Re: Numbers
Quentin Anciaux wrote: > Hi, > > Le Samedi 25 Mars 2006 00:27, Brent Meeker a écrit : > >>Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >>>Le Vendredi 24 Mars 2006 20:38, 1Z a écrit : >>> Quentin Anciaux wrote: >A quick point still : >You seem to have a problem with mathematical monism and reject it due to >HP world... but HP world is not a consequence of mathematical monism, >but a consequence of many world theories which can themself presuppose >mathematical monism or not. Everett many world theory is not >mathematical monism, still it support HP world. Physically MW theories are inherently more constrained than mathematical MW theories. You are not going to get water flowing uphill in a physical MW theory, because it contradicts the consevation of energy. >>> >>>Quantum theory predict that there is a very tiny chance that a broken cup >>>of coffee restructured itself... yet in everett mw theory as all choices >>>are made, there exists branches where this happen all the time. Yet as >>>I'll quote you "it is not observed"... but that does not mean anything >>>against everett mw. >> >>It doesn't mean much against Everett because Everett predicts extremely >>small probabilities for such events > > > yes that's what I explain (I think), but even very very small probabilities > lead in many worlds to the existence of a very very tiny number of branches > where these weird events happen *all the time*. > > >>and so effectively predicts they will >>not be seen. Whether is counts against everything-exists theories depends >>on the probability measure over such theories - a frequent topic of >>discussion on this list. >> >>Brent Meeker > > > I believe in relative measure and I think this is a key to resolve HP > universes "problem" (I quote problem because I don't see why it is one after > all). What's "relative measure"? Do you mean the Born Rule. To retain it as an axiom vitiates the explanatory power of MW. But all attempts to derive it seem to have fallen into cicularity. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Hi, Le Samedi 25 Mars 2006 00:27, Brent Meeker a écrit : > Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > Le Vendredi 24 Mars 2006 20:38, 1Z a écrit : > >>Quentin Anciaux wrote: > >>>A quick point still : > >>>You seem to have a problem with mathematical monism and reject it due to > >>>HP world... but HP world is not a consequence of mathematical monism, > >>> but a consequence of many world theories which can themself presuppose > >>> mathematical monism or not. Everett many world theory is not > >>> mathematical monism, still it support HP world. > >> > >>Physically MW theories are inherently more constrained than > >>mathematical > >>MW theories. You are not going to get water flowing uphill in a > >>physical MW > >>theory, because it contradicts the consevation of energy. > > > > Quantum theory predict that there is a very tiny chance that a broken cup > > of coffee restructured itself... yet in everett mw theory as all choices > > are made, there exists branches where this happen all the time. Yet as > > I'll quote you "it is not observed"... but that does not mean anything > > against everett mw. > > It doesn't mean much against Everett because Everett predicts extremely > small probabilities for such events yes that's what I explain (I think), but even very very small probabilities lead in many worlds to the existence of a very very tiny number of branches where these weird events happen *all the time*. > and so effectively predicts they will > not be seen. Whether is counts against everything-exists theories depends > on the probability measure over such theories - a frequent topic of > discussion on this list. > > Brent Meeker I believe in relative measure and I think this is a key to resolve HP universes "problem" (I quote problem because I don't see why it is one after all). Regards, Quentin Anciaux --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Smullyan Shmullyan, give me a real example
Dear members of the list, Bruno and those who understand G. I have read or rather tried to read Smullyan's book. His examples are totally fabricated. I will never meet the white knight in the island of liars and truthtellers. I need examples which are relevant to life, at least the way I understand it in the context of the many-worlds. Einstein (or maybe someone writing about relativity) came up with the paradox of the travelling aging twin. Schroedinger came up with his cat's paradox. Tegmark came up with the quantum suicide experiment. Granted, I will never travel near the speed of light; I will never put a cat in a box equipped with a random and automatized killing device; and I will not attempt suicide; my wife would just kill me. However, these examples fired up my imagination: travelling near the speed of light, existing in a superposition of state, surviving a nuclear bomb under your chair. Smullyan's white knigth had the mission to teach me about the logic of G and G*. Sorry, he failed. The white knight does not fire up my imagination. I don't care about his island and about his questions. However I do care about life, death and immortality. The many-world does seem to guarantee a form of immortality, at least according to some interpretations. I consider this issue to be very relevant since sooner or later each one of us will be facing the issue of death or of non-death. I would like someone to come up with an extreme adventure story like the travelling twin, Schroedinger's cat, or Tegmark's suicide experiment to illustrate G and G*. For example this story would describe a close brush with death.. It would create a paradox by juxtaposing 1) classical or common sense logic assuming a single world, 2) classical or common sense logic assuming the many-world, and 3) G/G* logic assuming the many-world. What would the white knight do if he were living in the many-world? What kind of situations would highlight his talent to think in G. Would his behavior appear to be paradoxical from our logical point of view? George Levy --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Quentin Anciaux wrote: > Le Vendredi 24 Mars 2006 20:38, 1Z a écrit : > >>Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >>>A quick point still : >>>You seem to have a problem with mathematical monism and reject it due to >>>HP world... but HP world is not a consequence of mathematical monism, but >>>a consequence of many world theories which can themself presuppose >>>mathematical monism or not. Everett many world theory is not mathematical >>>monism, still it support HP world. >> >>Physically MW theories are inherently more constrained than >>mathematical >>MW theories. You are not going to get water flowing uphill in a >>physical MW >>theory, because it contradicts the consevation of energy. > > > Quantum theory predict that there is a very tiny chance that a broken cup of > coffee restructured itself... yet in everett mw theory as all choices are > made, there exists branches where this happen all the time. Yet as I'll quote > you "it is not observed"... but that does not mean anything against everett > mw. It doesn't mean much against Everett because Everett predicts extremely small probabilities for such events and so effectively predicts they will not be seen. Whether is counts against everything-exists theories depends on the probability measure over such theories - a frequent topic of discussion on this list. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
peterdjones wrote: > > [...] > I don't refuse them on the basis of prejudice, I refuse them > on the basis of not matching my experience. Your experience *is* a prejudice. Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
peterdjones wrote: > > Georges Quenot wrote: >> peterdjones wrote: >>> [...] What we can be sure of is that >>> 1) we exist >>> 2) we are conscious >>> 3) there is some sort of external world >>> 4) there is some phenomenon of time. >> *You* are sure of that and of what it might mean. Please do >> not decide for others. > > Is it possible for me to have a discussion with you ? Good question. After having tried I am not so sure. > If the answer is "yes", you are conceding: > > 1) you and I exist > 2) you and I are conscious > 3) you are external to me and vice-versa All of these statements can be understood in many ways depending upon the context and the person. *I do not* consider them *universally* true. > That only leaves (4), but I suppose all discussions take some time. In the context of this discussion, 1) through 4) are left, and especially 3). >>> These are all quite problematical for Mathematical Monism; >> As *you* believe and understand them, certainly. *I* do not >> see any problem for mathematical monism (I do not need the >> upper cases) to make sense. > > So you say. As things stand, I have to take your word, Thanks. We at least accomplished this. > since you have not offered any explanation. I am afraid I can't. I tried hard but you appeared to reject all grounds on which I could have built one. That's your freedom but I don't see what more I can do. Finally I pointed that we did not share enough grounds but even this did not seem to make it. >>> [...] Arguments should start with what you can be sure of. >> What "we" can be sure of (as well as what it might mean) can >> be very different from my viewpoint and from yours. > > Viewpoints can differ without being equally valid. Note that you need a viewpoint to decide that a viewpoint is more valid than another. > If you cannot account for the existence of such a thing as > a discussion *in* a discussion, I think I can and I do. > you are in trouble. I don't think so. Even if it turns out that we cannot discuss one with each other, I feel nothing wrong with that. That's just life. >> In order to have a chance to make the point, arguments that >> *you* address to *me* should start wtih what *I* can be sure >> of and not with what *you* can be sure of. And vice versa >> indeed. >> >> What I can be sure of is probably "weaker" than what you can >> be sure of. It is likely to be quite different too. That must >> be why it can be compatible with more (or different) ideas. I feel that we are drifting off topic... Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Quentin Anciaux wrote: > Le Vendredi 24 Mars 2006 20:38, 1Z a écrit : > > Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > A quick point still : > > > You seem to have a problem with mathematical monism and reject it due to > > > HP world... but HP world is not a consequence of mathematical monism, but > > > a consequence of many world theories which can themself presuppose > > > mathematical monism or not. Everett many world theory is not mathematical > > > monism, still it support HP world. > > > > Physically MW theories are inherently more constrained than > > mathematical > > MW theories. You are not going to get water flowing uphill in a > > physical MW > > theory, because it contradicts the consevation of energy. > > Quantum theory predict that there is a very tiny chance that a broken cup of > coffee restructured itself... yet in everett mw theory as all choices are > made, there exists branches where this happen all the time. Yet as I'll quote > you "it is not observed"... but that does not mean anything against everett > mw. The fact that a theory is makes predictions that are not observed is always against it. > > Plus physical > > theories > > have more resources available to explain why wrlds are separate and > > non-interacting. > > What resources ? space, time, causality. > > Finally, there is no particular reason why I have to support physical > > MW theories either! > > That's the whole point where you wanted to get till the beginning, you simply > refuse any many world theories. I don't refuse them on the basis of prejudice, I refuse them on the basis of not matching my experience. > Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Le Vendredi 24 Mars 2006 20:38, 1Z a écrit : > Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > A quick point still : > > You seem to have a problem with mathematical monism and reject it due to > > HP world... but HP world is not a consequence of mathematical monism, but > > a consequence of many world theories which can themself presuppose > > mathematical monism or not. Everett many world theory is not mathematical > > monism, still it support HP world. > > Physically MW theories are inherently more constrained than > mathematical > MW theories. You are not going to get water flowing uphill in a > physical MW > theory, because it contradicts the consevation of energy. Quantum theory predict that there is a very tiny chance that a broken cup of coffee restructured itself... yet in everett mw theory as all choices are made, there exists branches where this happen all the time. Yet as I'll quote you "it is not observed"... but that does not mean anything against everett mw. > Plus physical > theories > have more resources available to explain why wrlds are separate and > non-interacting. What resources ? > Finally, there is no particular reason why I have to support physical > MW theories either! That's the whole point where you wanted to get till the beginning, you simply refuse any many world theories. Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Quentin Anciaux wrote: > A quick point still : > You seem to have a problem with mathematical monism and reject it due to HP > world... but HP world is not a consequence of mathematical monism, but a > consequence of many world theories which can themself presuppose mathematical > monism or not. Everett many world theory is not mathematical monism, still it > support HP world. Physically MW theories are inherently more constrained than mathematical MW theories. You are not going to get water flowing uphill in a physical MW theory, because it contradicts the consevation of energy. Plus physical theories have more resources available to explain why wrlds are separate and non-interacting. Finally, there is no particular reason why I have to support physical MW theories either! --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
A quick point still : You seem to have a problem with mathematical monism and reject it due to HP world... but HP world is not a consequence of mathematical monism, but a consequence of many world theories which can themself presuppose mathematical monism or not. Everett many world theory is not mathematical monism, still it support HP world. Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Le Vendredi 24 Mars 2006 16:40, 1Z a écrit :
> > No, I am not *spatially** inside a universe, becaue space is physics,.
> > not maths ! The number 2 that features in the set {1,2,3} is exactly
> > the same as the number 2 in the set {2,3,4}. It has no way of knowing
> > which
> > set it is in! Mathematical sets are **not** spatial regions! You are
> > thinking
> > about maths in a physical way, not in a mathematical way!
> >
>
> You're playing with the language... I'll try to make another mail longer to
> explain what I mean. Please just recall that I said that "You (at time t) is
> part of the *infinite* set of computations which goes throught your state at
> that time". That means Yes *2* cannot distinguish in which set... So for two
> times now you try to put word in my mouth which aren't.
That only makes the issue of my not experiencing HP universes worse...
> Quentin
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Re: Numbers
Georges Quenot wrote: > peterdjones wrote: > > > > [...] What we can be sure of is that > > 1) we exist > > 2) we are conscious > > 3) there is some sort of external world > > 4) there is some phenomenon of time. > > *You* are sure of that and of what it might mean. Please do > not decide for others. Is it possible for me to have a discussion with you ? If the answer is "yes", you are conceding: 1) you and I exist 2) you and I are conscious 3) you are external to me and vice-versa That only leaves (4), but I suppose all discussions take some time. > > These are all quite problematical for Mathematical Monism; > > As *you* believe and understand them, certainly. *I* do not > see any problem for mathematical monism (I do not need the > upper cases) to make sense. So you say. As things stand, I have to take your word,. since you have not offered any explanation. > > [...] Arguments should start with what you can be sure of. > > What "we" can be sure of (as well as what it might mean) can > be very different from my viewpoint and from yours. Viewpoints can differ without being equally valid. If you cannot account for the existence of sucha thing as a discussion *in* a discussion, you are in trouble. > In order to have a chance to make the point, arguments that > *you* address to *me* should start wtih what *I* can be sure > of and not with what *you* can be sure of. And vice versa > indeed. > > What I can be sure of is probably "weaker" than what you can > be sure of. It is likely to be quite different too. That must > be why it can be compatible with more (or different) ideas. > > Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Le Vendredi 24 Mars 2006 16:40, 1Z a écrit :
> No, I am not *spatially** inside a universe, becaue space is physics,.
> not maths ! The number 2 that features in the set {1,2,3} is exactly
> the same as the number 2 in the set {2,3,4}. It has no way of knowing
> which
> set it is in! Mathematical sets are **not** spatial regions! You are
> thinking
> about maths in a physical way, not in a mathematical way!
>
You're playing with the language... I'll try to make another mail longer to
explain what I mean. Please just recall that I said that "You (at time t) is
part of the *infinite* set of computations which goes throught your state at
that time". That means Yes *2* cannot distinguish in which set... So for two
times now you try to put word in my mouth which aren't.
Quentin
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Re: Numbers
peterdjones wrote: > > [...] What we can be sure of is that > 1) we exist > 2) we are conscious > 3) there is some sort of external world > 4) there is some phenomenon of time. *You* are sure of that and of what it might mean. Please do not decide for others. > These are all quite problematical for Mathematical Monism; As *you* believe and understand them, certainly. *I* do not see any problem for mathematical monism (I do not need the upper cases) to make sense. > [...] Arguments should start with what you can be sure of. What "we" can be sure of (as well as what it might mean) can be very different from my viewpoint and from yours. In order to have a chance to make the point, arguments that *you* address to *me* should start wtih what *I* can be sure of and not with what *you* can be sure of. And vice versa indeed. What I can be sure of is probably "weaker" than what you can be sure of. It is likely to be quite different too. That must be why it can be compatible with more (or different) ideas. Georges. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Bruno Marchal wrote: > Le 18-mars-06, à 16:00, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : > > > If every mathematical structure exists , then mathematical structures > > consisting > > of a counterpart of me plus a "Harry Potter" universe exist. Yet this > > is not > > observed. Of course that might be coincidence. > > > No it can't. This what the computationalist (or weaker) must explain. > This is mainly what the list is all about. > > Hal Finney, like my oldest attempts, try to explain the lack of Harry > Potter or white flying bunnies, by the abonormal huge rate of > computations needed to sustain such "illusions" in a coherent way. > My critics in a nutshell is that such an explanation cannot work once > we make explicit the first and third person description. The first > person, being unable to know the UD's delays of computations, cannot > distinguish a high variety of little and less little programs, so that > Hal Finney sort of explanation is incomplete (at best). My way of > tackling the problem consists in translating the UDA in the language of > a universal machine. Thanks to incompleteness this makes sense, and we > eventually are lead to an arithmetical interpretation of the Platonist > theories of everything, which observable consequences, like quantum > logic, many-worlds interfering in a wavy fashion, etc. > > Peter, what are your postulates? I think you are postulating an > aristotelian stuffy universe. Yes. If we use matter to answer the question "what is it about mathematical structure A that explains it's existence, rather than mathematical stucture B", we immediately arrive at a *definition* of matter which is non-solipsistic. >Are you postulating comp? I am fairly lukewarm about comp. I certainly wouldn't use it to expalin anythig else. What we can be sure of is that 1) we exist 2) we are conscious 3) there is some sort of external world 4) there is some phenomenon of time. These are all quite problematical for Mathematical Monism; assuming another problematical hypothesis, COMP, and using it to deny some or all of (1) to (4) is cart-bfore-the-horse. Arguments should start with what you can be sure of. >If yes, you are > in difficulties (cf UDA), if not, what is your theory of mind? A materialist cannot possible be worse off in explaining mind that a Mathematical Monist, sice he has at least one extra ingredient to play with. He is not obliged to deny that mind has anythign to do with computation, but when he hits problems he can appeal to matter itself -- for instance hypothesising that something about the specific physics/chemistry of the brain explains qualia. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Le Vendredi 24 Mars 2006 15:20, 1Z a écrit :
> >
> > I am not sure that you mean. I have no empirical evidence that I am in
> > a HP universe. MM suggests I must be. MM contradicts my experience,
> > so I reject MM.
>
> MM does not suggest you *must* be... please explain.
Yes it does. It suggests
a) every mathematical description is equally real.
Since
b) there is a mathematical description of the HP universe (as in a
video
game)
it follows that
c) the HP universe is a real as any other, according to MM.
Likewise, a counterpart of "me" must be in the HP universe because
every union and intersection of any two sets is as real as any other.
(or every any two bitstrings can be cut and pasted to make an equally
real bistring).
> > > Yes you are consistent
> > > with a universe with real sorcerer in it, yet till the time you are not
> > > aware of it you cannot say I'm in a HP universe, because you are only
> > > consistent with it, you would be able to say it when you would get more
> > > information (hence there will be a you who is in a HP consistent history
> > > (because you now it's real) and another you who's still in the fuzzy set
> > > HP/~HP.
> >
> > But they're all the same, in themselves ! Again, you are assuming a
> > degree
> > of separation that cannot arise from purely mathematical
> > considerations.
>
> No, I don't see where you want to get.
You are sneaking physics in by the back door! There is nothing
purely mathematical to keep "worlds" separate. Their unions and
intersections
must be equally real!
> >
> > If I am in a in a superposition/overlapping, it isn't consistent
> > with my (the real me typing this) knowledge, because I don't
> > experience anything like that. MM makes predictions that are
> > not born out by my experience.
>
> You are *inside* a universe, you cannot feel/sense overlapping universe nor
> universe splitting...
No, I am not *spatially** inside a universe, becaue space is physics,.
not maths ! The number 2 that features in the set {1,2,3} is exactly
the same as the number 2 in the set {2,3,4}. It has no way of knowing
which
set it is in! Mathematical sets are **not** spatial regions! You are
thinking
about maths in a physical way, not in a mathematical way!
> Quentin
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Re: Numbers
Bruno Marchal wrote: > Le 20-mars-06, à 00:04, John M a écrit : > > > > A Turing machine does nothing (by itself). Don't take > > the power for granted. Something has to OPERATE it to > > do anything. > > > Why? How could a digital machine distinguish reality, virtual reality, > arithmetical reality, etc. The question is about what computers are , form a 3rd-person perspective, not about what a machine would see from its own 1st person perspective. We know we have a 1st person perspecitve, and we have 3rd person knowledge of computers. That is the perspective of John's question. You question is from a machine's 1st person perspective. We don't even know that digitial computers have a 1st-person perspective. Your question might not even be valid. > > Bruno: > > let me draw your attention to one little phrasing in > > Hal's (and everybody else's, I presume, as I read > > these posts)- text: > > "If we assume..." > > And if we do not? > > > You will miss the consequences of the assumption. All science is based > on implicit or explicit assumption, related to (non definable) > world-views. Almost all science is based on the implicit assumption of a "stuffy" world view. Therefore, the burden of proof is on those who seek to deny it. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Fw: Numbers
Russell Standish wrote:
> This is the way I put the argument in my upcoming book. You can also
> read the Universal Dovetailer Argument in Bruno Marchal's SANE04
> paper.
>
> \item That a description logically capable of observing itself is
> enough to bootstrap itself into existence. Let me speak to this by
> means of an example: The C programming language is a popular
> language for computer applications. To convert a program written in
> C into machine instructions that can execute on the computer, one
> uses another program called a compiler. Many C compilers are
> available, but a popular compiler is the GNU C compiler, or gcc. Gcc
> is itself a C language program, you can download the program source
> code from http://www.gnu.org, and compile it yourself, if you
> already have a working C compiler. Once you have compiled gcc, you
> can then use gcc to compile itself. Thus gcc has bootstrapped itself
> onto your computer, and all references to any preexisting compiler
> forgotten.
No, gcc chasn't bootstrapped **itself** -- it has been bootstrapped by
another
compiler ("if you already have a working C compiler"). You can use gcc
to compile itself only if it has already been compiled. Gcc cannot
bootstrap
itself on a computer without a compiler. what you have said serves a
loose
illustration of self-bootsrapping, but it is not an actual expample of
it.
In fact there are no strict examples of self-bootstrapping -- of
something starting
up ex nihilo.
if it is possible for systems to bootstap themselves (or for
simulations
to be equivalent to realities) we should be able to observe it, and we
don't.
That is equally true even if we assume the observed world is already
a simulation -- "simulations" (ie second-order
simulations-within-the-Great-Simulation) don't
become "real" (ie first-order simulations)
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Re: Numbers
Of course, we can't be sure when we close ourselves in from any
explanation that is "meaningless".
We can run but we cannot hide from the fact that we will always have to
make assumptions that are without basis. Even when we close ourselves
in from any explanation that is not based on what we can grasp with our
brains, that step itself is ultimately unsupported. This is what I've
called rationalism *in a closed system*. Rationalism in a closed
system, the supposed path to autonomy from the transcendent, itself
requires faith.
Tom
-Original Message-
From: Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Tue, 21 Mar 2006 10:00:00 +1100
Subject: Re: Fw: Numbers
On Sun, Mar 19, 2006 at 11:45:43AM -0500, danny mayes wrote:
> Russell,
>
> Thats a good summary. However, my issue with your conclusion is
this:
> even if I accept that a "machine" or a "prime mover" is not
necessary,
> such explanations are still part of the plenitude and therefore part
of
> reality. So if everything is reducible to math or information, even
if
> you are correct that our reality can exist independent of these
> third-party explanations, such explanations still exist as part of
the
> totality of everything that can exist. What this would mean to me is
> that the reality I experience may occur naturally as a consequence of
> the logical bootstrapping you describe, but it would also be occuring
> through any number of artificial creations at the same time. These
> realities overlap and it would be meaningless for me to try and say
> whether the reality I am experiencing now is one or the other- it is
both.
That is precisely my point. It is meaningless to attribute the
creation of the these universes to any particular creator, or to none
at all. Hence the closure. It is a subtle point. Not everyone gets it,
and I'm not even sure of it myself.
>
> If you accept MWI or the plenitude, there are really only a few ways
to
> avoid the above argument. First, you could argue that our reality is
... deleting the rest, as I'm not trying to avoid the above argument ...
--
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is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.
-
---
A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics0425 253119 (")
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australia
http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
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---
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Re: Numbers
Le Vendredi 24 Mars 2006 15:20, 1Z a écrit : > > I am not sure that you mean. I have no empirical evidence that I am in > a HP universe. MM suggests I must be. MM contradicts my experience, > so I reject MM. MM does not suggest you *must* be... please explain. > > Yes you are consistent > > with a universe with real sorcerer in it, yet till the time you are not > > aware of it you cannot say I'm in a HP universe, because you are only > > consistent with it, you would be able to say it when you would get more > > information (hence there will be a you who is in a HP consistent history > > (because you now it's real) and another you who's still in the fuzzy set > > HP/~HP. > > But they're all the same, in themselves ! Again, you are assuming a > degree > of separation that cannot arise from purely mathematical > considerations. No, I don't see where you want to get. > > If I am in a in a superposition/overlapping, it isn't consistent > with my (the real me typing this) knowledge, because I don't > experience anything like that. MM makes predictions that are > not born out by my experience. You are *inside* a universe, you cannot feel/sense overlapping universe nor universe splitting... Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Le Vendredi 24 Mars 2006 13:07, 1Z a écrit :
> > Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > > Le Jeudi 23 Mars 2006 22:39, 1Z a écrit :
> > > > [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> > > > > He has proven beyond doubt, using Godellian arguments, that some
> > > > > numbers or intrinsically random .ie. that there is NO formulaic
> > > > > prescription that will reach that number from any starting point.
> > > >
> > > > If Mathematical Platonism is true, they exist anyway !
> > > >
> > > > What is not clear is why equations are important. Phsyics uses them,
> > > > but
> > > > physics is based on the idea that some logivally possible laws are
> > > > real and others aren't, not on the idea that everymathemtical object
> > > > is equally real.
> > >
> > > I disagree, physics is based on the idea that the world we *perceive* is
> > > predictable/understandable. As you are *not* in every mathematical
> > > object, you can't perceive more than the world you are embedded into.
> >
> > That would follow if "word" is taken in a physical sense, but it
> > far from clear that it would still be the case mathematically.
> >
> > If the set {1,2,3,4}
> > exists platonically, and the set
> > {1023,1024,1025,1026}
> > all the intersections and unions thereof exist, e.g. the set
> > (1,2,1023,1024}
> > exists (for all that it doesn't seem particularly intuitive).
> >
> > Likewise if
> > {, > world>}
> > exists, and the set,
> >
> > {, > of Harry Potter's world>}
> >
> > exists, then the set
> >
> > {, > Potter's world>}
> > exists.
>
> I agree, but there is a difference to say that your existense is consistent
> when spanning over these universe and to say that you know with the
> information available that you are in a HP universe.
I am not sure that you mean. I have no empirical evidence that I am in
a HP universe. MM suggests I must be. MM contradicts my experience,
so I reject MM.
> Yes you are consistent
> with a universe with real sorcerer in it, yet till the time you are not aware
> of it you cannot say I'm in a HP universe, because you are only consistent
> with it, you would be able to say it when you would get more information
> (hence there will be a you who is in a HP consistent history (because you now
> it's real) and another you who's still in the fuzzy set HP/~HP.
But they're all the same, in themselves ! Again, you are assuming a
degree
of separation that cannot arise from purely mathematical
considerations.
> > >That doesn't
> > > mean other "laws" could not rule other "parallel" universes.
> >
> > We've been here before: if there is a law that parallel universes do
> > not overlap,
> > that is itself only one mathematical possibility, and there must be
> > other regions
> > of the Mathematical Multiverse where it doesn't apply.
>
> I do not see why histories could not overlap, note the whole point of the
> computational theory is that *you* (at time t) are part of all computations
> (infinite number of) that goes throught your state... so in this definition
> you always are part of an infinite superposition/overlapping of history
> consistent with your current knowledge of the world.
If I am in a in a superposition/overlapping, it isn't consistent
with my (the real me typing this) knowledge, because I don't
experience anything like that. MM makes predictions that are
not born out by my experience.
> Quentin
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Re: Numbers
Le Vendredi 24 Mars 2006 13:07, 1Z a écrit :
> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > Le Jeudi 23 Mars 2006 22:39, 1Z a écrit :
> > > [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> > > > He has proven beyond doubt, using Godellian arguments, that some
> > > > numbers or intrinsically random .ie. that there is NO formulaic
> > > > prescription that will reach that number from any starting point.
> > >
> > > If Mathematical Platonism is true, they exist anyway !
> > >
> > > What is not clear is why equations are important. Phsyics uses them,
> > > but
> > > physics is based on the idea that some logivally possible laws are
> > > real and others aren't, not on the idea that everymathemtical object
> > > is equally real.
> >
> > I disagree, physics is based on the idea that the world we *perceive* is
> > predictable/understandable. As you are *not* in every mathematical
> > object, you can't perceive more than the world you are embedded into.
>
> That would follow if "word" is taken in a physical sense, but it
> far from clear that it would still be the case mathematically.
>
> If the set {1,2,3,4}
> exists platonically, and the set
> {1023,1024,1025,1026}
> all the intersections and unions thereof exist, e.g. the set
> (1,2,1023,1024}
> exists (for all that it doesn't seem particularly intuitive).
>
> Likewise if
> {, world>}
> exists, and the set,
>
> {, of Harry Potter's world>}
>
> exists, then the set
>
> {, Potter's world>}
> exists.
I agree, but there is a difference to say that your existense is consistent
when spanning over these universe and to say that you know with the
information available that you are in a HP universe. Yes you are consistent
with a universe with real sorcerer in it, yet till the time you are not aware
of it you cannot say I'm in a HP universe, because you are only consistent
with it, you would be able to say it when you would get more information
(hence there will be a you who is in a HP consistent history (because you now
it's real) and another you who's still in the fuzzy set HP/~HP.
> >That doesn't
> > mean other "laws" could not rule other "parallel" universes.
>
> We've been here before: if there is a law that parallel universes do
> not overlap,
> that is itself only one mathematical possibility, and there must be
> other regions
> of the Mathematical Multiverse where it doesn't apply.
I do not see why histories could not overlap, note the whole point of the
computational theory is that *you* (at time t) are part of all computations
(infinite number of) that goes throught your state... so in this definition
you always are part of an infinite superposition/overlapping of history
consistent with your current knowledge of the world.
Quentin
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Re: Numbers
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Le Jeudi 23 Mars 2006 22:39, 1Z a écrit :
> > [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> > > He has proven beyond doubt, using Godellian arguments, that some numbers
> > > or intrinsically random .ie. that there is NO formulaic prescription that
> > > will reach that number from any starting point.
> >
> > If Mathematical Platonism is true, they exist anyway !
> >
> > What is not clear is why equations are important. Phsyics uses them,
> > but
> > physics is based on the idea that some logivally possible laws are
> > real and others aren't, not on the idea that everymathemtical object
> > is equally real.
>
> I disagree, physics is based on the idea that the world we *perceive* is
> predictable/understandable. As you are *not* in every mathematical object,
> you can't perceive more than the world you are embedded into.
That would follow if "word" is taken in a physical sense, but it
far from clear that it would still be the case mathematically.
If the set {1,2,3,4}
exists platonically, and the set
{1023,1024,1025,1026}
all the intersections and unions thereof exist, e.g. the set
(1,2,1023,1024}
exists (for all that it doesn't seem particularly intuitive).
Likewise if
{, }
exists, and the set,
{, }
exists, then the set
{, }
exists.
>That doesn't
> mean other "laws" could not rule other "parallel" universes.
We've been here before: if there is a law that parallel universes do
not overlap,
that is itself only one mathematical possibility, and there must be
other regions
of the Mathematical Multiverse where it doesn't apply.
> Quentin
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-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Fw: Numbers
On Sun, Mar 19, 2006 at 11:45:43AM -0500, danny mayes wrote:
> Russell,
>
> Thats a good summary. However, my issue with your conclusion is this:
> even if I accept that a "machine" or a "prime mover" is not necessary,
> such explanations are still part of the plenitude and therefore part of
> reality. So if everything is reducible to math or information, even if
> you are correct that our reality can exist independent of these
> third-party explanations, such explanations still exist as part of the
> totality of everything that can exist. What this would mean to me is
> that the reality I experience may occur naturally as a consequence of
> the logical bootstrapping you describe, but it would also be occuring
> through any number of artificial creations at the same time. These
> realities overlap and it would be meaningless for me to try and say
> whether the reality I am experiencing now is one or the other- it is both.
That is precisely my point. It is meaningless to attribute the
creation of the these universes to any particular creator, or to none
at all. Hence the closure. It is a subtle point. Not everyone gets it,
and I'm not even sure of it myself.
>
> If you accept MWI or the plenitude, there are really only a few ways to
> avoid the above argument. First, you could argue that our reality is
... deleting the rest, as I'm not trying to avoid the above argument ...
--
*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.
A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics0425 253119 (")
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
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