subject:"\[PEIRCE\-L\] semantic problem with the term"

 

Helmut - a concept can be formed by an individual. It doesn't have
to be formed by a group. The concept that the  two people are using
is a dynamic object. Yes, their interaction, if there are two people
discussing a common concept,  connects them to the wider community.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Fri 31/03/17  4:26 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  Edwina, The immediate interpretant is internal, but a concept is
formed by a society, which the individuals are parts of. So perhaps
they have access to what is internal of the society? I mean, when eg.
two individuals talk about a common concept, this talk automatically
makes them parts of the community, so the sign that is taking place
in the community is sort of partially transparent for them, so  their
two-persons-sign can be connected with the bigger and slower
community-sign it is part of? Best, Helmut 31. März 2017 um
22:04 Uhr
 Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
 Helmut - you asked: 

Do you think, that also an immediate interpretant and a final one
may become a dynamical object? My guess is, that immediate
interpretants become concepts, dynamical interpretants become
material things, and final interpretants become topics that have
happened or been in the past (all for DynObjs). 

My view is that the Immediate Interpretant is internal and thus,
cannot become a dynamic object, which is external.  I don't see that
an immediate Interpretant is a concept, which is to say, an
intellectual construct. It could be an anticipatory form of what will
be an objective form that is externalizing to be a Dynamic
Interpretant, i.e., similar to an embryo. A dynamical Interpretant
could be a material existentiality and also, a conceptual
existentiality. I see a final interpretant as not a particular but a
general. 

Edwina
 --
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
 largest alternative telecommunications provider.
 http://www.primus.ca [1]
 On Fri 31/03/17 2:46 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:   
List, Jeffrey, I too had problems with that. Now I think, that Peirce
uses the term "habit" in a broader sense: Usually, when I hear or
read "habit" I think of a gradual approximation process. This cannot
be the case with conservation of energy, because exact conservation
cannot be approached: If in all reactions, physical and chemical,
only a little energy was lost or won, then the universe would freeze
or explode in an instant, I guess. A similar problem is the fine
tunedness of constants. But Peircean habit also may be saltatory, and
includes emergences, I guess. "Effete" sounds a bit pejatorive to me,
I rather think of matter as condensed or precipitated mind, but
"effete" I accept for correct of course.   Edwina, you wrote, that a
dynamical interpretant of one sign may work as a dynamical object for
another. Do you think, that also an immediate interpretant and a final
one may become a dynamical object? My guess is, that immediate
interpretants become concepts, dynamical interpretants become
material things, and final interpretants become topics that have
happened or been in the past (all for DynObjs).   Best, Helmut  
31. März 2017 um 17:45 Uhr
 Von: "Jeffrey Brian Downard" 

Edwina, Clark, List, 
Better,  I think, to call the first explanatory principle you quote
from Peirce a hypothesis than an axiom. In addition to being a better
reflection of what Peirce is doing in introducing these grand
explanatory principles into the special sciences from his work in
metaphysics, it will also help to avoid the confusion that might be
caused for people who think about axioms as fundamental rules that
are beyond doubt. 
--Jeff   
Jeffrey Downard
 Associate Professor
 Department of Philosophy
 Northern Arizona University
 (o) 928 523-8354  
-
 From: Edwina Taborsky
 Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 8:11 AM
 To: Peirce-L; CLARK GOBLE
 Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term 

Clark - OK - I'll put in a long comment here on how I see the
non-philosophical aspects of Peirce's work. Thanks for your
encouragement to do so. 
Basic axioms: that our universe operates as
energy-transforming-to-matter, or ‘things’ [Peirce used the term
‘things’ often]  via semiosic actions. 
* 

The emergence of Matter: Peirce: 1.412 “out of the womb of
indeterminacy, we must say that there would have come something, by
the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the
principle of habit there would have been a second flash…..” The
point here is that matter emerged as differentiated and also, as then
connected by habits and by kinetic interaction.
The or

Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-31 Thread Helmut Raulien


Edwina,

The immediate interpretant is internal, but a concept is formed by a society, which the individuals are parts of. So perhaps they have access to what is internal of the society? I mean, when eg. two individuals talk about a common concept, this talk automatically makes them parts of the community, so the sign that is taking place in the community is sort of partially transparent for them, so  their two-persons-sign can be connected with the bigger and slower community-sign it is part of?

Best,

Helmut

 

 31. März 2017 um 22:04 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
 



Helmut - you asked:

Do you think, that also an immediate interpretant and a final one may become a dynamical object? My guess is, that immediate interpretants become concepts, dynamical interpretants become material things, and final interpretants become topics that have happened or been in the past (all for DynObjs).

My view is that the Immediate Interpretant is internal and thus, cannot become a dynamic object, which is external.  I don't see that an immediate Interpretant is a concept, which is to say, an intellectual construct. It could be an anticipatory form of what will be an objective form that is externalizing to be a Dynamic Interpretant, i.e., similar to an embryo. A dynamical Interpretant could be a material existentiality and also, a conceptual existentiality. I see a final interpretant as not a particular but a general.

Edwina
--
This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
largest alternative telecommunications provider.

http://www.primus.ca

On Fri 31/03/17 2:46 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:




List,

Jeffrey, I too had problems with that. Now I think, that Peirce uses the term "habit" in a broader sense: Usually, when I hear or read "habit" I think of a gradual approximation process. This cannot be the case with conservation of energy, because exact conservation cannot be approached: If in all reactions, physical and chemical, only a little energy was lost or won, then the universe would freeze or explode in an instant, I guess. A similar problem is the fine tunedness of constants. But Peircean habit also may be saltatory, and includes emergences, I guess.

"Effete" sounds a bit pejatorive to me, I rather think of matter as condensed or precipitated mind, but "effete" I accept for correct of course.

 

Edwina, you wrote, that a dynamical interpretant of one sign may work as a dynamical object for another. Do you think, that also an immediate interpretant and a final one may become a dynamical object? My guess is, that immediate interpretants become concepts, dynamical interpretants become material things, and final interpretants become topics that have happened or been in the past (all for DynObjs).

 

Best,

Helmut

 

 

 31. März 2017 um 17:45 Uhr
Von: "Jeffrey Brian Downard"

Edwina, Clark, List,

 

Better,  I think, to call the first explanatory principle you quote from Peirce a hypothesis than an axiom. In addition to being a better reflection of what Peirce is doing in introducing these grand explanatory principles into the special sciences from his work in metaphysics, it will also help to avoid the confusion that might be caused for people who think about axioms as fundamental rules that are beyond doubt.

 

--Jeff
 

 

 



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354


 



From: Edwina Taborsky
Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 8:11 AM
To: Peirce-L; CLARK GOBLE
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

 



Clark - OK - I'll put in a long comment here on how I see the non-philosophical aspects of Peirce's work. Thanks for your encouragement to do so.

 

Basic axioms: that our universe operates as energy-transforming-to-matter, or ‘things’ [Peirce used the term ‘things’ often]  via semiosic actions.

 


	
	The emergence of Matter: Peirce: 1.412 “out of the womb of indeterminacy, we must say that there would have come something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the principle of habit there would have been a second flash…..” The point here is that matter emerged as differentiated and also, as then connected by habits and by kinetic interaction. 
	


 

The origin of Material matter: 1.362 “the starting point of the universe, God the Creator is the Absolute First; the terminus of the universe, God completely revealed, is the Absolute Second; every state of the universe at a measurable point of time is the third……..If your creed is that the whole universe is approaching in the infinitely distance future a state having a general character different from that toward which we look back in the infinitely distance past, you make the absolute to consist in two distinct real points and are an evolutionist”

 

I consider the term ‘God’ to be a synonym for Mind. See Peirce’s analysis –

Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

 
 Helmut - you asked: 

Do you think, that also an immediate interpretant and a final one
may become a dynamical object? My guess is, that immediate
interpretants become concepts, dynamical interpretants become
material things, and final interpretants become topics that have
happened or been in the past (all for DynObjs).

My view is that the Immediate Interpretant is internal and thus,
cannot become a dynamic object, which is external.  I don't see that
an immediate Interpretant is a concept, which is to say, an
intellectual construct. It could be an anticipatory form of what will
be an objective form that is externalizing to be a Dynamic
Interpretant, i.e., similar to an embryo. A dynamical Interpretant
could be a material existentiality and also, a conceptual
existentiality. I see a final interpretant as not a particular but a
general.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Fri 31/03/17  2:46 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  List, Jeffrey, I too had problems with that. Now I think, that
Peirce uses the term "habit" in a broader sense: Usually, when I hear
or read "habit" I think of a gradual approximation process. This
cannot be the case with conservation of energy, because exact
conservation cannot be approached: If in all reactions, physical and
chemical, only a little energy was lost or won, then the universe
would freeze or explode in an instant, I guess. A similar problem is
the fine tunedness of constants. But Peircean habit also may be
saltatory, and includes emergences, I guess. "Effete" sounds a bit
pejatorive to me, I rather think of matter as condensed or
precipitated mind, but "effete" I accept for correct of course.  
Edwina, you wrote, that a dynamical interpretant of one sign may work
as a dynamical object for another. Do you think, that also an
immediate interpretant and a final one may become a dynamical object?
My guess is, that immediate interpretants become concepts, dynamical
interpretants become material things, and final interpretants become
topics that have happened or been in the past (all for DynObjs).  
Best, Helmut   31. März 2017 um 17:45 Uhr
 Von: "Jeffrey Brian Downard"  

Edwina, Clark, List, 
Better,  I think, to call the first explanatory principle you quote
from Peirce a hypothesis than an axiom. In addition to being a better
reflection of what Peirce is doing in introducing these grand
explanatory principles into the special sciences from his work in
metaphysics, it will also help to avoid the confusion that might be
caused for people who think about axioms as fundamental rules that
are beyond doubt. 
--Jeff   
Jeffrey Downard
 Associate Professor
 Department of Philosophy
 Northern Arizona University
 (o) 928 523-8354  
-
 From: Edwina Taborsky 
 Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 8:11 AM
 To: Peirce-L; CLARK GOBLE
 Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term 

Clark - OK - I'll put in a long comment here on how I see the
non-philosophical aspects of Peirce's work. Thanks for your
encouragement to do so. 
Basic axioms: that our universe operates as
energy-transforming-to-matter, or ‘things’ [Peirce used the term
‘things’ often]  via semiosic actions. 
* 

The emergence of Matter: Peirce: 1.412 “out of the womb of
indeterminacy, we must say that there would have come something, by
the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the
principle of habit there would have been a second flash…..” The
point here is that matter emerged as differentiated and also, as then
connected by habits and by kinetic interaction.
The origin of Material matter: 1.362 “the starting point of the
universe, God the Creator is the Absolute First; the terminus of the
universe, God completely revealed, is the Absolute Second; every
state of the universe at a measurable point of time is the
third……..If your creed is that the whole universe is approaching
in the infinitely distance future a state having a general character
different from that toward which we look back in the infinitely
distance past, you make the absolute to consist in two distinct real
points and are an evolutionist”  
I consider the term ‘God’ to be a synonym for Mind. See
Peirce’s analysis – and I’ll only refer to a few: 
“Mind is a propositional function of the widest possible universe,
such that its values are the meanings of all signs whose actual
effects are in effective interconnection” [ 4.550]. 
NOTE: I note the term function which to me suggests that Mind is an
action and a process. I note also the term signs which to me cannot
refer simply to the representamen but to the whole articulated triad.

4.551: “Thought is not nece

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

 
 Jeffrey- I understand your point, but please understand that I don't
differentiate these terms with such specificity as do you and many
others.  That is - it would never occur to me, a non-philosophy
person, to define an axiom as 'a fundamental rule that is beyond
doubt'. I just muddle along with viewing it as 'my starting
point'

So- please allow me some 'wiggle room' in the use of these terms. I
am NOT trying to obscure or make a statement..I just don't use terms
the way philosophy experts do.
Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Fri 31/03/17 11:45 AM , Jeffrey Brian Downard
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent:
 Edwina, Clark, List, 
 Better,  I think, to call the first explanatory principle you quote
from Peirce a hypothesis than an axiom. In addition to being a better
reflection of what Peirce is doing in introducing these grand
explanatory principles into the special sciences from his  work in
metaphysics, it will also help to avoid the confusion that might be
caused for people who think about axioms as fundamental rules that
are beyond doubt. 
 --Jeff 
Jeffrey Downard
 Associate Professor
 Department of Philosophy
 Northern Arizona University
 (o) 928 523-8354   
-
 From: Edwina Taborsky 
 Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 8:11 AM
 To: Peirce-L; CLARK GOBLE
 Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term 

Clark - OK - I'll put in a long comment here on how I see the
non-philosophical aspects of Peirce's work. Thanks for your
encouragement to do so. 
Basic axioms: that our universe operates as
energy-transforming-to-matter, or ‘things’ [Peirce used the term
‘things’ often]  via semiosic actions. 
* 

 The emergence of Matter: Peirce: 1.412 “out of the womb of
indeterminacy, we must say that there would have come something, by
the principle  of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the
principle of habit there would have been a second flash…..” The
point here is that matter emerged as differentiated and also, as then
connected by habits and by kinetic interaction.  
The origin of Material matter: 1.362 “the starting point of the
universe, God the Creator is the Absolute First; the terminus of the
universe, God completely revealed,  is the Absolute Second; every
state of the universe at a measurable point of time is the
third……..If your creed is that the whole universe is approaching
in the infinitely distance future a state having a general character
different from that toward which  we look back in the infinitely
distance past, you make the absolute to consist in two distinct real
points and are an evolutionist” 
I consider the term ‘God’ to be a synonym for Mind. See
Peirce’s analysis – and I’ll only refer to a few: 
“Mind is a propositional function of the widest possible universe,
such that its values are the meanings of all signs whose actual
effects are in effective interconnection”  [ 4.550]. 
NOTE: I note the term function which to me suggests that Mind is an
action and a process. I note also the term signs which to me cannot
refer simply to the representamen but to the whole articulated triad.

4.551: “Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It
appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely
physical world”….But as there  cannot be a General without
Instances embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs. “

Note: Sign is capitalized in the original. And Peirce also suggests
being careful lest we set up a “danger that our system may not
represent every variety of non-human thought”. I take this to mean
that his system is intended to represent every variety of non-human
thought – and therefore, one does not require to go FIRST to the
study of human  thought to understand and use Peircean semiosis in
the non-human realm. And I note his comments on protoplasm and
crystals etc – which I won’t repeat here as the post would be too
long - and it's already long enough! 
Therefore, the Absolute First, understood as Feeling, but not the
sensational view of that term, but  as a primeval Will. [Again- I can
find the reference..] 
* 

 The starting point as Symbol: Certainly, one can define this
original Mind as a type of symbol – but not the human understanding
of the term  which puts it in a mode of Thirdness or art-i-factual,
but I  understand it as will, or desire to continuity of that
material existence without the awareness of this existence;  and the
nature of this existence is, as evolutionary, open in its expression.
Therefore it is not an iconic or indexical mode of articulation which
would reject diversity and spontaneity of new forms and complexity
but symbolic in that  the articulation is free and ope

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-31 Thread Helmut Raulien


List,

Jeffrey, I too had problems with that. Now I think, that Peirce uses the term "habit" in a broader sense: Usually, when I hear or read "habit" I think of a gradual approximation process. This cannot be the case with conservation of energy, because exact conservation cannot be approached: If in all reactions, physical and chemical, only a little energy was lost or won, then the universe would freeze or explode in an instant, I guess. A similar problem is the fine tunedness of constants. But Peircean habit also may be saltatory, and includes emergences, I guess.

"Effete" sounds a bit pejatorive to me, I rather think of matter as condensed or precipitated mind, but "effete" I accept for correct of course.

 

Edwina, you wrote, that a dynamical interpretant of one sign may work as a dynamical object for another. Do you think, that also an immediate interpretant and a final one may become a dynamical object? My guess is, that immediate interpretants become concepts, dynamical interpretants become material things, and final interpretants become topics that have happened or been in the past (all for DynObjs).

 

Best,

Helmut

 

 

 31. März 2017 um 17:45 Uhr
Von: "Jeffrey Brian Downard" 

Edwina, Clark, List,

 

Better,  I think, to call the first explanatory principle you quote from Peirce a hypothesis than an axiom. In addition to being a better reflection of what Peirce is doing in introducing these grand explanatory principles into the special sciences from his work in metaphysics, it will also help to avoid the confusion that might be caused for people who think about axioms as fundamental rules that are beyond doubt.

 

--Jeff
 

 

 



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354


 



From: Edwina Taborsky 
Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 8:11 AM
To: Peirce-L; CLARK GOBLE
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

 



Clark - OK - I'll put in a long comment here on how I see the non-philosophical aspects of Peirce's work. Thanks for your encouragement to do so.

 

Basic axioms: that our universe operates as energy-transforming-to-matter, or ‘things’ [Peirce used the term ‘things’ often]  via semiosic actions.

 


	
	The emergence of Matter: Peirce: 1.412 “out of the womb of indeterminacy, we must say that there would have come something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the principle of habit there would have been a second flash…..” The point here is that matter emerged as differentiated and also, as then connected by habits and by kinetic interaction. 
	


 

The origin of Material matter: 1.362 “the starting point of the universe, God the Creator is the Absolute First; the terminus of the universe, God completely revealed, is the Absolute Second; every state of the universe at a measurable point of time is the third……..If your creed is that the whole universe is approaching in the infinitely distance future a state having a general character different from that toward which we look back in the infinitely distance past, you make the absolute to consist in two distinct real points and are an evolutionist”

 

I consider the term ‘God’ to be a synonym for Mind. See Peirce’s analysis – and I’ll only refer to a few:

 

“Mind is a propositional function of the widest possible universe, such that its values are the meanings of all signs whose actual effects are in effective interconnection” [ 4.550].

 

NOTE: I note the term function which to me suggests that Mind is an action and a process. I note also the term signs which to me cannot refer simply to the representamen but to the whole articulated triad.

 

4.551: “Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world”….But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs. “

 

Note: Sign is capitalized in the original. And Peirce also suggests being careful lest we set up a “danger that our system may not represent every variety of non-human thought”. I take this to mean that his system is intended to represent every variety of non-human thought – and therefore, one does not require to go FIRST to the study of human thought to understand and use Peircean semiosis in the non-human realm. And I note his comments on protoplasm and crystals etc – which I won’t repeat here as the post would be too long - and it's already long enough!

 

Therefore, the Absolute First, understood as Feeling, but not the sensational view of that term, but  as a primeval Will. [Again- I can find the reference..]

 


	
	The starting point as Symbol: Certainly, one can define this original Mind as a type of symbol – but not the human understanding of the term which puts it in a mode of Thirdness or art-i-factual, but I  understand it as will, or desire

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-31 Thread Jeffrey Brian Downard

Edwina, Clark, List,


Better,  I think, to call the first explanatory principle you quote from Peirce 
a hypothesis than an axiom. In addition to being a better reflection of what 
Peirce is doing in introducing these grand explanatory principles into the 
special sciences from his work in metaphysics, it will also help to avoid the 
confusion that might be caused for people who think about axioms as fundamental 
rules that are beyond doubt.


--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Edwina Taborsky 
Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 8:11 AM
To: Peirce-L; CLARK GOBLE
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term


Clark - OK - I'll put in a long comment here on how I see the non-philosophical 
aspects of Peirce's work. Thanks for your encouragement to do so.


Basic axioms: that our universe operates as energy-transforming-to-matter, or 
‘things’ [Peirce used the term ‘things’ often]  via semiosic actions.


  1.  The emergence of Matter: Peirce: 1.412 “out of the womb of indeterminacy, 
we must say that there would have come something, by the principle of 
Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the principle of habit there 
would have been a second flash…..” The point here is that matter emerged as 
differentiated and also, as then connected by habits and by kinetic interaction.


The origin of Material matter: 1.362 “the starting point of the universe, God 
the Creator is the Absolute First; the terminus of the universe, God completely 
revealed, is the Absolute Second; every state of the universe at a measurable 
point of time is the third……..If your creed is that the whole universe is 
approaching in the infinitely distance future a state having a general 
character different from that toward which we look back in the infinitely 
distance past, you make the absolute to consist in two distinct real points and 
are an evolutionist”


I consider the term ‘God’ to be a synonym for Mind. See Peirce’s analysis – and 
I’ll only refer to a few:


“Mind is a propositional function of the widest possible universe, such that 
its values are the meanings of all signs whose actual effects are in effective 
interconnection” [ 4.550].


NOTE: I note the term function which to me suggests that Mind is an action and 
a process. I note also the term signs which to me cannot refer simply to the 
representamen but to the whole articulated triad.


4.551: “Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the 
work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world”….But as 
there cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot be 
thought without Signs. “


Note: Sign is capitalized in the original. And Peirce also suggests being 
careful lest we set up a “danger that our system may not represent every 
variety of non-human thought”. I take this to mean that his system is intended 
to represent every variety of non-human thought – and therefore, one does not 
require to go FIRST to the study of human thought to understand and use 
Peircean semiosis in the non-human realm. And I note his comments on protoplasm 
and crystals etc – which I won’t repeat here as the post would be too long - 
and it's already long enough!


Therefore, the Absolute First, understood as Feeling, but not the sensational 
view of that term, but  as a primeval Will. [Again- I can find the reference..]


  1.  The starting point as Symbol: Certainly, one can define this original 
Mind as a type of symbol – but not the human understanding of the term which 
puts it in a mode of Thirdness or art-i-factual, but I  understand it as will, 
or desire to continuity of that material existence without the awareness of 
this existence;  and the nature of this existence is, as evolutionary, open in 
its expression. Therefore it is not an iconic or indexical mode of articulation 
which would reject diversity and spontaneity of new forms and complexity but 
symbolic in that the articulation is free and open.



  2.  I understand these ‘things’ as having, necessarily FORM. The form, which 
sets up a differential boundary, sets matter up in a mode of  Secondness, which 
is stabilized by the habits-of-formation of Thirdness.



I won’t go into the many references to Secondness in Peirce’s work -  since 
there are so many – but it is obvious that matter within a mode of Secondness 
MUST have a differential FORM – or it would be unable to carry out the key 
action of Secondness, which is – to interact.





  1.  The method of this movement from pure Mind [pure energy] to particular 
Matter – is by the triadic process of the Sign, which I understand as 
irreducibly triadic.


“I will sketch a proof that the idea of meaning is irreducible to those of 
quality and reaction. It depends on two main premises. The first is that every 
genuine triadic relation involves meaning

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

 

Clark - OK - I'll put in a long comment here on how I see the
non-philosophical aspects of Peirce's work. Thanks for your
encouragement to do so.
Basic axioms: that our universe operates as
energy-transforming-to-matter, or ‘things’ [Peirce used the term
‘things’ often]  via semiosic actions.
*

The emergence of Matter: Peirce: 1.412 “out of the womb of
indeterminacy, we must say that there would have come something, by
the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the
principle of habit there would have been a second flash…..” The
point here is that matter emerged as differentiated and also, as then
connected by habits and by kinetic interaction. 
The origin of Material matter: 1.362 “the starting point of the
universe, God the Creator is the Absolute First; the terminus of the
universe, God completely revealed, is the Absolute Second; every
state of the universe at a measurable point of time is the
third……..If your creed is that the whole universe is approaching
in the infinitely distance future a state having a general character
different from that toward which we look back in the infinitely
distance past, you make the absolute to consist in two distinct real
points and are an evolutionist”
I consider the term ‘God’ to be a synonym for Mind. See
Peirce’s analysis – and I’ll only refer to a few:
“Mind is a propositional function of the widest possible universe,
such that its values are the meanings of all signs whose actual
effects are in effective interconnection” [ 4.550].
NOTE: I note the term function which to me suggests that Mind is an
action and a process. I note also the term signs which to me cannot
refer simply to the representamen but to the whole articulated triad.
4.551: “Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It
appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely
physical world”….But as there cannot be a General without
Instances embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs. “
Note: Sign is capitalized in the original. And Peirce also suggests
being careful lest we set up a “danger that our system may not
represent every variety of non-human thought”. I take this to mean
that his system is intended to represent every variety of non-human
thought – and therefore, one does not require to go FIRST to the
study of human thought to understand and use Peircean semiosis in the
non-human realm. And I note his comments on protoplasm and crystals
etc – which I won’t repeat here as the post would be too long -
and it's already long enough!
Therefore, the Absolute First, understood as Feeling, but not the
sensational view of that term, but  as a primeval Will. [Again- I can
find the reference..]
*

The starting point as Symbol: Certainly, one can define this
original Mind as a type of symbol – but not the human understanding
of the term which puts it in a mode of Thirdness or art-i-factual, but
I  understand it as will, or desire to continuity of that material
existence without the awareness of this existence;  and the nature of
this existence is, as evolutionary, open in its expression. Therefore
it is not an iconic or indexical mode of articulation which would
reject diversity and spontaneity of new forms and complexity but
symbolic in that the articulation is free and open. 
*

I understand these ‘things’ as having, necessarily FORM. The
form, which sets up a differential boundary, sets matter up in a mode
of  Secondness, which is stabilized by the habits-of-formation of
Thirdness.
I won’t go into the many references to Secondness in Peirce’s
work -  since there are so many – but it is obvious that matter
within a mode of Secondness MUST have a differential FORM – or it
would be unable to carry out the key action of Secondness, which is
– to interact.
*

The method of this movement from pure Mind [pure energy] to
particular Matter – is by the triadic process of the Sign, which I
understand as irreducibly triadic. 
“I will sketch a proof that the idea of meaning is irreducible to
those of quality and reaction. It depends on two main premises. The
first is that every genuine triadic relation involves meaning, as
meaning is obviously a triadic relation. The second is that a triadic
relation is inexpressible by means of dyadic relations alone”. 1.345
Now – with regard to the above, my interpretation is that pure
Mind in that mode of Firstness or potentiality – transforming to
matter is an ‘act of meaning’. And, Peirce says that such a
method of so doing is triadic. It must involve three ‘nodes’  so
to speak: the Object-Representamen-Interpretant’. Then, I am aware
that many on this list understand the semiosic action as ‘the
sign/representamen’ in a relation with the Object and the
Interpretant. I reject this interpretation for two reasons. First –
the interaction  of the Representamen-Object can be and u

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 Jon, list

The psychical law i.e., Mind, is primordial and 'matter is effete
mind' - but - this Mind is not human mind, but that basic natural
'primordial mind' which seeks or wills, so to speak, itself into
existentiality by becoming matter - which it does via continuous
actions of semiosis.

Philosophy, to my understanding, focuses on the actions of the human
mind not the natural mind. The human mind articulates itself primarily
in man-made artifacts; i.e., in language, in observable or existential
beliefs and behaviour, in various artifactual images. The natural Mind
articulates itself in matter - which is almost but not as complex in
form and in networked interaction, in informational processing. I see
the human aspects of Mind-to-Matter as a more complex mode than the
natural mode. 

I honestly don't see that one has to take the philosophical or
human-mind facets of this great Mind-becoming-matter into account
when discussing the natural-facets of Mind-becoming-matter. I think
one can legitimately examine Peircean semiosis actions in
Mind-becoming-Matter in the natural world without moving on to the
more complex human mind semiosic actions. 

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Thu 30/03/17  5:38 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, Clark, List:
 One thing that I am curious about is whether it is feasible to
follow Peirce's lead in expanding the scope of semeiosis from human
cognition to the physico-chemical and biological realms, without
maintaining Peirce's distinctive metaphysics of objective
idealism--"the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law
alone as primordial," such that "matter is effete mind, inveterate
habits becoming physical laws" (CP 6.24-25).  In other words, I am
not sure that we can fruitfully separate his scientific thought and
its contemporary implications from his philosophical thought and its
contemporary implications, or intelligibly discuss the former without
taking the latter into account. 
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] 
 On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 4:15 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Clark - thanks for your comments - and they are indeed very valid.
What I'd like to see, in discussions on the Peirce list, is an
expansion of his work from the focus on human cognition - to the
physico-chemical and biological realms. Peirce himself used his
semiosis in those realms but it doesn't get discussed on this list,
which seems to be 95% made up of those focused strictly on philosophy
and philosophers - and human cognition. 

So- given the make-up of the posters on this list and their interest
[in philosophy] then, I don't see the point of bringing up the 
non-philosophical focus of Peirce's work.  

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca [4] 
 On Thu 30/03/17  5:04 PM , CLARK GOBLE cl...@lextek.com [5] sent:
 On Mar 30, 2017, at 8:35 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

 I don't see the point of outlining my research on this list - as
I'd get reactions of 'Peirce didn't say that!' and 'That's
Taborsky-semiotics and it's not Pure Peirce!...I think my point was
just that what gets discussed is largely determined by the list
members. If we don’t like what’s being discussed we can start new
discussions. 
 I’ll confess that many of the discussions the past year I didn’t
find that interesting, although I occasionally chimed in here and
there on say the religion topic. Partially because it was just
something I was fairly ignorant on. So I like learning things I
don’t know. Sometimes they end up being helpful in unexpected ways
with my own pursuits. 
 I’ve started a few topics myself including the question of the
metaphysical nature of truth in Peirce.
 But there’s definitely other topics I’m interested in. One that
someone brought up was what it means to equate two signs. I’d add
what does it mean to repeat a sign, particularly relative to the
index and icon parts of the sign. This is actually a big topic in
Continental philosophy in the 1960’s especially by figures like
Derrida and Deleuze. 
 If you have other topics I’m game. I wouldn’t mind going back to
the reading we did on natural propositions a year or so ago. There
were parts of that discussion I wasn’t able to join in on due to
time demands that I still have questions about.
 I also am studying more typical epistemological questions in a
Peircean framework. It’s an interesting question to me since of
course traditional epistemology is again a more static analysis of
justification at the time of knowledge.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-30 Thread CLARK GOBLE

> On Mar 30, 2017, at 3:15 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> So- given the make-up of the posters on this list and their interest [in 
> philosophy] then, I don't see the point of bringing up the  non-philosophical 
> focus of Peirce's work.

I should note that while my own interests are primarily philosophical, my 
background is actual primarily physics not philosophy. I enjoy the 
non-philosophical topics quite a bit although I often don’t know enough about 
the topic to say much. I’ve brought up some of the non-philosophical topics 
here before too such as the relationship of category theory in advanced physics 
or mathematics as it relates to Peirce. Not that I know much about category 
theory, but a few others made comments I learned from.

So I am actually pretty interesting in the applied semiotics. Indeed while my 
interests are primarily philosophical I’ve read a reasonable amount on applies 
semiotics in various arenas.

I seem to remember a discussion a few months ago on political implications of 
Peirce’s thought. I focused primarily on his more conservative tendencies in 
his critical common sensism but also the focus on inquiry.

Anyway, please comment on the non-philosophical points. Even if I don’t 
typically comment I frequently read them.

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Edwina, Clark, List:

One thing that I am curious about is whether it is feasible to follow
Peirce's lead in expanding the scope of semeiosis from human cognition to
the physico-chemical and biological realms, *without *maintaining Peirce's
distinctive metaphysics of objective idealism--"the physical law as derived
and special, the psychical law alone as primordial," such that "matter is
effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws" (CP 6.24-25).  In
other words, I am not sure that we can fruitfully separate his scientific
thought and its contemporary implications from his philosophical thought
and its contemporary implications, or intelligibly discuss the former
without taking the latter into account.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 4:15 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Clark - thanks for your comments - and they are indeed very valid. What
> I'd like to see, in discussions on the Peirce list, is an expansion of his
> work from the focus on human cognition - to the physico-chemical and
> biological realms. Peirce himself used his semiosis in those realms but it
> doesn't get discussed on this list, which seems to be 95% made up of those
> focused strictly on philosophy and philosophers - and human cognition.
>
> So- given the make-up of the posters on this list and their interest [in
> philosophy] then, I don't see the point of bringing up the
>  non-philosophical focus of Peirce's work.
>
> Edwina
> --
> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
> largest alternative telecommunications provider.
>
> http://www.primus.ca
>
> On Thu 30/03/17 5:04 PM , CLARK GOBLE cl...@lextek.com sent:
>
> On Mar 30, 2017, at 8:35 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>
> I don't see the point of outlining my research on this list - as I'd get
> reactions of 'Peirce didn't say that!' and 'That's Taborsky-semiotics and
> it's not Pure Peirce!...
>
> I think my point was just that what gets discussed is largely determined
> by the list members. If we don’t like what’s being discussed we can start
> new discussions.
>
> I’ll confess that many of the discussions the past year I didn’t find that
> interesting, although I occasionally chimed in here and there on say the
> religion topic. Partially because it was just something I was fairly
> ignorant on. So I like learning things I don’t know. Sometimes they end up
> being helpful in unexpected ways with my own pursuits.
>
> I’ve started a few topics myself including the question of the
> metaphysical nature of truth in Peirce.
>
> But there’s definitely other topics I’m interested in. One that someone
> brought up was what it means to equate two signs. I’d add what does it mean
> to repeat a sign, particularly relative to the index and icon parts of the
> sign. This is actually a big topic in Continental philosophy in the 1960’s
> especially by figures like Derrida and Deleuze.
>
> If you have other topics I’m game. I wouldn’t mind going back to the
> reading we did on natural propositions a year or so ago. There were parts
> of that discussion I wasn’t able to join in on due to time demands that I
> still have questions about.
>
> I also am studying more typical epistemological questions in a Peircean
> framework. It’s an interesting question to me since of course traditional
> epistemology is again a more static analysis of justification at the time
> of knowledge. There are problems with that. But if we switch to a more
> Peircean focus on inquiry, what is the place of those more traditional
> epistemological justifications?
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Clark - thanks for your comments - and they are indeed very valid.
What I'd like to see, in discussions on the Peirce list, is an
expansion of his work from the focus on human cognition - to the
physico-chemical and biological realms. Peirce himself used his
semiosis in those realms but it doesn't get discussed on this list,
which seems to be 95% made up of those focused strictly on philosophy
and philosophers - and human cognition.

So- given the make-up of the posters on this list and their interest
[in philosophy] then, I don't see the point of bringing up the
non-philosophical focus of Peirce's work.

Edwina
--
This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
largest alternative telecommunications provider.
http://www.primus.ca
On Thu 30/03/17 5:04 PM , CLARK GOBLE cl...@lextek.com sent:
On Mar 30, 2017, at 8:35 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
I don't see the point of outlining my research on this list - as
I'd get reactions of 'Peirce didn't say that!' and 'That's
Taborsky-semiotics and it's not Pure Peirce!...
I think my point was just that what gets discussed is largely
determined by the list members. If we don’t like what’s being
discussed we can start new discussions.
I’ll confess that many of the discussions the past year I didn’t
find that interesting, although I occasionally chimed in here and
there on say the religion topic. Partially because it was just
something I was fairly ignorant on. So I like learning things I
don’t know. Sometimes they end up being helpful in unexpected ways
with my own pursuits.
I’ve started a few topics myself including the question of the
metaphysical nature of truth in Peirce.
But there’s definitely other topics I’m interested in. One that
someone brought up was what it means to equate two signs. I’d add
what does it mean to repeat a sign, particularly relative to the
index and icon parts of the sign. This is actually a big topic in
Continental philosophy in the 1960’s especially by figures like
Derrida and Deleuze.
If you have other topics I’m game. I wouldn’t mind going back to
the reading we did on natural propositions a year or so ago. There
were parts of that discussion I wasn’t able to join in on due to
time demands that I still have questions about.
I also am studying more typical epistemological questions in a
Peircean framework. It’s an interesting question to me since of
course traditional epistemology is again a more static analysis of
justification at the time of knowledge. There are problems with that.
But if we switch to a more Peircean focus on inquiry, what is the
place of those more traditional epistemological justifications?

Links:
--
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-30 Thread CLARK GOBLE

> On Mar 30, 2017, at 8:35 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> I don't see the point of outlining my research on this list - as I'd get 
> reactions of 'Peirce didn't say that!' and 'That's Taborsky-semiotics and 
> it's not Pure Peirce!...
> 

I think my point was just that what gets discussed is largely determined by the 
list members. If we don’t like what’s being discussed we can start new 
discussions. 

I’ll confess that many of the discussions the past year I didn’t find that 
interesting, although I occasionally chimed in here and there on say the 
religion topic. Partially because it was just something I was fairly ignorant 
on. So I like learning things I don’t know. Sometimes they end up being helpful 
in unexpected ways with my own pursuits.

I’ve started a few topics myself including the question of the metaphysical 
nature of truth in Peirce.

But there’s definitely other topics I’m interested in. One that someone brought 
up was what it means to equate two signs. I’d add what does it mean to repeat a 
sign, particularly relative to the index and icon parts of the sign. This is 
actually a big topic in Continental philosophy in the 1960’s especially by 
figures like Derrida and Deleuze.

If you have other topics I’m game. I wouldn’t mind going back to the reading we 
did on natural propositions a year or so ago. There were parts of that 
discussion I wasn’t able to join in on due to time demands that I still have 
questions about.

I also am studying more typical epistemological questions in a Peircean 
framework. It’s an interesting question to me since of course traditional 
epistemology is again a more static analysis of justification at the time of 
knowledge. There are problems with that. But if we switch to a more Peircean 
focus on inquiry, what is the place of those more traditional epistemological 
justifications?
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: RE: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Edwina, John C., List:

As I already pointed out, according to that quotation, every
Sign/Representamen *has *an Object and *determines* an Interpretant; hence
these are three *distinct *subjects, not three *parts *(or "nodes") of the
Sign *itself*.  Here is a passage that makes this even clearer.

CSP:  A *Representamen *is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the
Second Correlate being termed its *Object*, and the possible Third
Correlate being termed its *Interpretant*, by which triadic relation the
possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same
triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. A
*Sign* is a Representamen of which some Interpretant is a cognition of
mind. Signs are the only representamens that have been much studied. (EP
2:290-291, emphases in original; 1903)

A Sign indeed *functions*, and does so triadically (EP 2:429; 1907).  We
might even say that it *has *the function of standing *for *its Object *to *its
Interpretant (CP 2.228; c. 1897).  However, neither of these expressions is
the same thing as saying that it *is *a function; i.e., the kind of thing
that simply processes input to generate output.  Notice also that Peirce
twice characterized the Interpretant as "possible," which bears on
something that Clark Goble and I were discussing in another thread; here is
a second passage that touches on that.

CSP:  Namely, while no Representamen *actually *functions as such until it
*actually *determines an Interpretant, yet it becomes a Representamen as
soon as it is fully *capable *of doing this; and its Representative Quality
is not necessarily dependent upon its ever *actually *determining an
Interpretant, nor even upon its *actually *having an Object. (CP 2.275,
emphases added; c. 1902)

My understanding is thus that every Sign/Representamen has an
*Immediate *Object
and determines an *Immediate *Interpretant, because those are
real possibilities that are *internal *to it; but evidently there might be
such a thing as a Sign/Representamen that has no *Dynamic *Object and/or
(especially) determines no *Dynamic *Interpretant, because those are
*external *to it.  I wonder if recognizing these distinctions
(possible/actual and internal/external) could be a way to reconcile "the
Sign as triad" (with Immediate Object/Interpretant) and "the Sign as one
correlate of a triadic relation" (with Dynamic Object/Interpretant).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 3:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Yes, agreed, there are many places where Peirce is using the term 'sign'
> to refer to the 'representamen'. And the Interpretant can become a
> sign/representamen with the original sign as its object. Yes -  in that
> case, the triad would be the object. In my reading of Peirce - that is
> exactly what happens: a full triad becomes an Object. That is how things
> develop, adapt and evolve in the Peircean framework.
>
> That is, there is no such thing as an existentially separate Dynamic
> Object, or an existentially separate Representamen or an existentially
> separate Interpretant. They are, in their definitions and functions of
> DO/R/DI, operating as such only in that triadic interaction. And that is
> the case even if they are each in a mode of Secondness.
>
> Something that is existentially separate in the sense that it is
> observationally differentiated from an Other - does not mean that it
> is semiosically separate. I can't think of a single thing that would be
> semiosically separate - and that includes even a grain of sand.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Thu 30/03/17 4:10 PM , John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za sent:
>
> That is the way I understood the quote, Edwina, though there are certainly
> many places where Peirce uses “sign” as a synonym for representamen. One of
> the problems I have with sign used this way in all cases is that the
> interpretant can be a sign with the original sign its object. The only way
> I have been able to diagram this is with the triad as the object. But maybe
> that is just my lack of imagination.
>
>
>
> John
>
>
>
> John Collier
>
> Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
>
> Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
>
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>
>
>
> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
> Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 9:23 PM
> To: John Collier
> Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
>
> John - thanks for the quotation.
>
> I fully agree. The Peircean framework is irreducibly  triadic. As he
> writes, "Every sign has an object" and it

Re: RE: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

 
 Yes, agreed, there are many places where Peirce is using the term
'sign' to refer to the 'representamen'. And the Interpretant can
become a sign/representamen with the original sign as its object. Yes
-  in that case, the triad would be the object. In my reading of
Peirce - that is exactly what happens: a full triad becomes an
Object. That is how things develop, adapt and evolve in the Peircean
framework. 

That is, there is no such thing as an existentially separate Dynamic
Object, or an existentially separate Representamen or an existentially
separate Interpretant. They are, in their definitions and functions of
DO/R/DI, operating as such only in that triadic interaction. And that
is the case even if they are each in a mode of Secondness. 

Something that is existentially separate in the sense that it is
observationally differentiated from an Other - does not mean that it
is semiosically separate. I can't think of a single thing that would
be semiosically separate - and that includes even a grain of sand.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Thu 30/03/17  4:10 PM , John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za sent:
That is the way I understood the quote, Edwina, though there are
certainly many places where Peirce uses “sign” as a synonym for
representamen.  One of the problems I have with sign used this way in
all cases is that the interpretant can be a sign with the original
sign its object. The only way I have been able to diagram this is
with the triad as the object. But maybe that is just my lack of
imagination. 
John 
John Collier 

Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate 

Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal 

http://web.ncf.ca/collier [1] 
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
 Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 9:23 PM
 To: John Collier 
 Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term  

John - thanks for the quotation.  

I fully agree. The Peircean framework is irreducibly  triadic. As he
writes, "Every sign has an object" and it is "essential to the
function of a sign that it should determine an Interpretant". 
Therefore - the  sign is, even to exist as such, triadic. It must
have that object. And, to function as a sign [gosh - does a sign
FUNCTION?]...it must have an Interpretant. Otherwise - it isn't a
sign, even all by itself. 
That's why I acknowledge the triad as a distinct entity [Sign] -
because none of these 'parts' exist 'per se' on their own, but only
within the FUNCTION of the triad.  
Edwina 
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca [2] 
 On Thu 30/03/17 11:59 AM , John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za [3]
sent:  

I am not very keen on multiple universes, though I readily admit
different metaphysical categories. But I think any deep difference is
just talk. 
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com [4]] 
 Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 3:33 PM
 To: John Collier 
 Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu [5]
 Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term   
John C., List:  
[John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be
confusing. 
Perhaps I missed them, but I am not aware of any passages where
Peirce used "sign" to mean a "triad" or a "triadic function" that
consists of the representamen, object, and interpretant.  If there
are such passages, I would be grateful for the citations so that I
can take a look at them.  Would you at least agree that Peirce
predominantly used "sign" in the way that I am advocating? 
[John Collier] I think the following undated passage in which Peirce
refers to the sign as the most characteristic form of thirdness is
hard to understand if the sign meant here is the representamen 
alone. It is essential to being a sign that it have an object and
interpretant. I take this as meaning that it is part of their nature
to be triadic. I agree that Peirce mostly used “sign” to mean the
iconic representamen. This issue was discussed on the list  some time
ago. 
Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness, and the Reducibility of Fourthness
[R] | MS [R] 914:5-6 

 The most characteristic form of thirdness is that of a sign; and it
is shown that every cognition is of the nature of a sign. Every sign
has an object, which may be regarded either as it is immediately
represented  in the sign to be [or] as it is in it own firstness. It
is equally essential to the function of a sign that it should
determine an Interpretant, or second correlate related to the object
of the sign as the s

Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-30 Thread Jerry Rhee

The very word *means *signifies something which is in the middle between
two others. Moreover, this third state of mind, or Thought, is a sense of
learning, and learning is the means by which we pass from ignorance to
knowledge.



There are three kinds of signs.



Firstly, there are *likenesses,* or *icons*

Secondly, there are *indications,* or *indices*

Thirdly, there are* symbols,* or general signs


*Let us consider the various uses of these three kinds of signs more
closely.*



Symbols grow. They come into being by development out of other signs,
particularly from likenesses or from mixed signs partaking of the nature of
likenesses and symbols. We think only in signs. These mental signs are of
mixed nature; the symbol-parts of them are called concepts.

https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/peirce1.htm



1) *Symbols* which directly determine only their *grounds* or imputed
qualities, and *are* thus but sums of marks or *terms*;


2) *Symbols* which also independently determine their *objects* by means of
other term or terms, and thus, expressing their own objective validity,
become capable of truth or falsehood, that is, *are* *propositions*; and,


3) *Symbols* which also independently determine their *interpretants*, and
thus the minds to which they appeal, by premissing a proposition or
propositions which such a mind is to admit. These *are* *arguments*.

http://www.peirce.org/writings/p32.html


Of course, a Peircean who knew of what Peirce meant would already know this
and everyone else would be a fool.



Best,
Jerry R

On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 3:10 PM, John Collier  wrote:

> That is the way I understood the quote, Edwina, though there are certainly
> many places where Peirce uses “sign” as a synonym for representamen. One of
> the problems I have with sign used this way in all cases is that the
> interpretant can be a sign with the original sign its object. The only way
> I have been able to diagram this is with the triad as the object. But maybe
> that is just my lack of imagination.
>
>
>
> John
>
>
>
> John Collier
>
> Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
>
> Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
>
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>
>
>
> *From:* Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
> *Sent:* Thursday, 30 March 2017 9:23 PM
> *To:* John Collier 
> *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
>
>
>
> John - thanks for the quotation.
>
> I fully agree. The Peircean framework is irreducibly  triadic. As he
> writes, "Every sign has an object" and it is "essential to the function
> of a sign that it should determine an *Interpretant".*  Therefore - the
> sign is, even to exist as such, triadic. It must *have* that object. And,
> to *function as a sign* [gosh - does a sign FUNCTION?]...it must have an
> Interpretant. Otherwise - it isn't a sign, even all by itself.
>
>
>
> That's why I acknowledge the triad as a distinct entity [Sign] - because
> none of these 'parts' exist 'per se' on their own, but only within the
> FUNCTION of the triad.
>
>
>
>
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --
> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
> largest alternative telecommunications provider.
>
> http://www.primus.ca
>
> *On Thu 30/03/17 11:59 AM , John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za
>  sent:*
>
> I am not very keen on multiple universes, though I readily admit different
> metaphysical categories. But I think any deep difference is just talk.
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com
> ]
> *Sent:* Thursday, 30 March 2017 3:33 PM
> *To:* John Collier
> *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
>
>
>
> John C., List:
>
>
>
> *[John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be confusing.*
>
>
>
> Perhaps I missed them, but I am not aware of any passages where Peirce
> used "sign" to mean a "triad" or a "triadic function" that *consists of*
> the representamen, object, and interpretant.  If there are such passages, I
> would be grateful for the citations so that I can take a look at them.
> Would you at least agree that Peirce *predominantly *used "sign" in the
> way that I am advocating?
>
>
>
> *[John Collier] I think the following undated passage in which Peirce
> refers to the sign as the most characteristic form of thirdness is hard to
> understand if the sign meant here is the representamen alone. It is
> essential to being a sign that it have an object and interpretant. I take
> this as meaning that it is part of th

RE: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-30 Thread John Collier

That is the way I understood the quote, Edwina, though there are certainly many 
places where Peirce uses “sign” as a synonym for representamen. One of the 
problems I have with sign used this way in all cases is that the interpretant 
can be a sign with the original sign its object. The only way I have been able 
to diagram this is with the triad as the object. But maybe that is just my lack 
of imagination.

John

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 9:23 PM
To: John Collier 
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term


John - thanks for the quotation.

I fully agree. The Peircean framework is irreducibly  triadic. As he writes, 
"Every sign has an object" and it is "essential to the function of a sign that 
it should determine an Interpretant".  Therefore - the sign is, even to exist 
as such, triadic. It must have that object. And, to function as a sign [gosh - 
does a sign FUNCTION?]...it must have an Interpretant. Otherwise - it isn't a 
sign, even all by itself.



That's why I acknowledge the triad as a distinct entity [Sign] - because none 
of these 'parts' exist 'per se' on their own, but only within the FUNCTION of 
the triad.





Edwina






--
This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
largest alternative telecommunications provider.

http://www.primus.ca

On Thu 30/03/17 11:59 AM , John Collier 
colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za> sent:
I am not very keen on multiple universes, though I readily admit different 
metaphysical categories. But I think any deep difference is just talk.

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 3:33 PM
To: John Collier
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

John C., List:

[John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be confusing.

Perhaps I missed them, but I am not aware of any passages where Peirce used 
"sign" to mean a "triad" or a "triadic function" that consists of the 
representamen, object, and interpretant.  If there are such passages, I would 
be grateful for the citations so that I can take a look at them.  Would you at 
least agree that Peirce predominantly used "sign" in the way that I am 
advocating?

[John Collier] I think the following undated passage in which Peirce refers to 
the sign as the most characteristic form of thirdness is hard to understand if 
the sign meant here is the representamen alone. It is essential to being a sign 
that it have an object and interpretant. I take this as meaning that it is part 
of their nature to be triadic. I agree that Peirce mostly used “sign” to mean 
the iconic representamen. This issue was discussed on the list some time ago.

Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness, and the Reducibility of Fourthness [R] | MS 
[R] 914:5-6
The most characteristic form of thirdness is that of a sign; and it is shown 
that every cognition is of the nature of a sign. Every sign has an object, 
which may be regarded either as it is immediately represented in the sign to be 
[or] as it is in it own firstness. It is equally essential to the function of a 
sign that it should determine an Interpretant, or second correlate related to 
the object of the sign as the sign is itself related to that object; and this 
interpretant may be regarded as the sign represents it to be, as it is in its 
pure secondness to the object, and as it is in its own firstness. Upon these 
considerations are founded six trichotomic divisions of signs…


John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

 

John - thanks for the quotation. 

I fully agree. The Peircean framework is irreducibly  triadic. As he
writes, "Every sign has an object" and it is "essential to the
function of a sign that it should determine an Interpretant". 
Therefore - the sign is, even to exist as such, triadic. It must have
that object. And, to function as a sign [gosh - does a sign
FUNCTION?]...it must have an Interpretant. Otherwise - it isn't a
sign, even all by itself.
That's why I acknowledge the triad as a distinct entity [Sign] -
because none of these 'parts' exist 'per se' on their own, but only
within the FUNCTION of the triad. 
Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Thu 30/03/17 11:59 AM , John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za sent:
I am not very keen on multiple universes, though I readily admit
different metaphysical categories. But I think any deep difference 
is just talk. 
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
 Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 3:33 PM
 To: John Collier 
 Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term   
John C., List:  
[John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be
confusing. 
Perhaps I missed them, but I am not aware of any passages where
Peirce used "sign" to mean a "triad" or a "triadic function" that
consists of the representamen, object, and interpretant.  If there
are such passages, I would be grateful for the citations so that I
can take a look at them.  Would you at least agree that Peirce
predominantly used "sign" in the way that I am advocating? 
[John Collier] I think the following undated passage in which Peirce
refers to the sign as the most characteristic form of thirdness is
hard to understand  if the sign meant here is the representamen
alone. It is essential to being a sign that it have an object and
interpretant. I take this as meaning that it is part of their nature
to be triadic. I agree that Peirce mostly used “sign” to mean the
iconic representamen.  This issue was discussed on the list some time
ago. 
Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness, and the Reducibility of Fourthness
[R] | MS  [R] 914:5-6 

 The most characteristic form of thirdness is that of a sign; and it
is shown that every cognition is of the nature of a sign. Every sign
has an object,  which may be regarded either as it is immediately
represented in the sign to be [or] as it is in it own firstness. It
is equally essential to the function of a sign that it should
determine an Interpretant, or second  correlate related to the object
of the sign as the sign is itself related to that object; and this
interpretant may be regarded as the sign represents it to be, as it
is in its pure secondness to the object, and as it is in its own
firstness. Upon these  considerations are founded six trichotomic
divisions of signs… 
John Collier 

Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate 

Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal 

http://web.ncf.ca/collier [1] 


Links:
--
[1] http://web.ncf.ca/collier

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Jeff, List:

Thanks for once again giving all of us this important reminder.  It
probably goes without saying that my focus tends to be on #1; after all,
how can we claim that something we advocate is genuinely Peircean, without
first carefully ascertaining what Peirce's own considered views were?  Of
course, this is not always an easy task, due to the voluminous and
fragmented nature of his compiled writings.  On the other hand, my recent
series of articles about "The Logic of Ingenuity" falls under #4; that
label and some of the associated ideas are my own, but I still try to stick
with Peirce's definitions of the underlying concepts like "retroduction"
and "diagrams."  As I have said before, I find it inappropriate--Peirce
went so far as to call it unethical--to adopt his terminology while
assigning different meanings to it, such that the result might *appear* to
be Peircean, but really is not (per #1).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 11:19 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Edwina, Jon S., List, All,
>
> As I have suggested on other occasions, it will likely improve the quality
> of our discussions if we make our aims clearer when we make a remark
> or engage in a line of inquiry. That way, we'll have some assurance that
> different people aren't working at cross purposes or talking past each
> other. Here are some of the purposes I see guiding our various discussions:
>
> 1.  We want to understand some conclusion that Peirce has drawn and
> determine whether or not it really was the position that he adopted at some
> point in his inquiries, or perhaps was his considered view all things
> considered.
>
> 2. We seek to reconstruct some of the arguments found in one or another
> text to see we might gain a better understanding of how the arguments
> work--and how they fit with other arguments Peirce made.
>
> 3. We want to better understanding Peirce's own aims and methods. He says
> that one of his major aims was to develop a method of methods. As such,
> we're trying to learn better how to employ these methods in our own
> inquiries.
>
> 4. We are guided by a hunch that Peirce had some useful ideas, and we want
> to borrow some of those ideas, modify as needed for our own purposes, and
> then engage in our own inquiries.
>
> 5. We are pursuing our own inquiries using our own methods and, for the
> sake of curiosity, we want to see how our own methods and
> conclusions  compare to some of Peirce's. At times, when the views diverge,
> some might want to suggest that Peirce was likely wrong or
> seriously misguided--at least when viewed in from the perspective of our
> own methods and conclusions.
>
> 6. We have our own views and methods and we don't care much about what
> Peirce really thought--except to point out that some things he said appear,
> on their face, to be entirely crazy.
>
> Posts that fit the description under (6) seem out of place on the list.
> They are distracting and tend to undermine the health of the discussion of
> those pursuing the other aims. The aims expressed in 1-3 have, I take it,
> been guiding much of the discussion on the list since its inception when
> Joe expressed the guidelines for engaging in the dialogue. Personally, I have
> found myself doing the things listed in 4-5 at various times in my own
> reading thinking, but much of my work is guided by the aims expressed in
> 1-3. Having said that, each of us needs to make a decision about when it is
> appropriate to make posts to the list when our aims fall under (4) or
> (5)--especially when we are jumping into a conversation between people who
> are really guided by aims (1-3). For those who do think it is reasonable to
> jump into such conversations and make remarks that are really guided by
> such different purposes, it will help to spell out the purposes so others
> don't waste their time trying to respond by showing, based on textual
> evidence, that such a view does not reasonably reflect what is found in the
> texts.
>
> Finally, to respond to your remark about those who spend time focusing on
> the way Peirce defined key terms--such work is essential to doing 1-3 well.
> It certainly isn't the only thing that needs to be done, but for such
> purposes, it is an important starting point.
>
> I fully recognize that there is a considerable difference between the aim
> of seeking to find the truth about Peirce's own views and how he arrived at
> such conclusions, and the aim of pushing inquiry further and seeking the
> truth, all things considered. Both are admirable goals, and those of us who
> seek to engage in the more scholarly task usually do so with a longer term
> goal of drawing on the arguments and methods for the sake of finding the
> truth about the questions at hand.
>
> My hope in making these points is to remind

Aw: Re: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-30 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jon, List,

Thank you. So this was another semantic problem, this time with the term "would"!

30. März 2017 um 20:04 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt"

Helmut, List:

HR: Eg. he wrote, that the dynamical object is real, and that it also is the object as a final study would show it to be.

I think that the key word here is would. The idea is that the real is that which would come to be known by an infinite community after indefinite inquiry, not just what will or even can be discovered in the future. As you say, some information is now lost to history; but it could have been known at some point in the past, and would be known today and in the future if it had thus been preserved. Therefore, it is real, even though no one will ever actually come to know it.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 12:45 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Jeffrey, List,

I like you 6 points for orientation how to discuss. I can find an argument of mine from this thread in points 5 and 1. The subject was, that Peirce believed in completely satisfying results due to final study. This applies eg. to dynamical object and final interpretant.

Eg. he wrote, that the dynamical object is real, and that it also is the object as a final study would show it to be.

From the position of your point Nr.5, I argued, that an object which is something that happened or had been in the past (a finished event or a snapshot of a past constellation or situation) can never be reconstructed, because very likely the documentation about it is not complete, information is missing. No study, how final ever, can retrieve it.

So, from point Nr.5, I would say, Peirce was wrong at this point.

But, because I rather wanted to argue from point Nr.1, I had suggested, that perhaps Peirce believed in Bayesianism, but this approach was not correct, I rather should have asked:

Did he believe in a kind of information-conservation-law?

This would mean, that any past event and situation can theoretically be reconstructed by looking at everything that is influenced by this event or situation.

There are theories, which claim something like that, eg. QBism, and hidden variables, if I haven´t gotten it wrongly.

Well, this topic sort of bothers me, because I (at the moment) do not believe in information conservation, because it contradicts the concept of entropy increase and Heisenbergean uncertainty, both of which I am more or less certain.

On the other hand, I often had thought: "Peirce must be wrong at this point", but later I had seen, that he was not, but I.

But perhaps this example like you wrote in point Nr1, was not "his considered view all things considered".

But the problem is, that there are dynamical objects, which change, and others, that don´t. If they change, they cannot be reached by a final study, because a study takes time, and maybe they change faster than the study approaches them. Apart from the type above (past things), there is only one type of dynamical objects that, I guess, does not change, that is metaphysical laws, but Peirce did not believe in their unchangeability.

So I am sort of drawn to point Nr.5, Peirce was wrong, so convince me that he was not.

Best,

Helmut

Re: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

ch conclusions, and the aim of pushing inquiry further
and seeking the truth, all things considered. Both  are admirable
goals, and those of us who seek to engage in the more scholarly task
usually do so with a longer term goal of drawing on the arguments and
methods for the sake of finding the truth about the questions at hand.

My hope in making these points is to  remind myself that my purposes
may not always match the purposes of others, and I want to avoid the
confusion and conflicts that arise when people work at cross
purposes. My hope is that others, too, will make their purposes
clearer--especially when they say  things that, on their face, do not
fit well with the arguments and explanations Peirce gives. As Jon S.
has pointed out, your remarks about definitions do not fit with
Peirce's methods--both with respect to doing the history of
philosophy and also with respect  to doing philosophy. 
Yours, 
Jeff 
Jeffrey Downard
 Associate Professor
 Department of Philosophy
 Northern Arizona University
 (o) 928 523-8354   
-
 From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
 Sent: Thursday, March 30, 2017 6:52 AM
 To: tabor...@primus.ca
 Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term  
  Edwina, List: 
  Just one (hopefully last) comment here. 
   ET:  But a thing that bothers me about some of the focus of this
list is its isolation from reality; that is, it's all about words and
definitions. But Peirce wasn't focused on that.  
  Peirce was certainly not only focused on words and definitions--I
agree that his interests and contributions were far broader than
that--but he was often focused on them.  After all, he wrote reams of
definitions for the  Century Dictionary and Baldwin's Dictionary of
Philosophy and Psychology.  More to the point, he advocated a
scrupulous ethics of terminology (EP 2:263-266; 1903) and diligently
sought to adhere to it himself, resulting in the plethora of
neologisms  that he invented in an effort to avoid misunderstanding
or confusion with the ideas of others. 
   CSP:  ... the woof and warp of all thought and all research is
symbols, and the life of thought and science is the life inherent in
symbols; so that it is wrong to say that a good language is important
to good thought, merely; for it is of the essence of it. 
   CSP:  The body of the symbol changes slowly, but its meaning
inevitably grows, incorporates new elements and throws off old ones.
But the effort of all should be to keep the essence of every
scientific term unchanged and exact; although absolute exactitude is
not so much as conceivable.
 CSP:  ... when a man has introduced a conception into science, it
naturally becomes both his privilege and his duty to assign to that
conception suitable scientific expressions, and that when a name has
been conferred upon a conception by him to whose labors  science is
indebted for that conception, it becomes the duty of all,—a duty to
the discoverer, and a duty to science,—to accept his name ...
whoever deliberately uses a word or other symbol in any other sense
than that which was conferred upon it by its sole  rightful creator
commits a shameful offense against the inventor of the symbol and
against science, and it becomes the duty of the others to treat the
act with contempt and indignation.
 CSP:  Having thus given some idea of the nature of the reasons which
weigh with me, I proceed to state the rules which I find to be binding
upon me in this field ... Seventh, to regard it as needful to
introduce new systems of expression when new connections  of
importance between conceptions come to be made out, or when such
systems can, in any way, positively subserve the purposes of
philosophical study. 
  Regards, 
  Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer,
Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [1]  
   
 On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 7:30 AM, Edwina Taborsky   wrote:
John, list - yes, I agree with your comments. 

But a thing that bothers me about some of the focus of this list is
its isolation from reality; that is, it's all about words and
definitions. But Peirce wasn't focused on that. As John points out,
he used his terms in a variety of ways;  - and his focus  was on the
pragmatism of semiosis. That is - what is the pragmatic function of
Peircean semiosis? 

In Peirce, we read about semiosis within protoplasm, within
crystals, within the formation of matter [matter is effete Mind].
None of this deals with terminology but with the pragmatic function
of semiosis - which Peirce sees, as far as I can understand,  as the
gradual evolution of Mind. Mind is NOT a synonym of the human mind or
consciousness but of the natural world. And we see this dynamic
flexible action within the ten classes - which, as triads, enable
this adaptive evolving capacity of Mind into M

Re: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Helmut, List:

HR:  Eg. he wrote, that the dynamical object is real, and that it also is
the object as a final study would show it to be.


I think that the key word here is *would*.  The idea is that the real is
that which *would *come to be known by an infinite community after
indefinite inquiry, not just what *will* or even *can *be discovered in the
future.  As you say, some information is now lost to history; but it *could
*have been known at some point in the past, and *would *be known today and
in the future *if *it had thus been preserved.  Therefore, it is real, even
though no one will ever *actually *come to know it.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 12:45 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Jeffrey, List,
> I like you 6 points for orientation how to discuss. I can find an argument
> of mine from this thread in points 5 and 1. The subject was, that Peirce
> believed in completely satisfying results due to final study. This applies
> eg. to dynamical object and final interpretant.
> Eg. he wrote, that the dynamical object is real, and that it also is the
> object as a final study would show it to be.
> From the position of your point Nr.5, I argued, that an object which is
> something that happened or had been in the past (a finished event or a
> snapshot of a past constellation or situation) can never be reconstructed,
> because very likely the documentation about it is not complete, information
> is missing. No study, how final ever, can retrieve it.
> So, from point Nr.5, I would say, Peirce was wrong at this point.
> But, because I rather wanted to argue from point Nr.1, I had suggested,
> that perhaps Peirce believed in Bayesianism, but this approach was not
> correct, I rather should have asked:
> Did he believe in a kind of information-conservation-law?
> This would mean, that any past event and situation can theoretically be
> reconstructed by looking at everything that is influenced by this event or
> situation.
> There are theories, which claim something like that, eg. QBism, and hidden
> variables, if I haven´t gotten it wrongly.
> Well, this topic sort of bothers me, because I (at the moment) do not
> believe in information conservation, because it contradicts the concept of
> entropy increase and Heisenbergean uncertainty, both of which I am more or
> less certain.
> On the other hand, I often had thought: "Peirce must be wrong at this
> point", but later I had seen, that he was not, but I.
>
> But perhaps this example like you wrote in point Nr1, was not "his
> considered view all things considered".
> But the problem is, that there are dynamical objects, which change, and
> others, that don´t. If they change, they cannot be reached by a final
> study, because a study takes time, and maybe they change faster than the
> study approaches them. Apart from the type above (past things), there is
> only one type of dynamical objects that, I guess, does not change, that is
> metaphysical laws, but Peirce did not believe in their unchangeability.
> So I am sort of drawn to point Nr.5, Peirce was wrong, so convince me that
> he was not.
> Best,
> Helmut
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-30 Thread Jerry Rhee

There is much hubris.



Words are defective.



we ought to say that we are in thought, and not that thoughts are in us.



There are three kinds of signs.



The word *symbol* has so many meanings that it would be an injury to the
language to add a new one.



In the first figure; the middle is the subject of the major premise, and
predicate of the minor.  Therefore, the middle serves as either the subject
or the predicate in the first figure.



Ronna: If what philosophy is trying to do is figure out the nature of
things, or the way the world is, isn’t there something strange about saying
that the right route to that is interpreting a text and trying to figure
out what the author meant?

Seth: Could you make an analogy between the two-fold character of
interpretation-

Ronna: And that is?



Seth:  What does the author mean?  and Is it true?



Ronna: Okay.



Seth:  And philosophical thought?  The philosopher would make a mistake if
he thought that the question was, Is it true? Before he came to the first
issue, in regard to whatever he was talking about.  So this two-fold
character of interpretation-



Robert: Meaning and truth?

Seth:  Right, would also apply to the world.



Hth,
Jerry R

On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 11:32 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:

> John C., List:
>
> I was convinced by our List discussion a few months ago that we should not
> draw sharp distinctions between "universes" and "categories" in this
> context.
>
> I actually think that what you quoted *only *makes sense if the sign is
> the representamen alone.  Note that it identifies the most characteristic
> form of 3ns as the *form *of a sign, not the sign *itself*.  More to the
> point, it *does not* say that the sign is a "triad" or "triadic function"
> that *consists of* the representamen, object, and interpretant.  On the
> contrary, it says that every sign *has *an object and *determines *an
> interpretant; they are three distinct *subjects* in the sense that Gary
> F. just mentioned.  Peirce's use of the term "correlate" for each of them
> seems pretty definitive to me; they are three "things" (again, not the best
> word) that are involved in a single triadic relation, not three components
> (or "nodes") of a single triadic "thing."
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 10:59 AM, John Collier 
> wrote:
>
>> I am not very keen on multiple universes, though I readily admit
>> different metaphysical categories. But I think any deep difference is just
>> talk.
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
>> *Sent:* Thursday, 30 March 2017 3:33 PM
>> *To:* John Collier 
>> *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
>> *Subject:* Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
>>
>>
>>
>> John C., List:
>>
>> *[John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be confusing.*
>>
>> Perhaps I missed them, but I am not aware of any passages where Peirce
>> used "sign" to mean a "triad" or a "triadic function" that *consists of*
>> the representamen, object, and interpretant.  If there are such passages, I
>> would be grateful for the citations so that I can take a look at them.
>> Would you at least agree that Peirce *predominantly *used "sign" in the
>> way that I am advocating?
>>
>>
>>
>> *[John Collier] I think the following undated passage in which Peirce
>> refers to the sign as the most characteristic form of thirdness is hard to
>> understand if the sign meant here is the representamen alone. It is
>> essential to being a sign that it have an object and interpretant. I take
>> this as meaning that it is part of their nature to be triadic. I agree that
>> Peirce mostly used “sign” to mean the iconic representamen. This issue was
>> discussed on the list some time ago.*
>>
>>
>>
>> Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness, and the Reducibility of Fourthness [R]
>> | MS [R] 914:5-6
>>
>> The most characteristic form of thirdness is that of a *sign*; and it is
>> shown that every cognition is of the nature of a sign. Every sign has an
>> object, which may be regarded either as it is immediately represented in
>> the sign to be [or] as it is in it own firstness. It is equally
>> essential to the function of a sign that it should determine an
>> *Interpretant*, or second correlate related to the object of the sign as
>> the sign is itself related to that object; an

Aw: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-30 Thread Helmut Raulien

nversation between people who are really guided by aims (1-3). For those who do think it is reasonable to jump into such conversations and make remarks that are really guided by such different purposes, it will help to spell out the purposes so others don't waste their time trying to respond by showing, based on textual evidence, that such a view does not reasonably reflect what is found in the texts.

 

Finally, to respond to your remark about those who spend time focusing on the way Peirce defined key terms--such work is essential to doing 1-3 well. It certainly isn't the only thing that needs to be done, but for such purposes, it is an important starting point.

 

I fully recognize that there is a considerable difference between the aim of seeking to find the truth about Peirce's own views and how he arrived at such conclusions, and the aim of pushing inquiry further and seeking the truth, all things considered. Both are admirable goals, and those of us who seek to engage in the more scholarly task usually do so with a longer term goal of drawing on the arguments and methods for the sake of finding the truth about the questions at hand.

 

My hope in making these points is to remind myself that my purposes may not always match the purposes of others, and I want to avoid the confusion and conflicts that arise when people work at cross purposes. My hope is that others, too, will make their purposes clearer--especially when they say things that, on their face, do not fit well with the arguments and explanations Peirce gives. As Jon S. has pointed out, your remarks about definitions do not fit with Peirce's methods--both with respect to doing the history of philosophy and also with respect to doing philosophy.

 

Yours,

 

Jeff

 

 

 

 

 



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354


 



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Thursday, March 30, 2017 6:52 AM
To: tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

 



Edwina, List:
 

Just one (hopefully last) comment here.

 


ET:  But a thing that bothers me about some of the focus of this list is its isolation from reality; that is, it's all about words and definitions. But Peirce wasn't focused on that.


 

Peirce was certainly not only focused on words and definitions--I agree that his interests and contributions were far broader than that--but he was often focused on them.  After all, he wrote reams of definitions for the  Century Dictionary and Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology.  More to the point, he advocated a scrupulous ethics of terminology (EP 2:263-266; 1903) and diligently sought to adhere to it himself, resulting in the plethora of neologisms that he invented in an effort to avoid misunderstanding or confusion with the ideas of others.

 


CSP:  ... the woof and warp of all thought and all research is symbols, and the life of thought and science is the life inherent in symbols; so that it is wrong to say that a good language is important to good thought, merely; for it is of the essence of it.

 


CSP:  The body of the symbol changes slowly, but its meaning inevitably grows, incorporates new elements and throws off old ones. But the effort of all should be to keep the essence of every scientific term unchanged and exact; although absolute exactitude is not so much as conceivable.

CSP:  ... when a man has introduced a conception into science, it naturally becomes both his privilege and his duty to assign to that conception suitable scientific expressions, and that when a name has been conferred upon a conception by him to whose labors science is indebted for that conception, it becomes the duty of all,—a duty to the discoverer, and a duty to science,—to accept his name ... whoever deliberately uses a word or other symbol in any other sense than that which was conferred upon it by its sole rightful creator commits a shameful offense against the inventor of the symbol and against science, and it becomes the duty of the others to treat the act with contempt and indignation.

CSP:  Having thus given some idea of the nature of the reasons which weigh with me, I proceed to state the rules which I find to be binding upon me in this field ... Seventh, to regard it as needful to introduce new systems of _expression_ when new connections of importance between conceptions come to be made out, or when such systems can, in any way, positively subserve the purposes of philosophical study.

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt





 

On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 7:30 AM, Edwina Taborsky  <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:


John, list - yes, I agree with your comments.

But a thing that bothers me about some of the focus of this list is

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

John C., List:

I was convinced by our List discussion a few months ago that we should not
draw sharp distinctions between "universes" and "categories" in this
context.

I actually think that what you quoted *only *makes sense if the sign is the
representamen alone.  Note that it identifies the most characteristic form
of 3ns as the *form *of a sign, not the sign *itself*.  More to the point,
it *does not* say that the sign is a "triad" or "triadic function"
that *consists
of* the representamen, object, and interpretant.  On the contrary, it says
that every sign *has *an object and *determines *an interpretant; they are
three distinct *subjects* in the sense that Gary F. just mentioned.
Peirce's use of the term "correlate" for each of them seems pretty
definitive to me; they are three "things" (again, not the best word) that
are involved in a single triadic relation, not three components (or
"nodes") of a single triadic "thing."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 10:59 AM, John Collier  wrote:

> I am not very keen on multiple universes, though I readily admit different
> metaphysical categories. But I think any deep difference is just talk.
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* Thursday, 30 March 2017 3:33 PM
> *To:* John Collier 
> *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
>
>
>
> John C., List:
>
> *[John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be confusing.*
>
> Perhaps I missed them, but I am not aware of any passages where Peirce
> used "sign" to mean a "triad" or a "triadic function" that *consists of*
> the representamen, object, and interpretant.  If there are such passages, I
> would be grateful for the citations so that I can take a look at them.
> Would you at least agree that Peirce *predominantly *used "sign" in the
> way that I am advocating?
>
>
>
> *[John Collier] I think the following undated passage in which Peirce
> refers to the sign as the most characteristic form of thirdness is hard to
> understand if the sign meant here is the representamen alone. It is
> essential to being a sign that it have an object and interpretant. I take
> this as meaning that it is part of their nature to be triadic. I agree that
> Peirce mostly used “sign” to mean the iconic representamen. This issue was
> discussed on the list some time ago.*
>
>
>
> Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness, and the Reducibility of Fourthness [R] | MS
> [R] 914:5-6
>
> The most characteristic form of thirdness is that of a *sign*; and it is
> shown that every cognition is of the nature of a sign. Every sign has an
> object, which may be regarded either as it is immediately represented in
> the sign to be [or] as it is in it own firstness. It is equally essential
> to the function of a sign that it should determine an *Interpretant*, or
> second correlate related to the object of the sign as the sign is itself
> related to that object; and this interpretant may be regarded as the sign
> represents it to be, as it is in its pure secondness to the object, and as
> it is in its own firstness. Upon these considerations are founded six
> trichotomic divisions of signs…
>
>
>
> John Collier
>
> Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
>
> Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
>
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-30 Thread Jeffrey Brian Downard

Edwina, Jon S., List, All,


As I have suggested on other occasions, it will likely improve the quality of 
our discussions if we make our aims clearer when we make a remark or engage in 
a line of inquiry. That way, we'll have some assurance that different people 
aren't working at cross purposes or talking past each other. Here are some of 
the purposes I see guiding our various discussions:


1.  We want to understand some conclusion that Peirce has drawn and determine 
whether or not it really was the position that he adopted at some point in his 
inquiries, or perhaps was his considered view all things considered.


2. We seek to reconstruct some of the arguments found in one or another text to 
see we might gain a better understanding of how the arguments work--and how 
they fit with other arguments Peirce made.


3. We want to better understanding Peirce's own aims and methods. He says that 
one of his major aims was to develop a method of methods. As such, we're trying 
to learn better how to employ these methods in our own inquiries.


4. We are guided by a hunch that Peirce had some useful ideas, and we want to 
borrow some of those ideas, modify as needed for our own purposes, and then 
engage in our own inquiries.


5. We are pursuing our own inquiries using our own methods and, for the sake of 
curiosity, we want to see how our own methods and conclusions  compare to some 
of Peirce's. At times, when the views diverge, some might want to suggest that 
Peirce was likely wrong or seriously misguided--at least when viewed in from 
the perspective of our own methods and conclusions.


6. We have our own views and methods and we don't care much about what Peirce 
really thought--except to point out that some things he said appear, on their 
face, to be entirely crazy.


Posts that fit the description under (6) seem out of place on the list. They 
are distracting and tend to undermine the health of the discussion of those 
pursuing the other aims. The aims expressed in 1-3 have, I take it, been 
guiding much of the discussion on the list since its inception when Joe 
expressed the guidelines for engaging in the dialogue. Personally, I have found 
myself doing the things listed in 4-5 at various times in my own reading 
thinking, but much of my work is guided by the aims expressed in 1-3. Having 
said that, each of us needs to make a decision about when it is appropriate to 
make posts to the list when our aims fall under (4) or (5)--especially when we 
are jumping into a conversation between people who are really guided by aims 
(1-3). For those who do think it is reasonable to jump into such conversations 
and make remarks that are really guided by such different purposes, it will 
help to spell out the purposes so others don't waste their time trying to 
respond by showing, based on textual evidence, that such a view does not 
reasonably reflect what is found in the texts.


Finally, to respond to your remark about those who spend time focusing on the 
way Peirce defined key terms--such work is essential to doing 1-3 well. It 
certainly isn't the only thing that needs to be done, but for such purposes, it 
is an important starting point.


I fully recognize that there is a considerable difference between the aim of 
seeking to find the truth about Peirce's own views and how he arrived at such 
conclusions, and the aim of pushing inquiry further and seeking the truth, all 
things considered. Both are admirable goals, and those of us who seek to engage 
in the more scholarly task usually do so with a longer term goal of drawing on 
the arguments and methods for the sake of finding the truth about the questions 
at hand.


My hope in making these points is to remind myself that my purposes may not 
always match the purposes of others, and I want to avoid the confusion and 
conflicts that arise when people work at cross purposes. My hope is that 
others, too, will make their purposes clearer--especially when they say things 
that, on their face, do not fit well with the arguments and explanations Peirce 
gives. As Jon S. has pointed out, your remarks about definitions do not fit 
with Peirce's methods--both with respect to doing the history of philosophy and 
also with respect to doing philosophy.


Yours,


Jeff






Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Thursday, March 30, 2017 6:52 AM
To: tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Edwina, List:

Just one (hopefully last) comment here.

ET:  But a thing that bothers me about some of the focus of this list is its 
isolation from reality; that is, it's all about words and definitions. But 
Peirce wasn't focused on that.

Peirce was certainly not only focused on words and definitions--I

RE: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-30 Thread gnox

Jon A.S., John C.,

 

In the quotation cited by Jon, it is clear from the context that the word 
“subject” is being used as a more technical term for “thing” — i.e. in the 
sense of subject given in the Century Dictionary as follows:

7. In metaph.: (a) A real thing to which given characters relate and in which 
they are said to inhere.

That which manifests its qualities—in other words, that

in which the appearing causes inhere, that to which they

belong—is called their subject, or substance, or substratum.

Sir W. Hamilton, Metaphysics, viii.

 

Peirce is not using it either in the Kantian sense or in the sense of the 
component of a proposition opposed to the predicate. Peirce did not use the 
word interchangeably with predicate, as should be clear from the Stjernfelt 
passage cited.

He very often, however, used the terms sign and representamen interchangeably.

 

Jon’s points are all well taken, in my opinion.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 30-Mar-17 09:33
To: John Collier 
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

 

John C., List:

 

[John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be confusing.

 

Perhaps I missed them, but I am not aware of any passages where Peirce used 
"sign" to mean a "triad" or a "triadic function" that consists of the 
representamen, object, and interpretant.  If there are such passages, I would 
be grateful for the citations so that I can take a look at them.  Would you at 
least agree that Peirce predominantly used "sign" in the way that I am 
advocating?

 

[John Collier] I suspect that Peirce meant universe of discourse, which is 
quite a different thing from a universe (as in, say, Popper).

 

Maybe, but Peirce also discussed three "Universes of Experience" in "A 
Neglected Argument," written earlier the same year as the letter to Welby; and 
those seem to have metaphysical significance, since he explicitly affirmed the 
Reality of all three.  In any case, the names that he assigned to the semeiotic 
constituents of the Universes--Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants--imply 
that they correspond to the different modes of being.

 

[John Collier] Peirce uses “subject” in a rather strange way in which 
predicates can be subjects. Stjernfelt, Natural Propositions, 6.10 Hypostatic 
abstraction.

 

In the passage that I cited (EP 2:411; 1907), I think it is clear that Peirce 
was not referring to the sign, object, and interpretant as predicates when he 
called them "subjects" ...

 

CSP:  (It is important to understand what I mean by semiosis. All dynamical 
action, or action of brute force, physical or psychical, either takes place 
between two subjects,—whether they react equally upon each other, or one is 
agent and the other patient, entirely or partially,—or at any rate is a 
resultant of such actions between pairs. But by "semiosis" I mean, on the 
contrary, an action, or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of 
three subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this 
tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions between 
pairs. Σημείωσις in Greek of the Roman period, as early as Cicero's time, if I 
remember rightly, meant the action of almost any kind of sign; and my 
definition confers on anything that so acts the title of a "sign.")

 

... especially given the particular definition of "sign" to which he referred 
here, which appears on the previous page (EP 2:410).

 

CSP:  I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which 
mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by 
the object relatively to the interpretant, and determines the interpretant in 
reference to the object, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be 
determined by the object through the mediation of this "sign." The object and 
the interpretant are thus merely the two correlates of the sign; the one being 
antecedent, the other consequent of the sign.

 

Regards,

 

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-30 Thread John Collier

I am not very keen on multiple universes, though I readily admit different 
metaphysical categories. But I think any deep difference is just talk.

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 3:33 PM
To: John Collier 
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

John C., List:

[John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be confusing.

Perhaps I missed them, but I am not aware of any passages where Peirce used 
"sign" to mean a "triad" or a "triadic function" that consists of the 
representamen, object, and interpretant.  If there are such passages, I would 
be grateful for the citations so that I can take a look at them.  Would you at 
least agree that Peirce predominantly used "sign" in the way that I am 
advocating?

[John Collier] I think the following undated passage in which Peirce refers to 
the sign as the most characteristic form of thirdness is hard to understand if 
the sign meant here is the representamen alone. It is essential to being a sign 
that it have an object and interpretant. I take this as meaning that it is part 
of their nature to be triadic. I agree that Peirce mostly used “sign” to mean 
the iconic representamen. This issue was discussed on the list some time ago.

Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness, and the Reducibility of Fourthness [R] | MS 
[R] 914:5-6
The most characteristic form of thirdness is that of a sign; and it is shown 
that every cognition is of the nature of a sign. Every sign has an object, 
which may be regarded either as it is immediately represented in the sign to be 
[or] as it is in it own firstness. It is equally essential to the function of a 
sign that it should determine an Interpretant, or second correlate related to 
the object of the sign as the sign is itself related to that object; and this 
interpretant may be regarded as the sign represents it to be, as it is in its 
pure secondness to the object, and as it is in its own firstness. Upon these 
considerations are founded six trichotomic divisions of signs…

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

 

Clark, list - I think I wasn't clear in my post below. What I meant
to say is that Peirce himself did not use singular terms that meant
'only this' in his work. As John Collier points out - he used 'sign'
and 'representamen';  his use of the three categories were filled
with expansive synonyms for their meanings; his notion of the triad
was not focused around the representamen as controlling agent but was
focused around the contribution to meaning via the interaction of all
three 'nodes'. My concern with terminology is that much of the focus
on this list is to insist that a term, as used by Peirce, has not
merely only one singular meaning but indeed, has only one singular
action. That rejects the adaptive capacity of Peircean semiosis.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Thu 30/03/17 10:40 AM , Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca sent:
 Clark- again, thanks for your comments.

The fact that Mind and consciousness are often used synonymously is
not - as you point out - part of the Peircean analysis. But to inform
readers that you are using Peircean terms - and not 'general audience
terms - is not the same as the focus on this list on and only on
Peircean terms and their singular use in HIS work.

Of course Saussure is static! That's what makes his semiology so
easy to use - and the 'hidden meanings' unveiled by the researcher
are assumed to be static as well...and hidden due to some
psychological trauma of the author/artist or whatever. 

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca [1] 
 On Thu 30/03/17 10:12 AM , Clark Goble cl...@lextek.com sent:
 On Mar 30, 2017, at 6:30 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
 In Peirce, we read about semiosis within protoplasm, within
crystals, within the formation of matter [matter is effete Mind].
None of this deals with terminology but with the pragmatic function
of semiosis - which Peirce sees, as far as I can understand, as the
gradual evolution of Mind. Mind is NOT a synonym of the human mind or
consciousness but of the natural world.
 I think this gets at definition problems though. For instance often
mind and consciousness are used synonymously in discourse. As you
note that’s not how Peirce primarily uses it, although he’ll
sometimes slip into other use when speaking more casually.  
 In contemporary discourse even consciousness is ambiguous since it
can simultaneously mean a kind of first person qualia or awareness of
phenomena or even self-awareness as a kind of reflexive knowledge of a
phenomena and that one is also aware that one is aware of the
phenomena as a self-awareness. The former is pure firstness for
Peirce I think although he’ll also sometimes call it the inner
aspect of the swerve or chance in a sign process. The other aspects
are indexical aspects of signs and simple complexity of signs. 
 But one quickly sees that keeping ones terminology is important.
 While I’m more dubious towards his foundational ontologies it
seems these matters become crucial there. While we’ve discussed
those ontologies a lot of late, it’s mainly been due to other
issues such as Peirce’s sense of truth.
  If one focuses only on words and terms, then, it is just as easy,
indeed easier,  to use the semiotics of such as Saussure or Morris
..for these are all about 'this' means 'that' - and one can get
readily into the seeming joy of 'hidden meanings'. But Peirce doesn't
deal with this; his semiotics is an active, adaptive and evolving 
process of generation of Mind-into-Matter - a much more difficult
analysis.
 I’d actually disagree quite a lot with that. I think both miss key
aspects of meaning - particularly Saussure whose structuralism is
quite static whereas Peirce’s thirdness and definition of a sign
anticipates much of post-structuralism. (Indeed one could argue that
indirectly a lot of post-structuralism arises out of Peirce) 


Links:
--
[1] http://www.primus.ca
[2] http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Clark- again, thanks for your comments.

The fact that Mind and consciousness are often used synonymously is
not - as you point out - part of the Peircean analysis. But to inform
readers that you are using Peircean terms - and not 'general audience
terms - is not the same as the focus on this list on and only on
Peircean terms and their singular use in HIS work.

Of course Saussure is static! That's what makes his semiology so
easy to use - and the 'hidden meanings' unveiled by the researcher
are assumed to be static as well...and hidden due to some
psychological trauma of the author/artist or whatever.

Edwina
--
This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
largest alternative telecommunications provider.
http://www.primus.ca
On Thu 30/03/17 10:12 AM , Clark Goble cl...@lextek.com sent:
On Mar 30, 2017, at 6:30 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
In Peirce, we read about semiosis within protoplasm, within
crystals, within the formation of matter [matter is effete Mind].
None of this deals with terminology but with the pragmatic function
of semiosis - which Peirce sees, as far as I can understand, as the
gradual evolution of Mind. Mind is NOT a synonym of the human mind or
consciousness but of the natural world.
I think this gets at definition problems though. For instance often
mind and consciousness are used synonymously in discourse. As you
note that’s not how Peirce primarily uses it, although he’ll
sometimes slip into other use when speaking more casually.
In contemporary discourse even consciousness is ambiguous since it
can simultaneously mean a kind of first person qualia or awareness of
phenomena or even self-awareness as a kind of reflexive knowledge of a
phenomena and that one is also aware that one is aware of the
phenomena as a self-awareness. The former is pure firstness for
Peirce I think although he’ll also sometimes call it the inner
aspect of the swerve or chance in a sign process. The other aspects
are indexical aspects of signs and simple complexity of signs.
But one quickly sees that keeping ones terminology is important.
While I’m more dubious towards his foundational ontologies it
seems these matters become crucial there. While we’ve discussed
those ontologies a lot of late, it’s mainly been due to other
issues such as Peirce’s sense of truth.
If one focuses only on words and terms, then, it is just as easy,
indeed easier, to use the semiotics of such as Saussure or Morris
..for these are all about 'this' means 'that' - and one can get
readily into the seeming joy of 'hidden meanings'. But Peirce doesn't
deal with this; his semiotics is an active, adaptive and evolving
process of generation of Mind-into-Matter - a much more difficult
analysis.
I’d actually disagree quite a lot with that. I think both miss key
aspects of meaning - particularly Saussure whose structuralism is
quite static whereas Peirce’s thirdness and definition of a sign
anticipates much of post-structuralism. (Indeed one could argue that
indirectly a lot of post-structuralism arises out of Peirce)

Links:
--
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Clark - thanks for your comments.

The biosemiotics people [and I'm part of that group] are indeed
focused on pragmatics, which is not, I think, quite the same as
'practical applications'. And there's interest in the Peircean
semiosis in the chemico-physical realm and in AI, artificial
intelligence. The focus is, as I said, on how 'matter' comes into
existence as a Form; how it incorporates continuity in type and also,
enables adaptability and novelty of instantiations. These issues are
all found, quite detailed and clear, within the Peircean texts. The
Peircean framework moves out of the linguistic realm, and out of the
zone of the human mind, and into the natural world. That, to me, is
its strength.

I don't see the point of outlining my research on this list - as I'd
get reactions of 'Peirce didn't say that!' and 'That's
Taborsky-semiotics and it's not Pure Peirce!...

Yes, Peirce did give up on words since their meanings can differ
among different groups and over time. But, again, to focus on words
and ignore the real operational function of the Peircean framework -
well, to me at least, it seems irrelevant, but I know that for the
'philosophy guys' here, it seems to give them great delight to deal
with those semantics.

Edwina
--
This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
largest alternative telecommunications provider.
http://www.primus.ca
On Thu 30/03/17 10:03 AM , Clark Goble cl...@lextek.com sent:
On Mar 30, 2017, at 6:30 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
But a thing that bothers me about some of the focus of this list is
its isolation from reality; that is, it's all about words and
definitions. But Peirce wasn't focused on that. As John points out,
he used his terms in a variety of ways; - and his focus was on the
pragmatism of semiosis. That is - what is the pragmatic function of
Peircean semiosis?I think the biosemiotic people were focused on
practical applications. There are of course lots of semiotic analysis
of various sorts of communications out there although this list has
never focused on that too much.
But while my own interests are primarily philosophical I’m
certainly open to any topic people would like to start. Why not tell
us some of your own research?
To the definition point, I think especially with philosophical
concerns we’re grasping after subtle differences. Often we use the
same words to mean different things. That’s especially true when
the differences in question (like say the nominalist vs. realist one)
have metaphysical implications but only subtle practical differences.
That makes language a bit tricky. That’s a large reason why Peirce
himself tended, especially in his later periods, to coin neologisms.

Links:
--
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')

Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-30 Thread Clark Goble

> On Mar 30, 2017, at 6:30 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> In Peirce, we read about semiosis within protoplasm, within crystals, within 
> the formation of matter [matter is effete Mind]. None of this deals with 
> terminology but with the pragmatic function of semiosis - which Peirce sees, 
> as far as I can understand, as the gradual evolution of Mind. Mind is NOT a 
> synonym of the human mind or consciousness but of the natural world.

I think this gets at definition problems though. For instance often mind and 
consciousness are used synonymously in discourse. As you note that’s not how 
Peirce primarily uses it, although he’ll sometimes slip into other use when 
speaking more casually. 

In contemporary discourse even consciousness is ambiguous since it can 
simultaneously mean a kind of first person qualia or awareness of phenomena or 
even self-awareness as a kind of reflexive knowledge of a phenomena and that 
one is also aware that one is aware of the phenomena as a self-awareness. The 
former is pure firstness for Peirce I think although he’ll also sometimes call 
it the inner aspect of the swerve or chance in a sign process. The other 
aspects are indexical aspects of signs and simple complexity of signs.

But one quickly sees that keeping ones terminology is important.

While I’m more dubious towards his foundational ontologies it seems these 
matters become crucial there. While we’ve discussed those ontologies a lot of 
late, it’s mainly been due to other issues such as Peirce’s sense of truth.

> If one focuses only on words and terms, then, it is just as easy, indeed 
> easier,  to use the semiotics of such as Saussure or Morris ..for these are 
> all about 'this' means 'that' - and one can get readily into the seeming joy 
> of 'hidden meanings'. But Peirce doesn't deal with this; his semiotics is an 
> active, adaptive and evolving  process of generation of Mind-into-Matter - a 
> much more difficult analysis.

I’d actually disagree quite a lot with that. I think both miss key aspects of 
meaning - particularly Saussure whose structuralism is quite static whereas 
Peirce’s thirdness and definition of a sign anticipates much of 
post-structuralism. (Indeed one could argue that indirectly a lot of 
post-structuralism arises out of Peirce)
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-30 Thread Clark Goble

> On Mar 30, 2017, at 6:30 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> But a thing that bothers me about some of the focus of this list is its 
> isolation from reality; that is, it's all about words and definitions. But 
> Peirce wasn't focused on that. As John points out, he used his terms in a 
> variety of ways;  - and his focus was on the pragmatism of semiosis. That is 
> - what is the pragmatic function of Peircean semiosis?
> 
I think the biosemiotic people were focused on practical applications. There 
are of course lots of semiotic analysis of various sorts of communications out 
there although this list has never focused on that too much.

But while my own interests are primarily philosophical I’m certainly open to 
any topic people would like to start. Why not tell us some of your own research?

To the definition point, I think especially with philosophical concerns we’re 
grasping after subtle differences. Often we use the same words to mean 
different things. That’s especially true when the differences in question (like 
say the nominalist vs. realist one) have metaphysical implications but only 
subtle practical differences. That makes language a bit tricky. That’s a large 
reason why Peirce himself tended, especially in his later periods, to coin 
neologisms.

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Edwina, List:

Just one (hopefully last) comment here.

ET:  But a thing that bothers me about some of the focus of this list is
its isolation from reality; that is, it's all about words and definitions.
But Peirce wasn't focused on that.

Peirce was certainly not *only *focused on words and definitions--I agree
that his interests and contributions were far broader than that--but
he was *often
*focused on them.  After all, he wrote reams of definitions for the *Century
Dictionary* and Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*.  More
to the point, he advocated a scrupulous ethics of terminology (EP
2:263-266; 1903) and diligently sought to adhere to it himself, resulting
in the plethora of neologisms that he invented in an effort to avoid
misunderstanding or confusion with the ideas of others.

CSP:  ... the woof and warp of all thought and all research is symbols, and
the life of thought and science is the life inherent in symbols; so that it
is wrong to say that a good language is *important *to good thought,
merely; for it is of the essence of it.

CSP:  The body of the symbol changes slowly, but its meaning inevitably
grows, incorporates new elements and throws off old ones. But the effort of
all should be to keep the *essence *of every scientific term unchanged and
exact; although absolute exactitude is not so much as conceivable.

CSP:  ... when a man has introduced a conception into science, it naturally
becomes both his privilege and his duty to assign to that conception
suitable scientific expressions, and that when a name has been conferred
upon a conception by him to whose labors science is indebted for that
conception, it becomes the duty of all,—a duty to the discoverer, and a
duty to science,—to accept his name ... whoever deliberately uses a word or
other symbol in any other sense than that which was conferred upon it by
its sole rightful creator commits a shameful offense against the inventor
of the symbol and against science, and it becomes the duty of the others to
treat the act with contempt and indignation.

CSP:  Having thus given some idea of the nature of the reasons which weigh
with me, I proceed to state the rules which I find to be binding upon me in
this field ... Seventh, to regard it as needful to introduce new systems of
expression when new connections of importance between conceptions come to
be made out, or when such systems can, in any way, positively subserve the
purposes of philosophical study.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 7:30 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> John, list - yes, I agree with your comments.
>
> But a thing that bothers me about some of the focus of this list is its
> isolation from reality; that is, it's all about words and definitions. But
> Peirce wasn't focused on that. As John points out, he used his terms in a
> variety of ways;  - and his focus was on the pragmatism of semiosis. That
> is - what is the pragmatic function of Peircean semiosis?
>
> In Peirce, we read about semiosis within protoplasm, within crystals,
> within the formation of matter [matter is effete Mind]. None of this deals
> with terminology but with the pragmatic function of semiosis - which Peirce
> sees, as far as I can understand, as the gradual evolution of Mind. Mind is
> NOT a synonym of the human mind or consciousness but of the natural world.
> And we see this dynamic flexible action within the ten classes - which, as
> triads, enable this adaptive evolving capacity of Mind into Matter.
>
> If one focuses only on words and terms, then, it is just as easy, indeed
> easier,  to use the semiotics of such as Saussure or Morris ..for these are
> all about 'this' means 'that' - and one can get readily into the seeming
> joy of 'hidden meanings'. But Peirce doesn't deal with this; his semiotics
> is an active, adaptive and evolving  process of generation of
> Mind-into-Matter - a much more difficult analysis.
>
> Matter, to exist, obviously has a form. A form obviously must have
> continuity of type; therefore, to consider that Peirce didn't 'say these
> words' is to ignore the basic focus of his work. ..which is a vast, vast
> exploration of the nature of and the function of, this universe.
>
> Edwina
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

John C., List:

*[John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be confusing.*

Perhaps I missed them, but I am not aware of any passages where Peirce used
"sign" to mean a "triad" or a "triadic function" that *consists of* the
representamen, object, and interpretant.  If there are such passages, I
would be grateful for the citations so that I can take a look at them.
Would you at least agree that Peirce *predominantly *used "sign" in the way
that I am advocating?

*[John Collier] I suspect that Peirce meant universe of discourse, which is
quite a different thing from a universe (as in, say, Popper).*

Maybe, but Peirce also discussed three "Universes of Experience" in "A
Neglected Argument," written earlier the same year as the letter to Welby;
and those seem to have *metaphysical *significance, since he explicitly
affirmed the Reality of all three.  In any case, the names that he assigned
to the *semeiotic *constituents of the Universes--Possibles, Existents, and
Necessitants--imply that they correspond to the different modes of being.

*[John Collier] **Peirce uses “subject” in a rather strange way in which
predicates can be subjects. Stjernfelt, **Natural Propositions, 6.10
Hypostatic abstraction.*

In the passage that I cited (EP 2:411; 1907), I think it is clear that
Peirce was *not *referring to the sign, object, and interpretant as
predicates when he called them "subjects" ...

CSP:  (It is important to understand what I mean by *semiosis*. All
dynamical action, or action of brute force, physical or psychical, either
takes place between two subjects,—whether they react equally upon each
other, or one is agent and the other patient, entirely or partially,—or at
any rate is a resultant of such actions between pairs. But by "semiosis" I
mean, on the contrary, an action, or influence, which is, or involves, a
cooperation of *three *subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its
interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable
into actions between pairs. *Σημείωσις* in Greek of the Roman period, as
early as Cicero's time, if I remember rightly, meant the action of almost
any kind of sign; and my definition confers on anything that so acts the
title of a "sign.")

... especially given the particular definition of "sign" to which he
referred here, which appears on the previous page (EP 2:410).

CSP:  I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being,
which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both
determined by the object *relatively to the interpretant*, and determines
the interpretant *in reference to the object*, in such wise as to cause the
interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this
"sign." The object and the interpretant are thus merely the two correlates
of the sign; the one being antecedent, the other consequent of the sign.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 3:12 AM, John Collier  wrote:

> Some points interspersed.
>
>
>
> John Collier
>
> Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
>
> Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
>
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* Wednesday, 29 March 2017 11:37 PM
> *To:* tabor...@primus.ca
> *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
>
>
>
> Edwina, List:
>
>
>
> It has never been my intention to insult you, and I have never resorted to
> name-calling as you routinely have.  I have simply expressed my considered
> opinion that your model of sign-action is significantly different from
> Peirce's, and I have provided the reasons why I take that position.  I wish
> that we could have a friendly discussion about this, rather than a
> debate--and that others would join us in doing so--but unfortunately, we
> cannot seem to get past our directly opposing convictions.
>
> ET:  I use Peirce's term of 'representamen'  rather than 'sign' to
> acknowledge the unique role in the triad; that mediative function/action in
> the triadic set - and to differentiate it from the WHOLE Sign, the triad.
>
> Again, Peirce does not define the Sign as a *triad *(or a triadic
> *function*) that *includes *the Representamen; rather, he defines it * as
> *the Representamen, the first correlate of a triadic *relation*.  The
> Object and Interpretant are not *additional parts *of the Sign, they are
> the *other two* *correlates * in that triadic relation.  To me, this is
> absolutely fundamental to Peircean semeiosis, so any

Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

 

John, list - yes, I agree with your comments.

But a thing that bothers me about some of the focus of this list is
its isolation from reality; that is, it's all about words and
definitions. But Peirce wasn't focused on that. As John points out,
he used his terms in a variety of ways;  - and his focus was on the
pragmatism of semiosis. That is - what is the pragmatic function of
Peircean semiosis?

In Peirce, we read about semiosis within protoplasm, within
crystals, within the formation of matter [matter is effete Mind].
None of this deals with terminology but with the pragmatic function
of semiosis - which Peirce sees, as far as I can understand, as the
gradual evolution of Mind. Mind is NOT a synonym of the human mind or
consciousness but of the natural world. And we see this dynamic
flexible action within the ten classes - which, as triads, enable
this adaptive evolving capacity of Mind into Matter. 

If one focuses only on words and terms, then, it is just as easy,
indeed easier,  to use the semiotics of such as Saussure or Morris
..for these are all about 'this' means 'that' - and one can get
readily into the seeming joy of 'hidden meanings'. But Peirce doesn't
deal with this; his semiotics is an active, adaptive and evolving 
process of generation of Mind-into-Matter - a much more difficult
analysis.

Matter, to exist, obviously has a form. A form obviously must have
continuity of type; therefore, to consider that Peirce didn't 'say
these words' is to ignore the basic focus of his work. ..which is a
vast, vast exploration of the nature of and the function of, this
universe.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Thu 30/03/17  4:12 AM , John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za sent:
Some points interspersed. 
John Collier 

Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate 

Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal 

http://web.ncf.ca/collier [1] 
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
 Sent: Wednesday, 29 March 2017 11:37 PM
 To: tabor...@primus.ca
 Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term   
Edwina, List:  
It has never been my intention to insult you, and I have never
resorted to name-calling as you routinely have.  I have simply
expressed my considered opinion that your model of sign-action is
significantly different from Peirce's, and I  have provided the
reasons why I take that position.  I wish that we could have a
friendly discussion about this, rather than a debate--and that others
would join us in doing so--but unfortunately, we cannot seem to get
past our directly opposing convictions.   
ET:  I use Peirce's term of 'representamen'  rather than 'sign' to
acknowledge the unique role in the triad; that mediative
function/action in the triadic set - and to differentiate it from the
WHOLE Sign, the triad.
Again, Peirce does not define the Sign as a triad (or a triadic
function) that includes the Representamen; rather, he defines it  as
the Representamen, the first correlate of a triadic relation.  The
Object and Interpretant are not additional parts of the Sign, they
are the other two correlates  in that triadic relation.  To me, this
is absolutely fundamental to Peircean semeiosis, so any model that
denies it is by definition non-Peircean. 

[John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be
confusing.   
ET:  As I've often said, none of the parts of this triad exist 'per
se' on their own. They are not each 'subjects' in their own right and
I disagree that each is 'a constituent in their own universe'. I don't
consider that the three modal  categories are 'universes'.
Of course they "exist," albeit only when they are in the mode of
2ns.  Peirce explicitly referred to the Sign/Representamen, Object,
and Interpretant as "subjects" (EP 2:411); and he explicitly called
the three modal categories "Universes"  (EP 2:478-479); and he
explicitly stated that the Sign, both Objects, all three
Interpretants, and their relations are all constituents of one or
another Universe (EP 2:480-490).  Hence your disagreement on these
matters is with him, not just with me. 

[John Collier] I suspect that Peirce meant universe of discourse,
which is quite a different thing from a universe (as in, say,
Popper). Peirce uses “subject”  in a rather strange way in which
predicates can be subjects. Stjernfelt,  Natural Propositions, 6.10
Hypostatic abstraction. 
I have no objections to raise to your further points. 
John   
ET:  There is nothing wrong with using different te

RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-30 Thread John Collier

Some points interspersed.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, 29 March 2017 11:37 PM
To: tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Edwina, List:

It has never been my intention to insult you, and I have never resorted to 
name-calling as you routinely have.  I have simply expressed my considered 
opinion that your model of sign-action is significantly different from 
Peirce's, and I have provided the reasons why I take that position.  I wish 
that we could have a friendly discussion about this, rather than a debate--and 
that others would join us in doing so--but unfortunately, we cannot seem to get 
past our directly opposing convictions.

ET:  I use Peirce's term of 'representamen'  rather than 'sign' to acknowledge 
the unique role in the triad; that mediative function/action in the triadic set 
- and to differentiate it from the WHOLE Sign, the triad.

Again, Peirce does not define the Sign as a triad (or a triadic function) that 
includes the Representamen; rather, he defines it as the Representamen, the 
first correlate of a triadic relation.  The Object and Interpretant are not 
additional parts of the Sign, they are the other two correlates in that triadic 
relation.  To me, this is absolutely fundamental to Peircean semeiosis, so any 
model that denies it is by definition non-Peircean.
[John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be confusing.

ET:  As I've often said, none of the parts of this triad exist 'per se' on 
their own. They are not each 'subjects' in their own right and I disagree that 
each is 'a constituent in their own universe'. I don't consider that the three 
modal categories are 'universes'.

Of course they "exist," albeit only when they are in the mode of 2ns.  Peirce 
explicitly referred to the Sign/Representamen, Object, and Interpretant as 
"subjects" (EP 2:411); and he explicitly called the three modal categories 
"Universes" (EP 2:478-479); and he explicitly stated that the Sign, both 
Objects, all three Interpretants, and their relations are all constituents of 
one or another Universe (EP 2:480-490).  Hence your disagreement on these 
matters is with him, not just with me.
[John Collier] I suspect that Peirce meant universe of discourse, which is 
quite a different thing from a universe (as in, say, Popper). Peirce uses 
“subject” in a rather strange way in which predicates can be subjects. 
Stjernfelt, Natural Propositions, 6.10 Hypostatic abstraction.

I have no objections to raise to your further points.

John

ET:  There is nothing wrong with using different terms.

I agree!  My issue is with (a) using the same terms that Peirce did, but then 
assigning different definitions to them; and (b) using different terms, but 
then claiming that your model is the same as Peirce's.

ET:  With regard to 'habits of formation' - what the heck do you think those 
'habits' are doing?

What I am questioning is your definition of the Representamen as "a set of 
habits of formation."  I do not see where Peirce ever associates the 
Representamen with habits.  Rather, he identifies a habit as a final logical 
Interpretant, precisely because it does not act as a Representamen to determine 
any further logical Interpretants (EP 2:418).

ET:  As Peirce notes, 1.414, a 'bundle of habits' is a 'thing' or a substance. 
That seems pretty clear to me that this 'bundle of habits FORMS the thing.

Saying that bundles of habits are substances (as Peirce did) is not the same as 
saying that bundles of habits form substances (as you do).  When they are 
Existents (mode of 2ns), Representamina, Objects, and Interpretants are all 
bundles of habits in this sense.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 3:30 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote:

Jon - I will say this only once; I won't get into a debate with you.

1) I use Peirce's term of 'representamen'  rather than 'sign' to acknowledge 
the unique role in the triad; that mediative function/action in the triadic set 
- and to differentiate it from the WHOLE Sign, the triad. As I've often said, 
none of the parts of this triad exist 'per se' on their own. They are not each 
'subjects' in their own right  and I disagree that each is 'a constituent in 
their own universe'. I don't consider that the three modal categories are 
'universes'.

You do not differentiate this mediative process; indeed, you rarely refer to it 
as a vital action. Indeed, all you seem to focus on is NAMING the different 
parts of the Sign. But do you examine

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-29 Thread Jerry Rhee

*`when once it is written, every composition trundles about everywhere in
the same way, in the presence both of those who know about the subject and
of those who have nothing at all to do with it.. ~ *Phaedrus



*Few persons care to study logic, because everybody conceives himself to be
proficient enough in the art of reasoning already. But I observe that this
satisfaction is limited to one's own ratiocination, and does not extend to
that of other men.* ~ Fixation of belief


Best,
Jerry R

On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 4:36 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> It has never been my intention to insult you, and I have never resorted to
> name-calling as you routinely have.  I have simply expressed my considered
> opinion that your model of sign-action is significantly different from
> Peirce's, and I have provided the reasons why I take that position.  I wish
> that we could have a friendly discussion about this, rather than a
> debate--and that others would join us in doing so--but unfortunately, we
> cannot seem to get past our directly opposing convictions.
>
> ET:  I use Peirce's term of 'representamen'  rather than 'sign' to
> acknowledge the unique role in the triad; that mediative function/action in
> the triadic set - and to differentiate it from the WHOLE Sign, the triad.
>
>
> Again, Peirce does not define the Sign as a *triad *(or a triadic
> *function*) that *includes *the Representamen; rather, he defines it *as *the
> Representamen, the first correlate of a triadic *relation*.  The Object
> and Interpretant are not *additional parts *of the Sign, they are the *other
> two* *correlates *in that triadic relation.  To me, this is absolutely
> fundamental to Peircean semeiosis, so any model that denies it is by
> definition non-Peircean.
>
> ET:  As I've often said, none of the parts of this triad exist 'per se' on
> their own. They are not each 'subjects' in their own right and I disagree
> that each is 'a constituent in their own universe'. I don't consider that
> the three modal categories are 'universes'.
>
>
> Of course they "exist," albeit only when they are in the mode of 2ns.
> Peirce explicitly referred to the Sign/Representamen, Object, and
> Interpretant as "subjects" (EP 2:411); and he explicitly called the three
> modal categories "Universes" (EP 2:478-479); and he explicitly stated that
> the Sign, both Objects, all three Interpretants, and their relations are
> all constituents of one or another Universe (EP 2:480-490).  Hence your
> disagreement on these matters is with him, not just with me.
>
> ET:  There is nothing wrong with using different terms.
>
>
> I agree!  My issue is with (a) using the same terms that Peirce did, but
> then assigning different definitions to them; and (b) using different
> terms, but then claiming that your model is the same as Peirce's.
>
> ET:  With regard to 'habits of formation' - what the heck do you think
> those 'habits' are doing?
>
>
> What I am questioning is your definition of the Representamen as "a set of
> habits of formation."  I do not see where Peirce ever associates the
> Representamen with habits.  Rather, he identifies a habit as a final
> logical *Interpretant*, precisely because it *does not* act as a
> Representamen to determine any *further* logical Interpretants (EP 2:418).
>
> ET:  As Peirce notes, 1.414, a 'bundle of habits' is a 'thing' or a
> substance. That seems pretty clear to me that this 'bundle of habits FORMS
> the thing.
>
>
> Saying that bundles of habits *are *substances (as Peirce did) is not the
> same as saying that bundles of habits *form *substances (as you do).
> When they are Existents (mode of 2ns), Representamina, Objects, and
> Interpretants are *all *bundles of habits in this sense.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 3:30 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>>
>> Jon - I will say this only once; I won't get into a debate with you.
>>
>> 1) I use Peirce's term of 'representamen'  rather than 'sign' to
>> acknowledge the unique role in the triad; that mediative function/action in
>> the triadic set - and to differentiate it from the WHOLE Sign, the triad.
>> As I've often said, none of the parts of this triad exist 'per se' on their
>> own. They are not each 'subjects' in their own right  and I disagree that
>> each is 'a constituent in their own universe'. I don't consider that the
>> three modal categories are 'universes'.
>>
>> You do not differentiate this mediative process; indeed, you rarely refer
>> to it as a vital action. Indeed, all you seem to focus on is NAMING the
>> different parts of the Sign. But do you examine the dynamic PROCESS that is
>> going on?
>>
>> I consider that the Sign as a whole is a triadic FUNCTION. Actions are
>> going on in that triad! It's not a static or mechanical process!
>>
>> 2) There is nothing wrong with using different terms. With regard to
>> 'habits of formation' - what the heck do you think those 'habits' are
>> doing? Do you deny that ther

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-29 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Edwina, List:

It has never been my intention to insult you, and I have never resorted to
name-calling as you routinely have.  I have simply expressed my considered
opinion that your model of sign-action is significantly different from
Peirce's, and I have provided the reasons why I take that position.  I wish
that we could have a friendly discussion about this, rather than a
debate--and that others would join us in doing so--but unfortunately, we
cannot seem to get past our directly opposing convictions.

ET:  I use Peirce's term of 'representamen'  rather than 'sign' to
acknowledge the unique role in the triad; that mediative function/action in
the triadic set - and to differentiate it from the WHOLE Sign, the triad.

Again, Peirce does not define the Sign as a *triad *(or a triadic *function*)
that *includes *the Representamen; rather, he defines it *as *the
Representamen, the first correlate of a triadic *relation*.  The Object and
Interpretant are not *additional parts *of the Sign, they are the *other
two* *correlates *in that triadic relation.  To me, this is absolutely
fundamental to Peircean semeiosis, so any model that denies it is by
definition non-Peircean.

ET:  As I've often said, none of the parts of this triad exist 'per se' on
their own. They are not each 'subjects' in their own right and I disagree
that each is 'a constituent in their own universe'. I don't consider that
the three modal categories are 'universes'.

Of course they "exist," albeit only when they are in the mode of 2ns.
Peirce explicitly referred to the Sign/Representamen, Object, and
Interpretant as "subjects" (EP 2:411); and he explicitly called the three
modal categories "Universes" (EP 2:478-479); and he explicitly stated that
the Sign, both Objects, all three Interpretants, and their relations are
all constituents of one or another Universe (EP 2:480-490).  Hence your
disagreement on these matters is with him, not just with me.

ET:  There is nothing wrong with using different terms.

I agree!  My issue is with (a) using the same terms that Peirce did, but
then assigning different definitions to them; and (b) using different
terms, but then claiming that your model is the same as Peirce's.

ET:  With regard to 'habits of formation' - what the heck do you think
those 'habits' are doing?

What I am questioning is your definition of the Representamen as "a set of
habits of formation."  I do not see where Peirce ever associates the
Representamen with habits.  Rather, he identifies a habit as a final
logical *Interpretant*, precisely because it *does not* act as a
Representamen to determine any *further* logical Interpretants (EP 2:418).

ET:  As Peirce notes, 1.414, a 'bundle of habits' is a 'thing' or a
substance. That seems pretty clear to me that this 'bundle of habits FORMS
the thing.

Saying that bundles of habits *are *substances (as Peirce did) is not the
same as saying that bundles of habits *form *substances (as you do).  When
they are Existents (mode of 2ns), Representamina, Objects, and
Interpretants are *all *bundles of habits in this sense.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 3:30 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

>
> Jon - I will say this only once; I won't get into a debate with you.
>
> 1) I use Peirce's term of 'representamen'  rather than 'sign' to
> acknowledge the unique role in the triad; that mediative function/action in
> the triadic set - and to differentiate it from the WHOLE Sign, the triad.
> As I've often said, none of the parts of this triad exist 'per se' on their
> own. They are not each 'subjects' in their own right  and I disagree that
> each is 'a constituent in their own universe'. I don't consider that the
> three modal categories are 'universes'.
>
> You do not differentiate this mediative process; indeed, you rarely refer
> to it as a vital action. Indeed, all you seem to focus on is NAMING the
> different parts of the Sign. But do you examine the dynamic PROCESS that is
> going on?
>
> I consider that the Sign as a whole is a triadic FUNCTION. Actions are
> going on in that triad! It's not a static or mechanical process!
>
> 2) There is nothing wrong with using different terms. With regard to
> 'habits of formation' - what the heck do you think those 'habits' are
> doing? Do you deny that there are 'habits'? I'm sure you don't, as Peirce
> uses the term! But to what purpose is that habit? You ignore this. What's
> going on in the world that is due to habit-taking? Why don't you explore
> this? Do you think that an atom has no continuity of type? That this
> continuity of type doesn't provide it with a continuity of behaviour? That
> this continuity of type doesn't differentiate it from another atom?  WHY do
> habits exist? You don't examine this.
>
> As Peirce notes, 1.414, a 'bundle of habits' is a 'thing' or a substance.
> That seems pretty clear to me that this 'bundle of habits FORMS the thing.
>
> And, as he notes [1.22] "The embryonic being for Aristotle was the being
> he

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 Jon - I will say this only once; I won't get into a debate with you.

1) I use Peirce's term of 'representamen'  rather than 'sign' to
acknowledge the unique role in the triad; that mediative
function/action in the triadic set - and to differentiate it from the
WHOLE Sign, the triad. As I've often said, none of the parts of this
triad exist 'per se' on their own. They are not each 'subjects' in
their own right  and I disagree that each is 'a constituent in their
own universe'. I don't consider that the three modal categories are
'universes'.

You do not differentiate this mediative process; indeed, you rarely
refer to it as a vital action. Indeed, all you seem to focus on is
NAMING the different parts of the Sign. But do you examine the
dynamic PROCESS that is going on?

I consider that the Sign as a whole is a triadic FUNCTION. Actions
are going on in that triad! It's not a static or mechanical process!

2) There is nothing wrong with using different terms. With regard to
'habits of formation' - what the heck do you think those 'habits' are
doing? Do you deny that there are 'habits'? I'm sure you don't, as
Peirce uses the term! But to what purpose is that habit? You ignore
this. What's going on in the world that is due to habit-taking? Why
don't you explore this? Do you think that an atom has no continuity
of type? That this continuity of type doesn't provide it with a
continuity of behaviour? That this continuity of type doesn't
differentiate it from another atom?  WHY do habits exist? You don't
examine this.

As Peirce notes, 1.414, a 'bundle of habits' is a 'thing' or a
substance. That seems pretty clear to me that this 'bundle of habits
FORMS the thing. 

And, as he notes [1.22] "The embryonic being for Aristotle was the
being he called matter, which is alike in all things, and which in
the course of its development took on form. Form is an element having
a different mode of beingMy view is that there are three modes of
being" 1.22. Here Peirce is referring to the FORM that matter takes
on, i.e., within the three categorical modes of Firstness, Secondness
and Thirdness. 

You seem to focus only on the words and don't examine what they mean
in actual actions and in the actual formation of matter.

Again- there's no point in arguing about this - as you will resort
to insults [telling me that I am 'non-Peircean']...and such
interactions are not a productive debate.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Wed 29/03/17  3:48 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 ET:  As I've said repeatedly - the key factor of Peircean semiosis
is that it is not mechanical or linear but enables an understanding
of complex morphological generation which is enabled by constant
transformative RELATIONS between TRIADIC PROCESSES. Again, the full
triad is the SIGN. None of the other 'parts' of the triadic SIGN
exist 'per se' on their own. They only function - as functions -
within the full triadic interaction. 
 This is what I personally have a hard time recognizing as Peircean
semeiosis, which is certainly not mechanical or linear--i.e.,
dyadic--but I understand it to be a matter of triadic relations,
rather than relations between triadic processes.  Again, the Sign is
not a triadic function, it is one participant in an irreducibly
triadic relation.  The Sign (or Representamen), the Object (Dynamic
and Immediate), and the Interpretant (Immediate, Dynamic, and Final)
are not  themselves relations, they are all real subjects from a
logical and metaphysical standpoint.  Each of them, as well as their
relations to each other, can be a constituent of any of the three
Universes--a Possible (1ns), an Existent (2ns), or a Necessitant
(3ns).  The Sign itself is a qualisign/mark, sinsign/token, or
legisign/type.  The Sign's relation to its Object is what makes it an
icon, index, or symbol.  The Sign's relation to its Interpretant is
what makes it a rheme, dicent, or argument. 
 I find all of this to be fully consistent with a straightforward
reading of Peirce's extensive writings on semeiosis.  At the risk of
being labeled once more as "literal-bound," a quick search of the
Collected Papers turns up zero instances of "habit(s) of formation,"
"morphological generation," "triadic process," or "triadic function."
 While these are evidently "key factors" in Taborskyan semiosis, to me
this suggests rather strongly that  Peircean semeiosis has nothing to
do with any of them.  On the other hand, "triadic relation" appears
84 times.  What is unscientific or arrogant about simply stating what
the textual evidence clearly indicates to me?  You express just as
much certainty about the validity of your views as I do about mine.
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt -

Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

 
 Helmut - yes, my apologies, you are quite right about the benefits
of using different terms. My problem was that I wasn't sure what YOU
meant by the term 'fact'.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Wed 29/03/17  3:27 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  Edwina, List, Most of your post I dont see contradicting what I
wrote, except that you are against "mapping the semantic movement of
one term to another term". But why not trying to translate, if it
helps interdisciplinarity? Philosophers and lay persons talk about
"truth", "facts", "things", "concepts", and so on, and disagree with
each other all the time, often because their analysis is dyadic. So
why not make Peircean thinking more available by translating some of
his terms into common speech? I guess the net gain will be higher
than to ask everybody to learn Peirces terms and their meanings
first, because maybe they wont. And for myself a sort of internalized
dictionary is good too, so I do not always have to switch between the
term sets, when I read or think about one time Peircean and the other
time non-Peircean concepts. Best, Helmut 29. März 2017 um 19:28
Uhr
 Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
 Helmut, list -  I'm not exactly sure what you mean by a 'fact'. I
think that is introducing another set of semantics into the Peircean
framework and I'm not sure that it has any function. 

Again, the Dynamic Object functions ONLY within the triadic process
of semiosis. It doesn't 'exist' per se. Certainly, objective reality
exists but - within a semiosic process. That insect is objectively
'real', but it functions within a semiosic process made up of the
basic triad: Object-Representamen-Interpretant. And we can  fine-tune
that into Dynamic Object-Immediate Object/Representamen/
Immediate-Dynamic-Final Interpretants. 

So- the insect, in interaction with the bird watching it - functions
as a Dynamic Object within the bird's awareness of it. And...an
Immediate Object..which is transformed by the bird's 'mind' into an
Immediate and Dynamic Interpretant of 'possible food'. 

But, the insect is itself presenting itself as a Dynamic
Interpretant of the biological processes that resulted in its actual
existence as 'that insect'. 

And of course, the other semiosic processes are included: the habits
of morphological formation held within the Representamen of both the
insect and bird. 

AND - increase the complexity by acknowledging that each 'part' can
be in a different categorical mode [Firstness, Secondness,
Thirdness]. 

As I've said repeatedly - the key factor of Peircean semiosis is
that it is not mechanical or linear but enables an understanding of
complex morphological generation which is enabled by constant
transformative RELATIONS between TRIADIC PROCESSES. Again, the full
triad is the SIGN. None of the other 'parts' of the triadic SIGN
exist 'per se' on their own. They only function - as functions -
within the full triadic interaction. 

There is no  point, in my view, of analyzing Peirce as 'just another
set of terms'  used in mapping the semantic movement of one term to
another term. - the key concept in Peirce is that it sets up an
infrastructure enabling complex morphological transformations of
'meaning -to-meaning' . One morphology to another morphology. 

Someone else who ventured into this area, is Spencer Brown, with his
Laws of Form. As he wrote: 

"the theme of this book is that a universe comes into being when a
space is severed or taken apart. The skin of a living organism cuts
off an outside from an inside. So does the circumference of a circle
in a plane. By tracing the way we represent such a severance, we can
begin to reconstruct, with an accuracy and coverage that appear
almost uncanny, the basic forms underlying linguistic, mathematical,
physical, and biological science, and can being to see how the
familiar laws of our own experience follow inexorably from the
original act of severance". [1973:v]. 

Now - that sounds VERY similar to Peirce's cosmological outline
[1.412] of the emergence of the FORMS within the universe. [See his A
Guess at the Riddle]. 

And, as Spencer Brown acknowledges the influence of Peirce - one can
see that influence throughout his remarkable book. 

Edwina 
 --
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
 largest alternative telecommunications provider.
 http://www.primus.ca [1]
 On Wed 29/03/17 1:05 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:   
Edwina, Maybe the dynamical object of a sign is not identical with a
certain fact: It is the fact for the sign, and the fact is not
exactly the d.o., it is the d.o only in the sign, and the fact is
much more, eg. the interpretant in another sign. So it is only
correct to say: "The dynamical object is a fact", if this "is" is not
m

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-29 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Edwina, List:

ET:  As I've said repeatedly - the key factor of Peircean semiosis is that
it is not mechanical or linear but enables an understanding of complex
morphological generation which is enabled by constant transformative
RELATIONS between TRIADIC PROCESSES. Again, the full triad is the SIGN.
None of the other 'parts' of the triadic SIGN exist 'per se' on their own.
They only function - as functions - within the full triadic interaction.

This is what I personally have a hard time recognizing as *Peircean *semeiosis,
which is certainly not mechanical or linear--i.e., dyadic--but I understand
it to be a matter of *triadic relations*, rather than *relations between
triadic processes*.  Again, the Sign is not a triadic *function*, it is one
participant in an irreducibly triadic *relation*.  The Sign (or
Representamen), the Object (Dynamic and Immediate), and the Interpretant
(Immediate, Dynamic, and Final) are not *themselves *relations, they are
all real *subjects* from a logical and metaphysical standpoint.  Each of
them, as well as their relations *to each other*, can be a constituent of
any of the three Universes--a Possible (1ns), an Existent (2ns), or a
Necessitant (3ns).  The Sign itself is a qualisign/mark, sinsign/token, or
legisign/type.  The Sign's relation to its Object is what makes it an icon,
index, or symbol.  The Sign's relation to its Interpretant is what makes it
a rheme, dicent, or argument.

I find all of this to be fully consistent with a straightforward reading of
Peirce's extensive writings on semeiosis.  At the risk of being labeled
once more as "literal-bound," a quick search of the Collected Papers turns
up zero instances of "habit(s) of formation," "morphological generation,"
"triadic process," or "triadic function."  While these are evidently "key
factors" in *Taborskyan *semiosis, to me this suggests rather strongly
that *Peircean
*semeiosis has nothing to do with any of them.  On the other hand, "triadic
relation" appears 84 times.  What is unscientific or arrogant about simply
stating what the textual evidence clearly indicates to me?  You express
just as much certainty about the validity of your views as I do about mine.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 12:28 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> Helmut, list -  I'm not exactly sure what you mean by a 'fact'. I think
> that is introducing another set of semantics into the Peircean framework
> and I'm not sure that it has any function.
>
> Again, the Dynamic Object functions ONLY within the triadic process of
> semiosis. It doesn't 'exist' per se. Certainly, objective reality exists
> but - within a semiosic process. That insect is objectively 'real', but it
> functions within a semiosic process made up of the basic triad:
> Object-Representamen-Interpretant. And we can  fine-tune that into
> Dynamic Object-Immediate Object/Representamen/ Immediate-Dynamic-Final
> Interpretants.
>
> So- the insect, in interaction with the bird watching it - functions as a
> Dynamic Object within the bird's awareness of it. And...an Immediate
> Object..which is transformed by the bird's 'mind' into an Immediate and
> Dynamic Interpretant of 'possible food'.
>
> But, the insect is itself presenting itself as a Dynamic Interpretant of
> the biological processes that resulted in its actual existence as 'that
> insect'.
>
> And of course, the other semiosic processes are included: the habits of
> morphological formation held within the Representamen of both the insect
> and bird.
>
> AND - increase the complexity by acknowledging that each 'part' can be in
> a different categorical mode [Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness].
>
> As I've said repeatedly - the key factor of Peircean semiosis is that it
> is not mechanical or linear but enables an understanding of complex
> morphological generation which is enabled by constant transformative
> RELATIONS between TRIADIC PROCESSES. Again, the full triad is the SIGN.
> None of the other 'parts' of the triadic SIGN exist 'per se' on their own.
> They only function - as functions - within the full triadic interaction.
>
> There is no  point, in my view, of analyzing Peirce as 'just another set
> of terms'  used in mapping the semantic movement of one term to another
> term. - the key concept in Peirce is that it sets up an infrastructure
> enabling complex morphological transformations of 'meaning -to-meaning' .
> One morphology to another morphology.
>
> Someone else who ventured into this area, is Spencer Brown, with his Laws
> of Form. As he wrote:
>
> "the theme of this book is that a universe comes into being when a space
> is severed or taken apart. The skin of a living organism cuts off an
> outside from an inside. So does the circumference of a circle in a plane.
> By tracing the way we represent such a severance, we can begin to
> recon

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-29 Thread Helmut Raulien

Edwina, List,

Most of your post I dont see contradicting what I wrote, except that you are against "mapping the semantic movement of one term to another term". But why not trying to translate, if it helps interdisciplinarity? Philosophers and lay persons talk about "truth", "facts", "things", "concepts", and so on, and disagree with each other all the time, often because their analysis is dyadic. So why not make Peircean thinking more available by translating some of his terms into common speech? I guess the net gain will be higher than to ask everybody to learn Peirces terms and their meanings first, because maybe they wont. And for myself a sort of internalized dictionary is good too, so I do not always have to switch between the term sets, when I read or think about one time Peircean and the other time non-Peircean concepts.

Best,

Helmut

29. März 2017 um 19:28 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"

Helmut, list - I'm not exactly sure what you mean by a 'fact'. I think that is introducing another set of semantics into the Peircean framework and I'm not sure that it has any function.

Again, the Dynamic Object functions ONLY within the triadic process of semiosis. It doesn't 'exist' per se. Certainly, objective reality exists but - within a semiosic process. That insect is objectively 'real', but it functions within a semiosic process made up of the basic triad: Object-Representamen-Interpretant. And we can fine-tune that into Dynamic Object-Immediate Object/Representamen/ Immediate-Dynamic-Final Interpretants.

So- the insect, in interaction with the bird watching it - functions as a Dynamic Object within the bird's awareness of it. And...an Immediate Object..which is transformed by the bird's 'mind' into an Immediate and Dynamic Interpretant of 'possible food'.

But, the insect is itself presenting itself as a Dynamic Interpretant of the biological processes that resulted in its actual existence as 'that insect'.

And of course, the other semiosic processes are included: the habits of morphological formation held within the Representamen of both the insect and bird.

AND - increase the complexity by acknowledging that each 'part' can be in a different categorical mode [Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness].

As I've said repeatedly - the key factor of Peircean semiosis is that it is not mechanical or linear but enables an understanding of complex morphological generation which is enabled by constant transformative RELATIONS between TRIADIC PROCESSES. Again, the full triad is the SIGN. None of the other 'parts' of the triadic SIGN exist 'per se' on their own. They only function - as functions - within the full triadic interaction.

There is no point, in my view, of analyzing Peirce as 'just another set of terms' used in mapping the semantic movement of one term to another term. - the key concept in Peirce is that it sets up an infrastructure enabling complex morphological transformations of 'meaning -to-meaning' . One morphology to another morphology.

Someone else who ventured into this area, is Spencer Brown, with his Laws of Form. As he wrote:

"the theme of this book is that a universe comes into being when a space is severed or taken apart. The skin of a living organism cuts off an outside from an inside. So does the circumference of a circle in a plane. By tracing the way we represent such a severance, we can begin to reconstruct, with an accuracy and coverage that appear almost uncanny, the basic forms underlying linguistic, mathematical, physical, and biological science, and can being to see how the familiar laws of our own experience follow inexorably from the original act of severance". [1973:v].

Now - that sounds VERY similar to Peirce's cosmological outline [1.412] of the emergence of the FORMS within the universe. [See his A Guess at the Riddle].

And, as Spencer Brown acknowledges the influence of Peirce - one can see that influence throughout his remarkable book.

Edwina

--
This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
largest alternative telecommunications provider.

http://www.primus.ca

On Wed 29/03/17 1:05 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:

Edwina,

Maybe the dynamical object of a sign is not identical with a certain fact: It is the fact for the sign, and the fact is not exactly the d.o., it is the d.o only in the sign, and the fact is much more, eg. the interpretant in another sign.

So it is only correct to say: "The dynamical object is a fact", if this "is" is not meant as identity, but as being a subset of something, like when we say: "A human is a mammal".

Best,

Helmut

29. März 2017 um 14:33 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"

Helmut - the point to remember about Peircean semiosis is that it is dynamic; it sets up an active process of informational transformation. This is non-linear, so it is an error, I feel, to view Peircean semiosis as a step-by-step action, i.e., a linear movement from Object to Representamen to Interpretant. This view

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

 
 Helmut, list -  I'm not exactly sure what you mean by a 'fact'. I
think that is introducing another set of semantics into the Peircean
framework and I'm not sure that it has any function.

Again, the Dynamic Object functions ONLY within the triadic process
of semiosis. It doesn't 'exist' per se. Certainly, objective reality
exists but - within a semiosic process. That insect is objectively
'real', but it functions within a semiosic process made up of the
basic triad: Object-Representamen-Interpretant. And we can  fine-tune
that into Dynamic Object-Immediate Object/Representamen/
Immediate-Dynamic-Final Interpretants.

So- the insect, in interaction with the bird watching it - functions
as a Dynamic Object within the bird's awareness of it. And...an
Immediate Object..which is transformed by the bird's 'mind' into an
Immediate and Dynamic Interpretant of 'possible food'.

But, the insect is itself presenting itself as a Dynamic
Interpretant of the biological processes that resulted in its actual
existence as 'that insect'. 

And of course, the other semiosic processes are included: the habits
of morphological formation held within the Representamen of both the
insect and bird.

AND - increase the complexity by acknowledging that each 'part' can
be in a different categorical mode [Firstness, Secondness,
Thirdness].

As I've said repeatedly - the key factor of Peircean semiosis is
that it is not mechanical or linear but enables an understanding of
complex morphological generation which is enabled by constant
transformative RELATIONS between TRIADIC PROCESSES. Again, the full
triad is the SIGN. None of the other 'parts' of the triadic SIGN
exist 'per se' on their own. They only function - as functions -
within the full triadic interaction.

There is no  point, in my view, of analyzing Peirce as 'just another
set of terms'  used in mapping the semantic movement of one term to
another term. - the key concept in Peirce is that it sets up an
infrastructure enabling complex morphological transformations of
'meaning -to-meaning' . One morphology to another morphology. 

Someone else who ventured into this area, is Spencer Brown, with his
Laws of Form. As he wrote: 

"the theme of this book is that a universe comes into being when a
space is severed or taken apart. The skin of a living organism cuts
off an outside from an inside. So does the circumference of a circle
in a plane. By tracing the way we represent such a severance, we can
begin to reconstruct, with an accuracy and coverage that appear
almost uncanny, the basic forms underlying linguistic, mathematical,
physical, and biological science, and can being to see how the
familiar laws of our own experience follow inexorably from the
original act of severance". [1973:v].

Now - that sounds VERY similar to Peirce's cosmological outline
[1.412] of the emergence of the FORMS within the universe. [See his A
Guess at the Riddle].

And, as Spencer Brown acknowledges the influence of Peirce - one can
see that influence throughout his remarkable book.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Wed 29/03/17  1:05 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  Edwina, Maybe the dynamical object of a sign is not identical with
a certain fact: It is the fact for the sign, and the fact is not
exactly the d.o., it is the d.o only in the sign, and the fact is
much more, eg. the interpretant in another sign. So it is only
correct to say: "The dynamical object is a fact", if this "is" is not
meant as identity, but as being a subset of something, like when we
say: "A human is a mammal". Best, Helmut 29. März 2017 um 14:33
Uhr
 Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
Helmut - the point to remember about Peircean semiosis is that it is
dynamic; it sets up an active process of informational transformation.
This is non-linear, so it is an error, I feel, to view Peircean
semiosis as a step-by-step action, i.e., a linear movement from
Object to Representamen to Interpretant. This view negates the
dynamic power of the Peircean framework. 

Instead, a Dynamic Object - which is only a Dynamic Object because
it is currently functioning within a semiosic process where it IS the
Dynamic Object..well, this same Dynamic Object could be at the same
time operating in another semiosic process...where it is functioning
as the Dynamic Interpretant. And both processes are developing that
mediation process of the Representamen. 

If you think of it, Peirce used this dynamic functionalism right
from the start; that is - in his cosmology, [1.412] where he outlines
the beginning of the universe as a Process of the emergence of
instantiations of matter, and then, the development of habits of
formation of this matter; and the outline of how these particular
'bits' interact with each other;

Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-29 Thread Helmut Raulien

Edwina,

So it is only correct to say: "The dynamical object is a fact", if this "is" is not meant as identity, but as being a subset of something, like when we say: "A human is a mammal".

Best,

Helmut

29. März 2017 um 14:33 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"

Instead, a Dynamic Object - which is only a Dynamic Object because it is currently functioning within a semiosic process where it IS the Dynamic Object..well, this same Dynamic Object could be at the same time operating in another semiosic process...where it is functioning as the Dynamic Interpretant. And both processes are developing that mediation process of the Representamen.

If you think of it, Peirce used this dynamic functionalism right from the start; that is - in his cosmology, [1.412] where he outlines the beginning of the universe as a Process of the emergence of instantiations of matter, and then, the development of habits of formation of this matter; and the outline of how these particular 'bits' interact with each other; how Thirdness functions to stabilize these processes...and so on. How Firstness functions to introduce novelty and diversity.

All other outlines of semiotics and semiology, i.e., non-Peircean, ignore this complex dynamism of the Peircean framework. They operate almost completely within the linguistic or within the human conceptual framework and focus on that linear movement from 'this' to 'that'. As such, they are used to suggest 'hidden meanings' and 'the unconscious'. But they have nothing to do with the actual morphology of matter as an action of Mind and can't be used within the biological and physic-chemical realms. The Peircean framework is basic, in my view, to these realms...and I admit that I'm not much interested in using Peirce within the linguistic or human conceptual analysis.

Edwina

--
This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
largest alternative telecommunications provider.

http://www.primus.ca

On Wed 29/03/17 3:35 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:

Edwina,

I agree. By "the sign" (and farer down "subsign") I didnt mean any sign or the phaneron, but the sign of which the dynamical object is a dynamical object.

Best,

Helmut

29. März 2017 um 01:57 Uhr

Von: "Edwina Taborsky"

Helmut - it depends what you mean by 'sign'. The Dynamic Object is external to another Dynamic Object! But, in my view, since 'everything is in Signs' then, everything functions within a triadic set of relations: the Object-Representamen-Interpretant.

The Dynamic Object is, when it is named as such, is already in a semiosic interaction with another Object. So- it could be one molecule in interaction with another molecule. Of an insect in interaction with a flower. The interaction sets up, within each of them [each Dynamic Object] an Immediate Object. This is transformed by the habits-of-mediation in each of them [the Representamen]and both 'produce' an Immediate and Dynamic Interpretant.

So- the two molecules are both transformed - and might become one larger molecule. Both are transformed.

And the insect interprets the nectar of the flower as food. The flower interprets the contact of the insect as pollination. Both are transformed.

Edwina

--
This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
largest alternative telecommunications provider.

http://www.primus.ca

On Tue 28/03/17 7:03 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:

Jon, Edwina, List,

I think, the dynamical object must be external from the sign, because all other parts, or, less mechanicallly spoken, aspects, of it are internal of it. And, if nothing at all would be external from the sign, the sign would have no connection to other signs and be idiosyncratic.

I guess, that the dyn. object is an external entity from the perspective of the sign (a fact), but an interpretant of another, usually slower, supersign.

Which kind of interpretant, I guess, refers to which kind of dynamical object it provides:

A final interpretant of the slower supersign provides to the subsign a dyn. object which is something that has happened or been in the past,

a dynamical interpretant forms eg. a dyn. object which is a material thing,

an immediate interpretant forms a d.o. which is a concept.

About the fourth kind of dynamical objects, metaphysical laws and axioms, I cannot say or guess anything but that th

Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term