Re: If Quantum Mechanics can be derived using arithmetic only, how would that derivation begin?

[agrayson2000]

On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 5:06:50 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 4:56:51 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 4:22:54 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 28 Nov 2018, at 21:10, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>> Bruno, can you do it without resort to your idiosyncratic jargon? AG
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I can do that. 
>>>
>>
>> *I don't believe it can be done. For example, even if there exists such a 
>> thing as a complex sum whose amplitude squared can be calculated (and 
>> presumably something implied by arithmetic), how would you know that this 
>> is the way to calculate probabilities for quantum experiments?  AG *
>>
>
> *Put another way, there's nothing in pure arithmetic to indicate how to 
> calculate a probability in quantum experiments. Same goes for, say, the x 
> and p operators used in QM; and so forth. AG*
>

*Regardless of rules of arithmetic and mathematical logic, I simply don't 
believe that something like Born's Rule can be inferred without actually 
observing a quantum interference pattern. AG*

>
>
>
> Actually the “universal dovetailer argument (UDA)” is a version of my 
>>> thesis accessible to kids, at least up to the seventh step (the 8th one 
>>> requires some good understanding of the Church’s or Turing’s thesis).
>>>
>>> But it might be quicker to read the sane04 paper, and ask me question 
>>> wherever you don’t understand? 
>>>
>>> The UDA explains informally why, once we assume mechanism, we have to 
>>> recover the physical appearance from arithmetic only. 
>>>
>>> The translation of the UDA in arithmetic gives then all the mathematical 
>>> details to do the extraction of physics, and we have got already the 
>>> quantum logics of the quanta and of the qualia (accepting some definitions 
>>> of course). But this of course asks for learning a bit of mathematical 
>>> logic (“my” idiosyncratic jargon, I guess).
>>>
>>> Now, if you prefer to study online, we can do that, step by step. Just 
>>> take a look at the sane04 paper, which you can read or download here:
>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html. 
>>> (*)
>>>
>>> And tell me if you prefer to ask me question, or to do the whole thing 
>>> step by step online.
>>>
>>> You might need to be patient, as I am still 500 mails late …
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>> (*) B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th 
>>> International System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, 
>>> SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 2004.
>>>
>>>
>>> -- 
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>>>
>>>

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:27:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 27 Nov 2018, at 18:50, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, November 27, 2018 at 4:32:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 24 Nov 2018, at 17:27, John Clark  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Turing explained how matter can behave intelligently, 
>>
>>
>> No. He showed how a person can be attached to a computation, and also 
>> that physics is Turing complete, so that we can use matter to implement 
>> computations, like nature plausibly does. But it is not matter which behave 
>> intelligently: it is the person associated to the computation, and it 
>> behaves as well relatively to numbers than to matter. You use of matter is 
>> “magical”.
>>
>>
>>
> If humans are matter (meaning of course that human brains are matter), 
> then *humans behave intelligently* means that (at least some) *matter 
> behaves intelligently*.  
>
>
> Like with a computer: some arrangement of some matter can emulate a 
> (universal) computation. That means that the physical laws are Turing 
> complete. 
>
> It does not mean that primary matter exists (see my reminding of what this 
> means in my answer to Brent, soon enough!).
>
>
>
>
>
> It is not clear that Turing in his last ("morphogenesis") years thought 
> that the Turing machine was a complete definition of computing in nature.
>
>
>
> If mechanism is true, in principle, nature has more powerful processing 
> ability than any computer. Now, it could mean only that nature use a random 
> oracle, which would come only from our ignorance about which computations 
> run us, if I may say.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>

Going by something Barry Cooper wrote

*The intuition is that computational unconventionality certainly entails 
higher-type computation, with a correspondingly enhanced respect for 
embodied information. There is some understanding of the algorithmic 
content of descriptions. But so far we have merely scratched the surface.*

"natural computing" may involve something that is non-Turing in a sense 
that doesn't involve actual oracles in the hyperarithmetical processing 
sense (but could involve topology: *We can say that topology is precisely 
about the relation between finiteness and infiniteness that is relevant to 
computation.* [ 
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf
 
]).


I posit that *experience processing* is a "natural computing" that is 
non-Turing.

This new article may be of interest:


"there are now many signs that consciousness-like phenomena might exist not 
just among humans or even great apes – but that insects might have them, 
too"
] https://aeon.co/essays/inside-the-mind-of-a-bee-is-a-hive-of-sensory-activity 
]



- pt

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Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 28 Nov 2018, at 16:03, Lawrence Crowell  
> wrote:
> 
> On Friday, November 9, 2018 at 6:51:06 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
> From: Brent Meeker >
>> 
>> You're dodging my point.  The "issue" of how we have subjective experience 
>> only seems to be an issue because in comparison to the "objective" 
>> experience of matter where we can trace long, mathematically define causal 
>> chains down to...a Lagrangian and coupling constants or something similar, 
>> which is long enough and esoteric enough that almost everyone loses interest 
>> along the way.  But some people (like Vic) are going to say, "But where does 
>> the Langrangian and coupling constants come from?"  and "Why a Lagrangian 
>> anyway?" My point is that when we can give a similarly deep and detailed 
>> account of why you think of an elephant when reading this, then nobody will 
>> worry about "the hard problem of consciousness"; just like they don't worry 
>> about "the hard problems of matter" like where that Lagrangian comes from or 
>> why a complex Hilbert space.
> 
> Why can't I worry about those things? Where does the Lagrangian come from? 
> And why use a complex Hilbert space? I don't think this is the underlying 
> reason for saying that the "hard problem" of consciousness dissolves on 
> solving the engineering problems. Solving the engineering problems will 
> enable us to produce a fully conscious AI -- but will we then know how it 
> works? We will certainly know where it came from.
> 
> Bruce
> 
> When it comes to science I have to back what Bruce says here.

Me to. The clever machines of tomorrow might be the descendants of our bugs, 
not our programs …
But I think the universal machine is very smart, it is us who don’t listen.



> All knowledge faces the limits of the Münchhausen trilemma, where we have 
> three possible types of arguments. The first is the basic axiomatic approach, 
> which generally is the cornerstone and capstone of mathematics and science. 
> The second is a "turtles all the way down," where an argument is based on 
> premises that have deeper reasons, and this nests endlessly. Vic Stenger 
> found this to be of most interest with his "models all the way down." The 
> third is a circular argument which would mean all truth is just tautology. 
> The second and third turn out to have some relevancy, where these are 
> complement in Godel's theorem. While in general we use the first in science 
> and mathematics we generally can't completely eliminate the other two. 
> However, for most work we have an FAPP limitation to how far we want to go. 
> Because of that if there is ultimately just a quantum vacuum, or some set of 
> vacua, that is eternal, we may then just rest our case there.



Yu risk to eliminate consciousness, and the machine’s explanation of 
consciousness.

Assuming mechanism, we know exactly why we have too assume a universal 
machinery, and nothing more. Then we can use the whole of mathematics to derive 
the phenomenology, including matter, and compare with what we observe.



> 
> If one wants to do philosophy or theology that may be fine, but one has to 
> make sure not to confuse these as categories with the category of science.

No. That is the habit since theology has been stealer from science by the 
con-man. 

Maybe you know a theology which does not need science, that which does not need 
modesty, caution, critically open, etc.

The problem when you forget hat theology is a science, is that you take the 
risk of imposing some theology or metaphysical axiom, like if today’s science 
did solved the Plato/Aristotle extreme disjunct.




> Maybe as Dennett says, philosophy is what we do when we do not understand how 
> to ask the question right.

That is science. Bad philosophy and bad science is when we assert a problem is 
solved, when it is not.



> In that setting at best we can only do sort of "pre-science," but not really 
> science as such. Theology is an even looser area of thought, and I generally 
> see no connection with science at all.


Theology is just Metaphysics with the understanding that we must do a bet of 
some sort, be it on some physical thing, (a material universe), or a 
metaphysical things (the Tao?), or a mathematical, or musical, whatever things.

If you study the history of occidental science, theology is the science which 
brings mathematics and physics, and mathematics was a source of inspiration for 
many non physical realities to be conceived. Most of them being often 
mathematical in nature. 
If you study theology from Pythagorus to damascius, you will understand that it 
is science, even if one using a non communicable data (a first person 
experience).
Then theology is responsible for the birth of mathematical logic too, much 
later. I have given references.

No, the problem is that, for historical reason, we have separated theology from 
science, which was necessary to associate religion with politics, which, is 
OBVIOUSLY what the blasphemy 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 28 Nov 2018, at 00:44, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Tue, Nov 27, 2018 at 5:32 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> >>My commitment is with the scientific method, so when you make outlandish 
> >>claims (matter is not needed to make calculations Robison arithmetic alone 
> >>can do so,  Kleene’s predicate T(x, y, z) can encode information) I ask you 
> >>to actually do so.
>  
> > You ask me to implement those computation in the physical reality.
> 
> All I ask you to do is follow the scientific method. 


I do, which is not so frequent in theology and metaphysics those days.

You are the one invoking your ontological commitment when defining real by 
“physically real”, and then asking me the impossible task to transform a 
computation realised in arithmetic into a computation realised in the physical 
reality. The only way to do that is to implement a universal machine (a 
mathematical being) into the physical reality.

The whole point is that this physical reality is not necessarily primary, and 
that it is an appearance emerging from the first person indeterminacy of any 
universal machine respectively to the set of all computations.

You just mock the argument at the start by invoking your personal metaphysical 
belief. That is not valid.




>  
> > That has nothing to do with the fact that all computations are implemented 
> > in the “block-univers”, or better “block-mindscape” associate to arithmetic.
> 
> All that is just a fancy way of saying you don't need no stinking scientific 
> method. You like definitions so I will give you two, the multiverse as a 
> collection of all real universes and a real universe is one capable of 
> producing a working Turing Machine.

All terms are used in too fuzzy way here. The arithmetical reality produces all 
working machines, and indeed all of their works. You can’t use work like "real” 
when doing metaphysics with the scientific method.





>   And there is no better way to prove that something exists than to produce 
> it.

I guess you mean to produce it physically, which means that you are using the 
criteria of meta^hysical reality due to Aristotle. No problem, but then you 
need to abandon mechanism, or to explain us what in “real matter”  is both 
Turing emulable (as it should with mechanism), yet not emulated in arithmetic, 
which would violate Turing completeness of arithmetic, indeed of its tiny 
initial sigma_1 segment.
That makes no sense.



> Neither you or Mr.Kleene or Mr.Robinson or anybody else has ever shown that a 
> working Turing Machine can be produced without using matter that obeys the 
> laws of physics and they haven't even come close to doing so.


They start from that. They are not doing metaphysics, nor physics. It is a 
standard theorem in all mathematical textbook that Robison arithmetic is Turing 
complete. If a sigma_1 relation is true, RA proves it, and that proofs can be 
translated in arithmetic and is associated to a computation done in arithmetic. 
You just show that you have no clue what computability theory is. 



> 
> > That is the usual interest form of pseudo-regions behaviour.
>  
> Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that 
> one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.

You repeat this again, which might show that you are not aware of your 
prejudices. But your older post does not confirm this. 

Do you commit yourself or not in a primary physical universe? That is what I 
called the Aristotelian Theology. The first “God” of Aristotle is the “first 
mover”, the one who gave the initial “impulsion”, and plays no other role. The 
second God of Aristotle is Matter. An irreducible substance which essence 
implies its existence, which is a way to say that it does not come from 
something else, which departs a lot from Plato’s types of conception of reality.


>  
> > my “outlandish” statements are just part of any course in computer science.
> 
> BULLSHIT!  Try peddling your ideas in Silicon Valley, talk to a venture 
> capitalist about funding it, You'd be laughed out if town!  


You have not yet begun to criticise my ideas (actually, the Löbian machine’s 
idea). You criticise (without realising) the mathematical work of Turing and 
others on which the Silicon Valley already relies.




> 
> > I have been asked both in Brussels and Lille to withdraw those explanations 
> > as it was judged to be well known.
> 
> The stuff you're correct about is not original and the stuff that's original 
> is not correct.

You seem to repeat a common slogan. Good. Usually this is not done publicly. 
Do you get money for this?





>  
> > You are not criticising me, you are criticising the whole of computer 
> > science.
> 
> Tell that to the Billionaires in Silicon Valley, they'll cry all the way to 
> the bank.
> 
> >> I don't ask you to tell me about it, anybody can spin a tale in the 
> >> English language or the Mathematical language, I ask you to actually 

Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

[agrayson2000]

On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 7:38:26 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 28 Nov 2018, at 16:03, Lawrence Crowell  > wrote:
>
> On Friday, November 9, 2018 at 6:51:06 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> From: Brent Meeker 
>>
>>
>> You're dodging my point.  The "issue" of how we have subjective 
>> experience only seems to be an issue because in comparison to the 
>> "objective" experience of matter where we can trace long, mathematically 
>> define causal chains down to...a Lagrangian and coupling constants or 
>> something similar, which is long enough and esoteric enough that almost 
>> everyone loses interest along the way.  But some people (like Vic) are 
>> going to say, "But where does the Langrangian and coupling constants come 
>> from?"  and "Why a Lagrangian anyway?" My point is that when we can give a 
>> similarly deep and detailed account of why you think of an elephant when 
>> reading this, then nobody will worry about "the hard problem of 
>> consciousness"; just like they don't worry about "the hard problems of 
>> matter" like where that Lagrangian comes from or why a complex Hilbert 
>> space.
>>
>>
>> Why can't I worry about those things? Where does the Lagrangian come 
>> from? And why use a complex Hilbert space? I don't think this is the 
>> underlying reason for saying that the "hard problem" of consciousness 
>> dissolves on solving the engineering problems. Solving the engineering 
>> problems will enable us to produce a fully conscious AI -- but will we then 
>> know how it works? We will certainly know where it came from.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>
> When it comes to science I have to back what Bruce says here. 
>
>
> Me to. The clever machines of tomorrow might be the descendants of our 
> bugs, not our programs …
> But I think the universal machine is very smart, it is us who don’t listen.
>
>
>
> All knowledge faces the limits of the Münchhausen trilemma, where we have 
> three possible types of arguments. The first is the basic axiomatic 
> approach, which generally is the cornerstone and capstone of mathematics 
> and science. The second is a "turtles all the way down," where an argument 
> is based on premises that have deeper reasons, and this nests endlessly. 
> Vic Stenger found this to be of most interest with his "models all the way 
> down." The third is a circular argument which would mean all truth is just 
> tautology. The second and third turn out to have some relevancy, where 
> these are complement in Godel's theorem. While in general we use the first 
> in science and mathematics we generally can't completely eliminate the 
> other two. However, for most work we have an FAPP limitation to how far we 
> want to go. Because of that if there is ultimately just a quantum vacuum, 
> or some set of vacua, that is eternal, we may then just rest our case there.
>
>
>
>
> Yu risk to eliminate consciousness, and the machine’s explanation of 
> consciousness.
>
> Assuming mechanism, we know exactly why we have too assume a universal 
> machinery, and nothing more. Then we can use the whole of mathematics to 
> derive the phenomenology, including matter, and compare with what we 
> observe.
>
>
>
>
> If one wants to do philosophy or theology that may be fine, but one has to 
> make sure not to confuse these as categories with the category of science.
>
>
> No. That is the habit since theology has been stealer from science by the 
> con-man. 
>
> Maybe you know a theology which does not need science, that which does not 
> need modesty, caution, critically open, etc.
>
> The problem when you forget hat theology is a science, is that you take 
> the risk of imposing some theology or metaphysical axiom, like if today’s 
> science did solved the Plato/Aristotle extreme disjunct.
>
>
>
>
> Maybe as Dennett says, philosophy is what we do when we do not understand 
> how to ask the question right.
>
>
> That is science. Bad philosophy and bad science is when we assert a 
> problem is solved, when it is not.
>
>
>
> In that setting at best we can only do sort of "pre-science," but not 
> really science as such. Theology is an even looser area of thought, and I 
> generally see no connection with science at all.
>
>
>
> Theology is just Metaphysics with the understanding that we must do a bet 
> of some sort, be it on some physical thing, (a material universe), or a 
> metaphysical things (the Tao?), or a mathematical, or musical, whatever 
> things.
>
> If you study the history of occidental science, theology is the science 
> which brings mathematics and physics, and mathematics was a source of 
> inspiration for many non physical realities to be conceived. Most of them 
> being often mathematical in nature. 
> If you study theology from Pythagorus to damascius, you will understand 
> that it is science, even if one using a non communicable data (a first 
> person experience).
> Then theology is responsible for the birth of mathematical logic too, much 
> later. I have given 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Martin Abramson]

My original question was about copying memories between identical carbon
atoms. How does that work with DNA molecules? Are they composed of carbon
atoms?

On Thu, Nov 29, 2018 at 10:37 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Nov 28, 2018 at 9:08 PM Martin Abramson 
> wrote:
>
> > *How do they replicate themselves with the exact same memory engrams as
>> before? Thanks for the response. m.a.*
>>
>
> The exact mechanism depends on the specific example, computers have many
> different ways to duplicate information. In the case of DNA the double
> helix unravels and splits down the middle so you have 2 single helix
> molecules, but each helix still contains as much information as the
> original double helix because the 4 bases in the helix is what carries the
> information and Adenine only binds with Thymine and Cytosine only binds
> with Guanine. So each single helix can grab free bases floating around and
> start to grow, and pretty soon you have 2 identical double helix molecules
> where there was only one before.
>
>  John K Clark
>
>
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:44:05 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 27 Nov 2018, at 20:21, Brent Meeker > 
> wrote:
>
>
> What is this "primary matter" of which you speak? 
>
>
>
> X is Primary means basically that we have to assume X (or something judged 
> enough equivalent).
>
> The idea of primary matter is the (physicalist) idea that we have to 
> assume a bit of physics, to get the physical law. It is used by people who 
> dislike the idea that matter might be explained without assuming anything 
> physical. 
>
>
>
>
My understanding of "primary matter" is that it is what matter (hyle) is 
before it meets form, hence *hylomorphism *[ 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylomorphism 
]. 

Thomas Aquinas thought (from what I've read) that matter is that which 
gives forms individual instances, or "character", like individual trees, or 
people, etc.





>
>
>
> molecules? 
>
>
> Assuming contemporary chemistry, molecules are explained by quarks and 
> electrons, and quantum mechanics.
>


Why are there so many articles today that claim to refute this?

[ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3262307/ ]
[ 
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/the-curious-wavefunction/historical-contingency-and-the-futility-of-reductionism-why-chemistry-and-biology-is-not-physics/
 
]

 - pt

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Re: If Quantum Mechanics can be derived using arithmetic only, how would that derivation begin?

[Brent Meeker]

What can be inferred always depends on what you take as premises. If you 
start from the Hilbert space formulation of QM or an equivalent 
formulation/*and you premise that there is a probability interpretation 
of  a state*/, then Gleason's theorem tells you that the Born rule 
provides the unique probability values.


Brent

On 11/29/2018 10:23 AM, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
*Regardless of rules of arithmetic and mathematical logic, I simply 
don't believe that something like Born's Rule can be inferred without 
actually observing a quantum interference pattern. AG*


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Re: The most accurate clock ever

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/29/2018 6:28 AM, John Clark wrote:
In yesterday's issue of the journal Nature Scientists at the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) reported they have made a 
new type of clock that is the most accurate ever, it's called a 
Ytterbium Lattice Clock. It's about 100 times better than any previous 
clock, if set at the time of the Big Bang 13.8 billion years ago today 
it would be off by less than one second.


https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-018-0738-2

It's so good the main source of error is due to General Relativity, if 
you lift the clock up by just one centimeter the Earth's gravitational 
field is slightly weaker and so the clock runs noticeably faster, that 
may be why NIST is now working on a portable version of their 
Ytterbium Lattice Clock. If GPS satellites had clocks this good they'd 
know where they were relative to the Earth to within a centimeter and 
so could tell users on the ground where they were within a centimeter; 
and that would be more than good enough for jet fighters to 
automatically land on aircraft carriers without a pilot, even at night 
in a heavy fog in a bad storm with the deck tossing up and down.


Unfortunately for that idea, the surface of the Earth, and especially 
the ocean, varies by a lot more than a centimeter.  Off the coast of CA 
where the Pacific Missile range is, the "Earth's surface" as defined in 
WGS84 is a few meters underwater.  That's why one must us local 
corrections for GPS altitude.  But the local correction is still only an 
average over tidal cycles, etc.


Brent

It would be by far the best instrument ever made to detect tiny 
changes in the gravitational field, and that would make it much easier 
to find things buried deep underground. The Earth just became more 
transparent. It might even be used to detect Gravitational Waves and 
Dark Matter.


John K Clark
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

What does this mean in terms of (the possibility of) making a Star Trek 
transporter?  :)

[ https://www.thoughtco.com/star-trek-instantaneous-matter-transport-3072118 
]

- pt

On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 8:34:23 PM UTC-6, Monterey wrote:
>
> My original question was about copying memories between identical carbon 
> atoms. How does that work with DNA molecules? Are they composed of carbon 
> atoms?
>
> On Thu, Nov 29, 2018 at 10:37 AM John Clark  > wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Nov 28, 2018 at 9:08 PM Martin Abramson > > wrote:
>>
>> > *How do they replicate themselves with the exact same memory engrams 
>>> as before? Thanks for the response. m.a.*
>>>
>>
>> The exact mechanism depends on the specific example, computers have many 
>> different ways to duplicate information. In the case of DNA the double 
>> helix unravels and splits down the middle so you have 2 single helix 
>> molecules, but each helix still contains as much information as the 
>> original double helix because the 4 bases in the helix is what carries the 
>> information and Adenine only binds with Thymine and Cytosine only binds 
>> with Guanine. So each single helix can grab free bases floating around and 
>> start to grow, and pretty soon you have 2 identical double helix molecules 
>> where there was only one before.
>>
>>  John K Clark
>>
>>
>>
>>

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Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 28 Nov 2018, at 18:40, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, November 28, 2018 at 9:03:42 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
> On Friday, November 9, 2018 at 6:51:06 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
> From: Brent Meeker >
>> 
>> You're dodging my point.  The "issue" of how we have subjective experience 
>> only seems to be an issue because in comparison to the "objective" 
>> experience of matter where we can trace long, mathematically define causal 
>> chains down to...a Lagrangian and coupling constants or something similar, 
>> which is long enough and esoteric enough that almost everyone loses interest 
>> along the way.  But some people (like Vic) are going to say, "But where does 
>> the Langrangian and coupling constants come from?"  and "Why a Lagrangian 
>> anyway?" My point is that when we can give a similarly deep and detailed 
>> account of why you think of an elephant when reading this, then nobody will 
>> worry about "the hard problem of consciousness"; just like they don't worry 
>> about "the hard problems of matter" like where that Lagrangian comes from or 
>> why a complex Hilbert space.
> 
> Why can't I worry about those things? Where does the Lagrangian come from? 
> And why use a complex Hilbert space? I don't think this is the underlying 
> reason for saying that the "hard problem" of consciousness dissolves on 
> solving the engineering problems. Solving the engineering problems will 
> enable us to produce a fully conscious AI -- but will we then know how it 
> works? We will certainly know where it came from.
> 
> Bruce
> 
> When it comes to science I have to back what Bruce says here. All knowledge 
> faces the limits of the Münchhausen trilemma, where we have three possible 
> types of arguments. The first is the basic axiomatic approach, which 
> generally is the cornerstone and capstone of mathematics and science. The 
> second is a "turtles all the way down," where an argument is based on 
> premises that have deeper reasons, and this nests endlessly. Vic Stenger 
> found this to be of most interest with his "models all the way down." The 
> third is a circular argument which would mean all truth is just tautology. 
> The second and third turn out to have some relevancy, where these are 
> complement in Godel's theorem. While in general we use the first in science 
> and mathematics we generally can't completely eliminate the other two. 
> However, for most work we have an FAPP limitation to how far we want to go. 
> Because of that if there is ultimately just a quantum vacuum, or some set of 
> vacua, that is eternal, we may then just rest our case there.
> 
> If one wants to do philosophy or theology that may be fine, but one has to 
> make sure not to confuse these as categories with the category of science. 
> Maybe as Dennett says, philosophy is what we do when we do not understand how 
> to ask the question right. In that setting at best we can only do sort of 
> "pre-science," but not really science as such. Theology is an even looser 
> area of thought, and I generally see no connection with science at all.
> 
> LC
> 
> 
> 
> The "models almost all the way up ... and ... down" quote ("models" replacing 
> the original "turtles") came first from the philosopher of science Ronald 
> Giere [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ronald_Giere ].
> 
> In his book Scientific Perspectivism he develops a version of perspectival 
> realism in which he argues that scientific descriptions are somewhat like 
> colors, in that they capture only selected aspects of reality, and those 
> aspects are not bits of the world seen as they are in themselves, but bits of 
> the world seen from a distinctive human perspective.


You can compare this with the consequence of mechanism and incompleteness, 
which enforces the 8 different self-referential universal (Löbian) machine 
“perspective” on arithmetic when seen by inside: 

p (true)
Bp (provable).  (split in two)
Bp & p (knowable)
Bp & Dp (observable).  (split in two)
Bp & Dp & p (sensible).  (split in two)

It is a form of perspectivism, or modalism. The modal B and D (which is the 
diamond -B-) obeys the same law for all correct Löbian machine (universal 
machine aware of its universality), but can be very different form one 
individual to another.

B is Gödel’s beweisbar, or some generalisation for arbitrary 


> In addition to the color example, Giere articulates his perspectivism by 
> appeal to maps and to his own earlier and influential work on scientific 
> models. Maps represent the world, but the representations they provide are 
> conventional, affected by interest, and never fully accurate or complete.

That makes sense, same here, if you know the relation between each mode, and 
between the modes and arithmetic.



> Similarly, scientific models are idealized structures that represent the 
> world from particular and limited points of view. According to Giere, what 
> goes for colors, maps, and models goes generally: 

Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/29/2018 11:08 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 28 Nov 2018, at 18:40, Philip Thrift > wrote:




On Wednesday, November 28, 2018 at 9:03:42 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell 
wrote:


On Friday, November 9, 2018 at 6:51:06 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:

From: *Brent Meeker* 


You're dodging my point.  The "issue" of how we have
subjective experience only seems to be an issue because in
comparison to the "objective" experience of matter where we
can trace long, mathematically define causal chains down
to...a Lagrangian and coupling constants or something
similar, which is long enough and esoteric enough that
almost everyone loses interest along the way.  But some
people (like Vic) are going to say, "But where does the
Langrangian and coupling constants come from?"  and "Why a
Lagrangian anyway?" My point is that when we can give a
similarly deep and detailed account of why you think of an
elephant when reading this, then nobody will worry about
"the hard problem of consciousness"; just like they don't
worry about "the hard problems of matter" like where that
Lagrangian comes from or why a complex Hilbert space.


Why can't I worry about those things? Where does the
Lagrangian come from? And why use a complex Hilbert space? I
don't think this is the underlying reason for saying that the
"hard problem" of consciousness dissolves on solving the
engineering problems. Solving the engineering problems will
enable us to produce a fully conscious AI -- but will we then
know how it works? We will certainly know where it came from.

Bruce


When it comes to science I have to back what Bruce says here. All
knowledge faces the limits of the Münchhausen trilemma, where we
have three possible types of arguments. The first is the basic
axiomatic approach, which generally is the cornerstone and
capstone of mathematics and science. The second is a "turtles all
the way down," where an argument is based on premises that have
deeper reasons, and this nests endlessly. Vic Stenger found this
to be of most interest with his "models all the way down." The
third is a circular argument which would mean all truth is just
tautology. The second and third turn out to have some relevancy,
where these are complement in Godel's theorem. While in general
we use the first in science and mathematics we generally can't
completely eliminate the other two. However, for most work we
have an FAPP limitation to how far we want to go. Because of that
if there is ultimately just a quantum vacuum, or some set of
vacua, that is eternal, we may then just rest our case there.

If one wants to do philosophy or theology that may be fine, but
one has to make sure not to confuse these as categories with the
category of science. Maybe as Dennett says, philosophy is what we
do when we do not understand how to ask the question right. In
that setting at best we can only do sort of "pre-science," but
not really science as such. Theology is an even looser area of
thought, and I generally see no connection with science at all.

LC




The "models almost all the way up ... and ... down" quote ("models" 
replacing the original "turtles") came first from the philosopher of 
science *Ronald Giere* [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ronald_Giere ].


/In his book Scientific Perspectivism he develops a version of 
perspectival realism in which he argues that scientific descriptions 
are somewhat like colors, in that they capture only selected aspects 
of reality, and those aspects are not bits of the world seen as they 
are in themselves, but bits of the world seen from a distinctive 
human perspective. /



You can compare this with the consequence of mechanism and 
incompleteness, which enforces the 8 different self-referential 
universal (Löbian) machine “perspective” on arithmetic when seen by 
inside:


p (true)
Bp (provable).  (split in two)
Bp & p (knowable)
Bp & Dp (observable).  (split in two)
Bp & Dp & p (sensible).  (split in two)

It is a form of perspectivism, or modalism. The modal B and D (which 
is the diamond -B-) obeys the same law for all correct Löbian machine 
(universal machine aware of its universality), but can be very 
different form one individual to another.


B is Gödel’s beweisbar, or some generalisation for arbitrary


/In addition to the color example, Giere articulates his 
perspectivism by appeal to maps and to his own earlier and 
influential work on scientific models. Maps represent the world, but 
the representations they provide are conventional, affected by 
interest, and never fully accurate or complete. /


That makes sense, same here, if you know the relation between each 
mode, and between the modes and arithmetic.

The most accurate clock ever

[John Clark]

In yesterday's issue of the journal Nature Scientists at the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) reported they have made a new
type of clock that is the most accurate ever, it's called a Ytterbium
Lattice Clock. It's about 100 times better than any previous clock, if set
at the time of the Big Bang 13.8 billion years ago today it would be off by
less than one second.

https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-018-0738-2

It's so good the main source of error is due to General Relativity, if you
lift the clock up by just one centimeter the Earth's gravitational field is
slightly weaker and so the clock runs noticeably faster, that may be why
NIST is now working on a portable version of their Ytterbium Lattice Clock.
If GPS satellites had clocks this good they'd know where they were relative
to the Earth to within a centimeter and so could tell users on the ground
where they were within a centimeter; and that would be more than good
enough for jet fighters to automatically land on aircraft carriers without
a pilot, even at night in a heavy fog in a bad storm with the deck tossing
up and down. It would be by far the best instrument ever made to detect
tiny changes in the gravitational field, and that would make it much easier
to find things buried deep underground. The Earth just became more
transparent. It might even be used to detect Gravitational Waves and Dark
Matter.

John K Clark

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[John Clark]

On Wed, Nov 28, 2018 at 9:08 PM Martin Abramson 
wrote:

> *How do they replicate themselves with the exact same memory engrams as
> before? Thanks for the response. m.a.*
>

The exact mechanism depends on the specific example, computers have many
different ways to duplicate information. In the case of DNA the double
helix unravels and splits down the middle so you have 2 single helix
molecules, but each helix still contains as much information as the
original double helix because the 4 bases in the helix is what carries the
information and Adenine only binds with Thymine and Cytosine only binds
with Guanine. So each single helix can grab free bases floating around and
start to grow, and pretty soon you have 2 identical double helix molecules
where there was only one before.

 John K Clark

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Re: If Quantum Mechanics can be derived using arithmetic only, how would that derivation begin?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 28 Nov 2018, at 21:10, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> Bruno, can you do it without resort to your idiosyncratic jargon? AG


I can do that. Actually the “universal dovetailer argument (UDA)” is a version 
of my thesis accessible to kids, at least up to the seventh step (the 8th one 
requires some good understanding of the Church’s or Turing’s thesis).

But it might be quicker to read the sane04 paper, and ask me question wherever 
you don’t understand? 

The UDA explains informally why, once we assume mechanism, we have to recover 
the physical appearance from arithmetic only. 

The translation of the UDA in arithmetic gives then all the mathematical 
details to do the extraction of physics, and we have got already the quantum 
logics of the quanta and of the qualia (accepting some definitions of course). 
But this of course asks for learning a bit of mathematical logic (“my” 
idiosyncratic jargon, I guess).

Now, if you prefer to study online, we can do that, step by step. Just take a 
look at the sane04 paper, which you can read or download here:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html. 
(*)

And tell me if you prefer to ask me question, or to do the whole thing step by 
step online.

You might need to be patient, as I am still 500 mails late …

Bruno


(*) B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th 
International System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, SANE 
2004, Amsterdam, 2004.

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 27 Nov 2018, at 18:50, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, November 27, 2018 at 4:32:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 24 Nov 2018, at 17:27, John Clark > 
>> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
>> Turing explained how matter can behave intelligently,
> 
> No. He showed how a person can be attached to a computation, and also that 
> physics is Turing complete, so that we can use matter to implement 
> computations, like nature plausibly does. But it is not matter which behave 
> intelligently: it is the person associated to the computation, and it behaves 
> as well relatively to numbers than to matter. You use of matter is “magical”.
> 
> 
> 
> If humans are matter (meaning of course that human brains are matter), then 
> humans behave intelligently means that (at least some) matter behaves 
> intelligently.  

Like with a computer: some arrangement of some matter can emulate a (universal) 
computation. That means that the physical laws are Turing complete. 

It does not mean that primary matter exists (see my reminding of what this 
means in my answer to Brent, soon enough!).




> 
> It is not clear that Turing in his last ("morphogenesis") years thought that 
> the Turing machine was a complete definition of computing in nature.


If mechanism is true, in principle, nature has more powerful processing ability 
than any computer. Now, it could mean only that nature use a random oracle, 
which would come only from our ignorance about which computations run us, if I 
may say.

Bruno




> 
> - pt
> 
> 
> 
> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 27 Nov 2018, at 20:21, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 11/27/2018 2:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 25 Nov 2018, at 15:41, John Clark >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> On Sun, Nov 25, 2018 at 4:40 AM Philip Thrift >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>>  Dennett's said:
>>> 
>>> “The elusive subjective conscious experience—the redness of red, the 
>>> painfulness of pain—that philosophers call qualia? Sheer illusion.”
>>> 
>>> The trouble with the above statement isn't so much that it's false, the 
>>> trouble is that it's silly. In the first place an illusion is a 
>>> misinterpretation of the senses, but pain is direct experience that needs 
>>> no interpretation. I would love to ask Mr. Dennett how things would be 
>>> different if pain was not an illusion, if he can't answer that, and I don't 
>>> think he could, then the statement "pain is a illusion" contains no 
>>> information.
>>> 
>>> And illusion itself is a conscious phenomena, so saying consciousness is an 
>>> illusion is just saying consciousness is consciousness which, although 
>>> true, is not very illuminating. When discussing any philosophical issue the 
>>> word "illusion" should be used very cautiously. And if the topic involves 
>>> consciousness or quala and silliness is to be avoided the word "illusion" 
>>> should never be used at all because it explains nothing.  
>> 
>> That us why we use synonymous like first person, phenomenological, etc. 
>> 
>> For example, with mechanism, the matter that we see is not an illusion, but 
>> the primary matter that we infer
> 
> What is this "primary matter" of which you speak? 


X is Primary means basically that we have to assume X (or something judged 
enough equivalent).

The idea of primary matter is the (physicalist) idea that we have to assume a 
bit of physics, to get the physical law. It is used by people who dislike the 
idea that matter might be explained without assuming anything physical. 







> molecules?

Assuming contemporary chemistry, molecules are explained by quarks and 
electrons, and quantum mechanics.




> atoms? quarks? strings? 

Strings might be close to a notion of primary matter, except it is nt clear if 
they are conceived of being made by something, and it is also open, for most 
physicists, if they are primitive of not.

The notion of primary matter is typically not a physical notion, but a 
metaphysical one. To solve the problem which came first, mind or matter, it is 
obvious we cannot decide in advance the solution.




>   Who is it who every claims any one of these is "primary”? 

The (weak) materialist metaphysician. Like those who says that a computation 
needs to be implemented in some primitive physical reality to exist. They adopt 
Aristotle assumption about some ontological physical reality.

Most physicists, as any good scientists, are neutral on this. Some proposes 
their own opinion, after pension, or at some dinner when drunk. But physics and 
metaphysics are not the same branche of inquiry, even if related of course.




> What theory depends on one of them being primary? 


Many people says that there is no after-life. They use the mind-brain identity 
principle, usually in some materialist context, so that when the brain perish, 
they believe that their first person stop to exist in some absolute way. With 
mechanism, like with Everett QM, that conclusion does not follow.




> I think you are beating a straw man to imply that others theories are wrong 
> therefore yours must be right.


I never claim that a theory is right or wrong. I show only that the Mechanist 
theory implies immaterialism, and I explain how to recover physics 
phenomenologically, and how we can test that, and why the current empirical 
evidences favours more mechanism than materialism. 


Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
>> from that seeing experience is an illusion, or a delusion. It is just a 
>> wrong inference, as most illusion are. 
>> 
>> Consciousness cannot be an illusion, indeed, but all content of 
>> consciousness, minus being conscious, can be wrong.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> John K Clark
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> 
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Re: If Quantum Mechanics can be derived using arithmetic only, how would that derivation begin?

[agrayson2000]

On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 4:22:54 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 28 Nov 2018, at 21:10, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
> Bruno, can you do it without resort to your idiosyncratic jargon? AG
>
>
>
> I can do that. 
>

I don't believe it can be done. For example, even if there exists such a 
thing as a complex sum whose amplitude squared can be calculated (and 
presumably something implied by arithmetic), how would you know that this 
is the way to calculate probabilities for quantum experiments?  AG 

> Actually the “universal dovetailer argument (UDA)” is a version of my 
> thesis accessible to kids, at least up to the seventh step (the 8th one 
> requires some good understanding of the Church’s or Turing’s thesis).
>
> But it might be quicker to read the sane04 paper, and ask me question 
> wherever you don’t understand? 
>
> The UDA explains informally why, once we assume mechanism, we have to 
> recover the physical appearance from arithmetic only. 
>
> The translation of the UDA in arithmetic gives then all the mathematical 
> details to do the extraction of physics, and we have got already the 
> quantum logics of the quanta and of the qualia (accepting some definitions 
> of course). But this of course asks for learning a bit of mathematical 
> logic (“my” idiosyncratic jargon, I guess).
>
> Now, if you prefer to study online, we can do that, step by step. Just 
> take a look at the sane04 paper, which you can read or download here:
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html. 
> (*)
>
> And tell me if you prefer to ask me question, or to do the whole thing 
> step by step online.
>
> You might need to be patient, as I am still 500 mails late …
>
> Bruno
>
>
> (*) B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th 
> International System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, 
> SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 2004.
>
>
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>
>

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Re: If Quantum Mechanics can be derived using arithmetic only, how would that derivation begin?

[agrayson2000]

On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 4:56:51 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 4:22:54 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 28 Nov 2018, at 21:10, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>> Bruno, can you do it without resort to your idiosyncratic jargon? AG
>>
>>
>>
>> I can do that. 
>>
>
> *I don't believe it can be done. For example, even if there exists such a 
> thing as a complex sum whose amplitude squared can be calculated (and 
> presumably something implied by arithmetic), how would you know that this 
> is the way to calculate probabilities for quantum experiments?  AG *
>

*Put another way, there's nothing in pure arithmetic to indicate how to 
calculate a probability in quantum experiments. Same goes for, say, the x 
and p operators used in QM; and so forth. AG*


Actually the “universal dovetailer argument (UDA)” is a version of my 
>> thesis accessible to kids, at least up to the seventh step (the 8th one 
>> requires some good understanding of the Church’s or Turing’s thesis).
>>
>> But it might be quicker to read the sane04 paper, and ask me question 
>> wherever you don’t understand? 
>>
>> The UDA explains informally why, once we assume mechanism, we have to 
>> recover the physical appearance from arithmetic only. 
>>
>> The translation of the UDA in arithmetic gives then all the mathematical 
>> details to do the extraction of physics, and we have got already the 
>> quantum logics of the quanta and of the qualia (accepting some definitions 
>> of course). But this of course asks for learning a bit of mathematical 
>> logic (“my” idiosyncratic jargon, I guess).
>>
>> Now, if you prefer to study online, we can do that, step by step. Just 
>> take a look at the sane04 paper, which you can read or download here:
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html. 
>> (*)
>>
>> And tell me if you prefer to ask me question, or to do the whole thing 
>> step by step online.
>>
>> You might need to be patient, as I am still 500 mails late …
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>> (*) B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th 
>> International System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, 
>> SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 2004.
>>
>>
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