subject:"Re\: \[PEIRCE\-L\] Peirce and Democracy"

> On Dec 6, 2016, at 2:47 PM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
> 
> Theoretical physicists are of course less practiqual minded. But the right 
> point of comparison would then be theoretical chemists.
> 
> The key point, however, is that neither chemistry nor physics should be taken 
> as equivelants to the buch of people currently practicing the these sciences.
> 
> That would be reductionalism, ignoring the basic views by CSP.

Theoretical chemists are physicists. 

To your key point though I’m not quite sure what you mean. The point of 
objection is how practical the field is, but surely that question can’t be 
asked independent of the people practicing and the way they practice even if 
not reducible to those people.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

Theoretical physicists are of course less practiqual minded. But the 
right point of comparison would then be theoretical chemists.


The key point, however, is that neither chemistry nor physics should be 
taken as equivelants to the buch of people currently practicing the 
these sciences.


That would be reductionalism, ignoring the basic views by CSP.

Kirsti
Clark Goble kirjoitti 6.12.2016 23:01:

On Dec 6, 2016, at 11:12 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:

How come you say chemists have a "more practical field"??? This I
find an amusing note.

Is there a rationale behind this note, or is it just a flippant one
which cannot be given any grounds for?


Chemists tend to be grounded more with experiment whereas theoretical
physicists often are unencumbered by empirical data. The whole focus
on not only grand unified theories but all sorts of odd theoretical
largely mathematical constructs is common. There’s a big divide in
physics between those of a more empirical bent doing experiment and
those of a more mathematical or abstract bent doing theory. Not that
people don’t have feet in both areas at times - I certainly did back
in my physics days. But it seems quite different culturally from my
friends who are chemists even in academia.

Admittedly there are hybrid disciplines like material science which is
often physics but still more tied to engineering or chemistry in
mindset. But the way physicists are acculturated seems quite different
from chemists, geologists or the like.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

> On Dec 6, 2016, at 11:56 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
> 
> The real, for CSP, revealed itself only 'in the long run'. 

I’m not sure that’s quite right. It’s true that the meaning of the real is 
found in the long run. 

the opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, 
is what we mean by truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real

But the real can easily reveal itself in the short run as well. It’s just that 
we will be fallible in our beliefs regarding it. But that’s always true. The 
point about the long run is simply a way to avoid that fallibilism in terms of 
what truth means. I think a case can be made that Peirce’s long run arises out 
of his frequentist (as opposed to bayesian) approach to probabilities. I think 
the point is much more about stability. If our beliefs about the real are 
stable through inquiry then if those beliefs are true then we can say the real 
has revealed itself.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

> On Dec 6, 2016, at 12:33 PM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
> 
> Peirce was opposed to behaviorism in any proper sense, because behaviorism 
> did not exist by his time. It came into being later.
> 
> Behaviorism came from US, and sweeped over the field of anglo-american 
> psychology later than the span of life of CSP.

(Assume you mean “Peirce was not opposed to behaviorism in any proper sense…”)

While this is true as far as it goes, the idea of the black box where all that 
matters are inputs and outputs is not only found in behavioralism.  In Peirce’s 
paper “Issues of Pragmaticism” where he discusses critical common sensism he 
gets at many of these issues relative to what he terms the occult nature of 
habits. It’s in EP 2:347 although here’s a variant of it I found online to aid 
discussion.

http://pages.uoregon.edu/koopman/events_readings/coast_group/PNWPrag_2010_peirce.pdf

I think it fair to put Peirce’s views here up against Skinner and company.

Now to be fair, I think it is easy to uncritically read Peirce’s notion of 
habit as behavioralism. (Not that you or anyone else here is doing that - just 
that people have appealed to Peirce in that fashion in the literature) It 
doesn’t help that Peirce doesn’t always use his term “interpretant” but 
sometimes uses the term “responses.” 

The main objection by Peirce (although obviously a behavioralist could raise 
counter-objections) would be CP 6.23.

…exact conformity [between stimulus and response] would be in downright 
conflict with the law; since it would instantly crystalize thought and prevent 
all further formation of habit. The law of mind only makes a given feeling more 
likely to arise.

That is the very conception of habit for Peirce involves metaphysical 
assumptions that are at odds with behavioralism. That’s true even if a 
behavioralist doesn’t require a strict law between input and output. Now a 
behavioralist could raise other objections but fundamentally the way Peirce 
conceives of habit and mind seem at odds with them. Part of that is due to the 
way Peirce sees the relationship between consciousness and habit.

The other typical objection is Morris’ behavioralism in the late 1930’s. But of 
course there are differences between Morris’ pragmatism and Peirce’s. Morris 
simply moves in a more positivist direction and I think his behavioralism is 
due to that.
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

> On Dec 6, 2016, at 11:12 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
> 
> How come you say chemists have a "more practical field"??? This I find an 
> amusing note.
> 
> Is there a rationale behind this note, or is it just a flippant one which 
> cannot be given any grounds for?

Chemists tend to be grounded more with experiment whereas theoretical 
physicists often are unencumbered by empirical data. The whole focus on not 
only grand unified theories but all sorts of odd theoretical largely 
mathematical constructs is common. There’s a big divide in physics between 
those of a more empirical bent doing experiment and those of a more 
mathematical or abstract bent doing theory. Not that people don’t have feet in 
both areas at times - I certainly did back in my physics days. But it seems 
quite different culturally from my friends who are chemists even in academia.

Admittedly there are hybrid disciplines like material science which is often 
physics but still more tied to engineering or chemistry in mindset. But the way 
physicists are acculturated seems quite different from chemists, geologists or 
the like.

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Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy


Helmut,

Peirce was opposed to behaviorism in any proper sense, because 
behaviorism did not exist by his time. It came into being later.


Behaviorism came from US, and sweeped over the field of anglo-american 
psychology later than the span of life of CSP.


The roots of behaviorism come from Russia, from the works of I.P. 
Pavlov. However, only a piece of his work was taken into use, that of a 
conditional reflex. Which was very handy to replicate in experiments.  
This simplistic notion gave rise to a huge wave of popularity, both 
within psychology and other fields. It became the common view ordinary 
people were educated into.


I.P. Pavlov, however, was concerned about the nervonal system as a 
whole, His great invention was his theory on dynamical stereotypes 
aiming at giving a valid description of the whole of living beings, 
central and peripheral nerve system together with the muscular parts.  
Action was also involved. Action with other living beings.


A selection of his works have been published in German, which I have 
been reading to my great delight in my early days as a researcher.


The behavioralist schools present a sheer vandalism in relation with the 
work of I.P Pavlov. The brain science of today would have much to learn 
from his writings.


He lived for his work, and was allowed to do so, both in the tsarist and 
the soviet era. He did not care the least on the regime he was living 
in.


Hope this answered some of your questions, Helmut.

Kirsti




Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 5.12.2016 23:34:

Clark, John, list,
I am not nearly as skilled in this subject, and about Peirce-texts as
you are, but I am happy to learn, that Peirce was opposed to
positivism and behaviourism. Because I always was having the
impression, that Peirce was a bit on the positivist side: There is
always the emphasis on "habit", when it is about thirdness. In Tychism
even the natural laws are due to habit. Habit for me does not seem to
be a metaphysical concept. I think for example, that emergence is
something completely different from habit, though thirdness. Ok, the
term "emergence" did not exist at the time of Peirce, it has to do
with chaos theory. But there was transcendental philosophy, and Peirce
sort of started with Kant. But if you compare Kants and Peirces
concepts of "A-Priori", then there is a difference: For Kant it means
something like conditions for knowledge out of pure reason. For
Peirce, in his four methods of inquiry, it is rather something having
to do with feeling or instinct. Which are positive things, but not
transcendent, grounded in metaphysics, things. So I am a bit confused
now. Ok, you might say, that semiotics is a sort of metaphysics, and a
behaviour has a better chance to become a habit if it goes along with
existing transcendental laws such as pure reason or natural laws. The
latter though are habits themselves, so: Circle. Remains pure reason.
Did Peirce believe in that, or is it also a matter of habit for him?
Confused, but wishing you the
Best,
Helmut

 05. Dezember 2016 um 18:31 Uhr
 "Clark Goble"  wrote:


On Dec 5, 2016, at 7:05 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:
On 11/29/2016 2:57 PM, Clark Goble wrote:


Treating thirdness as something real in the universe independent
of what any particular person thinks about it is key.


That is not a new point. Scientists have always assumed that the
laws of nature are "really real".


It's a major point but not an universal one. Especially among
physicists Feynman's loose adoption of a kind of instrumentalism was
influential. So it wasn't just Mach or certain aspects of the
positivists. Of course most physicists who haven't studied any
philosophy end up with an incoherent mess of views on the nature of
physical laws. Sometimes a realist, sometimes an idealist, sometimes a
Feynman like denial that anything matters but calculating. At least in
my experience with physicists. (Chemists are somewhat different due to
a more practical field)

However I think what Peirce did differently was in thinking of the
laws of physics in terms of thirdness. I don't think most others -
even those who were realists about law - put them in quite that
formulation. (If only because few thought of things in those terms)

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

For CSP the real was not reducible to existent individuals, be 
theyindividual facts fould out by measuments in empirical,however strict 
experimental investigations,  OR individual minds, ie. any particular 
persons, taken as existent individuals.


The real, for CSP, revealed itself only 'in the long run'. Not only as 
continuing series of experimentation, but also as continuing endeavour 
to interpret the findings in a coherent way.  With the aim of pointing 
out the best ways to continue, boht experimenting and theorizing. - All 
theorizing contains metaphysics, in one sense and form, or another.


This has nowadays been sometimes called the underdetermination of all 
and any thoeries. No theory can ever be fully backed up by any amount of 
experimental facts.


If that was assumed, then CSP would have had it all wrong. The absolute 
truth would be possible to achieve on a certain point of time. - No 
future development thus needed.


This did not happen with classical mechanics, classical physics. It was 
not proven wrong, it was only proven that its field of proper 
application is limited.


With quantum mechanics a similar process is still going on. Uniting the 
particle view and the wave view presenting an acute problem.


Something similar happened within mathematics, with the parallem axiom.

If research is  seriously taken as a communal enterprise, not just as 
comething existent (human) individuals coop up in their mind, and then 
(mysteriously) are able to share, then the great divide between natural 
sciences and human sciences must be seriously reconsidered. - Not just 
taken as granted and self-evident.


All science is a social and cultural enterprise, thus these two must be 
taken seriously in philosophizing on and about science.


Best,

Kirsti




John F Sowa kirjoitti 5.12.2016 16:05:

On 11/29/2016 2:57 PM, Clark Goble wrote:

Treating thirdness as something real in the universe independent
of what any particular person thinks about it is key.


That is not a new point.  Scientists have always assumed that the
laws of nature are "really real".

Ernst Mach is the positivist who claimed that the laws of physics
are *nothing but* summaries of observations.  His perverse attitude
warped the minds of the Vienna circlers, who warped the minds of much
of 20th c philosophy.  For the rest of life, Carnap continued to teach
that perversion in his courses on the philosophy of science.

Both Peirce and Einstein considered Mach's emphasis on observation
to be useful as a guideline for clarifying the foundations.  But
Mach was the target of Peirce's condemnation (CP 1.129):

Find a scientific man who proposes to get along without any 
metaphysics

-- not by any means every man who holds the ordinary reasonings of
metaphysicians in scorn -- and you have found one whose doctrines are
thoroughly vitiated by the crude and uncriticized metaphysics with
which they are packed.  We must philosophize, said the great 
naturalist

Aristotle -- if only to avoid philosophizing.  Every man of us has a
metaphysics, and has to have one; and it will influence his life
greatly.  Far better, then, that that metaphysics should be criticized
and not be allowed to run loose.


Einstein considered Mach a good experimental physicist, but "a 
miserable

philosopher".  In his Gedanken experiments, Einstein was inspired by
Mach to consider what observations might support a theory of relativity
-- e.g. traveling on a train that was moving at the speed of light.

Mach would never approve of Gedanken experiments, and he would have
denounced them vehemently.  Fortunately for physics, Einstein had the
courage and good sense to ignore Mach.

Unfortunately, the psychologists did not have anyone of Einstein's
stature to defend them.  As a result, they allowed the behaviorists
to destroy serious research in psychology for over half a century.

John



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy


Clark,

How come you say chemists have a "more practical field"??? This I find 
an amusing note.


Is there a rationale behind this note, or is it just a flippant one 
which cannot be given any grounds for?


Kirsti

Clark Goble kirjoitti 5.12.2016 19:31:

On Dec 5, 2016, at 7:05 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:

On 11/29/2016 2:57 PM, Clark Goble wrote:


Treating thirdness as something real in the universe independent
of what any particular person thinks about it is key.


That is not a new point. Scientists have always assumed that the
laws of nature are "really real".


It’s a major point but not an universal one. Especially among
physicists Feynman’s loose adoption of a kind of instrumentalism was
influential. So it wasn’t just Mach or certain aspects of the
positivists. Of course most physicists who haven’t studied any
philosophy end up with an incoherent mess of views on the nature of
physical laws. Sometimes a realist, sometimes an idealist, sometimes a
Feynman like denial that anything matters but calculating. At least in
my experience with physicists. (Chemists are somewhat different due to
a more practical field)

However I think what Peirce did differently was in thinking of the
laws of physics in terms of thirdness. I don’t think most others -
even those who were realists about law - put them in quite that
formulation. (If only because few thought of things in those terms)



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

> On Dec 5, 2016, at 3:47 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:
> 
> Going back to Kant (especially his ethics which are so tied to the in-itself) 
> this means that one can’t treat as fully transcendent laws. While Peirce’s 
> aesthetics are his least developed part of thought, he grounds ethics on 
> aesthetics. I think he’s mostly following Kant even if he doesn’t follow him 
> exactly. Kant you may recall has aesthetics as this weird feeling in general 
> without reference to particular phenomena but tied to phenomena in general. 
> It’s a kind of odd middle ground between the in-itself noumenal and 
> phenomenal realm. (I’ll confess I find Kant pretty difficult here) 

Just to go along with the above, here’s a paper I came upon that deals with 
this explicitly.

http://rkatkins.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/PleasuresofGoodness.pdf 

I think most people tend to think through this in terms of Aristotle more than 
Kant. But I think keeping in mind Peirce’s connection to Kant (especially in 
his earlier work) is important.
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-12-05 Thread Clark Goble

> On Dec 5, 2016, at 2:34 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
> I am not nearly as skilled in this subject, and about Peirce-texts as you 
> are, but I am happy to learn, that Peirce was opposed to positivism and 
> behaviourism. Because I always was having the impression, that Peirce was a 
> bit on the positivist side

A good book that gets at the differences is C. J. Misak’s Verificationism: Its 
History and Prospects. The main difference is that for Peirce the pragmatic 
maxim is a criteria for meaning whereas for the positivists it’s a criteria for 
truth. That has big implications particularly in terms of how Peirce’s 
conception of truth is rejected by the positivists (and arguably to a certain 
degree by James and the later neopragmatists). 

The second thing is that the positivists and then how they were used in 
psychology sees content as a kind of black box where the interior doesn’t 
matter so long as there’s a habit of behavior between inputs and outputs. 
Peirce in contrast has his doctrine of continuity which allows one to care 
about the interior of signs. Indeed such matters become quite important. As 
John Sowa noted earlier today, it was an unfortunate blind alley that both 
psychology and philosophy went down where the interior didn’t matter. It 
devolves into a naive functionalism which is quite at odds with Peirce’s 
thought.

I’d say that the positivists are actually more interesting than they are 
treated by contemporary philosophy. Unfortunately they are misrepresented to 
form a kind of boogey-man that can be attacked and dismissed. Their thought, 
while misguided, was actually far more nuanced than presented. In particular 
famous attacks on them (here thinking of the ‘disprove’ that falsification was 
supposed to give) were just plain silly. Typically such matters were already 
considered at part of their thought. The stronger arguments were from Quine and 
that’s why it’s really after him that positivism largely dies in philosophy. 
(Before my time, but I think the analytic/synthetic division is pretty 
problematic)

> Habit for me does not seem to be a metaphysical concept.

One can certainly apply signs and talk about habits just with reference to 
human use. But I think this misses the place of regularity in nature (such as 
Peirce’s famous weather vane example). It’s Peirce’s move to take these as 
ontological - roughly redoing Spinoza with a new substance made up of 
firstness, secondness, and thirdness - that gives them their greatest 
flexibility.

As I’ve long said, this ontological stance is one of his most controversial 
elements. (Let alone the deeper cosmology we discussed here in September and 
October) I think one need not adopt the ontology to adopt his logical analysis.

> Ok, the term "emergence" did not exist at the time of Peirce, it has to do 
> with chaos theory. 

Emergence pre-dates chaos theory by quite a bit. However it was some of the 
interesting mathematical discoveries in the early 90’s and late 80’s that did 
perhaps popularize emergence. But you can find plenty of discussion of it prior 
to that - especially in the free will literature where radical or ontological 
emergence was seen as the way out for free will and consciousness. Chaos proper 
in mathematics is purely determinative and the chaos part is much more an 
epistemological limit due to how extremely small errors magnify the error of 
prediction extremely quickly in some systems. This then gets at the question of 
what is merely unknowable as a practical matter epistemologically versus what 
is truly open. But that debate goes back quite a long time. It’s best seen in 
the debate about whether randomness in quantum mechanics is epistemological or 
real. (I think consensus is moving strongly towards realism but there are still 
some holdouts)

I should note I’m deeply skeptical of ontological emergences (the idea that the 
properties of the whole can’t be even in theory explained by the properties of 
the parts, their interactions and if relevant the properties of the observer). 
I tend to think regular in theory reductive emergence explains most examples 
like the feel of water or other such matters. Without a practical example of 
ontological emergence I’m not sure one should accept it. Or, to quote Peirce, 
what’s the difference that makes a difference?

> But there was transcendental philosophy, and Peirce sort of started with 
> Kant. But if you compare Kants and Peirces concepts of "A-Priori", then there 
> is a difference: For Kant it means something like conditions for knowledge 
> out of pure reason. For Peirce, in his four methods of inquiry, it is rather 
> something having to do with feeling or instinct. Which are positive things, 
> but not transcendent, grounded in metaphysics, things. So I am a bit confused 
> now. Ok, you might say, that semiotics is a sort of metaphysics, and a 
> behaviour has a better chance to become a habit if it goes along with 
>

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-12-05 Thread Helmut Raulien

Clark, John, list,

I am not nearly as skilled in this subject, and about Peirce-texts as you are, but I am happy to learn, that Peirce was opposed to positivism and behaviourism. Because I always was having the impression, that Peirce was a bit on the positivist side: There is always the emphasis on "habit", when it is about thirdness. In Tychism even the natural laws are due to habit. Habit for me does not seem to be a metaphysical concept. I think for example, that emergence is something completely different from habit, though thirdness. Ok, the term "emergence" did not exist at the time of Peirce, it has to do with chaos theory. But there was transcendental philosophy, and Peirce sort of started with Kant. But if you compare Kants and Peirces concepts of "A-Priori", then there is a difference: For Kant it means something like conditions for knowledge out of pure reason. For Peirce, in his four methods of inquiry, it is rather something having to do with feeling or instinct. Which are positive things, but not transcendent, grounded in metaphysics, things. So I am a bit confused now. Ok, you might say, that semiotics is a sort of metaphysics, and a behaviour has a better chance to become a habit if it goes along with existing transcendental laws such as pure reason or natural laws. The latter though are habits themselves, so: Circle. Remains pure reason. Did Peirce believe in that, or is it also a matter of habit for him? Confused, but wishing you the

Best,

Helmut

05. Dezember 2016 um 18:31 Uhr
"Clark Goble" wrote:

On Dec 5, 2016, at 7:05 AM, John F Sowa wrote:

On 11/29/2016 2:57 PM, Clark Goble wrote:

Treating thirdness as something real in the universe independent
of what any particular person thinks about it is key.

That is not a new point. Scientists have always assumed that the
laws of nature are "really real".

It’s a major point but not an universal one. Especially among physicists Feynman’s loose adoption of a kind of instrumentalism was influential. So it wasn’t just Mach or certain aspects of the positivists. Of course most physicists who haven’t studied any philosophy end up with an incoherent mess of views on the nature of physical laws. Sometimes a realist, sometimes an idealist, sometimes a Feynman like denial that anything matters but calculating. At least in my experience with physicists. (Chemists are somewhat different due to a more practical field)

However I think what Peirce did differently was in thinking of the laws of physics in terms of thirdness. I don’t think most others - even those who were realists about law - put them in quite that formulation. (If only because few thought of things in those terms)

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-12-05 Thread Jerry Rhee

Dear list:

I should narrow down my question:

For what reasons should a scientist, who believes in the realness of
natural laws, also value that of absolute chance?  Are there any examples?

Best,
Jerry R

On Mon, Dec 5, 2016 at 11:38 AM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Dear John, list:
>
> Would anyone care to share their thoughts on what is meant by Absolute
> Chance?
>
> Thanks in advance,
> Jerry R
>
> On Mon, Dec 5, 2016 at 11:31 AM, Clark Goble  wrote:
>
>>
>> On Dec 5, 2016, at 7:05 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:
>>
>> On 11/29/2016 2:57 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
>>
>> Treating thirdness as something real in the universe independent
>> of what any particular person thinks about it is key.
>>
>>
>> That is not a new point.  Scientists have always assumed that the
>> laws of nature are "really real".
>>
>>
>> It’s a major point but not an universal one. Especially among physicists
>> Feynman’s loose adoption of a kind of instrumentalism was influential. So
>> it wasn’t just Mach or certain aspects of the positivists. Of course most
>> physicists who haven’t studied any philosophy end up with an incoherent
>> mess of views on the nature of physical laws. Sometimes a realist,
>> sometimes an idealist, sometimes a Feynman like denial that anything
>> matters but calculating. At least in my experience with physicists.
>> (Chemists are somewhat different due to a more practical field)
>>
>> However I think what Peirce did differently was in thinking of the laws
>> of physics in terms of thirdness. I don’t think most others - even those
>> who were realists about law - put them in quite that formulation. (If only
>> because few thought of things in those terms)
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -
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>> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce
>> -l/peirce-l.htm .
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-12-05 Thread Jerry Rhee

Dear John, list:

Would anyone care to share their thoughts on what is meant by Absolute
Chance?

Thanks in advance,
Jerry R

On Mon, Dec 5, 2016 at 11:31 AM, Clark Goble  wrote:

>
> On Dec 5, 2016, at 7:05 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:
>
> On 11/29/2016 2:57 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
>
> Treating thirdness as something real in the universe independent
> of what any particular person thinks about it is key.
>
>
> That is not a new point.  Scientists have always assumed that the
> laws of nature are "really real".
>
>
> It’s a major point but not an universal one. Especially among physicists
> Feynman’s loose adoption of a kind of instrumentalism was influential. So
> it wasn’t just Mach or certain aspects of the positivists. Of course most
> physicists who haven’t studied any philosophy end up with an incoherent
> mess of views on the nature of physical laws. Sometimes a realist,
> sometimes an idealist, sometimes a Feynman like denial that anything
> matters but calculating. At least in my experience with physicists.
> (Chemists are somewhat different due to a more practical field)
>
> However I think what Peirce did differently was in thinking of the laws of
> physics in terms of thirdness. I don’t think most others - even those who
> were realists about law - put them in quite that formulation. (If only
> because few thought of things in those terms)
>
>
>
>
> -
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> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-12-05 Thread Clark Goble

> On Dec 5, 2016, at 7:05 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> On 11/29/2016 2:57 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
>> Treating thirdness as something real in the universe independent
>> of what any particular person thinks about it is key.
> 
> That is not a new point.  Scientists have always assumed that the
> laws of nature are "really real".

It’s a major point but not an universal one. Especially among physicists 
Feynman’s loose adoption of a kind of instrumentalism was influential. So it 
wasn’t just Mach or certain aspects of the positivists. Of course most 
physicists who haven’t studied any philosophy end up with an incoherent mess of 
views on the nature of physical laws. Sometimes a realist, sometimes an 
idealist, sometimes a Feynman like denial that anything matters but 
calculating. At least in my experience with physicists. (Chemists are somewhat 
different due to a more practical field)

However I think what Peirce did differently was in thinking of the laws of 
physics in terms of thirdness. I don’t think most others - even those who were 
realists about law - put them in quite that formulation. (If only because few 
thought of things in those terms)

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-12-05 Thread John F Sowa


On 11/29/2016 2:57 PM, Clark Goble wrote:

Treating thirdness as something real in the universe independent
of what any particular person thinks about it is key.


That is not a new point.  Scientists have always assumed that the
laws of nature are "really real".

Ernst Mach is the positivist who claimed that the laws of physics
are *nothing but* summaries of observations.  His perverse attitude
warped the minds of the Vienna circlers, who warped the minds of much
of 20th c philosophy.  For the rest of life, Carnap continued to teach
that perversion in his courses on the philosophy of science.

Both Peirce and Einstein considered Mach's emphasis on observation
to be useful as a guideline for clarifying the foundations.  But
Mach was the target of Peirce's condemnation (CP 1.129):


Find a scientific man who proposes to get along without any metaphysics
-- not by any means every man who holds the ordinary reasonings of
metaphysicians in scorn -- and you have found one whose doctrines are
thoroughly vitiated by the crude and uncriticized metaphysics with
which they are packed.  We must philosophize, said the great naturalist
Aristotle -- if only to avoid philosophizing.  Every man of us has a
metaphysics, and has to have one; and it will influence his life
greatly.  Far better, then, that that metaphysics should be criticized
and not be allowed to run loose.


Einstein considered Mach a good experimental physicist, but "a miserable
philosopher".  In his Gedanken experiments, Einstein was inspired by
Mach to consider what observations might support a theory of relativity
-- e.g. traveling on a train that was moving at the speed of light.

Mach would never approve of Gedanken experiments, and he would have
denounced them vehemently.  Fortunately for physics, Einstein had the
courage and good sense to ignore Mach.

Unfortunately, the psychologists did not have anyone of Einstein's
stature to defend them.  As a result, they allowed the behaviorists
to destroy serious research in psychology for over half a century.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-29 Thread Stephen C. Rose

Again well said and it vindicates respect for Peirce. The next thing to say
of course is that he did not see his work as finished but as a stable
structure for the future which IMO belongs to him now whether anyone knows
it or not. And oddly I think Wittgenstein would agree  and see himself and
Nietzsche as seminal partners in the same move.

Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU

On Tue, Nov 29, 2016 at 2:57 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

> On Tue, Nov 29, 2016 at 11:42 AM, Clark Goble  wrote:
>
> one should note that in the 1890’s Peirce shifted from a moderate realist
> largely following Duns Scotus to a stronger realist largely on the basis of
> how he considered thirdness ontologically. So a quote from 1893 is almost
> certainly in reference to his moderate realist phase.
>
> I should add that even with either the Scotus styled moderate realism or
> the stronger realism that took thirdness as fully mind independent, that
> Peirce and Dewey did route a third way between the extremes of realism and
> idealism. That continued through the idealist/realist debates up to around
> the post war period when positivism and analytic philosophy became dominate.
>
>
> On Nov 29, 2016, at 11:31 AM, Stephen C. Rose  wrote:
>
> Thanks Clark for putting that odd Carus quote in  context and for your
> clarififying words that follow, particularly your description of thirdness.
> In my own thinking I see this final stage as action and expression which
> means essentially that Peirce moves us from what used to be called
> transcendent to the here and now.
>
>
> I was trying to get at how “here and now” versus “transcendence” as a
> false dichotomy that both Peirce and Dewey managed to avoid. Effectively
> both realism of the sort introduced by Descartes as well as the idealism
> that effectively also branched off from Descartes introduce this false
> dilemma. Even before he moves more away from Duns Scotus there’s a sense
> that Peirce isn’t satisfied with either approach because both hinge upon a
> kind of internalist view from which to think through the problem.
>
> Treating thirdness as something real in the universe independent of what
> any particular person thinks about it is key. In epistemology and semantics
> we call this Externalism and it pops up in various guises. I think the
> problem with Duns Scotus’ moderate realism is that for all its strengths
> it’s still fundamentally tied to the individual (albeit perhaps not quite
> as strong as what Descartes gave philosophy) Most of the problem of
> nominalism really is the problem of internalism. Lose internalism and then
> realism makes far more sense without the problems of transcendence.
>
> In a certain way the entire trajectory of Peirce’s thought from the
> beginnings of rejecting Kantian transcendence and the “in itself” is this
> move of thinking through Externalism. If anything it’s surprising that it’s
> not until the later part of the 1890’s that he finally takes his objective
> idealism seriously.
>
> While to my mind there are many problems with Dewey, one of his great
> strengths is that many aspects of this central Peircean insight remain in
> Dewey’s thought.
>
>
>
> -
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>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-29 Thread Clark Goble

> On Tue, Nov 29, 2016 at 11:42 AM, Clark Goble  > wrote:
>> one should note that in the 1890’s Peirce shifted from a moderate realist 
>> largely following Duns Scotus to a stronger realist largely on the basis of 
>> how he considered thirdness ontologically. So a quote from 1893 is almost 
>> certainly in reference to his moderate realist phase. 
>> 
>> I should add that even with either the Scotus styled moderate realism or the 
>> stronger realism that took thirdness as fully mind independent, that Peirce 
>> and Dewey did route a third way between the extremes of realism and 
>> idealism. That continued through the idealist/realist debates up to around 
>> the post war period when positivism and analytic philosophy became dominate.
> 
> On Nov 29, 2016, at 11:31 AM, Stephen C. Rose  wrote:
> 
> Thanks Clark for putting that odd Carus quote in  context and for your 
> clarififying words that follow, particularly your description of thirdness. 
> In my own thinking I see this final stage as action and expression which 
> means essentially that Peirce moves us from what used to be called 
> transcendent to the here and now. 

I was trying to get at how “here and now” versus “transcendence” as a false 
dichotomy that both Peirce and Dewey managed to avoid. Effectively both realism 
of the sort introduced by Descartes as well as the idealism that effectively 
also branched off from Descartes introduce this false dilemma. Even before he 
moves more away from Duns Scotus there’s a sense that Peirce isn’t satisfied 
with either approach because both hinge upon a kind of internalist view from 
which to think through the problem. 

Treating thirdness as something real in the universe independent of what any 
particular person thinks about it is key. In epistemology and semantics we call 
this Externalism and it pops up in various guises. I think the problem with 
Duns Scotus’ moderate realism is that for all its strengths it’s still 
fundamentally tied to the individual (albeit perhaps not quite as strong as 
what Descartes gave philosophy) Most of the problem of nominalism really is the 
problem of internalism. Lose internalism and then realism makes far more sense 
without the problems of transcendence.

In a certain way the entire trajectory of Peirce’s thought from the beginnings 
of rejecting Kantian transcendence and the “in itself” is this move of thinking 
through Externalism. If anything it’s surprising that it’s not until the later 
part of the 1890’s that he finally takes his objective idealism seriously.

While to my mind there are many problems with Dewey, one of his great strengths 
is that many aspects of this central Peircean insight remain in Dewey’s thought.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-29 Thread Stephen C. Rose

Thanks Clark for putting that odd Carus quote in  context and for your
clarififying words that follow, particularly your description of thirdness.
In my own thinking I see this final stage as action and expression which
means essentially that Peirce moves us from what used to be called
transcendent to the here and now.

Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU

On Tue, Nov 29, 2016 at 11:42 AM, Clark Goble  wrote:

>
> On Nov 28, 2016, at 8:29 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
>
> “I look upon Mr. Peirce as an extreme nominalist, or, if he prefers it, as
> a nominal realist soaked with nominalistic opinions. He professes to be a
> realist, but he rescinds the foundation of realism. Like the bear of the
> hermit Mr. Peirce throws the stone at the fly of necessary connection, and
> in doing so kills the philosophy of realism itself...
>
> In summing up the result of the whole battle, we find that there is not a
> single question on which we have to yield or even modify our position. Our
> position remains the same, while Mr. Peirce's position has become glaringly
> untenable.”
>  ~Paul Carus, Monist, 1893,
>
>
> Not sure how that relates to the other discussion but one should note that
> in the 1890’s Peirce shifted from a moderate realist largely following Duns
> Scotus to a stronger realist largely on the basis of how he considered
> thirdness ontologically. So a quote from 1893 is almost certainly in
> reference to his moderate realist phase.
>
> I should add that even with either the Scotus styled moderate realism or
> the stronger realism that took thirdness as fully mind independent, that
> Peirce and Dewey did route a third way between the extremes of realism and
> idealism. That continued through the idealist/realist debates up to around
> the post war period when positivism and analytic philosophy became dominate.
>
>
>
>
> -
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-29 Thread Clark Goble

> On Nov 28, 2016, at 8:29 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
> 
> “I look upon Mr. Peirce as an extreme nominalist, or, if he prefers it, as a 
> nominal realist soaked with nominalistic opinions. He professes to be a 
> realist, but he rescinds the foundation of realism. Like the bear of the 
> hermit Mr. Peirce throws the stone at the fly of necessary connection, and in 
> doing so kills the philosophy of realism itself...  
> 
> In summing up the result of the whole battle, we find that there is not a 
> single question on which we have to yield or even modify our position. Our 
> position remains the same, while Mr. Peirce's position has become glaringly 
> untenable.”
> 
>  ~Paul Carus, Monist, 1893,

Not sure how that relates to the other discussion but one should note that in 
the 1890’s Peirce shifted from a moderate realist largely following Duns Scotus 
to a stronger realist largely on the basis of how he considered thirdness 
ontologically. So a quote from 1893 is almost certainly in reference to his 
moderate realist phase. 

I should add that even with either the Scotus styled moderate realism or the 
stronger realism that took thirdness as fully mind independent, that Peirce and 
Dewey did route a third way between the extremes of realism and idealism. That 
continued through the idealist/realist debates up to around the post war period 
when positivism and analytic philosophy became dominate.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-28 Thread Jerry Rhee

Dear list:

I found this article that clarifies the position Peirce would take.  Well,
if you take this in context of *Man's Glassy Essence* and *The Logic of
Relatives:*

“I look upon Mr. Peirce as an extreme nominalist, or, if he prefers it, as
a nominal realist soaked with nominalistic opinions. He professes to be a
realist, but he rescinds the foundation of realism. Like the bear of the
hermit Mr. Peirce throws the stone at the fly of necessary connection, and
in doing so kills the philosophy of realism itself...



In summing up the result of the whole battle, we find that there is not a
single question on which we have to yield or even modify our position. Our
position remains the same, while Mr. Peirce's position has become glaringly
untenable.”



~Paul Carus, Monist, 1893,

*The Founder of Tychism, His Methods, Philosophy, and Criticisms *

On Mon, Nov 28, 2016 at 8:40 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon, Clark, List,
>
> Jon wrote:
>
> I agree; I think that Peirce would have the same distaste for rigid
> political ideologies--regardless of where they fall on the spectrum--that
> he clearly had for rigid theological dogmas, and for much the same reasons.
>
>
> I agree with Clark and Jon in this. Yes, rigidity and dogmatism block not
> only the way of inquiry.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>
> On Mon, Nov 28, 2016 at 8:11 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Clark, List:
>>
>> I agree; I think that Peirce would have the same distaste for rigid
>> political ideologies--regardless of where they fall on the spectrum--that
>> he clearly had for rigid theological dogmas, and for much the same reasons.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Mon, Nov 28, 2016 at 5:13 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:
>>>
>>> On Nov 28, 2016, at 2:57 PM, Gary Richmond 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> I prefer to find a value in the 'tension' between bottom-up and top-down
>>> solutions which Clark hinted at. I'm not at all sure what Peirce's
>>> preferences would be in this matter.
>>>
>>> As I said Peirce (especially in his mature phase) lived during the rise
>>> of Bizmarkian progressivism. While that movement suffered from a lack of
>>> humility in terms of what one could control, it also faced a system with
>>> little interstate commerce and relatively low technology. The world we live
>>> in today is simply radically different in terms of how integrated it is.
>>> Peirce may well offer compelling abstract principles. However I’m far from
>>> convinced even if we knew his preferences it’d tell us much about how to
>>> act today. The world changed too much with the inflection point of WWII
>>> decades after Peirce’s death.
>>>
>>> I think keeping the tension between emergent and top down approaches is
>>> important. But far more important is being open to data and testing our
>>> solutions. Neither of which is terribly common among politics or activists
>>> in particular. There’s lots of confirmation bias and outright dismissal of
>>> uncomfortable facts by all sides. That much more than privileging causal
>>> directions seems the problem. Or, to put it in Peirce’s terms, we tend to
>>> block off inquiry especially when it tends to confirm a preference of the
>>> political outgroup.
>>>
>>> This keeping open inquiry seems to be the greatest value Peirce offers
>>> politics and not a popular one (despite a lot of lip service).
>>>
>>
>>
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>>
>>
>>
>>
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-28 Thread Gary Richmond

Jon, Clark, List,

Jon wrote:

I agree; I think that Peirce would have the same distaste for rigid
political ideologies--regardless of where they fall on the spectrum--that
he clearly had for rigid theological dogmas, and for much the same reasons.


I agree with Clark and Jon in this. Yes, rigidity and dogmatism block not
only the way of inquiry.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, Nov 28, 2016 at 8:11 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Clark, List:
>
> I agree; I think that Peirce would have the same distaste for rigid
> political ideologies--regardless of where they fall on the spectrum--that
> he clearly had for rigid theological dogmas, and for much the same reasons.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Nov 28, 2016 at 5:13 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:
>>
>> On Nov 28, 2016, at 2:57 PM, Gary Richmond 
>> wrote:
>>
>> I prefer to find a value in the 'tension' between bottom-up and top-down
>> solutions which Clark hinted at. I'm not at all sure what Peirce's
>> preferences would be in this matter.
>>
>> As I said Peirce (especially in his mature phase) lived during the rise
>> of Bizmarkian progressivism. While that movement suffered from a lack of
>> humility in terms of what one could control, it also faced a system with
>> little interstate commerce and relatively low technology. The world we live
>> in today is simply radically different in terms of how integrated it is.
>> Peirce may well offer compelling abstract principles. However I’m far from
>> convinced even if we knew his preferences it’d tell us much about how to
>> act today. The world changed too much with the inflection point of WWII
>> decades after Peirce’s death.
>>
>> I think keeping the tension between emergent and top down approaches is
>> important. But far more important is being open to data and testing our
>> solutions. Neither of which is terribly common among politics or activists
>> in particular. There’s lots of confirmation bias and outright dismissal of
>> uncomfortable facts by all sides. That much more than privileging causal
>> directions seems the problem. Or, to put it in Peirce’s terms, we tend to
>> block off inquiry especially when it tends to confirm a preference of the
>> political outgroup.
>>
>> This keeping open inquiry seems to be the greatest value Peirce offers
>> politics and not a popular one (despite a lot of lip service).
>>
>
>
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-28 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Clark, List:

I agree; I think that Peirce would have the same distaste for rigid
political ideologies--regardless of where they fall on the spectrum--that
he clearly had for rigid theological dogmas, and for much the same reasons.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Nov 28, 2016 at 5:13 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:
>
> On Nov 28, 2016, at 2:57 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
> I prefer to find a value in the 'tension' between bottom-up and top-down
> solutions which Clark hinted at. I'm not at all sure what Peirce's
> preferences would be in this matter.
>
> As I said Peirce (especially in his mature phase) lived during the rise of
> Bizmarkian progressivism. While that movement suffered from a lack of
> humility in terms of what one could control, it also faced a system with
> little interstate commerce and relatively low technology. The world we live
> in today is simply radically different in terms of how integrated it is.
> Peirce may well offer compelling abstract principles. However I’m far from
> convinced even if we knew his preferences it’d tell us much about how to
> act today. The world changed too much with the inflection point of WWII
> decades after Peirce’s death.
>
> I think keeping the tension between emergent and top down approaches is
> important. But far more important is being open to data and testing our
> solutions. Neither of which is terribly common among politics or activists
> in particular. There’s lots of confirmation bias and outright dismissal of
> uncomfortable facts by all sides. That much more than privileging causal
> directions seems the problem. Or, to put it in Peirce’s terms, we tend to
> block off inquiry especially when it tends to confirm a preference of the
> political outgroup.
>
> This keeping open inquiry seems to be the greatest value Peirce offers
> politics and not a popular one (despite a lot of lip service).
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

> On Nov 28, 2016, at 2:57 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> I prefer to find a value in the 'tension' between bottom-up and top-down 
> solutions which Clark hinted at. I'm not at all sure what Peirce's 
> preferences would be in this matter.

As I said Peirce (especially in his mature phase) lived during the rise of 
Bizmarkian progressivism. While that movement suffered from a lack of humility 
in terms of what one could control, it also faced a system with little 
interstate commerce and relatively low technology. The world we live in today 
is simply radically different in terms of how integrated it is. Peirce may well 
offer compelling abstract principles. However I’m far from convinced even if we 
knew his preferences it’d tell us much about how to act today. The world 
changed too much with the inflection point of WWII decades after Peirce’s death.

I think keeping the tension between emergent and top down approaches is 
important. But far more important is being open to data and testing our 
solutions. Neither of which is terribly common among politics or activists in 
particular. There’s lots of confirmation bias and outright dismissal of 
uncomfortable facts by all sides. That much more than privileging causal 
directions seems the problem. Or, to put it in Peirce’s terms, we tend to block 
off inquiry especially when it tends to confirm a preference of the political 
outgroup. 

This keeping open inquiry seems to be the greatest value Peirce offers politics 
and not a popular one (despite a lot of lip service).
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-28 Thread Gary Richmond

Jon, Clark, List,

For now just a quick response to a couple points Jon made. He wrote:

Part of the challenge is that we all tend to spend most of our time in echo
chambers where our own views are just obvious to everyone, and we cannot
imagine how or why someone would see things differently.  I am talking
about myself as much as anyone else.  Persuasion is becoming a lost art,
mostly because we are too busy talking (or yelling) to listen and consider
carefully what "the other side" has to say.

I agree "that we all tend to spend most of our time in echo chambers," and
I will, of course, include myself as inhabiting such a communication
bubble. While I try to expose myself to views different from my own--that
is, I occasionally make a special effort to do so--I don't do this very
often, and I tend toward an immediate critique of such opposing views
which, in effect, cancels them out.

Perhaps if we could get out of our "echo chambers" we'd find that we *could*
reach consensus on what consitutes 'wicked problems'--I believe that there
*may* truly be some--and even how we might approach solutions to them. But,
especially social media makes this consensus building seem less and less
likely.

To clarify--in the context of an off-List discussion, I was talking about
how the courts short-circuited the democratic process on those two
matters.  I think that it is much more legitimate within our form of
government for major social changes like these to come about by persuasion
of the majority to revise laws, rather than judicial imposition of
"constitutional rights" that have no clear basis in the actual text.

Yes, thanks for the clarification. I knew you were speaking of the courts
 and should have chosen a better example.

As for what constitutes certain "constitutional rights" having no clear
basis in the actual text of the Constitution, I think that that is a matter
of interpretation which I, personally, do not feel qualified to make.

In other words, I favor bottom-up solutions over top-down ones.  I suspect
(but cannot prove) that Peirce would have, as well.

I prefer to find a value in the 'tension' between bottom-up and top-down
solutions which Clark hinted at. I'm not at all sure what Peirce's
preferences would be in this matter.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, Nov 28, 2016 at 4:09 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> GR:  When, as in the USA, the federal government is unable, for example,
> over a long period of time to enact laws which clearly address what is
> rapidly coming to be seen by many of all political persuasions as a
> critical need for investment in the upgrading of the country's antiquated
> infrastructure (e.g. bridges, electrical grids, water supply systems,
> public transportation systems, etc.), many of which are interstate issues
> and so simply *can't* be addressed by states alone), this presents a
> threat to the welfare of the citizenry generally.
>
>
> As an engineer, I am very much a proponent of the notion that
> infrastructure investment is essential to overall economic well-being.  The
> problem is figuring out how to pay for such needed improvements, given that
> the federal government has already been spending more than it receives by a
> very large margin over a very long period of time.  I also think that there
> is a legitimate question about how much of this should be handled at the
> national level vs. the state and local level.  There really are no obvious
> or easy answers to any of these issues, hence the polarization and
> paralysis.  Doing nothing is the least costly solution in the short term;
> i.e., between now and the next election.  We claim to want courageous
> leadership, but then punish those who dare to tell us the truth and ask us
> to make sacrifices accordingly.
>
> GR:  But Peirce wrote this in the 19th century, while in the 21st we have
> "wicked problems" in this country and in the world which (like, say, the
> displacement of workers by internet technolgies and robotics, etc.--but
> there are several) need *urgent* attention.
>
>
> There is *not* widespread consensus about which problems are truly
> "wicked" and "need urgent attention," nor that government-imposed solutions
> are appropriate and effective.  Part of the challenge is that we all tend
> to spend most of our time in echo chambers where our own views are just
> obvious to everyone, and we cannot imagine how or why someone would see
> things differently.  I am talking about myself as much as anyone else.
> Persuasion is becoming a lost art, mostly because we are too busy talking
> (or yelling) to listen and consider carefully what "the other side" has to
> say.
>
> GR:  On the other hand, it is surely possible for the federal government
> to move too quickly, as Jon

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-28 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Gary R., List:

GR:  When, as in the USA, the federal government is unable, for example,
over a long period of time to enact laws which clearly address what is
rapidly coming to be seen by many of all political persuasions as a
critical need for investment in the upgrading of the country's antiquated
infrastructure (e.g. bridges, electrical grids, water supply systems,
public transportation systems, etc.), many of which are interstate issues
and so simply *can't* be addressed by states alone), this presents a threat
to the welfare of the citizenry generally.

As an engineer, I am very much a proponent of the notion that
infrastructure investment is essential to overall economic well-being.  The
problem is figuring out how to pay for such needed improvements, given that
the federal government has already been spending more than it receives by a
very large margin over a very long period of time.  I also think that there
is a legitimate question about how much of this should be handled at the
national level vs. the state and local level.  There really are no obvious
or easy answers to any of these issues, hence the polarization and
paralysis.  Doing nothing is the least costly solution in the short term;
i.e., between now and the next election.  We claim to want courageous
leadership, but then punish those who dare to tell us the truth and ask us
to make sacrifices accordingly.

GR:  But Peirce wrote this in the 19th century, while in the 21st we have
"wicked problems" in this country and in the world which (like, say, the
displacement of workers by internet technolgies and robotics, etc.--but
there are several) need *urgent* attention.

There is *not* widespread consensus about which problems are truly "wicked"
and "need urgent attention," nor that government-imposed solutions are
appropriate and effective.  Part of the challenge is that we all tend to
spend most of our time in echo chambers where our own views are just
obvious to everyone, and we cannot imagine how or why someone would see
things differently.  I am talking about myself as much as anyone else.
Persuasion is becoming a lost art, mostly because we are too busy talking
(or yelling) to listen and consider carefully what "the other side" has to
say.

GR:  On the other hand, it is surely possible for the federal government to
move too quickly, as Jon (off-list) has suggested that we may have as
regards abortion and gay rights ...

To clarify--in the context of an off-List discussion, I was talking about
how the courts short-circuited the democratic process on those two matters.
 I think that it is much more legitimate within our form of government for
major social changes like these to come about by persuasion of the majority
to revise laws, rather than judicial imposition of "constitutional rights"
that have no clear basis in the actual text.  In other words, I favor
bottom-up solutions over top-down ones.  I suspect (but cannot prove) that
Peirce would have, as well.

Regards,

Jon

On Mon, Nov 28, 2016 at 2:29 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Clark, Jon S, List,
>
> Clark wrote:
>
>
> It would seem that Peirce would be concerned about too strong a central
> government in that he wants to maximize inquiry and thus possible solutions
> to a problem rather than a single line of inquiry. This would mean a trust
> in federalism of a sort. A federalism where each state and ideally each
> county/city within that state would be free to try solutions to problems.
> Only after seeing success in other locals would solutions be adopted more
> widely and then via each state/county.
>
> The problem otherwise, from a Peircean perspective, would be the danger of
> too quickly abandoning common sense (the tried experiential solutions of a
> community) as well as imposing a single hypothesis on society with no way
> to really test it well. That is there would be a large danger of abduction
> not being sufficiently tested in terms of it being the best of possible
> solutions.
>
> I’m not sure if anyone else would agree here.
>
>
> My first impression is that you may be on to something here, Clark, that
> Peirce's understanding would tend toward a kind of federalism as needed to
> ensure that no single hypothesis be adopted too quickly for the country as
> a whole. While it is probably not the best example, I immediately thought
> of the fairly recent remarks by Governor Hickenlooper of Colorado
> concerning his state's two year experiment in legalizing cannabis and what
> the data (etc.) surrounding the results of that experiment might mean for
> other states considering legalization. He said, in effect, that he thought
> it important to move slowly in such matters, suggesting that other states
> wait at least a "couple of years" more allow his (and several other) states
> to further amass data. Indeed, one NYU researcher studying the Colorado
> data as it comes in suggested that maybe a decade wouldn't be too long.
>
> “There are no

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

> On Nov 28, 2016, at 1:29 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> My first impression is that you may be on to something here, Clark, that 
> Peirce's understanding would tend toward a kind of federalism as needed to 
> ensure that no single hypothesis be adopted too quickly for the country as a 
> whole. 

Again I’m largely ignorant on Peirce’s direct views on politics - I assume he’d 
be a product of his times as much as a product of his underlying philosophy. 
However while I am embarrassed to confess I’m poorly read on the writings of 
the American founders, I believe that this type of extreme federalism was 
pushed by Madison. If I recall he wanted types of federalism down to the 
country, not merely state level. (Don’t quote me on that — I have never read 
the Federalists Papers)

> While it is probably not the best example, I immediately thought of the 
> fairly recent remarks by Governor Hickenlooper of Colorado concerning his 
> state's two year experiment in legalizing cannabis and what the data (etc.) 
> surrounding the results of that experiment might mean for other states 
> considering legalization. 

There are lots of examples through history of state level experiments picked up 
by other states and even the federal government. One could also point to 
Obamacare’s reliance on Romney’s health care program in Massachusetts for 
instance.

>  When, as in the USA, the federal government is unable, for example, over a 
> long period of time to enact laws which clearly address what is rapidly 
> coming to be seen by many of all political persuasions as a critical need for 
> investment in the upgrading of the country's antiquated infrastructure (e.g. 
> bridges, electrical grids, water supply systems, public transportation 
> systems, etc.), many of which are interstate issues and so simply can't be 
> addressed by states alone), this presents a threat to the welfare of the 
> citizenry generally.

Infrastructure is tricky for a variety of reasons. I’m almost loath to chime in 
there. I’m not sure most of the decaying infrastructure is on federal roads. 
Thus it’s far from clear to me that states couldn’t improve infrastructure. By 
and large it’s that they don’t want to spend the money to do so for a variety 
of reasons. This isn’t to ignore that federal roads also need upkeep. Regarding 
electrical grids it seems to me that part of the problem there are actually 
states imposing stronger environmental regulations that limit development. This 
was a big problem increasing the electrical grid in California for instance 
despite the need. 

I’d add though that infrastructure costs in the United States are substantially 
higher in cost than in Europe. By and large this is seen as due to there being 
too many veto points along with too many layers of regulation from federal, 
state and locality all of which cost money. The ability to come to a compromise 
at the legislative/executive level as is often done in other countries isn’t an 
option in the US. How much that has to do with federalism isn’t clear to me. It 
seems instead due to the way legislation was drafted. In theory there’s no 
reason simpler regulations that still protect the environment couldn’t be 
written. There’s just no political will for that - although one might argue 
that it would be easier to do that at a state level than federal level. 
Although the counter argument would be that states would simply deregulate and 
not worry about the environment. (Say California versus Texas) 

I’m not sure Peirce has much to say in all this since his focus is on truth and 
what works rather than these balances of powers. While it’s possible to read 
Peirce in terms of power (arguably that’s exactly what Derrida does) it seems 
relatively uncommon. (Usually for better or worse Foucault is the focus there)

While I’m perhaps unduly pessimistic on the unnecessary expense and delays our 
particular regulatory scheme give us, there’s an argument for this from 
Peirce’s own common sensism and Burkeanism. That is the secular slowness you 
mention later in your post. Like you I worry that this is becoming a bigger and 
bigger problem even though I am overall very sympathetic to federalism. There 
are types of reform our system, as opposed to say a Parliamentary majority in 
Canada, are poorly suited to solve.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

> On Nov 28, 2016, at 12:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> That strikes me as a sensible application of Peirce's self-proclaimed 
> "sentimental conservatism" (CP 1.661).  If "philosophical science" should be 
> allowed to "influence religion and morality ... only with secular slowness 
> and the most conservative caution" (CP 1.620), then it seems like the same is 
> true of proposed political solutions to perceived societal problems.  Perhaps 
> with a similar thought in mind, the Founders quite intentionally designed an 
> arrangement in which it is very difficult to enact sweeping changes at the 
> national level in the absence of broad consensus.  When public opinion is 
> polarized like it is right now, gridlock in Washington is a feature of the 
> system, not a bug--despite the complaints that it routinely engenders from 
> both sides of the aisle.

I agree, although as I mentioned to Gary, I think there are big problems with 
this as well. (I think the intelligence reforms after 911 are a great example 
of a type of reform our system is poorly suited to make)

Our system is definitely designed to force consensus building. One might well 
argue that the contemporary problem in American politics isn’t the system but 
the strategy of preaching to ones own group rather than trying to persuade 
people outside of ones group. That is identity politics battles are the exact 
opposite of the Peircean strategy which is inquiry which in turn presupposes 
persuasion. If so, the the polarization in our politics actually reflects the 
breakdown of the Peircean scheme.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-28 Thread Gary Richmond

Clark, Jon S, List,

Clark wrote:


It would seem that Peirce would be concerned about too strong a central
government in that he wants to maximize inquiry and thus possible solutions
to a problem rather than a single line of inquiry. This would mean a trust
in federalism of a sort. A federalism where each state and ideally each
county/city within that state would be free to try solutions to problems.
Only after seeing success in other locals would solutions be adopted more
widely and then via each state/county.

The problem otherwise, from a Peircean perspective, would be the danger of
too quickly abandoning common sense (the tried experiential solutions of a
community) as well as imposing a single hypothesis on society with no way
to really test it well. That is there would be a large danger of abduction
not being sufficiently tested in terms of it being the best of possible
solutions.

I’m not sure if anyone else would agree here.


My first impression is that you may be on to something here, Clark, that
Peirce's understanding would tend toward a kind of federalism as needed to
ensure that no single hypothesis be adopted too quickly for the country as
a whole. While it is probably not the best example, I immediately thought
of the fairly recent remarks by Governor Hickenlooper of Colorado
concerning his state's two year experiment in legalizing cannabis and what
the data (etc.) surrounding the results of that experiment might mean for
other states considering legalization. He said, in effect, that he thought
it important to move slowly in such matters, suggesting that other states
wait at least a "couple of years" more allow his (and several other) states
to further amass data. Indeed, one NYU researcher studying the Colorado
data as it comes in suggested that maybe a decade wouldn't be too long.

“There are no conclusions available about how it’s going,” said Mark A.R.
Kleiman , a New
York University professor who is one of the nation’s foremost experts on
marijuana legalization and its consequences. “None of the bad things that
are likely to happen if this thing goes badly would have happened yet.”
(from an article in the Denver Post, Oct., 2016).

Clark continued:


There are of course strong arguments against federalism in preference to a
stronger central government. That is the problem of getting solutions
implemented when there are countering movements in individual states where
particular powers are able to unduly control government. (This was of
course the argument of the classic progressives of the Teddy Roosevelt era)



There are indeed "strong arguments against federalism in preference to a
stronger central government." When, as in the USA, the federal government
is unable, for example, over a long period of time to enact laws which
clearly address what is rapidly coming to be seen by many of all political
persuasions as a critical need for investment in the upgrading of the
country's antiquated infrastructure (e.g. bridges, electrical grids, water
supply systems, public transportation systems, etc.), many of which are
interstate issues and so simply *can't* be addressed by states alone), this
presents a threat to the welfare of the citizenry generally. That some
conservatives--as in the USA and England, for example--can make of the
several important, nay, *essential* tasks of central government something
of a 'dirty word' is not, as I see it, in the country's interest. We *all*,
for example, need potable water.

Jon S. wrote:

That strikes me as a sensible application of Peirce's self-proclaimed
"sentimental conservatism" (CP 1.661).  If "philosophical science" should
be allowed to "influence religion and morality ... only with secular
slowness and the most conservative caution" (CP 1.620), then it seems like
the same is true of proposed political solutions to perceived societal
problems.


Yes, "secular slowness." But Peirce wrote this in the 19th century, while
in the 21st we have "wicked problems" in this country and in the world
which (like, say, the displacement of workers by internet technolgies and
robotics, etc.--but there are several) need *urgent* attention. The
solution to these will not, as I see it, be a kind of universal Toryism.
Jon continued:

Perhaps with a similar thought in mind, the Founders quite intentionally
designed an arrangement in which it is very difficult to enact sweeping
changes at the national level in the absence of broad consensus.  When
public opinion is polarized like it is right now, gridlock in Washington is
a *feature *of the system, not a *bug*--despite the complaints that it
routinely engenders from both sides of the aisle.


I cannot necessarily agree with Jon that the gridlock we see in
Washington--which has gone on for much too long in my opinion, for example,
in consideration of the above mentioned national infrastructure (but there
are several other essential matters affected by this

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-28 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Clark, List:

That strikes me as a sensible application of Peirce's self-proclaimed
"sentimental conservatism" (CP 1.661).  If "philosophical science" should
be allowed to "influence religion and morality ... only with secular
slowness and the most conservative caution" (CP 1.620), then it seems like
the same is true of proposed political solutions to perceived societal
problems.  Perhaps with a similar thought in mind, the Founders quite
intentionally designed an arrangement in which it is very difficult to
enact sweeping changes at the national level in the absence of broad
consensus.  When public opinion is polarized like it is right now, gridlock
in Washington is a *feature *of the system, not a *bug*--despite the
complaints that it routinely engenders from both sides of the aisle.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Nov 28, 2016 at 12:40 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:
>
> On Nov 26, 2016, at 2:39 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
> Meanwhile, my own sense is that one possible strength of Peirce's theory
> lies in his philosophical* summum bonum*, namely, the notion of our
> seeking the 'reasonable in itself'. It follows that--and here one perhaps
> necessarily goes beyond a consideration of democracy--when this *summum
> bonum* is offered in consideration, now not of mere science, but of what
> have been called the 'wicked problems' confronting humanity and the world,
> that one might hope for approaches (if not exactly solutions) which appear
> reasonable for those communities of interest hoping to address them.
>
> As I’ve thought more about the comments over the weekend I think I have
> come to an implication of Peirce’s thought. This isn’t necessarily
> something Peirce himself considered too much.
>
> It would seem that Peirce would be concerned about too strong a central
> government in that he wants to maximize inquiry and thus possible solutions
> to a problem rather than a single line of inquiry. This would mean a trust
> in federalism of a sort. A federalism where each state and ideally each
> county/city within that state would be free to try solutions to problems.
> Only after seeing success in other locals would solutions be adopted more
> widely and then via each state/county.
>
> The problem otherwise, from a Peircean perspective, would be the danger of
> too quickly abandoning common sense (the tried experiential solutions of a
> community) as well as imposing a single hypothesis on society with no way
> to really test it well. That is there would be a large danger of abduction
> not being sufficiently tested in terms of it being the best of possible
> solutions.
>
> I’m not sure if anyone else would agree here.
>
> There are of course strong arguments against federalism in preference to a
> stronger central government. That is the problem of getting solutions
> implemented when there are countering movements in individual states where
> particular powers are able to unduly control government. (This was of
> course the argument of the classic progressives of the Teddy Roosevelt era)
>  That is there will intrinsically be a tension between discovering
> solutions for a problem and whether the majority or at least powerful want
> to solve that problem. For an example of this think of the relative
> difference in state policies in a state like Mississippi versus what we
> might call a more successful state.
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

> On Nov 26, 2016, at 2:39 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> Meanwhile, my own sense is that one possible strength of Peirce's theory lies 
> in his philosophical summum bonum, namely, the notion of our seeking the 
> 'reasonable in itself'. It follows that--and here one perhaps necessarily 
> goes beyond a consideration of democracy--when this summum bonum is offered 
> in consideration, now not of mere science, but of what have been called the 
> 'wicked problems' confronting humanity and the world, that one might hope for 
> approaches (if not exactly solutions) which appear reasonable for those 
> communities of interest hoping to address them. 

As I’ve thought more about the comments over the weekend I think I have come to 
an implication of Peirce’s thought. This isn’t necessarily something Peirce 
himself considered too much.

It would seem that Peirce would be concerned about too strong a central 
government in that he wants to maximize inquiry and thus possible solutions to 
a problem rather than a single line of inquiry. This would mean a trust in 
federalism of a sort. A federalism where each state and ideally each 
county/city within that state would be free to try solutions to problems. Only 
after seeing success in other locals would solutions be adopted more widely and 
then via each state/county. 

The problem otherwise, from a Peircean perspective, would be the danger of too 
quickly abandoning common sense (the tried experiential solutions of a 
community) as well as imposing a single hypothesis on society with no way to 
really test it well. That is there would be a large danger of abduction not 
being sufficiently tested in terms of it being the best of possible solutions.

I’m not sure if anyone else would agree here.

There are of course strong arguments against federalism in preference to a 
stronger central government. That is the problem of getting solutions 
implemented when there are countering movements in individual states where 
particular powers are able to unduly control government. (This was of course 
the argument of the classic progressives of the Teddy Roosevelt era)  That is 
there will intrinsically be a tension between discovering solutions for a 
problem and whether the majority or at least powerful want to solve that 
problem. For an example of this think of the relative difference in state 
policies in a state like Mississippi versus what we might call a more 
successful state.

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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-27 Thread Helmut Raulien

Clark, list,

So this Burkeanism is a quite flexible way of conservativism! I like it, it reminds me of a neuron, if "burden" is replaced with "potential". Or of a Schmitt-trigger (electronic digital switch which fires only at a certain input potential). It even redefines the meaning of "tradition" from something dark, dull, and likely wicked from the past to something to-be-reflected by testing its viability in the present. If only all conservatives would become Burkeanists, then there would be no need anymore for radical renewists, or what do you call the opposite of conservatives.

Best,

Helmut

26. November 2016 um 21:22 Uhr
"Clark Goble" wrote:

On Nov 25, 2016, at 12:17 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

So, if Peirce wrote things about democracy, was opposed to female suffrage, and thought that a community should be ruled by an authoritative government, then I think that this is not relevant. He was out on a limb then, I presumptuously guess.

One should note that the Burkean style of conservative was opposed to suffrage. It then quickly embraced it once it became clear (especially in the UK) that women actually shared their views on most matters. While again I’m not sure of Peirce’s views here, his critical common sensism clearly shows some influence from the broad contours of Burkeanism and its concern for tradition.

A way of viewing this is that this style of conservatism requires a burden of proof to be met for significant change. (I’d say radical, but that’s perhaps too strong given the tendency to fear radical change and fight against it) In a certain way the level of democratic consensus necessary for these changes is a way of meeting that burden. Thus the small c conservatives would oppose change precisely in order in a community level for this burden to be met. Once met and it didn’t show significant practical problems then these types of Burkeans would consider it part of their tradition and become strong defenders. This method seems very alien and confusing but is a significant part of conservatism in both the American and British traditions. As I said I strongly suspect that’s where Peirce is.
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-26 Thread Jerry Rhee

Gary, list:



I don’t know the context but on its own, I disagree with what you quote,

“There is no "answer" or "solution."



because



“*The only moral evil is not to have an ultimate aim*.”

~Peirce, *EP2:202*



That is, there is a break in common sense whereas commonsense is whole.



Best,
Jerry R

On Sat, Nov 26, 2016 at 3:39 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> List,
>
> Because of the Thanksgiving holiday, like Clark I too am a bit behind in
> my reading and reflecting on the posts in this thread (I've managed to read
> each one through but once). I hope to do much more reflecting by early next
> week.
>
> Meanwhile, my own sense is that one possible strength of Peirce's theory
> lies in his philosophical* summum bonum*, namely, the notion of our
> seeking the 'reasonable in itself'. It follows that--and here one perhaps
> necessarily goes beyond a consideration of democracy--when this *summum
> bonum* is offered in consideration, now not of mere science, but of what
> have been called the 'wicked problems' confronting humanity and the world,
> that one might hope for approaches (if not exactly solutions) which appear
> reasonable for those communities of interest hoping to address them.
> Regarding those 'wicked problems' (you probably have your own short list,
> while mine, I must admit, is quite long),  Douglas Schuler today wrote:
>
> There is no "answer" or "solution." I think the approach that we must take
> (with no guarantees of success) is straightforward: we must build the
> necessary intellectual-emotional-normative-social-organizational
> infrastructure that *could* enable us to move forward. The name I use for
> that is "civic intelligence."
>
>
> Here's an online slideshow outlining Schuler's idea of 'civic intelligenc'.
> http://www.slideshare.net/dougschuler/improving-civic-intell
> igence-repairing-the-engine-on-a-moving-car
>
> It seems to me that 'civic intelligence' is in some ways anticipated by
> Peirce and, possibly, facilitated by certain ideas in his philosophy. I'll
> leave it at that for now, but hope to connect Peirce's philosophy to
> Schuler's approach (as well as that of my colleague, Aldo de Moor's
> 'community sense') next week. O
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
>
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>
> On Sat, Nov 26, 2016 at 3:22 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:
>
>>
>> On Nov 25, 2016, at 12:17 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>>
>> So, if Peirce wrote things about democracy, was opposed to female
>> suffrage, and thought that a community should be ruled by an authoritative
>> government, then I think that this is not relevant. He was out on a limb
>> then, I presumptuously guess.
>>
>>
>> One should note that the Burkean style of conservative was opposed to
>> suffrage. It then quickly embraced it once it became clear (especially in
>> the UK) that women actually shared their views on most matters. While again
>> I’m not sure of Peirce’s views here, his critical common sensism clearly
>> shows some influence from the broad contours of Burkeanism and its concern
>> for tradition.
>>
>> A way of viewing this is that this style of conservatism requires a
>> burden of proof to be met for significant change. (I’d say radical, but
>> that’s perhaps too strong given the tendency to fear radical change and
>> fight against it) In a certain way the level of democratic consensus
>> necessary for these changes is a way of meeting that burden. Thus the small
>> c conservatives would oppose change precisely in order in a community level
>> for this burden to be met. Once met and it didn’t show significant
>> practical problems then these types of Burkeans would consider it part of
>> their tradition and become strong defenders. This method seems very alien
>> and confusing but is a significant part of conservatism in both the
>> American and British traditions. As I said I strongly suspect that’s where
>> Peirce is.
>>
>>
>> -
>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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>> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
>> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce
>> -l/peirce-l.htm .
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
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>
>
>
>
>
>

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PEIRCE-L

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-26 Thread Gary Richmond

List,

Because of the Thanksgiving holiday, like Clark I too am a bit behind in my
reading and reflecting on the posts in this thread (I've managed to read
each one through but once). I hope to do much more reflecting by early next
week.

Meanwhile, my own sense is that one possible strength of Peirce's theory
lies in his philosophical* summum bonum*, namely, the notion of our seeking
the 'reasonable in itself'. It follows that--and here one perhaps
necessarily goes beyond a consideration of democracy--when this *summum
bonum* is offered in consideration, now not of mere science, but of what
have been called the 'wicked problems' confronting humanity and the world,
that one might hope for approaches (if not exactly solutions) which appear
reasonable for those communities of interest hoping to address them.
Regarding those 'wicked problems' (you probably have your own short list,
while mine, I must admit, is quite long),  Douglas Schuler today wrote:

There is no "answer" or "solution." I think the approach that we must take
(with no guarantees of success) is straightforward: we must build the
necessary intellectual-emotional-normative-social-organizational
infrastructure that *could* enable us to move forward. The name I use for
that is "civic intelligence."

Here's an online slideshow outlining Schuler's idea of 'civic intelligenc'.
http://www.slideshare.net/dougschuler/improving-civic-
intelligence-repairing-the-engine-on-a-moving-car

It seems to me that 'civic intelligence' is in some ways anticipated by
Peirce and, possibly, facilitated by certain ideas in his philosophy. I'll
leave it at that for now, but hope to connect Peirce's philosophy to
Schuler's approach (as well as that of my colleague, Aldo de Moor's
'community sense') next week. O

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*

On Sat, Nov 26, 2016 at 3:22 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

>
> On Nov 25, 2016, at 12:17 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>
> So, if Peirce wrote things about democracy, was opposed to female
> suffrage, and thought that a community should be ruled by an authoritative
> government, then I think that this is not relevant. He was out on a limb
> then, I presumptuously guess.
>
>
> One should note that the Burkean style of conservative was opposed to
> suffrage. It then quickly embraced it once it became clear (especially in
> the UK) that women actually shared their views on most matters. While again
> I’m not sure of Peirce’s views here, his critical common sensism clearly
> shows some influence from the broad contours of Burkeanism and its concern
> for tradition.
>
> A way of viewing this is that this style of conservatism requires a burden
> of proof to be met for significant change. (I’d say radical, but that’s
> perhaps too strong given the tendency to fear radical change and fight
> against it) In a certain way the level of democratic consensus necessary
> for these changes is a way of meeting that burden. Thus the small c
> conservatives would oppose change precisely in order in a community level
> for this burden to be met. Once met and it didn’t show significant
> practical problems then these types of Burkeans would consider it part of
> their tradition and become strong defenders. This method seems very alien
> and confusing but is a significant part of conservatism in both the
> American and British traditions. As I said I strongly suspect that’s where
> Peirce is.
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-26 Thread Clark Goble

> On Nov 25, 2016, at 12:17 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
> So, if Peirce wrote things about democracy, was opposed to female suffrage, 
> and thought that a community should be ruled by an authoritative government, 
> then I think that this is not relevant. He was out on a limb then, I 
> presumptuously guess.

One should note that the Burkean style of conservative was opposed to suffrage. 
It then quickly embraced it once it became clear (especially in the UK) that 
women actually shared their views on most matters. While again I’m not sure of 
Peirce’s views here, his critical common sensism clearly shows some influence 
from the broad contours of Burkeanism and its concern for tradition. 

A way of viewing this is that this style of conservatism requires a burden of 
proof to be met for significant change. (I’d say radical, but that’s perhaps 
too strong given the tendency to fear radical change and fight against it) In a 
certain way the level of democratic consensus necessary for these changes is a 
way of meeting that burden. Thus the small c conservatives would oppose change 
precisely in order in a community level for this burden to be met. Once met and 
it didn’t show significant practical problems then these types of Burkeans 
would consider it part of their tradition and become strong defenders. This 
method seems very alien and confusing but is a significant part of conservatism 
in both the American and British traditions. As I said I strongly suspect 
that’s where Peirce is.
-
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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-25 Thread Helmut Raulien

Gary, list,

I think, democracy is a matter of systems theory. But Peirce, I think, did not go into systems theories, as he built a theory of signs in a universal phaneron, which works without having to look at interpreting systems such as individuals, social systems, countries or nations. That does not mean that his theory is wrong. It just does not include the systems thing. So, if Peirce wrote things about democracy, was opposed to female suffrage, and thought that a community should be ruled by an authoritative government, then I think that this is not relevant. He was out on a limb then, I presumptuously guess.

Best,

Helmut

24. November 2016 um 00:55 Uhr
"Gary Richmond" wrote:

Clark, Stefan, Stephen, List,

Clark quoted me quoting Stefan,a snippet of which I emphasized in my last post: "The context for Peirce thinking about democracy and political economy are obviously his religious ideas. Central concepts in this context are love and greed/ altruism and egoism." Stefan thought we might consider looking at Aristotle's views of democracy in approaching Peirce's. I expressed some considerable reservations about that approach.

Clark wrote:

I think that in a general sense that is "the more interesting question," and if it could br addressed in light of Peirce's views, well that would be very interesting indeed. But principally I'm hoping to get at the specific sense in which Peirce viewed democracy and related concepts, then possibly comparing/contrasting his views with Dewey's, Talisse's, Hook's, etc., and, especially, contemporary views. I think that the group of quotations which Stefan offered might be a good place to look for at least hints of how Peirce viewed democracy, political economy, republicanism, etc. It also may prove to be 'slim pickin's'.

Talisse's work, with which I introduced this topic, might also provide an entree to Peirce's view. Stephen offered an excerpt from that book, A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy, from which the following snippet is excerpted; this too might suggest a driection for our inquiry:

RT: the Peircean can offer epistemological reasons to support more
aggressive policies of distributive justice, or fundamental reforms of the
news media which need not appeal to “growth,” but only to the prerequisites
of proper epistemic activity. For unlike “growth,” the ideal of promoting
epistemic responsibility amongst a population of democratic citizens is

not reasonably rejectable.

Yet
the question remains: do Talisse's views as expressed in his book truly reflect Peirce'

But, first, what are Peirce's views of political economy and democracy.

Best,

Gary R

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

C 745

718 482-5690

On Wed, Nov 23, 2016 at 5:53 PM, Clark Goble wrote:

On Nov 23, 2016, at 3:29 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:

The context for Peirce thinking about democracy and political economy are obviously his religious ideas. Central concepts in this context are love and greed/ altruism and egoism. This brings immediatly Aristoteles classification of forms of government to my mind (Pol. III, 6 f.).

I’d imagine the interesting question regarding democracy is how it relates to societal inquiry. That is the more interesting question is less the boundaries of democracy as compared to competing institutions than the different types of governments within democracy. An obvious example is top down type governance verses bottom up or emergent government. The former tends to be what progressivism embraces (either the early 20th century Bismarkian inspired form or the more contemporary form) whereas in theory conservatism embraces the later. This also gets at the issue of federalism (which given Trump some liberals are starting to embrace).

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-24 Thread Jerry Rhee

Dear Stefan, list:



To illustrate better what I mean, consider the following:



The surprising fact, opponent of female suffrage *C*, is observed.

But if the woman-drama *A* were true, then C would be a matter of course.

Hence, *there is reason to suspect* that A is true.



“Opponent of female suffrage” is surprising because Lady Welby.



As to whether Peirce wanted to bring attention to the woman-drama,
that *wrinkled
old women exercising naked in public* *are as* *unfunny as philosophers
ruling*, consider his views on Plato.



As to the method of authority, Peirce also said:



*My book will have no instruction to impart to anybody.  Like a
mathematical treatise, it will suggest certain ideas and certain reasons
for holding them true; but then, if you accept them, it must be because you
like my reasons, and the responsibility lies with you.  Man is essentially
a social animal: but to be social is one thing, to be gregarious is
another:  I decline to serve as bellwether.  *



Hth,

Jerry R

On Thu, Nov 24, 2016 at 1:14 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Stefan, Ben, list:
>
>
>
> You say
>
> *there stands the word ‘democracy’ *
>
> *and uses of the word ‘hypotheses’ *
>
> *and that it is ‘just an example’*.
>
>
>
> But hypotheses, examples and words are powerful and reflect much of the
> way we situate ourselves in Thought.
>
>
>
> For example, (not sure whether this example will resonate),
>
>
>
> There are ‘presidents’:  Abraham Lincoln and Thomas Jefferson
>
> And there are ‘presidents’:  Donald Trump and Barack Obama
>
>
>
> To say that I believe Lincoln is an ideal example is different from saying
> I believe Trump is an ideal example.  Moreover, I may not have believed
> Lincoln was an ideal example if I had lived in his time.  These examples
> say different things to different people and even across different epochs.
> Yet, Lincoln and Trump are each actual examples of one evolving democracy.
>
>
>
> As for Peirce’s views on democracy, there is what you and Ben just
> posted.  But there are also other things that contradict his stated views
> on female suffrage and the selected view on the method of authority.
>
> Peirce’s ultimate aim was to further the growth of concrete
> reasonableness, hasten the chariot wheels of redeeming love.
>
> And he knew well of man’s glassy essence.
>
>
>
> Here is an idea, an ultimate example that promotes democracy.
>
> Consider the analogy in light of the earlier quote on *hypotheseos*:
>
>
>
> Jesus answered, "I am the way and the truth and the life. No one comes to
> the Father except through me. *If you really know me, you will know my
> Father* as well. From now on, you do know him and have seen him.”
>
> ~John 14:6-7
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Jerry Rhee
>
> one two three…
>
> On Thu, Nov 24, 2016 at 12:32 PM, sb  wrote:
>
>> Ben, List
>>
>> wow, that is interesting! Thanks!
>>
>> Also these quotes from the fixation of belief fit into the picture:
>>
>> "The method of authority will always govern the mass of mankind; and
>> those who wield the various forms of organized force in the state will
>> never be convinced that dangerous reasoning ought not to be suppressed in
>> some way. If liberty of speech is to be untrammeled from the grosser forms
>> of constraint, then uniformity of opinion will be secured by a moral
>> terrorism to which the respectability of society will give its thorough
>> approval. Following the method of authority is the path of peace. "
>>
>> "For the mass of mankind, then, there is perhaps no better method
>> [authority] than this. If it is their highest impulse to be intellectual
>> slaves, then slaves they ought to remain."
>>
>> Best,
>> Stefan
>>
>>
>>
>> Am 24. November 2016 18:58:41 MEZ, schrieb Benjamin Udell <
>> baud...@gmail.com>:
>>>
>>> I've dug a few things up, some of it interesting, some of it also ugly.
>>> Peirce had more than one mood.
>>>
>>> Last pagragraph in Peirce's review in _The Nation_, Vol. 67, Aug. 25,
>>> 1898, 153-155, of _The Psychology of Suggestion_ by Boris Sidis with an
>>> introduction by William James.
>>> http://www.sidis.net/reviewsuggestion1.htm .
>>> Reprinted in _Contributions to 'The Nation'_ 2:166-9.
>>>
>>>   In part iii. the author gives a slight account of some at those mental
>>> epidemics of which several French writers, beginning with Moreau, have
>>> made admirable studies. That the mob self is a subconscious self is
>>> obvious. It is quite true, too, as Dr. Sidis says, that America is
>>> peculiarly subject to epidemic mental seizures, in fact, it may be said
>>> that democracy, as contrasted with autocracy—and especially government by
>>> public opinion and popular sentiment as expressed in newspapers—is
>>> government by the irrational element of man. To discover how this can be
>>> cured, as a practical, realized result, without the ends of government
>>> being narrowed to the good of an individual or class, is our great problem.
>>> Prof. James

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-24 Thread Jerry Rhee

Stefan, Ben, list:



You say

*there stands the word ‘democracy’ *

*and uses of the word ‘hypotheses’ *

*and that it is ‘just an example’*.



But hypotheses, examples and words are powerful and reflect much of the way
we situate ourselves in Thought.



For example, (not sure whether this example will resonate),



There are ‘presidents’:  Abraham Lincoln and Thomas Jefferson

And there are ‘presidents’:  Donald Trump and Barack Obama



To say that I believe Lincoln is an ideal example is different from saying
I believe Trump is an ideal example.  Moreover, I may not have believed
Lincoln was an ideal example if I had lived in his time.  These examples
say different things to different people and even across different epochs.
Yet, Lincoln and Trump are each actual examples of one evolving democracy.



As for Peirce’s views on democracy, there is what you and Ben just posted.
But there are also other things that contradict his stated views on female
suffrage and the selected view on the method of authority.

Peirce’s ultimate aim was to further the growth of concrete reasonableness,
hasten the chariot wheels of redeeming love.

And he knew well of man’s glassy essence.



Here is an idea, an ultimate example that promotes democracy.

Consider the analogy in light of the earlier quote on *hypotheseos*:



Jesus answered, "I am the way and the truth and the life. No one comes to
the Father except through me. *If you really know me, you will know my
Father* as well. From now on, you do know him and have seen him.”

~John 14:6-7



Best,

Jerry Rhee

one two three…

On Thu, Nov 24, 2016 at 12:32 PM, sb  wrote:

> Ben, List
>
> wow, that is interesting! Thanks!
>
> Also these quotes from the fixation of belief fit into the picture:
>
> "The method of authority will always govern the mass of mankind; and those
> who wield the various forms of organized force in the state will never be
> convinced that dangerous reasoning ought not to be suppressed in some way.
> If liberty of speech is to be untrammeled from the grosser forms of
> constraint, then uniformity of opinion will be secured by a moral terrorism
> to which the respectability of society will give its thorough approval.
> Following the method of authority is the path of peace. "
>
> "For the mass of mankind, then, there is perhaps no better method
> [authority] than this. If it is their highest impulse to be intellectual
> slaves, then slaves they ought to remain."
>
> Best,
> Stefan
>
>
>
> Am 24. November 2016 18:58:41 MEZ, schrieb Benjamin Udell <
> baud...@gmail.com>:
>>
>> I've dug a few things up, some of it interesting, some of it also ugly.
>> Peirce had more than one mood.
>>
>> Last pagragraph in Peirce's review in _The Nation_, Vol. 67, Aug. 25,
>> 1898, 153-155, of _The Psychology of Suggestion_ by Boris Sidis with an
>> introduction by William James.
>> http://www.sidis.net/reviewsuggestion1.htm .
>> Reprinted in _Contributions to 'The Nation'_ 2:166-9.
>>
>>   In part iii. the author gives a slight account of some at those mental
>> epidemics of which several French writers, beginning with Moreau, have
>> made admirable studies. That the mob self is a subconscious self is
>> obvious. It is quite true, too, as Dr. Sidis says, that America is
>> peculiarly subject to epidemic mental seizures, in fact, it may be said
>> that democracy, as contrasted with autocracy—and especially government by
>> public opinion and popular sentiment as expressed in newspapers—is
>> government by the irrational element of man. To discover how this can be
>> cured, as a practical, realized result, without the ends of government
>> being narrowed to the good of an individual or class, is our great problem.
>> Prof. James seems to think that this part is the best. We will defer to his
>> judgment, but certainly a great subject here remains virgin ground for a
>> writer of power.
>> [End quote]
>>
>> That should be read together with the quote - from the same year, 1898 -
>> that Clark found in CP 1.654 (in "Practical Concerns and the Wisdom of
>> Sentiment" in "Vitally Important Topics") http://www.textlog.de/4277.html
>> :
>>
>> Common sense, which is the resultant of the traditional experience of
>> mankind, witnesses unequivocally that the heart is more than the head, and
>> is in fact everything in our highest concerns, thus agreeing with my
>> unproved logical theorem; and those persons who think that sentiment has no
>> part in common sense forget that the dicta of common sense are objective
>> facts, not the way some dyspeptic may feel, but what the healthy, natural,
>> normal democracy thinks. And yet when you open the next new book on the
>> philosophy of religion that comes out, the chances are that it will be
>> written by an intellectualist who in his preface offers you his metaphysics
>> as a guide for the soul, talking as if philosophy were one of our deepest
>> concerns. How can the writer so deceive himself?
>>
>>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-24 Thread sb

Ben, List

wow, that is interesting! Thanks!

Also these quotes from the fixation of belief fit into the picture:

"The method of authority will always govern the mass of mankind; and those who 
wield the various forms of organized force in the state will never be convinced 
that dangerous reasoning ought not to be suppressed in some way. If liberty of 
speech is to be untrammeled from the grosser forms of constraint, then 
uniformity of opinion will be secured by a moral terrorism to which the 
respectability of society will give its thorough approval. Following the method 
of authority is the path of peace. "

"For the mass of mankind, then, there is perhaps no better method [authority] 
than this. If it is their highest impulse to be intellectual slaves, then 
slaves they ought to remain."

Best,
Stefan


Am 24. November 2016 18:58:41 MEZ, schrieb Benjamin Udell :
>I've dug a few things up, some of it interesting, some of it also ugly.
>
>Peirce had more than one mood.
>
>Last pagragraph in Peirce's review in _The Nation_, Vol. 67, Aug. 25, 
>1898, 153-155, of _The Psychology of Suggestion_ by Boris Sidis with an
>
>introduction by William James.
>http://www.sidis.net/reviewsuggestion1.htm .
>Reprinted in _Contributions to 'The Nation'_ 2:166-9.
>
>   In part iii. the author gives a slight account of some at those
>mental epidemics of which several French writers, beginning with
>Moreau, have made admirable studies. That the mob self is a
>subconscious self is obvious. It is quite true, too, as Dr. Sidis
>says, that America is peculiarly subject to epidemic mental
>   seizures, in fact, it may be said that democracy, as contrasted with
>autocracy—and especially government by public opinion and popular
>   sentiment as expressed in newspapers—is government by the irrational
>element of man. To discover how this can be cured, as a practical,
>realized result, without the ends of government being narrowed to
>the good of an individual or class, is our great problem. Prof.
>James seems to think that this part is the best. We will defer to
>his judgment, but certainly a great subject here remains virgin
>ground for a writer of power.
>[End quote]
>
>That should be read together with the quote - from the same year, 1898
>- 
>that Clark found in CP 1.654 (in "Practical Concerns and the Wisdom of 
>Sentiment" in "Vitally Important Topics")
>http://www.textlog.de/4277.html :
>
> Common sense, which is the resultant of the traditional
>experience of mankind, witnesses unequivocally that the heart is
>more than the head, and is in fact everything in our highest
>concerns, thus agreeing with my unproved logical theorem; and those
>persons who think that sentiment has no part in common sense forget
>   that the dicta of common sense are objective facts, not the way some
>dyspeptic may feel, but what the healthy, natural, normal democracy
>   thinks. And yet when you open the next new book on the philosophy of
>religion that comes out, the chances are that it will be written by
>an intellectualist who in his preface offers you his metaphysics as
>a guide for the soul, talking as if philosophy were one of our
>deepest concerns. How can the writer so deceive himself?
>
>_The Nation_ 85 (12 September 1907) 229: NOTES Peirce: _Contributions
>to 
>The Nation_ 3:290
>https://www.google.com/search?q=%22We+fear+that+Mr.+Stickney+is+too+optimistic%22
>
>   Albert Stickney's "Organized Democracy" (Houghton, Mifflin & Co.) is
>one of those radical pleas for political reconstruction which,
>however little likely to be adopted or even seriously considered,
>are not without usefulness as criticisms of existing political
>evils. Mr. Stickney is convinced not only that we have not true
>democracy in this country, but also that we cannot have true
>democracy so long as the present electoral and administrative
>systems prevail. Under popular election of all officials for fixed
>terms, joined to the party system, all that the voter can do is to
>vote for the candidate of this or that machine; his own personal
>choice, if he have one, he cannot possibly register. The remedy Mr.
>Stickney urges is the establishment, in local, State, and Federal
>Government, of a system of single-headed administration, with the
>heads of departments controlled directly by a Legislature the
>members of which are popularly chosen by viva voce vote. For tenure
>during short terms there would be substituted tenure during good
>behavior. Congress, for example, would become a body of one house
>with the power of removing the President, but without control over
>subordinate appointments. We fear that Mr. Stickney is too
>optimistic, and too little appreciative of the difficulty in this
>country of achieving reforms by wholesale; but his shrewd
>observations and

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-24 Thread Benjamin Udell

I've dug a few things up, some of it interesting, some of it also ugly.
Peirce had more than one mood.

Last pagragraph in Peirce's review in _The Nation_, Vol. 67, Aug. 25,
1898, 153-155, of _The Psychology of Suggestion_ by Boris Sidis with an
introduction by William James.

http://www.sidis.net/reviewsuggestion1.htm .
Reprinted in _Contributions to 'The Nation'_ 2:166-9.

In part iii. the author gives a slight account of some at those
mental epidemics of which several French writers, beginning with
Moreau, have made admirable studies. That the mob self is a
subconscious self is obvious. It is quite true, too, as Dr. Sidis
says, that America is peculiarly subject to epidemic mental
seizures, in fact, it may be said that democracy, as contrasted with
autocracy—and especially government by public opinion and popular
sentiment as expressed in newspapers—is government by the irrational
element of man. To discover how this can be cured, as a practical,
realized result, without the ends of government being narrowed to
the good of an individual or class, is our great problem. Prof.
James seems to think that this part is the best. We will defer to
his judgment, but certainly a great subject here remains virgin
ground for a writer of power.
[End quote]

That should be read together with the quote - from the same year, 1898 -
that Clark found in CP 1.654 (in "Practical Concerns and the Wisdom of
Sentiment" in "Vitally Important Topics") http://www.textlog.de/4277.html :

Common sense, which is the resultant of the traditional
experience of mankind, witnesses unequivocally that the heart is
more than the head, and is in fact everything in our highest
concerns, thus agreeing with my unproved logical theorem; and those
persons who think that sentiment has no part in common sense forget
that the dicta of common sense are objective facts, not the way some
dyspeptic may feel, but what the healthy, natural, normal democracy
thinks. And yet when you open the next new book on the philosophy of
religion that comes out, the chances are that it will be written by
an intellectualist who in his preface offers you his metaphysics as
a guide for the soul, talking as if philosophy were one of our
deepest concerns. How can the writer so deceive himself?

_The Nation_ 85 (12 September 1907) 229: NOTES Peirce: _Contributions to
The Nation_ 3:290

https://www.google.com/search?q=%22We+fear+that+Mr.+Stickney+is+too+optimistic%22

Albert Stickney's "Organized Democracy" (Houghton, Mifflin & Co.) is
one of those radical pleas for political reconstruction which,
however little likely to be adopted or even seriously considered,
are not without usefulness as criticisms of existing political
evils. Mr. Stickney is convinced not only that we have not true
democracy in this country, but also that we cannot have true
democracy so long as the present electoral and administrative
systems prevail. Under popular election of all officials for fixed
terms, joined to the party system, all that the voter can do is to
vote for the candidate of this or that machine; his own personal
choice, if he have one, he cannot possibly register. The remedy Mr.
Stickney urges is the establishment, in local, State, and Federal
Government, of a system of single-headed administration, with the
heads of departments controlled directly by a Legislature the
members of which are popularly chosen by viva voce vote. For tenure
during short terms there would be substituted tenure during good
behavior. Congress, for example, would become a body of one house
with the power of removing the President, but without control over
subordinate appointments. We fear that Mr. Stickney is too
optimistic, and too little appreciative of the difficulty in this
country of achieving reforms by wholesale; but his shrewd
observations and obvious seriousness make his book not
uninteresting. Incidentally, we commend to the curious the
extraordinary punctuation of the volume.
[End quote]

Of course we know that Peirce believed that people who won't think ought
to be enslaved. 1908 to Lady Welby
https://www.google.com/search?q=%22Folly+in+politics+cannot+go+farther+than+English+liberalism%22
:

Being a convinced Pragmaticist in Semeiotic, naturally and
necessarily nothing can appear to me sillier than rationalism; and
folly in politics cannot go further than English liberalism. The
people ought to be enslaved; only the slaveholders ought to practice
the virtues that alone can maintain their rule. England will
discover too late that it has sapped the foundations of its culture.
[...]
[End quote]

Douglas R. Anderson discusses Peirce and politics in the anthology _The
Rule of Reason_, from which I drew that quote. That passage appears also
in the Peirce collection _Values in a Universe of Chance_ p. 402

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-24 Thread sb

Jerry, 

i believe we are talking about different things. Obviously there stands the 
word 'democracy', but it is mentioned within a list of different uses of the 
word 'hypotheses'. Therefore it is possible, that it is just an example and 
does not necessarily express his personal views on democracy. Why do you think 
it is more than an example? I am not sure about it and open to another reading.

Best,
Stefan


Am 24. November 2016 03:29:39 MEZ, schrieb Jerry Rhee :
>Hi Stefan, list:
>
>Well, the quote I selected is immediately followed by,
>"Freedom is the hypothesis or condition of democracy."
>
>So, what's that about, then, if not about democracy?
>
>Also, the original quote has a very definite likeness to Plato's ideas,
>in
>particular, those in the *Republic* and even that in the *Laws*.
>
>So, then, what does Peirce and Plato say is useful about *likeness*?
>
>Best,
>Jerry R
>
>On Wed, Nov 23, 2016 at 7:45 PM, sb  wrote:
>
>> Jerry,
>>
>> i am not sureb whether your quote from "Four Consequences" is useful
>or
>> not. In my opinion it is just an example and does not necessarily
>express
>> Peirce opinion about democracy. Do you think different about this
>quote?
>>
>> Best,
>> Stefan
>>
>> The whole context is:
>>
>> ---
>> 1. Several persons versed in logic have objected that I have here
>quite
>> misapplied the term hypothesis, and that what I so designate is an
>argument
>> from analogy. It is a sufficient reply to say that the example of the
>> cipher has been given as an apt illustration of hypothesis by
>Descartes
>> (Rule 10, Oeuvres choisies: Paris, 1865, page 334), by Leibniz
>(Nouveaux
>> Essais, lib. 4, ch. 12, §13, Ed. Erdmann, p. 383 b), and (as I learn
>from
>> D. Stewart; Works, vol. 3, pp. 305 et seqq.) by Gravesande,
>Boscovich,
>> Hartley, and G.L. Le Sage. The term Hypothesis has been used in the
>> following senses: 1. For the theme or proposition forming the subject
>of
>> discourse. 2. For an assumption. Aristotle divides theses or
>propositions
>> adopted without any reason into definitions and hypotheses. The
>latter are
>> propositions stating the existence of something. Thus the geometer
>says,
>> "Let there be a triangle." 3. For a condition in a general sense. We
>are
>> said to seek other things than happiness ex hypotheseos,
>conditionally. The
>> best republic is the ideally perfect, the second the best on earth,
>the
>> third the best ex hypotheseos, under the circumstances. Freedom is
>the
>> hypothesis or condition of democracy. 4. For the antecedent of a
>> hypothetical proposition. 5. For an oratorical question which assumes
>> facts. 6. In the Synopsis of Psellus, for the reference of a subject
>to the
>> things it denotes. 7. Most commonly in modern times, for the
>conclusion of
>> an argument from consequence and consequent to antecedent. This is my
>use
>> of the term. 8. For such a conclusion when too weak to be a theory
>accepted
>> into the body of a science.
>>
>> I give a few authorities to support the seventh use:
>>
>> Chauvin. -- Lexicon Rationale, 1st Ed. -- "Hypothesis est propositio,
>quæ
>> assumitur ad probandum aliam veritatem incognitam. Requirunt multi,
>ut hæc
>> hypothesis vera esse cognoscatur, etiam antequam appareat, an alia ex
>ea
>> deduci possint. Verum aiunt alii, hoc unum desiderari, ut hypothesis
>pro
>> vera admittatur, quod nempe ex hac talia deducitur, quæ respondent
>> phænomenis, et satisfaciunt omnibus difficultatibus, quæ hac parte in
>re,
>> et in iis quæ de ea apparent, occurrebant."
>> 
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Am 24. November 2016 02:11:57 MEZ, schrieb Jerry Rhee
>> >:
>>>
>>> Dear list:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Here is how I see Peirce to have conceived of democracy:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> “The best republic is the ideally perfect, the second the best on
>earth,
>>> the third the best *ex hypotheseos,* under the circumstances.”
>>>
>>> ~Peirce, *Some Consequences of Four Incapacities*
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> “It has come about through the agencies of development that man is
>>> endowed with intelligence of such a nature that he can by ideal
>experiments
>>> ascertain that in a certain universe of logical possibility certain
>>> combinations occur while others do not occur.  Of those which occur
>in the
>>> ideal world some do and some do not occur in the real world; but all
>that
>>> occur in the real world occur also in the ideal world.
>>>
>>> For the real world is the world of sensible experience, and it is a
>part
>>> of the process of sensible experience to locate its facts in the
>world of
>>> ideas.”
>>>
>>> ~ Peirce, Logic of Relatives
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> “It is safer to try to understand the low in the light of the high
>than
>>> the high in the light of the low. In doing the latter one
>necessarily
>>> distorts the high, whereas in doing the former one does not deprive
>the low
>>> of the freedom to reveal itself as fully as what it is.” ~ Leo
>Strauss
>>>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-23 Thread Jerry Rhee

Hi Stefan, list:

Well, the quote I selected is immediately followed by,
"Freedom is the hypothesis or condition of democracy."

So, what's that about, then, if not about democracy?

Also, the original quote has a very definite likeness to Plato's ideas, in
particular, those in the *Republic* and even that in the *Laws*.

So, then, what does Peirce and Plato say is useful about *likeness*?

Best,
Jerry R

On Wed, Nov 23, 2016 at 7:45 PM, sb  wrote:

> Jerry,
>
> i am not sureb whether your quote from "Four Consequences" is useful or
> not. In my opinion it is just an example and does not necessarily express
> Peirce opinion about democracy. Do you think different about this quote?
>
> Best,
> Stefan
>
> The whole context is:
>
> ---
> 1. Several persons versed in logic have objected that I have here quite
> misapplied the term hypothesis, and that what I so designate is an argument
> from analogy. It is a sufficient reply to say that the example of the
> cipher has been given as an apt illustration of hypothesis by Descartes
> (Rule 10, Oeuvres choisies: Paris, 1865, page 334), by Leibniz (Nouveaux
> Essais, lib. 4, ch. 12, §13, Ed. Erdmann, p. 383 b), and (as I learn from
> D. Stewart; Works, vol. 3, pp. 305 et seqq.) by Gravesande, Boscovich,
> Hartley, and G.L. Le Sage. The term Hypothesis has been used in the
> following senses: 1. For the theme or proposition forming the subject of
> discourse. 2. For an assumption. Aristotle divides theses or propositions
> adopted without any reason into definitions and hypotheses. The latter are
> propositions stating the existence of something. Thus the geometer says,
> "Let there be a triangle." 3. For a condition in a general sense. We are
> said to seek other things than happiness ex hypotheseos, conditionally. The
> best republic is the ideally perfect, the second the best on earth, the
> third the best ex hypotheseos, under the circumstances. Freedom is the
> hypothesis or condition of democracy. 4. For the antecedent of a
> hypothetical proposition. 5. For an oratorical question which assumes
> facts. 6. In the Synopsis of Psellus, for the reference of a subject to the
> things it denotes. 7. Most commonly in modern times, for the conclusion of
> an argument from consequence and consequent to antecedent. This is my use
> of the term. 8. For such a conclusion when too weak to be a theory accepted
> into the body of a science.
>
> I give a few authorities to support the seventh use:
>
> Chauvin. -- Lexicon Rationale, 1st Ed. -- "Hypothesis est propositio, quæ
> assumitur ad probandum aliam veritatem incognitam. Requirunt multi, ut hæc
> hypothesis vera esse cognoscatur, etiam antequam appareat, an alia ex ea
> deduci possint. Verum aiunt alii, hoc unum desiderari, ut hypothesis pro
> vera admittatur, quod nempe ex hac talia deducitur, quæ respondent
> phænomenis, et satisfaciunt omnibus difficultatibus, quæ hac parte in re,
> et in iis quæ de ea apparent, occurrebant."
> 
>
>
>
>
> Am 24. November 2016 02:11:57 MEZ, schrieb Jerry Rhee  >:
>>
>> Dear list:
>>
>>
>>
>> Here is how I see Peirce to have conceived of democracy:
>>
>>
>>
>> “The best republic is the ideally perfect, the second the best on earth,
>> the third the best *ex hypotheseos,* under the circumstances.”
>>
>> ~Peirce, *Some Consequences of Four Incapacities*
>>
>>
>>
>> “It has come about through the agencies of development that man is
>> endowed with intelligence of such a nature that he can by ideal experiments
>> ascertain that in a certain universe of logical possibility certain
>> combinations occur while others do not occur.  Of those which occur in the
>> ideal world some do and some do not occur in the real world; but all that
>> occur in the real world occur also in the ideal world.
>>
>> For the real world is the world of sensible experience, and it is a part
>> of the process of sensible experience to locate its facts in the world of
>> ideas.”
>>
>> ~ Peirce, Logic of Relatives
>>
>>
>>
>> “It is safer to try to understand the low in the light of the high than
>> the high in the light of the low. In doing the latter one necessarily
>> distorts the high, whereas in doing the former one does not deprive the low
>> of the freedom to reveal itself as fully as what it is.” ~ Leo Strauss
>>
>>
>> "It appears to have been virtually the philosophy of Socrates."
>>
>> ~Peirce
>>
>>
>>
>> “Liberal education supplies us with experience in things beautiful.”
>>
>> ~Strauss, *What is Liberal Education?*
>>
>> *___*
>>
>>
>>
>> Here is how I see Peirce to have conceived of Aristotle:
>>
>>
>>
>> “Whether the form or the substratum is the essential nature of a physical
>> object is not yet clear. But that the principles are three, and in what
>> sense, and the way in which each is a principle, is clear.”
>>
>> ~Aristotle, *Physics*
>>
>>
>>
>> “We naturally choose three as the smallest number which will answer the
>>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

Jerry,

i am not sureb whether your quote from "Four Consequences" is useful or not. In 
my opinion it is just an example and does not necessarily express Peirce 
opinion about democracy. Do you think different about this quote?

Best,
Stefan

The whole context is:

---
1. Several persons versed in logic have objected that I have here quite 
misapplied the term hypothesis, and that what I so designate is an argument 
from analogy. It is a sufficient reply to say that the example of the cipher 
has been given as an apt illustration of hypothesis by Descartes (Rule 10, 
Oeuvres choisies: Paris, 1865, page 334), by Leibniz (Nouveaux Essais, lib. 4, 
ch. 12, §13, Ed. Erdmann, p. 383 b), and (as I learn from D. Stewart; Works, 
vol. 3, pp. 305 et seqq.) by Gravesande, Boscovich, Hartley, and G.L. Le Sage. 
The term Hypothesis has been used in the following senses: 1. For the theme or 
proposition forming the subject of discourse. 2. For an assumption. Aristotle 
divides theses or propositions adopted without any reason into definitions and 
hypotheses. The latter are propositions stating the existence of something. 
Thus the geometer says, "Let there be a triangle." 3. For a condition in a 
general sense. We are said to seek other things than happiness ex hypotheseos, 
conditionally. The best republic is the ideally perfect, the second the best on 
earth, the third the best ex hypotheseos, under the circumstances. Freedom is 
the hypothesis or condition of democracy. 4. For the antecedent of a 
hypothetical proposition. 5. For an oratorical question which assumes facts. 6. 
In the Synopsis of Psellus, for the reference of a subject to the things it 
denotes. 7. Most commonly in modern times, for the conclusion of an argument 
from consequence and consequent to antecedent. This is my use of the term. 8. 
For such a conclusion when too weak to be a theory accepted into the body of a 
science.

I give a few authorities to support the seventh use:

Chauvin. -- Lexicon Rationale, 1st Ed. -- "Hypothesis est propositio, quæ 
assumitur ad probandum aliam veritatem incognitam. Requirunt multi, ut hæc 
hypothesis vera esse cognoscatur, etiam antequam appareat, an alia ex ea deduci 
possint. Verum aiunt alii, hoc unum desiderari, ut hypothesis pro vera 
admittatur, quod nempe ex hac talia deducitur, quæ respondent phænomenis, et 
satisfaciunt omnibus difficultatibus, quæ hac parte in re, et in iis quæ de ea 
apparent, occurrebant." 




Am 24. November 2016 02:11:57 MEZ, schrieb Jerry Rhee :
>Dear list:
>
>
>
>Here is how I see Peirce to have conceived of democracy:
>
>
>
>“The best republic is the ideally perfect, the second the best on
>earth,
>the third the best *ex hypotheseos,* under the circumstances.”
>
>~Peirce, *Some Consequences of Four Incapacities*
>
>
>
>“It has come about through the agencies of development that man is
>endowed
>with intelligence of such a nature that he can by ideal experiments
>ascertain that in a certain universe of logical possibility certain
>combinations occur while others do not occur.  Of those which occur in
>the
>ideal world some do and some do not occur in the real world; but all
>that
>occur in the real world occur also in the ideal world.
>
>For the real world is the world of sensible experience, and it is a
>part of
>the process of sensible experience to locate its facts in the world of
>ideas.”
>
>~ Peirce, Logic of Relatives
>
>
>
>“It is safer to try to understand the low in the light of the high than
>the
>high in the light of the low. In doing the latter one necessarily
>distorts
>the high, whereas in doing the former one does not deprive the low of
>the
>freedom to reveal itself as fully as what it is.” ~ Leo Strauss
>
>
>"It appears to have been virtually the philosophy of Socrates."
>
>~Peirce
>
>
>
>“Liberal education supplies us with experience in things beautiful.”
>
>~Strauss, *What is Liberal Education?*
>
>*___*
>
>
>
>Here is how I see Peirce to have conceived of Aristotle:
>
>
>
>“Whether the form or the substratum is the essential nature of a
>physical
>object is not yet clear. But that the principles are three, and in what
>sense, and the way in which each is a principle, is clear.”
>
>~Aristotle, *Physics*
>
>
>
>“We naturally choose three as the smallest number which will answer the
>purpose.”
>
>~Peirce, *Logic of Relatives*
>
>
>
>Hth…
>
>
>
>Best,
>Jerry Rhee
>
>*CP 5.189*
>
>On Wed, Nov 23, 2016 at 6:50 PM, sb  wrote:
>
>> Gary, List,
>>
>> long speak, short forgotten conclusions: I believe that two
>directions
>> could be fruitful to understand Peirce idea of democracy better.
>First,
>> thinking with Habermas that (ideal) scientific communities can be a
>> blueprint for (ideal) democracies. Second, diving deeper into Peirce
>ethics
>> in comparison to Socrates idea of Ethics. Peirce makes a few short
>comments
>> about Socrates as one of the forefathers of pragmatism (it's a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

Gary, Clark, List,

"Stefan thought we might consider looking at Aristotle's views of democracy in 
approaching Peirce's. I expressed some considerable reservations about that 
approach."

Hope my intention became clearer by my previous post.

"I’d imagine the interesting question regarding democracy is how it relates to 
societal inquiry."

Absolutely.

"That is the more interesting question is less the boundaries of democracy as 
compared to competing institutions than the different types of governments 
within democracy."

Fully agree.

"But, first, what are Peirce's views of political economy and democracy."

I believe we need more material. That is the reason why i am trying to think 
loose. Thinking loose to find more material for close reading.

Best,
Stefan


Am 24. November 2016 00:55:52 MEZ, schrieb Gary Richmond 
:
>Clark, Stefan, Stephen, List,
>
>Clark quoted me quoting Stefan,a snippet of which I emphasized in my
>last
>post: "The context for Peirce thinking about democracy and political
>economy are obviously his religious ideas. Central concepts in this
>context
>are love and greed/ altruism and egoism." Stefan thought we might
>consider
>looking at Aristotle's views of democracy in approaching Peirce's. I
>expressed some considerable reservations about that approach.
>
>Clark wrote:
>
>I’d imagine the interesting question regarding democracy is how it
>relates
>to societal inquiry. That is the more interesting question is less the
>boundaries of democracy as compared to competing institutions than the
>different types of governments within democracy.
>
>
>I think that in a *general sense* that *is* "the more interesting
>question," and if it could br addressed in light of Peirce's views,
>well
>that would be *very* interesting indeed. But principally I'm hoping to
>get
>at the *specific sense* in which Peirce viewed democracy and related
>concepts, then possibly comparing/contrasting his views with Dewey's,
>Talisse's, Hook's, etc., and, especially, contemporary views. I think
>that
>the group of quotations which Stefan offered might be a good place to
>look
>for at least hints of how Peirce viewed democracy, political economy,
>republicanism, etc. It also may prove to be 'slim pickin's'.
>
>Talisse's work, with which I introduced this topic, might also provide
>an
>entree to Peirce's view. Stephen offered an excerpt from that book, *A
>Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy,* from which the following snippet
>is
>excerpted; this too might suggest a driection for our inquiry:
>
>RT: the Peircean can offer epistemological reasons to support more
>aggressive policies of distributive justice, or fundamental reforms of
>the
>news media which need not appeal to “growth,” but only to the
>prerequisites
>of proper epistemic activity. For unlike “growth,” the ideal of
>promoting
>epistemic responsibility amongst a population of democratic citizens is
>not reasonably rejectable.
>
>Yet
>the question remains: do Talisse's views as expressed in his book truly
>reflect Peirce'
>
>s
>
>?
>
>But, first, what are Peirce's views of political economy and
>democracy.
>
>
>Best,
>
>Gary R
>
>
>[image: Gary Richmond]
>
>*Gary Richmond*
>*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>*Communication Studies*
>*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>*C 745*
>*718 482-5690*
>
>On Wed, Nov 23, 2016 at 5:53 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:
>
>>
>> On Nov 23, 2016, at 3:29 PM, Gary Richmond 
>> wrote:
>>
>> The context for Peirce thinking about democracy and political economy
>are
>> obviously his religious ideas. Central concepts in this context are
>love
>> and greed/ altruism and egoism. This brings immediatly Aristoteles
>> classification of forms of government to my mind (Pol. III, 6 f.).
>>
>>
>> I’d imagine the interesting question regarding democracy is how it
>relates
>> to societal inquiry. That is the more interesting question is less
>the
>> boundaries of democracy as compared to competing institutions than
>the
>> different types of governments within democracy. An obvious example
>is top
>> down type governance verses bottom up or emergent government. The
>former
>> tends to be what progressivism embraces (either the early 20th
>century
>> Bismarkian inspired form or the more contemporary form) whereas in
>theory
>> conservatism embraces the later. This also gets at the issue of
>federalism
>> (which given Trump some liberals are starting to embrace).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -
>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY
>ON
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to
>PEIRCE-L
>> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in
>the
>> BODY of the message. More at
>http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
>> .
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>

-- 
Diese Nachricht wurde von meinem Android-Mobiltelefon

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-23 Thread Jerry Rhee

Dear list:



Here is how I see Peirce to have conceived of democracy:



“The best republic is the ideally perfect, the second the best on earth,
the third the best *ex hypotheseos,* under the circumstances.”

~Peirce, *Some Consequences of Four Incapacities*



“It has come about through the agencies of development that man is endowed
with intelligence of such a nature that he can by ideal experiments
ascertain that in a certain universe of logical possibility certain
combinations occur while others do not occur.  Of those which occur in the
ideal world some do and some do not occur in the real world; but all that
occur in the real world occur also in the ideal world.

For the real world is the world of sensible experience, and it is a part of
the process of sensible experience to locate its facts in the world of
ideas.”

~ Peirce, Logic of Relatives



“It is safer to try to understand the low in the light of the high than the
high in the light of the low. In doing the latter one necessarily distorts
the high, whereas in doing the former one does not deprive the low of the
freedom to reveal itself as fully as what it is.” ~ Leo Strauss


"It appears to have been virtually the philosophy of Socrates."

~Peirce



“Liberal education supplies us with experience in things beautiful.”

~Strauss, *What is Liberal Education?*

*___*



Here is how I see Peirce to have conceived of Aristotle:



“Whether the form or the substratum is the essential nature of a physical
object is not yet clear. But that the principles are three, and in what
sense, and the way in which each is a principle, is clear.”

~Aristotle, *Physics*



“We naturally choose three as the smallest number which will answer the
purpose.”

~Peirce, *Logic of Relatives*



Hth…



Best,
Jerry Rhee

*CP 5.189*

On Wed, Nov 23, 2016 at 6:50 PM, sb  wrote:

> Gary, List,
>
> long speak, short forgotten conclusions: I believe that two directions
> could be fruitful to understand Peirce idea of democracy better. First,
> thinking with Habermas that (ideal) scientific communities can be a
> blueprint for (ideal) democracies. Second, diving deeper into Peirce ethics
> in comparison to Socrates idea of Ethics. Peirce makes a few short comments
> about Socrates as one of the forefathers of pragmatism (it's a wild guess,
> but there could be something interesting)
>
> Best,
> Stefan
>
>
> Am 23. November 2016 23:29:37 MEZ, schrieb Gary Richmond <
> gary.richm...@gmail.com>:
>>
>> Stefan, List,
>>
>> Stefan, thanks for bringing together these several relevant Peirce
>> quotations. You concluded your post:
>>
>> The context for Peirce thinking about democracy and political economy are
>> obviously his religious ideas. Central concepts in this context are love
>> and greed/ altruism and egoism. This brings immediatly Aristoteles
>> classification of forms of government to my mind (Pol. III, 6 f.).
>>
>>
>> government of... altruistic
>> good
>> egoistic
>> bad
>> one
>> monarchy
>> tyranny
>> few aristocracy
>> oligarchy
>> many politeía
>> democracy
>>
>>
>> Maybe this could be a direction to think more about Peirce and
>> democracy...
>>
>> I'm not so sure that reflecting on Aristotle's views in this matter will
>> help us much in getting at Peirce's. I would , however, tend to strongly
>> agree with you that "The context for Peirce thinking about democracy and
>> political economy are obviously his religious ideas. Central concepts in
>> this context are love and greed/ altruism and egoism."
>> I'm not sure why this brought Aristotle's classification "immediately" to
>> your mind given that Aristotle's views would seem to have little to do with
>> religion, love, and greed. As for Peirce's view (if not exactly of
>> democracy, at least of what underpins political economy), it seems to me to
>> be admirably represented by this quotation which you offered which
>> contrasts the Gospel of Christ (i.e., of Love) with the Gospel of Greed.
>>
>> 6.294. Here, then, is the issue. The gospel of Christ says that progress
>> comes from every individual merging his individuality in sympathy with his
>> neighbors. On the other side, the conviction of the nineteenth century is
>> that progress takes place by virtue of every individual’s striving for
>> himself with all his might and trampling his neighbor under foot whenever
>> he gets a chance to do so. This may accurately be called the Gospel of
>> Greed.
>>
>> Peirce most surely did not have anything good to say about social
>> Darwinism.
>>
>> While for Aristotle democracy is not a good form of government, one ought
>> recall that for him the concept of democracy is rule by the indigent or
>> needy (I'm not sure why this gets democracy placed among the 'egoistic'
>> forms of government). The better form for him is, as in your diagram above,
>> that of the *politeía* composed, I take it, of those with enough time
>> and resources to pursue virtue (one might assume, in the interest of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

Gary, List,

long speak, short forgotten conclusions: I believe that two directions could be 
fruitful to understand Peirce idea of democracy better. First, thinking with 
Habermas that (ideal) scientific communities can be a blueprint for (ideal) 
democracies. Second, diving deeper into Peirce ethics in comparison to Socrates 
idea of Ethics. Peirce makes a few short comments about Socrates as one of the 
forefathers of pragmatism (it's a wild guess, but there could be something 
interesting)

Best,
Stefan

Am 23. November 2016 23:29:37 MEZ, schrieb Gary Richmond 
:
>Stefan, List,
>
>Stefan, thanks for bringing together these several relevant Peirce
>quotations. You concluded your post:
>
>The context for Peirce thinking about democracy and political economy
>are
>obviously his religious ideas. Central concepts in this context are
>love
>and greed/ altruism and egoism. This brings immediatly Aristoteles
>classification of forms of government to my mind (Pol. III, 6 f.).
>
>
>government of... altruistic
>good
>egoistic
>bad
>one
>monarchy
>tyranny
>few aristocracy
>oligarchy
>many politeía
>democracy
>
>
>Maybe this could be a direction to think more about Peirce and
>democracy...
>
>I'm not so sure that reflecting on Aristotle's views in this matter
>will
>help us much in getting at Peirce's. I would , however, tend to
>strongly
>agree with you that "The context for Peirce thinking about democracy
>and
>political economy are obviously his religious ideas. Central concepts
>in
>this context are love and greed/ altruism and egoism."
>I'm not sure why this brought Aristotle's classification "immediately"
>to
>your mind given that Aristotle's views would seem to have little to do
>with
>religion, love, and greed. As for Peirce's view (if not exactly of
>democracy, at least of what underpins political economy), it seems to
>me to
>be admirably represented by this quotation which you offered which
>contrasts the Gospel of Christ (i.e., of Love) with the Gospel of
>Greed.
>
>6.294. Here, then, is the issue. The gospel of Christ says that
>progress
>comes from every individual merging his individuality in sympathy with
>his
>neighbors. On the other side, the conviction of the nineteenth century
>is
>that progress takes place by virtue of every individual’s striving for
>himself with all his might and trampling his neighbor under foot
>whenever
>he gets a chance to do so. This may accurately be called the Gospel of
>Greed
>.
>
>Peirce most surely did not have anything good to say about social
>Darwinism.
>
>While for Aristotle democracy is not a good form of government, one
>ought
>recall that for him the concept of democracy is rule by the indigent or
>needy (I'm not sure why this gets democracy placed among the 'egoistic'
>forms of government). The better form for him is, as in your diagram
>above,
>that of the *politeía* composed, I take it, of those with enough time
>and
>resources to pursue virtue (one might assume, in the interest of the
>general good), so certainly not the common people. *Politeía* is,
>however,
>a problematic term in Aristotle's work and is to this day much debated
>as
>he does not use it in a consistent sense in *Politics*. But, in any
>event,
>even a benevolent monarchy is preferable to a democracy in Aristotle's
>sense of that concept.
>
>Best,
>
>Gary R
>
>
>[image: Gary Richmond]
>
>*Gary Richmond*
>*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>*Communication Studies*
>*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>*C 745*
>*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>
>On Tue, Nov 22, 2016 at 3:06 PM, sb  wrote:
>
>> Gary, Clark, List,
>>
>> You may recall that I concluded my message which began this thread
>with
>> this question: can anyone on the list offer some Peirce quotations
>which
>> might help quickly clarify his views on democracy?
>>
>> when i search the CP for "democra" there are only three hits. Just
>because
>> of curiosity i also searched for "Jefferson" and "Tocqueville"but
>there
>> were no results. Hits in CP I and CP VI are:
>>
>> CP 1.654. Common sense, which is the resultant of the traditional
>> experience of mankind, witnesses unequivocally that the heart is more
>than
>> the head, and is in fact everything in our highest concerns, thus
>agreeing
>> with my unproved logical theorem; and those persons who think that
>> sentiment has no part in common sense forget that the dicta of common
>sense
>> are objective facts, not the way some dyspeptic may feel, but what
>the
>> healthy, natural, normal *democracy* thinks. And yet when you open
>the
>> next new book on the philosophy of religion that comes out, the
>chances are
>> that it will be written by an intellectualist who in his preface
>offers you
>> his metaphysics as a guide for the soul, talking as if philosophy
>were one
>> of our deepest concerns. How can the writer so deceive himself?
>> 
>> CP 6.449. Many a scientific man and student of philosophy recognizes
>that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy


Gary, List,

yes, you are certainly right that politeia is an problematic concept. 
Especially when we think of the exlusiveness of the greece idea of the 
rule of many: no women, no slaves, no foreigners, no people who have to 
work for their living etc. But democracy in the extremest form Aristole 
could think of in his wildest dreams just included those who have to 
work but not women, slaves etc. (correct me if i am wrong). So his idea 
of democracy is quite far away from our understanding of democracy.


Before he introduces his classification he speaks of the virtues 
citizens should have and concludes that it is reason which distinguishes 
the ones who should rule and the ones who should not. And making the 
case for reason is important for greek thinkers, because their disgust 
for democracy was in my opinion always motivated by the judical murder 
of Socrates - it was their traumatic collective experience with democracy.


Here sneaks in that i am german: The german democratic trauma is the 
breakdown of the Weimar republic. To understand the democratic trauma, 
we have to keep in mind, that the breakdown wasn't a putsch or 
something. No, the Germans elected democratically a Reichskanzler of 
whom they knew that he wouldn't play to the rules of democracy. This 
taumatic experience is in Germany always summarized as: "Weimar, the 
democracy without democrats". The after war german conclusion to this 
was, that it was a lack of reason which led into the abyss and we 
therefore have to be and educate reasonable and responsible citizens.


My point is now, that in the same way we think today about democracy and 
mob rule the greek thinkers thought about politeia and democracy.


That said, i am now coming through the backdoor together with Habermas 
back to Peirce. I believe we have to understand the Habermasian ideal 
conception of deliberative democracy against this backdrop. He thinks 
the ideal democracy as a powerfree, inclusive discourse between 
reasonable citizens. And it is the reasonableness of the citizens which 
makes the inclusiveness of discourse possible and it is the 
inclusiveness of discourse which makes people reasonable*. As everybody 
knows Habermas borrowed his idea of discourse community from Peirce' 
concept of scientific community. The difference is, that the scientific 
community searches for truth whereas the community of citizens searches 
for the answer to the question "How do we want to live together in 
future?".


Interpreting with Peirce, it is greed and selfishness that destroys 
scientific and political communities and it is love and generosity that 
makes them possible. Now, for Peirce the highest form of love and logic 
is the self-sacrifice:


"He who would not sacrifice his own soul to save the whole world, is, as 
it seems to me, illogical in all his inferences, collectively. Logic is 
rooted in the social principle. ( CP 2.654)"


And i believe that for the same reason Socrates chose to die. It would 
have been not logical to flee, because his whole life would have been a 
farce if he had fled. In contrast, by choosing to die, he shows his 
logical consistency and his love for the citizens of athens, since by 
sacrificing himself, he still wants to educate them to care for their 
virtues**.


Hope this doesen't make my first cryptic comment even more cryptic ;)

Best,
Stefan


*my interpretation of Habermas
** my interpretation of Foucaults interpretation of Socrates in: /Le 
Gouvernement de soi et des autres: le courage de la vérité/


Am 23.11.16 um 23:29 schrieb Gary Richmond:


Stefan, List,

Stefan, thanks for bringing together these several relevant Peirce 
quotations. You concluded your post:


The context for Peirce thinking about democracy and political
economy are obviously his religious ideas. Central concepts in
this context are love and greed/ altruism and egoism. This brings
immediatly Aristoteles classification of forms of government to my
mind (Pol. III, 6 f.).


government of...altruistic
good
egoistic
bad
one
monarchy
tyranny
few aristocracy
oligarchy
manypoliteía
democracy


Maybe this could be a direction to think more about Peirce and
democracy...

I'm not so sure that reflecting on Aristotle's views in this matter 
will help us much in getting at Peirce's. I would , however, tend to 
strongly agree with you that "The context for Peirce thinking about 
democracy and political economy are obviously his religious ideas. 
Central concepts in this context are love and greed/ altruism and egoism."


I'm not sure why this brought Aristotle's classification "immediately" 
to your mind given that Aristotle's views would seem to have little to 
do with religion, love, and greed. As for Peirce's view (if not 
exactly of democracy, at least of what underpins political economy), 
it seems to me to be admirably represented by this quotation

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-23 Thread Gary Richmond

Clark, Stefan, Stephen, List,

Clark quoted me quoting Stefan,a snippet of which I emphasized in my last
post: "The context for Peirce thinking about democracy and political
economy are obviously his religious ideas. Central concepts in this context
are love and greed/ altruism and egoism." Stefan thought we might consider
looking at Aristotle's views of democracy in approaching Peirce's. I
expressed some considerable reservations about that approach.

Clark wrote:

I’d imagine the interesting question regarding democracy is how it relates
to societal inquiry. That is the more interesting question is less the
boundaries of democracy as compared to competing institutions than the
different types of governments within democracy.

I think that in a *general sense* that *is* "the more interesting
question," and if it could br addressed in light of Peirce's views, well
that would be *very* interesting indeed. But principally I'm hoping to get
at the *specific sense* in which Peirce viewed democracy and related
concepts, then possibly comparing/contrasting his views with Dewey's,
Talisse's, Hook's, etc., and, especially, contemporary views. I think that
the group of quotations which Stefan offered might be a good place to look
for at least hints of how Peirce viewed democracy, political economy,
republicanism, etc. It also may prove to be 'slim pickin's'.

Talisse's work, with which I introduced this topic, might also provide an
entree to Peirce's view. Stephen offered an excerpt from that book, *A
Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy,* from which the following snippet is
excerpted; this too might suggest a driection for our inquiry:

RT: the Peircean can offer epistemological reasons to support more
aggressive policies of distributive justice, or fundamental reforms of the
news media which need not appeal to “growth,” but only to the prerequisites
of proper epistemic activity. For unlike “growth,” the ideal of promoting
epistemic responsibility amongst a population of democratic citizens is
not reasonably rejectable.

Yet
 the question remains: do Talisse's views as expressed in his book truly
reflect Peirce'

s

?

But, first, what are Peirce's views of political economy and democracy.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Wed, Nov 23, 2016 at 5:53 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

>
> On Nov 23, 2016, at 3:29 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
> The context for Peirce thinking about democracy and political economy are
> obviously his religious ideas. Central concepts in this context are love
> and greed/ altruism and egoism. This brings immediatly Aristoteles
> classification of forms of government to my mind (Pol. III, 6 f.).
>
>
> I’d imagine the interesting question regarding democracy is how it relates
> to societal inquiry. That is the more interesting question is less the
> boundaries of democracy as compared to competing institutions than the
> different types of governments within democracy. An obvious example is top
> down type governance verses bottom up or emergent government. The former
> tends to be what progressivism embraces (either the early 20th century
> Bismarkian inspired form or the more contemporary form) whereas in theory
> conservatism embraces the later. This also gets at the issue of federalism
> (which given Trump some liberals are starting to embrace).
>
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
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http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-23 Thread Clark Goble

> On Nov 23, 2016, at 3:29 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> The context for Peirce thinking about democracy and political economy are 
> obviously his religious ideas. Central concepts in this context are love and 
> greed/ altruism and egoism. This brings immediatly Aristoteles classification 
> of forms of government to my mind (Pol. III, 6 f.).
> 
> 

I’d imagine the interesting question regarding democracy is how it relates to 
societal inquiry. That is the more interesting question is less the boundaries 
of democracy as compared to competing institutions than the different types of 
governments within democracy. An obvious example is top down type governance 
verses bottom up or emergent government. The former tends to be what 
progressivism embraces (either the early 20th century Bismarkian inspired form 
or the more contemporary form) whereas in theory conservatism embraces the 
later. This also gets at the issue of federalism (which given Trump some 
liberals are starting to embrace).

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-23 Thread Gary Richmond

Stefan, List,

Stefan, thanks for bringing together these several relevant Peirce
quotations. You concluded your post:

The context for Peirce thinking about democracy and political economy are
obviously his religious ideas. Central concepts in this context are love
and greed/ altruism and egoism. This brings immediatly Aristoteles
classification of forms of government to my mind (Pol. III, 6 f.).

government of... altruistic
good
egoistic
bad
one
monarchy
tyranny
few aristocracy
oligarchy
many politeía
democracy

Maybe this could be a direction to think more about Peirce and democracy...

I'm not so sure that reflecting on Aristotle's views in this matter will
help us much in getting at Peirce's. I would , however, tend to strongly
agree with you that "The context for Peirce thinking about democracy and
political economy are obviously his religious ideas. Central concepts in
this context are love and greed/ altruism and egoism."
I'm not sure why this brought Aristotle's classification "immediately" to
your mind given that Aristotle's views would seem to have little to do with
religion, love, and greed. As for Peirce's view (if not exactly of
democracy, at least of what underpins political economy), it seems to me to
be admirably represented by this quotation which you offered which
contrasts the Gospel of Christ (i.e., of Love) with the Gospel of Greed.

6.294. Here, then, is the issue. The gospel of Christ says that progress
comes from every individual merging his individuality in sympathy with his
neighbors. On the other side, the conviction of the nineteenth century is
that progress takes place by virtue of every individual’s striving for
himself with all his might and trampling his neighbor under foot whenever
he gets a chance to do so. This may accurately be called the Gospel of Greed
.

Peirce most surely did not have anything good to say about social Darwinism.

While for Aristotle democracy is not a good form of government, one ought
recall that for him the concept of democracy is rule by the indigent or
needy (I'm not sure why this gets democracy placed among the 'egoistic'
forms of government). The better form for him is, as in your diagram above,
that of the *politeía* composed, I take it, of those with enough time and
resources to pursue virtue (one might assume, in the interest of the
general good), so certainly not the common people. *Politeía* is, however,
a problematic term in Aristotle's work and is to this day much debated as
he does not use it in a consistent sense in *Politics*. But, in any event,
even a benevolent monarchy is preferable to a democracy in Aristotle's
sense of that concept.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*

On Tue, Nov 22, 2016 at 3:06 PM, sb  wrote:

> Gary, Clark, List,
>
> You may recall that I concluded my message which began this thread with
> this question: can anyone on the list offer some Peirce quotations which
> might help quickly clarify his views on democracy?
>
> when i search the CP for "democra" there are only three hits. Just because
> of curiosity i also searched for "Jefferson" and "Tocqueville"but there
> were no results. Hits in CP I and CP VI are:
>
> CP 1.654. Common sense, which is the resultant of the traditional
> experience of mankind, witnesses unequivocally that the heart is more than
> the head, and is in fact everything in our highest concerns, thus agreeing
> with my unproved logical theorem; and those persons who think that
> sentiment has no part in common sense forget that the dicta of common sense
> are objective facts, not the way some dyspeptic may feel, but what the
> healthy, natural, normal *democracy* thinks. And yet when you open the
> next new book on the philosophy of religion that comes out, the chances are
> that it will be written by an intellectualist who in his preface offers you
> his metaphysics as a guide for the soul, talking as if philosophy were one
> of our deepest concerns. How can the writer so deceive himself?
> 
> CP 6.449. Many a scientific man and student of philosophy recognizes that
> it is the Christian church which has made him a man among men. To it he
> owes consolations, enjoyments, escapes from great perils, and whatever
> rectitude of heart and purpose may be his. To the monks of the medieval
> church he owes the preservation of ancient literature; and without the
> revival of learning he can hardly see how the revival of science would have
> been possible. To them he owes the framework of his intellectual system,
> and if he speaks English, a most important part of his daily speech. The
> law of love which, however little it be obeyed, he holds to be the soul of
> civilization, came to Europe through Christianity. Besides, religion is a
> great, perhaps the greatest, factor of that social life

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-22 Thread Jerry Rhee

Dear list:



Here are some quotes by Leo Strauss next to one by Peirce:





“The best republic is the ideally perfect, the second the best on earth,
the third the best *ex hypotheseos,* under the circumstances.

Freedom is the *hypothesis* or condition of democracy.”

~Some Consequences of Four Incapacities







“By understanding both sophistry (in its highest as well as in its lower
meanings) and statesmanship, one will understand what philosophy is.
Philosophy strives for knowledge of the whole.”

~ *What is political philosophy?*



“The aim of the good ruler can be achieved by means of laws- this was done,
according to Xenophon, in the most remarkable manner in Lycurgus’ city-

or by rule without laws, i.e., by tyranny: the beneficent tyrant as
described by Simonides makes his city happy…



It is certainly most significant that, as regards the happiness achieved by
means of laws, Xenophon can adduce an actual example (Sparta), whereas as
regards the happiness achieved by tyranny, he offers no other evidence than
the promise of a poet.



In other words, it is of very great importance that, according to Xenophon,
the aim of the good ruler is much more likely to be achieved by means of
laws than by means of absolute rule.”

~ *On Tyranny*

Hth,
Jerry R

On Tue, Nov 22, 2016 at 2:12 PM, sb  wrote:

> Gary, Clark, List,
>
> You may recall that I concluded my message which began this thread with
> this question: can anyone on the list offer some Peirce quotations which
> might help quickly clarify his views on democracy?
>
> when i search the CP for "democra" there are only three hits. Just because
> of curiosity i also searched for "Jefferson" and "Tocqueville"but there
> were no results. Hits in CP I and CP VI are:
>
> CP 1.654. Common sense, which is the resultant of the traditional
> experience of mankind, witnesses unequivocally that the heart is more than
> the head, and is in fact everything in our highest concerns, thus agreeing
> with my unproved logical theorem; and those persons who think that
> sentiment has no part in common sense forget that the dicta of common sense
> are objective facts, not the way some dyspeptic may feel, but what the
> healthy, natural, normal *democracy* thinks. And yet when you open the
> next new book on the philosophy of religion that comes out, the chances are
> that it will be written by an intellectualist who in his preface offers you
> his metaphysics as a guide for the soul, talking as if philosophy were one
> of our deepest concerns. How can the writer so deceive himself?
> 
> CP 6.449. Many a scientific man and student of philosophy recognizes that
> it is the Christian church which has made him a man among men. To it he
> owes consolations, enjoyments, escapes from great perils, and whatever
> rectitude of heart and purpose may be his. To the monks of the medieval
> church he owes the preservation of ancient literature; and without the
> revival of learning he can hardly see how the revival of science would have
> been possible. To them he owes the framework of his intellectual system,
> and if he speaks English, a most important part of his daily speech. The
> law of love which, however little it be obeyed, he holds to be the soul of
> civilization, came to Europe through Christianity. Besides, religion is a
> great, perhaps the greatest, factor of that social life which extends
> beyond one’s own circle of personal friends. That life is everything for
> elevated, and humane, and *democratic* civilization; and if one renounces
> the Church, in what other way can one as satisfactorily exercise the
> faculty of fraternizing with all one‘s neighbours?
>
> In CP VIII:
>
> Peirce: CP 8 Bibliography General 1875 [G-1875-1]1875
> 3. “A Plan and an Illustration” (on proportional representation), The
> *Democratic* Party; A Political Study, by a Political Zero (Melusina Fay
> Peirce), John Wilson and Son, Cambridge, 1875, pp. 36-37. Both the whole
> work and Peirce’s contribution are anonymous, but these are identified in
> [Fisch-Haskell].
>
> The publication by Melusina can be found here: http://www.unav.es/gep/
> TheDemocraticPartyMichigan.pdf
>
> Using the keyword "republic" i find:
>
> CP 2.654 To be logical men should not be selfish; and, in point of fact,
> they are not so selfish as they are thought. The willful prosecution of
> one’s desires is a different thing from selfishness. The miser is not
> selfish; his money does him no good, and he cares for what shall become of
> it after his death. We are constantly speaking of *our* possessions on
> the Pacific, and of *our* destiny as a *republic*, where no personal
> interests are involved, in a way which shows that we have wider ones. We
> discuss with anxiety the possible exhaustion of coal in some hundreds of
> years, or the cooling-off of the sun in some millions, and show in the most
> popular of all religious tenets that we can conceive the possibility of a
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-22 Thread sb


Gary, Clark, List,

You may recall that I concluded my message which began this thread 
with this question: can anyone on the list offer some Peirce 
quotations which might help quickly clarify his views on democracy?
when i search the CP for "democra" there are only three hits. Just 
because of curiosity i also searched for "Jefferson" and 
"Tocqueville"but there were no results. Hits in CP I and CP VI are:


   CP 1.654. Common sense, which is the resultant of the traditional
   experience of mankind, witnesses unequivocally that the heart is
   more than the head, and is in fact everything in our highest
   concerns, thus agreeing with my unproved logical theorem; and those
   persons who think that sentiment has no part in common sense forget
   that the dicta of common sense are objective facts, not the way some
   dyspeptic may feel, but what the healthy, natural, normal
   *democracy* thinks. And yet when you open the next new book on the
   philosophy of religion that comes out, the chances are that it will
   be written by an intellectualist who in his preface offers you his
   metaphysics as a guide for the soul, talking as if philosophy were
   one of our deepest concerns. How can the writer so deceive himself?
   

   CP 6.449. Many a scientific man and student of philosophy recognizes
   that it is the Christian church which has made him a man among men.
   To it he owes consolations, enjoyments, escapes from great perils,
   and whatever rectitude of heart and purpose may be his. To the monks
   of the medieval church he owes the preservation of ancient
   literature; and without the revival of learning he can hardly see
   how the revival of science would have been possible. To them he owes
   the framework of his intellectual system, and if he speaks English,
   a most important part of his daily speech. The law of love which,
   however little it be obeyed, he holds to be the soul of
   civilization, came to Europe through Christianity. Besides, religion
   is a great, perhaps the greatest, factor of that social life which
   extends beyond one’s own circle of personal friends. That life is
   everything for elevated, and humane, and *democratic* civilization;
   and if one renounces the Church, in what other way can one as
   satisfactorily exercise the faculty of fraternizing with all one‘s
   neighbours?

In CP VIII:

   Peirce: CP 8 Bibliography General 1875 [G-1875-1]1875
   3. “A Plan and an Illustration” (on proportional representation),
   The *Democratic* Party; A Political Study, by a Political Zero
   (Melusina Fay Peirce), John Wilson and Son, Cambridge, 1875, pp.
   36-37. Both the whole work and Peirce’s contribution are anonymous,
   but these are identified in [Fisch-Haskell].

The publication by Melusina can be found here: 
http://www.unav.es/gep/TheDemocraticPartyMichigan.pdf


Using the keyword "republic" i find:

   CP 2.654 To be logical men should not be selfish; and, in point of
   fact, they are not so selfish as they are thought. The willful
   prosecution of one’s desires is a different thing from selfishness.
   The miser is not selfish; his money does him no good, and he cares
   for what shall become of it after his death. We are constantly
   speaking of /our/ possessions on the Pacific, and of /our/ destiny
   as a *republic*, where no personal interests are involved, in a way
   which shows that we have wider ones. We discuss with anxiety the
   possible exhaustion of coal in some hundreds of years, or the
   cooling-off of the sun in some millions, and show in the most
   popular of all religious tenets that we can conceive the possibility
   of a man‘s descending into hell for the salvation of his fellows.

   CP 2.654 Now, it is not necessary for logicality that a man should
   himself be capable of the heroism of self-sacrifice. It is
   sufficient that he should recognize the possibility of it, should
   perceive that only that man’s inferences who has it are really
   logical, and should consequently regard his own as being only so far
   valid as they would be accepted by the hero. So far as he thus
   refers his inferences to that standard, he becomes identified with
   such a mind.
   

   CP 5.355. That being the case, it becomes interesting to inquire how
   it is with men as a matter of fact. There is a psychological theory
   that man cannot act without a view to his own pleasure. This theory
   is based on a falsely assumed subjectivism. Upon our principles of
   the objectivity of knowledge, it could not be based; and if they are
   correct, it is reduced to an absurdity. It seems to me that the
   usual opinion of the selfishness of man is based in large measure
   upon this false theory. I do not think that the facts bear out the
   usual opinion. The immense self-sacrifices which the most wilful men
   often make, show that wilfulness is a very different thing from
   selfishness. The care that men have for what is to happen after

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-22 Thread sb


Gary, Clark, List,

You may recall that I concluded my message which began this thread 
with this question: can anyone on the list offer some Peirce 
quotations which might help quickly clarify his views on democracy?
when i search the CP for "democra" there are only three hits. Just 
because of curiosity i also searched for "Jefferson" and 
"Tocqueville"but there were no results. Hits in CP I and CP VI are:


   CP 1.654. Common sense, which is the resultant of the traditional
   experience of mankind, witnesses unequivocally that the heart is
   more than the head, and is in fact everything in our highest
   concerns, thus agreeing with my unproved logical theorem; and those
   persons who think that sentiment has no part in common sense forget
   that the dicta of common sense are objective facts, not the way some
   dyspeptic may feel, but what the healthy, natural, normal
   *democracy* thinks. And yet when you open the next new book on the
   philosophy of religion that comes out, the chances are that it will
   be written by an intellectualist who in his preface offers you his
   metaphysics as a guide for the soul, talking as if philosophy were
   one of our deepest concerns. How can the writer so deceive himself?
   

   CP 6.449. Many a scientific man and student of philosophy recognizes
   that it is the Christian church which has made him a man among men.
   To it he owes consolations, enjoyments, escapes from great perils,
   and whatever rectitude of heart and purpose may be his. To the monks
   of the medieval church he owes the preservation of ancient
   literature; and without the revival of learning he can hardly see
   how the revival of science would have been possible. To them he owes
   the framework of his intellectual system, and if he speaks English,
   a most important part of his daily speech. The law of love which,
   however little it be obeyed, he holds to be the soul of
   civilization, came to Europe through Christianity. Besides, religion
   is a great, perhaps the greatest, factor of that social life which
   extends beyond one’s own circle of personal friends. That life is
   everything for elevated, and humane, and *democratic* civilization;
   and if one renounces the Church, in what other way can one as
   satisfactorily exercise the faculty of fraternizing with all one‘s
   neighbours?

In CP VIII:

   Peirce: CP 8 Bibliography General 1875 [G-1875-1]1875
   3. “A Plan and an Illustration” (on proportional representation),
   The *Democratic* Party; A Political Study, by a Political Zero
   (Melusina Fay Peirce), John Wilson and Son, Cambridge, 1875, pp.
   36-37. Both the whole work and Peirce’s contribution are anonymous,
   but these are identified in [Fisch-Haskell].

The publication by Melusina can be found here: 
http://www.unav.es/gep/TheDemocraticPartyMichigan.pdf


Using the keyword "republic" i find:

   CP 2.654 To be logical men should not be selfish; and, in point of
   fact, they are not so selfish as they are thought. The willful
   prosecution of one’s desires is a different thing from selfishness.
   The miser is not selfish; his money does him no good, and he cares
   for what shall become of it after his death. We are constantly
   speaking of /our/ possessions on the Pacific, and of /our/ destiny
   as a *republic*, where no personal interests are involved, in a way
   which shows that we have wider ones. We discuss with anxiety the
   possible exhaustion of coal in some hundreds of years, or the
   cooling-off of the sun in some millions, and show in the most
   popular of all religious tenets that we can conceive the possibility
   of a man‘s descending into hell for the salvation of his fellows.

   CP 2.654 Now, it is not necessary for logicality that a man should
   himself be capable of the heroism of self-sacrifice. It is
   sufficient that he should recognize the possibility of it, should
   perceive that only that man’s inferences who has it are really
   logical, and should consequently regard his own as being only so far
   valid as they would be accepted by the hero. So far as he thus
   refers his inferences to that standard, he becomes identified with
   such a mind.
   

   CP 5.355. That being the case, it becomes interesting to inquire how
   it is with men as a matter of fact. There is a psychological theory
   that man cannot act without a view to his own pleasure. This theory
   is based on a falsely assumed subjectivism. Upon our principles of
   the objectivity of knowledge, it could not be based; and if they are
   correct, it is reduced to an absurdity. It seems to me that the
   usual opinion of the selfishness of man is based in large measure
   upon this false theory. I do not think that the facts bear out the
   usual opinion. The immense self-sacrifices which the most wilful men
   often make, show that wilfulness is a very different thing from
   selfishness. The care that men have for what is to happen after

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-22 Thread Clark Goble

> On Nov 20, 2016, at 1:38 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> You may recall that I concluded my message which began this thread with this 
> question: can anyone on the list offer some Peirce quotations which might 
> help quickly clarify his views on democracy?
>  

I searched the CP and the word only appears once in CP 1.654. But it doesn’t 
appear too helpful.

Common sense, which is the resultant of the traditional experience of mankind, 
witnesses unequivocally that the heart is more than the head, and is in fact 
everything in our highest concerns, thus agreeing with my unproved logical 
theorem; and those persons who think that sentiment has no part in common sense 
forget that the dicta of common sense are objective facts, not the way some 
dyspeptic may feel, but what the healthy, natural, normal democracy thinks. And 
yet when you open the next new book on the philosophy of religion that comes 
out, the chances are that it will be written by an intellectualist who in his 
preface offers you his metaphysics as a guide for the soul, talking as if 
philosophy were one of our deepest concerns. How can the writer so deceive 
himself?

I confess that I’m never quite sure what people mean by democracy. It’s used in 
so many unclear ways that it’s usually less than helpful unless carefully 
unpacked and qualified. Often what people mean by it is a set of practices like 
rule of law, free voting, and a lot else. Yet then it gets reduced to mere 
voting without the social norms required behind the voting. (I think we saw 
that in Iraq where providing the vote was insufficient to provide democracy as 
most understood it)

As to Peirce’s political views. I always took him as a kind of Burkean 
conservative, although it’s not something I studied much. 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-20 Thread Jerry Rhee

d? How did you model your assumptions statistically?
>>>>>
>>>>> In testing your theory, what were your initial hypotheses? Where have
>>>>> you been able to falsify or verify your assumptions? Where did you 
>>>>> struggle
>>>>> empirically because of data quality?
>>>>>
>>>>> Best,
>>>>> Stefan
>>>>>
>>>>> Am 19. November 2016 22:48:20 MEZ, schrieb Edwina Taborsky
>>>>> <tabor...@primus.ca> <tabor...@primus.ca>:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Yes - I've taught this relationship between economics, population
>>>>>> size and political infrastructure for about 20 years. No- it's not
>>>>>> really in the *Architectonics*  book. It IS in a graphic book, *The
>>>>>> Graphic Guide to Socioeconomics* - which a retired CEO banker and
>>>>>> myself have just finished [about 170 slides]which deals with the
>>>>>> pragmatic relations between population size and economic modes and
>>>>>> political modes.  I am not sure if I should attach it since is has 
>>>>>> nothing
>>>>>> to do with Peirce. It's a powerpoint presentation which we are planning
>>>>>> to promote as a 'graphic guide for dummies' on the topic, so to speak.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That is - we tried to make it clear that democracy, which means
>>>>>> 'political power of the majority decision' is suitable only in large
>>>>>> population, flexible-risktaking- growth economies, and unsuitable in 
>>>>>> small
>>>>>> population no-growth steady-state economies which must ensure their
>>>>>> economic continuity by focusing on retaining the capacity-to-make-wealth 
>>>>>> by
>>>>>> stable measures [control of the land, control of the cattle, control of
>>>>>> fishing rights, etc].
>>>>>>
>>>>>> And we've been very surprised in our test runs with various people -
>>>>>> how many people don't understand the basic issues of growth/no growth
>>>>>> economies, carrying capacity of the economy; growth vs steady-state
>>>>>> populations; what is a middle class; what is capitalism; the role of 
>>>>>> risk;
>>>>>> the role of individuals..etc. etc.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Edwina
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - Original Message -
>>>>>> *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
>>>>>> *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>>>>>> *Sent:* Saturday, November 19, 2016 4:20 PM
>>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Edwina, list,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You've clearly given this a lot of prior thought, Edwina. I want to
>>>>>> reflect on wht you wrote and see what others think before commenting
>>>>>> further. Btw, would looking again at your book, *Architectonics of
>>>>>> Semiosis*, for example, Chapter 2, "Purity and Power," be of any
>>>>>> value in this discussion (as I initially began reading it I recall that 
>>>>>> in
>>>>>> an off-list message you commented that in some ways you were now seeing
>>>>>> things quite differently than you did in 1998)?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Best,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Gary R
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [image: Gary Richmond]
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *Gary Richmond*
>>>>>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>>>>>> *Communication Studies*
>>>>>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>>>>>> *C 745*
>>>>>> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Sat, Nov 19, 2016 at 4:01 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Gary R- that's an interesting topic.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 1) I'd like to first comment that *democracy*, as a political
>>>>>>> system for arriving at authoritative government decisions, is the 
>>>>>>> 'right'
>>>>>>> method but ONLY in a very large popul

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-20 Thread Stephen C. Rose

ing- growth economies, and unsuitable in small
>>>>> population no-growth steady-state economies which must ensure their
>>>>> economic continuity by focusing on retaining the capacity-to-make-wealth 
>>>>> by
>>>>> stable measures [control of the land, control of the cattle, control of
>>>>> fishing rights, etc].
>>>>>
>>>>> And we've been very surprised in our test runs with various people -
>>>>> how many people don't understand the basic issues of growth/no growth
>>>>> economies, carrying capacity of the economy; growth vs steady-state
>>>>> populations; what is a middle class; what is capitalism; the role of risk;
>>>>> the role of individuals..etc. etc.
>>>>>
>>>>> Edwina
>>>>>
>>>>> - Original Message -
>>>>> *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
>>>>> *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>>>>> *Sent:* Saturday, November 19, 2016 4:20 PM
>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy
>>>>>
>>>>> Edwina, list,
>>>>>
>>>>> You've clearly given this a lot of prior thought, Edwina. I want to
>>>>> reflect on wht you wrote and see what others think before commenting
>>>>> further. Btw, would looking again at your book, *Architectonics of
>>>>> Semiosis*, for example, Chapter 2, "Purity and Power," be of any
>>>>> value in this discussion (as I initially began reading it I recall that in
>>>>> an off-list message you commented that in some ways you were now seeing
>>>>> things quite differently than you did in 1998)?
>>>>>
>>>>> Best,
>>>>>
>>>>> Gary R
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> [image: Gary Richmond]
>>>>>
>>>>> *Gary Richmond*
>>>>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>>>>> *Communication Studies*
>>>>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>>>>> *C 745*
>>>>> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sat, Nov 19, 2016 at 4:01 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Gary R- that's an interesting topic.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 1) I'd like to first comment that *democracy*, as a political system
>>>>>> for arriving at authoritative government decisions, is the 'right' method
>>>>>> but ONLY in a very large population with a growth economy and a growth
>>>>>> population. That is, political systems have FUNCTIONS; the function is: 
>>>>>> who
>>>>>> has the societal right to make decisions among this population?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In economies which are *no-growth*, such as all the pre-industrial
>>>>>> agricultural and horticultural economies which dominated the planet until
>>>>>> the industrial age, democracy is dysfunctional. That is, all political
>>>>>> systems must privilege the wealth-producing sectors of the population. If
>>>>>> your economy is agricultural/horticultural - which can only produce 
>>>>>> enough
>>>>>> wealth to support a *steady-state* or no-growth population, then,
>>>>>> the political system must put the authority to make decisions in the
>>>>>> control of the owners of wealth production; i.e., the landowners. This
>>>>>> control over the land must be hereditary [you can't have fights over
>>>>>> ownership], and limited [you can't split up the land into minuscule small
>>>>>> farms].  Democracy, which puts decision-making into the hands of the
>>>>>> majority, doesn't work in such an economy.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> When the economy moves to a *growth* mode [and enables a growth
>>>>>> population], the political system must empower those sectors of the
>>>>>> population which *make an economy grow*. This is the middle class -
>>>>>> a non-hereditary set of the population, made up of private 
>>>>>> individual/small
>>>>>> group businesses. This economic mode is highly flexible [new business can
>>>>>> start, succeed, fail]; extremely adaptable and enables rapid population
>>&g

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-20 Thread Gary Richmond

Stefan, Edwina, Mike, List,

While I think that there is a most interesting and even important
discussion adumbrated in these recent exchanges (I too would tend to
disagree with Edwina's views, Stefan, as she wrote that she thought I might
when she kindly sent me the draft of her slide presentation when I
requested it off-list), I would like to suggest that, except to the extent
that it is Peirce-related, that this discussion be taken off-list.

You may recall that I concluded my message which began this thread with
this question: can anyone on the list offer some Peirce quotations which
might help quickly clarify his views on democracy?

Best,

Gary R (writing as list moderator)


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*

On Sun, Nov 20, 2016 at 11:25 AM, sb <peirc...@semiotikon.de> wrote:

> Edwina,
>
> i can't discuss your views until i have not fully understood them To
> understand them it would be great if you provided some of your work on the
> topic. Yes, i have great objections to your views. [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and
> Democracy
>
>
>>> Edwina,
>>>
>>> i would be really interested how you tackled such a complex theoretical
>>> concept empirically.
>>>
>>> Which historic datasets of demography and economics did you use? To
>>> build up such a database must have been quite labourious!
>>>
>>> I would also be really interested in how you operationalized your
>>> theory? What constructs and variables did you use? In which datasets are
>>> they found? How did you model your assumptions statistically?
>>>
>>> In testing your theory, what were your initial hypotheses? Where have
>>> you been able to falsify or verify your assumptions? Where did you struggle
>>> empirically because of data quality?
>>>
>>> Best,
>>> Stefan
>>>
>>> Am 19. November 2016 22:48:20 MEZ, schrieb Edwina Taborsky
>>> <tabor...@primus.ca> <tabor...@primus.ca>:
>>>>
>>>> Yes - I've taught this relationship between economics, population size
>>>> and political infrastructure for about 20 years. No- it's not really in the
>>>> *Architectonics*  book. It IS in a graphic book, *The Graphic Guide to
>>>> Socioeconomics* - which a retired CEO banker and myself have just
>>>> finished [about 170 slides]which deals with the pragmatic relations
>>>> between population size and economic modes and political modes.  I am not
>>>> sure if I should attach it since is has nothing to do with Peirce. It's a
>>>> powerpoint presentation which we are planning to promote as a 'graphic
>>>> guide for dummies' on the topic, so to speak.
>>>>
>>>> That is - we tried to make it clear that democracy, which means
>>>> 'political power of the majority decision' is suitable only in large
>>>> population, flexible-risktaking- growth economies, and unsuitable in small
>>>> population no-growth steady-state economies which must ensure their
>>>> economic continuity by focusing on retaining the capacity-to-make-wealth by
>>>> stable measures [control of the land, control of the cattle, control of
>>>> fishing rights, etc].
>>>>
>>>> And we've been very surprised in our test runs with various people -
>>>> how many people don't understand the basic issues of growth/no growth
>>>> economies, carrying capacity of the economy; growth vs steady-state
>>>> populations; what is a middle class; what is capitalism; the role of risk;
>>>> the role of individuals..etc. etc.
>>>>
>>>> Edwina
>>>>
>>>> - Original Message -
>>>> *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
>>>> *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>>>> *Sent:* Saturday, November 19, 2016 4:20 PM
>>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy
>>>>
>>>> Edwina, list,
>>>>
>>>> You've clearly given this a lot of prior thought, Edwina. I want to
>>>> reflect on wht you wrote and see what others think before commenting
>>>> further. Btw, would looking again at your book, *Architectonics of
>>>> Semiosis*, for example, Chapter 2, "Purity and Power," be of any value
>>>> in this discussion (as I initially began reading it I recall that in an
>>>> off-list message you commented that in some ways you were now

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-20 Thread Edwina Taborsky

Stefan - I am not making 'big claims on the agora'. 

I posted my concerns on a specific and limited list, the Peirce List, about a 
proposed discussion topic on democracy as outlined by Dewey and Peirce. My 
concerns about Dewey were that his outline of a political system separated it 
completely from an economic system - and separated that economic system from 
its ecological environment. As such, I felt that his theories about a political 
system failed to see that it is not and can never be simply an intellectual 
enterprise but is grounded in hard factual reality [economics/environment]. As 
for Peirce, he said almost nothing about political or economic systems - BUT 
his focus on the nature of Mind within a biological system and on the 
interrelationship of the individual and the collective could be analyzed within 
an economic and political system.

My claims, furthermore are hardly 'big claims' but are basic commonsense, and 
backed up by supportive empirical factual data on ecology, population growth, 
technological development, societal changes,  various tribal societies and 
historical development.

You, very obviously, have some kind of deep personal and intellectual interest 
in this area, and probably have very different conclusions - so my views are 
upsetting to your conclusions. Yet - you haven't offered, 'on the agora', any 
counter argument; you have merely attacked me without providing your own 
evidence in rebuttal.

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: sb 
  To: Mike Bergman ; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
  Sent: Sunday, November 20, 2016 9:59 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy


  Edwina,

  i don't insult you and i don't sneer at you. You are making big claims on the 
agora and i hold you accountable for your claims on the agora. 


  I am sure you have some kind of publication where you have laid out your 
theoretical views (published papers, working papers or presentations) providing 
literature etc. I am also sure you can provide some written work about your 
empirical research on this topic (posters, presentations, whatever...). This 
would be just one post to the list with some of your work attached. I don't 
believe anbody would be anoyed if you would present us some of your work to 
back up your claims.

  Best,
  Stefan


  Am 20.11.16 um 15:11 schrieb Edwina Taborsky:

Stefan - again, your CHOICE of assuming I have no proof, because I refuse 
to start up a discussion of these issues on a site devoted to Peirce, is just 
your own illogical and non-empirical opinion.

That's right - I provided the conclusions of these theories - again, 
because this site is not for these issues - about which Peirce really said 
not-one-word. I suggested going off-line but you ignored me.

Yes, I taught these FACTS for 20 plus years - and, as with all my classes, 
it was data-based analysis. 

No- it is absolutely not geodeterminism - what a conceptual error on your 
part, but factual reality about two key areas: First, the environment and 
second, human adapative capacities. A population HAS to acknowledge reality; 
that means ecological reality. It has to acknowledge the capacity - both 
benefits and limitations -  of that local environment to support a population; 
that means soil type, arability; water type and quantity; climate and 
temperature; local plants and animals; domesticative viability of  local plants 
and animals..which all deal with the 'carrying capacity' of the environment to 
support life - plant, animal and human.

All of these factual realities must be acknowledged - and then - you can 
move on to the very obvious adaptive strategies of population size [and how 
people limited its growth], settlement size and organizational infrastructure, 
migration, ..and the societal organization of the population...and the 
political...etc. 

We studied ten major societal systems - as basic human logical adaptations 
to the factual realities of their ecological environments - and - the changes 
that technological advances enabled. 

And yes, we explained why a growth economy requires an emphasis on 
individual rights. Actually, that bit IS Peircean, for he would acknowledge 
that freedom and spontaneity, which is a property of the individual and not the 
collective,  provides novelty and thus, adaptive ideas...that might, just 
might, become habits of organization within the society. We studied how 
no-growth societies actually limited and disabled individualism, and how growth 
societies privileged individualism. Again- these are empirically based..The 
movement to a printing press, individual literacy, schools, even the growth of 
universities..began to promote individualism.The US Declaration of Independence 
privileges individualism...

Even, I supposed, privileging the  wealth-producing sectors of the society 
could be understood as Peircean [as well as basic commonsense], for that part 
of the population that enables

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-20 Thread Mike Bergman


  
  
List,
I was imprecise in my use of the qualifier "all" in my
statement, "In the end, it is all wrong." The correct qualifier
that I meant to say is "partially". And, by "partially" I also
do not mean to imply that I personally know or believe what
portions of the argument may be wrong, just that "truth" in a
Peircean sense as I understand it is a limit function that can
be approximated and approached, but never fully achieved. I
apologize to Edwina for my imprecise language.
I think there are some fascinating questions raised by
Edwina's thesis posed by our move as a global economy to where
wealth comes increasingly from accumulated knowledge and
intelligent machines rather than human workers. I have posed those
questions to her offline.
Mike


On 11/20/2016 12:01 AM, Mike Bergman
  wrote:


  
  Stefan, the questions you ask for data and methodology are
  natural and understandable in terms of Peirce's abiding
  guidance on the scientific method and fallibility. Edwina, the
  evidence you offer is the best available given our current
  state of knowledge, and represents a reasonable and
  supportable hypothesis given the evidence.
  I think Peirce would approve of the inquiry of this thread,
  but not the last snide tone of your response, Stefan. This has
  been an interesting thread, and Edwina has put forward one of
  the more cogent summaries of how to look at the question of
  "why democracy" I have seen. In the end, it is all wrong, but
  it is something to strive to learn more from, not dismiss.
  Best, Mike
  On 11/19/2016 11:53 PM, sb wrote:
  
  


Edwina,

oh, this is a Peirce list, that's interesting, isn't it? What
kind of red hering is this? You keep writing this stuff on this
list for years over and over again. Now, when someone asks you
for some evidence of your "theory" you say you can't provide it
because this is a Peirce list? Why the heck do state that stuff
in the first place on this list over and over again?

Asking for evidence is quite a natural thing for scientists -
not willing to provide it for ideologists. 

Got nothing more to say and ask.

Best,
Stefan





Am 20. November 2016 03:36:35 MEZ,
  schrieb Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>:
  
Stefan - I can't deal with your
questions on this list, as it is a site devoted to
Peirce - and Peirce has nothing to do with ecological
analysis of societal adaptation. 
 
i may deal with it off-list - but
your questions are, to me, rather strange, for you seem
to be approaching societal adaptation as if it were some
kind of chemical formula carried out in a laboratory.
There are plenty of books on 'cultural ecology' [look up
the term]- which is basically what I'm talking about [R.
Netting, E. Moran.] And plenty of books dealing with
non-industrial societies, their physical environments,
their societal systems, their economies, their
populations sizes..etc. 

There are all kinds of data on population dynamics among
various groups..
 
As for technological change -
there are equally well-documented works on the
development of technology, the development of sources of
energy [manpower, animal, wind, water, fossil fuels,
etc]. The development of towns, of currency, roads,
...literacy etc...And there are plenty of books on
societal organization and the development of the middle
class market economy in the West. [J.D. Bernal,
Ferdinand Braudel..]
 
Edwina

  - Original Message -
  
  From: sb 
  To: Gary Richmond
; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Saturday,
    November 19, 2016 8:34 PM
  Subject: Re:
[PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy
  
  
  Edwina,
  
  where can we find these descriptive data? Did you use
  archival data? Did you do any fieldwork? Has it been
  published? What sources do you draw on? How did you
  conduct your qualitative research? What hypotheses

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-20 Thread Edwina Taborsky

Stefan - again, your CHOICE of assuming I have no proof, because I refuse to 
start up a discussion of these issues on a site devoted to Peirce, is just your 
own illogical and non-empirical opinion.

That's right - I provided the conclusions of these theories - again, because 
this site is not for these issues - about which Peirce really said 
not-one-word. I suggested going off-line but you ignored me.

Yes, I taught these FACTS for 20 plus years - and, as with all my classes, it 
was data-based analysis. 

No- it is absolutely not geodeterminism - what a conceptual error on your part, 
but factual reality about two key areas: First, the environment and second, 
human adapative capacities. A population HAS to acknowledge reality; that means 
ecological reality. It has to acknowledge the capacity - both benefits and 
limitations -  of that local environment to support a population; that means 
soil type, arability; water type and quantity; climate and temperature; local 
plants and animals; domesticative viability of  local plants and animals..which 
all deal with the 'carrying capacity' of the environment to support life - 
plant, animal and human.

All of these factual realities must be acknowledged - and then - you can move 
on to the very obvious adaptive strategies of population size [and how people 
limited its growth], settlement size and organizational infrastructure, 
migration, ..and the societal organization of the population...and the 
political...etc. 

We studied ten major societal systems - as basic human logical adaptations to 
the factual realities of their ecological environments - and - the changes that 
technological advances enabled. 

And yes, we explained why a growth economy requires an emphasis on individual 
rights. Actually, that bit IS Peircean, for he would acknowledge that freedom 
and spontaneity, which is a property of the individual and not the collective,  
provides novelty and thus, adaptive ideas...that might, just might, become 
habits of organization within the society. We studied how no-growth societies 
actually limited and disabled individualism, and how growth societies 
privileged individualism. Again- these are empirically based..The movement to a 
printing press, individual literacy, schools, even the growth of 
universities..began to promote individualism.The US Declaration of Independence 
privileges individualism...

Even, I supposed, privileging the  wealth-producing sectors of the society 
could be understood as Peircean [as well as basic commonsense], for that part 
of the population that enables continuity of type [pure Peirce] must have some 
form of dominance over the marginal deviations-from-the-norm.

And what happens when the population grows beyond the carrying capacity of the 
local environment and current technology? We studied that as well.

So- because I chose not to 'hog the thread' with non-Peircean analysis, does 
not mean, despite your words, that I have no proof. You obviously reject such a 
perspective -  calling it 'geodeterminism' [which it is not] - 

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: sb 
  To: Mike Bergman ; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu (IUPUI) 
  Sent: Sunday, November 20, 2016 7:48 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy


  Mike,

  Peirce would't approve that "last snide tone" if i would bar the road of 
inquiry. I don't do that. I just want somebody who makes big claims about how 
the social world works to back up her claims empirically. To discuss such 
complex things At least a clear theoretical outline of hypotheses and their 
relation is needed, an outline how to operationalize them and an outline how to 
proof them empirically.

  But in the initial post Edwina didn't fomulate hypotheses. She told everybody 
in an apodictic way how things work:

a.. That is, all political systems must privilege the wealth-producing 
sectors of the population 
b.. When the economy moves to a growth mode [and enables a growth 
population], the political system must empower those sectors of the population 
which make an economy grow. 
c.. For a growth economy to work, it must support individual rights" 
  If somebody talks this way i believe it has to be grounded on thorough 
empricial analysis which goes beyond "looking" at things. I would expect a bit 
more evidence from somebody who has developed an intoduction for dummies into 
the topic and taught this stuff to students for about 20 years.

  And no, giving shallow hints at streams of literature is not "the best 
available" evidence. Cultural ecology is not a monolithic block. Not everthing 
within it has the geodeterministic component Edwina gives it. I also adore the 
Annales School (Braudel), but there has been some work in economic history 
since then. Furthermore Vidal de la Blaches genre de vie didn't have - in 
contrast to Friedrich Ratzels ideas - this geodeterministic component. And 
since then there have be

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-20 Thread Edwina Taborsky

That's right, Stefan! It's a Peirce list - and I, and you, have no right to 
take it over for a discussion that has absolutely nothing to do with Peirce. I 
suggested going off-line but you, yourself, chose to keep it online and in 
addition, to insult and sneer at me. That was your choice.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: sb 
  To: Edwina Taborsky ; Gary Richmond ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Sunday, November 20, 2016 12:53 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

  Edwina,

  oh, this is a Peirce list, that's interesting, isn't it? What kind of red 
hering is this? You keep writing this stuff on this list for years over and 
over again. Now, when someone asks you for some evidence of your "theory" you 
say you can't provide it because this is a Peirce list? Why the heck do state 
that stuff in the first place on this list over and over again?

  Asking for evidence is quite a natural thing for scientists - not willing to 
provide it for Thaideologists. 

  Got nothing more to say and ask.

  Best,
  Stefan

  Am 20. November 2016 03:36:35 MEZ, schrieb Edwina Taborsky 
<tabor...@primus.ca>:
Stefan - I can't deal with your questions on this list, as it is a site 
devoted to Peirce - and Peirce has nothing to do with ecological analysis of 
societal adaptation. 

i may deal with it off-list - but your questions are, to me, rather 
strange, for you seem to be approaching societal adaptation as if it were some 
kind of chemical formula carried out in a laboratory. There are plenty of books 
on 'cultural ecology' [look up the term]- which is basically what I'm talking 
about [R. Netting, E. Moran.] And plenty of books dealing with non-industrial 
societies, their physical environments, their societal systems, their 
economies, their populations sizes..etc. 

There are all kinds of data on population dynamics among various groups..

As for technological change - there are equally well-documented works on 
the development of technology, the development of sources of energy [manpower, 
animal, wind, water, fossil fuels, etc]. The development of towns, of currency, 
roads, ...literacy etc...And there are plenty of books on societal organization 
and the development of the middle class market economy in the West. [J.D. 
Bernal, Ferdinand Braudel..]

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: sb 
  To: Gary Richmond ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Saturday, November 19, 2016 8:34 PM
      Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

  Edwina,

  where can we find these descriptive data? Did you use archival data? Did 
you do any fieldwork? Has it been published? What sources do you draw on? How 
did you conduct your qualitative research? What hypotheses guided your 
qualitative research? Have documented how you get to your conclusions? Could 
you provide us your analytical framework? What are the exact cases you did 
study? What are the dimensions of comparison between the cases? Where are they 
similar? Where are they different? What is your ecological analysis based on? 
Where did you get the ecological data? How did you link it with the cases you 
have studied? Have your heard of Qualitative Comparative Analysis?

  In short: Could you please provide us information on what data you did 
use, where to find these data, how you analyzed the data and where to find the 
documentation of your analysis to back up any of your claims?

  "Looking" at "the West", "late industrialism" and "climate", is a bit 
abstract, isn't it? I would really appreciate if you could elaborate a bit more 
on data and how you arrived at your conclusions, than on the conclusions 
themselfes. 

  Best,
  Stefan

  Am 20. November 2016 01:35:38 MEZ, schrieb Edwina Taborsky 
<tabor...@primus.ca>: 
Stefan - the analysis is based on descriptive data of the ecological 
anthropological analyses of various socioeconomic peoples - hunting/gathering; 
the different types of agriculturalism - wet and dry horticulture, pastoral 
nomadic, rainfall agriculture...and early and late industrialism. It includes 
first a consideration of the ecological realities in the area; second the 
socioeconomic descriptions of the way [kinship, political, legal] that people 
have adapted to those ecological realities..and third, the history and 
technological developments ...particularly of the West. Why the West? Because 
it has the richest most fertile biome on the planet - which is why its 
population kept increasing and why it eventually had to, with difficulty, 
change its technology to support that increased population.

Data would be based around ecological factors: arable land and soil, 
water type and availability [ie, desert, tundra, seasonal, irrigation, 
rainfall, rainforest..] ; climate and temperatures;  plant and animal types and 
the domestication capacities of both; carrying capacity of the land; c

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-20 Thread sb

ssage -
*From:* sb <mailto:peirc...@semiotikon.de>
*To:* Gary Richmond <mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com> ;
Peirce-L <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
        *Sent:* Saturday, November 19, 2016 8:34 PM
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

Edwina,

where can we find these descriptive data? Did you use
archival data? Did you do any fieldwork? Has it been
published? What sources do you draw on? How did you conduct
your qualitative research? What hypotheses guided your
qualitative research? Have documented how you get to your
conclusions? Could you provide us your analytical framework?
What are the exact cases you did study? What are the
dimensions of comparison between the cases? Where are they
similar? Where are they different? What is your ecological
analysis based on? Where did you get the ecological data? How
did you link it with the cases you have studied? Have your
heard of Qualitative Comparative Analysis?

In short: Could you please provide us information on what
data you did use, where to find these data, how you analyzed
the data and where to find the documentation of your analysis
to back up any of your claims?

"Looking" at "the West", "late industrialism" and "climate",
is a bit abstract, isn't it? I would really appreciate if you
could elaborate a bit more on data and how you arrived at
your conclusions, than on the conclusions themselfes.

Best,
Stefan


Am 20. November 2016 01:35:38 MEZ, schrieb Edwina Taborsky
<tabor...@primus.ca>:

Stefan - the analysis is based on descriptive data of the
ecological anthropological analyses of various
socioeconomic peoples - hunting/gathering; the different
types of agriculturalism - wet and dry horticulture,
pastoral nomadic, rainfall agriculture...and early and
late industrialism. It includes first a consideration of
the ecological realities in the area; second the
socioeconomic descriptions of the way [kinship,
political, legal] that people have adapted to those
ecological realities..and third, the history and
technological developments ...particularly of the West.
Why the West? Because it has the richest most
fertile biome on the planet - which is why its population
kept increasing and why it eventually had to, with
difficulty, change its technology to support that
increased population.
Data would be based around ecological factors: arable
land and soil, water type and availability [ie, desert,
tundra, seasonal, irrigation, rainfall, rainforest..] ;
climate and temperatures;  plant and animal types and the
domestication capacities of both; carrying capacity of
the land; carrying capacity of the technology to extract
food/sustenance;
Then, you'd look at population size. And then societal
systems - such as kinship systems, and political systems.
There is no lab test possible; there are no falsifying
assumptions. It's pure description of 'the ecological
realities and the societal forms of actual peoples. Then,
one can generalize. And it's interesting to see how
peoples - completely out of touch with each other - have
nevertheless developed the SAME societal structures if
they are in similar ecological realities.
Edwina

- Original Message -
*From:* sb <mailto:peirc...@semiotikon.de>
*To:* Edwina Taborsky <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca> ;
Gary Richmond <mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com> ;
            Peirce-L <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
*Sent:* Saturday, November 19, 2016 6:35 PM
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

Edwina,

i would be really interested how you tackled such a
complex theoretical concept empirically.

Which historic datasets of demography and economics
did you use? To build up such a database must have
been quite labourious!

I would also be really interested in how you
operationalized your theory? What constructs and
variables did you use? In which datasets are they
found? How did you model your assumptions statistically?

In testing your theory, what were your initial
hypotheses? Where have you been able to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-19 Thread Mike Bergman


  
  
Stefan, the questions you ask for data and methodology are
natural and understandable in terms of Peirce's abiding guidance
on the scientific method and fallibility. Edwina, the evidence
you offer is the best available given our current state of
knowledge, and represents a reasonable and supportable
hypothesis given the evidence.
I think Peirce would approve of the inquiry of this thread,
but not the last snide tone of your response, Stefan. This has
been an interesting thread, and Edwina has put forward one of
the more cogent summaries of how to look at the question of "why
democracy" I have seen. In the end, it is all wrong, but it is
something to strive to learn more from, not dismiss.
Best, Mike
On 11/19/2016 11:53 PM, sb wrote:


  
  
  Edwina,
  
  oh, this is a Peirce list, that's interesting, isn't it? What kind
  of red hering is this? You keep writing this stuff on this list
  for years over and over again. Now, when someone asks you for some
  evidence of your "theory" you say you can't provide it because
  this is a Peirce list? Why the heck do state that stuff in the
  first place on this list over and over again?
  
  Asking for evidence is quite a natural thing for scientists - not
  willing to provide it for ideologists. 
  
  Got nothing more to say and ask.
  
  Best,
  Stefan
  
  
  
  
  
  Am 20. November 2016 03:36:35 MEZ,
schrieb Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>:

  Stefan - I can't deal with your
  questions on this list, as it is a site devoted to Peirce
  - and Peirce has nothing to do with ecological analysis of
  societal adaptation. 
   
  i may deal with it off-list - but
  your questions are, to me, rather strange, for you seem to
  be approaching societal adaptation as if it were some kind
  of chemical formula carried out in a laboratory. There are
  plenty of books on 'cultural ecology' [look up the term]-
  which is basically what I'm talking about [R. Netting, E.
  Moran.] And plenty of books dealing with non-industrial
  societies, their physical environments, their societal
  systems, their economies, their populations sizes..etc. 
  
  There are all kinds of data on population dynamics among
  various groups..
   
  As for technological change - there
  are equally well-documented works on the development of
  technology, the development of sources of energy
  [manpower, animal, wind, water, fossil fuels, etc]. The
  development of towns, of currency, roads, ...literacy
  etc...And there are plenty of books on societal
  organization and the development of the middle class
  market economy in the West. [J.D. Bernal, Ferdinand
  Braudel..]
   
  Edwina
  
- Original Message - 
From: sb 
To: Gary Richmond
  ; Peirce-L 
Sent: Saturday,
  November 19, 2016 8:34 PM
    Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L]
  Peirce and Democracy


Edwina,

where can we find these descriptive data? Did you use
archival data? Did you do any fieldwork? Has it been
published? What sources do you draw on? How did you conduct
your qualitative research? What hypotheses guided your
qualitative research? Have documented how you get to your
conclusions? Could you provide us your analytical framework?
What are the exact cases you did study? What are the
dimensions of comparison between the cases? Where are they
similar? Where are they different? What is your ecological
analysis based on? Where did you get the ecological data?
How did you link it with the cases you have studied? Have
your heard of Qualitative Comparative Analysis?

In short: Could you please provide us information on what
data you did use, where to find these data, how you analyzed
the data and where to find the documentation of your
analysis to back up any of your claims?

"Looking" at "the West", "late industrialism" and "climate",
is a bit abstract, isn't it? I would really appreciate if
you could elaborate a bit more on data and how you arrived
at your conclusions, than on the conclusions themselfes. 

Be

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-19 Thread sb

Edwina,

oh, this is a Peirce list, that's interesting, isn't it? What kind of red 
hering is this? You keep writing this stuff on this list for years over and 
over again. Now, when someone asks you for some evidence of your "theory" you 
say you can't provide it because this is a Peirce list? Why the heck do state 
that stuff in the first place on this list over and over again?

Asking for evidence is quite a natural thing for scientists - not willing to 
provide it for ideologists. 

Got nothing more to say and ask.

Best,
Stefan





Am 20. November 2016 03:36:35 MEZ, schrieb Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>:
>Stefan - I can't deal with your questions on this list, as it is a site
>devoted to Peirce - and Peirce has nothing to do with ecological
>analysis of societal adaptation. 
>
>i may deal with it off-list - but your questions are, to me, rather
>strange, for you seem to be approaching societal adaptation as if it
>were some kind of chemical formula carried out in a laboratory. There
>are plenty of books on 'cultural ecology' [look up the term]- which is
>basically what I'm talking about [R. Netting, E. Moran.] And plenty of
>books dealing with non-industrial societies, their physical
>environments, their societal systems, their economies, their
>populations sizes..etc. 
>
>There are all kinds of data on population dynamics among various
>groups..
>
>As for technological change - there are equally well-documented works
>on the development of technology, the development of sources of energy
>[manpower, animal, wind, water, fossil fuels, etc]. The development of
>towns, of currency, roads, ...literacy etc...And there are plenty of
>books on societal organization and the development of the middle class
>market economy in the West. [J.D. Bernal, Ferdinand Braudel..]
>
>Edwina
>  - Original Message - 
>  From: sb 
>  To: Gary Richmond ; Peirce-L 
>  Sent: Saturday, November 19, 2016 8:34 PM
>  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy
>
>
>  Edwina,
>
>where can we find these descriptive data? Did you use archival data?
>Did you do any fieldwork? Has it been published? What sources do you
>draw on? How did you conduct your qualitative research? What hypotheses
>guided your qualitative research? Have documented how you get to your
>conclusions? Could you provide us your analytical framework? What are
>the exact cases you did study? What are the dimensions of comparison
>between the cases? Where are they similar? Where are they different?
>What is your ecological analysis based on? Where did you get the
>ecological data? How did you link it with the cases you have studied?
>Have your heard of Qualitative Comparative Analysis?
>
>In short: Could you please provide us information on what data you did
>use, where to find these data, how you analyzed the data and where to
>find the documentation of your analysis to back up any of your claims?
>
>"Looking" at "the West", "late industrialism" and "climate", is a bit
>abstract, isn't it? I would really appreciate if you could elaborate a
>bit more on data and how you arrived at your conclusions, than on the
>conclusions themselfes. 
>
>  Best,
>  Stefan
>
>
>
>Am 20. November 2016 01:35:38 MEZ, schrieb Edwina Taborsky
><tabor...@primus.ca>:
>Stefan - the analysis is based on descriptive data of the ecological
>anthropological analyses of various socioeconomic peoples -
>hunting/gathering; the different types of agriculturalism - wet and dry
>horticulture, pastoral nomadic, rainfall agriculture...and early and
>late industrialism. It includes first a consideration of the ecological
>realities in the area; second the socioeconomic descriptions of the way
>[kinship, political, legal] that people have adapted to those
>ecological realities..and third, the history and technological
>developments ...particularly of the West. Why the West? Because it has
>the richest most fertile biome on the planet - which is why its
>population kept increasing and why it eventually had to, with
>difficulty, change its technology to support that increased population.
>
>Data would be based around ecological factors: arable land and soil,
>water type and availability [ie, desert, tundra, seasonal, irrigation,
>rainfall, rainforest..] ; climate and temperatures;  plant and animal
>types and the domestication capacities of both; carrying capacity of
>the land; carrying capacity of the technology to extract
>food/sustenance; 
>
>Then, you'd look at population size. And then societal systems - such
>as kinship systems, and political systems.
>
>There is no lab test possible; there are no falsifying assumptions.
>It's pure description of 'the ecological re

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-19 Thread John F Sowa


On 11/19/2016 6:14 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

I don't think that democracy 'is human destiny', and I don't
believe that we are moving 'in the direction of goodness'.


I agree.  Just look at history.

Greece and Rome had democracies.  But both of those democracies were
toppled by tyrants (AKA monarchs) (AKA emperors) (AKA dictators).

Over the centuries there have been many kinds of governments
with voting systems, but the voters were usually a limited
number of property owners.  Sometimes they were privileged
nobility (e.g., the nobles who forced the king to sign the
Magna Cara).

But those elective systems are usually very unstable.
Look at all the monarchs, emperors, and republics that
France had after their big revolution at the end of the
18th century.

The United States is the world's oldest surviving democracy.
The many checks and balances in the Constitution have often
led to stagnation (as in recent years), but they have
successfully prevented a takeover by a dictator -- at least
until now.  Let's hope it survives another 4 years.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

Stefan - I can't deal with your questions on this list, as it is a site devoted 
to Peirce - and Peirce has nothing to do with ecological analysis of societal 
adaptation. 

i may deal with it off-list - but your questions are, to me, rather strange, 
for you seem to be approaching societal adaptation as if it were some kind of 
chemical formula carried out in a laboratory. There are plenty of books on 
'cultural ecology' [look up the term]- which is basically what I'm talking 
about [R. Netting, E. Moran.] And plenty of books dealing with non-industrial 
societies, their physical environments, their societal systems, their 
economies, their populations sizes..etc. 

There are all kinds of data on population dynamics among various groups..

As for technological change - there are equally well-documented works on the 
development of technology, the development of sources of energy [manpower, 
animal, wind, water, fossil fuels, etc]. The development of towns, of currency, 
roads, ...literacy etc...And there are plenty of books on societal organization 
and the development of the middle class market economy in the West. [J.D. 
Bernal, Ferdinand Braudel..]

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: sb 
  To: Gary Richmond ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Saturday, November 19, 2016 8:34 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy


  Edwina,

  where can we find these descriptive data? Did you use archival data? Did you 
do any fieldwork? Has it been published? What sources do you draw on? How did 
you conduct your qualitative research? What hypotheses guided your qualitative 
research? Have documented how you get to your conclusions? Could you provide us 
your analytical framework? What are the exact cases you did study? What are the 
dimensions of comparison between the cases? Where are they similar? Where are 
they different? What is your ecological analysis based on? Where did you get 
the ecological data? How did you link it with the cases you have studied? Have 
your heard of Qualitative Comparative Analysis?

  In short: Could you please provide us information on what data you did use, 
where to find these data, how you analyzed the data and where to find the 
documentation of your analysis to back up any of your claims?

  "Looking" at "the West", "late industrialism" and "climate", is a bit 
abstract, isn't it? I would really appreciate if you could elaborate a bit more 
on data and how you arrived at your conclusions, than on the conclusions 
themselfes. 

  Best,
  Stefan



  Am 20. November 2016 01:35:38 MEZ, schrieb Edwina Taborsky 
<tabor...@primus.ca>:
Stefan - the analysis is based on descriptive data of the ecological 
anthropological analyses of various socioeconomic peoples - hunting/gathering; 
the different types of agriculturalism - wet and dry horticulture, pastoral 
nomadic, rainfall agriculture...and early and late industrialism. It includes 
first a consideration of the ecological realities in the area; second the 
socioeconomic descriptions of the way [kinship, political, legal] that people 
have adapted to those ecological realities..and third, the history and 
technological developments ...particularly of the West. Why the West? Because 
it has the richest most fertile biome on the planet - which is why its 
population kept increasing and why it eventually had to, with difficulty, 
change its technology to support that increased population.

Data would be based around ecological factors: arable land and soil, water 
type and availability [ie, desert, tundra, seasonal, irrigation, rainfall, 
rainforest..] ; climate and temperatures;  plant and animal types and the 
domestication capacities of both; carrying capacity of the land; carrying 
capacity of the technology to extract food/sustenance; 

Then, you'd look at population size. And then societal systems - such as 
kinship systems, and political systems.

There is no lab test possible; there are no falsifying assumptions. It's 
pure description of 'the ecological realities and the societal forms of actual 
peoples. Then, one can generalize. And it's interesting to see how peoples - 
completely out of touch with each other - have nevertheless developed the SAME 
societal structures if they are in similar ecological realities.

Edwina




  - Original Message - 
  From: sb 
  To: Edwina Taborsky ; Gary Richmond ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Saturday, November 19, 2016 6:35 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy


  Edwina,

  i would be really interested how you tackled such a complex theoretical 
concept empirically. 

  Which historic datasets of demography and economics did you use? To build 
up such a database must have been quite labourious!

  I would also be really interested in how you operationalized your theory? 
What constructs and variables did you use? In which datasets are they found? 
How did you model you

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-19 Thread sb

Edwina,

where can we find these descriptive data? Did you use archival data? Did you do 
any fieldwork? Has it been published? What sources do you draw on? How did you 
conduct your qualitative research? What hypotheses guided your qualitative 
research? Have documented how you get to your conclusions? Could you provide us 
your analytical framework? What are the exact cases you did study? What are the 
dimensions of comparison between the cases? Where are they similar? Where are 
they different? What is your ecological analysis based on? Where did you get 
the ecological data? How did you link it with the cases you have studied? Have 
your heard of Qualitative Comparative Analysis?

In short: Could you please provide us information on what data you did use, 
where to find these data, how you analyzed the data and where to find the 
documentation of your analysis to back up any of your claims?

"Looking" at "the West", "late industrialism" and "climate", is a bit abstract, 
isn't it? I would really appreciate if you could elaborate a bit more on data 
and how you arrived at your conclusions, than on the conclusions themselfes. 

Best,
Stefan


Am 20. November 2016 01:35:38 MEZ, schrieb Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>:
>Stefan - the analysis is based on descriptive data of the ecological
>anthropological analyses of various socioeconomic peoples -
>hunting/gathering; the different types of agriculturalism - wet and dry
>horticulture, pastoral nomadic, rainfall agriculture...and early and
>late industrialism. It includes first a consideration of the ecological
>realities in the area; second the socioeconomic descriptions of the way
>[kinship, political, legal] that people have adapted to those
>ecological realities..and third, the history and technological
>developments ...particularly of the West. Why the West? Because it has
>the richest most fertile biome on the planet - which is why its
>population kept increasing and why it eventually had to, with
>difficulty, change its technology to support that increased population.
>
>Data would be based around ecological factors: arable land and soil,
>water type and availability [ie, desert, tundra, seasonal, irrigation,
>rainfall, rainforest..] ; climate and temperatures;  plant and animal
>types and the domestication capacities of both; carrying capacity of
>the land; carrying capacity of the technology to extract
>food/sustenance; 
>
>Then, you'd look at population size. And then societal systems - such
>as kinship systems, and political systems.
>
>There is no lab test possible; there are no falsifying assumptions.
>It's pure description of 'the ecological realities and the societal
>forms of actual peoples. Then, one can generalize. And it's interesting
>to see how peoples - completely out of touch with each other - have
>nevertheless developed the SAME societal structures if they are in
>similar ecological realities.
>
>Edwina
>
>
>
>
>  ----- Original Message - 
>  From: sb 
>  To: Edwina Taborsky ; Gary Richmond ; Peirce-L 
>  Sent: Saturday, November 19, 2016 6:35 PM
>  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy
>
>
>  Edwina,
>
>i would be really interested how you tackled such a complex theoretical
>concept empirically. 
>
>Which historic datasets of demography and economics did you use? To
>build up such a database must have been quite labourious!
>
>I would also be really interested in how you operationalized your
>theory? What constructs and variables did you use? In which datasets
>are they found? How did you model your assumptions statistically?
>
>In testing your theory, what were your initial hypotheses? Where have
>you been able to falsify or verify your assumptions? Where did you
>struggle empirically because of data quality? 
>
>  Best,
>  Stefan
>
>
>Am 19. November 2016 22:48:20 MEZ, schrieb Edwina Taborsky
><tabor...@primus.ca>:
>Yes - I've taught this relationship between economics, population size
>and political infrastructure for about 20 years. No- it's not really in
>the Architectonics  book. It IS in a graphic book, The Graphic Guide to
>Socioeconomics - which a retired CEO banker and myself have just
>finished [about 170 slides]which deals with the pragmatic relations
>between population size and economic modes and political modes.  I am
>not sure if I should attach it since is has nothing to do with Peirce.
>It's a powerpoint presentation which we are planning to promote as a
>'graphic guide for dummies' on the topic, so to speak. 
>
>That is - we tried to make it clear that democracy, which means
>'political power of the majority decision' is suitable only in large
>population, flexible-risktaking- growth economies, and unsuitable i

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-19 Thread Stephen C. Rose

I don't know what Peirce thought about this, but I see democracy as an
ontological term that covers all governance and is the standard by which
all goverance should be evaluated. I do not believe it relates to size of
population or other demographic benchmarks. It has to do with the rights of
the individual and the needs of all. These are in tension. It makes little
sense to argue about this because I am certain that my view is not germane
to a Pierce forum. As to the notion that the US is not a democracy but a
republic, that is a favorite from the 50s when Robert Welch proclaimed it.
That would set up a binary betwixt democracy and republic. Fine but again
not germane, at least to the context I am using. It would of course make me
happy to see democracy widened in its meaning to embrace everything about
it that makes it universally desirable as a polity, fit to the situations
where it is embraced.

Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU

On Sat, Nov 19, 2016 at 7:54 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Stephen, List:
>
> I would suggest that democracy IS majority rule, and thus that the United
> States is NOT a democracy.  Instead, it is a republic; in particular, a
> federal republic, with numerous checks and balances intended to prevent the
> concentration of power in any one person or institution--including, most
> notably, the majority of the population.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sat, Nov 19, 2016 at 6:36 PM, Stephen C. Rose 
> wrote:
>
>> Edwina, List
>>
>> To take only one point, I emphatically hold that democracy is much more
>> than majority rule.  We have just had an election which we would have to
>> denote undemocratic if that was the case. As a polity I favor a
>> constitutional democracy such as the we we have in the US. In addition to
>> not being rule by a simple majority, democracy is a skein of things, among
>> them rights, a mode of personal behavior, an ideal for all social and
>> community polities and an itemization or index of precious rights such as
>> we have in our Bill of Rights. I do not mean to minimize your project which
>> has intrinsic interest relevant t the topic. But the definition as majority
>> rule is on its face inadequate to express what democracy is in a system or
>> ethics.
>>
>> Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU
>>
>

-
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-19 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Stephen, List:

I would suggest that democracy IS majority rule, and thus that the United
States is NOT a democracy.  Instead, it is a republic; in particular, a
federal republic, with numerous checks and balances intended to prevent the
concentration of power in any one person or institution--including, most
notably, the majority of the population.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Nov 19, 2016 at 6:36 PM, Stephen C. Rose 
wrote:

> Edwina, List
>
> To take only one point, I emphatically hold that democracy is much more
> than majority rule.  We have just had an election which we would have to
> denote undemocratic if that was the case. As a polity I favor a
> constitutional democracy such as the we we have in the US. In addition to
> not being rule by a simple majority, democracy is a skein of things, among
> them rights, a mode of personal behavior, an ideal for all social and
> community polities and an itemization or index of precious rights such as
> we have in our Bill of Rights. I do not mean to minimize your project which
> has intrinsic interest relevant t the topic. But the definition as majority
> rule is on its face inadequate to express what democracy is in a system or
> ethics.
>
> Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU
>

-
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to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

Stephan - Of course a democracy - and all modes of political operation - are 
carried out within some form of legal legitimization or constitution [written 
or oral].

And you are quite right to caution, strongly caution, against 'simple 
democracy' [see Aristotle's comments on this in his Politics] - as this can be 
the terrible 'tyranny of the majority'. That's why there must be measures to 
prevent such a tyranny. I like Karl Popper's outline of 'The Open Society and 
Its Enemies' for a discussion of such things. See also Natan Sharansky, 'The 
Case for Democracy'.

Here in Canada, we DO have this tyranny, where the big cities have the most MPs 
[members of parliament] and winning a big city can mean the power to form the 
govt. For example, Toronto has more MPs than ALL of two big provinces: Manitoba 
and Saskatchewan - so, catering to the citizens of Toronto can give you control 
of the govt. That's not good!

All societies have correct modes of social behaviour, a belief in citizen 
rights, an ideal mode of life - whether the political system is hereditary 
tribalism or..democracy.

My point is not to reject democracy - which I don't But to point out that 
it is a system of governance intimately tied to the size of the population. And 
this population size is itself intimately linked to the economic mode. And the 
economic mode is linked to the ecological realities of where that population 
exists. eg..you can't grow wheat in the arctic!!

The US Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights is one of the, if not 
THE most magnificent declaration of human freedom and rights ever created by 
man. I keep a copy beside my desk.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Stephen C. Rose 
  To: sb 
  Cc: Edwina Taborsky ; Gary Richmond ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Saturday, November 19, 2016 7:36 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy


  Edwina, List


  To take only one point, I emphatically hold that democracy is much more than 
majority rule.  We have just had an election which we would have to denote 
undemocratic if that was the case. As a polity I favor a constitutional 
democracy such as the we we have in the US. In addition to not being rule by a 
simple majority, democracy is a skein of things, among them rights, a mode of 
personal behavior, an ideal for all social and community polities and an 
itemization or index of precious rights such as we have in our Bill of Rights. 
I do not mean to minimize your project which has intrinsic interest relevant t 
the topic. But the definition as majority rule is on its face inadequate to 
express what democracy is in a system or ethics. 


  Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU 


  On Sat, Nov 19, 2016 at 6:35 PM, sb <peirc...@semiotikon.de> wrote:

Edwina,

i would be really interested how you tackled such a complex theoretical 
concept empirically. 

Which historic datasets of demography and economics did you use? To build 
up such a database must have been quite labourious!

I would also be really interested in how you operationalized your theory? 
What constructs and variables did you use? In which datasets are they found? 
How did you model your assumptions statistically?

In testing your theory, what were your initial hypotheses? Where have you 
been able to falsify or verify your assumptions? Where did you struggle 
empirically because of data quality? 

Best,
Stefan


Am 19. November 2016 22:48:20 MEZ, schrieb Edwina Taborsky 
<tabor...@primus.ca>:
  Yes - I've taught this relationship between economics, population size 
and political infrastructure for about 20 years. No- it's not really in the 
Architectonics  book. It IS in a graphic book, The Graphic Guide to 
Socioeconomics - which a retired CEO banker and myself have just finished 
[about 170 slides]which deals with the pragmatic relations between 
population size and economic modes and political modes.  I am not sure if I 
should attach it since is has nothing to do with Peirce. It's a powerpoint 
presentation which we are planning to promote as a 'graphic guide for dummies' 
on the topic, so to speak. 

  That is - we tried to make it clear that democracy, which means 
'political power of the majority decision' is suitable only in large 
population, flexible-risktaking- growth economies, and unsuitable in small 
population no-growth steady-state economies which must ensure their economic 
continuity by focusing on retaining the capacity-to-make-wealth by stable 
measures [control of the land, control of the cattle, control of fishing 
rights, etc]. 

  And we've been very surprised in our test runs with various people - how 
many people don't understand the basic issues of growth/no growth economies, 
carrying capacity of the economy; growth vs steady-state populations; what is a 
middle class; what is capitalism; the role of risk; the role of 
individuals..etc. etc. 

  Edwina
- Original Message -

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-19 Thread Stephen C. Rose

Edwina, List

To take only one point, I emphatically hold that democracy is much more
than majority rule.  We have just had an election which we would have to
denote undemocratic if that was the case. As a polity I favor a
constitutional democracy such as the we we have in the US. In addition to
not being rule by a simple majority, democracy is a skein of things, among
them rights, a mode of personal behavior, an ideal for all social and
community polities and an itemization or index of precious rights such as
we have in our Bill of Rights. I do not mean to minimize your project which
has intrinsic interest relevant t the topic. But the definition as majority
rule is on its face inadequate to express what democracy is in a system or
ethics.

Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU

On Sat, Nov 19, 2016 at 6:35 PM, sb <peirc...@semiotikon.de> wrote:

> Edwina,
>
> i would be really interested how you tackled such a complex theoretical
> concept empirically.
>
> Which historic datasets of demography and economics did you use? To build
> up such a database must have been quite labourious!
>
> I would also be really interested in how you operationalized your theory?
> What constructs and variables did you use? In which datasets are they
> found? How did you model your assumptions statistically?
>
> In testing your theory, what were your initial hypotheses? Where have you
> been able to falsify or verify your assumptions? Where did you struggle
> empirically because of data quality?
>
> Best,
> Stefan
>
> Am 19. November 2016 22:48:20 MEZ, schrieb Edwina Taborsky <
> tabor...@primus.ca>:
>>
>> Yes - I've taught this relationship between economics, population size
>> and political infrastructure for about 20 years. No- it's not really in the
>> *Architectonics*  book. It IS in a graphic book, *The Graphic Guide to
>> Socioeconomics* - which a retired CEO banker and myself have just
>> finished [about 170 slides]which deals with the pragmatic relations
>> between population size and economic modes and political modes.  I am not
>> sure if I should attach it since is has nothing to do with Peirce. It's a
>> powerpoint presentation which we are planning to promote as a 'graphic
>> guide for dummies' on the topic, so to speak.
>>
>> That is - we tried to make it clear that democracy, which means
>> 'political power of the majority decision' is suitable only in large
>> population, flexible-risktaking- growth economies, and unsuitable in small
>> population no-growth steady-state economies which must ensure their
>> economic continuity by focusing on retaining the capacity-to-make-wealth by
>> stable measures [control of the land, control of the cattle, control of
>> fishing rights, etc].
>>
>> And we've been very surprised in our test runs with various people - how
>> many people don't understand the basic issues of growth/no growth
>> economies, carrying capacity of the economy; growth vs steady-state
>> populations; what is a middle class; what is capitalism; the role of risk;
>> the role of individuals..etc. etc.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> - Original Message -
>> *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
>> *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>> *Sent:* Saturday, November 19, 2016 4:20 PM
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy
>>
>> Edwina, list,
>>
>> You've clearly given this a lot of prior thought, Edwina. I want to
>> reflect on wht you wrote and see what others think before commenting
>> further. Btw, would looking again at your book, *Architectonics of
>> Semiosis*, for example, Chapter 2, "Purity and Power," be of any value
>> in this discussion (as I initially began reading it I recall that in an
>> off-list message you commented that in some ways you were now seeing things
>> quite differently than you did in 1998)?
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>>
>> [image: Gary Richmond]
>>
>> *Gary Richmond*
>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>> *Communication Studies*
>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>> *C 745*
>> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>>
>> On Sat, Nov 19, 2016 at 4:01 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Gary R- that's an interesting topic.
>>>
>>> 1) I'd like to first comment that *democracy*, as a political system
>>> for arriving at authoritative government decisions, is the 'right' method
>>> but ONLY in a very large population with a growth economy and a growth
>>> population. That is, political systems have FUNCTIONS; th

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

Stefan - the analysis is based on descriptive data of the ecological 
anthropological analyses of various socioeconomic peoples - hunting/gathering; 
the different types of agriculturalism - wet and dry horticulture, pastoral 
nomadic, rainfall agriculture...and early and late industrialism. It includes 
first a consideration of the ecological realities in the area; second the 
socioeconomic descriptions of the way [kinship, political, legal] that people 
have adapted to those ecological realities..and third, the history and 
technological developments ...particularly of the West. Why the West? Because 
it has the richest most fertile biome on the planet - which is why its 
population kept increasing and why it eventually had to, with difficulty, 
change its technology to support that increased population.

Data would be based around ecological factors: arable land and soil, water type 
and availability [ie, desert, tundra, seasonal, irrigation, rainfall, 
rainforest..] ; climate and temperatures;  plant and animal types and the 
domestication capacities of both; carrying capacity of the land; carrying 
capacity of the technology to extract food/sustenance; 

Then, you'd look at population size. And then societal systems - such as 
kinship systems, and political systems.

There is no lab test possible; there are no falsifying assumptions. It's pure 
description of 'the ecological realities and the societal forms of actual 
peoples. Then, one can generalize. And it's interesting to see how peoples - 
completely out of touch with each other - have nevertheless developed the SAME 
societal structures if they are in similar ecological realities.

Edwina




  - Original Message - 
  From: sb 
  To: Edwina Taborsky ; Gary Richmond ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Saturday, November 19, 2016 6:35 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy


  Edwina,

  i would be really interested how you tackled such a complex theoretical 
concept empirically. 

  Which historic datasets of demography and economics did you use? To build up 
such a database must have been quite labourious!

  I would also be really interested in how you operationalized your theory? 
What constructs and variables did you use? In which datasets are they found? 
How did you model your assumptions statistically?

  In testing your theory, what were your initial hypotheses? Where have you 
been able to falsify or verify your assumptions? Where did you struggle 
empirically because of data quality? 

  Best,
  Stefan


  Am 19. November 2016 22:48:20 MEZ, schrieb Edwina Taborsky 
<tabor...@primus.ca>:
Yes - I've taught this relationship between economics, population size and 
political infrastructure for about 20 years. No- it's not really in the 
Architectonics  book. It IS in a graphic book, The Graphic Guide to 
Socioeconomics - which a retired CEO banker and myself have just finished 
[about 170 slides]which deals with the pragmatic relations between 
population size and economic modes and political modes.  I am not sure if I 
should attach it since is has nothing to do with Peirce. It's a powerpoint 
presentation which we are planning to promote as a 'graphic guide for dummies' 
on the topic, so to speak. 

That is - we tried to make it clear that democracy, which means 'political 
power of the majority decision' is suitable only in large population, 
flexible-risktaking- growth economies, and unsuitable in small population 
no-growth steady-state economies which must ensure their economic continuity by 
focusing on retaining the capacity-to-make-wealth by stable measures [control 
of the land, control of the cattle, control of fishing rights, etc]. 

And we've been very surprised in our test runs with various people - how 
many people don't understand the basic issues of growth/no growth economies, 
carrying capacity of the economy; growth vs steady-state populations; what is a 
middle class; what is capitalism; the role of risk; the role of 
individuals..etc. etc. 

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Gary Richmond 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Saturday, November 19, 2016 4:20 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy


  Edwina, list,


  You've clearly given this a lot of prior thought, Edwina. I want to 
reflect on wht you wrote and see what others think before commenting further. 
Btw, would looking again at your book, Architectonics of Semiosis, for example, 
Chapter 2, "Purity and Power," be of any value in this discussion (as I 
initially began reading it I recall that in an off-list message you commented 
that in some ways you were now seeing things quite differently than you did in 
1998)?


  Best,


  Gary R








  Gary Richmond
  Philosophy and Critical Thinking
  Communication Studies
  LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
  C 745
  718 482-5690


  On Sat, Nov 19, 2016 at 4:01 PM, Edwina

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-19 Thread Jerry Rhee

Stefan, Edwina, list:

Great questions!

Yes, Edwina, what is the icon, the index and the symbol?

Best,
Jerry R

On Sat, Nov 19, 2016 at 5:35 PM, sb <peirc...@semiotikon.de> wrote:

> Edwina,
>
> i would be really interested how you tackled such a complex theoretical
> concept empirically.
>
> Which historic datasets of demography and economics did you use? To build
> up such a database must have been quite labourious!
>
> I would also be really interested in how you operationalized your theory?
> What constructs and variables did you use? In which datasets are they
> found? How did you model your assumptions statistically?
>
> In testing your theory, what were your initial hypotheses? Where have you
> been able to falsify or verify your assumptions? Where did you struggle
> empirically because of data quality?
>
> Best,
> Stefan
>
>
> Am 19. November 2016 22:48:20 MEZ, schrieb Edwina Taborsky <
> tabor...@primus.ca>:
>>
>> Yes - I've taught this relationship between economics, population size
>> and political infrastructure for about 20 years. No- it's not really in the
>> *Architectonics*  book. It IS in a graphic book, *The Graphic Guide to
>> Socioeconomics* - which a retired CEO banker and myself have just
>> finished [about 170 slides]which deals with the pragmatic relations
>> between population size and economic modes and political modes.  I am not
>> sure if I should attach it since is has nothing to do with Peirce. It's a
>> powerpoint presentation which we are planning to promote as a 'graphic
>> guide for dummies' on the topic, so to speak.
>>
>> That is - we tried to make it clear that democracy, which means
>> 'political power of the majority decision' is suitable only in large
>> population, flexible-risktaking- growth economies, and unsuitable in small
>> population no-growth steady-state economies which must ensure their
>> economic continuity by focusing on retaining the capacity-to-make-wealth by
>> stable measures [control of the land, control of the cattle, control of
>> fishing rights, etc].
>>
>> And we've been very surprised in our test runs with various people - how
>> many people don't understand the basic issues of growth/no growth
>> economies, carrying capacity of the economy; growth vs steady-state
>> populations; what is a middle class; what is capitalism; the role of risk;
>> the role of individuals..etc. etc.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> - Original Message -
>> *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
>> *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>> *Sent:* Saturday, November 19, 2016 4:20 PM
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy
>>
>> Edwina, list,
>>
>> You've clearly given this a lot of prior thought, Edwina. I want to
>> reflect on wht you wrote and see what others think before commenting
>> further. Btw, would looking again at your book, *Architectonics of
>> Semiosis*, for example, Chapter 2, "Purity and Power," be of any value
>> in this discussion (as I initially began reading it I recall that in an
>> off-list message you commented that in some ways you were now seeing things
>> quite differently than you did in 1998)?
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>>
>> [image: Gary Richmond]
>>
>> *Gary Richmond*
>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>> *Communication Studies*
>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>> *C 745*
>> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>>
>> On Sat, Nov 19, 2016 at 4:01 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Gary R- that's an interesting topic.
>>>
>>> 1) I'd like to first comment that *democracy*, as a political system
>>> for arriving at authoritative government decisions, is the 'right' method
>>> but ONLY in a very large population with a growth economy and a growth
>>> population. That is, political systems have FUNCTIONS; the function is: who
>>> has the societal right to make decisions among this population?
>>>
>>> In economies which are *no-growth*, such as all the pre-industrial
>>> agricultural and horticultural economies which dominated the planet until
>>> the industrial age, democracy is dysfunctional. That is, all political
>>> systems must privilege the wealth-producing sectors of the population. If
>>> your economy is agricultural/horticultural - which can only produce enough
>>> wealth to support a *steady-state* or no-growth population, then, the
>>> political system must put th

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

Stephen, list: I don't think that democracy 'is human destiny', and I don't 
believe that we are moving 'in the direction of goodness'. Perhaps that's my 
cynicism but i don't think that man gets kinder, better as the centuries pass. 
I think our basic emotional psychological natures preclude that. - So, my view 
is that tribal hereditary govts can be 'right' in a particular economic mode 
[steady state, no growth]...and democracy is right in a different economic mode 
[growth]. 

Therefore, for example, I think it was wrong/ill-informed for Europeans many 
years ago to insist that indigeneous tribes elect a chief to meet with them to 
discuss trade and treaties. These tribes had hereditary leadership - and 
electing a leader broke up the stable infrastructure and moved the tribe into a 
pattern of openness to bribes and kin-based conflicts.

Democracy only means: decisions are made by the majority of the population. 
There is no inherent 'goodness' or morality attached to it - but, it is the 
only correct method for a large, growth economy requiring flexible adaptive 
actions and risk-taking. And- to prevent democracy in large populations by, eg, 
dictatorship or religious fundamentalism..is harmful.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Stephen C. Rose 
  To: Gary Richmond 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Saturday, November 19, 2016 4:34 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy


  I derive from my sense of Peirce and my own thinking that democracy is a 
scalable and universal polity, that it contains other values essential to the 
promulgation of goodness, truth and beauty, and that any effort to see it as 
valid only at certain scales or under certain conditions is as futile as 
seeking to see anything outside of the contexts of fallibility and continuity 
which are the underpinnings of slow but sure progress, aided by logic. 
Democracy is human destiny as we move in the direction of goodness. I think 
pragmaticism is a step in the direction Wittgenstein also had in mind. Both men 
proceeded from mystical premises they recognized could not easily be spoken of. 
Mysticism is as democracy is inherently egalitarian. 


  Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU 


  On Sat, Nov 19, 2016 at 4:20 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> 
wrote:

Edwina, list,


You've clearly given this a lot of prior thought, Edwina. I want to reflect 
on wht you wrote and see what others think before commenting further. Btw, 
would looking again at your book, Architectonics of Semiosis, for example, 
Chapter 2, "Purity and Power," be of any value in this discussion (as I 
initially began reading it I recall that in an off-list message you commented 
that in some ways you were now seeing things quite differently than you did in 
1998)?


Best,


Gary R








Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690


On Sat, Nov 19, 2016 at 4:01 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

  Gary R- that's an interesting topic.

  1) I'd like to first comment that democracy, as a political system for 
arriving at authoritative government decisions, is the 'right' method but ONLY 
in a very large population with a growth economy and a growth population. That 
is, political systems have FUNCTIONS; the function is: who has the societal 
right to make decisions among this population?

  In economies which are no-growth, such as all the pre-industrial 
agricultural and horticultural economies which dominated the planet until the 
industrial age, democracy is dysfunctional. That is, all political systems must 
privilege the wealth-producing sectors of the population. If your economy is 
agricultural/horticultural - which can only produce enough wealth to support a 
steady-state or no-growth population, then, the political system must put the 
authority to make decisions in the control of the owners of wealth production; 
i.e., the landowners. This control over the land must be hereditary [you can't 
have fights over ownership], and limited [you can't split up the land into 
minuscule small farms].  Democracy, which puts decision-making into the hands 
of the majority, doesn't work in such an economy.

  When the economy moves to a growth mode [and enables a growth 
population], the political system must empower those sectors of the population 
which make an economy grow. This is the middle class - a non-hereditary set of 
the population, made up of private individual/small group businesses. This 
economic mode is highly flexible [new business can start, succeed, fail]; 
extremely adaptable and enables rapid population growth. As such an economic 
mode, political decision-making must fall into the control of this middle class 
- and we have the emergence of elected legislatures and the disappearance of 
hereditary authority. 

  For a growth economy to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

Yes - I've taught this relationship between economics, population size and 
political infrastructure for about 20 years. No- it's not really in the 
Architectonics  book. It IS in a graphic book, The Graphic Guide to 
Socioeconomics - which a retired CEO banker and myself have just finished 
[about 170 slides]which deals with the pragmatic relations between 
population size and economic modes and political modes.  I am not sure if I 
should attach it since is has nothing to do with Peirce. It's a powerpoint 
presentation which we are planning to promote as a 'graphic guide for dummies' 
on the topic, so to speak. 

That is - we tried to make it clear that democracy, which means 'political 
power of the majority decision' is suitable only in large population, 
flexible-risktaking- growth economies, and unsuitable in small population 
no-growth steady-state economies which must ensure their economic continuity by 
focusing on retaining the capacity-to-make-wealth by stable measures [control 
of the land, control of the cattle, control of fishing rights, etc]. 

And we've been very surprised in our test runs with various people - how many 
people don't understand the basic issues of growth/no growth economies, 
carrying capacity of the economy; growth vs steady-state populations; what is a 
middle class; what is capitalism; the role of risk; the role of 
individuals..etc. etc. 

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Gary Richmond 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Saturday, November 19, 2016 4:20 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy


  Edwina, list,


  You've clearly given this a lot of prior thought, Edwina. I want to reflect 
on wht you wrote and see what others think before commenting further. Btw, 
would looking again at your book, Architectonics of Semiosis, for example, 
Chapter 2, "Purity and Power," be of any value in this discussion (as I 
initially began reading it I recall that in an off-list message you commented 
that in some ways you were now seeing things quite differently than you did in 
1998)?


  Best,


  Gary R








  Gary Richmond
  Philosophy and Critical Thinking
  Communication Studies
  LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
  C 745
  718 482-5690


  On Sat, Nov 19, 2016 at 4:01 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

Gary R- that's an interesting topic.

1) I'd like to first comment that democracy, as a political system for 
arriving at authoritative government decisions, is the 'right' method but ONLY 
in a very large population with a growth economy and a growth population. That 
is, political systems have FUNCTIONS; the function is: who has the societal 
right to make decisions among this population?

In economies which are no-growth, such as all the pre-industrial 
agricultural and horticultural economies which dominated the planet until the 
industrial age, democracy is dysfunctional. That is, all political systems must 
privilege the wealth-producing sectors of the population. If your economy is 
agricultural/horticultural - which can only produce enough wealth to support a 
steady-state or no-growth population, then, the political system must put the 
authority to make decisions in the control of the owners of wealth production; 
i.e., the landowners. This control over the land must be hereditary [you can't 
have fights over ownership], and limited [you can't split up the land into 
minuscule small farms].  Democracy, which puts decision-making into the hands 
of the majority, doesn't work in such an economy.

When the economy moves to a growth mode [and enables a growth population], 
the political system must empower those sectors of the population which make an 
economy grow. This is the middle class - a non-hereditary set of the 
population, made up of private individual/small group businesses. This economic 
mode is highly flexible [new business can start, succeed, fail]; extremely 
adaptable and enables rapid population growth. As such an economic mode, 
political decision-making must fall into the control of this middle class - and 
we have the emergence of elected legislatures and the disappearance of 
hereditary authority. 

For a growth economy to work, it must support individual rights [to invent, 
differ from the norm, to succeed AND fail] so that failure, for example, will 
only affect those few individuals and not a whole village/collective. 
Therefore, individualism must be stressed and empowered; a growth economy must 
enable novelty, innovation, freedom of the peripheryas well as success, 
which is measured by the adoption by the collective of that product/service. 
FOR A WHILE.

2) But - it seems that the definition and function of democracy in Dewey 
does not deal with the economy and the questions of the production of wealth 
and size of population. Instead, it deals with social issues - Talisse writes:

"The core of Deweyan democracy can be stated as follo

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-19 Thread Stephen C. Rose

I derive from my sense of Peirce and my own thinking that democracy is a
scalable and universal polity, that it contains other values essential to
the promulgation of goodness, truth and beauty, and that any effort to see
it as valid only at certain scales or under certain conditions is as futile
as seeking to see anything outside of the contexts of fallibility and
continuity which are the underpinnings of slow but sure progress, aided by
logic. Democracy is human destiny as we move in the direction of goodness.
I think pragmaticism is a step in the direction Wittgenstein also had in
mind. Both men proceeded from mystical premises they recognized could not
easily be spoken of. Mysticism is as democracy is inherently egalitarian.

Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU

On Sat, Nov 19, 2016 at 4:20 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Edwina, list,
>
> You've clearly given this a lot of prior thought, Edwina. I want to
> reflect on wht you wrote and see what others think before commenting
> further. Btw, would looking again at your book, *Architectonics of
> Semiosis*, for example, Chapter 2, "Purity and Power," be of any value in
> this discussion (as I initially began reading it I recall that in an
> off-list message you commented that in some ways you were now seeing things
> quite differently than you did in 1998)?
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>
> On Sat, Nov 19, 2016 at 4:01 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Gary R- that's an interesting topic.
>>
>> 1) I'd like to first comment that *democracy*, as a political system for
>> arriving at authoritative government decisions, is the 'right' method but
>> ONLY in a very large population with a growth economy and a growth
>> population. That is, political systems have FUNCTIONS; the function is: who
>> has the societal right to make decisions among this population?
>>
>> In economies which are *no-growth*, such as all the pre-industrial
>> agricultural and horticultural economies which dominated the planet until
>> the industrial age, democracy is dysfunctional. That is, all political
>> systems must privilege the wealth-producing sectors of the population. If
>> your economy is agricultural/horticultural - which can only produce enough
>> wealth to support a *steady-state* or no-growth population, then, the
>> political system must put the authority to make decisions in the control of
>> the owners of wealth production; i.e., the landowners. This control over
>> the land must be hereditary [you can't have fights over ownership], and
>> limited [you can't split up the land into minuscule small farms].
>> Democracy, which puts decision-making into the hands of the majority,
>> doesn't work in such an economy.
>>
>> When the economy moves to a *growth* mode [and enables a growth
>> population], the political system must empower those sectors of the
>> population which *make an economy grow*. This is the middle class - a
>> non-hereditary set of the population, made up of private individual/small
>> group businesses. This economic mode is highly flexible [new business can
>> start, succeed, fail]; extremely adaptable and enables rapid population
>> growth. As such an economic mode, political decision-making must fall into
>> the control of this middle class - and we have the emergence of elected
>> legislatures and the disappearance of hereditary authority.
>>
>> For a growth economy to work, it must support individual rights [to
>> invent, differ from the norm, to succeed AND fail] so that failure, for
>> example, will only affect those few individuals and not a whole
>> village/collective. Therefore, individualism must be stressed and
>> empowered; a growth economy must enable novelty, innovation, freedom of the
>> peripheryas well as success, which is measured by the adoption by the
>> collective of that product/service. FOR A WHILE.
>>
>> 2) But - it seems that the definition and function of democracy in Dewey
>> does not deal with the economy and the questions of the production of
>> wealth and size of population. Instead, it deals with social issues -
>> Talisse writes:
>>
>> "The core of Deweyan democracy can be stated as follows. Deweyan
>> democracy is *substantive *rather than proceduralist, *communicative *rather
>> than aggregative,and *deep *rather than statist. I shall take these
>> contrasts in order.Deweyan democracy is *substantive *insofar as it
>> rejects any attempt to separate politics and deeper normative concerns.
>> More precisely, Dewey held that the democratic political order is
>> essentially a *moral *order, and, further, he held that democratic
>> participation is an essential constituent ofthe good life and a necessary
>> constituent for a “truly human way of living” Dewey rejects the idea
>>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-19 Thread Gary Richmond

Edwina, list,

You've clearly given this a lot of prior thought, Edwina. I want to reflect
on wht you wrote and see what others think before commenting further. Btw,
would looking again at your book, *Architectonics of Semiosis*, for
example, Chapter 2, "Purity and Power," be of any value in this discussion
(as I initially began reading it I recall that in an off-list message you
commented that in some ways you were now seeing things quite differently
than you did in 1998)?

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Nov 19, 2016 at 4:01 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R- that's an interesting topic.
>
> 1) I'd like to first comment that *democracy*, as a political system for
> arriving at authoritative government decisions, is the 'right' method but
> ONLY in a very large population with a growth economy and a growth
> population. That is, political systems have FUNCTIONS; the function is: who
> has the societal right to make decisions among this population?
>
> In economies which are *no-growth*, such as all the pre-industrial
> agricultural and horticultural economies which dominated the planet until
> the industrial age, democracy is dysfunctional. That is, all political
> systems must privilege the wealth-producing sectors of the population. If
> your economy is agricultural/horticultural - which can only produce enough
> wealth to support a *steady-state* or no-growth population, then, the
> political system must put the authority to make decisions in the control of
> the owners of wealth production; i.e., the landowners. This control over
> the land must be hereditary [you can't have fights over ownership], and
> limited [you can't split up the land into minuscule small farms].
> Democracy, which puts decision-making into the hands of the majority,
> doesn't work in such an economy.
>
> When the economy moves to a *growth* mode [and enables a growth
> population], the political system must empower those sectors of the
> population which *make an economy grow*. This is the middle class - a
> non-hereditary set of the population, made up of private individual/small
> group businesses. This economic mode is highly flexible [new business can
> start, succeed, fail]; extremely adaptable and enables rapid population
> growth. As such an economic mode, political decision-making must fall into
> the control of this middle class - and we have the emergence of elected
> legislatures and the disappearance of hereditary authority.
>
> For a growth economy to work, it must support individual rights [to
> invent, differ from the norm, to succeed AND fail] so that failure, for
> example, will only affect those few individuals and not a whole
> village/collective. Therefore, individualism must be stressed and
> empowered; a growth economy must enable novelty, innovation, freedom of the
> peripheryas well as success, which is measured by the adoption by the
> collective of that product/service. FOR A WHILE.
>
> 2) But - it seems that the definition and function of democracy in Dewey
> does not deal with the economy and the questions of the production of
> wealth and size of population. Instead, it deals with social issues -
> Talisse writes:
>
> "The core of Deweyan democracy can be stated as follows. Deweyan democracy
> is *substantive *rather than proceduralist, *communicative *rather than
> aggregative,and *deep *rather than statist. I shall take these contrasts
> in order.Deweyan democracy is *substantive *insofar as it rejects any
> attempt to separate politics and deeper normative concerns. More precisely,
> Dewey held that the democratic political order is essentially a *moral *order,
> and, further, he held that democratic participation is an essential
> constituent ofthe good life and a necessary constituent for a “truly human
> way of living” Dewey rejects the idea thatit consists simply in
> processes of voting, campaigning, canvassing, lobbying, and petitioning in
> service of one’s individual preferences; that is, Dewey held democratic
> participation is essentially *communicative*, it consists in the
> willingness of citizens to engage in activity by which they may “convince
> and be convinced by reason” (MW 10:404) and come to realize“values prized
> in common” (LW 13:71).
>
> The above seems to me, to be a social relations account - and doesn't deal
> with the fact that democracy as a political system, empowers a particular
> segment of the population - the middle class, in an economy based around
> individual private sector small businesses. It has nothing to do with 'the
> good life' or a 'truly human way of living'. Nomadic pastoralists, and
> land-based feudal agriculture were also 'human ways of living.
>
> 3) From the Stanford Encyclopaedia, I found the following on Dewey:
>
> "As Dewey puts it, ‘men are

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy