Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Mark Peaty writes:
SP: 'Getting back to the original question about teleportation
experiments, are you saying that it would be impossible, or just
technically very difficult to preserve personal identity whilst
undergoing such a process? As Brent pointed out, tec
Brent: 'But *your* infinity is just *really big*. There are only a
finite number of atoms in a person and they have only a finite number of
relations. So how can an exact copy require infinite resources? '
MP: Well yes, perhaps there are only a finite number of relationships,
but these relat
Mark Peaty writes:
SP: 'Getting back to the original question about teleportation experiments, are
you saying that it would be impossible, or just technically very difficult to
preserve personal identity whilst undergoing such a process? As Brent pointed
out, technical difficulty is not an
John Mikes writes:
Friends:
Siding with Mark (almost?)
just to a 'wider' view of mentality than implied by
physicalistic - physiologistic - even maybe
comp-related frameworks, indicating the domains we did
not even discovered, but love to disregard. Upon Marks
post
--- Stathis Papaioannou (wr
Mark Peaty wrote:
SP: 'Getting back to the original question about teleportation
experiments, are you saying that it would be impossible, or just
technically very difficult to preserve personal identity whilst
undergoing such a process? As Brent pointed out, technical difficulty is
not an iss
SP: 'Getting back to the original question about teleportation
experiments, are you saying that it would be impossible, or just
technically very difficult to preserve personal identity whilst
undergoing such a process? As Brent pointed out, technical difficulty is
not an issue in thought experi
Friends:
Siding with Mark (almost?)
just to a 'wider' view of mentality than implied by
physicalistic - physiologistic - even maybe
comp-related frameworks, indicating the domains we did
not even discovered, but love to disregard. Upon Marks
post
--- Stathis Papaioannou (wroteamong more):
<[EMAI
Mark Peaty writes:
SP: 'So given months or years, you really are like a car in which every single
component has been replaced, the only remaining property of the original car
being the design'
MP: Yes, indeed. For the word design here, I prefer to use 'structure', with
the proviso that
SP: 'So given months or years, you really are like a car in which every
single component has been replaced, the only remaining property of the
original car being the design'
MP: Yes, indeed. For the word design here, I prefer to use 'structure',
with the proviso that the structure/s we are int
Thanks for this Peter: I am still chewing on this, with a view to
ultimate digestion.
I do get a certain kind of Angels and pinheads impression about some of
it though. Hopefully that is just an illusion! :-)
Regards
Mark Peaty CDES
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/
Mark Peaty writes:
Brent: 'However, all that is needed for the arguments that appear on this list
is to recreate a rough, functioning copy of the body plus a detailed
reproduction of memory and a brain that functioned approximately the same.
That much might not be too hard. After all, as
Bruno Marchal writes:
>> Bruno: If consciousness supervenes on all physical processes a case
>> can be made that matter could be relevant for consciousness. (I see
>> Peter Jones makes a similar remark).
>
> Stathis: Except that you could say the same for the Maudlin example,
> in which i
Mark Peaty wrote:
Brent: 'However, all that is needed for the arguments that appear on
this list is to recreate a rough, functioning copy of the body plus a
detailed reproduction of memory and a brain that functioned
approximately the same. That much might not be too hard. After all, as
Sta
Brent: 'However, all that is needed for the arguments that appear on
this list is to recreate a rough, functioning copy of the body plus a
detailed reproduction of memory and a brain that functioned
approximately the same. That much might not be too hard. After all, as
Stathis points out, you
Le 04-janv.-07, à 22:51, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
I am not sure what Hans Moravec's "physical mechanism" would be for
the 'teddy bear' example of panpsychism? I have read Mind Children and
Robot thoroughly, am cluless, regarding why Moravec should agree with
Spinoza.
Me too.
Bruno
Le 04-janv.-07, à 16:37, James N Rose a écrit :
It is -not- complex or human consciousness -- which emerges later.
But it is the primal foundation-presence and qualia on which
emerged forms of consciousness rely - in order for those complex forms
to exist, as they do.
I agree. (if I underst
Le 05-janv.-07, à 05:55, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno: If consciousness supervenes on all physical processes a case
can be made that matter could be relevant for consciousness. (I see
Peter Jones makes a similar remark).
Stathis: Except that you could say the same for the Maudlin e
John,
You made excellent points, which I'm happy to
reply to ..
John M wrote:
--- James N Rose <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
JR:
> ...
> Make it easier -- a coma patient, inert for decades,
> re-wakes alone in
> a room, registers its situation and in an instant -
> dies. Would that
> moment q
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 03-janv.-07, à 16:36, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (in more than one
posts) :
> Maudlin starts off with the assumption that a recording being
> conscious is obviously absurd, hence the need for the conscious
> machine to handle counterfactuals. If it were not for
I am not sure what Hans Moravec's "physical mechanism" would be for the
'teddy bear' example of panpsychism? I have read Mind Children and Robot
thoroughly, am cluless, regarding why Moravec should agree with Spinoza.
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this me
--- James N Rose <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 03-janv.-07, à 16:36, Stathis Papaioannou wrote
(in more than one
> posts) :
>
> > Maudlin starts off with the assumption that a
recording being
> > conscious is obviously absurd, hence the need
for the conscious
> >
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Peter Jones writes:
> >
> > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > >
> > > > Although you have clearly stated that the two ideas - consciousness
> > > > supervening on all physical processes and consciousness supervening
Mark Peaty wrote:
Brent: 'Remember that Bruno is a logician.'
MP: :-) Yes, this much is easy to infer. The full scope of what this
might MEAN however, is little short of terrifying ... ;-)
MP: Infinity, infinite, infinitely big or small; these are challenging
concepts at the best of times
Brent: 'Remember that Bruno is a logician.'
MP: :-) Yes, this much is easy to infer. The full scope of what this
might MEAN however, is little short of terrifying ... ;-)
MP: Infinity, infinite, infinitely big or small; these are challenging
concepts at the best of times and made very intere
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 03-janv.-07, à 16:36, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (in more than one
posts) :
> Maudlin starts off with the assumption that a recording being
> conscious is obviously absurd, hence the need for the conscious
> machine to handle counterfactuals. If it were not for this as
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> > > Although you have clearly stated that the two ideas - consciousness
> > > supervening on all physical processes and consciousness supervening on
> > > no physical process - are compl
Le 03-janv.-07, à 16:36, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (in more than one
posts) :
Maudlin starts off with the assumption that a recording being
conscious is obviously absurd, hence the need for the conscious
machine to handle counterfactuals. If it were not for this assumption
then there
1Z wrote:
>
>
> Mark Peaty wrote:
>> SP: 'using the term "comp" as short for "computationalism" as something
>> picked up from Bruno. On the face of it, computationalism seems quite
>> sensible: the best theory of consciousness and the most promising
>> candidate for producing artificial intelli
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> > Although you have clearly stated that the two ideas - consciousness
> > supervening on all physical processes and consciousness supervening on
> > no physical process - are completely different I think they are r
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Although you have clearly stated that the two ideas - consciousness
> supervening on all physical processes and consciousness supervening on
> no physical process - are completely different I think they are related in
> that in both cases matte
For my benefit, could you flesh that out in plain English please?
Regards
Mark Peaty CDES
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/
1Z wrote:
Mark Peaty wrote:
SP: 'using the term "comp" as short for "computationalism" as something
picked up from Bruno. On the face of it, co
Peter Jones writes:
> SP: 'using the term "comp" as short for "computationalism" as something
> picked up from Bruno. On the face of it, computationalism seems quite
> sensible: the best theory of consciousness and the most promising
> candidate for producing artificial intelligence/consciousn
Mark Peaty wrote:
SP: 'You don't actually have to emulate the entire universe, just enough
to fool its inhabitants. For example, you don't need to emulate the
appearance of a snowflake in the Andromeda galaxy except in the unlikely
event that someone went to have a look at it.'
MP: I think
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 03-janv.-07, à 05:24, Brent Meeker wrote (to Mark Peaty)
Remember that Bruno is a logician. When he writes "infinite" he
really means infinite - not "really, really big" as physicists do.
Almost all numbers are bigger than 10^120, which is the biggest number
that a
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Although you have clearly stated that the two ideas - consciousness
supervening on all physical processes and consciousness supervening on
no physical process - are completely different I think they are related in
that in both cases matter is irrelevant to consciousn
Mark Peaty wrote:
SP: 'using the term "comp" as short for "computationalism" as something
picked up from Bruno. On the face of it, computationalism seems quite
sensible: the best theory of consciousness and the most promising
candidate for producing artificial intelligence/consciousness'
What
SP: 'Recall that ordinary life does not involve anything like perfect
copying of your brain from moment to moment. Thousands of neurons are
dying all the time and you don't even notice, and it is possible to
infarct a substantial proportion of your brain and finish up with just a
bit of a limp.
Bruno Marchal writes:
> 1. The implementation problem: everything can implement a computation
> if you look at it the right way.
> Normally this is of no consequence - mapping the vibration of atoms in
> a rock to a word processing program would be at least as difficult as
> building a conve
Le 03-janv.-07, à 06:39, Mark Peaty a écrit :
BM: ' (= Bruno Marchal, not Brent Meeker)
OK, except I don't see what you mean by on a "number" basis. We know
that number have a lot of quantitative interesting relationships, but
after Godel, Solovay etc.. we do know that numbers have astonishi
Bruno Marchal writes:
> which invokes an argument discovered by Bruno and Tim Maudlin
> demonstrating that there is a problem with the theory that the mental
> supervenes on the physical. It seems that to be consistent you have to
> allow either that any computation, including the supposedly
Le 03-janv.-07, à 05:24, Brent Meeker wrote (to Mark Peaty)
Remember that Bruno is a logician. When he writes "infinite" he
really means infinite - not "really, really big" as physicists do.
Almost all numbers are bigger than 10^120, which is the biggest number
that appears in physics (and
Le 03-janv.-07, à 04:00, Mark Peaty a écrit :
SP: 'using the term "comp" as short for "computationalism" as
something picked up from Bruno. On the face of it, computationalism
seems quite sensible: the best theory of consciousness and the most
promising candidate for producing artificial
int
Le 03-janv.-07, à 03:46, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno Marchal writes:
> It gets cumbersome to qualify everything with "given the appearance
of > a physical world". As I have said before, I am not entirely
convinced > that comp is true,
Nor am I. (Remind that no machine can, from
Le 02-janv.-07, à 13:59, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Mark Peaty writes:
SP: ' In the end, what is "right" is an irreducible personal belief,
which you can try to change by appeal to emotions or by example, but
not by appeal to logic or empirical facts. And in fact I feel much
safer tha
Mark Peaty writes:
SP: 'using the term "comp" as short for "computationalism" as something picked
up from Bruno. On the face of it, computationalism seems quite sensible: the best theory of
consciousness and the most promising candidate for producing artificial intelligence/consciousness'
Th
BM: '
OK, except I don't see what you mean by on a "number" basis. We know
that number have a lot of quantitative interesting relationships, but
after Godel, Solovay etc.. we do know that numbers have astonishing
qualitative relationship to (like the hypostases to mention it). '
MP: No no no
Mark Peaty wrote:
SP: 'using the term "comp" as short for "computationalism" as something
picked up from Bruno. On the face of it, computationalism seems quite
sensible: the best theory of consciousness and the most promising
candidate for producing artificial intelligence/consciousness'
Tha
SP: 'using the term "comp" as short for "computationalism" as something
picked up from Bruno. On the face of it, computationalism seems quite
sensible: the best theory of consciousness and the most promising
candidate for producing artificial intelligence/consciousness'
That is what I thought
Bruno Marchal writes:
> It gets cumbersome to qualify everything with "given the appearance of
> a physical world". As I have said before, I am not entirely convinced
> that comp is true,
Nor am I. (Remind that no machine can, from its first person point of
view, be "entirely convinced"
Le 02-janv.-07, à 04:20, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 31-déc.-06, à 04:59, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit (to Tom Caylor):
> Of course: questions of personal meaning are not scientific
questions. > Physics may show you how to build a nuclear bomb, but it
won't tell
Mark Peaty writes:
SP: ' In the end, what is "right" is an irreducible personal belief, which you can try to
change by appeal to emotions or by example, but not by appeal to logic or empirical facts. And in
fact I feel much safer that way: if someone honestly believed that he knew what was
Le 02-janv.-07, à 08:14, Mark Peaty a écrit :
SP: ' In the end, what is "right" is an irreducible personal belief,
which you can try to change by appeal to emotions or by example, but
not by appeal to logic or empirical facts. And in fact I feel much
safer that way: if someone honestly believ
SP: ' In the end, what is "right" is an irreducible personal belief,
which you can try to change by appeal to emotions or by example, but not
by appeal to logic or empirical facts. And in fact I feel much safer
that way: if someone honestly believed that he knew what was "right" as
surely as he
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 31-déc.-06, à 04:59, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit (to Tom Caylor):
> Of course: questions of personal meaning are not scientific questions.
> Physics may show you how to build a nuclear bomb, but it won't tell
> you whether you should use it.
But Physics, per se,
Le 31-déc.-06, à 04:59, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit (to Tom Caylor):
Of course: questions of personal meaning are not scientific questions.
Physics may show you how to build a nuclear bomb, but it won't tell
you whether you should use it.
But Physics, per se, is not supposed to answer this
Hi John:
One example of what I am saying would be the way we drill holes in
the earth and pump out oil and oxidize it and the resulting energy
flux soon dissipates, can do little more useful work, and radiates
into space. If the oil was left in place it could be many millions
of years befor
an excellent reason
for dying). I therefore conclude that the meaning of life is the most
urgent of questions."
There is an analogy between "meaning of life for entity X", and
"consistency of machine/theory X".
There is a sense in which "the consistency of X" i
ber 31, 2006 1:57 PM
Subject: Re: The Meaning of Life
One way to look at "life" is from the point of view of energy hang-up
barriers - those various facts about the structure of our universe
that slow the dissipation of useful energy concentrations.
"Life" drills ho
One way to look at "life" is from the point of view of energy hang-up
barriers - those various facts about the structure of our universe
that slow the dissipation of useful energy concentrations.
"Life" drills holes in these barriers and thus is on the fastest
system path to maximum entropy
27; and not without including WITH the 'materially' explained features an extended form of mentality - the ideation also including phenomena callable 'inanimate').
John M
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent
ssion, does that have any bearing on whether or not it is true?
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
It's interesting that in my observations quite a lot of people have an
eye-opening experience around the age of 12 regarding the meaning of
life. Perhaps it has to do with entering puberty and
realisation that there was no ultimate meaning was one of
the more
positive experiences in my life. But even if it hadn't been, and threw
me into a
deep depression, does that have any bearing on whether or not it is true?
Stathis Papaioannou
It's interesting that in my observa
realisation that there was no ultimate meaning was one of
the more
positive experiences in my life. But even if it hadn't been, and threw
me into a
deep depression, does that have any bearing on whether or not it is true?
Stathis Papaioannou
It's interesting that in my observa
tathis Papaioannou
It's interesting that in my observations quite a lot of people have an
eye-opening experience around the age of 12 regarding the meaning of
life. Perhaps it has to do with entering puberty and forming our own
sense of purpose. I guess you might know something about this fr
was no ultimate meaning was one of the more
positive experiences in my life. But even if it hadn't been, and threw me into a
deep depression, does that have any bearing on whether or not it is true?
Stathis Papaioannou
It's interesting that in my observations quite a lot of people
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