Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?
Gary F, List, The distinction between these two ways of thinking about the phenomenological categories (matter and form) is present, I think, in the passage quoted. When you strive to get the purest conceptions you can of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, thinking of quality, reaction, and mediation – what you are striving to apprehend is pure Firstness, the Firstness of Secondness -- that is what Secondness is, of itself -- and the Firstness of Thirdness. (CP 1.530). The material categories of quality, reaction and mediation are the familiar categories that we readily find in common experience. The question is: are these common conceptions really fundamental as universal categories or not? Peirce suggests that it is an open question as to whether or not these material categories correspond in some way with the formal tones of thought that have the character of what he calls firstness, secondness and thirdness. These tones of thought have the form of elemental monadic, dyadic and triadic relations. That, at least, is how I read the writings between, say, 1896-1903 when he is developing the phenomenological account of the categories in a more refined manner--as a separate kind of philosophical theory. On my reading of the relevant texts, all of the observations, conceptions and valid forms of inference that any cognitive agent might employ to learn something about the world involve compositions of these three formal relations--no more and no less. If this claim is on the right track, then we can formulate a third question: 3. Does inquiry in philosophical logic show that self-controlled reasoning of any kind involves observations of these three formal features (and compositions involving them) in the signs we employ--and nothing more? I think a positive answer to this question is, at the least, a plausible hypothesis. As such, we have sufficient reason to treat examples of good and bad reasoning as data for our logical inquiries, and to focus our analyses on these formal features in the observations that we've gathered as we sort through the data and try to correct the observational errors that might be part and parcel of our data set for our developing theory of logic. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 From: g...@gnusystems.ca Sent: Tuesday, September 11, 2018 1:52 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences? Jeff, I’m puzzled by the fact that the two questions you pose are both about “the formal and material categories,” when by his own account (CP 1.284 for instance), all of Peirce’s phenomenological or phaneroscopic analyses deal with the formal categories (or “formal elements of the phaneron”) and not with the material. Thus your quotation from the Lowell Lectures I take to be entirely about the formal “categories” or “elements.” Perhaps I’m not understanding what you mean by “material categories” or why you see a need to mention both. Can you explain? Does the formal/material distinction have anything to do with how the categories are connected with the modal conceptions? By the way, we need a new subject line for this … Gary f. From: Jeffrey Brian Downard Sent: 11-Sep-18 12:00 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences? Jon S, Gary R, John S, Gary F, List, A question has been raised about the connection between the phenomenological categories of first, second and third, and the modal conceptions of what is possible, existent and (contingently) necessary. Here is one place where Peirce provides a relatively clear explanation of the relation between these tones of thought--considered as formal elements and as material categories--as they are studied in phenomenology and these three modal conceptions. But now I wish to call your attention to a kind of distinction which affects Firstness more than it does Secondness, and Secondness more than it does Thirdness. This distinction arises from the circumstance that where you have a triplet you have three pairs; and where you have a pair, you have two units. Thus, Secondness is an essential part of Thirdness though not of Firstness, and Firstness is an essential element of both Secondness and Thirdness. Hence there is such a thing as the Firstness of Secondness and such a thing as the Firstness of Thirdness; and there is such a thing as the Secondness of Thirdness. But there is no Secondness of pure Firstness and no Thirdness of pure Firstness or Secondness. When you strive to get the purest conceptions you can of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, thinking of quality, reaction, and mediation – what you are striving to apprehend is pure Firstness, the Firstness of Secondness -- that is what Secondness is, of itself -- an
RE: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?
Jeff, I'm puzzled by the fact that the two questions you pose are both about "the formal and material categories," when by his own account (CP 1.284 for instance), all of Peirce's phenomenological or phaneroscopic analyses deal with the formal categories (or "formal elements of the phaneron") and not with the material. Thus your quotation from the Lowell Lectures I take to be entirely about the formal "categories" or "elements." Perhaps I'm not understanding what you mean by "material categories" or why you see a need to mention both. Can you explain? Does the formal/material distinction have anything to do with how the categories are connected with the modal conceptions? By the way, we need a new subject line for this . Gary f. From: Jeffrey Brian Downard Sent: 11-Sep-18 12:00 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences? Jon S, Gary R, John S, Gary F, List, A question has been raised about the connection between the phenomenological categories of first, second and third, and the modal conceptions of what is possible, existent and (contingently) necessary. Here is one place where Peirce provides a relatively clear explanation of the relation between these tones of thought--considered as formal elements and as material categories--as they are studied in phenomenology and these three modal conceptions. But now I wish to call your attention to a kind of distinction which affects Firstness more than it does Secondness, and Secondness more than it does Thirdness. This distinction arises from the circumstance that where you have a triplet you have three pairs; and where you have a pair, you have two units. Thus, Secondness is an essential part of Thirdness though not of Firstness, and Firstness is an essential element of both Secondness and Thirdness. Hence there is such a thing as the Firstness of Secondness and such a thing as the Firstness of Thirdness; and there is such a thing as the Secondness of Thirdness. But there is no Secondness of pure Firstness and no Thirdness of pure Firstness or Secondness. When you strive to get the purest conceptions you can of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, thinking of quality, reaction, and mediation - what you are striving to apprehend is pure Firstness, the Firstness of Secondness -- that is what Secondness is, of itself -- and the Firstness of Thirdness. (CP 1.530). A Firstness is exemplified in every quality of a total feeling. It is perfectly simple and without parts; and everything has its quality. Thus the tragedy of King Lear has its Firstness, its flavor sui generis. That wherein all such qualities agree is universal Firstness, the very being of Firstness. The word possibility fits it, except that possibility implies a relation to what exists, while universal Firstness is the mode of being of itself. That is why a new word was required for it. Otherwise, "possibility" would have answered the purpose. (CP 1.531) We may say with some approach to accuracy that the general Firstness of all true Secondness is existence, though this term more particularly applies to Secondness in so far as it is an element of the reacting first and second. If we mean Secondness as it is an element of the occurrence, the Firstness of it is actuality. But actuality and existence are words expressing the same idea in different applications. Secondness, strictly speaking, is just when and where it takes place, and has no other being; and therefore different Secondnesses, strictly speaking, have in themselves no quality in common. Accordingly, existence, or the universal Firstness of all Secondness, is really not a quality at all. (CP 1.532) I think the following questions about the phenomenological categories are worth considering. 1. If Peirce's grand hypothesis concerning the character of the formal and material categories is plausible then, philosophically speaking, what follows as a consequence? 2. If the phenomenological analysis of the formal and material categories is on track, then how can we use these insights as a guide for philosophical inquiry? Here is a start on question (1). While it might seem something of a leap, I think the phenomenological theory provides the seeds of the arguments needed to show that analytic philosophers such as Quine and Goodman, and continental philosophers such as Derrida and Foucault, are mistaken. That is, these 20th century philosophers are mistaken in claiming that human experience is "radically subjective" in character and, as a result, that there are strong reasons for being skeptical about the possibility of any of us ever really understanding the reference and meaning of one another's expressions. Here is a start on question (2). The phenomenological account of the categories of experience and the methods that are employed
Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?
Jon, list, Jon wrote: JAS: Could you please provide citations where Peirce associated possibility (1ns), existence (2ns), and conditional necessity (3ns) with phenomenology, rather than metaphysics? I understand those to be modes of Being, rather than irreducible elements of experience; I think of the latter as quality (1ns), reaction (2ns), and mediation (3ns) I'll have to split my response up a bit because of time constraints, and so will offer for now only places where Peirce associates 1ns with possibility (I'll take up the other categories in later posts). I agree that Peirce most frequently associates 1ns with quality, but there are other words he uses to distinguish that category from 2ns and 3ns. Here are examples of his associating 1ns with possibility. 1903 | Lowell Lectures on Some Topics of Logic Bearing on Questions Now Vexed. Lecture III [R] | CP 1.25 Firstness is the mode of being which consists in its subject’s being positively such as it is regardless of aught else. That can only be a possibility. For as long as things do not act upon one another there is no sense or meaning in saying that they have any being, unless it be that they are such in themselves that they may perhaps come into relation with others. The mode of being a *redness*, before anything in the universe was yet red, was nevertheless a positive qualitative possibility. And redness in itself, even if it be embodied, is something positive and *sui generis*. That I call Firstness. We naturally attribute Firstness to outward objects, that is we suppose they have capacities in themselves which may or may not be already actualized, which may or may not ever be actualized, although we can know nothing of such possibilities [except] so far as they are actualized. You can see here as well the germ of his also characterizing the categories (first, in a late letter to William James as I recall) as may-be's, is's, and would-bes. So, commenting on (in the quotation above) only of 1ns*: "*We naturally attribute Firstness to outward objects, that is we suppose they have capacities in themselves which *may or may not be* already actualized, which *may or may not ever be* actualized, although *we can know nothing of such possibilities [except] so far as they are actualized.* Perhaps I might better have characterized the first category as that of may-be's (btw, Peirce also writes of can-be's and might-be's). In the quotation below, 1ns is characterized here as being "an abstract possibility" (there is also a passage where he speaks of its "indeterminacy." We *know* 1ns, however, only "immediately," that is, in *present* experience. 1905-06-01 | The Logic Notebook | MS [R] 339:242r *Firstness* is the Mode of Being of that which is such as it is positively and regardless of anything else. It is thus an abstract possibility, It can therefore only be known to us immediately. This final quotation gives *possibility* as one of several ideas in which 1ns is "prominent." 1904 | A Brief Intellectual Autobiography by Charles Sanders Peirce | Peirce, 1983, p. 72; MS [R] L107:22 *Firstness* is the mode or element of being by which any subject is such as it is, *positively* and regardless of everything else; or rather, the category is not bound down to this particular conception but is the element which is characteristic and peculiar in this definition and is a prominent ingredient in the ideas of quality, qualitativeness, absoluteness, originality, variety, chance, possibility, form, essence, feeling, etc. The point of Peirce associating 1ns with possibility is, I think, that while we *may *come to know it most characteristically as "quality," before it is so known it is a mere *qualitative possibility*. JAS: I think of the [irreducible elements of experience] as quality (1ns), reaction (2ns), and mediation (3ns) I mainly do myself. But I also believe that there are reasons to expand our categorial associations to include, not only possibility, but to see 1ns as "a prominent ingredient in the ideas of quality, qualitativeness, absoluteness, originality, variety, chance, possibility, form, essence, feeling, etc." In short, to limit 1ns to "quality" seems to me all too restrictive in a way, perhaps, tending to limit the power of phenomenological thinking about it. In my view, to associate it *only*, or even mainly, with 'quality' might tend to persuade one to gloss over phenomenological 1ns and, so, to plunge willy-nilly into logic as semeiotic with an insufficient sense of how this category finds a place in that science. Still, even more abstract than 'quality' or 'possibility', at its most abstract, it is but a Pythagorean number, 1ns, which "characterization" Peirce would seem to have come to prefer. Yet I think that *that* move actually allows all the associations listed above (and more) to co-mingle in our thinking, perhaps especially our semeiotic thinking. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?
__ From: Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Tuesday, September 11, 2018 6:25 AM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences? Gary R., List: Could you please provide citations where Peirce associated possibility (1ns), existence (2ns), and conditional necessity (3ns) with phenomenology, rather than metaphysics? I understand those to be modes of Being, rather than irreducible elements of experience; I think of the latter as quality (1ns), reaction (2ns), and mediation (3ns). Thanks, Jon S. On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 10:44 PM, Gary Richmond mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>> wrote: Jon, list, Jon wrote: JAS: To clarify, I wholeheartedly agree that the Categories play a significant role throughout Peirce's entire architectonic. The assertion that I questioned was that they are "central to semiotic," which I took to imply that they are somehow more prominent in that branch than others. My understanding is that instead the Categories are most fundamentally phenomenological. Well, of course, and by definition, "the Categories are most fundamentally phenomenological." I BI would hope that goes without saying. But of all the sciences following phenomenology, I believe that the categories are more central to semeiotics than to any of the other cenoscopic sciences, certainly more central there than to esthetics and ethics, metaphysics, the special sciences. JAS: I must point out again that Possibles/Existents/Necessitants are the constituents of three Universes, not Categories, although there is an obvious alignment with 1ns/2ns/3ns. I am no longer convinced that these Universes are truly metaphysical; after all, they are the primary basis for classifying Signs within Speculative Grammar, the first branch of logic as semeiotic. But in Phenomenology Peirce defines 1ns (in part) as the possible, 2ns as the existent, and 3ns with would-be's, that is, what would necessarily be if certain conditions were to come into being and prevailed. Therefore I have to modify my earlier suggestion that these three are essentially metaphysical, but now recall that the are essentially phenomenological. In short, this language of possible/ existent/ necessitant is first introduced in phenomenology. As you noted, all the categories have applications in semeiotic (theoretical grammar in particular) as well as metaphysics. Jon continued: JAS: I continue to be intrigued by Peirce's remark in "New Elements" to the effect that the employment of metaphysical terms and concepts in that context is a kind of hypostatic abstration. CSP: The logician is not concerned with any metaphysical theory; still less, if possible, is the mathematician. But it is highly convenient to express ourselves in terms of a metaphysical theory; and we no more bind ourselves to an acceptance of it than we do when we use substantives such as "humanity," "variety," etc., and speak of them as if they were substances, in the metaphysical sense. (EP 2:304; 1904) As I see it, this is more along the line of Peirce's saying that the sciences lower in the classification can offer examples, perhaps even terminological suggestions, to those above it. But it is the principles of logic as semeiotic which, as you yourself have noted, properly understood and applied, become those of metaphysics. Best, Gary Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York 718 482-5690 On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 10:28 PM Jon Alan Schmidt mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote: Gary R., List: GR: While perhaps "every perception involves signs," as several have noted, signs are not studied in phenomenology but in logic as semeiotic. Representation/mediation (3ns) is one irreducible element of the Phaneron, but so is quality (1ns), and so is reaction (2ns). GR: I think to reduce the application of the cat[eg]ories to the 3ns of signs + "the Universes of Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants," (again, not semeiotic but metaphysical categories) is to reduce almost to absurdity the central importance of the Universal Categories not only to semeiotics but, in my opinion, almost all the sciences which follow it. To clarify, I wholeheartedly agree that the Categories play a significant role throughout Peirce's entire architectonic. The assertion that I questioned was that they are "central to semiotic," which I took to imply that they are somehow more prominent in that branch than others. My understanding is that instead the Categories are most fundamentally phenomenological. I must point out again that Possibles/Existents/Necessitants are the constituents of three Universes, not Categories, although there is an obvious alignment with 1ns/2ns/3ns. I am no longer convinced th
Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?
Gary R., List: Could you please provide citations where Peirce associated possibility (1ns), existence (2ns), and conditional necessity (3ns) with phenomenology, rather than metaphysics? I understand those to be modes of Being, rather than irreducible elements of experience; I think of the latter as quality (1ns), reaction (2ns), and mediation (3ns). Thanks, Jon S. On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 10:44 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > Jon, list, > > Jon wrote: > > JAS: To clarify, I wholeheartedly agree that the Categories play a > significant role throughout Peirce's entire architectonic. The assertion > that I questioned was that they are "central to semiotic," which I took to > imply that they are somehow more prominent in that branch than others. My > understanding is that instead the Categories are most fundamentally > *phenomenological*. > > > Well, of course, and by definition, "the Categories are most > fundamentally *phenomenological*." I BI would hope that goes without > saying. But of all the sciences *following* phenomenology, I believe that > the categories are more central to semeiotics than to any of the other > cenoscopic sciences, certainly more central there than to esthetics and > ethics, metaphysics, the special sciences. > > JAS: I must point out again that Possibles/Existents/Necessitants are the > constituents of three *Universes*, not *Categories*, although there is an > obvious alignment with 1ns/2ns/3ns. I am no longer convinced that these > Universes are truly *metaphysical*; after all, they are the primary basis > for classifying Signs within *Speculative Grammar*, the first branch of *logic > as semeiotic*. > > > But *in* Phenomenology Peirce defines 1ns (in part) as the possible, 2ns > as the existent, and 3ns with would-be's, that is, what would necessarily > be if certain conditions were to come into being and prevailed. Therefore I > have to modify my earlier suggestion that these three are essentially > metaphysical, but now recall that the are essentially phenomenological. In > short, this language of possible/ existent/ necessitant is first > *introduced* in phenomenology. As you noted, all the categories have > applications in semeiotic (theoretical grammar in particular) as well as > metaphysics. Jon continued: > > JAS: I continue to be intrigued by Peirce's remark in "New Elements" to > the effect that the employment of metaphysical terms and concepts in that > context is a kind of *hypostatic abstration*. > > > CSP: The logician is not concerned with any metaphysical theory; still > less, if possible, is the mathematician. But it is highly convenient to > express ourselves in terms of a metaphysical theory; and we no more bind > ourselves to an acceptance of it than we do when we use substantives such > as "humanity," "variety," etc., and speak of them as if they were > substances, in the metaphysical sense. (EP 2:304; 1904) > > > As I see it, this is more along the line of Peirce's saying that the > sciences lower in the classification can offer examples, perhaps even > terminological suggestions, to those above it. But it is the principles of > logic as semeiotic which, as you yourself have noted, properly understood > and applied, become those of metaphysics. > > Best, > > Gary > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > *718 482-5690* > > On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 10:28 PM Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Gary R., List: >> >> GR: While perhaps "every perception involves signs," as several have >> noted, signs are not studied in phenomenology but in logic as semeiotic. >> >> >> Representation/mediation (3ns) is *one *irreducible element of the >> Phaneron, but so is quality (1ns), and so is reaction (2ns). >> >> GR: I think to reduce the application of the cat[eg]ories to the 3ns of >> signs + "the Universes of Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants," (again, >> not semeiotic but metaphysical categories) is to reduce almost to absurdity >> the central importance of the Universal Categories not only to semeiotics >> but, in my opinion, almost all the sciences which follow it. >> >> >> To clarify, I wholeheartedly agree that the Categories play a significant >> role throughout Peirce's entire architectonic. The assertion that I >> questioned was that they are "central to semiotic," which I took to imply >> that they are somehow more prominent in that branch than others. My >> understanding is that instead the Categories are most fundamentally >> *phenomenological*. >> >> I must point out again that Possibles/Existents/Necessitants are the >> constituents of three *Universes*, not *Categories*, although there is >> an obvious alignment with 1ns/2ns/3ns. I am no longer convinced that these >> Universes are truly *metaphysical*; after all, they are the primary >> basis for classifying Signs within *Speculative Grammar*, the first >> branch of *
Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?
John S., List: JFS: Semiotic, the general theory of signs, would also be pure mathematics, either formal or informal. Not according to Peirce; he classified it as a Normative Science. JFS: Semiotic under phenomenology would be an application to perception and recognition of actualities. As Auke noted, phenomenology is the study of *appearances*, not actualities. Actuality is a subset of Reality, and it is *metaphysics *that deals with the Reality of phenomena. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 10:16 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > Jon AS and Gary R, > > JAS > >> Why expect Peirce to mention logic as semeiotic in connection >> with phenomenology, when he explicitly classified it as a >> Normative Science? >> > > To show the relationships more clearly, I attached another copy > of CSPsemiotic.jpg. Note that Peirce placed formal logic under > mathematics and logic under normative science. That is two mentions. > > He mentions it twice because formal logic has no designated application > under mathematics. Its existential quantifiers range of possibilities. > When it is under normative science it is applied to some subject matter > where its variables refer to actualities. In such an application, it > would serve to evaluate truth or falsity. > > In 1887, Peirce wrote about the design of logic machines. But he did > not mention them in his 1903 classifications. If he had, he would > then place logic for theorem proving under a branch of engineering. > That would make three mentions. In general, there is no limit to > the number of sciences that could use the same theory of mathematics > -- including practical science (engineering). > > JFS > >> I believe that semiotic belongs directly under phenomenology, since >>> every perception involves signs. >>> >> > GR > >> While perhaps "every perception involves signs," as several have noted, >> signs are not studied in phenomenology but in logic as semeiotic. >> > > That's a critical distinction. Semiotic, the general theory of > signs, would also be pure mathematics, either formal or informal. > As mathematics, it would refer to possibilities. > > Semiotic under phenomenology would be an application to perception > and recognition of actualities. But it would make no value judgments. > It would be as nonjudgmental as a pattern recognition program. > > To deem some phenomena worthy of study is to make a normative > value judgment. But a bare, nonjudgmental contemplation is like > Buddhist meditation. That is phenomenology prior to any > intentionality. > > As with logic machines, one could use semiotic in a robot that > does some useful work. That would be an application of semiotic > under some branch of engineering. > > John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?
John, Gary R, List, There are two possible ways to proceed the discussion. The first is trying to prove ones position right, the second is trying to understand why the question could appear. Gary's contribution about utens and docens, that I quote, belongs for me to the second way, which I like most. Gary R. I have sometimes thought, and a few times on this list introduced the notion, that this issue might be at least partially resolved by considering more seriously Peirce's distinction between logica utens, the ordinary logic we all use and must use, and logica docens, the formal study of logic as a normative science. -- Yes, and we must not forget that all of the theoretical sciences have an utens and a docens. With math Peirce explicitly discusses it in his billiard player example. I do not recall to have ever found a mention of the utens and docens of phenomenology. That need not wondr us too much because although Peirce in several places discusses phenomenological issues, he was of the opinion that nothing is lost if we do not pay attention to the apprehension of the sign as an object. John: Semiotic under phenomenology would be an application to perception and recognition of actualities. But it would make no value judgments. It would be as nonjudgmental as a pattern recognition program. -- I would argue that: phenomenology is concerned with what appears, semiotics with signs. >From an analytical point of view. Since the sign evolves what is involved and >a sign only can do this by appearing at some point, there seems some overlap >between both sciences. But we must not forget that although the material >objects may overlap the formal don't. John, your suggestion: As with logic machines, one could use semiotic in a robot that does some useful work. -- is interesting. But I would have written one can use semiotics as a blueprint to build a robot. Ronald Stamper, working in the early days of Peirce scholarship when almost all had to be gathered from secondary sources and Morris was having his influence came a long way in making such a blueprint for information systems by developing his semiotic ladder, which also can be regarded as an refinement of Shannon/Weaver's technical, meaning and effectiveness levels or also Morris syntax, semantics and pragmatics. The interesting issue is that your CG properly belong to the meaning level. For the sign aspects pertaining to the sign regarded in itself, for instance, one would have to look for other means like pattern recognition techniques. I will not extend this line of thought but just suggest that the nine sign aspects point the way to what ought to be covered for a robot build according to semiotical principles. Best, Auke -Oorspronkelijk bericht- Van: John F Sowa Verzonden: dinsdag 11 september 2018 5:16 Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences? Jon AS and Gary R, JAS > Why expect Peirce to mention logic as semeiotic in connection with > phenomenology, when he explicitly classified it as a Normative > Science? To show the relationships more clearly, I attached another copy of CSPsemiotic.jpg. Note that Peirce placed formal logic under mathematics and logic under normative science. That is two mentions. He mentions it twice because formal logic has no designated application under mathematics. Its existential quantifiers range of possibilities. When it is under normative science it is applied to some subject matter where its variables refer to actualities. In such an application, it would serve to evaluate truth or falsity. In 1887, Peirce wrote about the design of logic machines. But he did not mention them in his 1903 classifications. If he had, he would then place logic for theorem proving under a branch of engineering. That would make three mentions. In general, there is no limit to the number of sciences that could use the same theory of mathematics -- including practical science (engineering). JFS >> I believe that semiotic belongs directly under phenomenology, since >> every perception involves signs. GR > While perhaps "every perception involves signs," as several have > noted, signs are not studied in phenomenology but in logic as semeiotic. That's a critical distinction. Semiotic, the general theory of signs, would also be pure mathematics, either formal or informal. As mathematics, it would refer to possibilities. Semiotic under phenomenology would be an application to perception and recognition of actualities. But it would make no value judgments. It would be as nonjudgmental as a pattern recognition program. To deem some phenomena worthy of study is to make a normative value judgment. But a bare, nonjudgmental contemplation is like Buddhist meditation. That is phenomenology prior to any intentionality. As with log
Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?
Jon, list, Jon wrote: JAS: To clarify, I wholeheartedly agree that the Categories play a significant role throughout Peirce's entire architectonic. The assertion that I questioned was that they are "central to semiotic," which I took to imply that they are somehow more prominent in that branch than others. My understanding is that instead the Categories are most fundamentally *phenomenological*. Well, of course, and by definition, "the Categories are most fundamentally *phenomenological*." I BI would hope that goes without saying. But of all the sciences *following* phenomenology, I believe that the categories are more central to semeiotics than to any of the other cenoscopic sciences, certainly more central there than to esthetics and ethics, metaphysics, the special sciences. JAS: I must point out again that Possibles/Existents/Necessitants are the constituents of three *Universes*, not *Categories*, although there is an obvious alignment with 1ns/2ns/3ns. I am no longer convinced that these Universes are truly *metaphysical*; after all, they are the primary basis for classifying Signs within *Speculative Grammar*, the first branch of *logic as semeiotic*. But *in* Phenomenology Peirce defines 1ns (in part) as the possible, 2ns as the existent, and 3ns with would-be's, that is, what would necessarily be if certain conditions were to come into being and prevailed. Therefore I have to modify my earlier suggestion that these three are essentially metaphysical, but now recall that the are essentially phenomenological. In short, this language of possible/ existent/ necessitant is first *introduced* in phenomenology. As you noted, all the categories have applications in semeiotic (theoretical grammar in particular) as well as metaphysics. Jon continued: JAS: I continue to be intrigued by Peirce's remark in "New Elements" to the effect that the employment of metaphysical terms and concepts in that context is a kind of *hypostatic abstration*. CSP: The logician is not concerned with any metaphysical theory; still less, if possible, is the mathematician. But it is highly convenient to express ourselves in terms of a metaphysical theory; and we no more bind ourselves to an acceptance of it than we do when we use substantives such as "humanity," "variety," etc., and speak of them as if they were substances, in the metaphysical sense. (EP 2:304; 1904) As I see it, this is more along the line of Peirce's saying that the sciences lower in the classification can offer examples, perhaps even terminological suggestions, to those above it. But it is the principles of logic as semeiotic which, as you yourself have noted, properly understood and applied, become those of metaphysics. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 10:28 PM Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > Gary R., List: > > GR: While perhaps "every perception involves signs," as several have > noted, signs are not studied in phenomenology but in logic as semeiotic. > > > Representation/mediation (3ns) is *one *irreducible element of the > Phaneron, but so is quality (1ns), and so is reaction (2ns). > > GR: I think to reduce the application of the cat[eg]ories to the 3ns of > signs + "the Universes of Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants," (again, > not semeiotic but metaphysical categories) is to reduce almost to absurdity > the central importance of the Universal Categories not only to semeiotics > but, in my opinion, almost all the sciences which follow it. > > > To clarify, I wholeheartedly agree that the Categories play a significant > role throughout Peirce's entire architectonic. The assertion that I > questioned was that they are "central to semiotic," which I took to imply > that they are somehow more prominent in that branch than others. My > understanding is that instead the Categories are most fundamentally > *phenomenological*. > > I must point out again that Possibles/Existents/Necessitants are the > constituents of three *Universes*, not *Categories*, although there is an > obvious alignment with 1ns/2ns/3ns. I am no longer convinced that these > Universes are truly *metaphysical*; after all, they are the primary basis > for classifying Signs within *Speculative Grammar*, the first branch of *logic > as semeiotic*. I continue to be intrigued by Peirce's remark in "New > Elements" to the effect that the employment of metaphysical terms and > concepts in that context is a kind of *hypostatic abstration*. > > CSP: The logician is not concerned with any metaphysical theory; still > less, if possible, is the mathematician. But it is highly convenient to > express ourselves in terms of a metaphysical theory; and we no more bind > ourselves to an acceptance of it than we do when we use substantives such > as "humanity," "variety," etc., and speak of them as if they were > substances, in the
Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?
Jon AS and Gary R, JAS Why expect Peirce to mention logic as semeiotic in connection with phenomenology, when he explicitly classified it as a Normative Science? To show the relationships more clearly, I attached another copy of CSPsemiotic.jpg. Note that Peirce placed formal logic under mathematics and logic under normative science. That is two mentions. He mentions it twice because formal logic has no designated application under mathematics. Its existential quantifiers range of possibilities. When it is under normative science it is applied to some subject matter where its variables refer to actualities. In such an application, it would serve to evaluate truth or falsity. In 1887, Peirce wrote about the design of logic machines. But he did not mention them in his 1903 classifications. If he had, he would then place logic for theorem proving under a branch of engineering. That would make three mentions. In general, there is no limit to the number of sciences that could use the same theory of mathematics -- including practical science (engineering). JFS I believe that semiotic belongs directly under phenomenology, since every perception involves signs. GR While perhaps "every perception involves signs," as several have noted, signs are not studied in phenomenology but in logic as semeiotic. That's a critical distinction. Semiotic, the general theory of signs, would also be pure mathematics, either formal or informal. As mathematics, it would refer to possibilities. Semiotic under phenomenology would be an application to perception and recognition of actualities. But it would make no value judgments. It would be as nonjudgmental as a pattern recognition program. To deem some phenomena worthy of study is to make a normative value judgment. But a bare, nonjudgmental contemplation is like Buddhist meditation. That is phenomenology prior to any intentionality. As with logic machines, one could use semiotic in a robot that does some useful work. That would be an application of semiotic under some branch of engineering. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?
Gary R., List:
GR: While perhaps "every perception involves signs," as several have
noted, signs are not studied in phenomenology but in logic as semeiotic.
Representation/mediation (3ns) is *one *irreducible element of the
Phaneron, but so is quality (1ns), and so is reaction (2ns).
GR: I think to reduce the application of the cat[eg]ories to the 3ns of
signs + "the Universes of Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants," (again,
not semeiotic but metaphysical categories) is to reduce almost to absurdity
the central importance of the Universal Categories not only to semeiotics
but, in my opinion, almost all the sciences which follow it.
To clarify, I wholeheartedly agree that the Categories play a significant
role throughout Peirce's entire architectonic. The assertion that I
questioned was that they are "central to semiotic," which I took to imply
that they are somehow more prominent in that branch than others. My
understanding is that instead the Categories are most fundamentally
*phenomenological*.
I must point out again that Possibles/Existents/Necessitants are the
constituents of three *Universes*, not *Categories*, although there is an
obvious alignment with 1ns/2ns/3ns. I am no longer convinced that these
Universes are truly *metaphysical*; after all, they are the primary basis
for classifying Signs within *Speculative Grammar*, the first branch of *logic
as semeiotic*. I continue to be intrigued by Peirce's remark in "New
Elements" to the effect that the employment of metaphysical terms and
concepts in that context is a kind of *hypostatic abstration*.
CSP: The logician is not concerned with any metaphysical theory; still
less, if possible, is the mathematician. But it is highly convenient to
express ourselves in terms of a metaphysical theory; and we no more bind
ourselves to an acceptance of it than we do when we use substantives such
as "humanity," "variety," etc., and speak of them as if they were
substances, in the metaphysical sense. (EP 2:304; 1904)
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 8:25 PM, Gary Richmond
wrote:
> Jon, John, Francesco, Gary F, Auke, list,
>
> I too am mystified as to why John is suggesting that semeiotic should be
> placed below phenomenology in Peirce's classification of sciences. As JAS
> wrote: Why expect Peirce to mention logic as semeiotic in connection with
> phenomenology, when he explicitly classified it as a Normative Science?
>
> But perhaps a hint as to what John may have in mind occurs in his initial
> post in this thread:
>
> JS: When I drew a diagram to illustrate Peirce's classification,
> I did not include semeiotic because he had not mentioned it.
> But since it is a science, it belongs somewhere in that diagram.
> Where?
>
> I believe that it belongs directly under phenomenology, since every
> perception involves signs.
>
>
> While perhaps "every perception involves signs," as several have noted,
> signs are not *studied* in phenomenology but in logic as semeiotic. And
> while I'm not yet ready to fully commit to this suggestion, I am tending
> to think that Auke may be correct in suggesting that the study of semeiotics
> *per
> se** principally* occurs in the first of the three branches of logic,
> i.e., theoretical grammar. The second branch, critical logic ("logic as
> logic" as Peirce at least once characterized it) concerns itself
> *principally* with "classif[ying] arguments and determin[ing] the
> validity and degree of force of each kind," while the third and final
> branch, methodeutic (or, theoretical rhetoric) principally takes up "the
> methods that ought to be pursued in the investigation, in the exposition,
> and in the application of truth." But all of these branches of logic are,
> as I see it, informed by the categories.
>
>
> 1903 | Syllabus: Syllabus of a course of Lectures at the Lowell Institute
> beginning 1903, Nov. 23. On Some Topics of Logic | EP 2:260
>
> All thought being performed by means of signs, logic may be regarded as
> the science of the general laws of signs. It has three branches: (1)
> *Speculative
> Grammar*, or the general theory of the nature and meanings of signs,
> whether they be icons, indices, or symbols; (2) *Critic*, which
> classifies arguments and determines the validity and degree of force of
> each kind; (3) *Methodeutic*, which studies the methods that ought to be
> pursued in the investigation, in the exposition, and in the application of
> truth. *Each division depends on that which precedes it *(boldface added).
>
>
> I recall that many years ago Joe Ransdell and I had a list discussion
> about the place, not of semiotics but of phenomenology. At one point he
> suggested that it might not be a science at all and, in any event, even if
> it were, there wasn't much scientific work to do there and, moreover,
> Peirce had alre
Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?
Jon, John, Francesco, Gary F, Auke, list,
I too am mystified as to why John is suggesting that semeiotic should be
placed below phenomenology in Peirce's classification of sciences. As JAS
wrote: Why expect Peirce to mention logic as semeiotic in connection with
phenomenology, when he explicitly classified it as a Normative Science?
But perhaps a hint as to what John may have in mind occurs in his initial
post in this thread:
JS: When I drew a diagram to illustrate Peirce's classification,
I did not include semeiotic because he had not mentioned it.
But since it is a science, it belongs somewhere in that diagram.
Where?
I believe that it belongs directly under phenomenology, since every
perception involves signs.
While perhaps "every perception involves signs," as several have noted,
signs are not *studied* in phenomenology but in logic as semeiotic. And
while I'm not yet ready to fully commit to this suggestion, I am tending to
think that Auke may be correct in suggesting that the study of semeiotics *per
se** principally* occurs in the first of the three branches of logic, i.e.,
theoretical grammar. The second branch, critical logic ("logic as logic" as
Peirce at least once characterized it) concerns itself *principally*
with "classif[ying]
arguments and determin[ing] the validity and degree of force of each kind,"
while the third and final branch, methodeutic (or, theoretical rhetoric)
principally takes up "the methods that ought to be pursued in the
investigation, in the exposition, and in the application of truth." But all
of these branches of logic are, as I see it, informed by the categories.
1903 | Syllabus: Syllabus of a course of Lectures at the Lowell Institute
beginning 1903, Nov. 23. On Some Topics of Logic | EP 2:260
All thought being performed by means of signs, logic may be regarded as the
science of the general laws of signs. It has three branches: (1) *Speculative
Grammar*, or the general theory of the nature and meanings of signs,
whether they be icons, indices, or symbols; (2) *Critic*, which classifies
arguments and determines the validity and degree of force of each kind; (3)
*Methodeutic*, which studies the methods that ought to be pursued in the
investigation, in the exposition, and in the application of truth. *Each
division depends on that which precedes it *(boldface added).
I recall that many years ago Joe Ransdell and I had a list discussion about
the place, not of semiotics but of phenomenology. At one point he suggested
that it might not be a science at all and, in any event, even if it were,
there wasn't much scientific work to do there and, moreover, Peirce had
already done most all the important work in it. As you might imagine, I
disagreed.
I think that it's possible (and in my experience, a fact) that some
logicians and semioticians have trouble imaginingg that, "since every
perception involves signs," that wherever you *might* place
phenomenology--if you classify it as a science at all--semiotics has either
to replace it or, as John has done, place semiotics very near phenomenology
(so, near the head of cenoscopic science). It may be that *everything is
semiotic*, but semiotic is studied in *semeiotic* (I always use this
spelling when referring to Peirce's tripartite science).
I have sometimes thought, and a few times on this list introduced the
notion, that this issue might be at least partially resolved by considering
more seriously Peirce's distinction between *logica utens*, the ordinary
logic we all use and must use, and *logica docens*, the formal study of
logic as a normative science. For it is surely true that if we are to say
anything at all about phenomenological inquiries-and, for that matter,
theoretical esthetical and ethical inquiries, we are fairly dependent on
our ordinary logic, our *logica* *utens*. Theoretical ethics, esthetics,
and logic as semeiotic (that is, the normative sciences) can, however,
offer *examples* to the first cenoscopic science, phenomenology. So, along
with such exemplary cases, since we have a *logica utens *we can make
progress in that under-studied and, in my opinion, under-appreciated
science. Phenomenology is hard to do, as Peirce in several places makes
clear, such that, as in every discipline, some are drawn to it and others
are not, some have great intellectual capacity for tackling it, some have
less.
JAS wrote: Also, in what sense are his Categories "central to semiotic"?
His trichotomies for Sign classification are divisions into the *Universes *of
Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants, rather than the *Categories* of
1ns, 2ns, and 3ns.
I would disagree with Jon in this matter since I *do*, as does John, see
the Categories as "central to semiotic," that there is much more categorial
involvement in semeiotics than "the *Universes *of Possibles, Existents,
and Necessitants" which are, after all, principles that the science
following logic as semeiotic, that is, metaphysics offers. However, a
discussion of
Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?
John S., List: I am still puzzled. Why expect Peirce to mention logic as semeiotic in connection with phenomenology, when he explicitly classified it as a Normative Science? Also, in what sense are his Categories "central to semiotic"? His trichotomies for Sign classification are divisions into the *Universes *of Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants, rather than the *Categories* of 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns. What Peirce *did *say on various occasions is that Signs are the paradigmatic exemplars of the phenomenological Category of 3ns, which is the element of representation or (more generally) mediation. Nevertheless, again, the science that *studies *Signs is not part of phenomenology, but of Normative Science. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 3:55 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > Auke, Francesco, Frances, Gary F, and Jon AS, > > I agree with your points, but none of them explain one important > issue: Peirce's categories of 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns are central to > semiotic, and they are usually called *phenomenological* categories. > > But in that classification of 1903, he did not mention semiotic > in connection with phenomenology. At the end of this note, I > include a copy of every paragraph from the 1903 classification > that mentions the word 'phenomenology'. > > AvB > >> Speculative rhetoric the first branch of non-mathematical logic is >> an alias for semiotics. There is no reason at all to look elsewhere >> in the classification of the science. >> > > In the middle of CP 1.191, where Peirce is talking about normative > science, he wrote "All thought being performed by means of signs, > logic may be regarded as the science of the general laws of signs." > > That sentence mentions logic and signs in connection with normative > science. But why didn't he mention a connection between phenomenology > and signs in paragraph 186 or 190? > > FB > >> I take seriously his claim that "logic is semiotics" and use "semiotics" >> as equivalent to "logic" (in the broad sense). If this identification >> is made, every problem about semiotics' collocation in the scheme >> disappears >> > > I agree. But that does not explain why he did not mention either > word 'logic' or 'semiotic' in his discussion of phenomenology. > > FK > >> it could be that only "formal" semiotics was intended to be the >> new thrust for logics, but not a new label for logics. >> > > That is probably what Peirce intended, since he continued to use > both words. In fact, his ethics of terminology would prevent him > from dropping the word 'logic', which had a long history of usage. > > GF > >> I’m guessing that you don’t want to include semiotics with logic, >> as Peirce did in the Syllabus classification of 1903 (without using >> the word “semiotic”) >> > > I *definitely* want to include semiotic with logic. But that > is not the question I was asking. > > GF > >> I think Peirce’s 1903 solution to the problem was to trichotomize >> logic as Speculative Grammar, Critic and Methodeutic. >> > > But that sentence is in the middle of a discussion of normative > science. It doesn't explain why he didn't mention either word > 'logic' or 'semiotic' in connection with phenomenology. > > JAS > >> I agree with Gary F. and Francesco, and share Auke's puzzlement >> that there is any question about this. CSP: Normative Science has >> three widely separated divisions: >> (i) Esthetics; (ii) Ethics; (iii) Logic. >> > > I certainly wasn't puzzled about that. My question was about > the absence of any mention of semiotic in Peirce's discussion > of phenomenology. > > My guess: Peirce started to write a brief summary of his > classification. Note the one sentence paragraph 190 below, > but the much longer paragraphs 191. > > I suspect that Peirce continued to get many new ideas as he > wrote. Therefore, his omission of any mention of semiotic in > his discussion of phenomenology was accidental, not deliberate. > > That conclusion is supported by the fact that his lengthy discussion > about logic in a paragraph about the normative sciences seems to be > out of place. As Peirce was writing, he seemed to get sidetracked > by new ideas that came to mind. He probably wrote them down as > they came to him, and he never went back to edit the earlier parts. > > John > > > CP 1.186 > Philosophy is divided into a. Phenomenology; b. Normative Science; > c. Metaphysics. Phenomenology ascertains and studies the kinds of > elements universally present in the phenomenon; meaning by the > phenomenon, whatever is present at any time to the mind in any way. > Normative science distinguishes what ought to be from what ought not > to be, and makes many other divisions and arrangements subservient to > its primary dualistic distinction. Metaphysi
Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?
Auke, Francesco, Frances, Gary F, and Jon AS, I agree with your points, but none of them explain one important issue: Peirce's categories of 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns are central to semiotic, and they are usually called *phenomenological* categories. But in that classification of 1903, he did not mention semiotic in connection with phenomenology. At the end of this note, I include a copy of every paragraph from the 1903 classification that mentions the word 'phenomenology'. AvB Speculative rhetoric the first branch of non-mathematical logic is an alias for semiotics. There is no reason at all to look elsewhere in the classification of the science. In the middle of CP 1.191, where Peirce is talking about normative science, he wrote "All thought being performed by means of signs, logic may be regarded as the science of the general laws of signs." That sentence mentions logic and signs in connection with normative science. But why didn't he mention a connection between phenomenology and signs in paragraph 186 or 190? FB I take seriously his claim that "logic is semiotics" and use "semiotics" as equivalent to "logic" (in the broad sense). If this identification is made, every problem about semiotics' collocation in the scheme disappears I agree. But that does not explain why he did not mention either word 'logic' or 'semiotic' in his discussion of phenomenology. FK it could be that only "formal" semiotics was intended to be the new thrust for logics, but not a new label for logics. That is probably what Peirce intended, since he continued to use both words. In fact, his ethics of terminology would prevent him from dropping the word 'logic', which had a long history of usage. GF I’m guessing that you don’t want to include semiotics with logic, as Peirce did in the Syllabus classification of 1903 (without using the word “semiotic”) I *definitely* want to include semiotic with logic. But that is not the question I was asking. GF I think Peirce’s 1903 solution to the problem was to trichotomize logic as Speculative Grammar, Critic and Methodeutic. But that sentence is in the middle of a discussion of normative science. It doesn't explain why he didn't mention either word 'logic' or 'semiotic' in connection with phenomenology. JAS I agree with Gary F. and Francesco, and share Auke's puzzlement that there is any question about this. CSP: Normative Science has three widely separated divisions: (i) Esthetics; (ii) Ethics; (iii) Logic. I certainly wasn't puzzled about that. My question was about the absence of any mention of semiotic in Peirce's discussion of phenomenology. My guess: Peirce started to write a brief summary of his classification. Note the one sentence paragraph 190 below, but the much longer paragraphs 191. I suspect that Peirce continued to get many new ideas as he wrote. Therefore, his omission of any mention of semiotic in his discussion of phenomenology was accidental, not deliberate. That conclusion is supported by the fact that his lengthy discussion about logic in a paragraph about the normative sciences seems to be out of place. As Peirce was writing, he seemed to get sidetracked by new ideas that came to mind. He probably wrote them down as they came to him, and he never went back to edit the earlier parts. John CP 1.186 Philosophy is divided into a. Phenomenology; b. Normative Science; c. Metaphysics. Phenomenology ascertains and studies the kinds of elements universally present in the phenomenon; meaning by the phenomenon, whatever is present at any time to the mind in any way. Normative science distinguishes what ought to be from what ought not to be, and makes many other divisions and arrangements subservient to its primary dualistic distinction. Metaphysics seeks to give an account of the universe of mind and matter. Normative science rests largely on phenomenology and on mathematics; metaphysics on phenomenology and on normative science. 189 The Psychical Sciences are: a. Nomological Psychics or Psychology; b. Classificatory Psychics, or Ethnology; c. Descriptive Psychics, or History. Nomological psychics discovers the general elements and laws of mental phenomena. It is greatly influenced by phenomenology, by logic, by metaphysics, and by biology (a branch of classificatory physics). Classificatory psychics classifies products of mind and endeavors to explain them on psychological principles. At present it is far too much in its infancy (except linguistics, to which reference will be made below) to approach very closely to psychology. It borrows from psychology and from physics. Descriptive psychics endeavors in the first place to describe individual manifestations of mind, whether they be permanent works or actions; and to that task it joins that of endeavoring to explain them on the principles of psychology and ethnology. It borrows from geography (a branch of descriptive ph
Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?
t the only signs we can > study are signs interpreted in human thought. I reply that by the > definition thoughts are themselves signs, and that if it happens to be a > fact that all other signs are ultimately interpreted in thought-signs, then > that fact is irrelevant to logic. The proof that it is irrelevant is that > all the principles of logic are deducible from my definition without taking > any account of the alleged fact, much more clearly than if any attempt is > made to introduce this allegation as a premiss. Therefore, unless this > allegation be regarded as itself a truth of logic, which it is not, since > it is not of a formal nature, it is perfectly irrelevant to logic. I also > define very carefully what I mean by a “formal” law. I say nothing in the > definition about normative principles, because not all the principles of > logic are normative. Indeed, it is only the connection of logic with > esthetics through ethics which causes it to be a normative science at all. > ]] > > > > (This by the way is the only place I’ve found where Peirce uses the term > “formal semiotic.”) I think Peirce’s 1903 solution to the problem was to > trichotomize logic as Speculative Grammar, Critic and Methodeutic. > Speculative Grammar, being First in this trichotomy, is *minimally* > normative (normativity being a form of Secondness), but still connected > with logic in the broad sense. “Thus there are, in my view of the subject, > three branches of logic: Speculative Grammar, Critic, and Methodeutic” — as > Peirce said at the end of Lowell Lecture 1, and in the Syllabus (CP 1.191, > EP2:259). > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Francesco Bellucci > *Sent:* 10-Sep-18 01:08 > *To:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the > sciences? > > > > Dear John, List, > as I see it, semiotics is logic in the broad sense (comprising spec. gr., > critical logic, and methodeutic), and its place in the classification of > the sciences is the place of logic. The fact in Peirce's schemes of > classification of the sciences there never appears semiotics, is an > indication that it is simply identical with logic (and, I tend to think, > especially with the first branch of logic, spec. gr.) > > That a thinker can spend so much time and ink talking about signs, their > functioning and their varieties, and yet fail to find a place for the > science of signs in his classification of the sciences seems to be > unbelivable. Therefore, I take seriously his claim that "logic is > semiotics" and use "semiotics" as equivalent to "logic" (in the broad > sense). If this identification is made, every problem about semiotics' > collocation in the scheme disappears > > Best > > Francesco > > On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 1:17 AM, John F Sowa wrote: > > In his 1903 classification of the sciences (CP 1.180-202) > Peirce classified formal logic under mathematics, but he also > classified logic as a normative science. > > Question: Where is semeiotic? > > As a formal theory, it would be classified with formal logic > under mathematics. But semeiotic is also an applied science when > it is used in perception, action, communication... > > When I drew a diagram to illustrate Peirce's classification, > I did not include semeiotic because he had not mentioned it. > But since it is a science, it belongs somewhere in that diagram. > Where? > > I believe that it belongs directly under phenomenology, since every > perception involves signs. See the attached CSPsemiotic.jpg. > > Does anyone have any comments? > > John > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?
John, list, I have to agree with Francesco and Auke. I’m guessing that you don’t want to include semiotics with logic, as Peirce did in the Syllabus classification of 1903 (without using the word “semiotic”), because it doesn’t seem normative enough. Peirce recognized the problem here and had already wrestled with it in his Carnegie application in 1902 (Draft D - MS L75.235-237): [[ I define logic very broadly as the study of the formal laws of signs, or formal semiotic. I define a sign as something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant, into the same sort of correspondence with something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to C. In this definition I make no more reference to anything like the human mind than I do when I define a line as the place within which a particle lies during a lapse of time. At the same time, a sign, by virtue of this definition, has some sort of meaning. That is implied in correspondence. Now meaning is mind in the logical sense. But many will object that the only signs we can study are signs interpreted in human thought. I reply that by the definition thoughts are themselves signs, and that if it happens to be a fact that all other signs are ultimately interpreted in thought-signs, then that fact is irrelevant to logic. The proof that it is irrelevant is that all the principles of logic are deducible from my definition without taking any account of the alleged fact, much more clearly than if any attempt is made to introduce this allegation as a premiss. Therefore, unless this allegation be regarded as itself a truth of logic, which it is not, since it is not of a formal nature, it is perfectly irrelevant to logic. I also define very carefully what I mean by a “formal” law. I say nothing in the definition about normative principles, because not all the principles of logic are normative. Indeed, it is only the connection of logic with esthetics through ethics which causes it to be a normative science at all. ]] (This by the way is the only place I’ve found where Peirce uses the term “formal semiotic.”) I think Peirce’s 1903 solution to the problem was to trichotomize logic as Speculative Grammar, Critic and Methodeutic. Speculative Grammar, being First in this trichotomy, is minimally normative (normativity being a form of Secondness), but still connected with logic in the broad sense. “Thus there are, in my view of the subject, three branches of logic: Speculative Grammar, Critic, and Methodeutic” — as Peirce said at the end of Lowell Lecture 1, and in the Syllabus (CP 1.191, EP2:259). Gary f. From: Francesco Bellucci Sent: 10-Sep-18 01:08 To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences? Dear John, List, as I see it, semiotics is logic in the broad sense (comprising spec. gr., critical logic, and methodeutic), and its place in the classification of the sciences is the place of logic. The fact in Peirce's schemes of classification of the sciences there never appears semiotics, is an indication that it is simply identical with logic (and, I tend to think, especially with the first branch of logic, spec. gr.) That a thinker can spend so much time and ink talking about signs, their functioning and their varieties, and yet fail to find a place for the science of signs in his classification of the sciences seems to be unbelivable. Therefore, I take seriously his claim that "logic is semiotics" and use "semiotics" as equivalent to "logic" (in the broad sense). If this identification is made, every problem about semiotics' collocation in the scheme disappears Best Francesco On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 1:17 AM, John F Sowa mailto:s...@bestweb.net> > wrote: In his 1903 classification of the sciences (CP 1.180-202) Peirce classified formal logic under mathematics, but he also classified logic as a normative science. Question: Where is semeiotic? As a formal theory, it would be classified with formal logic under mathematics. But semeiotic is also an applied science when it is used in perception, action, communication... When I drew a diagram to illustrate Peirce's classification, I did not include semeiotic because he had not mentioned it. But since it is a science, it belongs somewhere in that diagram. Where? I believe that it belongs directly under phenomenology, since every perception involves signs. See the attached CSPsemiotic.jpg. Does anyone have any comments? John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?
Frances to John and listers--- Wherever semiotics and logics might be located in a classification of the sciences, it could be that only "formal" semiotics was intended to be the new thrust for logics, but not a new label for logics; nor seemingly was it intended that all of semiotics broadly would be all of logics deeply. While semiotics is clearly claimed to be the theory or science of all signs, logics (or symbology) is likely stated to be only the theory or science of (signed) symbols. In any event, was it implied that semiotics is preparatory and contributory to logics, and that logics was merely ready to fall away from semiotics. To help better appreciate the locus and status of semiotics, until indeed more information might surface, it might be useful to review the impact that other formal theories and sciences could play here, such as metaphysics and ontology and cosmology and especially epistemology as well as psychology and methodology. It is assumed that art and tech and science are perhaps the main acts of humanity, but that semiotics is a field of study falling only under science, and then only under formal science. It is further supposed that the monadic formal science is philosophy and of a realist stripe, which is then followed by the dyadic natural science of say matter and life, and then the triadic social science of say polity and ethnicity and society. This layout of the umbrella sciences (formal and natural and social) tends to make a consistent categorial tern, and perhaps even a richer trichotomic tern. ---Frances - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?
John, Frances, I am puzzled. Speculative rhetoric the first branch of non-mathematical logic is an alias for semiotics. There is no reason at all to look elsewhere in the classification of the science. Auke -Oorspronkelijk bericht- Van: John F Sowa Verzonden: maandag 10 september 2018 6:03 Aan: frances.ke...@sympatico.ca; 'Peirce-L' Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences? On 9/9/2018 9:48 PM, frances.ke...@sympatico.ca wrote: > In his later classification of the sciences Peirce seemingly located > *formal* *logics* under the mathematical sciences, but he also located > *critical logics* and *normal* *logics* as separate normative sciences > under the philosophical sciences. Yes. That's what Peirce said in his 1903 classification, which I used for the CSPsemiotic.jpg diagram (attached). Note that formal logic is under mathematics, and logic is also the third of the normative sciences, as Peirce said. > The curiosity here might be whether semiotics as a science should be > somewhat separated from logics Yes. Peirce said that logic was a branch of semiotic, but he also said that a broader conception of logic would make it identical with semiotic. > then semiotics is also a defined referential science and an applied > instrumental science, so that semiotics aside from being a formal and > normal sort of logics might be best located somewhere under > phenomenology within the philosophical sciences. Semiotics after all > is a vast study of senses and signs and systems Yes. That would justify putting Semiotic under Phenomenology, as in CSPsemiotic.jpg. > Any pragmatist classification of the sciences should of course be > architectonically consistent with the trichotomic structure of the > phenomenal categories. This seems to be an initial task that has yet > to be fully done, even before the location of an independent or > isolated mathics and logics and semics within that completed structure. Yes. 1903 is the year that Peirce began his correspondence with Lady Welby. During the following decade, he wrote a great deal more about the trichotomic structure. But the currently available manuscripts don't mention how that structure might affect his 1903 classification. Unless and until more MSS are found with new information, the 1903 version be the framework into which we could include semiotic. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?
Dear John, List, as I see it, semiotics is logic in the broad sense (comprising spec. gr., critical logic, and methodeutic), and its place in the classification of the sciences is the place of logic. The fact in Peirce's schemes of classification of the sciences there never appears semiotics, is an indication that it is simply identical with logic (and, I tend to think, especially with the first branch of logic, spec. gr.) That a thinker can spend so much time and ink talking about signs, their functioning and their varieties, and yet fail to find a place for the science of signs in his classification of the sciences seems to be unbelivable. Therefore, I take seriously his claim that "logic is semiotics" and use "semiotics" as equivalent to "logic" (in the broad sense). If this identification is made, every problem about semiotics' collocation in the scheme disappears Best Francesco On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 1:17 AM, John F Sowa wrote: > In his 1903 classification of the sciences (CP 1.180-202) > Peirce classified formal logic under mathematics, but he also > classified logic as a normative science. > > Question: Where is semeiotic? > > As a formal theory, it would be classified with formal logic > under mathematics. But semeiotic is also an applied science when > it is used in perception, action, communication... > > When I drew a diagram to illustrate Peirce's classification, > I did not include semeiotic because he had not mentioned it. > But since it is a science, it belongs somewhere in that diagram. > Where? > > I believe that it belongs directly under phenomenology, since every > perception involves signs. See the attached CSPsemiotic.jpg. > > Does anyone have any comments? > > John > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?
On 9/9/2018 9:48 PM, frances.ke...@sympatico.ca wrote: In his later classification of the sciences Peirce seemingly located *formal* *logics* under the mathematical sciences, but he also located *critical logics* and *normal* *logics* as separate normative sciences under the philosophical sciences. Yes. That's what Peirce said in his 1903 classification, which I used for the CSPsemiotic.jpg diagram (attached). Note that formal logic is under mathematics, and logic is also the third of the normative sciences, as Peirce said. The curiosity here might be whether semiotics as a science should be somewhat separated from logics Yes. Peirce said that logic was a branch of semiotic, but he also said that a broader conception of logic would make it identical with semiotic. then semiotics is also a defined referential science and an applied instrumental science, so that semiotics aside from being a formal and normal sort of logics might be best located somewhere under phenomenology within the philosophical sciences. Semiotics after all is a vast study of senses and signs and systems Yes. That would justify putting Semiotic under Phenomenology, as in CSPsemiotic.jpg. Any pragmatist classification of the sciences should of course be architectonically consistent with the trichotomic structure of the phenomenal categories. This seems to be an initial task that has yet to be fully done, even before the location of an independent or isolated mathics and logics and semics within that completed structure. Yes. 1903 is the year that Peirce began his correspondence with Lady Welby. During the following decade, he wrote a great deal more about the trichotomic structure. But the currently available manuscripts don't mention how that structure might affect his 1903 classification. Unless and until more MSS are found with new information, the 1903 version be the framework into which we could include semiotic. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences?
Frances to John and other interested listers--- In posting a revised tree diagram on a classification of the sciences you seem to be positing in your guess some frustration over its original realist framework, along with some irritation on where to locate a wider science of semiotics as a theory of signs that holds more than only symbols. In his later classification of the sciences Peirce seemingly located formal logics under the mathematical sciences, but he also located critical logics and normal logics as separate normative sciences under the philosophical sciences. The curiosity here might be whether semiotics as a science should be somewhat separated from logics altogether, but as a proto kind of quasi logics and thus where should semiotics then fall within a classification of the sciences. As an exacted foundational theory, semiotics would likely be well classified with formal logics under mathematics, but when fielded in other ways as an alternate study then semiotics is also a defined referential science and an applied instrumental science, so that semiotics aside from being a formal and normal sort of logics might be best located somewhere under phenomenology within the philosophical sciences. Semiotics after all is a vast study of senses and signs and systems, which breadth seems far beyond the depth of symbolic and algebraic logics, even given logics own necessary importance in mathematics and philosophics. Any pragmatist classification of the sciences should of course be architectonically consistent with the trichotomic structure of the phenomenal categories. This seems to be an initial task that has yet to be fully done, even before the location of an independent or isolated mathics and logics and semics within that completed structure. My muse is that a newly revised classification of the sciences but along Peircean lines is indeed possible. John wrote in my compacted paragraph: In his 1903 classification of the sciences (CP 1.180-202) Peirce classified formal logic under mathematics, but he also classified logic as a normative science. Question: Where is semeiotic? As a formal theory, it would be classified with formal logic under mathematics. But semeiotic is also an applied science when it is used in perception, action, communication. When I drew a diagram to illustrate Peirce's classification, I did not include semeiotic because he had not mentioned it. But since it is a science, it belongs somewhere in that diagram. Where? I believe that it belongs directly under phenomenology, since every perception involves signs. See the attached CSPsemiotic.jpg. Does anyone have any comments? - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
