Colin Hales wrote:
> Brent Meeker:
>
>
>
>>>Observation involves (necessitates) the AGI having experiences, some of
>>>which are an experiential representation of the external world. The
>>>process of generation of the experiential field(s) involves the
>>
>>insertion
>>
>>>of the AGI in the ch
Brent Meeker:
>
> > Observation involves (necessitates) the AGI having experiences, some of
> > which are an experiential representation of the external world. The
> > process of generation of the experiential field(s) involves the
> insertion
> > of the AGI in the chain of causality from that w
-Ursprungligt meddelande-
Från: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] För Brent Meeker
Skickat: den 11 oktober 2006 06:12
Till: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Ämne: Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical
concept' ;)
David Nyman wrote:
>
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
>
>>George and List:
>>a very naive question (even more than my other posts) since I miss lots
>
> of
>
>>posts that have been exuded on this list (since a decade or so of my
>
> incompletely reading it):
>
>>Has it been ever formulated (a
David Nyman wrote:
>
>
> On Oct 10, 9:12 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
>>Then
>>a calculation of pi is picked out among all instantiations of all
>>computations - but
>>it is still possible to calculate pi many different ways on many different
>>physical
>>systems. And it
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 09-oct.-06, à 21:54, George Levy a écrit :
To observe a split consciousness, you need an observer
who
is also split,
?
This is simple. The time/space/substrate/level of the observer must
match the time/space/substrate/level of what he observes. T
I have been in discussion with Booksurge and Amazon.com re the
provision of electronic version of my book since Booksurge closed
their online store.
The deal I wanted was for purchasers of the hardcopy to receive a
complimentary electronic copy, and for people to be able to purchase
an electronic
David Nyman wrote:
> But this conclusion
> is, I think, why Bruno thinks that 'matter' has no real explanatory
> role in the account of conscious experience. This isn't quite
> equivalent to claiming that it can't be the primary reality, but rather
> to claim that it adds nothing to the accounts
[EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
> George and List:
> a very naive question (even more than my other posts) since I miss lots
of
> posts that have been exuded on this list (since a decade or so of my
incompletely reading it):
> Has it been ever formulated (and accepted on this list!) what we mean by
the ve
And you also made a solemn promise to read the ones you've got?
Wait a year or two, and I'll make my book available for a free
download - if you have the time then, you'll be able to read it without
breaking your promise :)
In the meantime, I have to keep up the pretense of this book being a
com
Ah yes - I was confusing my 'isms. Eliminative materialism is an extreme type
of physicalism, but physicalism is broader. What I meant was what you
just stated - COMP is incompatible with physicalism, but not with materialism.
As I understand it, physicalism denies any form of downward causation,
On Oct 10, 9:12 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Then
> a calculation of pi is picked out among all instantiations of all
> computations - but
> it is still possible to calculate pi many different ways on many different
> physical
> systems. And it is possible by inspection of t
On Oct 10, 8:31 pm, "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > In this case, I would have to agree with Bruno
> > that 'matter' is simply being deployed as a placeholder for relata,That's a
> > feature, not a bug.
>
> > and
> > has no further explanatory role (except existence, of course - your
> > s
Hi,
Le mardi 10 octobre 2006 22:41, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
> Bruno:
> you wrote:
> "...I do believe that 5 is equal to 1+1+1+1+1, ..."
>
> Why not 1+1+1+1+1+1+1? you had a notion somewhere in your mathemaitcally
> instructed mind that you have to stop at exactly the 5th addition, because
>
Bruno:
you wrote:
"...I do believe that 5 is equal to 1+1+1+1+1, ..."
Why not 1+1+1+1+1+1+1? you had a notion somewhere in your mathemaitcally
instructed mind that you have to stop at exactly the 5th addition, because
there is a quantity (???) in the number '5' that made you stop there. Now
"qua
Russell,
thanks for the detailed reply with the agreement against Ccnss being sort-of
a self-awareness. Unfortunately I cannot get to your book for the time being
(we made a solemn oath with my wife at our 50th NOT to buy any more books,
rather get rid of most of them) and our excellent publ libr
George and List:
a very naive question (even more than my other
posts) since I miss lots of posts that have been exuded on this list (since a
decade or so of my incompletely reading
it):
Has it been ever formulated (and accepted on
this list!) what we mean by the verb "to observe"? What does
David Nyman wrote:
>
>
> On Oct 10, 2:51 am, "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
>> It's a claim of computationalism. I am just explaining how computationalism
>> is
>> compatible with physicalism. You are complaining about circularity, not
>> contradiction!
>
>
> So you're saying that this
Colin:
I could not have expressed my similar doubts anyhow close to such full
clarity, did not even try.
About the conceptual (numerically expressed) essence of "5" :
recalling some words of Bruno, it may be that it should be expressed by lots
and lots of rules-including number expressions, as any
David Nyman wrote:
> On Oct 10, 2:56 pm, "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > > If you aren't in fact
> > > claiming this, then your appeal to 'computation' as picking out the
> > > relevant properties can be valid only in the context of *specific*, not
> > > generalised, instantiations, and th
David Nyman wrote:
> On Oct 10, 2:56 pm, "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > > If you aren't in fact
> > > claiming this, then your appeal to 'computation' as picking out the
> > > relevant properties can be valid only in the context of *specific*, not
> > > generalised, instantiations, and th
On Oct 10, 2:56 pm, "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > If you aren't in fact
> > claiming this, then your appeal to 'computation' as picking out the
> > relevant properties can be valid only in the context of *specific*, not
> > generalised, instantiations, and thus becomes merely a shorthand
On Oct 10, 2:56 pm, "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > If you aren't in fact
> > claiming this, then your appeal to 'computation' as picking out the
> > relevant properties can be valid only in the context of *specific*, not
> > generalised, instantiations, and thus becomes merely a shorthand
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 09-oct.-06, à 23:56, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit :
>
>
> > ...But it's not. Lets talk about the object with this property of five
> > in
> > platonia as <5>. Here in reality what we are doing is creating a label
> > I
> > and interpreting the label as a pointer to stora
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 10-oct.-06, à 03:52, Russell Standish a écrit :
>
> >
> > On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 10:35:05AM -0700, 1Z wrote:
> >>
> >> The idea that materialism is not compatible with computationalism
> >> is a bold and startling claim.
> >
> > Materialism comes in a couple of differen
David Nyman wrote:
> On Oct 10, 2:51 am, "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > It's a claim of computationalism. I am just explaining how
> > computationalism is compatible with physicalism. You
> > are complaining about circularity, not contradiction!
>
> So you're saying that this variety of co
Le 09-oct.-06, à 21:54, George Levy a écrit :
To observe a split consciousness, you need an observer who is also split,
?
in sync with the split consciousness, across time, space, substrate and level (a la Zelazny - Science Fiction writer). In your example, for an observer to see consciousness
Le 10-oct.-06, à 03:52, Russell Standish a écrit :
>
> On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 10:35:05AM -0700, 1Z wrote:
>>
>> The idea that materialism is not compatible with computationalism
>> is a bold and startling claim.
>
> Materialism comes in a couple of different flavours. The one that COMP
> is inc
On Oct 10, 2:51 am, "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> It's a claim of computationalism. I am just explaining how
> computationalism is compatible with physicalism. You
> are complaining about circularity, not contradiction!
So you're saying that this variety of computationalism merely claims
t
Le 09-oct.-06, à 23:56, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit :
> ...But it's not. Lets talk about the object with this property of five
> in
> platonia as <5>. Here in reality what we are doing is creating a label
> I
> and interpreting the label as a pointer to storage where the value in
> the
> st
Russell Standish wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 10:35:05AM -0700, 1Z wrote:
> >
> > The idea that materialism is not compatible with computationalism
> > is a bold and startling claim.
>
> Materialism comes in a couple of different flavours. The one that COMP
> is incompatible with is "eliminat
31 matches
Mail list logo
