All,
New Scientist has a very interesting article this week about free will,
reality and entanglement. Worth a look. Additionally, for the trivia fans
among you, it seems one of the researchers quoted has clocked similarity
effects associated with entanglement at something like (minimum)
It is really just a discussion of Bell's inequality, I didn't find the
article had a lot new to say. I recall having read a similar standard
article in Scientific American in the 1980s.
On Fri, Jun 24, 2005 at 01:24:54AM -0500, rmiller wrote:
All,
New Scientist has a very interesting article
Jesse wrote
In reality the molecules in your brain are constantly being recycled--if
you believe that the changes that make up memories happen at the synapses,
the article at http://www.sci-con.org/articles/20040601.html suggests all
the molecules at the synapses are replaced in only 24
Can anyone explain http://chu.stanford.edu/guide.html#ratmech to me. Stephen
seems to think Pratt has solved the Caspar problem of dualism. It also
involves
http://www.meta-religion.com/Philosophy/Articles/Philosophy_of_the_mind/mind-bo
dy.htm by someone whose nom-de-internet is Cassiels Sophia.
-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Monday, June 20, 2005 1:33 PM
To: Norman Samish
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: Re: copy method important?
Le 18-juin-05, à 20:36, Norman Samish a écrit :
I'm no physicist, but doesn't Heisenberg's
I can see an interesting new problem in this thread. Let me put it in a thought
experiment as the praxis in this list requires.
You are in the same torture room as before, but now the guy is going to
torture you to death. You have three options:
A: you flip a coin to decide whether you are
From: rmiller
New Scientist has a very interesting article [...]
http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0503007
Nicolas Gisin, 'How come the Correlations'.
Note that what Gisin is saying (link above)
was, more or less, already written by John Bell.
It has been argued that quantum mechanics
is not
On Fri, Jun 24, 2005 at 11:23:33AM +1000, Eric Cavalcanti wrote:
Furthermore, there is always some way to tell the difference between the
copy and the original, in principle, even if that infomation is not
epistemologically
available to the subjects themselves. If the original flew to New
R. Miller writes:
The arguments here seem to assume a consensus experience, i.e. Can't we
all just agree on this set of evidence? What if reality experienced by
one in a closed room is fundamentally different that when experienced as a
dyad, triad, or mob? No one (to my knowledge) has been
Eric Cavalcanti writes:
You are in the same torture room as before, but now the guy is going to
torture you to death. You have three options:
A: you flip a coin to decide whether you are going to be tortured;
B: you press the copy button 100 times;
C: you press the copy button once.
What do
Eric Cavalcanti writes:
I do not equate my identity with the matter that composes my body at all.
I would say that my personal identity cannot be defined in a
communicable way, in the way I see it. I believe there is something
fundamental about consciousness.
I guess that my position could be
Le 22-juin-05, à 15:05, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Hal Finney writes:
I was trying to use Stathis' terminology when I wrote about the
probability of dying. Actually I am now trying to use the ASSA and I
don't have a very good idea about what it means to specify a
subjective
next moment.
I hope you all have fun languishing in the hell that is pseudo-science and superstition.
P.S. Where's the math, you superstitious new-agers?
Le 22-juin-05, à 19:50, Quentin Anciaux a écrit :
I have one more question about measure :
I don't understand the concept of 'increasing' and 'decreasing'
measure if I
assume everything exists.
Me neither. Especially when I accept, for the sake of some argument,
the ASSA
(Absolute
Le 22-juin-05, à 20:35, George Levy a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 21-juin-05, à 05:33, George Levy a écrit :
Note that according to this definition the set of observer states may also encompass states with inconsistent histories as long as they are indistinguishable.
The possibilities
Le 22-juin-05, à 13:19, Brent Meeker a écrit :
-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, June 22, 2005 8:16 AM
To: Pete Carlton
Cc: EverythingList
Subject: Re: Dualism and the DA
Le 21-juin-05, à 21:21, Pete Carlton a écrit :
snip
Now, if
At 06:44 AM 6/24/2005, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
(snip)
So although it's not impossible that minds can somehow act as a group,
that is something in need of *real* experimental evidence. Stacking a
controversial theory on a weird idea balancing on an impossible situation
is asking for
Le 22-juin-05, à 21:26, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
x-tad-biggerActually, it occurred to me lately that saying everything happens may be the same as the paradox of the set of all sets.
/x-tad-bigger
That is indeed close to may critics of Tegmark. But as you know logician have made progress in
Le 24-juin-05, à 01:03, Brent Meeker a écrit :
And then I recall I gave an exercise: show that with comp the
no-cloning theorem can easily be justified a priori from comp. As I
said this follows easily from the Universal dovetailer Argument.
But the UDA and the comp-hypothesis are not the
On Fri, Jun 24, 2005 at 05:08:39PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 23-juin-05, ? 05:38, Lee Corbin a ?crit :
you *can* be
in two places at the same time.
From a third person pov: OK.
From a first person pov: how?
You can be in two places at the same time, but you can't enjoy two
Le 24-juin-05, à 14:47, A. Maxwell a écrit :
Where's the math?, snip
Here:
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0521483255/104-6734233
-3264737?v=glance
Look Maxwell, in the list nobody pretends to know the truth, and we are
just making *arguments*. But if you like math, see
Le 24-juin-05, à 17:23, Eugen Leitl a écrit :
On Fri, Jun 24, 2005 at 05:08:39PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 23-juin-05, ? 05:38, Lee Corbin a ?crit :
you *can* be
in two places at the same time.
From a third person pov: OK.
From a first person pov: how?
You can be in two places at
Eric Cavalcanti wrote:
If I were to be consistent, I
would have to wonder whether the person I was a few months ago was
really
me, because the atoms comprising my body today are probably completely
different. In fact, in *every respect* the person I was a few months ago
differs more from
rmiller wrote:
Jesse wrote
In reality the molecules in your brain are constantly being recycled--if
you believe that the changes that make up memories happen at the synapses,
the article at http://www.sci-con.org/articles/20040601.html suggests all
the molecules at the synapses are
New Agers? Few of us on this list believe in stuff like ESP, the only
exceptions I know of are rmiller and Stephen Paul King. Most of us believe
in a completely reductionist view of how the brain produces intelligent
behavior (ie we think a sufficiently detailed simulation of a brain would
Le 24-juin-05, à 12:27, Eugen Leitl a écrit :
Why don't we terminate this pointless thread, until we can actually
make numerical
models of sufficiently complex animals and people, so the question
completely
renders itself irrelevant?
You answer like if by making things more precise,
Thank you, Jesse, for pointing out that fact. ;-)
Stephen
PS, If it where not for the few of us that have *actually had ESP
experiences*, that can not be refuted as hallucinations or temporal lobe
seizures, etc., (I can't claim to speak for Richard on this) and are willing
to find consistent
On Fri, Jun 24, 2005 at 06:52:11PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Why don't we terminate this pointless thread, until we can actually
make numerical
models of sufficiently complex animals and people, so the question
completely
renders itself irrelevant?
You answer like if by making things
Hi Bruno,
Le Vendredi 24 Juin 2005 15:25, Bruno Marchal a écrit :
Because if everything exists... every OM has a
successor (and I'd say it must always have more than one),
Perhaps. It depends of your definition of OM, and of your
everything theory.
Let me tell you the Lobian's answer: if
Please replace bits by bytes ;)
Quentin Anciaux
(Sorry for the delay; I like to spend several hours writing here but I have had meetings to attend etc..)On Jun 22, 2005, at 4:19 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:There are two *physical* issues here.1) The simplest one is that if you agree with the comp indeterminacy(or similar) you get an explanation of
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