On 28 Sep 2011, at 15:53, Pierz wrote:
At what point does mathematical truth stop? It seems to be the
existence of
some would imply the existence of all.
Like I said, I need to let this marinate in my consciousness a while.
I agree that all mathematical constructs must have the same kind
On 29 Sep 2011, at 04:11, Pierz wrote:
Not at all. That would be a physicalist revisionist definition of
numbers. You need to instantiate 17, in some way, to talk about 17,
but 17 itself does not need instantiation. With or without any
physical universe, 17 remain a prime number.
With or
On 9/28/2011 10:11 PM, Pierz wrote:
Not at all. That would be a physicalist revisionist definition of
numbers. You need to instantiate 17, in some way, to talk about 17,
but 17 itself does not need instantiation. With or without any
physical universe, 17 remain a prime number.
With or
On 9/29/2011 12:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
OK. But this is non communicable by (sound) machines. In fact in the ethics of the
ideally correct machine, asserting moral principle is immoral. We can only encourage
people to understand or discover this by themselves.
Bruno
Several times you
On 29 Sep 2011, at 19:09, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/29/2011 12:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
OK. But this is non communicable by (sound) machines. In fact in
the ethics of the ideally correct machine, asserting moral
principle is immoral. We can only encourage people to understand or
discover
At what point does mathematical truth stop? It seems to be the
existence of
some would imply the existence of all.
Like I said, I need to let this marinate in my consciousness a while.
I agree that all mathematical constructs must have the same kind of
existence, the same ontological status.
On 27 Sep 2011, at 21:25, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/27/2011 1:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Sep 2011, at 21:44, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/26/2011 9:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Suppose that you are currently in state S (which exist by the
comp assumption).
But what does you refer to?
Your
On 28 Sep 2011, at 05:44, Pierz wrote:
OK, well I think this and the other responses (notably Jason's) have
brought me a lot closer to grasping the essence of this argument. I
can see that the set of integers is also the set of all possible
information states, and that the difference between
Not at all. That would be a physicalist revisionist definition of
numbers. You need to instantiate 17, in some way, to talk about 17,
but 17 itself does not need instantiation. With or without any
physical universe, 17 remain a prime number.
With or without a mind too, I presume you
On 27 Sep 2011, at 02:01, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Sep 26, 2011 at 11:08 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
On 26 Sep 2011, at 04:42, Pierz wrote:
- it's not well explained in the paper
yet contains the all the really sweeping and startling assertions.
When I presented UDA at
On 26 Sep 2011, at 21:44, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/26/2011 9:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Suppose that you are currently in state S (which exist by the comp
assumption).
But what does you refer to?
Your first person view. Or the owner of your first person view,
restricted to that view,
On 9/27/2011 1:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Sep 2011, at 21:44, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/26/2011 9:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Suppose that you are currently in state S (which exist by the comp assumption).
But what does you refer to?
Your first person view. Or the owner of your first
OK, well I think this and the other responses (notably Jason's) have
brought me a lot closer to grasping the essence of this argument. I
can see that the set of integers is also the set of all possible
information states, and that the difference between that and the UD is
the element of sequential
On Tue, Sep 27, 2011 at 10:44 PM, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
OK, well I think this and the other responses (notably Jason's) have
brought me a lot closer to grasping the essence of this argument. I
can see that the set of integers is also the set of all possible
information states, and
On 26 Sep 2011, at 01:08, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/25/2011 10:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Yes, it would generate every possible information state,
and would therefore create me and all my possible futures, but these
'pictures' would have no coherence, would immediately dissolve back
into the
On Sun, Sep 25, 2011 at 9:42 PM, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
I can see that you are actually right in asserting that the UDA's
computations are not random, but I'm not sure that negates the core of
my objection. Actually what the UDA does is produce a bit field
containing every possible
On 9/26/2011 10:23 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Sep 25, 2011 at 9:42 PM, Pierz pier...@gmail.com
mailto:pier...@gmail.com wrote:
I can see that you are actually right in asserting that the UDA's
computations are not random, but I'm not sure that negates the core of
my
On Mon, Sep 26, 2011 at 9:44 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote:
On 9/26/2011 10:23 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Sep 25, 2011 at 9:42 PM, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
I can see that you are actually right in asserting that the UDA's
computations are not random, but I'm
On 26 Sep 2011, at 04:42, Pierz wrote:
OK, well first of all let me retract any ad hominem remarks that may
have offended you. Call it a rhetorical flourish! I apologise. There
are clearly some theories which require a profound amount of dedicated
learning to understand - such as QFT. I
On 9/26/2011 11:52 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Sep 26, 2011 at 9:44 AM, Stephen P. King
stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote:
On 9/26/2011 10:23 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Sep 25, 2011 at 9:42 PM, Pierz pier...@gmail.com
mailto:pier...@gmail.com
On 9/26/2011 9:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Suppose that you are currently in state S (which exist by the comp assumption).
But what does you refer to? The comp assumption seems ambiguous. Is it the assumption
that you are instantiated by a specific computation? Or is it the assumption that
On Mon, Sep 26, 2011 at 12:14 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote:
On 9/26/2011 11:52 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Sep 26, 2011 at 9:44 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote:
On 9/26/2011 10:23 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Sep 25, 2011 at 9:42 PM, Pierz
On Mon, Sep 26, 2011 at 11:08 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 26 Sep 2011, at 04:42, Pierz wrote:
- it's not well explained in the paper
yet contains the all the really sweeping and startling assertions.
When I presented UDA at the ASSC meeting of 1995 (I think) a famous
On 25 Sep 2011, at 04:20, Pierz wrote:
OK, so I've read the UDA and I 'get' it,
Wow. Nice!
but at the moment I simply
can't accept that it is anything like a 'proof'.
Hmm... (Then you should not say I get it, but I don't get it). A
proof is only something presented as a proof. You can
On Sep 24, 10:20 pm, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
Let's take a look at the UD. Obviously this is not an 'intelligent'
device, beyond the intelligence implicit in the very simple base
algorithm. It just runs every possible computer program. Random
computer programs are made of and produce
On 9/25/2011 10:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Yes, it would generate every possible information state,
and would therefore create me and all my possible futures, but these
'pictures' would have no coherence, would immediately dissolve back
into the static they emerged from.
The point is that IF
OK, well first of all let me retract any ad hominem remarks that may
have offended you. Call it a rhetorical flourish! I apologise. There
are clearly some theories which require a profound amount of dedicated
learning to understand - such as QFT. I majored in History and
Philosophy of Science and
OK, so I've read the UDA and I 'get' it, but at the moment I simply
can't accept that it is anything like a 'proof'. I keep reading Bruno
making statements like If we are machine-emulable, then physics is
necessarily reducible to number psychology, but to me there remain
serious flaws, not in the
On 9/24/2011 7:20 PM, Pierz wrote:
OK, so I've read the UDA and I 'get' it, but at the moment I simply
can't accept that it is anything like a 'proof'. I keep reading Bruno
making statements like If we are machine-emulable, then physics is
necessarily reducible to number psychology, but to me
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