constitutes no
objection to my view that all the parts of a perfect continuum have the
same dimensionality as the whole. (Strictly, all the *material*, or *actual*,
parts, but I cannot now take the space that minute accuracy would require,
which would be many pages.) That being the case, my notion of the essential
character of a perfect continuum is the absolute generality with which two
rules hold good, first, that every part has parts; and second, that every
sufficiently small part has the same mode of immediate connection with
others as every other has. (CP 4.642; 1908 May 26)


Every material part of a perfect continuum is *indefinite *and has "the
same dimensionality as the whole," but any number of *definite *parts of
the same or "lesser dimensionality, down to absolute simplicity"--i.e.,
dimensionless and indivisible points--can be "marked off" as
"interruptions" or "breaches of continuity."  Therefore, since the original
continuum has "some indefinite multitude of dimensions," all of its
material parts must likewise have "some indefinite multitude of
dimensions"; and any subsidiary continuum that has a *definite *number
of *discrete
*dimensions is "a topical singularity," like "an oval line on a spheroidal
or anchor-ring surface."  What is the implication of this for our *physical
*universe?  I see two alternatives.

   1. Continuous space-time has no discrete dimensions in itself; it is a
   material part of the original continuum.
   2. Continuous space-time has a definite number of discrete dimensions;
   it is "a figure of lower dimensionality" in the original continuum.

#1 leads to my previous statement that you quoted twice--*discrete *dimensions
are arbitrary and artificial creations of thought for particular purposes,
cognitive constructions that *represent *space-time.  However, Peirce
evidently endorsed #2 instead.

CSP:  The whole universe of true and real possibilities forms a continuum,
upon which this Universe of Actual Existence is, by virtue of the essential
Secondness of Existence, a discontinuous mark--like a line figure drawn on
the area of the blackboard. (NEM 4:345, RLT 162; 1898)


As you already observed in your latest reply to Jeff, this would seem to
require an external "scriber" who *chooses *to draw the line figure on the
blackboard--i.e., to "mark off" the *discrete *dimensions of the physical
universe as *definite *parts of the original continuum.  As Peirce wrote
elsewhere ...

CSP:  In a continuum there really are no points except such as are marked;
and such interrupt the continuum. It is true that the capability of being
marked gives to the points the beginnings of *potential being*, but only
the beginnings. It should be called a *conditional bein

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary R, List,


You ask:  "Who, besides Peirce (besides some theologians) have mused on how our 
Universe came into being?" I take most major philosophers to recognize a need 
to address the question:  what is the origin of all things. How will it end? A 
range of answers have been considered by the likes of Plato and Aristotle, Hume 
and Kant, Quine to Plantinga.


Some say that the history of the cosmos goes back in time with no beginning, 
and that it will continue without end. Others say that it had a beginning and 
that it will have an end in time. Empirically minded philosophers have argued 
that metaphysical questions of this sort have no positive answers--one way or 
the other--that can be put to the test. Kant considers these opposing answers 
to be antinomies in the Dialectic of the first Critique. He suggests that we 
are lead by Reason to address questions concerning the absolute--and that we 
need to tease out where Reason might be leading us astray.


I take Peirce's explorations in the last lecture of RLT to be entirely 
consonant with what he says here:


Chance is First, Law is Second, the tendency to take habits is Third.†4 Mind is 
First, Matter is Second, Evolution is Third. Such are the materials out of 
which chiefly a philosophical theory ought to be built, in order to represent 
the state of knowledge to which the nineteenth century has brought us. Without 
going into other important questions of philosophical architectonic, we can 
readily foresee what sort of a metaphysics would appropriately be constructed 
from those conceptions. Like some of the most ancient and some of the most 
recent speculations it would be a Cosmogonic Philosophy. It would suppose that 
in the beginning -- infinitely remote -- there was a chaos of unpersonalized 
feeling, which being without connection or regularity would properly be without 
existence. This feeling, sporting here and there in pure arbitrariness, would 
have started the germ of a generalizing tendency. Its other sportings would be 
evanescent, but this would have a growing virtue. Thus, the tendency to habit 
would be started; and from this, with the other principles of evolution, all 
the regularities of the universe would be evolved. At any time, however, an 
element of pure chance survives and will remain until the world becomes an 
absolutely perfect, rational, and symmetrical system, in which mind is at last 
crystallized in the infinitely distant future. (CP 6.32-33)


The idea of our cosmos starting in a condition of absolute chaos of 
unpersonalized feeling, and then ending in a state of absolutely perfect order 
seem to be limiting sorts of ideas. As with an asymptotic function in calculus, 
we can see that the series we are tracing seems to converge as things head off 
infinitely far in each direction. It is a mistake, however, to think that it 
actually does converge at some definite point in that series. In this case, I 
think a better analogy than a function in calculus is the conception of the 
absolute in projective geometry. It is better because the idea of convergence 
is a matter of proportion involving continuous magnitudes that may have an 
indeterminate metrical character. Proportions are preserved, but not scalar 
values.


As far as I can see, Peirce appears to be drawing on the ideas of the beginning 
and ending points of inquiry--as those are worked out in a speculative rhetoric 
(methodeutic)--and he is treated them as principles having an objective 
character in his metaphysical cosmology. The analogy is:  (A) the starting 
point of inquiry is to (B) the origin of all things as (C) the ending point of 
inquiry is to (D) the end of all things. So, A:B::C:D. Similarly, A:C::B:D.


As Peirce suggests in "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties...", the starting 
point of a process of cognition can be thought of as triangle touching the 
surface of water in a glass. The starting point of inquiry--the tip of the 
triangle--is a kind of limiting idea.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Gary Richmond 
Sent: Thursday, August 29, 2019 4:50 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

Jeff, Jon, List,

Jeff concluded:

JD: In saying that the dimensions of space, time and quality were potential and 
not actual, I do not take him to be saying that the dimensions were not real. 
Possibles may, on Peirce's account, be real things.

It seems to me that possibles (1ns) are potentially real enough in the 
ur-continuity (3ns). Continuity as 3ns involves 1ns as those, shall we say, 
"selected" possibilities which will ultimately be realized as the qualities 
which can come into existence. That is, they are possibilities which become 
real qualities when they are embodied in existential things (2ns).

JD: I take this starting point, which i

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Gary Richmond]

ague
> potentiality, as a kind of limiting idea. One thing he is trying to
> accomplish in clarifying such a limiting idea is to arrive at something
> that doesn't call out for further explanation. If someone asks, why does
> the original vague potentiality have the characteristics it does? His
> answer is:  that doesn't need a further explanation. It can be illustrated
> using diagrams. He is offering analogy to the effect that the vague
> potentiality is like an empty chalkboard before any chalk streaks have been
> drawn on its surface. Some philosophers might claim that Peirce is wrong to
> think the original vague potentiality doesn't need a further explanation,
> but I take that to be the view he is exploring in this last lecture.
>
>
> --Jeff
>
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
>
>
> --
> *From:* Gary Richmond 
> *Sent:* Thursday, August 29, 2019 1:24 PM
> *To:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang
>
> Jon, Jeff, List,
>
> This message is meant to solicit clarification on what seems to be the
> thrust of Jon's argument in support of a dimensionless ur-continuity. My
> question is: Am I clearly grasping what you're getting at, Jon? You wrote
> near the end of your post:
>
> JAS: What I notice is that *measurement *is evidently intrinsic to the
> definition of dimension, except for the particular mathematical usage
> mentioned in the first one, where "the idea of measurement is quite
> extraneous."
>
>
> Again, I would tend to strongly with your suggestion that:
>
>
> JAS: ". . . *discrete *dimensions are arbitrary and artificial creations
> of thought for that purpose, rather than *real *characters of space-time
> in itself."
>
>
> You continued:
>
>
> JAS: [. . .] The linked video [which Jeff earlier provided] about higher
> numbers of dimensions employs the same "bottom-up" analytic approach, using
> the real number line--what Peirce called a "pseudo-continuum"--as the basis
> for *defining *each individual dimension.
>
>
> I would take it, then, that "pseudo-continuua," are most certainly of
> *analytical* value as long as one remembers, as you have been positing
> recently (and I agree) that:
>
> JAS: . . .*discrete *dimensions are arbitrary and artificial creations of
> thought for that [analytical] purpose, rather than *real *characters of
> space-time in itself.
>
>
> You then asked if dimensionality would even apply in a "top-down" approach
> and suggested that it may not, offering a Peirce quotation in support of
> your suggestion :
>
> JAS: What might it look like to adopt a "top-down" synthetic approach
> instead?  Would the familiar notion of dimensions even apply?  Maybe not,
> according to Peirce.
>
> CSP:  A continuum may have any discrete multitude of dimensions
> whatsoever. lf the multitude of dimensions surpasses all discrete
> multitudes there cease to be any distinct dimensions. I have not as yet
> obtained a logically distinct conception of such a continuum.
> Provisionally, I identify it with the *uralt * [Ger., ancient], vague
> generality of the most abstract potentiality. (NEM 3:111, RLT 253-254; 1898)
>
>
> You then quoted Peirce on the 'blackboard' as a metaphor for the
> original,  or, ur-continuum:
>
> CSP:  Let the clean blackboard be a sort of diagram of the original vague
> potentiality, or at any rate of some early stage of its determination. This
> is something more than a figure of speech; for after all continuity is
> generality. This blackboard is a continuum of two dimensions, while that
> which it stands for is a continuum of some indefinite multitude of
> dimensions. This blackboard is a continuum of possible points; while that
> is a continuum of possible dimensions of quality, or is a continuum of
> possible dimensions of a continuum of possible dimensions of quality, or
> something of that sort. There are no points on this blackboard. There are
> no dimensions in that continuum. (CP 6.203, RLT 261; 1898)
>
>
> JAS: Rather than "a vague infinity of dimensions," there are no
> *distinct *dimensions-- no *defnite *dimensions--no *discrete *dimensions
> at all in the original continuum that is fundamental to the constitution of
> being.
>
>
> So, finally getting back to my question: Are you suggesting that it is*
> only* in the in the aboriginal (from Latin
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Latin> *ab
> <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/ab#Latin> origine
> <https://

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

ams. He is offering analogy to 
the effect that the vague potentiality is like an empty chalkboard before any 
chalk streaks have been drawn on its surface. Some philosophers might claim 
that Peirce is wrong to think the original vague potentiality doesn't need a 
further explanation, but I take that to be the view he is exploring in this 
last lecture.


--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Gary Richmond 
Sent: Thursday, August 29, 2019 1:24 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

Jon, Jeff, List,

This message is meant to solicit clarification on what seems to be the thrust 
of Jon's argument in support of a dimensionless ur-continuity. My question is: 
Am I clearly grasping what you're getting at, Jon? You wrote near the end of 
your post:

JAS: What I notice is that measurement is evidently intrinsic to the definition 
of dimension, except for the particular mathematical usage mentioned in the 
first one, where "the idea of measurement is quite extraneous."

Again, I would tend to strongly with your suggestion that:

JAS: ". . . discrete dimensions are arbitrary and artificial creations of 
thought for that purpose, rather than real characters of space-time in itself."

You continued:

JAS: [. . .] The linked video [which Jeff earlier provided] about higher 
numbers of dimensions employs the same "bottom-up" analytic approach, using the 
real number line--what Peirce called a "pseudo-continuum"--as the basis for 
defining each individual dimension.

I would take it, then, that "pseudo-continuua," are most certainly of 
analytical value as long as one remembers, as you have been positing recently 
(and I agree) that:

JAS: . . .discrete dimensions are arbitrary and artificial creations of thought 
for that [analytical] purpose, rather than real characters of space-time in 
itself.

You then asked if dimensionality would even apply in a "top-down" approach and 
suggested that it may not, offering a Peirce quotation in support of your 
suggestion :

JAS: What might it look like to adopt a "top-down" synthetic approach instead?  
Would the familiar notion of dimensions even apply?  Maybe not, according to 
Peirce.

CSP:  A continuum may have any discrete multitude of dimensions whatsoever. lf 
the multitude of dimensions surpasses all discrete multitudes there cease to be 
any distinct dimensions. I have not as yet obtained a logically distinct 
conception of such a continuum. Provisionally, I identify it with the uralt  
[Ger., ancient], vague generality of the most abstract potentiality. (NEM 
3:111, RLT 253-254; 1898)

You then quoted Peirce on the 'blackboard' as a metaphor for the original,  or, 
ur-continuum:

CSP:  Let the clean blackboard be a sort of diagram of the original vague 
potentiality, or at any rate of some early stage of its determination. This is 
something more than a figure of speech; for after all continuity is generality. 
This blackboard is a continuum of two dimensions, while that which it stands 
for is a continuum of some indefinite multitude of dimensions. This blackboard 
is a continuum of possible points; while that is a continuum of possible 
dimensions of quality, or is a continuum of possible dimensions of a continuum 
of possible dimensions of quality, or something of that sort. There are no 
points on this blackboard. There are no dimensions in that continuum. (CP 
6.203, RLT 261; 1898)

JAS: Rather than "a vague infinity of dimensions," there are no distinct 
dimensions-- no defnite dimensions--no discrete dimensions at all in the 
original continuum that is fundamental to the constitution of being.

So, finally getting back to my question: Are you suggesting that it is only in 
the in the aboriginal (from Latin<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Latin> 
ab<https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/ab#Latin> 
origine<https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/origine#Latin> --“from the beginning”) 
continuum that there are no discrete dimensions? That makes sense to me; and, 
of course, it has significant implications for what you and I have been arguing 
regarding Peirce's late view of the situation of the earliest cosmos; namely, 
that ur-continuity is quasi-necessarily primal in the constitution of reality, 
including, of course, existential being on "time is."

Best,

Gary R

Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York




On Wed, Aug 28, 2019 at 10:12 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
Jeff, List:

JD:  Peirce provides definitions for dimension, dimensional and dimensionality 
in the Century Dictionary.

Thanks for pointing this out; it did not occur to me to look there 
(http://triggs.djvu.org/cen

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, Jeff, List,

This message is meant to solicit clarification on what seems to be the
thrust of Jon's argument in support of a dimensionless ur-continuity. My
question is: Am I clearly grasping what you're getting at, Jon? You wrote
near the end of your post:

JAS: What I notice is that *measurement *is evidently intrinsic to the
definition of dimension, except for the particular mathematical usage
mentioned in the first one, where "the idea of measurement is quite
extraneous."


Again, I would tend to strongly with your suggestion that:


JAS: ". . . *discrete *dimensions are arbitrary and artificial creations of
thought for that purpose, rather than *real *characters of space-time in
itself."


You continued:


JAS: [. . .] The linked video [which Jeff earlier provided] about higher
numbers of dimensions employs the same "bottom-up" analytic approach, using
the real number line--what Peirce called a "pseudo-continuum"--as the basis
for *defining *each individual dimension.


I would take it, then, that "pseudo-continuua," are most certainly of
*analytical* value as long as one remembers, as you have been positing
recently (and I agree) that:

JAS: . . .*discrete *dimensions are arbitrary and artificial creations of
thought for that [analytical] purpose, rather than *real *characters of
space-time in itself.


You then asked if dimensionality would even apply in a "top-down" approach
and suggested that it may not, offering a Peirce quotation in support of
your suggestion :

JAS: What might it look like to adopt a "top-down" synthetic approach
instead?  Would the familiar notion of dimensions even apply?  Maybe not,
according to Peirce.

CSP:  A continuum may have any discrete multitude of dimensions whatsoever.
lf the multitude of dimensions surpasses all discrete multitudes there
cease to be any distinct dimensions. I have not as yet obtained a logically
distinct conception of such a continuum. Provisionally, I identify it with
the *uralt * [Ger., ancient], vague generality of the most abstract
potentiality. (NEM 3:111, RLT 253-254; 1898)


You then quoted Peirce on the 'blackboard' as a metaphor for the original,
or, ur-continuum:

CSP:  Let the clean blackboard be a sort of diagram of the original vague
potentiality, or at any rate of some early stage of its determination. This
is something more than a figure of speech; for after all continuity is
generality. This blackboard is a continuum of two dimensions, while that
which it stands for is a continuum of some indefinite multitude of
dimensions. This blackboard is a continuum of possible points; while that
is a continuum of possible dimensions of quality, or is a continuum of
possible dimensions of a continuum of possible dimensions of quality, or
something of that sort. There are no points on this blackboard. There are
no dimensions in that continuum. (CP 6.203, RLT 261; 1898)


JAS: Rather than "a vague infinity of dimensions," there are no
*distinct *dimensions--
no *defnite *dimensions--no *discrete *dimensions at all in the original
continuum that is fundamental to the constitution of being.


So, finally getting back to my question: Are you suggesting that it is*
only* in the in the aboriginal (from Latin
 *ab
 origine
 --*“from the beginning”)
continuum that there are *no discrete dimensions*? That makes sense to me;
and, of course, it has significant implications for what you and I have
been arguing regarding Peirce's late view of the situation of the earliest
cosmos; namely, that ur-continuity is quasi-necessarily primal in the
constitution of reality, including, of course, existential being on "time
is."

Best,

Gary R

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*




On Wed, Aug 28, 2019 at 10:12 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Jeff, List:
>
> JD:  Peirce provides definitions for dimension, dimensional and
> dimensionality in the Century Dictionary.
>
>
> Thanks for pointing this out; it did not occur to me to look there (
> http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=02&page=741).
> Here is his first definition of "dimension."
>
> CSP:  Magnitude measured along a diameter; the measure through a body or
> closed figure along one of its principal axes; length, breadth, or
> thickness. Thus, a line has one dimension, length; a plane surface two,
> length and breadth; and a solid three, length, breadth, and thickness. The
> number of dimensions being equal to the number of principal axes, and that
> to the number of independent directions of extension, it has become usual,
> in mathematics, to express the number of ways of spread of a figure by
> saying that it has two, three, or *n* dimensions, although the idea of
> measurement is quite extraneous to the fact expressed. The word generally
> occurs in the plu

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Gary Richmond]

evolve into a space that has projective
>> characteristics (where there is "straightness" or homoloidal properties,
>> but no preservation of angles or lengths under transformations).
>>
>> If you will, let me think out loud using very rough terms about how some
>> of the characteristics of sub-atomic particles in a plasma might change as
>> those particles move through a space of high dimensions. What follows
>> is conjectural in character. In the case of a real physical space that
>> is highly folded, knotted and twisted, where the "particles" are charged
>> areas that move through the space, how should we conceive of the
>> dimensionality of such a space in the initial phases where the laws of time
>> and space themselves are evolving as the number of dimensions of that space
>> decrease?
>>
>> It helps, I think to distinguish between the global character of such a
>> space and its local character. Locally speaking, I imagine that the charged
>> areas might "break up" into smaller areas as they move through different
>> "branches" (i.e., handles, like a hole in a torus) that may twist (i.e.,
>> cross caps, as with a Mobius band) and that are knotted together and
>> then recombine with other moving charged areas.
>>
>> We tend to think of subatomic particles (e.g., quarks) as having
>> relatively fixed masses (voltages). Neutrinos, on the other hand, have mass
>> values that are simply less than a particular voltage value. This seems to
>> imply that they have an amount of energy that may vary, perhaps up to some
>> limit. Furthermore, I suspect the value of the charge and perhaps the value
>> of the spin (the angular momentum) of the charged areas moving through a
>> field may change as the charged area moves through a twist in the space.
>>
>> How might we study something as complex as a highly folded, twisted and
>> knotted space? As with any kind of relatively complex topological space, it
>> helps to decompose that space into its component parts. As such, we
>> can focus on one simpler two-dimensional surface at a time, and then think
>> about the various ways such surfaces might be connected. What is more, we
>> can think of the possible paths that things might travel on that surface as
>> edges in a graph. Those, I suspect, are kinds of the techniques we might
>> profitably employ to study the question of how the dimensions of space and
>> time might have evolved in the early history of the cosmos.
>>
>> Thanks for your patience as I've tried to talk out loud. In order to
>> make any progress in cosmological metaphysics, we will need to make a
>> transition from these sorts of conjectural musings on matters of
>> cosmological physics to something that is easier to get one's mind
>> around. As such, in a future post, I'd like to take up some
>>  graph-theoretical explorations of how we might think about the
>> dimensions of space and time. In doing so, the aim will be to create some
>> kind of diagram that helps to picture how time and space might be evolving
>> from a vague infinity of dimensions to a more determinate and smaller
>> number of dimensions.
>>
>> --Jeff
>>
>>
>> Jeffrey Downard
>> Associate Professor
>> Department of Philosophy
>> Northern Arizona University
>> (o) 928 523-8354
>>
>>
>> --
>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
>> *Sent:* Tuesday, August 27, 2019 8:01 PM
>> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
>> *Subject:* Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang
>>
>> Jeff, List:
>>
>> JD (below):  What is the general trend:  an increase in dimensions from 1
>> to 4, or a decrease in dimensions from infinity to four? How might the
>> rival metaphysical hypotheses be tested?
>>
>> JD (to Gary F.):  We have to ask, if real space has 3 dimensions, then
>> why is it a whole number and not an answer involving a decimal or
>> fractional expression?
>>
>>
>> Those are interesting questions, but I suggest that we first explore a
>> more fundamental one--what is a *dimension *in this context?
>>
>> According to Wikipedia <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dimension>, "the 
>> *dimension
>> *of a mathematical space (or object) is informally defined as the
>> minimum number of coordinates needed to specify any point within it."  Of
>> course, discrete coordinates--as well as the discrete positions and
>> instants that they are intended to mark--are arbitrary and artificial
>> creations of thought for t

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jeff, List:

JD:  Peirce provides definitions for dimension, dimensional and
dimensionality in the Century Dictionary.


Thanks for pointing this out; it did not occur to me to look there (
http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=02&page=741).
Here is his first definition of "dimension."

CSP:  Magnitude measured along a diameter; the measure through a body or
closed figure along one of its principal axes; length, breadth, or
thickness. Thus, a line has one dimension, length; a plane surface two,
length and breadth; and a solid three, length, breadth, and thickness. The
number of dimensions being equal to the number of principal axes, and that
to the number of independent directions of extension, it has become usual,
in mathematics, to express the number of ways of spread of a figure by
saying that it has two, three, or *n* dimensions, although the idea of
measurement is quite extraneous to the fact expressed. The word generally
occurs in the plural, referring to length, breadth, and thickness. (CD 1621)


Here is his second definition of "dimension."

CSP:  A mode of linear magnitude involved (generally along with others) in
the quantity to which it belongs. (*a*) In *alg*., a variable factor, the
number of dimensions of an expression being the number of variable factors
in that term for which this number is the largest. (*b*) In *phys*., a
linear measure of length, time, mass, or any kind of quantity regraded as a
fundamental factor of the quantity of which it is a dimension. (*ibid*)


Here is his first definition of "dimensional."

CSP:  Pertaining to extension in space; having a dimension or dimensions;
measurable in one or more directions: used in composition: as, a line is a
one-*dimensional*, a surface a two-*dimensional*, and a solid a three-
*dimensional *object. (*ibid*)


Finally, here is his only definition of "dimensionality."

CSP:  The number of dimensions of a quantity. (*ibid*)


He provides two other definitions for "dimension," and a second one for
"dimensional," but they do not strike me as relevant to this discussion.


JD:  Nothing jumps out at me in the definitions offered, but it is worth
noting that he does make a distinction between the dimensions of a
mathematical space and that of a physical space.


Where exactly do you see Peirce making that specific distinction?  The word
"space" appears only once, in a way that seems applicable to both the
mathematical and physical senses.  What I notice is that *measurement *is
evidently intrinsic to the definition of dimension, except for the
particular mathematical usage mentioned in the first one, where "the idea
of measurement is quite extraneous."  This is consistent with my suggestion
that *discrete *dimensions are arbitrary and artificial creations of
thought for that purpose, rather than *real *characters of space-time in
itself.

Moreover, the second definition hints at why we typically count dimensions
with whole numbers--we begin with "linear magnitude," and then build
up *additional
*discrete dimensions from there.  The linked video about higher numbers of
dimensions employs the same "bottom-up" analytic approach, using the real
number line--what Peirce called a "pseudo-continuum"--as the basis for
*defining
*each individual dimension.  What might it look like to adopt a "top-down"
synthetic approach instead?  Would the familiar notion of dimensions even
apply?  Maybe not, according to Peirce.

CSP:  A continuum may have any discrete multitude of dimensions whatsoever.
lf the multitude of dimensions surpasses all discrete multitudes there
cease to be any distinct dimensions. I have not as yet obtained a logically
distinct conception of such a continuum. Provisionally, I identify it with
the *uralt *vague generality of the most abstract potentiality. (NEM 3:111,
RLT 253-254; 1898)


The first three statements reflect his mistaken "supermultitudinous"
conception of continuity, but his later "topological" (or "topical") theory
would similarly require the dimensions (parts) of a perfect continuum to be
*indefinite* unless and until they are "marked off."  Nevertheless, the
development of "point-set topology" indicates that the lure of discreteness
remains strong in contemporary mathematics, even within the branch that
Peirce described as "the full account of all forms of Continuity" (NEM
2:626; 1905).  The fourth statement brings us back to the subject of this
thread, obviously anticipating what "the clean blackboard" represents later
in the same lecture--primordial 3ns, or what Gary R. has called "the
ur-continuity."

CSP:  Let the clean blackboard be a sort of diagram of the original vague
potentiality, or at any rate of some early stage of its determination. This
is something more than a figure of speech; for after all continuity is
generality. This blackboard is a continuum of two dimensions, while that
which it stands for is a continuum of some indefinite multitude of
dimensions. This blackboard 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

> On Aug 28, 2019, at 3:48 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard  
> wrote:
> 
> How might we study something as complex as a highly folded, twisted and 
> knotted space? As with any kind of relatively complex topological space, it 
> helps to decompose that space into its component parts. As such, we can focus 
> on one simpler two-dimensional surface at a time, and then think about the 
> various ways such surfaces might be connected. What is more, we can think of 
> the possible paths that things might travel on that surface as edges in a 
> graph.

This comment is a rather astounding  aside to this topic, emerging from the 
universe of love.  My intent is merely to illustrate that the concept spaces 
proposed by CSP have multiple applications in the sciences, such as 
bio-semiotics.

The study of “highly folded, twisted and knotted” particles is routine.
The sin-signs of such particles are analyzed and then indexed over a symbolic 
reference system.
The electrical relations among such “highly folded, twisted and knotted” 
particles are countable and are necessary to represent the particles in terms 
of quantum electro-dynamics. 
The connections among the particles are established by measures of the gain and 
lost of electro-magnetic energy under perturbations (X-ray diffraction 
patterns.)

The possible paths of formation that generate such particles are well known and 
constrained by external factors.

The reference for these sentences is, of course, the bedrock of CSP’s thinking, 
organic chemistry and the macromolecules of living cells.  The mathematical and 
physical logic used to draw these factual conclusions related to biological 
phenomena is CSP-Tarski-Leiniewski-based as applied to the atomic numbers. The 
perplex paths  within the particles are enumerated as labelled bi-partite 
graphs of a particular discrete “plasma” after it is organized by loving 
relations. The source of “love” is the affinities of the chemical elements for 
one - another.

Cheers

Jerry


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Jon:


> On Aug 27, 2019, at 10:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Those are interesting questions, but I suggest that we first explore a more 
> fundamental one--what is a dimension in this context?
> 
> According to Wikipedia , "the 
> dimension of a mathematical space (or object) is informally defined as the 
> minimum number of coordinates needed to specify any point within it."  Of 
> course, discrete coordinates--as well as the discrete positions and instants 
> that they are intended to mark--are arbitrary and artificial creations of 
> thought for the purpose of describing motion through space-time, which in 
> itself is continuous.  Does this perhaps entail that discrete dimensions of 
> any whole number are likewise arbitrary and artificial creations of 
> thought--hypothetical representations of space-time, rather than real 
> characters of it?
> 
> The definition of a dimension given in the second video linked in the post 
> addressed to Gary F.--the one about fractals--is even more obviously 
> arbitrary and artificial as a measure of "roughness."  What meaning could we 
> assign to a decimal or fractional value somehow assigned to real space-time 
> as a continuous whole?
> 

Are you missing the point of scientific realism?  Or any form of realism?

CSP was clear that the bedrock of his thinking and logic was matter, "organic 
chemistry”.  

Geometry is not a bedrock of anything.  
 (In the sense of thing, representation, form…
(Or in the sense of sinsign, index, dicisign…

Can geometry be anything more tham a mathematical concept? 
 … a symbol system that lacks any conceptual units of realism? 

The concept of dimension is absent from chemical logic, chemical mathematics, 
chemical representation.
But note that the table of elements is often associated with the physical 
phenomena that are described by geometry and depend on a different notion of 
space than that used chemical logic and reasoning.

Bedrocks are bedrocks, even when surface terminology may not refer to the depth 
of thoughts underlying surface structures.

Cheers

Jerry


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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Gary Richmond]

ly complex topological space, it
> helps to decompose that space into its component parts. As such, we
> can focus on one simpler two-dimensional surface at a time, and then think
> about the various ways such surfaces might be connected. What is more, we
> can think of the possible paths that things might travel on that surface as
> edges in a graph. Those, I suspect, are kinds of the techniques we might
> profitably employ to study the question of how the dimensions of space and
> time might have evolved in the early history of the cosmos.
>
> Thanks for your patience as I've tried to talk out loud. In order to make
> any progress in cosmological metaphysics, we will need to make a
> transition from these sorts of conjectural musings on matters of
> cosmological physics to something that is easier to get one's mind
> around. As such, in a future post, I'd like to take up some
>  graph-theoretical explorations of how we might think about the
> dimensions of space and time. In doing so, the aim will be to create some
> kind of diagram that helps to picture how time and space might be evolving
> from a vague infinity of dimensions to a more determinate and smaller
> number of dimensions.
>
> --Jeff
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
>
>
> --
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *Sent:* Tuesday, August 27, 2019 8:01 PM
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang
>
> Jeff, List:
>
> JD (below):  What is the general trend:  an increase in dimensions from 1
> to 4, or a decrease in dimensions from infinity to four? How might the
> rival metaphysical hypotheses be tested?
>
> JD (to Gary F.):  We have to ask, if real space has 3 dimensions, then why
> is it a whole number and not an answer involving a decimal or fractional
> expression?
>
>
> Those are interesting questions, but I suggest that we first explore a
> more fundamental one--what is a *dimension *in this context?
>
> According to Wikipedia <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dimension>, "the 
> *dimension
> *of a mathematical space (or object) is informally defined as the minimum
> number of coordinates needed to specify any point within it."  Of course,
> discrete coordinates--as well as the discrete positions and instants that
> they are intended to mark--are arbitrary and artificial creations of
> thought for the purpose of describing motion through space-time, which in
> itself is continuous.  Does this perhaps entail that discrete dimensions of 
> *any
> *whole number are likewise arbitrary and artificial creations of
> thought--hypothetical *representations *of space-time, rather than *real 
> *characters
> of it?
>
> The definition of a dimension given in the second video linked in the post
> addressed to Gary F.--the one about fractals--is even more obviously
> arbitrary and artificial as a measure of "roughness."  What *meaning *could
> we assign to a decimal or fractional value somehow assigned to *real 
> *space-time
> as a continuous whole?
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Tue, Aug 27, 2019 at 6:35 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <
> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>
>> Gary R., Jon S, Edwina, John S, List,
>>
>> Keeping in mind the distinction that Peirce makes between metaphysical
>> cosmology and physical cosmology, let me again stress a point made earlier.
>> Instead of assuming that, at any point in his inquiries, Peirce typically
>> affirmed one answer to each of the main questions in metaphysical
>> cosmology, I tend to think that he explored a fairly wide range of possible
>> answers.
>>
>> In any given text, he often does spend more effort on one set
>> of hypotheses and less on others. And, over the course of his career, he
>> often does reassess the options he has considered up to that point. As a
>> result of the inquiries, he does give greater weight to the plausibility of
>> some metaphysical hypotheses as compared to others. In many cases where he
>> might seem to be "taking a position", I find that he is merely pointing to
>> defects in some of the hypotheses. Most of the hypotheses offered in
>> the cosmological metaphysics of his time failed in some degree to explain
>> phenomena that clearly called out for explanation (e.g., why does our
>> common experience of time involve 1 ordered dimension and our experience
>&

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

echniques we might profitably employ to 
study the question of how the dimensions of space and time might have evolved 
in the early history of the cosmos.

Thanks for your patience as I've tried to talk out loud. In order to make any 
progress in cosmological metaphysics, we will need to make a transition from 
these sorts of conjectural musings on matters of cosmological physics to 
something that is easier to get one's mind around. As such, in a future post, 
I'd like to take up some graph-theoretical explorations of how we might think 
about the dimensions of space and time. In doing so, the aim will be to create 
some kind of diagram that helps to picture how time and space might be evolving 
from a vague infinity of dimensions to a more determinate and smaller number of 
dimensions.

--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Tuesday, August 27, 2019 8:01 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

Jeff, List:

JD (below):  What is the general trend:  an increase in dimensions from 1 to 4, 
or a decrease in dimensions from infinity to four? How might the rival 
metaphysical hypotheses be tested?

JD (to Gary F.):  We have to ask, if real space has 3 dimensions, then why is 
it a whole number and not an answer involving a decimal or fractional 
expression?

Those are interesting questions, but I suggest that we first explore a more 
fundamental one--what is a dimension in this context?

According to Wikipedia<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dimension>, "the dimension 
of a mathematical space (or object) is informally defined as the minimum number 
of coordinates needed to specify any point within it."  Of course, discrete 
coordinates--as well as the discrete positions and instants that they are 
intended to mark--are arbitrary and artificial creations of thought for the 
purpose of describing motion through space-time, which in itself is continuous. 
 Does this perhaps entail that discrete dimensions of any whole number are 
likewise arbitrary and artificial creations of thought--hypothetical 
representations of space-time, rather than real characters of it?

The definition of a dimension given in the second video linked in the post 
addressed to Gary F.--the one about fractals--is even more obviously arbitrary 
and artificial as a measure of "roughness."  What meaning could we assign to a 
decimal or fractional value somehow assigned to real space-time as a continuous 
whole?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Tue, Aug 27, 2019 at 6:35 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

Gary R., Jon S, Edwina, John S, List,

Keeping in mind the distinction that Peirce makes between metaphysical 
cosmology and physical cosmology, let me again stress a point made earlier. 
Instead of assuming that, at any point in his inquiries, Peirce typically 
affirmed one answer to each of the main questions in metaphysical cosmology, I 
tend to think that he explored a fairly wide range of possible answers.

In any given text, he often does spend more effort on one set of hypotheses and 
less on others. And, over the course of his career, he often does reassess the 
options he has considered up to that point. As a result of the inquiries, he 
does give greater weight to the plausibility of some metaphysical hypotheses as 
compared to others. In many cases where he might seem to be "taking a 
position", I find that he is merely pointing to defects in some of the 
hypotheses. Most of the hypotheses offered in the cosmological metaphysics of 
his time failed in some degree to explain phenomena that clearly called out for 
explanation (e.g., why does our common experience of time involve 1 ordered 
dimension and our experience of space involve 3 dimensions?) In some cases, the 
problematic hypotheses might have been amended to remedy such defects.

I tend to think that Peirce was remarkably sanguine about the fact that the big 
questions in metaphysics like "What is the origin of all things?" and "How did 
the universe evolve from such beginnings?" are the kinds of questions that get 
answered over the course of millennia by whole communities of inquirers and not 
by any individual during the course of a lifetime. As such, I am cautious about 
proclaiming that Peirce's position on these types of questions was, at some 
particular point in his career, "X" or that his final mature position was "Y". 
Rather, I think that he took his own advice on questions of metaphysics and 
tended to hold some 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jeff, List:

JD (below):  What is the general trend:  an increase in dimensions from 1
to 4, or a decrease in dimensions from infinity to four? How might the
rival metaphysical hypotheses be tested?

JD (to Gary F.):  We have to ask, if real space has 3 dimensions, then why
is it a whole number and not an answer involving a decimal or fractional
expression?


Those are interesting questions, but I suggest that we first explore a more
fundamental one--what is a *dimension *in this context?

According to Wikipedia , "the
*dimension
*of a mathematical space (or object) is informally defined as the minimum
number of coordinates needed to specify any point within it."  Of course,
discrete coordinates--as well as the discrete positions and instants that
they are intended to mark--are arbitrary and artificial creations of
thought for the purpose of describing motion through space-time, which in
itself is continuous.  Does this perhaps entail that discrete
dimensions of *any
*whole number are likewise arbitrary and artificial creations of
thought--hypothetical *representations *of space-time, rather than
*real *characters
of it?

The definition of a dimension given in the second video linked in the post
addressed to Gary F.--the one about fractals--is even more obviously
arbitrary and artificial as a measure of "roughness."  What *meaning *could
we assign to a decimal or fractional value somehow assigned to *real
*space-time
as a continuous whole?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Aug 27, 2019 at 6:35 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Gary R., Jon S, Edwina, John S, List,
>
> Keeping in mind the distinction that Peirce makes between metaphysical
> cosmology and physical cosmology, let me again stress a point made earlier.
> Instead of assuming that, at any point in his inquiries, Peirce typically
> affirmed one answer to each of the main questions in metaphysical
> cosmology, I tend to think that he explored a fairly wide range of possible
> answers.
>
> In any given text, he often does spend more effort on one set
> of hypotheses and less on others. And, over the course of his career, he
> often does reassess the options he has considered up to that point. As a
> result of the inquiries, he does give greater weight to the plausibility of
> some metaphysical hypotheses as compared to others. In many cases where he
> might seem to be "taking a position", I find that he is merely pointing to
> defects in some of the hypotheses. Most of the hypotheses offered in
> the cosmological metaphysics of his time failed in some degree to explain
> phenomena that clearly called out for explanation (e.g., why does our
> common experience of time involve 1 ordered dimension and our experience
> of space involve 3 dimensions?) In some cases, the problematic hypotheses
> might have been amended to remedy such defects.
>
> I tend to think that Peirce was remarkably sanguine about the fact that
> the big questions in metaphysics like "What is the origin of all things?"
> and "How did the universe evolve from such beginnings?" are the kinds of
> questions that get answered over the course of millennia by whole
> communities of inquirers and not by any individual during the course of a
> lifetime. As such, I am cautious about proclaiming that Peirce's position
> on these types of questions was, at some particular point in his career,
> "X" or that his final mature position was "Y". Rather, I think that he took
> his own advice on questions of metaphysics and tended to hold some
> metaphysical hypotheses as more plausible than others because they offered
> better explanations of the phenomena at hand or as worthy of our attention
> because they were easier to test.
>
> I find it more interesting to articulate the *reasons *he offers for
> holding that one hypothetical explanation is better than other than to
> insist, on textual grounds, that some answer to a question was his
> considered and mature view. Clarity about the conceptions employed in the
> rival hypotheses comes from understanding those reasons and especially from
> seeing what we might do to put the rival explanations to the test.
>
> So, here is a question. Consider two hypotheses: (a) the four dimensions
> of space and time that are characteristic of the world in which we
> live evolved by a process of an *increase* from a one-dimensional
> continuum and (b) the four dimensions of space and time that are
> characteristic of the world in which we lived are the result of a process
> of decrease from an objectively vague state having an infinite number of
> dimensions. What is the general trend:  an increase in dimensions from 1 to
> 4, or a decrease in dimensions from infinity to four? How might the rival
> metaphysical hypotheses be tested?
>
> Yours,
>
> J

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F, List,


I've been thinking about your question concerning the application of the 
conception of fractal dimensions to the possible evolution of the cosmos from a 
vague state having infinite dimensions to a more definite state having 4.


Not being an expert at thinking about things in higher dimensional spaces or in 
fractal dimensions, I find myself looking for some moving diagrams to help make 
things clearer.  Here are two resources I've found helpful:


  1.   On thinking about spheres in higher dimensional spaces:  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zwAD6dRSVyI

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gB9n2gHsHN4>
[http://img.youtube.com/vi/zwAD6dRSVyI/0.jpg]<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zwAD6dRSVyI>

Thinking outside the 10-dimensional box - 
YouTube<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zwAD6dRSVyI>
www.youtube.com
Visualizing high-dimensional spheres to understand a surprising puzzle. Home 
page: https://www.3blue1brown.com/ Brought to you by you: 
http://3b1b.co/high-d-...

2.  Thinking about fractal dimensions:  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gB9n2gHsHN4
Fractals are typically not self-similar - 
YouTube<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gB9n2gHsHN4>
www.youtube.com
An explanation of fractal dimension. Home page: https://www.3blue1brown.com/ 
Brought to you by you: http://3b1b.co/fractals-thanks And by Affirm: 
https://www...


With these introductory-level resources in mind, let me respond to your 
questions with a question. Which is more vague, claiming that a space has 3 
dimensions or claiming that another has 3.14159 dimensions? Normally, we think 
of the distinction between spatial frameworks having 1, 2, or 3 dimensions as 
being quite determinate in character. In comparison to answers that involve 
greater precision--spelled out in terms of a fifth decimal place, whole numbers 
no longer seem terribly precise or determinate.  We have to ask, if real space 
has 3 dimensions, then why is it a whole number and not an answer involving a 
decimal or fractional expression?


At the very least, it seems more natural to suppose space and time might have 
evolved by a process involving either an increase or a decrease in the number 
of dimensions--where the increase or decrease involved a continuous 
transformation rather than by great leaps via whole numbers.

--Jeff





Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: g...@gnusystems.ca 
Sent: Saturday, August 24, 2019 4:48:39 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang


Jeff, Jon, List,

It’s true that my suggestion of a radical split between the universes of 
discourse of physics and metaphysics oversimplifies the issues, as it tends to 
ignore not only the variety of metaphysical assumptions among physicists but 
also the variety and tentativity of Peirce’s own cosmological hypotheses. I’m 
looking forward to further inquiry along the lines Jeff has proposed.

Right now the only suggestion I can contribute is that a concept of time as a 
true topological continuum would be independent of scale, while any concept of 
historical time does have a fixed scale, which assigns the origin of the earth 
to around 5 billion years ago, the Big Bang to about 13.8 billion years ago, 
etc. You can’t have a scale in a temporal continuum without marking events in 
it and comparing the length of time between events, and those marks appear as 
discontinuities. To visualize an explanation of why we can’t locate the origin 
of “the universe” in continuous time, I sometimes use the analogy of “zooming 
in” on a representation of the Mandelbrot set: you can zoom in on any region 
forever (or you could if you had infinite computing power) without reaching an 
(“innermost”) end. (I wonder how the possibility of fractal dimensions would 
affect Jeff’s idea about the reduction of dimensions over time.)

I haven’t read the Quanta article yet and have a busy weekend ahead so this 
very rough sketch is all I can offer for awhile.

Gary f.



From: Jeffrey Brian Downard 
Sent: 23-Aug-19 12:46
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang



Jon S, Gary F, John S, List,



Peirce engages in inquiries that fall under the headings "cosmological 
metaphysics" and "cosmological physics." (see, for example, CP 6.213,  As we 
know, he is drawing on a number of resources including mathematics, 
phenomenology and semiotics for the sake of directing the inquiries in 
cosmological metaphysics. In turn, those philosophical inquiries are being put 
to the test in physics.



Both the metaphysical and the physical inquiries in cosmology are attempting to 
address many of the same basic types of questions. What is the origin of the 
universe? What explains the historical development of the cosmos? One of the 
big differences between the two types of inquiries is

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary R., Jon S, Edwina, John S, List,


Keeping in mind the distinction that Peirce makes between metaphysical 
cosmology and physical cosmology, let me again stress a point made earlier. 
Instead of assuming that, at any point in his inquiries, Peirce typically 
affirmed one answer to each of the main questions in metaphysical cosmology, I 
tend to think that he explored a fairly wide range of possible answers.


In any given text, he often does spend more effort on one set of hypotheses and 
less on others. And, over the course of his career, he often does reassess the 
options he has considered up to that point. As a result of the inquiries, he 
does give greater weight to the plausibility of some metaphysical hypotheses as 
compared to others. In many cases where he might seem to be "taking a 
position", I find that he is merely pointing to defects in some of the 
hypotheses. Most of the hypotheses offered in the cosmological metaphysics of 
his time failed in some degree to explain phenomena that clearly called out for 
explanation (e.g., why does our common experience of time involve 1 ordered 
dimension and our experience of space involve 3 dimensions?) In some cases, the 
problematic hypotheses might have been amended to remedy such defects.


I tend to think that Peirce was remarkably sanguine about the fact that the big 
questions in metaphysics like "What is the origin of all things?" and "How did 
the universe evolve from such beginnings?" are the kinds of questions that get 
answered over the course of millennia by whole communities of inquirers and not 
by any individual during the course of a lifetime. As such, I am cautious about 
proclaiming that Peirce's position on these types of questions was, at some 
particular point in his career, "X" or that his final mature position was "Y". 
Rather, I think that he took his own advice on questions of metaphysics and 
tended to hold some metaphysical hypotheses as more plausible than others 
because they offered better explanations of the phenomena at hand or as worthy 
of our attention because they were easier to test.


I find it more interesting to articulate the reasons he offers for holding that 
one hypothetical explanation is better than other than to insist, on textual 
grounds, that some answer to a question was his considered and mature view. 
Clarity about the conceptions employed in the rival hypotheses comes from 
understanding those reasons and especially from seeing what we might do to put 
the rival explanations to the test.


So, here is a question. Consider two hypotheses: (a) the four dimensions of 
space and time that are characteristic of the world in which we live evolved by 
a process of an increase from a one-dimensional continuum and (b) the four 
dimensions of space and time that are characteristic of the world in which we 
lived are the result of a process of decrease from an objectively vague state 
having an infinite number of dimensions. What is the general trend:  an 
increase in dimensions from 1 to 4, or a decrease in dimensions from infinity 
to four? How might the rival metaphysical hypotheses be tested?


Yours,


Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Tuesday, August 27, 2019 3:00:16 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

Gary R., List:

One correction--CP 1.412 is from 1887-1888, not 1891, so it reflects an even 
earlier stage of Peirce's thinking on these matters than what he wrote in the 
Monist series.

Whether particular comments are snide, unprofessional, and/or insulting is in 
the eye of the beholder.  John Sowa and Gary Fuhrman suggested a couple of good 
List practices almost exactly a year ago, which I have tried (but sometimes 
failed) to employ ever since.

JFS:  Avoid the word 'you'.  Every occurrence of the word 'you' shifts the 
focus from the statement to the person who made the statement.  This 
immediately puts that person on the defensive--and the result is an escalating 
round of ad hominem attacks and defenses.

GF:  Do not take offense. If nobody takes offense, nobody can give offense, 
even if they are trying to. Those who are defensive about their own statements, 
on the other hand, will often take offense when none is intended. If we can 
avoid this, the impulse to give offense is likely to dry up, because the 
would-be offender will not succeed in getting the reaction he seeks.

Since you understandably (but mistakenly) thought that Edwina "actually quoted" 
me, for the record--yet again--here is what I actually said.

JAS:  Rational people are open to persuasion, rather than dogmatically 
maintaining their predetermined views regardless of the evidence.  Credible 
scholars ground their opinions about a past a

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

Your additional comments are well-taken, especially about the distinction
that you suggest "may, indeed, prove to be at the core of the
disagreement."  In fact, it is why I follow Nicholas Guardiano's lead in
discerning not just one, but *three *cosmological accounts in Peirce's
writings--the fundamental constitution of being (3ns→1ns→2ns), in
accordance with *synechism*; the actual sequence of events (1ns→2ns→3ns),
in accordance with *tychism*; and the overall evolution of states
(1ns→3ns→2ns), in accordance with (objective) *idealism*.  1ns is *temporally
*primordial (possibility/spontaneity/chaos), but 3ns is *logically *primordial
(continuity/habit-taking/process); even the sequence of events would
be *impossible
*without the habit of persistence (3ns) enabling different products of
spontaneity (1ns) to begin reacting with each other (2ns).  From Peirce's
blackboard diagram ...

CSP:  We see the original generality like the ovum of the universe
segmentated by this mark. However, the mark is a mere accident, and as such
may be erased. It will not interfere with another mark drawn in quite
another way. There need be no consistency between the two. But no further
progress beyond this can be made, until a mark will *stay *for a little
while; that is, until some beginning of a *habit *has been established by
virtue of which the accident acquires some incipient staying quality, some
tendency toward consistency.
This habit is a generalizing tendency, and as such a generalization, and as
such a general, and as such a continuum or continuity. It must have its
origin in the original continuity which is inherent in potentiality.
Continuity, as generality, is inherent in potentiality, which is
essentially general. (CP 6.204; 1898)


Generality (3ns) is *original*, "like the ovum of the universe."
Continuity (3ns) is *original*, "inherent in potentiality, which is
essentially general."

Regards,

Jon S.

On Tue, Aug 27, 2019 at 4:41 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> Jon wrote:
>
> The resulting evolution of states is an ongoing and continuous process
> (3ns) away from the ideal limit of "unpersonalized feeling" (1ns) in the
> infinite past and toward the ideal limit of "dead matter" (2ns) in the
> infinite future.  On the other hand, we should acknowledge that when Peirce
> *himself *discussed cosmology, he *only *applied the term "universal
> tendency" to habit-taking and generalization (CP 6.209 and CP 7.515; both
> 1898)--paradigmatic examples of 3ns.
>
>
> This is a crucial point to keep in mind, I think, in our cosmological
> inquiry. For even if one can imagine that there are other universal
> tendencies, Peirce *"only *applied the term 'universal tendency' to
> habit-taking and generalization --paradigmatic examples [along with
> continuity, relevant here GR] of 3ns."
>
> JAS: . . .saying that 3ns is primordial in no way entails that 1ns and 2ns
> are *reducible to* 3ns, which was the error of Hegel . . . or that 1ns
> and 2ns are otherwise dispensable.  Instead, . . . 1ns and 2ns are *involved
> in* 3ns and can be *prescinded from* 3ns.  The entire universe is a
> continuum (3ns), with parts that are indefinite (1ns), unless and until
> they are actualized (2ns).  1898
>
> Again, this expresses an idea which, I believe, is vitally important in
> this discussion because holding that 3ns is primordial and represents a
> universal continuum entails its necessarily *involving* 1ns and 2ns, for,
> as I earlier argued, the latter can only be intellectually prescinded from
> 3ns which cannot replace either of them. JAS: "The entire universe is a
> continuum (3ns), with parts that are indefinite (1ns), unless and until
> they are actualized (2ns).
>
>
> JAS: Within our *existing* universe, the sequence of events is such that
> "Firstness, or chance, and Secondness, or Brute reaction, are other
> elements, without the independence of which Thirdness would not have
> anything upon which to operate" (CP 6.202; 1898).
>
>
> This points to the, in my view, all-important need to distinguish between
> Peirce's reflections on the very origins of *any *universe (*including *ours
> and "before time was") and this, "our existing universe." This distinction
> may, indeed, prove to be at the core of the disagreement we are having with
> Edwina. For in our existential universe, *time is*, and follows "the *sequence
> *of events" such that "Firstness, or chance, and Secondness, or Brute
> reaction" *will* bring about the particular habits, the laws of *this*, *our
> *universe! Peirce distinguishes these two in consideration of time
> (before time was vs existential time), and I find that helpful in sorting
> through the roots of disagreement in this matter.
>
> Finally, Jon wrote, then quotes Peirce in a passage which ought be
> inscribed above the door of anyone considering his cosmology.
>
> "Womb" is a metaphor, but "indeterminacy" is not.  The "linguistic phrase"
> is indeed a symbol, but according to

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, List,

Thanks for the corrections, esp. the first re: the correct dating of a
quotation.

As for the other matter, except for that one untoward remark reproduced as
your second item, and further noting your on-list apology in the third
item, explaining that it came from a acute sense of, as I see it, justified
frustration (in the heat of the moment) at the time of the 'objective
idealism' discussion, I have seen you as acting in a respectful manner on
the list; and this even as you equanimously suffered what I recently termed
"intellectual harassment" time and again at the hands of another list
member.

Edwina has once again said that she will no longer engage you in this
forum. I was sorry to read that, especially since you are both such
intelligent people. But unless she changes her mind, it might be best for
you not to respond to her posts (unless, of course, you or your thinking on
certain philosophical matters is explicitly mentioned by her). Of course,
you should feel free to do whatever *you* think best.

Meanwhile, let us all try to be better pragmatists in the forum, practicing
the kind of ethics of inquiry of which Peirce might approve.

Best,

Gary R (writing, mainly, as moderator)

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*




On Tue, Aug 27, 2019 at 6:00 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> One correction--CP 1.412 is from 1887-1888, not 1891, so it reflects an
> even earlier stage of Peirce's thinking on these matters than what he wrote
> in the *Monist *series.
>
> Whether particular comments are snide, unprofessional, and/or insulting is
> in the eye of the beholder.  John Sowa and Gary Fuhrman suggested a couple
> of good List practices almost exactly a year ago, which I have tried (but
> sometimes failed) to employ ever since.
>
> JFS:  Avoid the word 'you'.  Every occurrence of the word 'you' shifts
> the focus from the statement to the person who made the statement.  This
> immediately puts that person on the defensive--and the result is an
> escalating round of *ad hominem* attacks and defenses.
>
>
> GF:  *Do not take offense*. If nobody takes offense, nobody can *give*
> offense, even if they are trying to. Those who are defensive about their
> own statements, on the other hand, will often take offense when none is
> intended. If we can avoid this, the impulse to *give* offense is likely
> to dry up, because the would-be offender will not succeed in getting the
> reaction he seeks.
>
>
> Since you understandably (but mistakenly) thought that Edwina "actually
> quoted" me, for the record--yet again--here is what I actually said.
>
> JAS:  *Rational *people are open to persuasion, rather than dogmatically
> maintaining their predetermined views regardless of the evidence.
> *Credible *scholars ground their opinions about a past author in what his
> texts actually say, rather than projecting their predetermined views on
> him. I *always* encourage others to draw their own conclusions after
> evaluating the various arguments.
>
>
> JAS:  At this point, I have to wonder why I bothered spending so much time
> and effort explaining myself (again, and again, and again) to someone who
> is so obviously determined *not *to understand, or perhaps is simply
> *incapable *of understanding.  Frankly, I am not sure which of these is
> the more charitable alternative.
>
> JAS:  I apologize for the tone of the second quote, which reflects my
> frustration in the heat of the moment.  The truth is that both of us are
> quite relentless in our own ways, but from my standpoint, our latest
> dispute was never about my *opinion *being right and yours being
> wrong--it was about a plain-sense reading of *Peirce's *own texts,
> specifically CP 6.24-25.  The truth is that both of us are also quite
> intelligent, as our List participation indicates, but that is not the same
> thing as being capable of understanding--especially when a previously
> settled belief is challenged.
>
>
> At issue in that thread was not Peirce's cosmology as described in various
> ways over two-plus decades, but rather his (objective) idealism as
> explicitly spelled out in one particular passage and repeated in other
> contemporaneous ones (1891-1892).  Since Edwina evidently considers being
> "determined *not *to understand" as "the more charitable alternative," at
> this point I will simply agree with your concluding statement addressed to
> her.
>
> GR:  And for the record, I do not think that you lack the "capacity to
> understand" but, rather, that you are doggedly determined not to change you
> attitude regarding a matter on which you have long held a position even
> when, as in this case, the evidence suggests that good pragmatic practice
> suggest strongly you ought at least consider doing so, say, by re-reading
> the last lecture in RLT and everything Peirce wrote on the topic in the
> 20th century.
>
>
> Regards,
>
> J

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

One correction--CP 1.412 is from 1887-1888, not 1891, so it reflects an
even earlier stage of Peirce's thinking on these matters than what he wrote
in the *Monist *series.

Whether particular comments are snide, unprofessional, and/or insulting is
in the eye of the beholder.  John Sowa and Gary Fuhrman suggested a couple
of good List practices almost exactly a year ago, which I have tried (but
sometimes failed) to employ ever since.

JFS:  Avoid the word 'you'.  Every occurrence of the word 'you' shifts the
focus from the statement to the person who made the statement.  This
immediately puts that person on the defensive--and the result is an
escalating round of *ad hominem* attacks and defenses.


GF:  *Do not take offense*. If nobody takes offense, nobody can *give*
offense, even if they are trying to. Those who are defensive about their
own statements, on the other hand, will often take offense when none is
intended. If we can avoid this, the impulse to *give* offense is likely to
dry up, because the would-be offender will not succeed in getting the
reaction he seeks.


Since you understandably (but mistakenly) thought that Edwina "actually
quoted" me, for the record--yet again--here is what I actually said.

JAS:  *Rational *people are open to persuasion, rather than dogmatically
maintaining their predetermined views regardless of the evidence.
*Credible *scholars ground their opinions about a past author in what his
texts actually say, rather than projecting their predetermined views on
him. I *always* encourage others to draw their own conclusions after
evaluating the various arguments.


JAS:  At this point, I have to wonder why I bothered spending so much time
and effort explaining myself (again, and again, and again) to someone who
is so obviously determined *not *to understand, or perhaps is simply
*incapable *of understanding.  Frankly, I am not sure which of these is the
more charitable alternative.

JAS:  I apologize for the tone of the second quote, which reflects my
frustration in the heat of the moment.  The truth is that both of us are
quite relentless in our own ways, but from my standpoint, our latest
dispute was never about my *opinion *being right and yours being wrong--it
was about a plain-sense reading of *Peirce's *own texts, specifically CP
6.24-25.  The truth is that both of us are also quite intelligent, as our
List participation indicates, but that is not the same thing as being
capable of understanding--especially when a previously settled belief is
challenged.


At issue in that thread was not Peirce's cosmology as described in various
ways over two-plus decades, but rather his (objective) idealism as
explicitly spelled out in one particular passage and repeated in other
contemporaneous ones (1891-1892).  Since Edwina evidently considers being
"determined *not *to understand" as "the more charitable alternative," at
this point I will simply agree with your concluding statement addressed to
her.

GR:  And for the record, I do not think that you lack the "capacity to
understand" but, rather, that you are doggedly determined not to change you
attitude regarding a matter on which you have long held a position even
when, as in this case, the evidence suggests that good pragmatic practice
suggest strongly you ought at least consider doing so, say, by re-reading
the last lecture in RLT and everything Peirce wrote on the topic in the
20th century.


Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Aug 27, 2019 at 3:20 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Edwina, List,
>
> We are most certainly in disagreement in this matter as we always have
> been and, most likely, always will be. For if this passage doesn't convince
> you that Peirce, and *by his own admission,* either changed his mind or
> further developed his thought. . .
>
> Dr. Edward Montgomery remarked that my theory was not so much
> *evolutionary* as it was *emanational **[that is, Peirce's earlier
> suggestion that 1ns just sprung forth "**out of utterly causeless
> determinations of single events" made his theory "emanational"]*; and
> Professor Ogden Rood pointed out that there must have been *some original
> tendency to take habits which did not arise according to my [1891-92]
> hypothesis;* while I myself was most struck by the difficulty of so
> explaining the law of sequence in time,* if I proposed to make all laws
> developed from single **events**; since an event already supposes Time
> ["before time yet existed"] *(1908, most emphasis is mine).
>
>
> . . .then nothing will. It seems to me likely that you will stick to your
> position even if it does not represent, as in this case, Peirce's mature
> reflections, indeed re-thinking of the matter. You may disagree with his
> late analysis, but your own is at strictly at odds with it. Again:
>
> Professor Ogden Rood pointed out tha

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, List,

Jon wrote:

The resulting evolution of states is an ongoing and continuous process
(3ns) away from the ideal limit of "unpersonalized feeling" (1ns) in the
infinite past and toward the ideal limit of "dead matter" (2ns) in the
infinite future.  On the other hand, we should acknowledge that when Peirce
*himself *discussed cosmology, he *only *applied the term "universal
tendency" to habit-taking and generalization (CP 6.209 and CP 7.515; both
1898)--paradigmatic examples of 3ns.


This is a crucial point to keep in mind, I think, in our cosmological
inquiry. For even if one can imagine that there are other universal
tendencies, Peirce *"only *applied the term 'universal tendency' to
habit-taking and generalization --paradigmatic examples [along with
continuity, relevant here GR] of 3ns."

JAS: . . .saying that 3ns is primordial in no way entails that 1ns and 2ns
are *reducible to* 3ns, which was the error of Hegel . . . or that 1ns and
2ns are otherwise dispensable.  Instead, . . . 1ns and 2ns are
*involved in* 3ns
and can be *prescinded from* 3ns.  The entire universe is a continuum
(3ns), with parts that are indefinite (1ns), unless and until they are
actualized (2ns).  1898

Again, this expresses an idea which, I believe, is vitally important in
this discussion because holding that 3ns is primordial and represents a
universal continuum entails its necessarily *involving* 1ns and 2ns, for,
as I earlier argued, the latter can only be intellectually prescinded from
3ns which cannot replace either of them. JAS: "The entire universe is a
continuum (3ns), with parts that are indefinite (1ns), unless and until
they are actualized (2ns).


JAS: Within our *existing* universe, the sequence of events is such that
"Firstness, or chance, and Secondness, or Brute reaction, are other
elements, without the independence of which Thirdness would not have
anything upon which to operate" (CP 6.202; 1898).


This points to the, in my view, all-important need to distinguish between
Peirce's reflections on the very origins of *any *universe (*including *ours
and "before time was") and this, "our existing universe." This distinction
may, indeed, prove to be at the core of the disagreement we are having with
Edwina. For in our existential universe, *time is*, and follows "the *sequence
*of events" such that "Firstness, or chance, and Secondness, or Brute
reaction" *will* bring about the particular habits, the laws of *this*, *our
*universe! Peirce distinguishes these two in consideration of time (before
time was vs existential time), and I find that helpful in sorting through
the roots of disagreement in this matter.

Finally, Jon wrote, then quotes Peirce in a passage which ought be
inscribed above the door of anyone considering his cosmology.

"Womb" is a metaphor, but "indeterminacy" is not.  The "linguistic phrase"
is indeed a symbol, but according to Peirce, so is its *object*.

CSP:  If we are to explain the universe, we must assume that there was in
the beginning a state of things in which there was nothing ... *Not
determinately nothing ... Utter indetermination. But a symbol alone is
indeterminate. Therefore, Nothing, the indeterminate of the absolute
beginning, is a symbol. That is the way in which the beginning of things
can alone be understood.* (EP 2:322; 1904) (Emphasis added by GR)


Your analysis of this passage should (but, of course, won't) satisfy anyone
deeply reflecting on the matter under discussion.


JAS: The "flash" comes *from *"the womb of indeterminacy," [a symbol, a
3ns) GR] so the latter (3ns) must be primordial relative to the former
(1ns/2ns).  The parallel is with gestation, the situation prior to birth.
Switching to Peirce's later diagram (CP 6.203-208; 1898), as I have said
before, there cannot be any chalk marks (1ns/2ns) without a blackboard on
which to draw them (3ns).


And this is why I recommended to Edwina, and to anyone interested in
Peirce's late views of early cosmology, reading (or, rereading) at least
the final lecture of RLT.  And, I would add, if one really wants to go deep
into the matter, I'd highly recommend the relevant discussion (that is, the
cosmological/ blackboard-whiteboard discussion) in Jon's paper, "A
Neglected Additament: Peirce on Logic, Cosmology, and the Reality of God"
https://tidsskrift.dk/signs/article/view/103187


Best,

Gary R

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*




On Tue, Aug 27, 2019 at 1:14 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> ET:  So- there is not only a 'universal tendency towards habit-forming' -
> but a universal tendency towards chance/sporting/deviation - and a
> universal tendency to instantiation into discrete units. ALL Three are
> 'universal tendencies'.
>
>
> Thanks for confirming that 3ns is fundamental in the constitution of
> being, as I have maintained all along.  Any* tendency *is 3ns, and the
> reality of any *universal

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R, list

But you are ignoring my own comments! And I don't refer only to
Peirce's earlier work but to all his work! I find it strange that you
keep insisting that I refer only to 'his earlier comments ' ie 1.412]
when I have referred to many sections of Peirce. Equally - you can
chastise me for sticking to my opinion - but, can't the same be said
for you and others? 

I said - and here's that infamous 1. 412.- that Peirce wrote 'out of
the womb of indeterminacy we must say that there would have come
something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash.
Then by the principle of habit there would have been a second flash"
1.412.

My point in this is that BOTH Firstness and Thirdness are, so to
speak, 'original principles'. 

And Thirdness, as an act of relating 'this' and 'that'; as
mediative, cannot function except within matter. So, how could it be
primordial As he writes in 5.90-93, all three categories function
as correlates and he criticizes Hegel who focused only on Thirdness
and considered 'Firstness and Secondness must somehow be aufgehoben"
5.91. And again critiques Hegel in 5.436 and Hegel's absolute
idealism - and rejects that 'the third category...suffices to make
the world, or is even so much as self-sufficient" Peirce considers
all three modes as 'independent or distinct elements of the triune
Reality' 5.436. And all work together. 

And 'the third category - the category of though representation,
triadic relation, mediation, genuine thirdness, thirdness as such -
is an essential ingredient of reality yet does not by itself
constitute reality since this category [which in that cosmology
appears as the element of habit] can have no concrete being without
action, as a separate object on which to work its government, just as
action cannot exist without the immediate being of feeling on which to
act" 5.436.

The above, to me, is a clear indication that Thirdness cannot
function in a primordial or 'already operative' manner. It has "no
concrete being without action". As I keep saying, my reading is that
ALL  three modes are necessary and universal - and to claim that
Thirdness is 'already operative' or primordial - doesn't fit into the
words of Peirce. As Peirce  wrote 'an action cannot exist without the
immediate being of feeling on which to act'  ie., Thirdness requires
action [2ns] and 2ns requires 1ns. 

You may choose to deny 1.412 and say that he moved past it - but I
don't see that, for instance, his later work, eg, 6.214-19, denies
the operation of all three modes - and instead, he  declares that the
'initial condition, before the universe existed, was not a state of
pure abstract being. On the contrary it was a state of just nothing
at all" 6.215. …"There is no individual thing, no compulsion,
outward nor inward, no law. It is the germinal nothing, in which the
whole universe is involved or foreshadowed. As such, it is absolutely
undefined and unlimited possibility - boundless possibility. There is
no compulsion and no law. It is boundless freedom". 6.218.

Now -can you see Thirdness as 'already operative' in the above???

And 'it is clear that nothing but a principle of habit, itself due
to the growth by habit of an infinitesimal chance tendency toward
habit-taking, is the only bridge that can span the chasm between the
chance-medley of chaos and the cosmos of order and law" 6.262.

I read the above that habit or 3ns requires chance [1ns] and as
Peirce also noted, mediation or Thirdness is an act of relation, of
mediation and thus, can't be 'already operative' when there was
nothing to mediate.  Therefore - all three categorical modes are
necessary, universal - and none of them are primordial or 'already
operative' before the Universe 'began'. 

I don't see that Peirce privileges Thirdness in his cosmology; he
insists, rather, on the Triune. As for a post-Universe - then, again,
all three categorical modes, in both their genuine and degenerate
modes, are vital components, enabling a tychastic evolving
complexity. 

As for your comment about my reference to someone defining me as
'intelligent but not able to understand Peirce' - I apologize if you
thought/ or anyone thought that it referred to you. You would never,
ever,  so describe me - or anyone. Yes, it was JAS, and I have said
that because of his comments which I consider unprofessional and
insulting - I will  no longer discuss anything with him.

Edwina
 On Tue 27/08/19  4:19 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List,
 We are most certainly in disagreement in this matter as we always
have been and, most likely, always will be. For if this passage
doesn't convince you that Peirce, and by his own admission, either
changed his mind or further developed his thought. . . 
 Dr. Edward Montgomery remarked that my theory

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, List,

We are most certainly in disagreement in this matter as we always have been
and, most likely, always will be. For if this passage doesn't convince you
that Peirce, and *by his own admission,* either changed his mind or further
developed his thought. . .

Dr. Edward Montgomery remarked that my theory was not so much *evolutionary* as
it was *emanational **[that is, Peirce's earlier suggestion that 1ns just
sprung forth "**out of utterly causeless determinations of single events"
made his theory "emanational"]*; and Professor Ogden Rood pointed out that
there must have been *some original tendency to take habits which
did not arise according to my [1891-92] hypothesis;* while I myself was
most struck by the difficulty of so explaining the law of sequence in time,* if
I proposed to make all laws developed from single **events**; since an
event already supposes Time ["before time yet existed"] *(1908, most
emphasis is mine).


. . .then nothing will. It seems to me likely that you will stick to your
position even if it does not represent, as in this case, Peirce's mature
reflections, indeed re-thinking of the matter. You may disagree with his
late analysis, but your own is at strictly at odds with it. Again:

Professor Ogden Rood pointed out that there must have been some
original *tendency
to take habits *which did *not* arise according to my [1891-92] hypothesis.


 . . . and Peirce agrees with Rood that he was in error in not clearly
seeing and stating that original 'tendency' to take 'habits' (discussed in
posts of Jon's as themselves words implying 3ns).

And not only does he agree that he did not clearly see the need to valorize
this habit-taking tendency (3ns), but he also *explicitly *agrees with
Montgomery that he was in error to see the earliest cosmos in terms of
"developments
out of utterly causeless determinations of single events" (1908), that is,
in terms of the "causeless" sporting of 1nses. You may argue the contrary
until you're blue in the face, but this is clearly Peirce's position in
1908.

Should you ever attempt an analysis of Peirce's late thoughts on the
genesis of the cosmos, say, the 1898 blackboard in RLT, and include
excerpts from it -- which I assume you will find supportive of your own
position -- I would be both surprised and delighted to continue this
inquiry with you. But I am almost certain that that will *not* happen and
that you will continue to principally cite the 1891 passage as proof
positive that you are correct. You, it seems, *will* have the last word on
what Peirce thought in this matter rather than he. And by "last word" I
mean here what Peirce had to say from at least 1898 on which has been
discussed here at length, and which valorizes continuity as 3ns from the
get-go. Whom, may I ask (besides John Sowa, apparently), maintains your
position today? Certainly no contemporary scholar immersed in Peirce's
mature views regarding continuity.

In addition, a remark about the manner of your response to my post. You
concluded.


ET: I think that this kind of discussion has to be allowed - without snide
comments about whether our opponents have the 'capacity to understand' or
not.

A casual reader might think that here -- and elsewhere in your post on more
substantive matters such as "the womb of indeterminacy" passage -- that you
were referring to me as having made (in the snippet just quoted) what you
characterized as "snide comments." Snide or not, it was Jon and not I who
made the 'capacity to understand' comment. So, I would appreciate it that
in the future, when you are pointing to list member's words, that you
identify that person, especially, as in this case, when you have actually
quoted him.

And for the record, I do not think that you lack the "capacity to
understand" but, rather, that you are doggedly determined not to change you
attitude regarding a matter on which you have long held a position even
when, as in this case, the evidence suggests that good pragmatic practice
suggest strongly you ought at least consider doing so, say, by re-reading
the last lecture in RLT and everything Peirce wrote on the topic in the
20th century..

Best,

Gary R

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*




On Tue, Aug 27, 2019 at 2:53 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R, list
>
> Yes, I continue to stick by my interpretations - just as others continue
> to stick by theirs - and no-one here has offered any new evidence to make
> me change my interpretation. And I do add other references - just as do
> others.
>
> What I argue against is the notion that any of the three categories are,
> on their own, primordial. That is - to say that 3ns is primordial, as you
> and some others [not all] assert - is as 'emanational' as to assert that
> 1ns is primordial. I disagree that 3ns was 'already operative' - just as I
> disagree that 1ns or 2ns were already operative.
>
> Again, my vi

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R, list

Yes, I continue to stick by my interpretations - just as others
continue to stick by theirs - and no-one here has offered any new
evidence to make me change my interpretation. And I do add other
references - just as do others. 

What I argue against is the notion that any of the three categories
are, on their own, primordial. That is - to say that 3ns is
primordial, as you and some others [not all] assert - is as
'emanational' as to assert that 1ns is primordial. I disagree that
3ns was 'already operative' - just as I disagree that 1ns or 2ns were
already operative. 

Again, my view is that 'out of the womb of indeterminacy' - means
what it says: an  action/mode which is 'indeterminate'  and this is,
according to Peirce,  an act of Firstness. [1.302] I note also that
Peirce writes, "Indeterminacy, then, or pure firstness and haecceity,
or pure secondness, are facts not calling for and not capable of
explanation" 1.405.  That is - 'indeterminacy' does NOT mean
Thirdness but Firstness.

 I don't add a linguistic term [womb] to this physical event and
declare that because this word [womb] is a symbol [as are all words]
that this means that 3ns is primary. I look at the meaning of the
words - and they refer to 1ns. I note also again that Peirce
considers that the term 'indeterminate' refers to 1ns and not 3ns
[which refers to generality]. See his outline in 1.373... and his
explanation of the term. And 1.405. 

My view of Peirce's outline is that 'Nothing' means that none of the
three modal categories are primary or primordial or 'already
operative'. ALL three are necessary, are universal and develop,
necessarily, together, 'after the flash' so to speak. The word
itself, Nothing,  as a linguistic term, is of course a symbol, but
that does not mean that what it refers to [its Object] is in a mode
of 3ns. As he says, these three are 'the fundamental elementary modes
of consciousness' 1.378..and I don't see any comments about 3ns as
primordial or already operative. 

As Peirce says, 'There can, it is true, be no positive information
about what antedated the entire Universe of beings; because to begin
with, there was nothing to  have information about. But the universe
is intelligible; and therefore it is possible to give a general
account of it and its origin. This general account is a symbol; and
from the nature of a symbol, it must begin with the formal assertion
that there was an indeterminate nothing of the nature of a symbol.
this would be false if it conveyed any information. But it is the
correct and logical manner of beginning an account of the universe.
As a symbol it produces its infinite series of interpretants, which
in the beginning were absolutely vague like itselfVol 2, p323.

My reading of the above is that Peirce was not talking about the
PHYSICAL formation of the universe, but our 'giving a general account
of it and its origin'. This general account, in words and images, 
that we - and indeed all peoples - give - is a symbol. That is, it is
a rhetorical, linguistic, figurative account of PHYSICAL events. But-
to then assert that because our rhetorical figurative accounts of
this origin are symbolic of that origin -that they are as figures of
linguistic rhetoric - symbols...that the actual physical events are
ALSO in a mode of 3ns, is, in my view, an error. 

After all, Thirdness cannot function except as articulated within
matter - so, how could it be primordial or 'already operative'?
Thirdness, as mediation, is always relative...'mind objectified'. See
1.366, 1.369

After all - if we read 'Out of the womb of indeterminacy we must say
that there would have come something, by the principle of Firstness,
which we may call a flash. Then by the principle of habit there would
have been a second flash" 1.412. 

Well, if you claim that the 'principle of habit was 'already
operative' or primordial in this outline - well, then, so was the
Principle of Firstness!!

But my reading is that ALL THREE modes are necessary, universal -
and - co-emerged together 'at the flash'. 

So- as I said - we continue to disagree - and we both do base our
views on Peirce. Therefore, I think that this kind of discussion has
to be allowed - without snide comments about whether our opponents
have the 'capacity to understand' or not.

Edwina
 On Tue 27/08/19  1:51 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List,
 Yes, you continue to stick to your interpretation of the situation
of the early cosmos and will probably continue to do so, even when
presented with new evidence, for example, the unpublished draft that
includes the Ogden Rood (not 'Nash' as I last wrote, my computer
having 'corrected' Ogden Rood to Ogden 'Nash'!) and Montgomery
references, and which Jon quoted. That manuscript is strong evidence
that w

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, List,

Yes, you continue to stick to your interpretation of the situation of the
early cosmos and will probably continue to do so, even when presented with
new evidence, for example, the unpublished draft that includes the Ogden
Rood (not 'Nash' as I last wrote, my computer having 'corrected' Ogden Rood
to Ogden 'Nash'!) and Montgomery references, and which Jon quoted. That
manuscript is strong evidence that whatever Peirce may have been thinking
in 1891, he has by 1908 explicitly affirmed that 1ns could not "emanate"
willy-nilly out of sheer nothingness.

So, let's for a moment, for the purpose of argumentation, bracket Jon's
suggestion (with which, however, I tend to agree, but not strongly) that
even the 1891 analysis can be seen as containing, albeit perhaps obscurely,
a *principle of habit formation*. Let us imagine, then, for argument's
sake, that Peirce came to see himself as just downright wrong  in 1891-92,
that he clearly and rather obviously 'corrects' himself much later,
certainly my 1908, for that is what he seemingly does in  this snippet
(with commentary inserted) of the passage in question which Jon quoted at
greater length.

[D]uring the long years [from 1891 to 1908] which have elapsed since the
hypothesis first suggested itself to me, it may naturally be supposed that
faulty features *[notably. the notion of the 'emanation' of 1ns out of
nothingness] *of the original hypothesis have been brought [to] my
attention by others and have struck me in my own meditations *[I commented
in my last post, albeit parenthetically, that Peirce more than once
modified his ideas in these ways]*.. Dr. Edward Montgomery remarked that my
theory was not so much *evolutionary* as it was *emanational* *[that is,
Peirce's earlier suggestion that 1ns just sprung forth "**out of utterly
causeless determinations of single - 1ns - events" made his theory
"emanational"]*; and Professor Ogden Rood pointed out that there must have
been *some original tendency to take habits which did not arise according
to my [1891-92] hypothesis;* while I myself was most struck by the
difficulty of so explaining the law of sequence in time,* if I proposed to
make all laws developed from single **events**; since an event already
supposes Time ["before time yet existed"] *(1908, most emphasis is mine).


As Jon well put it, even in consideration of the 1891 musings:

JAS: 3ns--was *already *operative, which is why there could be "a second
flash ... resulting from" the first one.  Peirce explicitly acknowledged
this aspect in a manuscript draft for "A Neglected Argument," crediting
Ogden Rood with bringing it to his attention.


You have given your position on this cosmological matter many times over
the years, making the same arguments, employing the same references for the
most part, while more or less ignoring other and later cosmological
discussions by Peirce -- and there are quite a few!-- which others,
including me, have pointed to; and there are several, including the last of
the 1898 lectures and, now, the 1908 draft manuscript Jon quoted from. If
Peirce could modify his thinking -- if *that's* indeed what he did -- then
further reflection on material you have seemingly ignored perhaps might
modify yours too. The experiment is yours to make.

Meanwhile, as in his post today, I see that Jon is *further* developing his
argument in ways which I find compelling.

Best,

Gary R





*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*




On Tue, Aug 27, 2019 at 9:30 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

>
> Gary R
>
> I'll continue to support my reading of Peirce - which disagrees with your
> outline. I know that some on this list have, graciously, defined me as
> 'intelligent' - but, alas, also declared that my being intelligent does not
> necessarily include the ability to Understand Peirce. However, I'll stand
> by my own admittedly fallible assessment that I can understand Peirce.
>
> I continue to read Peirce's 1.412, not as 'incomplete and misleading' [I
> have been accused of such an assessment of this passage] but as a valid
> explanation of Peirce's cosmology - and fitting in quite well with his
> other outlines in 6.193-217 etc.See also 7.514-5.
>
> Therefore - I disagree with your view that 3ns is primordial. I read
> Peirce in my own admittedly fallible readings, that 'in the infinitely
> distant past in which there were no laws" 7.514, and 'the initial
> conditions, before the universe existed, was not a state of pure abstract
> being. On the contrary, it was a state of just nothing at all, not even a
> state of emptiness, for even emptiness is something" 6.215.
>
> My reading of the above is that Nothing - none of the three categories -
> is primordial. All three are necessary and one can't conclude that any one
> of them is 'more necessary' than the other. Therefore - as he outlines in
> 1.412, 'out of the womb of indeterminacy we must say that

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  So- there is not only a 'universal tendency towards habit-forming' -
but a universal tendency towards chance/sporting/deviation - and a
universal tendency to instantiation into discrete units. ALL Three are
'universal tendencies'.


Thanks for confirming that 3ns is fundamental in the constitution of being,
as I have maintained all along.  Any* tendency *is 3ns, and the reality of
any *universal *tendency reflects the primordiality of 3ns.  If in fact
there is "a universal tendency toward chance/sporting/deviation" and "a
universal tendency to instantiation into discrete units," then this
reflects the "really commanding function" of 3ns with respect to 1ns and
2ns, respectively (CP 6.202; 1898).  The resulting evolution of states is
an ongoing and continuous process (3ns) away from the ideal limit of
"unpersonalized feeling" (1ns) in the infinite past and toward the ideal
limit of "dead matter" (2ns) in the infinite future.  On the other hand, we
should acknowledge that when Peirce *himself *discussed cosmology, he *only
*applied the term "universal tendency" to habit-taking and generalization
(CP 6.209 and CP 7.515; both 1898)--paradigmatic examples of 3ns.

ET:  To consider that only 3ns is primordial moves one, I think, close to
necessitarianism [see 6.59 etc for Peirce's argument against this view].


Nonsense, no one is denying the *reality *of 1ns, which is what Peirce
specifically addressed in that paragraph.  Moreover, saying that 3ns is
primordial in no way entails that 1ns and 2ns are *reducible to* 3ns, which
was the error of Hegel (cf. CP 6.218; 1898), or that 1ns and 2ns are
otherwise dispensable.  Instead, as Gary R. already noted, 1ns and 2ns
are *involved
in* 3ns and can be *prescinded from* 3ns.  The entire universe is a
continuum (3ns), with parts that are indefinite (1ns), unless and until
they are actualized (2ns).  Within our *existing* universe, the sequence of
events is such that "Firstness, or chance, and Secondness, or Brute
reaction, are other elements, without the independence of which Thirdness
would not have anything upon which to operate" (CP 6.202; 1898).

ET:  After all - to say that 'womb of indeterminacy' is a symbol and
therefore, describes 3ns, is not an infallible reading. As a metaphor, the
linguistic phrase is certainly a symbol, but the physical action of a
'flash' is most certainly not a symbol but an indexical physical act.


"Womb" is a metaphor, but "indeterminacy" is not.  The "linguistic phrase"
is indeed a symbol, but according to Peirce, so is its *object*.

CSP:  If we are to explain the universe, we must assume that there was in
the beginning a state of things in which there was nothing ... Not
determinately nothing ... Utter indetermination. But a symbol alone is
indeterminate. Therefore, Nothing, the indeterminate of the absolute
beginning, is a symbol. That is the way in which the beginning of things
can alone be understood. (EP 2:322; 1904)


The "flash" comes *from *"the womb of indeterminacy," so the latter (3ns)
must be primordial relative to the former (1ns/2ns).  The parallel is with
gestation, the situation prior to birth.  Switching to Peirce's later
diagram (CP 6.203-208; 1898), as I have said before, there cannot be any
chalk marks (1ns/2ns) without a blackboard on which to draw them (3ns).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Aug 27, 2019 at 8:30 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R
>
> I'll continue to support my reading of Peirce - which disagrees with your
> outline. I know that some on this list have, graciously, defined me as
> 'intelligent' - but, alas, also declared that my being intelligent does not
> necessarily include the ability to Understand Peirce. However, I'll stand
> by my own admittedly fallible assessment that I can understand Peirce.
>
> I continue to read Peirce's 1.412, not as 'incomplete and misleading' [I
> have been accused of such an assessment of this passage] but as a valid
> explanation of Peirce's cosmology - and fitting in quite well with his
> other outlines in 6.193-217 etc.See also 7.514-5.
>
> Therefore - I disagree with your view that 3ns is primordial. I read
> Peirce in my own admittedly fallible readings, that 'in the infinitely
> distant past in which there were no laws" 7.514, and 'the initial
> conditions, before the universe existed, was not a state of pure abstract
> being. On the contrary, it was a state of just nothing at all, not even a
> state of emptiness, for even emptiness is something" 6.215.
>
> My reading of the above is that Nothing - none of the three categories -
> is primordial. All three are necessary and one can't conclude that any one
> of them is 'more necessary' than the other. Therefore - as he outlines in
> 1.412, 'out of the womb of indeterminacy we must say that there would have
> come something, by the principle o

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 Gary R

I'll continue to support my reading of Peirce - which disagrees with
your outline. I know that some on this list have, graciously, defined
me as 'intelligent' - but, alas, also declared that my being
intelligent does not necessarily include the ability to Understand
Peirce. However, I'll stand by my own admittedly fallible assessment
that I can understand Peirce.

I continue to read Peirce's 1.412, not as 'incomplete and
misleading' [I have been accused of such an assessment of this
passage] but as a valid explanation of Peirce's cosmology - and
fitting in quite well with his other outlines in 6.193-217 etc.See
also 7.514-5.

Therefore - I disagree with your view that 3ns is primordial. I read
Peirce in my own admittedly fallible readings, that 'in the infinitely
distant past in which there were no laws" 7.514, and 'the initial
conditions, before the universe existed, was not a state of pure
abstract being. On the contrary, it was a state of just nothing at
all, not even a state of emptiness, for even emptiness is something"
6.215. 

My reading of the above is that Nothing - none of the three
categories - is primordial. All three are necessary and one can't
conclude that any one of them is 'more necessary' than the other.
Therefore - as he outlines in 1.412, 'out of the womb of
indeterminacy we must say that there would have come something, by
the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the
principle of habit there would have been a second flashetc"  

I don't read the above to mean that any one of the three categories
is primordial; all three emerged and co-developed at the same
time..as time began. Before this - there was - Nothing.  Therefore -
I don't read that 3ns is 'presupposed'  - all three are necessary to
life. So- there is not only a 'universal tendency towards
habit-forming' - but a universal tendency towards
chance/sporting/deviation - and a universal tendency to instantiation
into discrete units. ALL Three are 'universal tendencies'. To consider
that only 3ns is primordial moves one, I think, close to
necessitarianism [see 6.59 etc for Peirce's argument against this
view]. 

After all - to say that 'womb of indeterminacy' is a symbol and
therefore, describes 3ns, is not an infallible reading. As a
metaphor, the linguistic phrase is certainly a symbol, but the
physical action of a 'flash' is most certainly not a symbol but an
indexical physical act. After all - the phrase 'rosy-fingered dawn'
is another metaphor and thus, a linguistic symbol, but the physical
act of the sun's 'rising' is not a symbol but a physical action. 

Peirce's outline of Firstness [see 1.302 and on] as not being
determined, 'that which has not another behind it, determining its
actions"  [ie indeterminate] - that is, indeterminate means that
there is no "prospect of its sometime having occasion to be embodied
in a fact, which is itself not a law or anything like a law" 1.304.
Then,  Secondness introduces determination, 'causation and statical
force' 1.325. Causation includes determination, where one force
affects and determines results of another. Thirdness introduces not
indeterminacy or determinacy but continuity. ..and such terms as
"generality, infinity, continuity, diffusion, growth, and
intelligence" 1.340.

I think that these interpretations - my own which sees all three
categories as necessary and none as primordial, and yours and others
which sees Thirdness as primordial - are obviously incompatible. I
will suggest that we can only continue the exploration of Peirce -
even within these two opposing views - but that we do not, on this
forum at least, insist that one or the other is the FINAL TRUTH. 

Edwina
 On Mon 26/08/19 10:03 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Jon, John, List, 
  JFS:  Although Jon prefers to quote other passages, Peirce never
denied CP 1.412. 
  JAS: "I have never claimed that Peirce denied CP 1.412.  What I
have maintained is that we should interpret it in light of later
passages, which presumably reflect Peirce's more considered views.  
Besides, upon careful examination of what that text actually says, it
turns out to be fully consistent with those subsequent writings." 
 Jon, thanks for putting to (fallible) rest, at least in my mind,
this controversial (at least on this list) issue of whether Peirce
saw flashes of 1ns -- a kind of aboriginal "sporting," or, 3ns -- as
"a tendency to take habits," as primordial in his musings on the
origins of the universe.
 Bringing pertinent quotations together, as well as your incisive
commentary, make it clear enough that not only was the latter
Peirce's mature understanding but, further, that "Peirce's more
considered views" (1908) were not inconsistent with his earlier ones
(1887-88) such that 3ns, and  not 1ns, is seen as incipient at the
birth of the co

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, John, List,


JFS:  Although Jon prefers to quote other passages, Peirce never denied CP
1.412.


JAS: "I have never claimed that Peirce denied CP 1.412.  What I have
maintained is that we should interpret it in light of later passages, which
presumably reflect Peirce's more considered views.  Besides, upon careful
examination of what that text actually says, it turns out to be fully
consistent with those subsequent writings."


Jon, thanks for putting to (fallible) rest, at least in my mind, this
controversial (at least on this list) issue of whether Peirce saw flashes
of 1ns -- a kind of aboriginal "sporting," *or*, 3ns -- as "a tendency to
take habits," as primordial in his musings on the origins of the universe.

Bringing pertinent quotations together, as well as your incisive
commentary, make it clear enough that not only was the latter Peirce's
mature understanding but, further, that "Peirce's more considered views"
(1908) were not inconsistent with his earlier ones (1887-88) such that 3ns,
and *not *1ns, is seen as incipient at the birth of the cosmos. In short,
it was Peirce's considered view that continuity, "the tendency to take
habits," 3ns, was first, that is, original *before time was*, so to speak.

[An aside: In his work in phenomenology (and in places with reference to
logic and metaphysics), Peirce makes clear that, except for the purposes of
certain types of analysis, that the three categories appear together, that
one may be prescinded from another but not disassociated. Also, from one
categorial vectorial standpoint (involution: 3ns -> 2ns -> 1ns), the
categories 1ns and 2ns are necessarily involved in 3ns such that they are *not
built up* from 1ns, but that 3ns is always* presupposed*.]

As you noted, Jon, in his earlier reflections on the earliest cosmology
Peirce writes: "Then *by the principle of habit* there would have been a
second flash." 1887-88 (emphasis added). "Habit" as employed here in
1887-88 at least suggests that both the first and the second, and
presumably all 'subsequent' flashes, are 'grounded' in this "principle of
habit."

Then, in the last of the 1898 Lectures (RLT), as both you and I (and
others) have argued, in presenting the 'blackboard' metaphor, Peirce makes
this explicit such that the 'sporting' of 1ns 'occurs' upon a pre-*cosmic
blackboard*, so to speak, representing a kind of ur-continuity, that
"principle of habit," a *primordial continuity* which is the *sine qua non* of
Peirce's early cosmology in my view.

Finally, in his last, or at least penultimate, thinking on the matter
Peirce would write that the development of laws occurred ". . . under a
certain *universal tendency toward habit-forming*. . ." 1908

As he remarked, and you noted, Jon, the idea that the original sporting of
1ns could *not* have arisen out of nothing, was brought home by Professor
Nash's pointing out "that there must have been some original tendency to
take habits" 1908. [There are other places where Peirce comments that there
were facets of his philosophy of which he early on had but a vague sense,
but which he then later clarified -- or, in some cases, corrected --as in
the diamond thought experiment -- or he is led to a clearer understanding
by something he's read, typically by another scholar, as in this case of
Nash's suggestion, or by the natural development of his own thought.] But,
again, and as you pointed out, even as early as 1887-88 Peirce had
introduced a "principle of habit taking" *in principio*.

Moving to another matter, you write regarding John Sowa's diagram of
Peirce's classification of the sciences:


JAS: "This is very disappointing--despite all of the recent on-List
complaints about attributing views to someone apart from verbatim
quotations, the attachment still falsely claims that it presents
*Peirce's *classification of
the sciences.  As I pointed out several months ago, it does not--there is
no passage whatsoever where he employed the term "Formal Semeiotic," and
also no passage whatsoever where he situated *any *aspect of Semeiotic
under Phenomenology."


This is indeed very disappointing as it seems to me that JFS employs a
double standard at such moments, that he himself seemingly has no trouble
whatsoever "attributing views to someone apart from verbatim quotations"
(as if every scholar under the sun -- including Peirce! -- didn't do such
things, and as if he didn't himself do this in his books and articles), but
complains about others, esp. you, Jon, attributing views to Peirce in this
way. I have tended to see this critique as so much nonsense when I didn't
see it as actual intellectual harassment.

But further, while I have not seen you attributing views to Peirce which I
do not myself find in the numerous and not infrequently lengthy quotations
and groups of quotations which you provide in support of your
interpretation, JFS's diagram clearly *does* do that in a way which I think
few Peirce scholars would find legitimate as John has clearly 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

JFS:  Although Jon prefers to quote other passages, Peirce never denied CP
1.412.


I have never claimed that Peirce denied CP 1.412.  What I have maintained
is that we should interpret it in light of later passages, which presumably
reflect Peirce's more considered views.  Besides, upon careful examination
of what that text actually says, it turns out to be fully consistent with
those subsequent writings.

CSP:  Our conceptions of the first stages of the development, before time
yet existed, must be as vague and figurative as the expressions of the
first chapter of Genesis. Out of the womb of indeterminacy we must say that
there would have come something, by the principle of Firstness, which we
may call a flash. Then by the principle of habit there would have been a
second flash. Though time would not yet have been, this second flash was in
some sense after the first, because resulting from it. Then there would
have come other successions ever more and more closely connected, the
habits and the tendency to take them ever strengthening themselves, until
the events would have been bound together into something like a continuous
flow. We have no reason to think that even now time is quite perfectly
continuous and uniform in its flow. The quasi-flow which would result
would, however, differ essentially from time in this respect, that it would
not necessarily be in a single stream. (CP 1.412, EP 1:278; 1887-1888)


The situation "before time yet existed," whatever that could mean, was "the
womb of indeterminacy"--i.e., a *symbol *as 3ns (cf. EP 2:322; 1904).  The
"principle of habit"--i.e., the law of mind (CP 6.23; 1891), also
3ns--was *already
*operative, which is why there could be "a second flash ... resulting from"
the first one.  Peirce explicitly acknowledged this aspect in a manuscript
draft for "A Neglected Argument," crediting Ogden Rood with bringing it to
his attention.

CSP:  At the same time, as well as I can make out, it is impossible to form
any rational philosophy of cosmology without admitting that violations of
the true laws of nature, in swarms [of] numberless though excessively
minute violations, are happening every second of time. In the years 1891-3,
I defended this position in six articles in the *Monist* under the name of
*tychism*; but only in one of the six did I allude to any other conception
of them than that [of] events occurring by absolute chance. I there
contended that the laws of nature, and, indeed, all experiential laws, have
been results of evolution, being (such was my original hypothesis,)
developments out of utterly causeless determinations of single events,
under a certain universal tendency toward habit-forming, conjoined with *a
survival of the fittest*; the fitness of habits, or "laws," of things
consisting in their growth not essentially tending to produce characters
which would necessarily remove any objects that should come to possess them
from the sphere of experience. The supposed tendency to take habits, that
is to say, to repeat former modes of action would itself grow by virtue of
itself into a stronger habit of habit-forming. It will at once be seen that
this could very well have been the way in which some laws of nature might
have originated, and that it is a hypothesis well worthy of examination
whether all laws may not have come to pass in this way. But during the long
years which have elapsed since the hypothesis first suggested itself to me,
it may naturally be supposed that faulty features of the original
hypothesis have been brought [to] my attention by others and have struck me
in my own meditations. Dr. Edward Montgomery remarked that my theory was
not so much *evolutionary* as it was *emanational*; and Professor Ogden
Rood pointed out that there must have been some original tendency to take
habits which did not arise according to my hypothesis; while I myself was
most struck by the difficulty of so explaining the law of sequence in time,
if I proposed to make all laws develope from single *events*; since an
event already supposes Time. (R 842:111-114[125-128]; 1908)


Peirce's cosmology requires the "tendency to take habits," the psychical
law, to be *original*--i.e., primordial--rather than something that *arose*.
This is the very explanation that the physical law itself calls for (cf. CP
6.613; 1893).  Moreover, "an event already supposes Time," so from that
standpoint it is problematic to treat the *beginning *of time as an
*event*--i.e.,
a singularity.  Instead, Peirce consistently held that it did not have any
*definite* beginning.

JFS:  For the relationships of cosmology, physics, metaphysics, and
religion, see the attached cspscience.jpg, which shows Peirce's
classification of the sciences of discovery.


This is very disappointing--despite all of the recent on-List complaints
about attributing views to someone apart from verbatim quotations, the
attachment still falsely claims that it presents *Peirce's *classification of
the 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Gary Richmond]

gt;
>>> Right now the only suggestion I can contribute is that a concept of time
>>> as a true topological continuum would be independent of scale, while any
>>> concept of *historical* time does have a fixed scale, which assigns the
>>> origin of the earth to around 5 billion years ago, the Big Bang to about
>>> 13.8 billion years ago, etc. You can’t have a scale in a temporal continuum
>>> without marking events in it and comparing the length of time between
>>> events, and those marks appear as discontinuities. To visualize an
>>> explanation of why we can’t locate the origin of “the universe” in
>>> *continuous* time, I sometimes use the analogy of “zooming in” on a
>>> representation of the Mandelbrot set: you can zoom in on any region forever
>>> (or you could if you had infinite computing power) without reaching an
>>> (“innermost”) end. (I wonder how the possibility of fractal dimensions
>>> would affect Jeff’s idea about the reduction of dimensions over time.)
>>>
>>> I haven’t read the Quanta article yet and have a busy weekend ahead so
>>> this very rough sketch is all I can offer for awhile.
>>>
>>> Gary f.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *From:* Jeffrey Brian Downard 
>>> *Sent:* 23-Aug-19 12:46
>>> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Jon S, Gary F, John S, List,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Peirce engages in inquiries that fall under the headings "cosmological
>>> metaphysics" and "cosmological physics." (see, for example, CP 6.213,  As
>>> we know, he is drawing on a number of resources including mathematics,
>>> phenomenology and semiotics for the sake of directing the inquiries in
>>> cosmological metaphysics. In turn, those philosophical inquiries are being
>>> put to the test in physics.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Both the metaphysical and the physical inquiries in cosmology are
>>> attempting to address many of the same basic types of questions. What is
>>> the origin of the universe? What explains the historical development of the
>>> cosmos? One of the big differences between the two types of inquiries is
>>> that metaphysics draws on the common observations of ordinary experience,
>>> while physics draws on special observations in order to put its theories to
>>> the test.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> As far as I am able to see, most cosmologists--ranging from Aristotle
>>> and Leibniz to Einstein and Hawking--draw on both philosophical and
>>> physical resources when framing the key questions and giving shape to their
>>> leading ideas. For the purposes of a science of review, Peirce thinks it is
>>> important to separate the two types of inquiry. Otherwise, we will run the
>>> risk of getting things out of order in ways that might bias and prejudice
>>> our inquiries.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Having said that much, I agree with John S in thinking that most of
>>> Peirce's explanations in his metaphysical and his physical inquiries in
>>> cosmology have the character of tentative hypothesis. What is more, Peirce
>>> often seems to be considering a wide range of hypotheses, many of which
>>> appear to be competing with each other. Some of the metaphysical hypotheses
>>> fit better with the best physical science of his day, but he is well aware
>>> that those theories were filled with vague ideas, had enormous gaps,
>>> and would likely be amended or replaced with better theories as inquiry
>>> proceeded. We might try to rate the key explanations he offers in
>>> his metaphysical and physical cosmological theories. For this purpose, we
>>> might employ the rating system he used in his inquiries in speculative
>>> grammar.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> With respect to the conceptions employed and conceptual divisions made
>>> in the hypotheses under consideration at his time, we could label them in
>>> the following way:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>i. {d} for {délos}),
>>> clear apprehension of some,
>>>
>>>  ii. {s} for {schedon},
>>> almost clear,
>>>
>>> iii. {m} for {metrios},
>>> and a tolerable but not thoroughly tried conception of others
>

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Helmut Raulien]

ey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>
Sent: 23-Aug-19 12:46
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang



 


Jon S, Gary F, John S, List,

 

Peirce engages in inquiries that fall under the headings "cosmological metaphysics" and "cosmological physics." (see, for example, CP 6.213,  As we know, he is drawing on a number of resources including mathematics, phenomenology and semiotics for the sake of directing the inquiries in cosmological metaphysics. In turn, those philosophical inquiries are being put to the test in physics.

 

Both the metaphysical and the physical inquiries in cosmology are attempting to address many of the same basic types of questions. What is the origin of the universe? What explains the historical development of the cosmos? One of the big differences between the two types of inquiries is that metaphysics draws on the common observations of ordinary experience, while physics draws on special observations in order to put its theories to the test.

 

As far as I am able to see, most cosmologists--ranging from Aristotle and Leibniz to Einstein and Hawking--draw on both philosophical and physical resources when framing the key questions and giving shape to their leading ideas. For the purposes of a science of review, Peirce thinks it is important to separate the two types of inquiry. Otherwise, we will run the risk of getting things out of order in ways that might bias and prejudice our inquiries.

 

Having said that much, I agree with John S in thinking that most of Peirce's explanations in his metaphysical and his physical inquiries in cosmology have the character of tentative hypothesis. What is more, Peirce often seems to be considering a wide range of hypotheses, many of which appear to be competing with each other. Some of the metaphysical hypotheses fit better with the best physical science of his day, but he is well aware that those theories were filled with vague ideas, had enormous gaps, and would likely be amended or replaced with better theories as inquiry proceeded. We might try to rate the key explanations he offers in his metaphysical and physical cosmological theories. For this purpose, we might employ the rating system he used in his inquiries in speculative grammar.

 

With respect to the conceptions employed and conceptual divisions made in the hypotheses under consideration at his time, we could label them in the following way:

 

                                               i. {d} for {délos}), clear apprehension of some, 

 ii. {s} for {schedon}, almost clear, 

    iii. {m} for {metrios}, and a tolerable but not thoroughly tried conception of others

    iv. {ch} for {chalepös} hardly better than {a}).

 v. {a} for {adélos}an unsatisfactory and doubtful notion of others,

 

For my part, I would put a mark of a, ch, m or s to most of the conceptions that figure prominently in the hypotheses he offers, I and would put a mark of d to only a small number--at least as far as my own understanding of those conceptions goes.

 

If we compare Peirce's cosmological hypotheses to those that are under consideration today, then we have our work cut out for us. As far as I am able to tell, there appear to be a remarkable diversity of cosmological hypotheses that have been put forward for consideration by the community of physical cosmologists. In fact, there are so many that rest on such widely differing conceptions (e.g., of the nature of space and time), that it is hard to sort out the metaphysical assumptions implicit in the competing hypotheses.

 

As such, let's focus our discussion here on two hypotheses:  (a) the idea that the origin of the universe is in a singularity that changed abruptly at an event called the Big Bang and (b) the idea that the origin of the universe involves no such singularity and that the evolution of the cosmos from its origins involved a relatively smooth expansion of space over time. Let us call (a) the Hawking-Penrose abrupt change hypothesis and (b) the Hartle-Hawking smooth change hypothesis. Here is a popular summary of the two.

 

https://www.quantamagazine.org/physicists-debate-hawkings-idea-that-the-universe-had-no-beginning-20190606/



	
		
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			Quanta Magazine
			

			
			www.quantamagazine.org
			

			
			A recent challenge to Stephen Hawking’s biggest idea — about how the universe might have come from nothing — has cosmologists choosing sides.
			
			
		
	



For those who are interested, the summary provides a link to the paper in which Hartle and Hawking formulated (b).

For the sake of comparing Peirce's cosmological hypotheses to (a) and (b), I'd be interested in looking more closely at the metaphysical explanations d

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Gary Richmond]

Ben, List,

Ben, thanks for posting a link to this short article by Jaime Nubiola on
Peirce's understanding of what a 'scientific metaphysics' entails.
https://www.academia.edu/19624309/What_a_Scientific_Metaphysics_Really_Is_According_to_C._S._Peirce

I have long followed Nubiola's work as I consider him to be one of the
foremost living experts on Peirce's thought and, btw, a terrific fellow.
While he has written on a wide variety of topics, I have especially
benefited from reading his papers on science, logic (esp., the logic of
abduction) and metaphysics, but also on such diverse topics as the
relationship of Peirce to Whitehead, to Wittgenstein, and to Searles among
others. He has also long argued for a greater place for Peirce's work in
20th-21st century philosophy, for example, that analytic philosophy ought
to take a "Peircean turn."

Nubiola is, as you know, a prolific author, writing mainly in Spanish,
alhtough many of his writings are available online in English. He has
almost singlehandedly put the University of Navarra on the map as a center
of contemporary Peircean research.

I do believe that the article you posted "may offer some guidance in the
current discussion of Peirce's metaphysics."

Best,

Gary R

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*




On Sat, Aug 24, 2019 at 10:00 AM Ben Novak  wrote:

>
> I wonder whether the following article by Jaime Nubiola may offer some
> guidance in the current discussion of Peirce's metaphysics:
>
>
> https://www.academia.edu/19624309/What_a_Scientific_Metaphysics_Really_Is_According_to_C._S._Peirce
>
>
> *Ben Novak*
> 5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142
> Telephone: (814) 808-5702
> Mobile: (814) 424-8501
>
> *"All art is mortal, **not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts
> themselves.* *One day the last portrait of Rembrandt* *and the last bar
> of Mozart will have ceased to be—**though possibly a colored canvas and a
> sheet of notes may remain—**because the last eye and the last ear
> accessible to their message **will have gone." *Oswald Spengler
>
>
> On Sat, Aug 24, 2019 at 7:48 AM  wrote:
>
>> Jeff, Jon, List,
>>
>> It’s true that my suggestion of a radical split between the universes of
>> discourse of physics and metaphysics oversimplifies the issues, as it tends
>> to ignore not only the variety of metaphysical assumptions among physicists
>> but also the variety and tentativity of Peirce’s own cosmological
>> hypotheses. I’m looking forward to further inquiry along the lines Jeff has
>> proposed.
>>
>> Right now the only suggestion I can contribute is that a concept of time
>> as a true topological continuum would be independent of scale, while any
>> concept of *historical* time does have a fixed scale, which assigns the
>> origin of the earth to around 5 billion years ago, the Big Bang to about
>> 13.8 billion years ago, etc. You can’t have a scale in a temporal continuum
>> without marking events in it and comparing the length of time between
>> events, and those marks appear as discontinuities. To visualize an
>> explanation of why we can’t locate the origin of “the universe” in
>> *continuous* time, I sometimes use the analogy of “zooming in” on a
>> representation of the Mandelbrot set: you can zoom in on any region forever
>> (or you could if you had infinite computing power) without reaching an
>> (“innermost”) end. (I wonder how the possibility of fractal dimensions
>> would affect Jeff’s idea about the reduction of dimensions over time.)
>>
>> I haven’t read the Quanta article yet and have a busy weekend ahead so
>> this very rough sketch is all I can offer for awhile.
>>
>> Gary f.
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Jeffrey Brian Downard 
>> *Sent:* 23-Aug-19 12:46
>> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang
>>
>>
>>
>> Jon S, Gary F, John S, List,
>>
>>
>>
>> Peirce engages in inquiries that fall under the headings "cosmological
>> metaphysics" and "cosmological physics." (see, for example, CP 6.213,  As
>> we know, he is drawing on a number of resources including mathematics,
>> phenomenology and semiotics for the sake of directing the inquiries in
>> cosmological metaphysics. In turn, those philosophical inquiries are being
>> put to the test in physics.
>>
>>
>>
>> Both the metaphysical and the physical inquiries in cosmology are
>> attempting to address many of the same basic types of questions. What is
>> the origin of the uni

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

GF:  Right now the only suggestion I can contribute is that a concept of
time as a true topological continuum would be independent of scale, while
any concept of *historical *time does have a fixed scale, which assigns the
origin of the earth to around 5 billion years ago, the Big Bang to about
13.8 billion years ago, etc.


*One* particular concept of historical time assigns those particular
dates--again, based on the (untestable) *assumption* that the laws of
nature have remained unchanged over all that time.  There are other
concepts of historical time that assign different dates, based on different
assumptions.  Again, Peirce declined to assign *any *date to the
"beginning" *at all*, based on his assumption of "thorough-going
evolutionism."

GF:  You can’t have a scale in a temporal continuum without marking events
in it and comparing the length of time between events, and those marks
appear as discontinuities.


Indeed, but any such "marking off" of a continuum is an arbitrary and
artificial "operation of thought."  The definite and discontinuous parts
that are thus created are not *real *constituents of the continuum *in
itself*.

CSP:  In the next place, I conceive that a Continuum has, IN ITSELF, no
definite parts, although to endow it with definite parts of no matter what
multitude, and even parts of lesser dimensionality down to absolute
simplicity, it is only necessary that these should be marked off, and
although even the operation of thought suffices to impart an approach to
definiteness of parts of any multitude we please.*
*This indubitably proves that the possession of parts by a continuum is not
a real character of it. For the real is that whose being one way or another
does not depend upon how individual persons may imagine it to be. (R S-30
[Copy T:6]; c. 1906)


Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Aug 24, 2019 at 6:48 AM  wrote:

> Jeff, Jon, List,
>
> It’s true that my suggestion of a radical split between the universes of
> discourse of physics and metaphysics oversimplifies the issues, as it tends
> to ignore not only the variety of metaphysical assumptions among physicists
> but also the variety and tentativity of Peirce’s own cosmological
> hypotheses. I’m looking forward to further inquiry along the lines Jeff has
> proposed.
>
> Right now the only suggestion I can contribute is that a concept of time
> as a true topological continuum would be independent of scale, while any
> concept of *historical* time does have a fixed scale, which assigns the
> origin of the earth to around 5 billion years ago, the Big Bang to about
> 13.8 billion years ago, etc. You can’t have a scale in a temporal continuum
> without marking events in it and comparing the length of time between
> events, and those marks appear as discontinuities. To visualize an
> explanation of why we can’t locate the origin of “the universe” in
> *continuous* time, I sometimes use the analogy of “zooming in” on a
> representation of the Mandelbrot set: you can zoom in on any region forever
> (or you could if you had infinite computing power) without reaching an
> (“innermost”) end. (I wonder how the possibility of fractal dimensions
> would affect Jeff’s idea about the reduction of dimensions over time.)
>
> I haven’t read the Quanta article yet and have a busy weekend ahead so
> this very rough sketch is all I can offer for awhile.
>
> Gary f.
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Gary

If one reads CSP more carefully, one finds strands of science, especially math 
and chemistry, in almost every sentence. 

The unity of his thinking appears to me to be the bedrocks from which his 
sentences take form.

Almost always, the semiosis of the sin-sign necessarily infers an index, a 
quantifiable INDEX that emerges from the bedrock of mental structures. At 
least, that is how I read the organic roots of the organization of his symbolic 
ordering that beget his natural predications.

Cheers 
Jerry



Sent from my iPad

> On Aug 23, 2019, at 9:29 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> 
> Jon, John, List,
> I don’t see how Peirce’s cosmology, which is essentially metaphysical (i.e. 
> based on logical principles), has any bearing on the Big Bang theory, which 
> is strictly a physical hypothesis testable only by means of physical 
> observations. I suppose Peirce as physicist would have had something to say 
> about the Big Bang, but I don’t think it would necessitate a modification of 
> his cosmology, nor would his cosmology imply a denial that the Big Bang 
> happened at the beginning of the physical universe as we know it.
> Gary f.
>  
> From: Jon Alan Schmidt  
> Sent: 23-Aug-19 09:58
> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang
>  
> John, List:
> 
>  
> 
> JFS:  An amazing event occurred around 13.8 billion years ago.
> 
>  
> 
> Again, that estimated time frame relies on the assumption that the laws of 
> nature have remained essentially unchanged for the entire duration--a 
> presupposition that Peirce rejected in favor of "thorough-going evolutionism" 
> (CP 6.14; 1891), since "law itself requires an explanation" (CP 6.613; 1893).
> 
>  
> 
> JAS:  Peirce's synechism, tychism, and (objective) idealism together conceive 
> the entire universe as fundamentally a semeiosic continuum--a continuum of 
> mind, including matter as "effete mind"
> 
> JFS:  The word 'fundamentally' is inappropriate.  Peirce's hypotheses were 
> vague.  The term 'effete mind' is vague, and his translation of Schelling's 
> term 'erloschene Geist' as "extinct mind" is just as vague ... At best, both 
> terms are colorful metaphors.  Any inferences from them are unsubstantiated 
> speculations.
> 
>  
> 
> Fortunately, Peirce did not leave us with only those terms.  He immediately 
> explained "effete mind" as "inveterate habits becoming physical laws" (CP 
> 6.25, EP 1:293; 1891).  In the previous paragraph, he defined idealism as 
> "the physical law derived and special, the psychical law alone as primordial" 
> (CP 6.24, EP 1:292; 1891).  He elaborated elsewhere that his 
> "Schelling-fashioned idealism ... holds matter to be mere specialized and 
> partially deadened mind" (CP 6.102, EP 1:312; 1892); "that what we call 
> matter is not completely dead, but is merely mind hidebound with habits" (CP 
> 6.158, EP 1:331; 1892); that "physical events are but degraded or undeveloped 
> forms of psychical events ... the phenomena of matter are but the result of 
> the sensibly complete sway of habits upon mind" (CP 6.264, EP 1:348; 1892); 
> that "we must ... regard matter as mind whose habits have become fixed so as 
> to lose the powers of forming them and losing them" (CP 6.101; 1902); and 
> that "matter is nothing but effete mind,--mind so completely under the 
> domination of habit as to act with almost perfect regularity & to have lost 
> its powers of forgetting & of learning" (R 936:3; no date).  All of these 
> passages, especially taken together, make it unmistakably clear that Peirce 
> considered the "stuff" of the universe to be fundamentally mind, from which 
> matter is derived.
> 
>  
> 
> CSP:  Philosophy tries to understand. In so doing, it is committed to the 
> assumption that things are intelligible, that the process of nature and the 
> process of reason are one. (CP 6.581; c. 1905)
> 
>  
> 
> JFS:  Most scientists today would agree with that quotation.  
> 
>  
> 
> Just for the record, Gary F. informed me off-List that the Peirce Edition 
> Project dated that quote to 1890 and included it in W6 accordingly (p. 392).  
> It is not clear why the CP editors thought that Peirce wrote it some 15 years 
> later.
> 
>  
> 
> JFS:  There is a huge amount of speculation about cosmology by scientists, 
> theologians, and people who have backgrounds in both.  They have a century 
> more information than Peirce had.  Yet they can't make any definite claims.
> 
>  
> 
> Of course--again, my interpretation of Peirce is 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Ben Novak]

I wonder whether the following article by Jaime Nubiola may offer some
guidance in the current discussion of Peirce's metaphysics:

https://www.academia.edu/19624309/What_a_Scientific_Metaphysics_Really_Is_According_to_C._S._Peirce


*Ben Novak*
5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142
Telephone: (814) 808-5702
Mobile: (814) 424-8501

*"All art is mortal, **not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts
themselves.* *One day the last portrait of Rembrandt* *and the last bar of
Mozart will have ceased to be—**though possibly a colored canvas and a
sheet of notes may remain—**because the last eye and the last ear
accessible to their message **will have gone." *Oswald Spengler


On Sat, Aug 24, 2019 at 7:48 AM  wrote:

> Jeff, Jon, List,
>
> It’s true that my suggestion of a radical split between the universes of
> discourse of physics and metaphysics oversimplifies the issues, as it tends
> to ignore not only the variety of metaphysical assumptions among physicists
> but also the variety and tentativity of Peirce’s own cosmological
> hypotheses. I’m looking forward to further inquiry along the lines Jeff has
> proposed.
>
> Right now the only suggestion I can contribute is that a concept of time
> as a true topological continuum would be independent of scale, while any
> concept of *historical* time does have a fixed scale, which assigns the
> origin of the earth to around 5 billion years ago, the Big Bang to about
> 13.8 billion years ago, etc. You can’t have a scale in a temporal continuum
> without marking events in it and comparing the length of time between
> events, and those marks appear as discontinuities. To visualize an
> explanation of why we can’t locate the origin of “the universe” in
> *continuous* time, I sometimes use the analogy of “zooming in” on a
> representation of the Mandelbrot set: you can zoom in on any region forever
> (or you could if you had infinite computing power) without reaching an
> (“innermost”) end. (I wonder how the possibility of fractal dimensions
> would affect Jeff’s idea about the reduction of dimensions over time.)
>
> I haven’t read the Quanta article yet and have a busy weekend ahead so
> this very rough sketch is all I can offer for awhile.
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Jeffrey Brian Downard 
> *Sent:* 23-Aug-19 12:46
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang
>
>
>
> Jon S, Gary F, John S, List,
>
>
>
> Peirce engages in inquiries that fall under the headings "cosmological
> metaphysics" and "cosmological physics." (see, for example, CP 6.213,  As
> we know, he is drawing on a number of resources including mathematics,
> phenomenology and semiotics for the sake of directing the inquiries in
> cosmological metaphysics. In turn, those philosophical inquiries are being
> put to the test in physics.
>
>
>
> Both the metaphysical and the physical inquiries in cosmology are
> attempting to address many of the same basic types of questions. What is
> the origin of the universe? What explains the historical development of the
> cosmos? One of the big differences between the two types of inquiries is
> that metaphysics draws on the common observations of ordinary experience,
> while physics draws on special observations in order to put its theories to
> the test.
>
>
>
> As far as I am able to see, most cosmologists--ranging from Aristotle and
> Leibniz to Einstein and Hawking--draw on both philosophical and
> physical resources when framing the key questions and giving shape to their
> leading ideas. For the purposes of a science of review, Peirce thinks it is
> important to separate the two types of inquiry. Otherwise, we will run the
> risk of getting things out of order in ways that might bias and prejudice
> our inquiries.
>
>
>
> Having said that much, I agree with John S in thinking that most of
> Peirce's explanations in his metaphysical and his physical inquiries in
> cosmology have the character of tentative hypothesis. What is more, Peirce
> often seems to be considering a wide range of hypotheses, many of which
> appear to be competing with each other. Some of the metaphysical hypotheses
> fit better with the best physical science of his day, but he is well aware
> that those theories were filled with vague ideas, had enormous gaps,
> and would likely be amended or replaced with better theories as inquiry
> proceeded. We might try to rate the key explanations he offers in
> his metaphysical and physical cosmological theories. For this purpose, we
> might employ the rating system he used in his inquiries in speculative
> grammar.
>
>
>
> With respect to the conceptions employed and conceptual divisions made

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[gnox]

Jeff, Jon, List,

It’s true that my suggestion of a radical split between the universes of 
discourse of physics and metaphysics oversimplifies the issues, as it tends to 
ignore not only the variety of metaphysical assumptions among physicists but 
also the variety and tentativity of Peirce’s own cosmological hypotheses. I’m 
looking forward to further inquiry along the lines Jeff has proposed.

Right now the only suggestion I can contribute is that a concept of time as a 
true topological continuum would be independent of scale, while any concept of 
historical time does have a fixed scale, which assigns the origin of the earth 
to around 5 billion years ago, the Big Bang to about 13.8 billion years ago, 
etc. You can’t have a scale in a temporal continuum without marking events in 
it and comparing the length of time between events, and those marks appear as 
discontinuities. To visualize an explanation of why we can’t locate the origin 
of “the universe” in continuous time, I sometimes use the analogy of “zooming 
in” on a representation of the Mandelbrot set: you can zoom in on any region 
forever (or you could if you had infinite computing power) without reaching an 
(“innermost”) end. (I wonder how the possibility of fractal dimensions would 
affect Jeff’s idea about the reduction of dimensions over time.)

I haven’t read the Quanta article yet and have a busy weekend ahead so this 
very rough sketch is all I can offer for awhile.

Gary f.

 

From: Jeffrey Brian Downard  
Sent: 23-Aug-19 12:46
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

 

Jon S, Gary F, John S, List,

 

Peirce engages in inquiries that fall under the headings "cosmological 
metaphysics" and "cosmological physics." (see, for example, CP 6.213,  As we 
know, he is drawing on a number of resources including mathematics, 
phenomenology and semiotics for the sake of directing the inquiries in 
cosmological metaphysics. In turn, those philosophical inquiries are being put 
to the test in physics.

 

Both the metaphysical and the physical inquiries in cosmology are attempting to 
address many of the same basic types of questions. What is the origin of the 
universe? What explains the historical development of the cosmos? One of the 
big differences between the two types of inquiries is that metaphysics draws on 
the common observations of ordinary experience, while physics draws on special 
observations in order to put its theories to the test.

 

As far as I am able to see, most cosmologists--ranging from Aristotle and 
Leibniz to Einstein and Hawking--draw on both philosophical and physical 
resources when framing the key questions and giving shape to their leading 
ideas. For the purposes of a science of review, Peirce thinks it is important 
to separate the two types of inquiry. Otherwise, we will run the risk of 
getting things out of order in ways that might bias and prejudice our inquiries.

 

Having said that much, I agree with John S in thinking that most of Peirce's 
explanations in his metaphysical and his physical inquiries in cosmology have 
the character of tentative hypothesis. What is more, Peirce often seems to be 
considering a wide range of hypotheses, many of which appear to be competing 
with each other. Some of the metaphysical hypotheses fit better with the best 
physical science of his day, but he is well aware that those theories were 
filled with vague ideas, had enormous gaps, and would likely be amended or 
replaced with better theories as inquiry proceeded. We might try to rate the 
key explanations he offers in his metaphysical and physical cosmological 
theories. For this purpose, we might employ the rating system he used in his 
inquiries in speculative grammar.

 

With respect to the conceptions employed and conceptual divisions made in the 
hypotheses under consideration at his time, we could label them in the 
following way:

 

   i. {d} for {délos}), clear 
apprehension of some, 

 ii. {s} for {schedon}, almost 
clear, 

iii. {m} for {metrios}, and a 
tolerable but not thoroughly tried conception of others

iv. {ch} for {chalepös} hardly 
better than {a}).

 v. {a} for {adélos}an 
unsatisfactory and doubtful notion of others,

 

For my part, I would put a mark of a, ch, m or s to most of the conceptions 
that figure prominently in the hypotheses he offers, I and would put a mark of 
d to only a small number--at least as far as my own understanding of those 
conceptions goes.

 

If we compare Peirce's cosmological hypotheses to those that are under 
consideration today, then we have our work cut out for us. As far as I am able 
to tell, there appear to be a remarkable diversity of cosmologi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

Thank you for this helpful clarification.  We seem to agree that Peirce's
cosmology and contemporary Big Bang cosmology rest on different
metaphysical assumptions, which is what I have been trying to emphasize all
along.  I also agree with you that Peirce's cosmology cannot be reduced to
physics or any other special science.

That said, I think that it would be a mistake to draw too sharp a
distinction between what you called "the logical universe"--i.e., what I
would call the semeiotic or psychical universe--and the physical universe.
In accordance with Peirce's synechism, it is a difference in degree, rather
than kind; and in accordance with his (objective) idealism, the physical
universe is derived and special, while the psychical universe is
primordial.   Hence the principles of the logical/semeiotic/psychical
universe are *more basic* than those of the physical universe, such that
matter in motion *evolves *from mind in thought as inveterate habits become
physical laws.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Fri, Aug 23, 2019 at 11:34 AM  wrote:

> Jon,
>
> All theories in physics, indeed all theories in “special sciences,” rest
> on metaphysical assumptions; that’s what makes them *special sciences*.
> Peirce’s cosmology is not a special science, certainly not a physical
> science. According to Peirce’s metaphysics, based on logical principles (as
> he always said that a scientific metaphysics must be), a discontinuity at
> the “beginning” of the logical universe (whatever that could mean) is a
> contradiction in terms. The Big Bang is a theory about the origin of the
> *physical* universe which rests on the core metaphysical assumptions of
> physics — which Peirce’s cosmology does *not *assume. Hence the
> “universe” of Peirce’s cosmology is not in the same universe of discourse
> as the physical “universe” that putatively began with the Big Bang. I don’t
> think you can logically argue for or against a hypothesis in one universe
> of discourse by drawing on principles belonging to a different universe of
> discourse. That was my point. The implication, as I see it, is that
> Peirce’s cosmology can’t be reduced to physics or any other special science.
>
> Gary f
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *Sent:* 23-Aug-19 11:43
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang
>
>
>
> Gary F., List:
>
> As I have already stated, I do not see how Peirce's synechistic and
> hyperbolic cosmology is compatible with the hypothesis of a singularity
> (discontinuity) at the beginning of the universe, especially since he
> affirmed more than once that time began "infinitely long ago" as whatever
> preceded it--whatever that could mean--"gradually and continuously
> developed into time" (NEM 4:149; 1898).  Moreover, the Big Bang theory is *not
> *testable by means of physical observations, since it rests on an
> untestable *assumption *that the laws of nature have remained essentially
> unchanged ever since almost immediately after the beginning of the
> universe--which, again, Peirce *denied *in accordance with his
> "thorough-going evolutionism."
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
>
>
> On Fri, Aug 23, 2019 at 9:29 AM  wrote:
>
> Jon, John, List,
>
> I don’t see how Peirce’s cosmology, which is essentially metaphysical
> (i.e. based on *logical* principles), has any bearing on the Big Bang
> theory, which is strictly a *physical* hypothesis testable only by means
> of physical observations. I suppose Peirce as physicist would have had
> something to say about the Big Bang, but I don’t think it would necessitate
> a modification of his cosmology, nor would his cosmology imply a denial
> that the Big Bang happened at the beginning of the physical universe as we
> know it.
>
> Gary f.
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jerry LR Chandler]

> On Aug 22, 2019, at 11:04 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> On 8/21/2019 1:18 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>> I suggest that [Peirce] could have offered an argument against
>> [the Big Bang] -- in fact, against any theory that posits a finite
>> age and definite beginning of the universe...
> 
> No.  Peirce insisted on following the evidence.  An amazing event
> occurred around 13.8 billion years ago.  There are many hypotheses
> about what it might have been, but no physicist or astronomer
> seriously claims that it didn't happen.

This claim is not true.

One issue is the nature of time. 

The postulate of the cyclic nature of cosmological events is equally valid, 
according to many.

Cheers

Jerry






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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Edwina Taborsky]

in his inquiries  in speculative grammar. 
With respect to the conceptions employed and conceptual divisions
made in the hypotheses under consideration at his time, we could
label them in the following way: 
i.  {d} for
{délos}), clear apprehension of some,  

  ii. {s} for
{schedon}, almost clear,  

 iii. {m} for
{metrios}, and a tolerable but not thoroughly tried conception of
others 

 iv. {ch} for
{chalepös} hardly better than {a}). 

  v. {a} for
{adélos}an unsatisfactory and doubtful notion of others, 
For my part, I would put a mark of a, ch, m or s to most of the
conceptions that figure prominently in the hypotheses he offers, I
and would put a mark of d to only a small number--at least as far as
my own understanding of those conceptions goes. 
If we compare Peirce's cosmological hypotheses to those that are
under consideration today, then we have our work cut out for us. As
far as I am able to tell, there appear to be a remarkable diversity
of cosmological hypotheses that have been put forward  for
consideration by the community of physical cosmologists. In fact,
there are so many that rest on such widely differing conceptions
(e.g., of the nature of space and time), that it is hard to sort out
the metaphysical assumptions implicit in the competing  hypotheses. 
As such, let's focus our discussion here on two hypotheses:  (a) the
idea that the origin of the universe is in a singularity that changed
abruptly at an event called the Big Bang and (b) the idea that the
origin of the universe involves no such singularity  and that the
evolution of the cosmos from its origins involved a relatively smooth
expansion of space over time. Let us call (a) the Hawking-Penrose
abrupt change hypothesis and (b) the Hartle-Hawking smooth change
hypothesis. Here is a popular summary of  the two. 

https://www.quantamagazine.org/physicists-debate-hawkings-idea-that-the-universe-had-no-beginning-20190606/
 
   Quanta Magazine  www.quantamagazine.org  A recent challenge 
to
Stephen Hawking’s biggest idea — about how the universe might
have come from nothing — has cosmologists choosing sides. 
  For those who are interested, the summary provides a link to the
paper in which Hartle and Hawking formulated (b).
For the sake of comparing Peirce's cosmological hypotheses to (a)
and (b), I'd be interested in looking more closely at the
metaphysical explanations developed the last lecture of RLT. In this
lecture, Peirce draws on mathematical conceptions of continuity  as
they are developed in the topology of his time for the sake of
examining questions about the possible evolution of the dimensions of
space and time from the early origins of the universe. Peirce
formulates a hypothesis that the number of dimensions of the 
universe in its origins may have been infinite. Over time, the number
of dimensions decreased to those we have today. 
How does Peirce's hypothesis compare to (a) and (b) above on the
question of the possible change in the number of dimensions of the
universe as space evolved over time? One interesting suggestion I
have seen in a journal article (that I am not able to locate  at
present) is that the differences between (a) and (b) might not be as
big as they as might appear at first glance. What might appear to be
a discontinuity in (a) as the singularity erupts in a big bang in a
relatively lower-dimensional space, would, in the  framework of a
relatively higher-dimensional space and time, be a continuous process
of change. 
That gives rise to an interesting question:  if there is a change in
the number of dimension of space and time from the origins of the
universe to the present time, what might explain the general
direction of those changes?  
--Jeff 
Jeffrey Downard
 Associate Professor
 Department of Philosophy
 Northern Arizona University
 (o) 928 523-8354   
-
 From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
 Sent: Friday, August 23, 2019 8:42 AM
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang  Gary F.,
List: 
  As I have already stated, I do not see how Peirce's synechistic and
hyperbolic cosmology is compatible with the hypothesis of a
singularity (discontinuity) at the beginning of the universe,
especially since he affirmed more than once that time began
"infinitely  long ago" as whatever preceded it--whatever that could
mean--"gradually and continuously developed into time" (NEM 4:149;
1898).  Moreover, the Big Bang theory is not testable by means of
physical observations, since it rests on an untestable assumption
that the laws of na

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

27;s cosmological hypotheses to (a) and (b), I'd 
be interested in looking more closely at the metaphysical explanations 
developed the last lecture of RLT. In this lecture, Peirce draws on 
mathematical conceptions of continuity as they are developed in the topology of 
his time for the sake of examining questions about the possible evolution of 
the dimensions of space and time from the early origins of the universe. Peirce 
formulates a hypothesis that the number of dimensions of the universe in its 
origins may have been infinite. Over time, the number of dimensions decreased 
to those we have today.


How does Peirce's hypothesis compare to (a) and (b) above on the question of 
the possible change in the number of dimensions of the universe as space 
evolved over time? One interesting suggestion I have seen in a journal article 
(that I am not able to locate at present) is that the differences between (a) 
and (b) might not be as big as they as might appear at first glance. What might 
appear to be a discontinuity in (a) as the singularity erupts in a big bang in 
a relatively lower-dimensional space, would, in the framework of a relatively 
higher-dimensional space and time, be a continuous process of change.


That gives rise to an interesting question:  if there is a change in the number 
of dimension of space and time from the origins of the universe to the present 
time, what might explain the general direction of those changes?


--Jeff






Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Friday, August 23, 2019 8:42 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

Gary F., List:

As I have already stated, I do not see how Peirce's synechistic and hyperbolic 
cosmology is compatible with the hypothesis of a singularity (discontinuity) at 
the beginning of the universe, especially since he affirmed more than once that 
time began "infinitely long ago" as whatever preceded it--whatever that could 
mean--"gradually and continuously developed into time" (NEM 4:149; 1898).  
Moreover, the Big Bang theory is not testable by means of physical 
observations, since it rests on an untestable assumption that the laws of 
nature have remained essentially unchanged ever since almost immediately after 
the beginning of the universe--which, again, Peirce denied in accordance with 
his "thorough-going evolutionism."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Fri, Aug 23, 2019 at 9:29 AM mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>> 
wrote:
Jon, John, List,
I don’t see how Peirce’s cosmology, which is essentially metaphysical (i.e. 
based on logical principles), has any bearing on the Big Bang theory, which is 
strictly a physical hypothesis testable only by means of physical observations. 
I suppose Peirce as physicist would have had something to say about the Big 
Bang, but I don’t think it would necessitate a modification of his cosmology, 
nor would his cosmology imply a denial that the Big Bang happened at the 
beginning of the physical universe as we know it.
Gary f.

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[gnox]

Jon,

All theories in physics, indeed all theories in “special sciences,” rest on 
metaphysical assumptions; that’s what makes them special sciences. Peirce’s 
cosmology is not a special science, certainly not a physical science. According 
to Peirce’s metaphysics, based on logical principles (as he always said that a 
scientific metaphysics must be), a discontinuity at the “beginning” of the 
logical universe (whatever that could mean) is a contradiction in terms. The 
Big Bang is a theory about the origin of the physical universe which rests on 
the core metaphysical assumptions of physics — which Peirce’s cosmology does 
not assume. Hence the “universe” of Peirce’s cosmology is not in the same 
universe of discourse as the physical “universe” that putatively began with the 
Big Bang. I don’t think you can logically argue for or against a hypothesis in 
one universe of discourse by drawing on principles belonging to a different 
universe of discourse. That was my point. The implication, as I see it, is that 
Peirce’s cosmology can’t be reduced to physics or any other special science.

Gary f

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt  
Sent: 23-Aug-19 11:43
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

 

Gary F., List:

As I have already stated, I do not see how Peirce's synechistic and hyperbolic 
cosmology is compatible with the hypothesis of a singularity (discontinuity) at 
the beginning of the universe, especially since he affirmed more than once that 
time began "infinitely long ago" as whatever preceded it--whatever that could 
mean--"gradually and continuously developed into time" (NEM 4:149; 1898).  
Moreover, the Big Bang theory is not testable by means of physical 
observations, since it rests on an untestable assumption that the laws of 
nature have remained essentially unchanged ever since almost immediately after 
the beginning of the universe--which, again, Peirce denied in accordance with 
his "thorough-going evolutionism."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>  
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> 

 

On Fri, Aug 23, 2019 at 9:29 AM mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
> wrote:

Jon, John, List,

I don’t see how Peirce’s cosmology, which is essentially metaphysical (i.e. 
based on logical principles), has any bearing on the Big Bang theory, which is 
strictly a physical hypothesis testable only by means of physical observations. 
I suppose Peirce as physicist would have had something to say about the Big 
Bang, but I don’t think it would necessitate a modification of his cosmology, 
nor would his cosmology imply a denial that the Big Bang happened at the 
beginning of the physical universe as we know it.

Gary f.


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

As I have already stated, I do not see how Peirce's synechistic and
hyperbolic cosmology is compatible with the hypothesis of a singularity
(discontinuity) at the beginning of the universe, especially since he
affirmed more than once that time began "infinitely long ago" as whatever
preceded it--whatever that could mean--"gradually and continuously
developed into time" (NEM 4:149; 1898).  Moreover, the Big Bang theory is *not
*testable by means of physical observations, since it rests on an
untestable *assumption *that the laws of nature have remained essentially
unchanged ever since almost immediately after the beginning of the
universe--which, again, Peirce *denied *in accordance with his
"thorough-going evolutionism."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Aug 23, 2019 at 9:29 AM  wrote:

> Jon, John, List,
>
> I don’t see how Peirce’s cosmology, which is essentially metaphysical
> (i.e. based on *logical* principles), has any bearing on the Big Bang
> theory, which is strictly a *physical* hypothesis testable only by means
> of physical observations. I suppose Peirce as physicist would have had
> something to say about the Big Bang, but I don’t think it would necessitate
> a modification of his cosmology, nor would his cosmology imply a denial
> that the Big Bang happened at the beginning of the physical universe as we
> know it.
>
> Gary f.
>

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[gnox]

Jon, John, List,

I don’t see how Peirce’s cosmology, which is essentially metaphysical (i.e. 
based on logical principles), has any bearing on the Big Bang theory, which is 
strictly a physical hypothesis testable only by means of physical observations. 
I suppose Peirce as physicist would have had something to say about the Big 
Bang, but I don’t think it would necessitate a modification of his cosmology, 
nor would his cosmology imply a denial that the Big Bang happened at the 
beginning of the physical universe as we know it.

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt  
Sent: 23-Aug-19 09:58
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

 

John, List:

 

JFS:  An amazing event occurred around 13.8 billion years ago.

 

Again, that estimated time frame relies on the assumption that the laws of 
nature have remained essentially unchanged for the entire duration--a 
presupposition that Peirce rejected in favor of "thorough-going evolutionism" 
(CP 6.14; 1891), since "law itself requires an explanation" (CP 6.613; 1893).

 

JAS:  Peirce's synechism, tychism, and (objective) idealism together conceive 
the entire universe as fundamentally a semeiosic continuum--a continuum of 
mind, including matter as "effete mind"

JFS:  The word 'fundamentally' is inappropriate.  Peirce's hypotheses were 
vague.  The term 'effete mind' is vague, and his translation of Schelling's 
term 'erloschene Geist' as "extinct mind" is just as vague ... At best, both 
terms are colorful metaphors.  Any inferences from them are unsubstantiated 
speculations.

 

Fortunately, Peirce did not leave us with only those terms.  He immediately 
explained "effete mind" as "inveterate habits becoming physical laws" (CP 6.25, 
EP 1:293; 1891).  In the previous paragraph, he defined idealism as "the 
physical law derived and special, the psychical law alone as primordial" (CP 
6.24, EP 1:292; 1891).  He elaborated elsewhere that his "Schelling-fashioned 
idealism ... holds matter to be mere specialized and partially deadened mind" 
(CP 6.102, EP 1:312; 1892); "that what we call matter is not completely dead, 
but is merely mind hidebound with habits" (CP 6.158, EP 1:331; 1892); that 
"physical events are but degraded or undeveloped forms of psychical events ... 
the phenomena of matter are but the result of the sensibly complete sway of 
habits upon mind" (CP 6.264, EP 1:348; 1892); that "we must ... regard matter 
as mind whose habits have become fixed so as to lose the powers of forming them 
and losing them" (CP 6.101; 1902); and that "matter is nothing but effete 
mind,--mind so completely under the domination of habit as to act with almost 
perfect regularity & to have lost its powers of forgetting & of learning" (R 
936:3; no date).  All of these passages, especially taken together, make it 
unmistakably clear that Peirce considered the "stuff" of the universe to be 
fundamentally mind, from which matter is derived.

 

CSP:  Philosophy tries to understand. In so doing, it is committed to the 
assumption that things are intelligible, that the process of nature and the 
process of reason are one. (CP 6.581; c. 1905)

 

JFS:  Most scientists today would agree with that quotation.  

 

Just for the record, Gary F. informed me off-List that the Peirce Edition 
Project dated that quote to 1890 and included it in W6 accordingly (p. 392).  
It is not clear why the CP editors thought that Peirce wrote it some 15 years 
later.

 

JFS:  There is a huge amount of speculation about cosmology by scientists, 
theologians, and people who have backgrounds in both.  They have a century more 
information than Peirce had.  Yet they can't make any definite claims.

 

Of course--again, my interpretation of Peirce is that the "beginning" itself 
was indefinite, just like any individual mind's "first" cognition of an 
external object.  Such is the nature of any truly continuous process.

 

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

JFS:  An amazing event occurred around 13.8 billion years ago.


Again, that estimated time frame relies on the assumption that the laws of
nature have remained essentially unchanged for the entire duration--a
presupposition that Peirce rejected in favor of "thorough-going
evolutionism" (CP 6.14; 1891), since "law itself requires an explanation"
(CP 6.613; 1893).

JAS:  Peirce's synechism, tychism, and (objective) idealism together
conceive the entire universe as fundamentally a semeiosic continuum--a
continuum of mind, including matter as "effete mind"

JFS:  The word 'fundamentally' is inappropriate.  Peirce's hypotheses were
vague.  The term 'effete mind' is vague, and his translation of Schelling's
term 'erloschene Geist' as "extinct mind" is just as vague ... At best,
both terms are colorful metaphors.  Any inferences from them are
unsubstantiated speculations.


Fortunately, Peirce did not leave us with *only *those terms.  He
immediately explained "effete mind" as "inveterate habits becoming physical
laws" (CP 6.25, EP 1:293; 1891).  In the previous paragraph, he defined
idealism as "the physical law derived and special, the psychical law alone
as primordial" (CP 6.24, EP 1:292; 1891).  He elaborated elsewhere that his
"Schelling-fashioned idealism ... holds matter to be mere specialized and
partially deadened mind" (CP 6.102, EP 1:312; 1892); "that what we call
matter is not completely dead, but is merely mind hidebound with habits"
(CP 6.158, EP 1:331; 1892); that "physical events are but degraded or
undeveloped forms of psychical events ... the phenomena of matter are but
the result of the sensibly complete sway of habits upon mind" (CP 6.264, EP
1:348; 1892); that "we must ... regard matter as mind whose habits have
become fixed so as to lose the powers of forming them and losing them" (CP
6.101; 1902); and that "matter is nothing but effete mind,--mind so
completely under the domination of habit as to act with almost perfect
regularity & to have lost its powers of forgetting & of learning" (R 936:3;
no date).  All of these passages, especially taken together, make it
unmistakably clear that Peirce considered the "stuff" of the universe
to be *fundamentally
*mind, from which matter is *derived*.

CSP:  Philosophy tries to understand. In so doing, it is committed to the
assumption that things are intelligible, that the process of nature and the
process of reason are one. (CP 6.581; c. 1905)

JFS:  Most scientists today would agree with that quotation.


Just for the record, Gary F. informed me off-List that the Peirce Edition
Project dated that quote to 1890 and included it in W6 accordingly (p.
392).  It is not clear why the CP editors thought that Peirce wrote it some
15 years later.

JFS:  There is a huge amount of speculation about cosmology by scientists,
theologians, and people who have backgrounds in both.  They have a century
more information than Peirce had.  Yet they can't make any definite claims.


Of course--again, my interpretation of Peirce is that the "beginning"
itself was indefinite, just like any individual mind's "first" cognition of
an external object.  Such is the nature of any truly *continuous *process.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Aug 22, 2019 at 11:04 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> On 8/21/2019 1:18 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
> > I suggest that [Peirce] could have offered an argument against
> > [the Big Bang] -- in fact, against any theory that posits a finite
> > age and definite beginning of the universe...
>
> No.  Peirce insisted on following the evidence.  An amazing event
> occurred around 13.8 billion years ago.  There are many hypotheses
> about what it might have been, but no physicist or astronomer
> seriously claims that it didn't happen.
>
> > Peirce's synechism, tychism, and (objective) idealism together
> > conceive the entire universe as fundamentally a semeiosic continuum
> > -- a continuum of mind, including matter as "effete mind"
>
> The word 'fundamentally' is inappropriate.  Peirce's hypotheses were
> vague.  The term 'effete mind' is vague, and his translation of
> Schelling's term 'erloschene Geist' as "extinct mind" is just as vague.
>
> The noun 'Geist' could be translated as spirit, mind, psyche, intellect.
> The adjective 'erloschene' could be applied to an extinct volcano,
> a flame that went out, or a family that had no heirs.  That isn't
> much different from the word 'effete', which by etymology means
> not fruitful.  At best, both terms are colorful metaphors.  Any
> inferences from them are unsubstantiated speculations.
>
> > CSP:  Philosophy tries to understand. In so doing, it is committed
> > to the assumption that things are intelligible, that the process
> > of nature and the process of reason are one. (CP 6.581; c. 1905)
>
> Most scientists today would agree with that quo

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[John F Sowa]

On 8/21/2019 1:18 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

I suggest that [Peirce] could have offered an argument against
[the Big Bang] -- in fact, against any theory that posits a finite
age and definite beginning of the universe...


No.  Peirce insisted on following the evidence.  An amazing event
occurred around 13.8 billion years ago.  There are many hypotheses
about what it might have been, but no physicist or astronomer
seriously claims that it didn't happen.


Peirce's synechism, tychism, and (objective) idealism together
conceive the entire universe as fundamentally a semeiosic continuum
-- a continuum of mind, including matter as "effete mind"


The word 'fundamentally' is inappropriate.  Peirce's hypotheses were
vague.  The term 'effete mind' is vague, and his translation of
Schelling's term 'erloschene Geist' as "extinct mind" is just as vague.

The noun 'Geist' could be translated as spirit, mind, psyche, intellect.
The adjective 'erloschene' could be applied to an extinct volcano,
a flame that went out, or a family that had no heirs.  That isn't
much different from the word 'effete', which by etymology means
not fruitful.  At best, both terms are colorful metaphors.  Any
inferences from them are unsubstantiated speculations.


CSP:  Philosophy tries to understand. In so doing, it is committed
to the assumption that things are intelligible, that the process
of nature and the process of reason are one. (CP 6.581; c. 1905)


Most scientists today would agree with that quotation.  The other
quotations by Peirce are reasonable, but none of them contradict
any science of the 20th or 21st c.

In any case, many hypotheses about the Big Bang do not assume that
it originated from nothing.  For example:

 1. Time itself is an emergent property.  The Big Bang is the name
of one boundary of space-time.  Outside that boundary, there is
no time, and the word 'before' is meaningless.

 2. There was a universe before the Big Bang.  But it collapsed in
a Big Crunch -- a gigantic black hole.  But that black hole was
so huge that it was unstable, and it exploded in what we call
the Big Bang.

 3. Our current universe is one component of a multiverse with
an open-ended variety of universes with different values for
the fundamental physical constants.  Most of those universes
are so weird that galaxies and stars as we know them could not
exist, and life as we know it would be impossible.

There is a huge amount of speculation about cosmology by scientists,
theologians, and people who have backgrounds in both.  They have a
century more information than Peirce had.  Yet they can't make any
definite claims.  I strongly endorse a comment that was published
in _Physics Today_:


When it comes to fundamental questions of existence — in this case,
the existence of our universe and its properties — we humans are
like a fish in a bowl trying to figure out the nature of the ocean.
It’s wiser to accept our ignorance with humility and embrace
uncertainty than to claim certainty with blind arrogance and risk
future embarrassment.


This is an excerpt from a book review by Marcelo Gleiser, a professor
of physics and astronomy at Dartmouth College.  See the URL below.

John
_

Book:  _A Fortunate Universe: Life in a Finely Tuned Cosmos_ by
Geraint Lewis and Luke Barnes.

A review of that book by Marcelo Gleiser:
https://physicstoday.scitation.org/doi/full/10.1063/PT.3.3765

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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang (was Objective Idealism and Synechism)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

List:

What might Peirce have said about the Big Bang theory?  As I acknowledged
before, we cannot know for sure; but I suggest that he *could* have offered
an argument *against* it--in fact, against *any* theory that posits a
finite age and definite beginning of the universe--similar to that which he
employed in one of his earliest published writings to deny that there is
any such thing as an *intuition*; i.e., a cognition *not* determined by a
*previous* cognition (CP 5.263, EP 1:26; 1868).  Since Peirce's synechism,
tychism, and (objective) idealism together conceive the entire universe as
fundamentally a *semeiosic *continuum--a continuum of *mind*, including
matter as "effete mind"--presumably the same basic reasoning applies to it.

CSP:  Now let any horizontal line represent a cognition, and let the length
of the line serve to measure (so to speak) the liveliness of consciousness
in that cognition. A point, having no length, will, on this principle,
represent an object quite out of consciousness. Let one horizontal line
below another represent a cognition which determines the cognition
represented by that other and which has the same object as the latter. Let
the finite distance between two such lines represent that they are two
different cognitions. With this aid to thinking, let us see whether "there
must be a first."


Not surprisingly, Peirce describes a *diagram*.  In this one, a line
represents a *distinct* cognition, such that a point represents
something *outside
of* cognition.  Although real cognition is a *continuous* inferential
process, in this exercise--written some four decades before Peirce finally
settled on his "topological" conception of continuity--there will always be
a *finite* distance between different lines representing different
*discrete* cognitions.

CSP (continued):  Suppose an inverted triangle to be gradually dipped into
water. At any date or instant, the surface of the water makes a horizontal
line across that triangle. This line represents a cognition. At a
subsequent date, there is a sectional line so made, higher upon the
triangle. This represents another cognition of the same object determined
by the former, and having a livelier consciousness. The apex of the
triangle represents the object external to the mind which determines both
these cognitions. The state of the triangle before it reaches the water,
represents a state of cognition which contains nothing which determines
these subsequent cognitions.


The inverted triangle represents an individual Quasi-mind, which we can
generalize to the entire universe.  It is never static, but always in
continuous motion downward, just as mind is always in continuous thought.  The
apex entering the water corresponds to the alleged instant when an external
object "first" determines a cognition about it; i.e., the "beginning."

CSP (continued):  To say, then, that if there be a state of cognition by
which all subsequent cognitions of a certain object are not determined,
there must subsequently be some cognition of that object not determined by
previous cognitions of the same object, is to say that when that triangle
is dipped into the water there must be a sectional line made by the surface
of the water lower than which no surface line had been made in that way.
But draw the horizontal line where you will, as many horizontal lines as
you please can be assigned at finite distances below it and below one
another. For any such section is at some distance above the apex, otherwise
it is not a line. Let this distance be *a*. Then there have been similar
sections at the distances 1/2*a*, 1/4*a*, 1/8*a*, 1/16*a*, above the apex,
and so on as far as you please. So that it is not true that there must be a
first.


At the apex itself, there can be no *cognition* yet, because there can be
no one-dimensional *line*--only a dimensionless *point*, which is a
"topical singularity" or discontinuity.  Between that and any line of
finite length, which must be a finite distance above the apex, there is
room for infinitely many shorter lines at proportionally smaller finite
distances.  In fact, according to Peirce's "supermultitudinous" conception
of continuity, there is room for shorter lines *exceeding all multitude*;
and according to his "topological" conception, there is an inexhaustible
supply of *indefinite* lines.  Hence there is no "first" cognition, and the
"beginning" is not a *definite* event.

CSP (continued):  Explicate the logical difficulties of this paradox (they
are identical with those of the Achilles) in whatever way you may. I am
content with the result, as long as your principles are fully applied to
the particular case of cognitions determining one another. Deny motion, if
it seems proper to do so; only then deny the process of determination of
one cognition by another. Say that instants and lines are fictions; only
say, also, that states of cognition and judgments are fictions. The point
here insisted on is not this or tha