Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jon- I'm not going to get into 'practical effects' of the two actions 
Rejection of a theory is an active, conscious, analytic choice. 'No comment' is 
none of these.

As for an assumption that 'something written later is a more accurate 
representation' - that's subjective and I won't get into that. After all, one 
could write something tomorrow that rejected the argument just written today! 

You didn't give up the 'universe' theory that easily; you wrote on it for 
several weeks, and if the term 'adamant' bothers you..well...

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 4:27 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories


  Edwina, List:


ET:  Jon- surely you know the difference between the active [a rejection of 
a theory] and the passive [no comment].


  In this case, what practical effects are different between "rejection" and 
"no comment," besides the words that we use for them?


ET:  And I didn't differentiate the two into 'early' and 'late, as you do, 
with you also suggesting that the 'late' is 'a more accurate representation of 
Peirce's views.


  Which would be a more accurate representation of your views--what you wrote 
20 years ago, or what you wrote this morning?


ET:  I don't see that the NA is a development nor a 'final or near-final 
view; nor do I see that it clarifies or that 1.412 is vague.


  Peirce wrote CP 1.412 in 1887-1888, and "A Neglected Argument" in 1908.  So 
far, I have not found any discussion of cosmology/comogony in his writings from 
the five years subsequent to the latter and prior to his death.  Unless and 
until something else turns up from that time frame, I think that there is 
considerable warrant for characterizing CP 6.490 as his final or near-final 
view.


ET:  Yes, you eventually abandoned the hypothesis.


  If I was really so "adamant" about it, would I have given it up so quickly 
and easily?  One counterexample was all it took.  I brought it up a lot lately 
because I was seeking either confirmation or disconfirmation from the List 
community, and I ultimately (and happily) received the latter.  With that 
question resolved, I am now seeking input from the List community on whether 
and how we should distinguish Universes vs. Categories, since Peirce refers to 
the former and not the latter in certain late writings--including, of course, 
"A Neglected Argument."


  Regards,


  Jon


  On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 2:53 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

1) Jon- surely you know the difference between the active [a rejection of a 
theory] and the passive [no comment]. And I didn't differentiate the two into 
'early' and 'late, as you do, with you also suggesting that the 'late' is 'a 
more accurate representation of Peirce's views.

You wrote: " his thought (obviously) continued to develop in the years that 
followed. In particular, I suggested that CP 6.490 reflects his final (or 
near-final) views on the origin of the universe, and clarifies some aspects 
that he left vague in CP 1.412."

I don't see that the NA is a development nor a 'final or near-final view; 
nor do I see that it clarifies or that 1.412 is vague. 

2) As for my view that you were 'adamantly' in favour of rejecting the 
category theory, which you described as 'early Peirce' in favour of the later 
'three universes - that is certainly my view - perhaps because of the number of 
posts you made on this topic over several weeks. Yes, you eventually abandoned 
the hypothesis. 

Edwina 
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Clark Goble ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 2:59 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories


  Edwina, List: 


ET:  No- you aren't accurate but I don't see that I should have to  
defend myself; if you have inaccurate views of my views - then, I am hardly 
going to fight you about your views of me!


  My apologies, I did not intend to misrepresent you; but how is having "no 
comment" on "A Neglected Argument" any different (in the pragmaticist sense) 
from rejecting it?  You just reiterated that you "don't find that it fits in 
with the emergence-evolution arguments found elsewhere in Peirce"; how is this 
at odds with my statement that you find it incompatible with his earlier 
cosmological/cosmogonic writings, which you favor?


ET:  BUT - you adamantly told us that Peirce effectively abandoned his 
use of the Categories, which you defined as 'early' and instea

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  I'm not going to get into 'practical effects' of the two actions.


If you cannot identify different practical effects of the two concepts,
then according to Peirce, they are identical.

ET:  After all, one could write something tomorrow that rejected the
argument just written today!


Right--and my point is that if one were to pass away the day after
tomorrow, without saying anything more about the matter, then others would
have considerable warrant for taking the *rejection* to be one's final view
on it, rather than the previously articulated position.

ET:  You didn't give up the 'universe' theory that easily; you wrote on it
for several weeks ...


I kept writing about it because no one had refuted it yet.  As soon as
someone did so, I gave it up immediately.  The only thing that bothers me
about "adamant" is that it is clearly not an accurate description of my
stance in this particular case.  Of course, I have been (and remain) quite
adamant about some *other *things.

Regards,

Jon

On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 3:41 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon- I'm not going to get into 'practical effects' of the two actions
> Rejection of a theory is an active, conscious, analytic choice. 'No
> comment' is none of these.
>
> As for an assumption that 'something written later is a more accurate
> representation' - that's subjective and I won't get into that. After all,
> one could write something tomorrow that rejected the argument just written
> today!
>
> You didn't give up the 'universe' theory that easily; you wrote on it for
> several weeks, and if the term 'adamant' bothers you..well...
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky 
> *Cc:* Peirce-L 
> *Sent:* Monday, October 24, 2016 4:27 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET:  Jon- surely you know the difference between the active [a rejection
> of a theory] and the passive [no comment].
>
>
> In this case, what *practical *effects are different between "rejection"
> and "no comment," besides the words that we use for them?
>
> ET:  And I didn't differentiate the two into 'early' and 'late, as you do,
> with you also suggesting that the 'late' is 'a more accurate representation
> of Peirce's views.
>
>
> Which would be a more accurate representation of *your *views--what you
> wrote 20 years ago, or what you wrote this morning?
>
> ET:  I don't see that the NA is a development nor a 'final or near-final
> view; nor do I see that it clarifies or that 1.412 is vague.
>
>
> Peirce wrote CP 1.412 in 1887-1888, and "A Neglected Argument" in 1908.
> So far, I have not found any discussion of cosmology/comogony in his
> writings from the five years subsequent to the latter and prior to his
> death.  Unless and until something else turns up from that time frame, I
> think that there is considerable warrant for characterizing CP 6.490 as his
> final or near-final view.
>
> ET:  Yes, you eventually abandoned the hypothesis.
>
>
> If I was really so "adamant" about it, would I have given it up so quickly
> and easily?  One counterexample was all it took.  I brought it up a lot
> lately because I was seeking either confirmation or disconfirmation from
> the List community, and I ultimately (and happily) received the latter.
> With that question resolved, I am now seeking input from the List community
> on whether and how we should distinguish Universes vs. Categories, since
> Peirce refers to the former and not the latter in certain late
> writings--including, of course, "A Neglected Argument."
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 2:53 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> 1) Jon- surely you know the difference between the active [a rejection of
>> a theory] and the passive [no comment]. And I didn't differentiate the two
>> into 'early' and 'late, as you do, with you also suggesting that the 'late'
>> is 'a more accurate representation of Peirce's views.
>>
>> You wrote: " his thought (obviously) continued to *develop *in the years
>> that followed. In particular, I suggested that CP 6.490 reflects his final
>> (or near-final) views on the origin of the universe, and clarifies some
>> aspects that he left vague in CP 1.412."
>>
>> I don't see that the NA is a *development* nor a '*final or near-final*
>> view; nor do I see that it *clarifies* or that 1.412 is vague.
>>
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  Jon- surely you know the difference between the active [a rejection of
a theory] and the passive [no comment].


In this case, what *practical *effects are different between "rejection"
and "no comment," besides the words that we use for them?

ET:  And I didn't differentiate the two into 'early' and 'late, as you do,
with you also suggesting that the 'late' is 'a more accurate representation
of Peirce's views.


Which would be a more accurate representation of *your *views--what you
wrote 20 years ago, or what you wrote this morning?

ET:  I don't see that the NA is a development nor a 'final or near-final
view; nor do I see that it clarifies or that 1.412 is vague.


Peirce wrote CP 1.412 in 1887-1888, and "A Neglected Argument" in 1908.  So
far, I have not found any discussion of cosmology/comogony in his writings
from the five years subsequent to the latter and prior to his death.
Unless and until something else turns up from that time frame, I think that
there is considerable warrant for characterizing CP 6.490 as his final or
near-final view.

ET:  Yes, you eventually abandoned the hypothesis.


If I was really so "adamant" about it, would I have given it up so quickly
and easily?  One counterexample was all it took.  I brought it up a lot
lately because I was seeking either confirmation or disconfirmation from
the List community, and I ultimately (and happily) received the latter.
With that question resolved, I am now seeking input from the List community
on whether and how we should distinguish Universes vs. Categories, since
Peirce refers to the former and not the latter in certain late
writings--including, of course, "A Neglected Argument."

Regards,

Jon

On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 2:53 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> 1) Jon- surely you know the difference between the active [a rejection of
> a theory] and the passive [no comment]. And I didn't differentiate the two
> into 'early' and 'late, as you do, with you also suggesting that the 'late'
> is 'a more accurate representation of Peirce's views.
>
> You wrote: " his thought (obviously) continued to *develop *in the years
> that followed. In particular, I suggested that CP 6.490 reflects his final
> (or near-final) views on the origin of the universe, and clarifies some
> aspects that he left vague in CP 1.412."
>
> I don't see that the NA is a *development* nor a '*final or near-final*
> view; nor do I see that it *clarifies* or that 1.412 is vague.
>
> 2) As for my view that you were 'adamantly' in favour of rejecting the
> category theory, which you described as 'early Peirce' in favour of the
> later 'three universes - that is certainly my view - perhaps because of
> the number of posts you made on this topic over several weeks. Yes, you
> eventually abandoned the hypothesis.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky 
> *Cc:* Clark Goble  ; Peirce-L 
> *Sent:* Monday, October 24, 2016 2:59 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET:  No- you aren't accurate but I don't see that I should have to  defend
> myself; if you have inaccurate views of my views - then, I am hardly going
> to fight you about your views of me!
>
>
> My apologies, I did not intend to misrepresent you; but how is having "no
> comment" on "A Neglected Argument" any different (in the pragmaticist
> sense) from rejecting it?  You just reiterated that you "don't find that it
> fits in with the emergence-evolution arguments found elsewhere in Peirce";
> how is this at odds with my statement that you find it incompatible with
> his earlier cosmological/cosmogonic writings, which you favor?
>
> ET:  BUT - you adamantly told us that Peirce effectively abandoned his use
> of the Categories, which you defined as 'early' and instead, moved on to
> consider the Three Universes.
>
>
> I believe that a fair review of the List archives would show that I was
> never "adamant" about this, but rather consistently characterized it as
> merely an "impression," or at most a "hypothesis"; and in any case, I
> immediately changed my mind and disavowed it when Gary R. reminded me that
> Peirce discussed the Categories at some length in at least one of his 1907
> drafts on "Pragmatism."  In other words, I have come to agree with you
> "that Peirce never abandoned the Categories"; however, I still see the
> discussion of "Universes" rather than "Categories" in both "A Neglected
> Argument&

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Edwina Taborsky]

1) Jon- surely you know the difference between the active [a rejection of a 
theory] and the passive [no comment]. And I didn't differentiate the two into 
'early' and 'late, as you do, with you also suggesting that the 'late' is 'a 
more accurate representation of Peirce's views.

You wrote: " his thought (obviously) continued to develop in the years that 
followed. In particular, I suggested that CP 6.490 reflects his final (or 
near-final) views on the origin of the universe, and clarifies some aspects 
that he left vague in CP 1.412."

I don't see that the NA is a development nor a 'final or near-final view; nor 
do I see that it clarifies or that 1.412 is vague. 

2) As for my view that you were 'adamantly' in favour of rejecting the category 
theory, which you described as 'early Peirce' in favour of the later 'three 
universes - that is certainly my view - perhaps because of the number of posts 
you made on this topic over several weeks. Yes, you eventually abandoned the 
hypothesis. 

Edwina




  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Clark Goble ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 2:59 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories


  Edwina, List:


ET:  No- you aren't accurate but I don't see that I should have to  defend 
myself; if you have inaccurate views of my views - then, I am hardly going to 
fight you about your views of me!


  My apologies, I did not intend to misrepresent you; but how is having "no 
comment" on "A Neglected Argument" any different (in the pragmaticist sense) 
from rejecting it?  You just reiterated that you "don't find that it fits in 
with the emergence-evolution arguments found elsewhere in Peirce"; how is this 
at odds with my statement that you find it incompatible with his earlier 
cosmological/cosmogonic writings, which you favor?


ET:  BUT - you adamantly told us that Peirce effectively abandoned his use 
of the Categories, which you defined as 'early' and instead, moved on to 
consider the Three Universes.


  I believe that a fair review of the List archives would show that I was never 
"adamant" about this, but rather consistently characterized it as merely an 
"impression," or at most a "hypothesis"; and in any case, I immediately changed 
my mind and disavowed it when Gary R. reminded me that Peirce discussed the 
Categories at some length in at least one of his 1907 drafts on "Pragmatism."  
In other words, I have come to agree with you "that Peirce never abandoned the 
Categories"; however, I still see the discussion of "Universes" rather than 
"Categories" in both "A Neglected Argument" and the December 1908 draft letter 
to Lady Welby as calling for an explanation.  If they are not two subtly 
different expressions of the same thing, perhaps in the sense that the three 
Universes are the phaneroscopic and/or metaphysical manifestations of the three 
(logical?) Categories, then what exactly is the distinction between the two 
terms?


  Regards,


  Jon


  On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 1:12 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

Jon, list
No- you aren't accurate but I don't see that I should have to  defend 
myself; if you have inaccurate views of my views - then, I am hardly going to 
fight you about your views of me!

BUT - you adamantly told us that Peirce effectively abandoned his use of 
the Categories, which you defined as 'early' and instead, moved on to consider 
the Three Universes. That was my argument with you - that you rejected his 
Categories as 'early Peirce' while the 'mature Peirce' discusssed only the 
Three Universes. I maintained that Peirce never abandoned the Categories and 
indeed, don't find them comparable in any way with the Three Universes.

As far as the emergence of the universe, I tend to support his 1.412 
outline, which is a physico-chemical-biological outline, along with his outline 
of evolution and adaptation [tychasm, agapasm] - none of which make any 
reference to a non-immanent a priori Creator/God - as outlined in the NA.  I 
didn't find your attempt to correlate 1.412 with the NA a convincing argument.

Therefore - I said, and repeat, that I have no comment on the NA, since I 
don't find that it fits in with the emergence-evolution arguments found 
elsewhere in Peirce.

As for Peirce's Platonism -[ which is not the same as neo-Platonism], I 
find Peirce a thorough Aristotelian - and the debate, for example, by Aristotle 
vs Platonism [in many areas, including in physics, metaphysics, politics] 
...seems to find support in Peirce's views on, for example,  matter and mind; 
causality; so, I don't find arguments defining

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  No- you aren't accurate but I don't see that I should have to  defend
myself; if you have inaccurate views of my views - then, I am hardly going
to fight you about your views of me!


My apologies, I did not intend to misrepresent you; but how is having "no
comment" on "A Neglected Argument" any different (in the pragmaticist
sense) from rejecting it?  You just reiterated that you "don't find that it
fits in with the emergence-evolution arguments found elsewhere in Peirce";
how is this at odds with my statement that you find it incompatible with
his earlier cosmological/cosmogonic writings, which you favor?

ET:  BUT - you adamantly told us that Peirce effectively abandoned his use
of the Categories, which you defined as 'early' and instead, moved on to
consider the Three Universes.


I believe that a fair review of the List archives would show that I was
never "adamant" about this, but rather consistently characterized it as
merely an "impression," or at most a "hypothesis"; and in any case, I
immediately changed my mind and disavowed it when Gary R. reminded me that
Peirce discussed the Categories at some length in at least one of his 1907
drafts on "Pragmatism."  In other words, I have come to agree with you
"that Peirce never abandoned the Categories"; however, I still see the
discussion of "Universes" rather than "Categories" in both "A Neglected
Argument" and the December 1908 draft letter to Lady Welby as calling for
an explanation.  If they are not two subtly different expressions of the
same thing, perhaps in the sense that the three Universes are the
phaneroscopic and/or metaphysical manifestations of the three (logical?)
Categories, then what exactly is the distinction between the two terms?

Regards,

Jon

On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 1:12 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, list
> No- you aren't accurate but I don't see that I should have to  defend
> myself; if you have inaccurate views of my views - then, I am hardly going
> to fight you about your views of me!
>
> BUT - you adamantly told us that Peirce effectively abandoned his use of
> the Categories, which you defined as 'early' and instead, moved on to
> consider the Three Universes. That was my argument with you - that you
> rejected his Categories as 'early Peirce' while the 'mature Peirce'
> discusssed only the Three Universes. I maintained that Peirce never
> abandoned the Categories and indeed, don't find them comparable in any way
> with the Three Universes.
>
> As far as the emergence of the universe, I tend to support his 1.412
> outline, which is a physico-chemical-biological outline, along with his
> outline of evolution and adaptation [tychasm, agapasm] - none of which make
> any reference to a non-immanent a priori Creator/God - as outlined in the
> NA.  I didn't find your attempt to correlate 1.412 with the NA a convincing
> argument.
>
> Therefore - I said, and repeat, that I have *no comment* on the NA, since
> I don't find that it fits in with the emergence-evolution arguments found
> elsewhere in Peirce.
>
> As for Peirce's Platonism -[ which is not the same as neo-Platonism], I
> find Peirce a thorough Aristotelian - and the debate, for example, by
> Aristotle vs Platonism [in many areas, including in physics, metaphysics,
> politics] ...seems to find support in Peirce's views on, for example,
>  matter and mind; causality; ....so, I don't find arguments defining him as
> 'Platonist' very convincing.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *To:* Clark Goble 
> *Cc:* Peirce-L 
> *Sent:* Monday, October 24, 2016 1:47 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories
>
> Clark, List:
>
> ET:  I tend to agree with you here Edwina. I don’t quite see big
> contradictions between his later more Hegelian work with the more
> neoplatonic work of the late 1880’s. Evolution yes. But I don’t see him
> moving away from the earlier positions.
>
>
> This actually sounds more like my position than Edwina's.  I have argued
> that Peirce's later cosmological/cosmogonic writings do not *contradict *his
> earlier ones; rather, they *clarify *some details that he had previously
> left vague.  By contrast, Edwina seems to *reject *the later
> writings--especially "A Neglected Argument," which she admits she cannot
> explain and does not even attempt to explain--as incompatible with the
> earlier ones, which she favors.  She also seems to bristle at *any *suggestion
> that Peirce was a (neo-)Platonist in *any *sense whatsoever.  Of course,
> these are my impressi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jon, list
No- you aren't accurate but I don't see that I should have to  defend myself; 
if you have inaccurate views of my views - then, I am hardly going to fight you 
about your views of me!

BUT - you adamantly told us that Peirce effectively abandoned his use of the 
Categories, which you defined as 'early' and instead, moved on to consider the 
Three Universes. That was my argument with you - that you rejected his 
Categories as 'early Peirce' while the 'mature Peirce' discusssed only the 
Three Universes. I maintained that Peirce never abandoned the Categories and 
indeed, don't find them comparable in any way with the Three Universes.

As far as the emergence of the universe, I tend to support his 1.412 outline, 
which is a physico-chemical-biological outline, along with his outline of 
evolution and adaptation [tychasm, agapasm] - none of which make any reference 
to a non-immanent a priori Creator/God - as outlined in the NA.  I didn't find 
your attempt to correlate 1.412 with the NA a convincing argument.

Therefore - I said, and repeat, that I have no comment on the NA, since I don't 
find that it fits in with the emergence-evolution arguments found elsewhere in 
Peirce.

As for Peirce's Platonism -[ which is not the same as neo-Platonism], I find 
Peirce a thorough Aristotelian - and the debate, for example, by Aristotle vs 
Platonism [in many areas, including in physics, metaphysics, politics] ...seems 
to find support in Peirce's views on, for example,  matter and mind; causality; 
so, I don't find arguments defining him as 'Platonist' very convincing.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Clark Goble 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 1:47 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories


  Clark, List:


ET:  I tend to agree with you here Edwina. I don’t quite see big 
contradictions between his later more Hegelian work with the more neoplatonic 
work of the late 1880’s. Evolution yes. But I don’t see him moving away from 
the earlier positions.


  This actually sounds more like my position than Edwina's.  I have argued that 
Peirce's later cosmological/cosmogonic writings do not contradict his earlier 
ones; rather, they clarify some details that he had previously left vague.  By 
contrast, Edwina seems to reject the later writings--especially "A Neglected 
Argument," which she admits she cannot explain and does not even attempt to 
explain--as incompatible with the earlier ones, which she favors.  She also 
seems to bristle at any suggestion that Peirce was a (neo-)Platonist in any 
sense whatsoever.  Of course, these are my impressions of her positions, and I 
hope that they are accurate; if not, I would welcome her 
correction/clarification.


  Regards,


  Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
  Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
  www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt


  On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 10:04 AM, Clark Goble  wrote:

  On Oct 22, 2016, at 2:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:


  The problem is, Gary, that you and Jon are both theists and both of you 
reject the 'Big Bang'. I am an atheist and support the 'Big Bang'. Therefore, 
both sides in this debate select sections from Peirce to which we feel 
compatible. Yet - as I keep saying, both views are empirically outside of any 
possibility of proof or TRUTH. You either believe in one OR the other [or some 
other theory].
I confess I don’t understand this disagreement, especially if it is coming 
in with our priors regarding theology. It seems to me the big bang is largely 
orthogonal to such questions. For one, most physics doesn’t see the big bang as 
the beginning of everything. The inflationary models at this point are quite 
old and widely accepted. String theory has its branes which float in higher 
dimensional space. Loop quantum gravity has bubble universes more akin to the 
original inflationary models. And some theorists reject them all and say all we 
have empirical evidence for is this universe.


i.e. it would seem both options are pretty open to atheists and theists of 
various stripes
  You try to substantiate that Peirce followed the same view as yours by 
defining his 'earlier work' as something that he moved away from and rejected. 
I don't see any evidence of this. I admit that I can't explain the NA - and I 
don't even attempt to do so - but - I don't find any evidence of Peirce 
rejecting the 1.412 argument - and other arguments about the self-organization 
and evolution of the universe [tychasm, agapasm].
I tend to agree with you here Edwina. I don’t quite see big contradictions 
between his later more Hegelian work with the more neoplatonic work of the late 
1880’s. Evolution yes. But I don’t see h

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Clark, List:

ET:  I tend to agree with you here Edwina. I don’t quite see big
contradictions between his later more Hegelian work with the more
neoplatonic work of the late 1880’s. Evolution yes. But I don’t see him
moving away from the earlier positions.


This actually sounds more like my position than Edwina's.  I have argued
that Peirce's later cosmological/cosmogonic writings do not *contradict *his
earlier ones; rather, they *clarify *some details that he had previously
left vague.  By contrast, Edwina seems to *reject *the later
writings--especially "A Neglected Argument," which she admits she cannot
explain and does not even attempt to explain--as incompatible with the
earlier ones, which she favors.  She also seems to bristle at *any *suggestion
that Peirce was a (neo-)Platonist in *any *sense whatsoever.  Of course,
these are my impressions of her positions, and I hope that they are
accurate; if not, I would welcome her correction/clarification.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 10:04 AM, Clark Goble  wrote:

> On Oct 22, 2016, at 2:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>
> The problem is, Gary, that you and Jon are both theists and both of you
> reject the 'Big Bang'. I am an atheist and support the 'Big Bang'.
> Therefore, both sides in this debate select sections from Peirce to which
> we feel compatible. Yet - as I keep saying, both views are empirically
> outside of any possibility of proof or TRUTH. You either believe in one OR
> the other [or some other theory].
>
> I confess I don’t understand this disagreement, especially if it is coming
> in with our priors regarding theology. It seems to me the big bang is
> largely orthogonal to such questions. For one, most physics doesn’t see the
> big bang as the beginning of everything. The inflationary models at this
> point are quite old and widely accepted. String theory has its branes which
> float in higher dimensional space. Loop quantum gravity has bubble
> universes more akin to the original inflationary models. And some theorists
> reject them all and say all we have empirical evidence for is this universe.
>
> i.e. it would seem both options are pretty open to atheists and theists of
> various stripes
>
> You try to substantiate that Peirce followed the same view as yours by
> defining his 'earlier work' as something that he moved away from and
> rejected. I don't see any evidence of this. I admit that I can't explain
> the NA - and I don't even attempt to do so - but - I don't find any
> evidence of Peirce rejecting the 1.412 argument - and other arguments about
> the self-organization and evolution of the universe [tychasm, agapasm].
>
> I tend to agree with you here Edwina. I don’t quite see big contradictions
> between his later more Hegelian work with the more neoplatonic work of the
> late 1880’s. Evolution yes. But I don’t see him moving away from the
> earlier positions.
>
> But I suspect part of this is how to interpret those earlier passages in
> 1.412. I’m largely convinced by Parker here. (Regarding Peirce anyway - I’m
> not sure I buy the ontology itself)
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Clark Goble]

> On Oct 22, 2016, at 2:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> The problem is, Gary, that you and Jon are both theists and both of you 
> reject the 'Big Bang'. I am an atheist and support the 'Big Bang'. Therefore, 
> both sides in this debate select sections from Peirce to which we feel 
> compatible. Yet - as I keep saying, both views are empirically outside of any 
> possibility of proof or TRUTH. You either believe in one OR the other [or 
> some other theory].

I confess I don’t understand this disagreement, especially if it is coming in 
with our priors regarding theology. It seems to me the big bang is largely 
orthogonal to such questions. For one, most physics doesn’t see the big bang as 
the beginning of everything. The inflationary models at this point are quite 
old and widely accepted. String theory has its branes which float in higher 
dimensional space. Loop quantum gravity has bubble universes more akin to the 
original inflationary models. And some theorists reject them all and say all we 
have empirical evidence for is this universe.

i.e. it would seem both options are pretty open to atheists and theists of 
various stripes

> You try to substantiate that Peirce followed the same view as yours by 
> defining his 'earlier work' as something that he moved away from and 
> rejected. I don't see any evidence of this. I admit that I can't explain the 
> NA - and I don't even attempt to do so - but - I don't find any evidence of 
> Peirce rejecting the 1.412 argument - and other arguments about the 
> self-organization and evolution of the universe [tychasm, agapasm].

I tend to agree with you here Edwina. I don’t quite see big contradictions 
between his later more Hegelian work with the more neoplatonic work of the late 
1880’s. Evolution yes. But I don’t see him moving away from the earlier 
positions.

But I suspect part of this is how to interpret those earlier passages in 1.412. 
I’m largely convinced by Parker here. (Regarding Peirce anyway - I’m not sure I 
buy the ontology itself)





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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Clark Goble]

> On Oct 22, 2016, at 10:14 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard  
> wrote:
> 
> As far as I can tell, Peirce never stopped talking about the categories in 
> the context of the phenomenology or phaneroscopy. Furthermore, he never 
> stopped talking about the categories in the context of the semiotics. 

I was having trouble with my email Friday due to those denial of service 
attacks. If my post on this did make it to the list I apologize. I’ll just 
requote one section of it that I was hoping you or someone else would comment 
on.

Kant has his 12 categories in four classes. The forth class of modality is 
possibiltiy, existence and necessity. The other three classes are quantity, 
quality, and relation. If I’m following Peirce correctly he’s just separating 
modes of being from these first three classes as the categories. 

While I’d missed the beginning of the discussion, I didn’t see anyone address 
this Kantian context. It seems quite natural to read Peirce as simply breaking 
Kant’s categories up into the universes of modality and then the categories for 
everything else.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jerry Rhee]

*Deus, sive Natura*:
“That eternal and infinite being we call *God*, or *Nature*, acts from the
same necessity from which he exists”
(Part IV, Preface), Spinoza

On Sun, Oct 23, 2016 at 6:36 PM, Søren Brier  wrote:

> Edwina, list
>
>
>
> It is clear that the concept of god  in panentheism is not a personal god,
> but a transcendent creative principle at the center of reality “before” and
> “outside” time that from Toho va Bohu sets of the self-organizing
> capability of the emerging universe ( which corresponds to the immanence
> aspect of god (working as agapism in Peirce’s conceptualization). It is the
> tendency to take habits. So – as I understand it –  the concept of god is
> used to explain these two creative and dynamical aspects of reality.
> Hartshorne and Reese in 1853 published the work *Philosophers Speak of
> God: Readings in theology and analysis of theistic ideas”* where they
> discusses these views historically and conceptually.
>
>
>
> Søren
>
>
>
> *From:* Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
> *Sent:* 23. oktober 2016 21:23
> *To:* Søren Brier; Gary Richmond; Peirce-L
>
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories
>
>
>
> Thanks Soren, but -the problem with terms such as pantheism and
> panentheism - is that they don't define the term 'god'.
>
>
>
>  By the way, when/if I refer to Peirce as a 'pantheist', I am possibly -
> and  probably- using the term incorrectly.
>
>
>
> I really mean 'pansemiotician'; i.e., that semiosis functions within all
> realms of matter/mind. This then means that one must ask 'what is semiosis'
> - and I consider that it is the morphological development of matter-mind,
> within the three categories, within the triadic format. ..And that this
> takes place in all realms: the physico-chemical, biological and
> socio-conceptual.
>
>
>
> The 'origin' and 'ultimate/final cause' of this semiosis - I don't locate
> it OUTSIDE of semiosis. And I see the justification for this in Peirce's
> 1.412 outline. Others, such as Jon and Gary R, focus more on the NA
> and therefore locate this ultimate/final cause in a supreme force, [which
> must be accepted without question] termed 'God'.   I see this outline as an
> inexplicable contradiction to 1.412 - despite Jon's claim that he has
> 'solved' the contradiction.
>
>
>
> So- I apologize; I think I've been using the term 'pantheist' incorrectly
> - as my focus on 1.412, doesn't attribute the formation and generation of
> the universe to any non-immanent agent [god].
>
>
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
>
> *From:* Søren Brier 
>
> *To:* 'Edwina Taborsky'  ; Gary Richmond
>  ; Peirce-L 
>
> *Sent:* Sunday, October 23, 2016 1:28 PM
>
> *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories
>
>
>
> Edwina, Jon , list
>
>
>
> I can only point to that Charles Hartshorne viewed Peirce’s position as
> panentheism and that this view combines the two positions.
>
>
>
>  Søren
>
>
>
> *From:* Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca ]
> *Sent:* 22. oktober 2016 19:16
> *To:* Gary Richmond; Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories
>
>
>
> Gary R, list:
>
>
>
> Exactly. You wrote:
>
> "For those who are unwilling to accept *Ens Necessarium* as anything but
> "Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature" (which appears to be Edwina's
> position, although I'm not as certain as to where Jeff stands on this),
> then there is no God, no need for God, and exactly *nothing '*preceeds'
> the odd self-creation of the Universe, presumably at the moment of the most
> singular and peculiar of singularities, the putative Big Bang. So, I don't
> expect there will be anything approaching a rapprochement in these
> fundamentally opposed positions any time soon."
>
>
>
> That was also my point. The two paradigms are not, either one of them,
> empirically, provable. That is, whether the universe is
> self-generated/created as well as self-organized, or, requires an
> non-immanent agential creator. Both are logical, but, both rely totally on
> belief. So, there can't be any 'rapprochement'. You either believe in one
> or the other. And therefore, there's not much use arguing about them!
>
>
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
>
> *From:* Gary Richmond 
>
> *To:* Peirce-L 
>
> *Sent:* Saturday, October 22, 2016 1:03 PM
>
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRC

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Søren Brier]

Edwina, list

It is clear that the concept of god  in panentheism is not a personal god, but 
a transcendent creative principle at the center of reality “before” and 
“outside” time that from Toho va Bohu sets of the self-organizing capability of 
the emerging universe ( which corresponds to the immanence aspect of god 
(working as agapism in Peirce’s conceptualization). It is the tendency to take 
habits. So – as I understand it –  the concept of god is used to explain these 
two creative and dynamical aspects of reality. Hartshorne and Reese in 1853 
published the work Philosophers Speak of God: Readings in theology and analysis 
of theistic ideas” where they discusses these views historically and 
conceptually.

Søren

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 23. oktober 2016 21:23
To: Søren Brier; Gary Richmond; Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

Thanks Soren, but -the problem with terms such as pantheism and panentheism - 
is that they don't define the term 'god'.

 By the way, when/if I refer to Peirce as a 'pantheist', I am possibly - and  
probably- using the term incorrectly.

I really mean 'pansemiotician'; i.e., that semiosis functions within all realms 
of matter/mind. This then means that one must ask 'what is semiosis' - and I 
consider that it is the morphological development of matter-mind, within the 
three categories, within the triadic format. ..And that this takes place in all 
realms: the physico-chemical, biological and socio-conceptual.

The 'origin' and 'ultimate/final cause' of this semiosis - I don't locate it 
OUTSIDE of semiosis. And I see the justification for this in Peirce's 1.412 
outline. Others, such as Jon and Gary R, focus more on the NA and therefore 
locate this ultimate/final cause in a supreme force, [which must be accepted 
without question] termed 'God'.   I see this outline as an inexplicable 
contradiction to 1.412 - despite Jon's claim that he has 'solved' the 
contradiction.

So- I apologize; I think I've been using the term 'pantheist' incorrectly - as 
my focus on 1.412, doesn't attribute the formation and generation of the 
universe to any non-immanent agent [god].

Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Søren Brier<mailto:sb@cbs.dk>
To: 'Edwina Taborsky'<mailto:tabor...@primus.ca> ; Gary 
Richmond<mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com> ; 
Peirce-L<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Sent: Sunday, October 23, 2016 1:28 PM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

Edwina, Jon , list

I can only point to that Charles Hartshorne viewed Peirce’s position as 
panentheism and that this view combines the two positions.

     Søren

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 22. oktober 2016 19:16
To: Gary Richmond; Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

Gary R, list:

Exactly. You wrote:
"For those who are unwilling to accept Ens Necessarium as anything but 
"Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature" (which appears to be Edwina's position, 
although I'm not as certain as to where Jeff stands on this), then there is no 
God, no need for God, and exactly nothing 'preceeds' the odd self-creation of 
the Universe, presumably at the moment of the most singular and peculiar of 
singularities, the putative Big Bang. So, I don't expect there will be anything 
approaching a rapprochement in these fundamentally opposed positions any time 
soon."

That was also my point. The two paradigms are not, either one of them, 
empirically, provable. That is, whether the universe is self-generated/created 
as well as self-organized, or, requires an non-immanent agential creator. Both 
are logical, but, both rely totally on belief. So, there can't be any 
'rapprochement'. You either believe in one or the other. And therefore, there's 
not much use arguing about them!

Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Gary Richmond<mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>
To: Peirce-L<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Sent: Saturday, October 22, 2016 1:03 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

Jon S, Edwina, Jeff D, List,

Jon wrote: I do not see it as valid at all to substitute "the Mind-like 
Reasonableness in Nature" for "God" as Ens necessarium.  As I have pointed out 
before, Peirce made it very clear in the manuscript drafts for "A Neglected 
Argument" that what he meant by "God" isnot someone or something that is 
"immanent in Nature."  I have also previously noted the distinction between 
"self-organization" (of that which already has Being), which is perfectly 
plausible and even evident in the world today, and "self-creation&quo

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Edwina Taborsky]

Thanks Soren, but -the problem with terms such as pantheism and panentheism - 
is that they don't define the term 'god'. 

 By the way, when/if I refer to Peirce as a 'pantheist', I am possibly - and  
probably- using the term incorrectly. 

I really mean 'pansemiotician'; i.e., that semiosis functions within all realms 
of matter/mind. This then means that one must ask 'what is semiosis' - and I 
consider that it is the morphological development of matter-mind, within the 
three categories, within the triadic format. ..And that this takes place in all 
realms: the physico-chemical, biological and socio-conceptual. 

The 'origin' and 'ultimate/final cause' of this semiosis - I don't locate it 
OUTSIDE of semiosis. And I see the justification for this in Peirce's 1.412 
outline. Others, such as Jon and Gary R, focus more on the NA and therefore 
locate this ultimate/final cause in a supreme force, [which must be accepted 
without question] termed 'God'.   I see this outline as an inexplicable 
contradiction to 1.412 - despite Jon's claim that he has 'solved' the 
contradiction. 

So- I apologize; I think I've been using the term 'pantheist' incorrectly - as 
my focus on 1.412, doesn't attribute the formation and generation of the 
universe to any non-immanent agent [god].

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Søren Brier 
  To: 'Edwina Taborsky' ; Gary Richmond ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Sunday, October 23, 2016 1:28 PM
  Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories


  Edwina, Jon , list

   

  I can only point to that Charles Hartshorne viewed Peirce’s position as 
panentheism and that this view combines the two positions.

   

   Søren

   

  From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
  Sent: 22. oktober 2016 19:16
  To: Gary Richmond; Peirce-L
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

   

  Gary R, list: 

   

  Exactly. You wrote:

  "For those who are unwilling to accept Ens Necessarium as anything but 
"Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature" (which appears to be Edwina's position, 
although I'm not as certain as to where Jeff stands on this), then there is no 
God, no need for God, and exactly nothing 'preceeds' the odd self-creation of 
the Universe, presumably at the moment of the most singular and peculiar of 
singularities, the putative Big Bang. So, I don't expect there will be anything 
approaching a rapprochement in these fundamentally opposed positions any time 
soon."

   

  That was also my point. The two paradigms are not, either one of them, 
empirically, provable. That is, whether the universe is self-generated/created 
as well as self-organized, or, requires an non-immanent agential creator. Both 
are logical, but, both rely totally on belief. So, there can't be any 
'rapprochement'. You either believe in one or the other. And therefore, there's 
not much use arguing about them!

   

  Edwina

- Original Message - 

From: Gary Richmond 

To: Peirce-L 

Sent: Saturday, October 22, 2016 1:03 PM

Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

 

Jon S, Edwina, Jeff D, List,

 

Jon wrote: I do not see it as valid at all to substitute "the Mind-like 
Reasonableness in Nature" for "God" as Ens necessarium.  As I have pointed out 
before, Peirce made it very clear in the manuscript drafts for "A Neglected 
Argument" that what he meant by "God" isnot someone or something that is 
"immanent in Nature."  I have also previously noted the distinction between 
"self-organization" (of that which already has Being), which is perfectly 
plausible and even evident in the world today, and "self-creation" or 
"self-generation" (something coming into Being on its own out of nothing), 
which I find completely implausible.

 

I agree, Jon, and have myself over the years argued that ""Mind-like 
Reasonableness in Nature" is a valid concept (along with "self-organization") 
only after the creation of a cosmos, or, as you put it, after there is Being. I 
too find the notion of "self-generation" and "self-creation" completely 
implausible and inexplicable. 

 

But didn't we just recently have this discussion (remember Platonism vs 
Aristotelianism?) in contemplating, for prime example, the blackboard analogy 
(to which Jon added the interesting 'dimension' of a whiteboard)? For those who 
are unwilling to accept Ens Necessarium as anything but "Mind-like 
Reasonableness in Nature" (which appears to be Edwina's position, although I'm 
not as certain as to where Jeff stands on this), then ther

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Søren Brier]

Edwina, Jon , list

I can only point to that Charles Hartshorne viewed Peirce’s position as 
panentheism and that this view combines the two positions.

 Søren

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 22. oktober 2016 19:16
To: Gary Richmond; Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

Gary R, list:

Exactly. You wrote:
"For those who are unwilling to accept Ens Necessarium as anything but 
"Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature" (which appears to be Edwina's position, 
although I'm not as certain as to where Jeff stands on this), then there is no 
God, no need for God, and exactly nothing 'preceeds' the odd self-creation of 
the Universe, presumably at the moment of the most singular and peculiar of 
singularities, the putative Big Bang. So, I don't expect there will be anything 
approaching a rapprochement in these fundamentally opposed positions any time 
soon."

That was also my point. The two paradigms are not, either one of them, 
empirically, provable. That is, whether the universe is self-generated/created 
as well as self-organized, or, requires an non-immanent agential creator. Both 
are logical, but, both rely totally on belief. So, there can't be any 
'rapprochement'. You either believe in one or the other. And therefore, there's 
not much use arguing about them!

Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Gary Richmond<mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>
To: Peirce-L<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Sent: Saturday, October 22, 2016 1:03 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

Jon S, Edwina, Jeff D, List,

Jon wrote: I do not see it as valid at all to substitute "the Mind-like 
Reasonableness in Nature" for "God" as Ens necessarium.  As I have pointed out 
before, Peirce made it very clear in the manuscript drafts for "A Neglected 
Argument" that what he meant by "God" isnot someone or something that is 
"immanent in Nature."  I have also previously noted the distinction between 
"self-organization" (of that which already has Being), which is perfectly 
plausible and even evident in the world today, and "self-creation" or 
"self-generation" (something coming into Being on its own out of nothing), 
which I find completely implausible.

I agree, Jon, and have myself over the years argued that ""Mind-like 
Reasonableness in Nature" is a valid concept (along with "self-organization") 
only after the creation of a cosmos, or, as you put it, after there is Being. I 
too find the notion of "self-generation" and "self-creation" completely 
implausible and inexplicable.

But didn't we just recently have this discussion (remember Platonism vs 
Aristotelianism?) in contemplating, for prime example, the blackboard analogy 
(to which Jon added the interesting 'dimension' of a whiteboard)? For those who 
are unwilling to accept Ens Necessarium as anything but "Mind-like 
Reasonableness in Nature" (which appears to be Edwina's position, although I'm 
not as certain as to where Jeff stands on this), then there is no God, no need 
for God, and exactly nothing 'preceeds' the odd self-creation of the Universe, 
presumably at the moment of the most singular and peculiar of singularities, 
the putative Big Bang. So, I don't expect there will be anything approaching a 
rapprochement in these fundamentally opposed positions any time soon.

Meanwhile, and while I think , Jeff, that you may be tending to over-emphasize 
the importance of developments in the existential graphs in consideration of 
the Categories/Universes problematic in the N.A. (I don't recall a single 
mention of EGs in that piece),  your most recent post does offer some 
intriguing hints as to how we might begin to rethink aspects of the relation 
between the Categories and the Universes, or at least that is my first 
impression. But how, say, the Gamma graphs might figure in all this, I have no 
idea whatsover.

Jeff concluded: So, in "The Neglected Argument", Peirce may very well be 
examining--on an observational basis--the different ways that we might think 
about the phenomenological account of the universes and categories in common 
experience for the sake of refining his explanations of how the logical 
conceptions of the universes of discourse and categories should be applied to 
those abductive inferences that give rise to our most global hypotheses.

For me at least there have always been uncanny, unresolved tensions between the 
phenomenological, the logical, and the metaphysical in The Neglected Argument. 
The attempt to unravel them seems to me of the greatest potential value.

Best,

Gary R

[Gary Richmond]

Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jerry Rhee]

omething else?
>>
>> One of the lessons I draw from "The Neglected Argument" is that answers
>> to the largest questions often drawn on conceptions that are, by their very
>> nature, quite vague. What is more, I think we should be cautious
>> about seeking  greater precision in the use of these conceptions than is
>> really needed or warranted. I deliberately tried to avoid imposing specific
>> claims about what is immanent in nature or what is separate from it as well
>> as claims about what might or might not be operating as a form of
>> self-organization and the like.
>>
>> For my part, I take these to be open questions, and we should be careful
>> about the way we might try re-frame the questions or formulate hypotheses
>> as tentative answers. I am trying to follow the critical
>> common-sensist approach in holding off on imposing too much exactness on
>> the questions or the answers when addressing these large matters. After
>> all, our shared common sense has been evolving for many thousands of years
>> and it probably contains forms of wisdom that surpass my abilities as a
>> relatively solitary and short-lived thinker.
>>
>> Having said that about my own common-sense way of coming at these
>> questions and answers, I do feel a need to push further as a person who
>> engages in philosophy. But I try to keep in mind that the philosophical
>> inquiries are theoretical in character and, across the board, they are
>> highly prone to error. A quick look at the history of philosophy should be
>> enough to confirm anyone's suspicions that, as a scientific form in
>> inquiry, it is still in its relative infancy in working out its methods as
>> compared to say, math or astronomy.
>>
>> So, I have ideas about how we might reconstruct several of Peirce's lines
>> of inquiry in "The Neglected Argument", but I see several major strands to
>> the inquiries and I see several methods at work. Moving beyond a
>> reconstruction of his argument, I believe that we can and should pursue
>> these different lines of inquiry--and that we should seek to do so as part
>> of a larger community of inquiry that seeks common ground and that is
>> drawing on commonly accepted methods and kinds of observations.
>>
>> --Jeff
>> Jeffrey Downard
>> Associate Professor
>> Department of Philosophy
>> Northern Arizona University
>> (o) 928 523-8354
>>
>> --
>> *From:* Edwina Taborsky 
>> *Sent:* Saturday, October 22, 2016 1:10 PM
>> *To:* Gary Richmond; Peirce-L
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories
>>
>> Gary R, Jon, Jeffrey, list etc...
>>
>> Self-generation, self-origination of the universe within the fundamental
>> categories of organization of Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness - as
>> outlined in 1.412, is to me, NOT inexplicable but entirely plausible and
>> logical. [It IS a Big Bang outline].  The Universe then proceeds to evolve,
>> as a complex and networked merger of Mind and Matter - again, outlined in
>> Peirce's various analyses of evolution [tychasm, agapasm]..To me, it is a
>> valid explanation.
>>
>> To require a metaphysical, agent/creator of this universe is to me -
>> utterly inexplicable and illogical. After all it does not explain the
>> origin of this metaphysical agent/creator!!!.
>>
>> As I keep saying, there are these two competing theories, both of which
>> quite frankly, are outside of any empirical proof. Therefore, one
>> *believes* - and I mean the word -* believes*  - in one and not the
>> other.
>>
>> I do NOT find the outline of a metaphysical agent/creator to be
>> explicable in any way. It rests on non-scientific means; i.e., one believes
>> because of authority or tenacity.  Of course this belief, like its
>> opposite,  is not empirically provable, but it is, to me, not
>> even logically explicable...because, for all the ancient reasons - one then
>> has to ask: And what was the origin of this metaphysical agent/creator. The
>> usual Scholastic answer is: There Is No Origin. Which means you are back to
>> the circle: you believe or don't believe.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> - Original Message -
>> *From:* Gary Richmond 
>> *To:* Peirce-L 
>> *Sent:* Saturday, October 22, 2016 3:35 PM
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories
>>
>> Jon, Edwina, List,
>>
>> Two things have been clarified for me from this discussion. First, that
>> as Jon noted, Pei

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

gages in philosophy. But I try to keep in mind that the philosophical
> inquiries are theoretical in character and, across the board, they are
> highly prone to error. A quick look at the history of philosophy should be
> enough to confirm anyone's suspicions that, as a scientific form in
> inquiry, it is still in its relative infancy in working out its methods as
> compared to say, math or astronomy.
>
> So, I have ideas about how we might reconstruct several of Peirce's lines
> of inquiry in "The Neglected Argument", but I see several major strands to
> the inquiries and I see several methods at work. Moving beyond a
> reconstruction of his argument, I believe that we can and should pursue
> these different lines of inquiry--and that we should seek to do so as part
> of a larger community of inquiry that seeks common ground and that is
> drawing on commonly accepted methods and kinds of observations.
>
> --Jeff
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
>
> --
> *From:* Edwina Taborsky 
> *Sent:* Saturday, October 22, 2016 1:10 PM
> *To:* Gary Richmond; Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories
>
> Gary R, Jon, Jeffrey, list etc...
>
> Self-generation, self-origination of the universe within the fundamental
> categories of organization of Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness - as
> outlined in 1.412, is to me, NOT inexplicable but entirely plausible and
> logical. [It IS a Big Bang outline].  The Universe then proceeds to evolve,
> as a complex and networked merger of Mind and Matter - again, outlined in
> Peirce's various analyses of evolution [tychasm, agapasm]..To me, it is a
> valid explanation.
>
> To require a metaphysical, agent/creator of this universe is to me -
> utterly inexplicable and illogical. After all it does not explain the
> origin of this metaphysical agent/creator!!!.
>
> As I keep saying, there are these two competing theories, both of which
> quite frankly, are outside of any empirical proof. Therefore, one
> *believes* - and I mean the word -* believes*  - in one and not the
> other.
>
> I do NOT find the outline of a metaphysical agent/creator to be explicable
> in any way. It rests on non-scientific means; i.e., one believes because of
> authority or tenacity.  Of course this belief, like its opposite,  is not
> empirically provable, but it is, to me, not even logically
> explicable...because, for all the ancient reasons - one then has to ask:
> And what was the origin of this metaphysical agent/creator. The usual
> Scholastic answer is: There Is No Origin. Which means you are back to the
> circle: you believe or don't believe.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Gary Richmond 
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Sent:* Saturday, October 22, 2016 3:35 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories
>
> Jon, Edwina, List,
>
> Two things have been clarified for me from this discussion. First, that as
> Jon noted, Peirce would unquestionably* not* "sanction calling a
> proposition "logical" that renders the origin of the entire universe
> *inexplicable*."
>
> The self-generation or self-creation of the Universe is such an illogical
> proposition. What Peirce offers in his early cosmological musings, as
> difficult as they certainly are to analyze and interpret, increasingly make
> better sense--at least for me--of the origins of the Universe than the
> competing theory, the Big Bang, for which Great Singularity there has never
> been a persuasive, or pretty much any, reason given.
>
> So, as I'm now seeing it, this great scientist, philosopher, and logician
> (semiotician), i.e., Peirce, arrives at his early cosmology (which
> necessitates God) because for him this is the only reasonable solution to
> the ancient question of why there is anything rather than nothing and why
> it takes the (for Peirce) trichotomic form which it does. That he employs
> the fruits of his intellectual labors over a lifetime, including his notion
> of Three Universes, in an attempt at a reasonable answer to this question
> is much less the action of a believer (an certainly not a theologian, for
> he famously rather despised theology), than as a scientist.
>
> Second, from his own words it is clear that Peirce would never "substitute
> "the Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature" for "God" as *Ens necessarium*."
>
> Jon has argued this repeatedly and so well that I have nothing to add to
> his argumentation.
>
> But this brings me back to the first point, namely, that for Peirce a
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jeff, List:

JD:  The classification of signs, objects, interpretants based on their
modal character and the modal character of the relations is grounded from
early to late on the division between possibles, existents and necessitates.


That particular terminology comes from the December 1908 letter to Lady
Welby--and Peirce explicitly associated them in that letter with
"Universes," not "Categories."

JD:  I don't see that he dropped the discussion of the modal categories in
the context of the formal logic in favor of trying to conceive of these
relations entirely in terms of universes and sub-universes of discourse.
Rather, he was actively experimenting and dramatically rethinking the
relations between them.


I am now inclined to agree with this, so the question becomes if and when
he settled on a resolution, and which writings reflect it.  There is also
the one that I already posed below--what (if anything) do "universes and
sub-universes of discourses" have to do with "Universes of Experience" in
"A Neglected Argument" and the "Universes" of Possibles, Existents, and
Necessitants in the letter to Welby?

JD:  In effect, the categories of possibles, actual existents and
necessities are still in the system, but they are being interpreted in
terms of different universes and sub-universes of discourse. The
sub-universes are needed because Peirce is now making distinctions between
different kinds and classes of possibles, actuals and necessities in the
formal system itself.


This sounds like equating "universes and sub-universes of discourse" with
the categories, or at least viewing the former as a particular
interpretation of the latter.  Is "sub-universes" a term that Peirce ever
used?  What are some examples of the "distinctions between different kinds
and classes" that create the need for these "sub-universes"?

JD:  So, in "The Neglected Argument", Peirce may very well be examining--on
an observational basis--the different ways that we might think about the
phenomenological account of the universes and categories in common
experience for the sake of refining his explanations of how the logical
conceptions of the universes of discourse and categories should be applied
to those abductive inferences that give rise to our most global hypotheses.


On what basis do we connect the seemingly phenomenological and/or
metaphysical Universes of Experience with "the logical conceptions of the
universes of discourse"?  Again, the article never once mentions
"categories," so what warrants drawing *any* conclusions about them from
this particular text?

Thanks,

Jon

On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 1:02 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Jeff, List:
>
> This is another post that I need to digest carefully.  I have already been
> getting better acquainted with the Existential Graphs in recent days, so
> that should help.  One immediate question is what connection (if any) there
> is between "universes of discourse" and "universes of experience"; Peirce
> only refers to the latter in "A Neglected Argument."  And again, he never
> once mentions "categories" in that article, so I have a hard time drawing
> any conclusions about those from it.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 11:14 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>
>> Gary R, Jon S, List,
>>
>> As far as I can tell, Peirce never stopped talking about the categories
>> in the context of the phenomenology or phaneroscopy. Furthermore, he never
>> stopped talking about the categories in the context of the semiotics.
>>
>> In fact, the phenomenological conception of the categories was a leading
>> idea that grew in importance and in its distinction (as compared to the
>> logical conception of the categories and the metaphysical conception of the
>> categories) from 1902 on.
>>
>> The classification of signs, objects, interpretants based on their modal
>> character and the modal character of the relations is grounded from early
>> to late on the division between possibles, existents and necessitates. The
>> explanations of the relations of determination, reference, representation,
>> signification, assurance, validity, and the like all hinge on this modal
>> division from beginning to end without waver.
>>
>> Having said that, I do see that Peirce was significantly rethinking the
>> relations between the quantifiers and the modal operators between 1903 and
>> the end. I don't see that he dropped the discussion of the modal categories
>> in the context of the formal logic in favor of trying to conceive of these
>> relations entirely in terms of universes and sub-universes of discourse.
>> Rather, he was actively experimenting and dramatically rethinking the
>> relations between them.
>>
>> Consider the rich explanations of the developments of the gamma graphs
>> that Don Roberts p

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

te it lateris not, to me, a strong argument. I don't
> think it is a matter of logic or fact that 'later writings are more
> truthful theories'. So - as I also keep saying, I don't think that there is
> a resolution to this particular debate. I certainly have no intention
> of suggesting that you and Jon stop believing in God and rejecting the
> BigBang!!!
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Gary Richmond 
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Sent:* Saturday, October 22, 2016 4:29 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories
>
> Edwina, Jon S, Jeff D, List,
>
> Edwina wrote: "I do NOT find the outline of a metaphysical agent/creator
> to be explicable in any way. It rests on non-scientific means; i.e., one
> believes because of authority or tenacity.  Of course this belief, like its
> opposite,  is not empirically provable, but it is, to me, not
> even logically explicable."
>
> First, can we agree that the idea of a creator is indeed Peirce's, he who
> outlined the scientific method of settling doubt as superior to that of
> authority or tenacity? How foolish of Peirce not to have seen his own
> blatent illogic. How do you explain this logical failure?
>
> Then, considering Peirce's 1898 cosmological musings (which introduce the
> ur-continuum and thus 3ns which *is* in some way associated with a creator
> as both Jon and I have pointed out in consideration of one of the three
> Universes), unlike his comments in "A Guess at the Riddle" which you always
> point to, this seems to me to be a deepening and development of those
> earlier views where 1ns seemed to arise out of some chaos perhaps not yet
> thought of by him as a continuum (his understanding of continua is
> developing at the same time). I find this, consequently, to be a more
> compelling early cosmic theory than that of "A Guess at the Riddle."
>
> (I've just read Jon's response which makes a similar point in a somewhat
> different way; but I've decided to send this as well.)
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jerry, List,


I find that John Sowa's remarks reflect my own assessment of where things 
stand. He provides a link to a presentation by Susan Haack, and she offers a 
nice review of how the philosophical landscape in the U.S. and the British 
Commonwealth have shifted over the course of the last hundred years. One sign 
of the relative immaturity of philosophy as a science is how splintered the 
philosophical community is about really basic questions concerning the kinds of 
methods and observations we ought to use. Once we figure in the splintered 
character of the continentally inspired part of the community, things seem even 
more immature. While the community of philosophical inquirers may have much 
room for growth, that doesn't mean that really good work hasn't been done in a 
number of important areas by some philosophers--such as Plato, Aristotle, 
Scotus, Aquinas, Hume, Mill, Kant, Peirce, etc.


In response to your other question, I suspect that the number of philosophers 
who have read CP 5.189 is quite low. In my estimate, the larger collection of 
his works are what matter for understanding the development of his ideas and 
arguments--and not any one passage.


--Jeff




Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jerry Rhee 
Sent: Saturday, October 22, 2016 2:12 PM
To: John F Sowa
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

Hi Jeff,

I like what you have to say.

Question on what you said:
A quick look at the history of philosophy should be enough to confirm anyone's 
suspicions that, as a scientific form in inquiry, it is still in its relative 
infancy in working out its methods as compared to say, math or astronomy.

Where in infancy is philosophy as a scientific form in inquiry?

That is, have the most rigorous philosophers accepted CP 5.189 as a formalized 
starting point to explain unexplained phenomena?

Thanks,
Jerry Rhee

On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 4:09 PM, John F Sowa 
mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> wrote:
On 10/22/2016 3:44 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
both explanations are based on belief; I really don't think either
is open to empirical evidence.

Peirce encouraged reasoning by hypothesis (abduction), but he
insisted that the implications of those hypotheses be evaluated
by testing (purposive action) and observation (perception).

He was highly skeptical about philosophers who proposed hypotheses
that could not be related, directly or indirectly, to perception
and action.

In an earlier note, I cited the recent lecture by Susan Haack:
http://www.jfsowa.com/ikl/Haack16.pdf

In slide 6, she included a photo of Peirce and wrote "Peirce urged that
philosophy be undertaken in the same spirit as the best work of the
sciences, and that it should rely on experience as well as reason."

In slide 7, she quoted two phrases by Peirce:  "sham reasoning" by
theologians and "lawless rovers on the sea of literature."

At the end (slide 84), she included a photo of Bertrand Russell sitting
in an armchair and wrote "the idea that philosophy can be conducted
purely a priori is an illusion ... but a seductive one."

I'm sure that Peirce would have been happy to know that people were
still reading, analyzing, and debating his writings a century later.
But I doubt that he would approve of "lawless rovers" on the sea of
what he wrote.

Instead, he would want his readers to continue the work he could no
longer do:  evaluate his hypotheses against their own experience
(by phaneroscopy) and by empirical evidence gathered and published
by others.

The debate in this thread is useful.  Speculation about what he
meant should be tested against the many versions of his writings,
but they should also be compared to the theories and empirical
evidence of the past century.

I believe that Peirce's writings improve on many of his successors.
His writings about indexicals (based on his long analysis of language)
are a great improvement on the armchair philosophers:  e.g., Russell's
hypothesis about definite descriptions, Perry's essential indexical,
and most of the speculation about proper names in possible worlds.

John


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jerry Rhee]

Hi Jeff,



I like what you have to say.



Question on what you said:

A quick look at the history of philosophy should be enough to confirm
anyone's suspicions that, as a scientific form in inquiry, it is still in
its relative infancy in working out its methods as compared to say, math or
astronomy.



Where in infancy is philosophy as a scientific form in inquiry?



That is, have the most rigorous philosophers accepted CP 5.189 as a
formalized starting point to explain unexplained phenomena?



Thanks,
Jerry Rhee

On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 4:09 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> On 10/22/2016 3:44 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>
>> both explanations are based on belief; I really don't think either
>> is open to empirical evidence.
>>
>
> Peirce encouraged reasoning by hypothesis (abduction), but he
> insisted that the implications of those hypotheses be evaluated
> by testing (purposive action) and observation (perception).
>
> He was highly skeptical about philosophers who proposed hypotheses
> that could not be related, directly or indirectly, to perception
> and action.
>
> In an earlier note, I cited the recent lecture by Susan Haack:
> http://www.jfsowa.com/ikl/Haack16.pdf
>
> In slide 6, she included a photo of Peirce and wrote "Peirce urged that
> philosophy be undertaken in the same spirit as the best work of the
> sciences, and that it should rely on experience as well as reason."
>
> In slide 7, she quoted two phrases by Peirce:  "sham reasoning" by
> theologians and "lawless rovers on the sea of literature."
>
> At the end (slide 84), she included a photo of Bertrand Russell sitting
> in an armchair and wrote "the idea that philosophy can be conducted
> purely a priori is an illusion ... but a seductive one."
>
> I'm sure that Peirce would have been happy to know that people were
> still reading, analyzing, and debating his writings a century later.
> But I doubt that he would approve of "lawless rovers" on the sea of
> what he wrote.
>
> Instead, he would want his readers to continue the work he could no
> longer do:  evaluate his hypotheses against their own experience
> (by phaneroscopy) and by empirical evidence gathered and published
> by others.
>
> The debate in this thread is useful.  Speculation about what he
> meant should be tested against the many versions of his writings,
> but they should also be compared to the theories and empirical
> evidence of the past century.
>
> I believe that Peirce's writings improve on many of his successors.
> His writings about indexicals (based on his long analysis of language)
> are a great improvement on the armchair philosophers:  e.g., Russell's
> hypothesis about definite descriptions, Perry's essential indexical,
> and most of the speculation about proper names in possible worlds.
>
> John
>
>
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>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[John F Sowa]

On 10/22/2016 3:44 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

both explanations are based on belief; I really don't think either
is open to empirical evidence.


Peirce encouraged reasoning by hypothesis (abduction), but he
insisted that the implications of those hypotheses be evaluated
by testing (purposive action) and observation (perception).

He was highly skeptical about philosophers who proposed hypotheses
that could not be related, directly or indirectly, to perception
and action.

In an earlier note, I cited the recent lecture by Susan Haack:
http://www.jfsowa.com/ikl/Haack16.pdf

In slide 6, she included a photo of Peirce and wrote "Peirce urged that
philosophy be undertaken in the same spirit as the best work of the
sciences, and that it should rely on experience as well as reason."

In slide 7, she quoted two phrases by Peirce:  "sham reasoning" by
theologians and "lawless rovers on the sea of literature."

At the end (slide 84), she included a photo of Bertrand Russell sitting
in an armchair and wrote "the idea that philosophy can be conducted
purely a priori is an illusion ... but a seductive one."

I'm sure that Peirce would have been happy to know that people were
still reading, analyzing, and debating his writings a century later.
But I doubt that he would approve of "lawless rovers" on the sea of
what he wrote.

Instead, he would want his readers to continue the work he could no
longer do:  evaluate his hypotheses against their own experience
(by phaneroscopy) and by empirical evidence gathered and published
by others.

The debate in this thread is useful.  Speculation about what he
meant should be tested against the many versions of his writings,
but they should also be compared to the theories and empirical
evidence of the past century.

I believe that Peirce's writings improve on many of his successors.
His writings about indexicals (based on his long analysis of language)
are a great improvement on the armchair philosophers:  e.g., Russell's
hypothesis about definite descriptions, Perry's essential indexical,
and most of the speculation about proper names in possible worlds.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary R, Jon S, Edwina, List,


I hope it was clear that my aim in formulating and then reformulating a series 
of assertinos and questions that pertain to Peirce's claims about God as 
creator of the three universes of experience in "The Neglected Argument" was 
clear. It was a deliberate attempt to follow the scholastic procedure in 
approaching disagreements between disputants. That is, I was hoping to close 
some of the distance between the parties (e.g., Jon S and Edwina) by exploring 
where there might be some common ground.


Here are two versions of an assertion I was trying to frame by drawing on 
Emersons's quote in his discussion of the farmer followed by two versions of a 
question. My goal was to think a bit more about the different senses in which 
Peirce might be saying that God is a creator. Given the fact that I grew up on 
a farm and spent much of my youth baling hay and tending to cows bearing 
calves, the allusion has a special resonance with my own experience.


1. The glory of God as Ens necessarium is that, in the division of labor, it is 
his part to create.


2.  The glory of the Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature as Ens necessarium is 
that, in the division of labor, it is its part to create.


3. Is the God as Ens necessarium self-sufficient in his originative capacity, 
or is his capacity to create homogeneities of connectedness out of variety 
within and between the three universes of experience dependent on something 
else?


4. Is the Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature as Ens necessarium self-sufficient 
in its originative capacity, or is its capacity to create homogeneities of 
connectedness out of variety within and between the three universes of 
experience dependent on something else?


One of the lessons I draw from "The Neglected Argument" is that answers to the 
largest questions often drawn on conceptions that are, by their very nature, 
quite vague. What is more, I think we should be cautious about seeking  greater 
precision in the use of these conceptions than is really needed or warranted. I 
deliberately tried to avoid imposing specific claims about what is immanent in 
nature or what is separate from it as well as claims about what might or might 
not be operating as a form of self-organization and the like.


For my part, I take these to be open questions, and we should be careful about 
the way we might try re-frame the questions or formulate hypotheses as 
tentative answers. I am trying to follow the critical common-sensist approach 
in holding off on imposing too much exactness on the questions or the answers 
when addressing these large matters. After all, our shared common sense has 
been evolving for many thousands of years and it probably contains forms of 
wisdom that surpass my abilities as a relatively solitary and short-lived 
thinker.


Having said that about my own common-sense way of coming at these questions and 
answers, I do feel a need to push further as a person who engages in 
philosophy. But I try to keep in mind that the philosophical inquiries are 
theoretical in character and, across the board, they are highly prone to error. 
A quick look at the history of philosophy should be enough to confirm anyone's 
suspicions that, as a scientific form in inquiry, it is still in its relative 
infancy in working out its methods as compared to say, math or astronomy.


So, I have ideas about how we might reconstruct several of Peirce's lines of 
inquiry in "The Neglected Argument", but I see several major strands to the 
inquiries and I see several methods at work. Moving beyond a reconstruction of 
his argument, I believe that we can and should pursue these different lines of 
inquiry--and that we should seek to do so as part of a larger community of 
inquiry that seeks common ground and that is drawing on commonly accepted 
methods and kinds of observations.


--Jeff




Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Edwina Taborsky 
Sent: Saturday, October 22, 2016 1:10 PM
To: Gary Richmond; Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

Gary R, Jon, Jeffrey, list etc...

Self-generation, self-origination of the universe within the fundamental 
categories of organization of Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness - as outlined in 
1.412, is to me, NOT inexplicable but entirely plausible and logical. [It IS a 
Big Bang outline].  The Universe then proceeds to evolve, as a complex and 
networked merger of Mind and Matter - again, outlined in Peirce's various 
analyses of evolution [tychasm, agapasm]..To me, it is a valid explanation.

To require a metaphysical, agent/creator of this universe is to me - utterly 
inexplicable and illogical. After all it does not explain the origin of this 
metaphysical agent/creator!!!.

As I keep saying, there are these two competin

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Edwina Taborsky]

Gary R, Jon, list:

The problem is, Gary, that you and Jon are both theists and both of you reject 
the 'Big Bang'. I am an atheist and support the 'Big Bang'. Therefore, both 
sides in this debate select sections from Peirce to which we feel compatible. 
Yet - as I keep saying, both views are empirically outside of any possibility 
of proof or TRUTH. You either believe in one OR the other [or some other 
theory]. 

You try to substantiate that Peirce followed the same view as yours by defining 
his 'earlier work' as something that he moved away from and rejected. I don't 
see any evidence of this. I admit that I can't explain the NA - and I don't 
even attempt to do so - but - I don't find any evidence of Peirce rejecting the 
1.412 argument - and other arguments about the self-organization and evolution 
of the universe [tychasm, agapasm].

I consider that his 'ens necessarium' are the three categories. Jon seems to 
think that Peirce moved away from them. I don't see this.

Then, both your and Jon's view of the primal role of Thirdness [that continuum] 
is something that I remain very sceptical of - for i consider that all three 
categories are 'primal'. 

So- we have lots of disagreements. BUT - on the issue of the origin of the 
universe, as I keep saying, the selection of one OR the other view is a matter 
of BELIEF. Not proof. And to declare that Peirce took the theist view because 
he wrote it lateris not, to me, a strong argument. I don't think it is a 
matter of logic or fact that 'later writings are more truthful theories'. So - 
as I also keep saying, I don't think that there is a resolution to this 
particular debate. I certainly have no intention of suggesting that you and Jon 
stop believing in God and rejecting the BigBang!!! 

Edwina
  - Original Message ----- 
  From: Gary Richmond 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Saturday, October 22, 2016 4:29 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories


  Edwina, Jon S, Jeff D, List,


  Edwina wrote: "I do NOT find the outline of a metaphysical agent/creator to 
be explicable in any way. It rests on non-scientific means; i.e., one believes 
because of authority or tenacity.  Of course this belief, like its opposite,  
is not empirically provable, but it is, to me, not even logically explicable."


  First, can we agree that the idea of a creator is indeed Peirce's, he who 
outlined the scientific method of settling doubt as superior to that of 
authority or tenacity? How foolish of Peirce not to have seen his own blatent 
illogic. How do you explain this logical failure?


  Then, considering Peirce's 1898 cosmological musings (which introduce the 
ur-continuum and thus 3ns which *is* in some way associated with a creator as 
both Jon and I have pointed out in consideration of one of the three 
Universes), unlike his comments in "A Guess at the Riddle" which you always 
point to, this seems to me to be a deepening and development of those earlier 
views where 1ns seemed to arise out of some chaos perhaps not yet thought of by 
him as a continuum (his understanding of continua is developing at the same 
time). I find this, consequently, to be a more compelling early cosmic theory 
than that of "A Guess at the Riddle." 



  (I've just read Jon's response which makes a similar point in a somewhat 
different way; but I've decided to send this as well.) 


  Best,


  Gary R






  Gary Richmond
  Philosophy and Critical Thinking
  Communication Studies
  LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
  C 745
  718 482-5690


  On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

Gary R, Jon, Jeffrey, list etc...

Self-generation, self-origination of the universe within the fundamental 
categories of organization of Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness - as outlined in 
1.412, is to me, NOT inexplicable but entirely plausible and logical. [It IS a 
Big Bang outline].  The Universe then proceeds to evolve, as a complex and 
networked merger of Mind and Matter - again, outlined in Peirce's various 
analyses of evolution [tychasm, agapasm]..To me, it is a valid explanation.

To require a metaphysical, agent/creator of this universe is to me - 
utterly inexplicable and illogical. After all it does not explain the origin of 
this metaphysical agent/creator!!!.

As I keep saying, there are these two competing theories, both of which 
quite frankly, are outside of any empirical proof. Therefore, one believes - 
and I mean the word - believes  - in one and not the other. 

I do NOT find the outline of a metaphysical agent/creator to be explicable 
in any way. It rests on non-scientific means; i.e., one believes because of 
authority or tenacity.  Of course this belief, like its opposite,  is not 
empirically provable, but it is, to me, not even 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jon, list - Yes, we've been over a few things before, including your view that 
Peirce rejected his earlier writings within his later writings. I disagree with 
this view. I disagree that he spent the 'next two decades' essentially revising 
and refining; his categories - which you seem to have problems with - are, in 
my view, never rejected and never abandoned. 

I have said that I can't explain his NA - and note that in it, he did NOT 
reject his self-generated universe of 1.412.  It is NOT obvious that Peirce 
found a self-generated universe unsatisfactory and instead opted for a 
non-immanent metaphysical agential creator. He doesn't say this; he doesn't 
reject the self-generating forces nor the three categories.

Again, I've said that for both of us, our basic beliefs affect our readings of 
Peirce. You are, openly and thoroughly, a theist. I am, openly and thoroughly, 
an atheist. Therefore - you reject 1.412, while I accept it.

I totally disagree with you that 'god' does not require an explanation for one 
MUST ask: 'where did God come from'? I consider that it DOES require an 
explanation. The scholastics tried to get around this requirement with their 
'well, something perfect doesn't require an origin; it is perfect because it is 
perfect becauseetc.  I don't find that acceptable.

Therefore - the questions of the origin of the three categories - is equally 
'ens necessarium'. Peirce himself defines them as fundamental and necessary. 
And as for the original energy without mass -  it is equally fundamental and 
necessary.

Again - I do wish that you would see my point. BOTH views are beliefs and BOTH 
are empirically unprovable. Therefore - which one you choose to accept - 
depends on which belief you find most satisfactory. I find Peirce's 1.412 most 
satisfactory - and that's where it ends.

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Saturday, October 22, 2016 4:24 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories


  Edwina, List:


  We have been over this ground already--Peirce wrote CP 1.412 in 1887-1888, 
and spent the next two decades revising and refining his views about the origin 
of the universe.  This is evident in various writings, including the 1891-1893 
"metaphysical series" in The Monist, the 1898 Cambridge Conferences lectures on 
Reasoning and the Logic of Things, and (finally) the 1908 article "A Neglected 
Argument for the Reality of God."  You have acknowledged previously that you 
cannot explain why these later descriptions, especially the last one, include 
"a non-immanent agential creator"; but it seems obvious that Peirce must have 
ultimately found any other explanation unsatisfactory.


  Even if we take CP 1.412 and your interpretation thereof in isolation, there 
are still tough questions that cannot be avoided.  Where did "the original 
chaos ... in effect a state of mere indeterminacy" come from?  Where did the 
three categories come from?  Where did matter/mind come from?  In other words, 
where did Being come from?  By 1908, Peirce had settled upon the unavoidable 
conclusion that the only Being whose origin does not require an explanation is 
Ens necessarium--i.e., necessary Being, which has no origin at all, and which 
he explicitly identified as God.


  Regards,


  Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
  Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
  www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt


  On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 2:44 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

Jon, list: The thing is, Peirce didn't base his analysis on the words of a 
song. And self-generation does not 'render the origin of the entire universe 
inexplicable'. He outlines and explains its self-generation in 1.412. He bases 
his analysis on an assumption that the three categories, which are modes [not 
agents] of organization of matter/mind.. are fundamental - and as such, can 
initiate and organize the universe.

I personally find the notion of a non-immanent agential creator - to be 
inexplicable and therefore the acceptance of such rests solely on a belief in 
such an agent.

As I've said - both explanations are based on belief; I really don't think 
either is open to empirical evidence. I happen to find the 1.412 explanation to 
be, yes, logical - and I therefore accept it.

Edwina


--



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  PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, Jon S, Jeff D, List,

Edwina wrote: "I do NOT find the outline of a metaphysical agent/creator to
be explicable in any way. It rests on non-scientific means; i.e., one
believes because of authority or tenacity.  Of course this belief, like its
opposite,  is not empirically provable, but it is, to me, not
even logically explicable."

First, can we agree that the idea of a creator is indeed Peirce's, he who
outlined the scientific method of settling doubt as superior to that of
authority or tenacity? How foolish of Peirce not to have seen his own
blatent illogic. How do you explain this logical failure?

Then, considering Peirce's 1898 cosmological musings (which introduce the
ur-continuum and thus 3ns which *is* in some way associated with a creator
as both Jon and I have pointed out in consideration of one of the three
Universes), unlike his comments in "A Guess at the Riddle" which you always
point to, this seems to me to be a deepening and development of those
earlier views where 1ns seemed to arise out of some chaos perhaps not yet
thought of by him as a continuum (his understanding of continua is
developing at the same time). I find this, consequently, to be a more
compelling early cosmic theory than that of "A Guess at the Riddle."

(I've just read Jon's response which makes a similar point in a somewhat
different way; but I've decided to send this as well.)

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R, Jon, Jeffrey, list etc...
>
> Self-generation, self-origination of the universe within the fundamental
> categories of organization of Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness - as
> outlined in 1.412, is to me, NOT inexplicable but entirely plausible and
> logical. [It IS a Big Bang outline].  The Universe then proceeds to evolve,
> as a complex and networked merger of Mind and Matter - again, outlined in
> Peirce's various analyses of evolution [tychasm, agapasm]..To me, it is a
> valid explanation.
>
> To require a metaphysical, agent/creator of this universe is to me -
> utterly inexplicable and illogical. After all it does not explain the
> origin of this metaphysical agent/creator!!!.
>
> As I keep saying, there are these two competing theories, both of which
> quite frankly, are outside of any empirical proof. Therefore, one
> *believes* - and I mean the word -* believes*  - in one and not the
> other.
>
> I do NOT find the outline of a metaphysical agent/creator to be explicable
> in any way. It rests on non-scientific means; i.e., one believes because of
> authority or tenacity.  Of course this belief, like its opposite,  is not
> empirically provable, but it is, to me, not even logically
> explicable...because, for all the ancient reasons - one then has to ask:
> And what was the origin of this metaphysical agent/creator. The usual
> Scholastic answer is: There Is No Origin. Which means you are back to the
> circle: you believe or don't believe.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Gary Richmond 
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Sent:* Saturday, October 22, 2016 3:35 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories
>
> Jon, Edwina, List,
>
> Two things have been clarified for me from this discussion. First, that as
> Jon noted, Peirce would unquestionably* not* "sanction calling a
> proposition "logical" that renders the origin of the entire universe
> *inexplicable*."
>
> The self-generation or self-creation of the Universe is such an illogical
> proposition. What Peirce offers in his early cosmological musings, as
> difficult as they certainly are to analyze and interpret, increasingly make
> better sense--at least for me--of the origins of the Universe than the
> competing theory, the Big Bang, for which Great Singularity there has never
> been a persuasive, or pretty much any, reason given.
>
> So, as I'm now seeing it, this great scientist, philosopher, and logician
> (semiotician), i.e., Peirce, arrives at his early cosmology (which
> necessitates God) because for him this is the only reasonable solution to
> the ancient question of why there is anything rather than nothing and why
> it takes the (for Peirce) trichotomic form which it does. That he employs
> the fruits of his intellectual labors over a lifetime, including his notion
> of Three Universes, in an attempt at a reasonable answer to this question
> is much less the action of a believer (an certainly not a theologian, for
> he famously rather despised theology), than as a scientist.
>
> Second, fro

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

We have been over this ground already--Peirce wrote CP 1.412 in 1887-1888,
and spent the next two decades revising and refining his views about the
origin of the universe.  This is evident in various writings, including the
1891-1893 "metaphysical series" in *The Monist*, the 1898 Cambridge
Conferences lectures on *Reasoning and the Logic of Things*, and (finally)
the 1908 article "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God."  You have
acknowledged previously that you *cannot explain* why these later
descriptions, especially the last one, include "a non-immanent agential
creator"; but it seems obvious that Peirce must have ultimately found any
other explanation *unsatisfactory*.

Even if we take CP 1.412 and your interpretation thereof in isolation,
there are still tough questions that cannot be avoided.  Where did "the
original chaos ... in effect a state of mere indeterminacy" come from?
Where did the three categories come from?  Where did matter/mind come
from?  In other words, where did Being come from?  By 1908, Peirce had
settled upon the unavoidable conclusion that the only Being whose origin *does
not* require an explanation is *Ens necessarium*--i.e., *necessary *Being,
which has no origin at all, and which he explicitly identified as God.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 2:44 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, list: The thing is, Peirce didn't base his analysis on the words of a
> song. And self-generation does not 'render the origin of the entire
> universe inexplicable'. He outlines and explains its self-generation in
> 1.412. He bases his analysis on an assumption that the three categories,
> which are modes [not agents] of organization of matter/mind.. are
> fundamental - and as such, can initiate and organize the universe.
>
> I personally find the notion of a non-immanent agential creator - to be
> inexplicable and therefore the acceptance of such rests solely on a belief
> in such an agent.
>
> As I've said - both explanations are based on belief; I really don't think
> either is open to empirical evidence. I happen to find the 1.412
> explanation to be, yes, logical - and I therefore accept it.
>
> Edwina
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Edwina Taborsky]

Gary R, Jon, Jeffrey, list etc...

Self-generation, self-origination of the universe within the fundamental 
categories of organization of Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness - as outlined in 
1.412, is to me, NOT inexplicable but entirely plausible and logical. [It IS a 
Big Bang outline].  The Universe then proceeds to evolve, as a complex and 
networked merger of Mind and Matter - again, outlined in Peirce's various 
analyses of evolution [tychasm, agapasm]..To me, it is a valid explanation.

To require a metaphysical, agent/creator of this universe is to me - utterly 
inexplicable and illogical. After all it does not explain the origin of this 
metaphysical agent/creator!!!.

As I keep saying, there are these two competing theories, both of which quite 
frankly, are outside of any empirical proof. Therefore, one believes - and I 
mean the word - believes  - in one and not the other. 

I do NOT find the outline of a metaphysical agent/creator to be explicable in 
any way. It rests on non-scientific means; i.e., one believes because of 
authority or tenacity.  Of course this belief, like its opposite,  is not 
empirically provable, but it is, to me, not even logically 
explicable...because, for all the ancient reasons - one then has to ask: And 
what was the origin of this metaphysical agent/creator. The usual Scholastic 
answer is: There Is No Origin. Which means you are back to the circle: you 
believe or don't believe.

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: Gary Richmond 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Saturday, October 22, 2016 3:35 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories


  Jon, Edwina, List,


  Two things have been clarified for me from this discussion. First, that as 
Jon noted, Peirce would unquestionably not "sanction calling a proposition 
"logical" that renders the origin of the entire universe inexplicable."


  The self-generation or self-creation of the Universe is such an illogical 
proposition. What Peirce offers in his early cosmological musings, as difficult 
as they certainly are to analyze and interpret, increasingly make better 
sense--at least for me--of the origins of the Universe than the competing 
theory, the Big Bang, for which Great Singularity there has never been a 
persuasive, or pretty much any, reason given. 


  So, as I'm now seeing it, this great scientist, philosopher, and logician 
(semiotician), i.e., Peirce, arrives at his early cosmology (which necessitates 
God) because for him this is the only reasonable solution to the ancient 
question of why there is anything rather than nothing and why it takes the (for 
Peirce) trichotomic form which it does. That he employs the fruits of his 
intellectual labors over a lifetime, including his notion of Three Universes, 
in an attempt at a reasonable answer to this question is much less the action 
of a believer (an certainly not a theologian, for he famously rather despised 
theology), than as a scientist.


  Second, from his own words it is clear that Peirce would never "substitute 
"the Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature" for "God" as Ens necessarium." 


  Jon has argued this repeatedly and so well that I have nothing to add to his 
argumentation.


  But this brings me back to the first point, namely, that for Peirce a 
principal, perhaps the principal purpose of science and reason is exactly to 
make the world explicable. As Terry Eagleton writes in Reason, Faith, and 
Revolution: Reflections on the God Debate in words which could be Peirce's: 


We may. . . inquire what we are to make of the fact that even before we 
have begun to reason properly, that the world is in principle reasonable in the 
first place (129).


  In additional, Eagleton comments, following Aquinas' dictum that "all virtues 
have their source in love":


Love is the ultimate form of soberly disenchanted realism, which is why it 
is the twin of truth (122),


  But that would get us into a discussion of Peirce's non-traditional view of 
Christianity, which is, even if deeply related, a distinctly different topic 
than the Reality of God in the N.A.


  Best,


  Gary R






  : Love is the ultimate form of soberly 


















  Gary Richmond
  Philosophy and Critical Thinking
  Communication Studies
  LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
  C 745
  718 482-5690


  On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 1:49 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
wrote:

Edwina, List:


  ET:  That is, whether the universe is self-generated/created as well as 
self-organized, or, requires an non-immanent agential creator. Both are logical 
...


I hardly think that Peirce would sanction calling a proposition "logical" 
that renders the origin of the entire universe inexplicable.  
Self-generation/creation does not even qualify as an admissible hypothesis 
according to his criteria, since it does not explai

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jon, list: The thing is, Peirce didn't base his analysis on the words of a 
song. And self-generation does not 'render the origin of the entire universe 
inexplicable'. He outlines and explains its self-generation in 1.412. He bases 
his analysis on an assumption that the three categories, which are modes [not 
agents] of organization of matter/mind.. are fundamental - and as such, can 
initiate and organize the universe.

I personally find the notion of a non-immanent agential creator - to be 
inexplicable and therefore the acceptance of such rests solely on a belief in 
such an agent.

As I've said - both explanations are based on belief; I really don't think 
either is open to empirical evidence. I happen to find the 1.412 explanation to 
be, yes, logical - and I therefore accept it.

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Saturday, October 22, 2016 1:49 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories


  Edwina, List:


ET:  That is, whether the universe is self-generated/created as well as 
self-organized, or, requires an non-immanent agential creator. Both are logical 
...


  I hardly think that Peirce would sanction calling a proposition "logical" 
that renders the origin of the entire universe inexplicable.  
Self-generation/creation does not even qualify as an admissible hypothesis 
according to his criteria, since it does not explain anything.  Julie Andrews 
sang it well--"Nothing comes from nothing, nothing ever could."


  Regards,


  Jon


  On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 12:15 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

Gary R, list: 

Exactly. You wrote:
"For those who are unwilling to accept Ens Necessarium as anything but 
"Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature" (which appears to be Edwina's position, 
although I'm not as certain as to where Jeff stands on this), then there is no 
God, no need for God, and exactly nothing 'preceeds' the odd self-creation of 
the Universe, presumably at the moment of the most singular and peculiar of 
singularities, the putative Big Bang. So, I don't expect there will be anything 
approaching a rapprochement in these fundamentally opposed positions any time 
soon."

That was also my point. The two paradigms are not, either one of them, 
empirically, provable. That is, whether the universe is self-generated/created 
as well as self-organized, or, requires an non-immanent agential creator. Both 
are logical, but, both rely totally on belief. So, there can't be any 
'rapprochement'. You either believe in one or the other. And therefore, there's 
not much use arguing about them!

Edwina
  - Original Message ----- 
  From: Gary Richmond 
  To: Peirce-L 
      Sent: Saturday, October 22, 2016 1:03 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories


  Jon S, Edwina, Jeff D, List,


  Jon wrote: I do not see it as valid at all to substitute "the Mind-like 
Reasonableness in Nature" for "God" as Ens necessarium.  As I have pointed out 
before, Peirce made it very clear in the manuscript drafts for "A Neglected 
Argument" that what he meant by "God" isnot someone or something that is 
"immanent in Nature."  I have also previously noted the distinction between 
"self-organization" (of that which already has Being), which is perfectly 
plausible and even evident in the world today, and "self-creation" or 
"self-generation" (something coming into Being on its own out of nothing), 
which I find completely implausible.


  I agree, Jon, and have myself over the years argued that ""Mind-like 
Reasonableness in Nature" is a valid concept (along with "self-organization") 
only after the creation of a cosmos, or, as you put it, after there is Being. I 
too find the notion of "self-generation" and "self-creation" completely 
implausible and inexplicable. 


  But didn't we just recently have this discussion (remember Platonism vs 
Aristotelianism?) in contemplating, for prime example, the blackboard analogy 
(to which Jon added the interesting 'dimension' of a whiteboard)? For those who 
are unwilling to accept Ens Necessarium as anything but "Mind-like 
Reasonableness in Nature" (which appears to be Edwina's position, although I'm 
not as certain as to where Jeff stands on this), then there is no God, no need 
for God, and exactly nothing 'preceeds' the odd self-creation of the Universe, 
presumably at the moment of the most singular and peculiar of singularities, 
the putative Big Bang. So, I don't expect there will be anything approaching a 
rapprochement in these fundamentally opposed positions any time soon.


  Meanwhil

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, Edwina, List,

Two things have been clarified for me from this discussion. First, that as
Jon noted, Peirce would unquestionably* not* "sanction calling a
proposition "logical" that renders the origin of the entire universe
*inexplicable*."

The self-generation or self-creation of the Universe is such an illogical
proposition. What Peirce offers in his early cosmological musings, as
difficult as they certainly are to analyze and interpret, increasingly make
better sense--at least for me--of the origins of the Universe than the
competing theory, the Big Bang, for which Great Singularity there has never
been a persuasive, or pretty much any, reason given.

So, as I'm now seeing it, this great scientist, philosopher, and logician
(semiotician), i.e., Peirce, arrives at his early cosmology (which
necessitates God) because for him this is the only reasonable solution to
the ancient question of why there is anything rather than nothing and why
it takes the (for Peirce) trichotomic form which it does. That he employs
the fruits of his intellectual labors over a lifetime, including his notion
of Three Universes, in an attempt at a reasonable answer to this question
is much less the action of a believer (an certainly not a theologian, for
he famously rather despised theology), than as a scientist.

Second, from his own words it is clear that Peirce would never "substitute
"the Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature" for "God" as *Ens necessarium*."

Jon has argued this repeatedly and so well that I have nothing to add to
his argumentation.

But this brings me back to the first point, namely, that for Peirce a
principal, perhaps *the* principal purpose of science and reason is exactly
to make the world explicable. As Terry Eagleton writes in *Reason, Faith,
and Revolution: Reflections on the God Debate* in words which could be
Peirce's:

We may. . . inquire what we are to make of the fact that even before we
have begun to reason properly, that the world is in principle reasonable in
the first place (129).


In additional, Eagleton comments, following Aquinas' dictum that "all
virtues have their source in love":

Love is the ultimate form of soberly disenchanted realism, which is why it
is the twin of truth (122),


But that would get us into a discussion of Peirce's non-traditional view of
Christianity, which is, even if deeply related, a distinctly different
topic than the Reality of God in the N.A.

Best,

Gary R



: Love is the ultimate form of soberly







[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*

On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 1:49 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> ET:  That is, whether the universe is self-generated/created as well as
> self-organized, or, requires an non-immanent agential creator. Both are
> logical ...
>
>
> I hardly think that Peirce would sanction calling a proposition "logical"
> that renders the origin of the entire universe *inexplicable*.
> Self-generation/creation does not even qualify as an admissible hypothesis
> according to his criteria, since it does not *explain *anything.  Julie
> Andrews sang it well--"Nothing comes from nothing, nothing ever could."
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 12:15 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Gary R, list:
>>
>> Exactly. You wrote:
>> "For those who are unwilling to accept *Ens Necessarium* as anything but
>> "Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature" (which appears to be Edwina's
>> position, although I'm not as certain as to where Jeff stands on this),
>> then there is no God, no need for God, and exactly *nothing '*preceeds'
>> the odd self-creation of the Universe, presumably at the moment of the most
>> singular and peculiar of singularities, the putative Big Bang. So, I don't
>> expect there will be anything approaching a rapprochement in these
>> fundamentally opposed positions any time soon."
>>
>> That was also my point. The two paradigms are not, either one of them,
>> empirically, provable. That is, whether the universe is
>> self-generated/created as well as self-organized, or, requires an
>> non-immanent agential creator. Both are logical, but, both rely totally on
>> belief. So, there can't be any 'rapprochement'. You either believe in one
>> or the other. And therefore, there's not much use arguing about them!
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> - Original Message -
>> *From:* Gary Richmond 
>> *To:* Peirce-L 
>> *Sent:* Saturday, October 22, 2016 1:03 PM
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRC

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Helmut Raulien]

List, esp. dear cosmologists,

I have got an idea about the universe, of which I do not know, if it makes sense. It is based on the assumption that there was no beginning, no big bang too, and on what I had read, that the energy represented mainly by matter, heat, and kinetic energy is equal the potential energy (a function mainly of matter and the distances between the stars). So if you would write a "minus" before eg. the potential energy, the sum of energy in the universe is zero. That would mean, that, as in an expanding universe the potential energy increases with the distances between masses, so as a counterweight, also the other energy forms, esp. matter, should permanently increase (virtual particles becoming real ones). The density and temperature should remain the same. Now my idea was, that if the universe becomes too big, perhaps it cannot keep its spherical shape, and splits, like a soap bubble splitting in two or more. In each universe bubble now it looks, as if there had been a big bang, but there has not. This hypothesis though requires a mechanism that keeps the ratio of heavy and light elements as it is: Trans-iron-elements are being made by fusion in supernovae, but they also are split again to hydrogen, eg. in evaporating black holes. I wonder, if this might make sense.

Best,

Helmut

 

  22. Oktober 2016 um 19:15 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky"  wrote:
 



Gary R, list: 

 

Exactly. You wrote:

"For those who are unwilling to accept Ens Necessarium as anything but "Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature" (which appears to be Edwina's position, although I'm not as certain as to where Jeff stands on this), then there is no God, no need for God, and exactly nothing 'preceeds' the odd self-creation of the Universe, presumably at the moment of the most singular and peculiar of singularities, the putative Big Bang. So, I don't expect there will be anything approaching a rapprochement in these fundamentally opposed positions any time soon."

 

That was also my point. The two paradigms are not, either one of them, empirically, provable. That is, whether the universe is self-generated/created as well as self-organized, or, requires an non-immanent agential creator. Both are logical, but, both rely totally on belief. So, there can't be any 'rapprochement'. You either believe in one or the other. And therefore, there's not much use arguing about them!

 

Edwina


- Original Message -

From: Gary Richmond

To: Peirce-L

Sent: Saturday, October 22, 2016 1:03 PM

Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

 


Jon S, Edwina, Jeff D, List,

 

Jon wrote: I do not see it as valid at all to substitute "the Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature" for "God" as Ens necessarium.  As I have pointed out before, Peirce made it very clear in the manuscript drafts for "A Neglected Argument" that what he meant by "God" isnot someone or something that is "immanent in Nature."  I have also previously noted the distinction between "self-organization" (of that which already has Being), which is perfectly plausible and even evident in the world today, and "self-creation" or "self-generation" (something coming into Being on its own out of nothing), which I find completely implausible.

 

I agree, Jon, and have myself over the years argued that ""Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature" is a valid concept (along with "self-organization") only after the creation of a cosmos, or, as you put it, after there is Being. I too find the notion of "self-generation" and "self-creation" completely implausible and inexplicable. 

 

But didn't we just recently have this discussion (remember Platonism vs Aristotelianism?) in contemplating, for prime example, the blackboard analogy (to which Jon added the interesting 'dimension' of a whiteboard)? For those who are unwilling to accept Ens Necessarium as anything but "Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature" (which appears to be Edwina's position, although I'm not as certain as to where Jeff stands on this), then there is no God, no need for God, and exactly nothing 'preceeds' the odd self-creation of the Universe, presumably at the moment of the most singular and peculiar of singularities, the putative Big Bang. So, I don't expect there will be anything approaching a rapprochement in these fundamentally opposed positions any time soon.

 

Meanwhile, and while I think , Jeff, that you may be tending to over-emphasize the importance of developments in the existential graphs in consideration of the Categories/Universes problematic in the N.A. (I don't recall a single mention of EGs in that piece),  your most recent post does offer some intriguing hints as to how we might begin to rethink aspects of the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jeff, List:

This is another post that I need to digest carefully.  I have already been
getting better acquainted with the Existential Graphs in recent days, so
that should help.  One immediate question is what connection (if any) there
is between "universes of discourse" and "universes of experience"; Peirce
only refers to the latter in "A Neglected Argument."  And again, he never
once mentions "categories" in that article, so I have a hard time drawing
any conclusions about those from it.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 11:14 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Gary R, Jon S, List,
>
> As far as I can tell, Peirce never stopped talking about the categories in
> the context of the phenomenology or phaneroscopy. Furthermore, he never
> stopped talking about the categories in the context of the semiotics.
>
> In fact, the phenomenological conception of the categories was a leading
> idea that grew in importance and in its distinction (as compared to the
> logical conception of the categories and the metaphysical conception of the
> categories) from 1902 on.
>
> The classification of signs, objects, interpretants based on their modal
> character and the modal character of the relations is grounded from early
> to late on the division between possibles, existents and necessitates. The
> explanations of the relations of determination, reference, representation,
> signification, assurance, validity, and the like all hinge on this modal
> division from beginning to end without waver.
>
> Having said that, I do see that Peirce was significantly rethinking the
> relations between the quantifiers and the modal operators between 1903 and
> the end. I don't see that he dropped the discussion of the modal categories
> in the context of the formal logic in favor of trying to conceive of these
> relations entirely in terms of universes and sub-universes of discourse.
> Rather, he was actively experimenting and dramatically rethinking the
> relations between them.
>
> Consider the rich explanations of the developments of the gamma graphs
> that Don Roberts provides in chapters 5-7 of his monograph on the
> existential graphs. One can nicely trace the development of the conceptions
> by looking at the index and seeing how Peirce used the conceptions of
> universes and categories at each of the major stages in the development of
> the gamma graphs.
>
> While the developments are complex, let me summarize a few prominent sets
> of ideas that Peirce experimented with between 1898 and 1910. Starting
> in 1898, Peirce introduced developments of the lines that connect spots in
> order to handle hypostatic abstraction, potentials and graphs of graphs. He
> tried tapered thickened lines in order to deal with ordered sequences,
> branches with numbered Rhos in order to express relations of different
> orders of acidity, capital letters to represent selectives and spatially
> ordered branching connections on numbered "carrots" for potentials to
> handle relations between possibilities, abstractions and existent objects.
>
> Thus far, all of the major developments are experiments on the lines
> connecting spots. He introduces a wavy line that goes around a symbol for
> gamma expressions of the alpha graph, but that is not a special kind of cut
> or boundary. Rather, it is just a way of highlighting the symbol (e.g., a
> selective, an assertion, etc.) to say what it precisely expresses. In
> Logical Tracts No. 2, Peirce introduced the dotted, wavy, and saw rims, but
> these too were used to talk about the things inside the rims as different 
> kinds
> of abstractions. They don't really introduce new kinds of boundaries into
> the diagrammatic space that is the sheet of assertion.
>
> Having tried a lot of experiments on the lines connecting spots, he then
> starts to experiment with variations on the cuts and scrolls to introduce
> new kinds of boundaries. Already, in the early development of the cut, he
> had already tried one variation on the continuous line forming a loop. In
> place of a single line looping around an area to form a boundary between
> two areas, he blackened in the area to represent the pseudograph as a way
> of expressing that everything in that area is false, regardless of the kind
> of possible expression that might be in that area. That is, it
> obliterates that area entirely. That was a kind of limiting case in the
> interpretation of the cut or scroll.
>
> Things change dramatically with the introduction of the tinctured graphs
> in 1903. Now, we have the areas inside of cuts colored or shaded in some
> way to distinguish between different ways of saying that something is
> actually the case, or possible so, or different ways of being necessitated.
> The introduction of the tinctures brings a whole host of complicatio

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  That is, whether the universe is self-generated/created as well as
self-organized, or, requires an non-immanent agential creator. Both are
logical ...


I hardly think that Peirce would sanction calling a proposition "logical"
that renders the origin of the entire universe *inexplicable*.
Self-generation/creation does not even qualify as an admissible hypothesis
according to his criteria, since it does not *explain *anything.  Julie
Andrews sang it well--"Nothing comes from nothing, nothing ever could."

Regards,

Jon

On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 12:15 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> Gary R, list:
>
> Exactly. You wrote:
> "For those who are unwilling to accept *Ens Necessarium* as anything but
> "Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature" (which appears to be Edwina's
> position, although I'm not as certain as to where Jeff stands on this),
> then there is no God, no need for God, and exactly *nothing '*preceeds'
> the odd self-creation of the Universe, presumably at the moment of the most
> singular and peculiar of singularities, the putative Big Bang. So, I don't
> expect there will be anything approaching a rapprochement in these
> fundamentally opposed positions any time soon."
>
> That was also my point. The two paradigms are not, either one of them,
> empirically, provable. That is, whether the universe is
> self-generated/created as well as self-organized, or, requires an
> non-immanent agential creator. Both are logical, but, both rely totally on
> belief. So, there can't be any 'rapprochement'. You either believe in one
> or the other. And therefore, there's not much use arguing about them!
>
> Edwina
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> *From:* Gary Richmond 
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Sent:* Saturday, October 22, 2016 1:03 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories
>
> Jon S, Edwina, Jeff D, List,
>
> Jon wrote: I do not see it as valid *at all* to substitute "the Mind-like
> Reasonableness in Nature" for "God" as *Ens necessarium*.  As I have
> pointed out before, Peirce made it very clear in the manuscript drafts for
> "A Neglected Argument" that what he meant by "God" is*not* someone or
> something that is "immanent in Nature."  I have also previously noted the
> distinction between "self-organization" (of that which already has Being),
> which is perfectly plausible and even evident in the world today, and
> "self-creation" or "self-generation" (something coming into Being on its
> own out of nothing), which I find completely implausible.
>
> I agree, Jon, and have myself over the years argued that ""Mind-like
> Reasonableness in Nature" is a valid concept (along with
> "self-organization") only *after *the creation of a cosmos, or, as you
> put it, after there is Being. I too find the notion of "self-generation"
> and "self-creation" completely implausible and inexplicable.
>
> But didn't we just recently have this discussion (remember Platonism vs
> Aristotelianism?) in contemplating, for prime example, the blackboard
> analogy (to which Jon added the interesting 'dimension' of a whiteboard)?
> For those who are unwilling to accept *Ens Necessarium* as anything but
> "Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature" (which appears to be Edwina's
> position, although I'm not as certain as to where Jeff stands on this),
> then there is no God, no need for God, and exactly *nothing '*preceeds'
> the odd self-creation of the Universe, presumably at the moment of the most
> singular and peculiar of singularities, the putative Big Bang. So, I don't
> expect there will be anything approaching a rapprochement in these
> fundamentally opposed positions any time soon.
>
> Meanwhile, and while I think , Jeff, that you may be tending to
> over-emphasize the importance of developments in the existential graphs in
> consideration of the Categories/Universes problematic in the N.A. (I don't
> recall a single mention of EGs in that piece),  your most recent post does
> offer some intriguing hints as to how we might begin to rethink aspects of
> the relation between the Categories and the Universes, or at least that is
> my first impression. But how, say, the Gamma graphs might figure in all
> this, I have no idea whatsover.
>
>
> Jeff concluded: So, in "The Neglected Argument", Peirce may very well be
> examining--on an observational basis--the different ways that we might
> think about the phenomenological account of the universes and categories in
> common experience for the sake of refining h

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Edwina Taborsky]

Gary R, list: 

Exactly. You wrote:
"For those who are unwilling to accept Ens Necessarium as anything but 
"Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature" (which appears to be Edwina's position, 
although I'm not as certain as to where Jeff stands on this), then there is no 
God, no need for God, and exactly nothing 'preceeds' the odd self-creation of 
the Universe, presumably at the moment of the most singular and peculiar of 
singularities, the putative Big Bang. So, I don't expect there will be anything 
approaching a rapprochement in these fundamentally opposed positions any time 
soon."

That was also my point. The two paradigms are not, either one of them, 
empirically, provable. That is, whether the universe is self-generated/created 
as well as self-organized, or, requires an non-immanent agential creator. Both 
are logical, but, both rely totally on belief. So, there can't be any 
'rapprochement'. You either believe in one or the other. And therefore, there's 
not much use arguing about them!

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Gary Richmond 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Saturday, October 22, 2016 1:03 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories


  Jon S, Edwina, Jeff D, List,


  Jon wrote: I do not see it as valid at all to substitute "the Mind-like 
Reasonableness in Nature" for "God" as Ens necessarium.  As I have pointed out 
before, Peirce made it very clear in the manuscript drafts for "A Neglected 
Argument" that what he meant by "God" isnot someone or something that is 
"immanent in Nature."  I have also previously noted the distinction between 
"self-organization" (of that which already has Being), which is perfectly 
plausible and even evident in the world today, and "self-creation" or 
"self-generation" (something coming into Being on its own out of nothing), 
which I find completely implausible.


  I agree, Jon, and have myself over the years argued that ""Mind-like 
Reasonableness in Nature" is a valid concept (along with "self-organization") 
only after the creation of a cosmos, or, as you put it, after there is Being. I 
too find the notion of "self-generation" and "self-creation" completely 
implausible and inexplicable. 


  But didn't we just recently have this discussion (remember Platonism vs 
Aristotelianism?) in contemplating, for prime example, the blackboard analogy 
(to which Jon added the interesting 'dimension' of a whiteboard)? For those who 
are unwilling to accept Ens Necessarium as anything but "Mind-like 
Reasonableness in Nature" (which appears to be Edwina's position, although I'm 
not as certain as to where Jeff stands on this), then there is no God, no need 
for God, and exactly nothing 'preceeds' the odd self-creation of the Universe, 
presumably at the moment of the most singular and peculiar of singularities, 
the putative Big Bang. So, I don't expect there will be anything approaching a 
rapprochement in these fundamentally opposed positions any time soon.


  Meanwhile, and while I think , Jeff, that you may be tending to 
over-emphasize the importance of developments in the existential graphs in 
consideration of the Categories/Universes problematic in the N.A. (I don't 
recall a single mention of EGs in that piece),  your most recent post does 
offer some intriguing hints as to how we might begin to rethink aspects of the 
relation between the Categories and the Universes, or at least that is my first 
impression. But how, say, the Gamma graphs might figure in all this, I have no 
idea whatsover.


Jeff concluded: So, in "The Neglected Argument", Peirce may very well be 
examining--on an observational basis--the different ways that we might think 
about the phenomenological account of the universes and categories in common 
experience for the sake of refining his explanations of how the logical 
conceptions of the universes of discourse and categories should be applied to 
those abductive inferences that give rise to our most global hypotheses. 


  For me at least there have always been uncanny, unresolved tensions between 
the phenomenological, the logical, and the metaphysical in The Neglected 
Argument. The attempt to unravel them seems to me of the greatest potential 
value. 



  Best,


  Gary R






  Gary Richmond
  Philosophy and Critical Thinking
  Communication Studies
  LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
  C 745
  718 482-5690


  On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
wrote:

Edwina, Jeff, List:


This highlights one of my strong initial misgivings about Jeff's posts from 
last night.  I do not see it as valid at all to substitute "the Mind-like 
Reasonableness in Nature" for "God" as Ens

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Gary Richmond]

Jon S, Edwina, Jeff D, List,

Jon wrote: I do not see it as valid *at all* to substitute "the Mind-like
Reasonableness in Nature" for "God" as *Ens necessarium*.  As I have
pointed out before, Peirce made it very clear in the manuscript drafts for
"A Neglected Argument" that what he meant by "God" is*not* someone or
something that is "immanent in Nature."  I have also previously noted the
distinction between "self-organization" (of that which already has Being),
which is perfectly plausible and even evident in the world today, and
"self-creation" or "self-generation" (something coming into Being on its
own out of nothing), which I find completely implausible.

I agree, Jon, and have myself over the years argued that ""Mind-like
Reasonableness in Nature" is a valid concept (along with
"self-organization") only *after *the creation of a cosmos, or, as you put
it, after there is Being. I too find the notion of "self-generation" and
"self-creation" completely implausible and inexplicable.

But didn't we just recently have this discussion (remember Platonism vs
Aristotelianism?) in contemplating, for prime example, the blackboard
analogy (to which Jon added the interesting 'dimension' of a whiteboard)?
For those who are unwilling to accept *Ens Necessarium* as anything but
"Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature" (which appears to be Edwina's
position, although I'm not as certain as to where Jeff stands on this),
then there is no God, no need for God, and exactly *nothing '*preceeds' the
odd self-creation of the Universe, presumably at the moment of the most
singular and peculiar of singularities, the putative Big Bang. So, I don't
expect there will be anything approaching a rapprochement in these
fundamentally opposed positions any time soon.

Meanwhile, and while I think , Jeff, that you may be tending to
over-emphasize the importance of developments in the existential graphs in
consideration of the Categories/Universes problematic in the N.A. (I don't
recall a single mention of EGs in that piece),  your most recent post does
offer some intriguing hints as to how we might begin to rethink aspects of
the relation between the Categories and the Universes, or at least that is
my first impression. But how, say, the Gamma graphs might figure in all
this, I have no idea whatsover.


Jeff concluded: So, in "The Neglected Argument", Peirce may very well be
examining--on an observational basis--the different ways that we might
think about the phenomenological account of the universes and categories in
common experience for the sake of refining his explanations of how the
logical conceptions of the universes of discourse and categories should be
applied to those abductive inferences that give rise to our
most global hypotheses.


For me at least there have always been uncanny, unresolved tensions between
the phenomenological, the logical, and the metaphysical in The Neglected
Argument. The attempt to unravel them seems to me of the greatest potential
value.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:

> Edwina, Jeff, List:
>
> This highlights one of my strong initial misgivings about Jeff's posts
> from last night.  I do not see it as valid *at all* to substitute "the
> Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature" for "God" as *Ens necessarium*.  As I
> have pointed out before, Peirce made it very clear in the manuscript drafts
> for "A Neglected Argument" that what he meant by "God" is *not* someone
> or something that is "immanent in Nature."  I have also previously noted
> the distinction between "self-organization" (of that which already has
> Being), which is perfectly plausible and even evident in the world today,
> and "self-creation" or "self-generation" (something coming into Being on
> its own out of nothing), which I find completely implausible.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 8:12 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jeffrey- very nice outline. My view is that  "the Mind-like
>> Reasonableness in Nature as *Ens necessarium* self-sufficient in its
>> originative capacity, "...for Peirce rejected the Cartesian separation of
>> Mind and Matter. Therefore, Mind, as a necessary component of Matter,
>> self-organizes that same Matter and its Laws - by means of the three
>> Categories which enable it to do just that.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

 different universes--where those 
universes have modal characteristics. In effect, the categories of possibles, 
actual existents and necessities are still in the system, but they are being 
interpreted in terms of different universes and sub-universes of discourse. The 
sub-universes are needed because Peirce is now making distinctions between 
different kinds and classes of possibles, actuals and necessities in the formal 
system itself.


The development of any system of mathematics is guided by a need to answer 
questions that have proven to be intractable in some area of inquiry. So too 
with the existential graphs. The primary purpose of developing these 
mathematical systems of formal logic is to answer real questions in philosophy, 
especially questions in the theory of semiotics. As such, the gamma system are 
formal models that can be used for analytical purposes in the semiotic theory 
to analyze propositions, inferences, their component parts, and the relations 
that hold between them--both local and global.


While Peirce was keenly interested in analyzing the validity of different kinds 
of deductive inferences involving different sorts of modal claims, I think he 
was even more keenly interested in having a mathematical set of tools that 
could be used to analyze inductive and abductive inference and the observations 
that inform such synthetic reasoning. (see Roberts, 100; Ms 499(s)).


So, let me venture an interpretative hypothesis. One of the guiding ideas in 
the later development of the gamma graphs involved a set of remarkable 
experiments in the use of different kinds of areas on the top and bottom of the 
sheet of assertion, and between multiple pages within a larger book of sheets. 
The introduction of two sides of a page and the introduction of multiple sheets 
in a book was driven, in part, by an interest in having a formal system that 
would be sufficiently rich to enable us to analyze inductive and abductive 
reasoning.


As such, the late developments in the gamma graphs may very well represent a 
concerted effort to rethink the different ways that one might represent 
different universes of discourse and categories of possibility, actuality and 
necessity--where this exploration was being done with an eye to solving 
longstanding philosophical problems in applying the universes of discourse and 
the modal categories of possibility, actuals and necessity to the accounts of 
abductive and inductive inference.


So, in "The Neglected Argument", Peirce may very well be examining--on an 
observational basis--the different ways that we might think about the 
phenomenological account of the universes and categories in common experience 
for the sake of refining his explanations of how the logical conceptions of the 
universes of discourse and categories should be applied to those abductive 
inferences that give rise to our most global hypotheses.


--Jeff







Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Gary Richmond 
Sent: Friday, October 21, 2016 10:05 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

Jon S, Jeff D, List,

Jon wrote: "There seems to be some evidence that Peirce may have stopped 
talking about Categories in favor of Universes late in his life; I want to know 
whether that is really the case, and if so, what significance we should 
attribute to this."

Jon, you earlier mentioned one piece of 'evidence', as I recall, in support of 
the notion "that Peirce may have stopped talking about Categories in favor of 
Universes late in his life" connected with some of Jappy's recent comments (or 
was it exactly those comments)? Would you point to that specific piece of 
evidence (or pieces of evidence) again? Is there additional evidence which you 
might point to?

What does your expression "in favor of" imply imply (if anything)? Assuming 
there is such (much?) evidence, what significance do *you* attribute to this 
strange, imo, ceasation of nearly a lifetime of analyzing Categories "in favor 
of" talk of Universes? For example, it seems to me that it is possible that the 
Categories are so fully developed in Peirce's theory and thinking that they "go 
without saying," in a manner of speaking.

 What date would you point to when Peirce begins this putative switch from 
Categories to Universes? How many times--and in what places--does he discuss 
Universes after having 'ceased' discussing Categories? That is, what is the 
frequency of his discussions of Universes after that time?  Is it often or 
oaccional? Aren't there yet categorial discussions at least as late as the 1908 
"Pragmatism" essay?

You "supposed" that your claim that there is "evidence that Peirce may have 
stopped talking about Categories in favor

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jon, list - But Peirce himself wrote of 'self-generation' from 'nothing' in 
1.412. There is no mention of an a priori or metaphysical causal agency; 
indeed, the system is self-generating "Out of the womb of indeterminacy we must 
say that there would have come something, by the principle of Firstness, which 
we may call a flash. Then by the principle of habit there would have been a 
second flash"

The basic axioms are inherent in the system: the three categories. That is all 
that is needed. No agential causality. "three elements are active in the world: 
first, chance; second, law; and third, habit-taking" 1.409.

I think that both you and I are also thinking within our own 'basic axioms' - 
and we cannot readily escape those. You are a theist and I am an atheist - and 
therefore you accept an a priori agent [God] whereas I find it implausible. 
These are our beliefs and I don't think they are subject to empirical evidence!!

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Jeffrey Brian Downard ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Saturday, October 22, 2016 12:00 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories


  Edwina, Jeff, List:


  This highlights one of my strong initial misgivings about Jeff's posts from 
last night.  I do not see it as valid at all to substitute "the Mind-like 
Reasonableness in Nature" for "God" as Ens necessarium.  As I have pointed out 
before, Peirce made it very clear in the manuscript drafts for "A Neglected 
Argument" that what he meant by "God" is not someone or something that is 
"immanent in Nature."  I have also previously noted the distinction between 
"self-organization" (of that which already has Being), which is perfectly 
plausible and even evident in the world today, and "self-creation" or 
"self-generation" (something coming into Being on its own out of nothing), 
which I find completely implausible.


  Regards,


  Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
  Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
  www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt


  On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 8:12 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

Jeffrey- very nice outline. My view is that  "the Mind-like Reasonableness 
in Nature as Ens necessarium self-sufficient in its originative capacity, 
"...for Peirce rejected the Cartesian separation of Mind and Matter. Therefore, 
Mind, as a necessary component of Matter, self-organizes that same Matter and 
its Laws - by means of the three Categories which enable it to do just that.

Edwina


--



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, Jeff, List:

This highlights one of my strong initial misgivings about Jeff's posts from
last night.  I do not see it as valid *at all* to substitute "the Mind-like
Reasonableness in Nature" for "God" as *Ens necessarium*.  As I have
pointed out before, Peirce made it very clear in the manuscript drafts for
"A Neglected Argument" that what he meant by "God" is *not* someone or
something that is "immanent in Nature."  I have also previously noted the
distinction between "self-organization" (of that which already has Being),
which is perfectly plausible and even evident in the world today, and
"self-creation" or "self-generation" (something coming into Being on its
own out of nothing), which I find completely implausible.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 8:12 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jeffrey- very nice outline. My view is that  "the Mind-like
> Reasonableness in Nature as *Ens necessarium* self-sufficient in its
> originative capacity, "...for Peirce rejected the Cartesian separation of
> Mind and Matter. Therefore, Mind, as a necessary component of Matter,
> self-organizes that same Matter and its Laws - by means of the three
> Categories which enable it to do just that.
>
> Edwina
>

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to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

My impression--I would not call it anything stronger--that Peirce wrote
about Universes rather than Categories late in his life precedes my
acquaintance with Jappy's paper, which happened just this week.  That only
serves as another data point; his specific claim in a footnote is that
"after 1906 Peirce never again employed his categories *as criteria in the
classification of signs*" (emphasis added).

It is not feasible to prove the negative, of course--we would have to
review every single thing that Peirce wrote after 1906, and the Peirce
Edition Project will not get to those documents for many years.  By
contrast, all it would take to refute the assertion is finding something
that Peirce wrote after 1906 that *does *classify signs by employing
Categories, rather than Universes.  The same is true for my broader
hypothesis that Peirce did not discuss Categories at all in his later
writings--and your counterexample of "Pragmatism," actually written in
1907, pushes the transition date back at least that far.

CSP:  Consequently, to the three forms of predicates there must correspond
three conceptions of different categories of characters:  namely, of a
character which attaches to its subject regardless of anything else such as
that of being hard, massive, or persistent; of a character which belongs to
a thing relatively to a second regardless of any third, such as an act of
making an effort against a resistance; and of a character which belongs to
a thing as determining a relation between two others, such as that of being
transparent or opaque or of coloring what is seen through it.  Moreover,
turning from the three kinds of predicates to their subjects, since by the
"mode of being" of anything can be meant only the kinds of characters which
it has, or is susceptible of taking, corresponding to the three kinds of
characters, there must be three categories of things:  first, those which
are such as they are regardless of anything else, like the living
consciousness of a given kind of feeling, say of red; secondly, those which
are such as they are by virtue of their relation to other things,
regardless of any third things, which is the case with the existence of all
bodies, whose reality consists in their acting on each other, in pairs;
thirdly, those which are such as they are by virtue of bringing two others
into relation, as signs of all sorts are such only so far as they bring
their significance to bear upon the objects to which they are applied. (EP
2.427-428; 1907)


Peirce gave no indication here--the year *after *writing "Prolegomena," and
the year *before* writing "A Neglected Argument"--of applying the term
"categories" only to predicates, or of abandoning it for "universes" when
referring to subjects.  In fact, what he said next seems to clinch the
case *against
*my impression.

CSP:  I have followed out this trichotomy into many other ramifications,
and have uniformly found it to be a most useful polestar in my explorations
into the different branches of philosophy.  There is no fallacy in it; for
it asserts nothing, but only offers suggestions.  It has preserved me, in
innumerable cases, from one-side opinions.  It has had me search in
directions that it has indicated for points of view that I should otherwise
have overlooked.  I do not claim that it is a novelty;--or rather, to
express myself more frankly, I do not confess that it is a novelty.  For it
is my conviction that any philosophical idea that in this age of the world
is altogether novel is subject to a *prima facie* presumption of falsity.
(EP 2.428; 1907)


Thus I am now inclined to reject my own hypothesis, and I thank you for
bringing this to my attention.  As for Jappy's assertion, I can only point
to this statement a few paragraphs later that has at least *some *bearing
on the classification of signs.

CSP:  It is easy to see that there are three kinds of interpretants of
signs.  Our categories suggest this ... (EP 2.430; 1907)


Peirce went on to describe the emotional/energetic/logical interpretants,
but it remains a matter of considerable debate whether these correspond to
the immediate/dynamic/final interpretants or the trichotomies of each as
feeling/action/thought.

So now we can move on to the next question--given that Peirce still
affirmed his three Categories, why did he *sometimes *instead refer to
three Universes in his later writings?  I did not consciously intend
anything by "in favor of" that differs significantly from my use here of
"rather than" or "instead," other than the presumption that such use of
terminology must have been deliberate on Peirce's part.  It seems to signal
that he saw a genuine difference between the two, and decided that
"Universes" was more appropriate for what he was discussing in certain
contexts than "Categories."  That distinction is what I am still trying to
figure out.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran L

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jeffrey- very nice outline. My view is that  "the Mind-like Reasonableness in 
Nature as Ens necessarium self-sufficient in its originative capacity, "...for 
Peirce rejected the Cartesian separation of Mind and Matter. Therefore, Mind, 
as a necessary component of Matter, self-organizes that same Matter and its 
Laws - by means of the three Categories which enable it to do just that.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jeffrey Brian Downard 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Friday, October 21, 2016 10:13 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories



  Hi Jon, List,



  Let me try to take up the question you posed at the end of your message: "how 
does this help me figure out Universes vs. Categories?"




  Well, I was under the impression that you are interested in questions about 
the universes and categories because you want to dig deeper into Peirce's  
claim in "The Neglected Argument" that God is creator of all three universes of 
experience. Let me know if I am mistaken about your aims and motivations.



  Working on the assumption that we share a common goal, let's take the last 
question in the earlier email and rephrase it in the following way:  is the 
Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature as Ens necessarium self-sufficient in its 
originative capacity, or is its capacity to create rich homogeneities of 
connectedness within and between the three universes of experience dependent on 
something else?



  For the sake of sharpening our discussion, it might help to return to the 
specific examples of sound, color, space and time that we were considering 
earlier. Let’s focus the question on those examples: how do the homogeneities 
of connectedness of qualities of sound and color in a larger universe of 
possible qualities experience relate to the homogeneities of connectedness in 
the experience of individuals as being located in a larger realm of space and 
time?



  Let us start the transition from the phenomenological analysis to a more 
normative inquiry in aesthetics. So, we contemplate--in a playful spirit--the 
homogeneities of connectedness that we find within and between the universe of 
the possible qualities of experience, the universe of actual objects as 
individuals at a place and time in our experience, and the universe in which 
space and time are ordered limitless wholes in experience. Then, having mused 
about these relationships within and between the universes, we ask:  what ideal 
should inform our deepest hopes as we engage in honest inquiry about the 
surprising features of our experience of these three universes? If this ideal 
is to be adequate to the task at hand, then I suspect that it, too, will need 
to be a sort of limitless whole. That is, it will need to be adequate to inform 
our aesthetic evaluations of what, among all possible universes of experience, 
is most attractive, considered for its own sake.




  What might have originated the homogeneities of connectedness within and 
between the universes so that they might be experienced as beautiful? The 
movement to claims about the beauty of this whole of experience gives rise to a 
need to sort out the universality and necessity that are part and parcel of 
such a normative evaluation. As Kant points out in the third Critique, the 
conditions of universality and necessity that attend such an evaluation are 
inter-subjective in character, and Peirce seems to agree. These conditions 
require that we be able to use our imaginations in order to find the underlying 
unity and harmony in the presentations that we are reflecting on aesthetically. 
These conditions of intersubjective universality and necessity and the 
requirements of finding unity and harmony are, I believe, at the root of the 
abductive inference from such musement on the universes to a conclusion about 
inherent attractiveness of an aesthetic ideal--such as an image of the concrete 
growth of reasonableness in the world as a whole.




  I suspect that Peirce's reference to homogeneities of connectedness is a 
crucial part of what is needed to validate the such an inference to a global 
hypothesis about what is most attractive as an aesthetic ideal. This idea helps 
to clarify the formal condition that is essential for the validity of the 
concluding judgment in the inference.




  So, let's reconsider the passage you quoted earlier:  




CSP:  But the saving truth is that there is a Thirdness in experience, an 
element of Reasonableness to which we can train our own reason to conform more 
and more.  If this were not the case, there could be no such thing as logical 
goodness or badness; and therefore we need not wait until it is proved that 
there is a reason operative in experience to which our own can approximate.  We 
should at once hope that it is so, since in that hope lies the only possibility 
of any knowledge. (CP 5.160, EP 2.212; 1903)


  The 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Gary Richmond]

nce. Towards this end, we could draw on mathematical
>> conceptions of spatial homogeneity and connection--such as what are found
>> in a multi-dimensional topology--and we might use those ideas to explore
>> the formal characteristics of the book of the sheets of assertion
>> in the gamma system of the existential graphs. As a parting thought, I
>> wonder how we might think about the way that such interconnected sheets
>> are generated in the first place. That is, what can we say about the formal
>> characteristics of the mathematical generators for such a
>> multidimensional diagrammatic space--where the book is supposed to model
>> the interconnections between the universes of what is possible, what is
>> actual, and what is necessary? Having hinted in this direction, I think
>> we should save that exploration for another time.
>>
>> --Jeff
>>
>> Jeffrey Downard
>> Associate Professor
>> Department of Philosophy
>> Northern Arizona University
>> (o) 928 523-8354
>>
>> --
>> *From:* Jeffrey Brian Downard 
>> *Sent:* Friday, October 21, 2016 4:25 PM
>> *Cc:* Peirce-L
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories
>>
>> Hi Jon, List,
>>
>> I don't detect any impatience, which is good because it will take some
>> patience on our part to dig deeper into the puzzles that stem from Peirce's
>> remarkably compact arguments in "The Neglected Argument." Let me start by
>> focusing on the first points you make about the meaning of create.
>>
>> The references you provide do support the claim that the first meaning of
>> "create" is a good fit with what Peirce says about the creation of the
>> three universes of experience, and I find those references helpful. In
>> particular, they help to focus the attention on the idea of what was
>> created from what. There are a number of ways of looking at the issue. How
>> is something created from nothing? How is existing brute matter created
>> from possibility? How is order created from randomness? These are all good
>> questions.
>>
>> Having said that, I would like to direct attention away from the question
>> of how one thing is created from another to the question of what kind of
>> creativity is being ascribed to God as Ens necessarium? The intransitive
>> meaning of “create” is to originate, or to engage in originative action.
>> Partly for personal reasons, I am intrigued by the example he provides for
>> this intransitive use of the term. He looks at Emerson’s Essay “The
>> Farmer”, and offers the following quote: “the glory of the Farmer is that,
>> in the division of labor, it is his part to create.”
>>
>> If we insert the God into this equation we get: “the glory of God as *Ens
>> necessarium* is that, in the division of labor, it is his part to
>> create.” Or, for those who find the reference to God hard to make out: “the
>> glory of the Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature as *Ens necessarium* is
>> that, in the division of labor, it is its part to create.”
>>
>>
>> Following this line of thought, what is it to for something to have the
>> capacity to engage in an originative action. Peirce says this about
>> origination:
>>
>> Originality is being such as that being is, regardless of aught else. CP
>> 2.89
>>
>> Drawing on this idea, we might think of God's creative act as a
>> self-sufficient act of origination. Or, to put it as a question and in
>> terms that others might find are more palatable to their ears:
>>
>> Is the Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature as *Ens necessarium* 
>> self-sufficient
>> in its originative capacity, or is its capacity to create (e.g., something
>> from nothing, brute matter from possibility, order from randomness, etc.)
>> dependent on something else?
>>
>> --Jeff
>> Jeffrey Downard
>> Associate Professor
>> Department of Philosophy
>> Northern Arizona University
>> (o) 928 523-8354
>>
>> --
>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
>> *Sent:* Friday, October 21, 2016 2:25 PM
>> *To:* Jeffrey Brian Downard
>> *Cc:* Peirce-L
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories
>>
>> Jeff, List:
>>
>> JD:  In saying the God created these universes of experience, is he using
>> the transitive or the intransitive sense, and if it is the former, then
>> which does he seem to have in mind?
>>
>>
>> Is there a good reason not to take him as 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

concrete growth of
> reasonableness in the world as a whole.
>
>
> I suspect that Peirce's reference to homogeneities of connectedness is
> a crucial part of what is needed to validate the such an inference to a
> global hypothesis about what is most attractive as an aesthetic ideal. This
> idea helps to clarify the formal condition that is essential for the
> validity of the concluding judgment in the inference.
>
>
> So, let's reconsider the passage you quoted earlier:
>
>
> CSP:  But the saving truth is that there is a Thirdness in experience, an
> element of Reasonableness to which we can train our own reason to conform
> more and more.  If this were not the case, there could be no such thing as
> logical goodness or badness; and therefore we need not wait until it is
> proved that there is a reason operative in experience to which our own can
> approximate.  We should at once hope that it is so, since in that hope lies
> the only possibility of any knowledge. (CP 5.160, EP 2.212; 1903)
>
>
> The element of Reasonableness that he describes can help us explain those
> surprisingly prevalent homogeneities of connectedness that are found with
> and between all three universes of experience. If I were to extend
> his assertion in the last sentence, I would add that in this hope lies the
> only possibility of successfully engaging in the sorts of self-controlled
> processes of inference that are necessary for perfecting our habits of
> feeling and action--as well our our habits of thought. The growth in the
> unity and harmony of our habits of feeling are the wellspring from with the
> unity and harmony of our habits of action and thought might grow.
>
> When time permits, we might try to dig deeper in an effort to explore the
> nature of these homogeneities of connectedness found in all three
> universes of experience. Towards this end, we could draw on mathematical
> conceptions of spatial homogeneity and connection--such as what are found
> in a multi-dimensional topology--and we might use those ideas to explore
> the formal characteristics of the book of the sheets of assertion
> in the gamma system of the existential graphs. As a parting thought, I
> wonder how we might think about the way that such interconnected sheets
> are generated in the first place. That is, what can we say about the formal
> characteristics of the mathematical generators for such a
> multidimensional diagrammatic space--where the book is supposed to model
> the interconnections between the universes of what is possible, what is
> actual, and what is necessary? Having hinted in this direction, I think
> we should save that exploration for another time.
>
> --Jeff
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
>
> --
> *From:* Jeffrey Brian Downard 
> *Sent:* Friday, October 21, 2016 4:25 PM
> *Cc:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories
>
> Hi Jon, List,
>
> I don't detect any impatience, which is good because it will take some
> patience on our part to dig deeper into the puzzles that stem from Peirce's
> remarkably compact arguments in "The Neglected Argument." Let me start by
> focusing on the first points you make about the meaning of create.
>
> The references you provide do support the claim that the first meaning of
> "create" is a good fit with what Peirce says about the creation of the
> three universes of experience, and I find those references helpful. In
> particular, they help to focus the attention on the idea of what was
> created from what. There are a number of ways of looking at the issue. How
> is something created from nothing? How is existing brute matter created
> from possibility? How is order created from randomness? These are all good
> questions.
>
> Having said that, I would like to direct attention away from the question
> of how one thing is created from another to the question of what kind of
> creativity is being ascribed to God as Ens necessarium? The intransitive
> meaning of “create” is to originate, or to engage in originative action.
> Partly for personal reasons, I am intrigued by the example he provides for
> this intransitive use of the term. He looks at Emerson’s Essay “The
> Farmer”, and offers the following quote: “the glory of the Farmer is that,
> in the division of labor, it is his part to create.”
>
> If we insert the God into this equation we get: “the glory of God as *Ens
> necessarium* is that, in the division of labor, it is his part to
> create.” Or, for those who find the reference to God hard to make out: “the
> glory of the Mind-like

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

might grow.

When time permits, we might try to dig deeper in an effort to explore the 
nature of these homogeneities of connectedness found in all three universes of 
experience. Towards this end, we could draw on mathematical conceptions of 
spatial homogeneity and connection--such as what are found in a 
multi-dimensional topology--and we might use those ideas to explore the formal 
characteristics of the book of the sheets of assertion in the gamma system of 
the existential graphs. As a parting thought, I wonder how we might think about 
the way that such interconnected sheets are generated in the first place. That 
is, what can we say about the formal characteristics of the mathematical 
generators for such a multidimensional diagrammatic space--where the book is 
supposed to model the interconnections between the universes of what is 
possible, what is actual, and what is necessary? Having hinted in this 
direction, I think we should save that exploration for another time.

--Jeff




Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jeffrey Brian Downard 
Sent: Friday, October 21, 2016 4:25 PM
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories


Hi Jon, List,


I don't detect any impatience, which is good because it will take some patience 
on our part to dig deeper into the puzzles that stem from Peirce's remarkably 
compact arguments in "The Neglected Argument." Let me start by focusing on the 
first points you make about the meaning of create.


The references you provide do support the claim that the first meaning of 
"create" is a good fit with what Peirce says about the creation of the three 
universes of experience, and I find those references helpful. In particular, 
they help to focus the attention on the idea of what was created from what. 
There are a number of ways of looking at the issue. How is something created 
from nothing? How is existing brute matter created from possibility? How is 
order created from randomness? These are all good questions.


Having said that, I would like to direct attention away from the question of 
how one thing is created from another to the question of what kind of 
creativity is being ascribed to God as Ens necessarium? The intransitive 
meaning of “create” is to originate, or to engage in originative action. Partly 
for personal reasons, I am intrigued by the example he provides for this 
intransitive use of the term. He looks at Emerson’s Essay “The Farmer”, and 
offers the following quote: “the glory of the Farmer is that, in the division 
of labor, it is his part to create.”



If we insert the God into this equation we get: “the glory of God as Ens 
necessarium is that, in the division of labor, it is his part to create.” Or, 
for those who find the reference to God hard to make out: “the glory of the 
Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature as Ens necessarium is that, in the division 
of labor, it is its part to create.”


Following this line of thought, what is it to for something to have the 
capacity to engage in an originative action. Peirce says this about origination:


Originality is being such as that being is, regardless of aught else. CP 2.89


Drawing on this idea, we might think of God's creative act as a self-sufficient 
act of origination. Or, to put it as a question and in terms that others might 
find are more palatable to their ears:


Is the Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature as Ens necessarium self-sufficient in 
its originative capacity, or is its capacity to create (e.g., something from 
nothing, brute matter from possibility, order from randomness, etc.) dependent 
on something else?


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Friday, October 21, 2016 2:25 PM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

Jeff, List:

JD:  In saying the God created these universes of experience, is he using the 
transitive or the intransitive sense, and if it is the former, then which does 
he seem to have in mind?

Is there a good reason not to take him as straightforwardly using his first 
(transitive) definition, especially since he quotes Genesis 1:1 as his initial 
example?

CSP:  To bring into being; cause to exist; specifically, to produce without the 
prior existence of the material used, or of other things like the thing 
produced; produce out of nothing. 
(http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=02&page=459&query=create)

Peirce is more explicit about his meaning in his definitions of God as Ens 
necessarium in some of the manuscript drafts for "A Neglected Argument."

CSP:  "He by Whom the three Universes of Experience are, s

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jerry Rhee]

Jeff, list:

Here is an even more compact argument that we should admire:

By a “Sign” is meant any Ens which is determined by a single Object or set
of Objects called its Originals, all other than the Sign itself, and in its
turn is capable of determining in a Mind something called its Interpretant,
and that in such a way that the Mind is thereby mediately determined to
some mode of conformity to the Original or Set of Originals. This is
particularly intended to define (very imperfectly as yet) a Complete Sign.

But a Complete Sign has or may have Parts which partake of the nature of
their whole; but often in a truncated fashion.

http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/complete-sign

By "*Complete*", then, is meant...?

one two three... Object Sign Interpretant...  utterer interpreter
commens...
Father Son Spirit...
*Ens*?  God?

hth,
Jerry R

On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 6:25 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Hi Jon, List,
>
>
> I don't detect any impatience, which is good because it will take some
> patience on our part to dig deeper into the puzzles that stem from Peirce's
> remarkably compact arguments in "The Neglected Argument." Let me start by
> focusing on the first points you make about the meaning of create.
>
>
> The references you provide do support the claim that the first meaning of
> "create" is a good fit with what Peirce says about the creation of the
> three universes of experience, and I find those references helpful. In
> particular, they help to focus the attention on the idea of what was
> created from what. There are a number of ways of looking at the issue. How
> is something created from nothing? How is existing brute matter created
> from possibility? How is order created from randomness? These are all good
> questions.
>
>
> Having said that, I would like to direct attention away from the question
> of how one thing is created from another to the question of what kind of
> creativity is being ascribed to God as Ens necessarium? The intransitive
> meaning of “create” is to originate, or to engage in originative action.
> Partly for personal reasons, I am intrigued by the example he provides for
> this intransitive use of the term. He looks at Emerson’s Essay “The
> Farmer”, and offers the following quote: “the glory of the Farmer is that,
> in the division of labor, it is his part to create.”
>
>
>
> If we insert the God into this equation we get: “the glory of God as *Ens
> necessarium* is that, in the division of labor, it is his part to
> create.” Or, for those who find the reference to God hard to make out: “the
> glory of the Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature as *Ens necessarium* is
> that, in the division of labor, it is its part to create.”
>
>
> Following this line of thought, what is it to for something to have the
> capacity to engage in an originative action. Peirce says this about
> origination:
>
>
> Originality is being such as that being is, regardless of aught else. CP
> 2.89
>
> Drawing on this idea, we might think of God's creative act as a
> self-sufficient act of origination. Or, to put it as a question and in
> terms that others might find are more palatable to their ears:
>
>
> Is the Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature as *Ens necessarium* self-sufficient
> in its originative capacity, or is its capacity to create (e.g., something
> from nothing, brute matter from possibility, order from randomness, etc.)
> dependent on something else?
>
>
> --Jeff
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
>
>
> --
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *Sent:* Friday, October 21, 2016 2:25 PM
>
> *To:* Jeffrey Brian Downard
> *Cc:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories
>
> Jeff, List:
>
> JD:  In saying the God created these universes of experience, is he using
> the transitive or the intransitive sense, and if it is the former, then
> which does he seem to have in mind?
>
>
> Is there a good reason not to take him as straightforwardly using his
> first (transitive) definition, especially since he quotes Genesis 1:1 as
> his initial example?
>
> CSP:  To bring into being; cause to exist; specifically, to produce
> without the prior existence of the material used, or of other things like
> the thing produced; produce out of nothing. (http://triggs.djvu.org/
> century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=02&page=459&query=create)
>
>
> Peirce is more explicit about his meaning in his definitions of God as *Ens
> necessarium* in some of the manuscript drafts for "A

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hi Jon, List,


I don't detect any impatience, which is good because it will take some patience 
on our part to dig deeper into the puzzles that stem from Peirce's remarkably 
compact arguments in "The Neglected Argument." Let me start by focusing on the 
first points you make about the meaning of create.


The references you provide do support the claim that the first meaning of 
"create" is a good fit with what Peirce says about the creation of the three 
universes of experience, and I find those references helpful. In particular, 
they help to focus the attention on the idea of what was created from what. 
There are a number of ways of looking at the issue. How is something created 
from nothing? How is existing brute matter created from possibility? How is 
order created from randomness? These are all good questions.


Having said that, I would like to direct attention away from the question of 
how one thing is created from another to the question of what kind of 
creativity is being ascribed to God as Ens necessarium? The intransitive 
meaning of “create” is to originate, or to engage in originative action. Partly 
for personal reasons, I am intrigued by the example he provides for this 
intransitive use of the term. He looks at Emerson’s Essay “The Farmer”, and 
offers the following quote: “the glory of the Farmer is that, in the division 
of labor, it is his part to create.”



If we insert the God into this equation we get: “the glory of God as Ens 
necessarium is that, in the division of labor, it is his part to create.” Or, 
for those who find the reference to God hard to make out: “the glory of the 
Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature as Ens necessarium is that, in the division 
of labor, it is its part to create.”


Following this line of thought, what is it to for something to have the 
capacity to engage in an originative action. Peirce says this about origination:


Originality is being such as that being is, regardless of aught else. CP 2.89


Drawing on this idea, we might think of God's creative act as a self-sufficient 
act of origination. Or, to put it as a question and in terms that others might 
find are more palatable to their ears:


Is the Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature as Ens necessarium self-sufficient in 
its originative capacity, or is its capacity to create (e.g., something from 
nothing, brute matter from possibility, order from randomness, etc.) dependent 
on something else?


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Friday, October 21, 2016 2:25 PM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

Jeff, List:

JD:  In saying the God created these universes of experience, is he using the 
transitive or the intransitive sense, and if it is the former, then which does 
he seem to have in mind?

Is there a good reason not to take him as straightforwardly using his first 
(transitive) definition, especially since he quotes Genesis 1:1 as his initial 
example?

CSP:  To bring into being; cause to exist; specifically, to produce without the 
prior existence of the material used, or of other things like the thing 
produced; produce out of nothing. 
(http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=02&page=459&query=create)

Peirce is more explicit about his meaning in his definitions of God as Ens 
necessarium in some of the manuscript drafts for "A Neglected Argument."

CSP:  "He by Whom the three Universes of Experience are, supposedly, getting, 
directly or indirectly, created from Nothing--soberly, from less than a blank." 
(R 841)

CSP:  "Reality is not determined by signification; but supposing Him Real, then 
out of Nothing, out of less than a Blank, He is creating the three Universes of 
Experience." (R 843)

CSP:  "He who is creating the three Universes of Experience from Nothing; 
soberly, from less than a blank." (R 843)

I think that we are on pretty solid ground here.

JD:  So, we're trying to explain the variety in our experience, and then we 
turn to those homogeneities of connectedness that are found in our experience 
of space and time.

"Homogeneities of connectedness" sound like continuities (Thirdness) to me, and 
thus bring this passage to mind.

CSP:  But the saving truth is that there is a Thirdness in experience, an 
element of Reasonableness to which we can train our own reason to conform more 
and more.  If this were not the case, there could be no such thing as logical 
goodness or badness; and therefore we need not wait until it is proved that 
there is a reason operative in experience to which our own can approximate.  We 
should at once hope that it is so, since in that hope lies the only possibility 
of any knowledge.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

d what a pectacle
> will unroll itself! As a mere hint of them I may point out that every small
> part of space, however remote, is bounded by just such neighbouring parts
> as every other, without a single exception throughout immensity.
>
> So, we're trying to explain the variety in our experience, and then we
> turn to those homogeneities of connectedness that are found in
> our experience of space and time. The homogeneities of connectedness are
> similar, in some respects, to the those found in the quality of the sound
> of a trombone moving through the tones, or those found in the change of the
> colors found in the setting of the sun in evening. Why does these colors,
> sounds have such homogeneities of connectedness, and why are they similar
> to those found in space in time?
>
> The notion of a homogeneity of connectedness has a rich history in both
> math and philosophy. Given the fact that he talked of bringing unity to the
> manifold of impressions in the start of "A New List of the Categories", it
> might be worth starting there. The reference is clearly to Kant's
> discussion in the first *Critique* of what is necessary for brining the
> manifold of sense into a synthetic unity.  The condition of homogeneity is
> key for understanding how it is possible for such synthesis. How might we
> understand Peirce's take on this condition for cognizing the
> manifold--either early on in the discussion of the New List or much later
> in the Neglected Argument?
>
> This, I think, is not an easy question to answer. As a starting point, I
> think it might help to focus on what Peirce says about the "play" of the
> imagination. This is a clear reference to Kant's and Schiller's discussion
> of such play on the part of a Muser who is engaged in aesthetic
> contemplation. This transition from phenomenological analysis to aesthetic
> contemplation holds, I think, an especially interesting move on Peirce's
> part--especially when it comes to understanding how an aesthetic condition
> for seeking homogeneities of connectedness in our experience might find its
> source.
>
> --Jeff
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
>
> --
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *Sent:* Thursday, October 20, 2016 9:17 AM
> *To:* Jeffrey Brian Downard
> *Cc:* Peirce-L
>
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories
>
> Jeff, List:
>
> Thanks, that was helpful but still leaves me with questions.
>
> JD:  Let us compare three different sorts of discussions of universes,
> realms and categories:
>
>
> It remains unclear to me what distinctions (if any) we should draw in
> defining these three terms, even within each of the three types of inquiry
> that you listed.
>
> JD:  Peirce talks about three universes of experience as part of his
> phenomenological inquiries. In the early pages of "A Neglected Argument,"
> the discussion of these universes is largely phenomenological in character.
>
>
> I agree up to a point, especially since Peirce calls them Universes of
> *Experience*.  However, he also defines each Universe on the basis of
> that in which the *Being *of its members consists, which suggests a 
> *metaphysical
> *aspect to them; and of course, the overall subject of the article is the
> Reality of God, which is obviously a metaphysical topic.  What makes this
> especially tricky is that phenomenology/phaneroscopy *precedes 
> *logic/semeiotic
> in the architectonic of the sciences, but metaphysics *follows *it.  I
> take this to mean that semeiotic can depend on phaneroscopy, but is not
> supposed to depend on metaphysics.  Where does this leave us?
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 10:53 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>
>> Hi Jon S, Gary R, List,
>>
>> Let me try to simply matters considerably. It will involve a number of
>> oversimplifications, but I'm hoping it might help to address some questions
>> you are finding vexing.
>>
>> Let us compare three different sorts of discussions of universes, realms
>> and categories:
>>
>> 1. The simple systems of formal algebraic and graphical logics--being
>> developed as a part of mathematics
>>
>> 2. The phenomenological inquiries.
>>
>> 3. The semiotic inquiries.
>>
>> Peirce talks about three universes of experience as part of his
>> phenomenological inquiries. In the early pages of "A Neglected Argument,"
>> the discussion of these universes is largely phenomeno

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Clark Goble]

> On Oct 20, 2016, at 9:18 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  > wrote:
> 
> Now we have "Modes of Being" or "modes of reality" that are identified as 
> "three Universes" and correspond to "Actuality, Possibility, Destiny (or 
> Freedom from Destiny)."  We also have "Realms for the different 
> Predicaments," which are what we used to call "Categories," but these 
> divisions "must not be confounded with the different Modes of Being"; 
> instead, "the succession of Predicates of Predicates is different in the 
> different Modes of Being."  Peirce leaves it at that ... and thus I am still 
> confused about Universes and Categories.

I think this is right. It’s probably worthwhile remembering the origin of these 
categories in Kant’s categories early in Peirce’s life. Like you I’m often 
confused between modes of being and categories. My sense (perhaps wrong) is 
that the latter are wrapped up with judgements for Peirce. They are thus more 
Kantian even if Peirce early on gives them a fairly neoplatonic like 
ontological thrust. The former though seems explicitly fundamental ontology in 
terms of actuality, possibility and destiny (roughly convergence from different 
efficient causal paths).

Again Kant has his 12 categories in four classes. The forth class of modality 
is possibiltiy, existence and necessity. The other three classes are quantity, 
quality, and relation. If I’m following Peirce correctly he’s just separating 
modes of being from these first three classes as the categories. 

I’m just going off the top of my head here, but I think this tendency in Peirce 
goes back quite early - to the 1870’s if not before.
-
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hi Jon, Gary R, List,


You asked, "Where does this leave us?"


I believe it leaves us with three related areas of inquiry--mathematical logic, 
phenomenology and semiotics--that we can draw on for the sake of gaining better 
insight in the questions you've been asking about universes, realms and the 
modal features of our assertions. Each has its own methods, and we should use 
them selectively to probe for better answers to those questions.


The real trick is putting the results of those areas of inquiry together 
properly in order to address the really hard questions in cosmological 
metaphysics and in the special science of cosmology.


Before turning to such questions of metaphysics and the special science of 
cosmology, my understanding is that this discussion started with a look at the 
opening moves in "A Neglected Argument." In what sense might God as ens 
necessarium really be creator of the three universes of experience? Or, better 
yet, in what way might the hypotheses involving such a conception of ens 
necessarium help to explain puzzling features of these global aspects of our 
ordinary experience? It will help, I think, to look a little closer at what 
Peirce might mean by "creator." He provided definitions of "create" and 
"creation" for the Century dictionary. Why don't we look there to see what 
hints might be found.


He says that create has several meanings. He provides 5 senses of the 
transitive use of the verb, and then one sense of the transitive. In saying the 
God created these universes of experience, is he using the transitive or the 
intransitive sense, and if it is the former, then which does he seem to have in 
mind?


Once that is done, it might help to look closely at what is calling out for 
explanation within each of these three universes and also between the three. 
Peirce is pretty good at describing what he has observed, so let's see what is 
to be found--quite publicly--in our experience as well. The feature that stands 
out to me are descriptions of this sort "Let the Muser, for example, after well 
appreciating, in its breadth and depth, the unspeakable variety of each 
Universe, turn to those phenomena that are of the nature of homogeneities of 
connectedness in each; and what a pectacle will unroll itself! As a mere hint 
of them I may point out that every small part of space, however remote, is 
bounded by just such neighbouring parts as every other, without a single 
exception throughout immensity.


So, we're trying to explain the variety in our experience, and then we turn to 
those homogeneities of connectedness that are found in our experience of space 
and time. The homogeneities of connectedness are similar, in some respects, to 
the those found in the quality of the sound of a trombone moving through the 
tones, or those found in the change of the colors found in the setting of the 
sun in evening. Why does these colors, sounds have such homogeneities of 
connectedness, and why are they similar to those found in space in time?


The notion of a homogeneity of connectedness has a rich history in both math 
and philosophy. Given the fact that he talked of bringing unity to the manifold 
of impressions in the start of "A New List of the Categories", it might be 
worth starting there. The reference is clearly to Kant's discussion in the 
first Critique of what is necessary for brining the manifold of sense into a 
synthetic unity.  The condition of homogeneity is key for understanding how it 
is possible for such synthesis. How might we understand Peirce's take on this 
condition for cognizing the manifold--either early on in the discussion of the 
New List or much later in the Neglected Argument?


This, I think, is not an easy question to answer. As a starting point, I think 
it might help to focus on what Peirce says about the "play" of the imagination. 
This is a clear reference to Kant's and Schiller's discussion of such play on 
the part of a Muser who is engaged in aesthetic contemplation. This transition 
from phenomenological analysis to aesthetic contemplation holds, I think, an 
especially interesting move on Peirce's part--especially when it comes to 
understanding how an aesthetic condition for seeking homogeneities of 
connectedness in our experience might find its source.


--Jeff




Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354


________
From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Thursday, October 20, 2016 9:17 AM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

Jeff, List:

Thanks, that was helpful but still leaves me with questions.

JD:  Let us compare three different sorts of discussions of universes, realms 
and categories:

It remains unclear to me what distinctions (if any) we sh

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

en make use of the prior work that has been done in the
> math, phenomenology and logic to address the questions of cosmological
> metaphysics that are so interesting--but hard to answer well.
>
> --Jeff
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
>
> --
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *Sent:* Thursday, October 20, 2016 8:18 AM
> *To:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories
>
> List:
>
> Following up on the post below--as I mentioned in the thread on Universes
> and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology), I now notice that Peirce added
> the caveat that whether it is correct to assign Subjects to Universes and
> Predicates to Categories "is a question for careful study" (CP 4.545).  He
> then proceeded to present a long and complicated analysis of propositions
> to explain why he found it *unsatisfactory *to view Universes as
> "receptacles of the Subjects alone" (CP 4.548).  At least, I think he did
> ...
>
> CSP:  Let us, at least, *provide *for such a [destined] mode of being in
> our system of
> diagrammatization, since it *may *turn out to be needed and, as I think,
> surely will.
>
> CSP:  I will proceed to explain why, although I am not prepared to deny
> that every proposition can be represented, and that I must say, for the
> most part very conveniently, under your view that the Universes are
> receptacles of the Subjects alone, I, nevertheless, cannot deem that mode
> of analyzing propositions to be satisfactory. (CP 4.547-548)
>
>
> The second sentence here is key, but it is tough to decipher.  I assume
> that "explain why" refers to the preceding assertion that a third mode of
> being will be needed.  The rest is very muddled.  What is the relevance of
> whether "every proposition can be represented"?  What, specifically, did
> Peirce find "very convenient"?  Most importantly, what "mode of analyzing
> propositions" could he not deem to be satisfactory?  Am I right to take
> this as referring to "your view that the Universes are receptacles of the
> Subjects alone"?
>
> I think so, because Peirce went on to suggest, as an alternative, "the
> principle that each Universe consists, not of Subjects, but the one of True
> assertions, the other of False, but each to the effect that there is
> something of a given description."  The rest of CP 4.548 is an analysis of
> two specific propositions using both methods, showing that the alternative
> is more correct.  But this means that there are only *two *Universes, not
> three; and they consist of True and False assertions, not Ideas,
> Things/Facts, and Habits/Laws/Continua.  Given the context, I gather that
> these may refer to the Sheet of Assertion and that which is fenced off from
> it by a cut.  So apparently this passage is apparently not about the
> "Universes of Experience" at all!  Peirce then came back to Categories in
> CP 4.549.
>
> CSP:  I will now say a few words about what you have called Categories,
> but for which I prefer the designation Predicaments, and which you have
> explained as predicates of predicates.  That wonderful operation of
> hypostatic abstraction by which we seem to create *entia rationis* that
> are, nevertheless, sometimes real, furnishes us the means of turning
> predicates from being signs that we think or think through, into being
> subjects thought of.
>
>
> As I also mentioned in the other thread, hypostatic abstraction enables us
> to convert predicates into subjects.  Does this mean that even if we assign
> subjects to Universes and predicates to Categories, it turns out to be a
> distinction without a difference?
>
> CSP  We thus think of the thought-sign itself, making it the object of
> another thought-sign.  Thereupon, we can repeat the operation of hypostatic
> abstraction, and from these second intentions derive third intentions.
> Does this series proceed endlessly?  I think not.  What then are the
> characters of its different members?  My thoughts on this subject are not
> yet harvested.  I will only say that the subject concerns Logic, but that
> the divisions so obtained must not be confounded with the different Modes
> of Being:  Actuality, Possibility, Destiny (or Freedom from Destiny).  On
> the contrary, the succession of Predicates of Predicates is different in
> the different Modes of Being.  Meantime, it will be proper that in our
> system of diagrammatization we should provide for the division, whenever
> needed, of each of our three Universes of modes of reality into *Realms *for
> the different Pre

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hi Jon S, Gary R, List,


Let me try to simply matters considerably. It will involve a number of 
oversimplifications, but I'm hoping it might help to address some questions you 
are finding vexing.


Let us compare three different sorts of discussions of universes, realms and 
categories:


1. The simple systems of formal algebraic and graphical logics--being developed 
as a part of mathematics

2. The phenomenological inquiries.

3. The semiotic inquiries.


Peirce talks about three universes of experience as part of his 
phenomenological inquiries. In the early pages of "A Neglected Argument," the 
discussion of these universes is largely phenomenological in character.


In the development of the formal systems of algebraic logic and existential 
graphs, Peirce builds various conceptions that model different universes of 
discourse and categories. In these different formal systems, the universes and 
modal notions are treated differently. For instance, the universes of discourse 
are handled differently in the alpha, beta, and the various systems of the 
gamma graphs.


In the development of the semiotic theory, he uses the formal systems of 
logical for the purpose of refining the classifications and explanations of the 
sign relations and patterns of inference. At this point, he needs a 
philosophical interpretation of the mathematical models--including 
interpretations of what a sheet of assertion means in the context of the alpha 
graphs, the beta graphs, and the various versions of the gamma graphs.


It might be helpful to think of the phenomenological inquiries concerning the 
three universes of experience as remarks concerning the more "global" features 
of our observations--where those observations are informing the classifications 
and philosophical explanations that being generated in the semiotic theory.


Each of these three lines of inquiry--formal logic as a part of mathematics, 
phenomenological, and semiotic--are informing the others, but in different 
ways. For instance, in the context of the formal logic, Peirce sees no need to 
pick between the different ways of conceiving of the universes of discourse and 
the modal features of the assertions. The alpha system of graphs can make do 
with a much simpler version of a universe of discourse than is needed for the 
various systems of the gamma graphs. It isn't the case that one version is 
right or wrong. They are just different formal systems--like the different 
systems of numbers (e.g., rationals, reals, surreals) or different systems 
involving continuity (e.g., topology of one two or three dimensions, projective 
geometry, metrical geometries). Clearly, some of these different formal systems 
are more "basic" than the others in some senses, but we should remember that, 
in the final analysis, they are just different formal systems starting with 
different sets of initial definitions, postulates and axioms. We seek to build 
formal system that manifest virtues such as balance and symmetry, but even the 
systems that lack these virtues may be of some special interest for particular 
problems.


Of course, when we move from these three forms of inquiry to metaphysics, we 
then need to press the question: what it the best explanation of the nature of 
what exists as objects and what is real as general? At this point, we can then 
make use of the prior work that has been done in the math, phenomenology and 
logic to address the questions of cosmological metaphysics that are so 
interesting--but hard to answer well.


--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Thursday, October 20, 2016 8:18 AM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

List:

Following up on the post below--as I mentioned in the thread on Universes and 
Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology), I now notice that Peirce added the caveat 
that whether it is correct to assign Subjects to Universes and Predicates to 
Categories "is a question for careful study" (CP 4.545).  He then proceeded to 
present a long and complicated analysis of propositions to explain why he found 
it unsatisfactory to view Universes as "receptacles of the Subjects alone" (CP 
4.548).  At least, I think he did ...

CSP:  Let us, at least, provide for such a [destined] mode of being in our 
system of
diagrammatization, since it may turn out to be needed and, as I think, surely 
will.

CSP:  I will proceed to explain why, although I am not prepared to deny that 
every proposition can be represented, and that I must say, for the most part 
very conveniently, under your view that the Universes are receptacles of the 
Subjects alone, I, nevertheless, cannot deem that mode of analyzing 
propositions to be satisfactory. (CP 4.547-548)

The second sentence here is key

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

List:

Following up on the post below--as I mentioned in the thread on Universes
and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology), I now notice that Peirce added the
caveat that whether it is correct to assign Subjects to Universes and
Predicates to Categories "is a question for careful study" (CP 4.545).  He
then proceeded to present a long and complicated analysis of propositions
to explain why he found it *unsatisfactory *to view Universes as
"receptacles of the Subjects alone" (CP 4.548).  At least, I think he did
...

CSP:  Let us, at least, *provide *for such a [destined] mode of being in
our system of
diagrammatization, since it *may *turn out to be needed and, as I think,
surely will.

CSP:  I will proceed to explain why, although I am not prepared to deny
that every proposition can be represented, and that I must say, for the
most part very conveniently, under your view that the Universes are
receptacles of the Subjects alone, I, nevertheless, cannot deem that mode
of analyzing propositions to be satisfactory. (CP 4.547-548)


The second sentence here is key, but it is tough to decipher.  I assume
that "explain why" refers to the preceding assertion that a third mode of
being will be needed.  The rest is very muddled.  What is the relevance of
whether "every proposition can be represented"?  What, specifically, did
Peirce find "very convenient"?  Most importantly, what "mode of analyzing
propositions" could he not deem to be satisfactory?  Am I right to take
this as referring to "your view that the Universes are receptacles of the
Subjects alone"?

I think so, because Peirce went on to suggest, as an alternative, "the
principle that each Universe consists, not of Subjects, but the one of True
assertions, the other of False, but each to the effect that there is
something of a given description."  The rest of CP 4.548 is an analysis of
two specific propositions using both methods, showing that the alternative
is more correct.  But this means that there are only *two *Universes, not
three; and they consist of True and False assertions, not Ideas,
Things/Facts, and Habits/Laws/Continua.  Given the context, I gather that
these may refer to the Sheet of Assertion and that which is fenced off from
it by a cut.  So apparently this passage is apparently not about the
"Universes of Experience" at all!  Peirce then came back to Categories in
CP 4.549.

CSP:  I will now say a few words about what you have called Categories, but
for which I prefer the designation Predicaments, and which you have
explained as predicates of predicates.  That wonderful operation of
hypostatic abstraction by which we seem to create *entia rationis* that
are, nevertheless, sometimes real, furnishes us the means of turning
predicates from being signs that we think or think through, into being
subjects thought of.


As I also mentioned in the other thread, hypostatic abstraction enables us
to convert predicates into subjects.  Does this mean that even if we assign
subjects to Universes and predicates to Categories, it turns out to be a
distinction without a difference?

CSP  We thus think of the thought-sign itself, making it the object of
another thought-sign.  Thereupon, we can repeat the operation of hypostatic
abstraction, and from these second intentions derive third intentions.
Does this series proceed endlessly?  I think not.  What then are the
characters of its different members?  My thoughts on this subject are not
yet harvested.  I will only say that the subject concerns Logic, but that
the divisions so obtained must not be confounded with the different Modes
of Being:  Actuality, Possibility, Destiny (or Freedom from Destiny).  On
the contrary, the succession of Predicates of Predicates is different in
the different Modes of Being.  Meantime, it will be proper that in our
system of diagrammatization we should provide for the division, whenever
needed, of each of our three Universes of modes of reality into *Realms *for
the different Predicaments.


Now we have "Modes of Being" or "modes of reality" that are identified as
"three Universes" and correspond to "Actuality, Possibility, Destiny (or
Freedom from Destiny)."  We also have "Realms for the different
Predicaments," which are what we used to call "Categories," but these
divisions "must not be confounded with the different Modes of Being";
instead, "the succession of Predicates of Predicates is different in the
different Modes of Being."  Peirce leaves it at that ... and thus I am
still confused about Universes and Categories.

Regards,

Jon

On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 7:26 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jeff, List:
>>>
>>> JD:  Relations of reference subsist between two subjects that belong to
>>> different categories of being. Referential relations subsist between
>>> subjects that belong to different universes of discourse.
>>>
>>>
>>> The passage that you quoted dates from 1903, before the shift in
>>> Peirce's theoretical framework that Jappy hypothesizes.  How do we
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

Jappy's paper is from earlier this year, and his book is not even out yet,
so his hypothesis obviously has not been vetted much so far.  I agree that
he may be overstating the magnitude of Peirce's alleged change in
theoretical framework; I brought it up because I find it interesting and
would like to know if it holds any water.  Ditto for my impression that
Peirce referred only to Universes rather than Categories late in his life;
I have no agenda there and would welcome evidence to the contrary.  Your
point about his isolation during that time period is well-taken.

Thanks,

Jon

On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 6:59 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jeff, Jon, List,
>
> *JD:  Relations of reference subsist between two subjects that belong to
> different categories of being. Referential relations subsist between
> subjects that belong to different universes of discourse.*
>
>
> *The passage that you quoted dates from 1903, before the shift in Peirce's
> theoretical framework that Jappy hypothesizes.  How do we reconcile your
> summary here with the "Prolegomena" passage from 1906, which indicates that
> Subjects belong to Universes and Predicates belong to Categories?  Which
> 1903 term corresponds to "Universes of Experience" in 1908--"categories of
> being" or "universes of discourse"?*
>
>
> I am again tending to think, perhaps along with Jeff, that it is possible
> to make too much of this "shift in Peirce's theoretical framework that
> Jappy hypothesizes." It is, after all, a mere hypothesis. Who else is
> supporting this hypothesis? How might it be tested?
>
> *JD:  I think that Peirce sometimes dropped the distinction between the
> realms of the logical categories and the realms of the universes in his
> later writings when he was examining matters of philosophical necessity and
> was operating as this very high level of the discussion.*
>
>
> *My impression--which may be incorrect--is that Peirce stopped talking
> about Categories altogether in his later writings, and only talked about
> Universes.  Jappy specifically claims that  but I am not entirely sure that
> this is also true in other areas.*
>
>
> Jon, I think your impression that Peirce stopped talking about Categories
> altogether in his later writings, and only talked about Universes" may
> indeed be wrong (there may even be a kind of unconscious hidden agenda at
> play here), so that until we have something more than Jappy's "claims"
> (this will require considerably more research, I think), it is hard for me
> to imagine that Peirce would reject his near life long championing of
> Categories (which I think he held to be of as great significance as his
> pragmatism, trichotomic semiotics, and Existential Graphs) for a *mere*
> metaphysical facet of them.
>
> In addition, late in the career of a man as isolated as Peirce was, with
> not many opportunites for publication at this point in his in life, that he
> doesn't necessarily make a point of discussing his categories as such may
> even suggest that they have become so much a part of his thinking that they
> "go without saying." So, this seemingly single-minded emphasis on Jaffy's
> hypothesis re: Universes, I find a bit troubling, I must admit.
>
> JD:  My ability to engage in these discussions has been limited due to my
> daughter’s health issues.
>
>
> Jeff, I think I have a sense, especially from getting to know you a bit at
> the International Peirce Centennial Congress at UMass, Lowell, a couple of
> years ago, of how difficult this has been for you for some time now, and I
> can only now commend your strength and perseverance in the face of these
> tremendous challenges. You, your daughter, and all your family will be in
> my thoughts now and daily.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>
> On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 7:26 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Jeff, List:
>>
>> JD:  Relations of reference subsist between two subjects that belong to
>> different categories of being. Referential relations subsist between
>> subjects that belong to different universes of discourse.
>>
>>
>> The passage that you quoted dates from 1903, before the shift in Peirce's
>> theoretical framework that Jappy hypothesizes.  How do we reconcile your
>> summary here with the "Prolegomena" passage from 1906, which indicates that
>> Subjects belong to Universes and Predicates belong to Categories?  Which
>> 1903 term corresponds to "Universes of Experience" in 1908--"categories of
>> being" or "universes of discourse"?
>>
>> JD:  I think that Peirce sometimes dropped the distinction between the
>> realms of the logical categories and the realms of the universes in his
>> later writings when he was examining matters of philosophical necessity and
>> was operating as this very high le

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jeff, List:

It looks like you may have inadvertently sent your reply to me only, rather
than to the List.  The whole thing is included below.

JD:  Well, the subject terms in a proposition typically refer to existent
objects or facts.


In "Prolegomena," Peirce states, "A logical universe is, no doubt, a
collection of logical subjects, but not necessarily of metaphysical
Subjects, or ‘substances’; for it may be composed of characters, of
elementary facts, etc." (CP 4.546, 1906).  So at least in that
context--assuming that "substances" are equivalent to "Things" and
"characters" are equivalent to "Ideas"--"subjects" apparently need not be
"existent objects or facts"; they can be items in *any *of the three
Universes of Experience, which are apparently equivalent to "logical
universes."

JD:  I was trying to direct your attention to a reading by Lieb of the
letter to Lady Welby in 1908 where the 66-fold classificatory system of
signs is made clearer.


I am not sure of the reference here, since you did not mention Lieb in your
initial post.  Which reading?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 6:49 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> Well, the subject terms in a proposition typically refer to existent
> objects or facts. The predicates may vary in character. Monadic predicates
> (e.g., a is black) refer to qualities in a way that conceives of them as
> possibles. Dyadic predicates (a hits b) refer to actions between agent and
> patient in a way that conceives of them as standing in brute relations.
> Predicates of a higher order of adicity (a gives b to c) conceives of a
> lawful relation that governs the giving so that a transfer of right is
> conveyed.
>
> So, typically, subjects pick out existent individuals in universes that
> are quantified in some way. Predicates pick out relations that may,
> themselves, have different modal characteristics.
>
> In order to work out specific instances of what Peirce was doing in the
> essays in 1906 and 1908, I would need to take a closer look. Having said
> that, I was trying to direct your attention to a reading by Lieb of the
> letter to Lady Welby in 1908 where the 66-fold classificatory system of
> signs is made clearer. It is helpful, I think, to read the later letters in
> light of what he says in the preceding letters.
>
> --Jeff
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Gary Richmond]

Jeff, Jon, List,

*JD:  Relations of reference subsist between two subjects that belong to
different categories of being. Referential relations subsist between
subjects that belong to different universes of discourse.*


*The passage that you quoted dates from 1903, before the shift in Peirce's
theoretical framework that Jappy hypothesizes.  How do we reconcile your
summary here with the "Prolegomena" passage from 1906, which indicates that
Subjects belong to Universes and Predicates belong to Categories?  Which
1903 term corresponds to "Universes of Experience" in 1908--"categories of
being" or "universes of discourse"?*


I am again tending to think, perhaps along with Jeff, that it is possible
to make too much of this "shift in Peirce's theoretical framework that
Jappy hypothesizes." It is, after all, a mere hypothesis. Who else is
supporting this hypothesis? How might it be tested?

*JD:  I think that Peirce sometimes dropped the distinction between the
realms of the logical categories and the realms of the universes in his
later writings when he was examining matters of philosophical necessity and
was operating as this very high level of the discussion.*


*My impression--which may be incorrect--is that Peirce stopped talking
about Categories altogether in his later writings, and only talked about
Universes.  Jappy specifically claims that  but I am not entirely sure that
this is also true in other areas.*


Jon, I think your impression that Peirce stopped talking about Categories
altogether in his later writings, and only talked about Universes" may
indeed be wrong (there may even be a kind of unconscious hidden agenda at
play here), so that until we have something more than Jappy's "claims"
(this will require considerably more research, I think), it is hard for me
to imagine that Peirce would reject his near life long championing of
Categories (which I think he held to be of as great significance as his
pragmatism, trichotomic semiotics, and Existential Graphs) for a *mere*
metaphysical facet of them.

In addition, late in the career of a man as isolated as Peirce was, with
not many opportunites for publication at this point in his in life, that he
doesn't necessarily make a point of discussing his categories as such may
even suggest that they have become so much a part of his thinking that they
"go without saying." So, this seemingly single-minded emphasis on Jaffy's
hypothesis re: Universes, I find a bit troubling, I must admit.

JD:  My ability to engage in these discussions has been limited due to my
daughter’s health issues.


Jeff, I think I have a sense, especially from getting to know you a bit at
the International Peirce Centennial Congress at UMass, Lowell, a couple of
years ago, of how difficult this has been for you for some time now, and I
can only now commend your strength and perseverance in the face of these
tremendous challenges. You, your daughter, and all your family will be in
my thoughts now and daily.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 7:26 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Jeff, List:
>
> JD:  Relations of reference subsist between two subjects that belong to
> different categories of being. Referential relations subsist between
> subjects that belong to different universes of discourse.
>
>
> The passage that you quoted dates from 1903, before the shift in Peirce's
> theoretical framework that Jappy hypothesizes.  How do we reconcile your
> summary here with the "Prolegomena" passage from 1906, which indicates that
> Subjects belong to Universes and Predicates belong to Categories?  Which
> 1903 term corresponds to "Universes of Experience" in 1908--"categories of
> being" or "universes of discourse"?
>
> JD:  I think that Peirce sometimes dropped the distinction between the
> realms of the logical categories and the realms of the universes in his
> later writings when he was examining matters of philosophical necessity and
> was operating as this very high level of the discussion.
>
>
> My impression--which may be incorrect--is that Peirce stopped talking
> about Categories altogether in his later writings, and only talked about
> Universes.  Jappy specifically claims that "after 1906 Peirce never again
> employed his categories as criteria in the classification of signs," but I
> am not entirely sure that this is also true in other areas.
>
> JD:  My ability to engage in these discussions has been limited due to my
> daughter’s health issues.
>
>
> Prayers are ascending for your daughter, as well as for you and the rest
> of your family.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 5:08 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
> jeffrey.down...@

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jeff, List:

JD:  Relations of reference subsist between two subjects that belong to
different categories of being. Referential relations subsist between
subjects that belong to different universes of discourse.


The passage that you quoted dates from 1903, before the shift in Peirce's
theoretical framework that Jappy hypothesizes.  How do we reconcile your
summary here with the "Prolegomena" passage from 1906, which indicates that
Subjects belong to Universes and Predicates belong to Categories?  Which
1903 term corresponds to "Universes of Experience" in 1908--"categories of
being" or "universes of discourse"?

JD:  I think that Peirce sometimes dropped the distinction between the
realms of the logical categories and the realms of the universes in his
later writings when he was examining matters of philosophical necessity and
was operating as this very high level of the discussion.


My impression--which may be incorrect--is that Peirce stopped talking about
Categories altogether in his later writings, and only talked about
Universes.  Jappy specifically claims that "after 1906 Peirce never again
employed his categories as criteria in the classification of signs," but I
am not entirely sure that this is also true in other areas.

JD:  My ability to engage in these discussions has been limited due to my
daughter’s health issues.


Prayers are ascending for your daughter, as well as for you and the rest of
your family.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 5:08 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Jon, Gary F, List,
>
> How might we think about the relationship between the categories and the
> universes? First, let's note that he uses these terms in a number of
> different ways in different contexts. For instance, in the Harvard Lectures
> of 1903, he provides a phenomenological account of the universal categories
> that are found in all possible experience. In other places, such as his
> work on algebraic and diagrammatic systems of logic, he provides a logical
> account of the categories and universes that employed
> when making assertions and drawing inferences. In what follows, I will
> focus on the latter distinction (hence the change in the subject heading
> for this post).
>
> For the sake of clarity, let's start by focusing our attention on one
> place where he talks about categories and universes. Here is what Peirce
> says about relations of reference and referential relations on the opening
> pages of "Nomenclature and Division of Dyadic Relations":
>
> The broadest division of dyadic relations is into those which can only
> subsist between two subjects of different categories of being (as between
> an existing individual and a quality) and those which can subsist between
> two subjects of the same category. A relation of the former kind may
> advantageously be termed a *reference*; a relation of the latter kind, a 
> *dyadic
> relation proper*. A dyadic relation proper is either such as can only
> have place between two subjects of different universes of discourse (as the
> membership of a natural person in a corporation), or is such as can subsist
> between two objects of the same universe. A relation of the former
> description may be termed a *referential relation*; a relation of the
> latter description, a *rerelation*. (CP 3.573).
>
> Notice what he says about relations of reference and referential
> relations. Relations of reference subsist between two subjects that belong
> to different *categories* of being. Referential relations subsist between
> subjects that belong to different *universes* of discourse.
>
>
>
> For my part, I think Peirce is engaged a discussion the way that he plans
> to handle these sort of relations in (1) his formal systems of algebraic
> logic and existential graphs (both of which are mathematical systems of
> logic) and (2) in his speculative grammar and critical logic as two parts
> of his semiotic theory. His aim is to rethink the mathematical systems so
> that he can then use them as tools in his philosophical inquiries in
> semiotics. He sees that there are a number of problems with the systems
> that Kempe and Schroder have developed, and he is draw on the
> obvious shortcomings in these two formal systems for the sake of gaining
> insight into how he might further develop his own systems--especially the
> existential graphs.
>
> While there are a number of difficult issues that he is trying to grapple
> with in this essay, it seems to me that one of the prominent concerns is
> how to handle the quantifiers and modal operators in these logical systems.
> In particular, I think he is worrying about the relationships between the
> realms that the quantifiers and modal operators each range over in the
> different sorts of assertions that make use of such logical conceptions.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Jeff:

Jeff, your remarks here are critical and are linked to CSP’s background.

If one does not make clear how the symbols of the symbol system are related, 
the reader/listener must arbitrary select one.  Usually, that, on this list 
serve, is the alphabetic symbol system.

But often, CSP uses other references as “re-relations”, expressing chemical 
meanings to graphs, for example, and then expressing icons as being like 
“radicals”.

In this regard, the logic of chemistry is particularly difficult to comprehend.
Abductive guesses are essential to finding the structure of existent matter.
The guesses are based on both general familiarity with the chemical symbol 
system and the role of valence in relation to other similar materials.  AFTER 
the reference name and reference relations are determined and accepted, then a 
new reference has been established.  And, both inductive, (preform-ative), 
deductive (proform-ative) experiments can be designed and conducted.  This is, 
of course, a very strange view of both epistemology and ontology.  It is also 
logically distinct from traditional mathematical and physical ratiocinations 
about theory and data.

This leads to massive confusion among the discussants. Quoting isolated 
passages is necessary. But, it not the principle way to understand CSP, at 
least in my opinion.  He understood several disciplines well and used his 
experience to innovate terms that span disciplines.  

Cheers

Jerry C.

> On Oct 19, 2016, at 6:08 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard  
> wrote:
> 
> Jon, Gary F, List,
> 
> How might we think about the relationship between the categories and the 
> universes? First, let's note that he uses these terms in a number of 
> different ways in different contexts. For instance, in the Harvard Lectures 
> of 1903, he provides a phenomenological account of the universal categories 
> that are found in all possible experience. In other places, such as his work 
> on algebraic and diagrammatic systems of logic, he provides a logical account 
> of the categories and universes that employed when making assertions and 
> drawing inferences. In what follows, I will focus on the latter distinction 
> (hence the change in the subject heading for this post).
> 
> For the sake of clarity, let's start by focusing our attention on one place 
> where he talks about categories and universes. Here is what Peirce says about 
> relations of reference and referential relations on the opening pages of 
> "Nomenclature and Division of Dyadic Relations":
> 
> The broadest division of dyadic relations is into those which can only 
> subsist between two subjects of different categories of being (as between an 
> existing individual and a quality) and those which can subsist between two 
> subjects of the same category. A relation of the former kind may 
> advantageously be termed a reference; a relation of the latter kind, a dyadic 
> relation proper. A dyadic relation proper is either such as can only have 
> place between two subjects of different universes of discourse (as the 
> membership of a natural person in a corporation), or is such as can subsist 
> between two objects of the same universe. A relation of the former 
> description may be termed a referential relation; a relation of the latter 
> description, a rerelation. (CP 3.573).
> 
> Notice what he says about relations of reference and referential relations. 
> Relations of reference subsist between two subjects that belong to different 
> categories of being. Referential relations subsist between subjects that 
> belong to different universes of discourse.
>  
> For my part, I think Peirce is engaged a discussion the way that he plans to 
> handle these sort of relations in (1) his formal systems of algebraic logic 
> and existential graphs (both of which are mathematical systems of logic) and 
> (2) in his speculative grammar and critical logic as two parts of his 
> semiotic theory. His aim is to rethink the mathematical systems so that he 
> can then use them as tools in his philosophical inquiries in semiotics. He 
> sees that there are a number of problems with the systems that Kempe and 
> Schroder have developed, and he is draw on the obvious shortcomings in these 
> two formal systems for the sake of gaining insight into how he might further 
> develop his own systems--especially the existential graphs.
> 
> While there are a number of difficult issues that he is trying to grapple 
> with in this essay, it seems to me that one of the prominent concerns is how 
> to handle the quantifiers and modal operators in these logical systems. In 
> particular, I think he is worrying about the relationships between the realms 
> that the quantifiers and modal operators each range over in the different 
> sorts of assertions that make use of such logical conceptions.
>  
> He adds the following remark about his limited aims in this essay: 
>  
> The author's writings on the logic of relations were substantially