Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le Samedi 18 Mars 2006 01:58, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Ground them operationally, then. Real things have real properties and unreal things don't. Real properties can be observed empirically. Primeness then is not a real property. I have to ask you one more time, but I'll reverse the

Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le Samedi 18 Mars 2006 01:58, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Ground them operationally, then. Real things have real properties and unreal things don't. Real properties can be observed empirically. Primeness then is not a real property. I'll take another stupid example to try to explain my

Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread Georges Quénot
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Since I don't adopt the premise that everything is mathematical, I would like to clarify just that point. I understood that you do not adopt it (and whatever your reasons I have to respect the fact). By the way I am

Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread peterdjones
Georges Quénot wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Since I don't adopt the premise that everything is mathematical, I would like to clarify just that point. I understood that you do not adopt it (and whatever your reasons I have to

Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread peterdjones
Quentin Anciaux wrote: Le Samedi 18 Mars 2006 01:58, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Ground them operationally, then. Real things have real properties and unreal things don't. Real properties can be observed empirically. Primeness then is not a real property. I have to ask you one

Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread Georges Quénot
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Since I don't adopt the premise that everything is mathematical, I would like to clarify just that point. I understood that you do not adopt it (and whatever your

Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread peterdjones
Georges Quénot wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quenot wrote: That [The universe] has real existence, as opposed to the other mathematical objects which are only abstract. is what I called a dualist view. Dualism says

Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread peterdjones
Brent Meeker wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Quentin Anciaux wrote: What properties of the multiverse would render only one mathematical object real and others abstract... A non-mathematical property. Hence mathematics alone is

Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread Georges Quénot
Georges Quénot wrote: 1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of equations of which a Harry Potter universe includes a counterpart of you. I meant: 1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of equations of which a Harry Potter universe including a

Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread Georges Quénot
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quenot wrote: That [The universe] has real existence, as opposed to the other mathematical objects which are only abstract. is what I called a dualist view.

Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 17-mars-06, à 16:32, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : I don't agree. I think you slip from minds can be implemented on more than one kind of hardware to minds do not need any kind of hardware. I slip? Where ? I take care of precisely not doing that, mainly through UDA *plus* the movie graph

Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 15-mars-06, à 17:51, Georges Quenot a écrit : *If* comp is true. I am not sure of that. Me too. But it is the theory I am studying. Also comp provides some neat etalon philosophy to compare with other theories. The advantage of comp (which I recall includes Church thesis) is that, at

Re: Solipsism (was: Numbers)

2006-03-18 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 17-mars-06, à 20:27, Hal Finney a écrit : John M writes: 1. do we have a REAL argument against solipsism? Let me express how solipsism can be analyzed in the model where physical reality is part of mathematical reality. Let us adopt Bruno's UDA perspective: the Universal Dovetailer

Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread George Levy
Quentin Anciaux wrote: Le Samedi 18 Mars 2006 01:58, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Ground them operationally, then. Real things have real properties and unreal things don't. Real properties can be observed empirically. Primeness then is not a real property. I have to ask

Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread peterdjones
Georges Quénot wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: 1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of equations of which a Harry Potter universe includes a counterpart of you. I meant: 1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of equations of which a Harry Potter

Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread peterdjones
George Levy wrote: Quentin Anciaux wrote: Le Samedi 18 Mars 2006 01:58, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Ground them operationally, then. Real things have real properties and unreal things don't. Real properties can be observed empirically. Primeness then is not a real property.

Territories and maps

2006-03-18 Thread Russell Standish
On Fri, Mar 17, 2006 at 04:55:37PM -0800, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [...] Maps are isomorphic to territories, but are not territories. Well. Territories *are* maps. Just a very specific type of map but maps anyway. err...no they are not. You can't grow potatoes in a map of a farm.

Re: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread Georges Quénot
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quénot wrote: 1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of equations of which a Harry Potter universe including a counterpart of you would be a solution. 1) Any configuration of material bodies can be represented as a some very long

Re: Fw: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread Russell Standish
But the tape can also hold an encoding of the Turing machine to perform the interpretation. This is the essence of the compiler theorem. One can simply iterate this process such that there is no concrete machine interpreting the tape. I think this is another way of putting the UDA. Cheers On

Re: Fw: Numbers

2006-03-18 Thread Norman Samish
Are you saying that a tape of infinite length, with infinite digits, is not Turing emulable? I don't understand how the 'compiler theorem' makes a 'concrete' machine unnecessary. I agree that the tape can contain an encoding of the Turing machine - as well as anything else that's