Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Brent meeker writes: > > > > > As I understand it, Bruno's theory is that you are all the > > > "consistent continuations" of your consciousness. I'm not exactly sure > > > what constitutes a consistent continuation, but it must be something > > > other than just sharing memories. At any given time my > consciousness is > > > accessing only a tiny fraction of my memories. Further I'm continually > > > forming and forgetting short-term memories as well as forgetting some > > > long-term memories. > > > > > > > > Basing identity on memory seems inconsistent with supposing that > > > identity is some property of consciousness alone. A digital > computation > > > doesn't depend on memory/data that isn't accessed. > > > > > > Identity from moment to moment is not just memory, it is the entire > > > content of conscious experience, perhaps accessing at any one time > only > > > a small portion of memory. It may be just a sense that I am the same > > > person continuing the same thought as I was a moment ago, or even less > > > than this when I am waking up from sleep, for example. At such > > > sufficiently vague moments, my consciousness may even be > > > indistinguishable with that of many other people in the world, such > that > > > if I ceased to exist momentarily I would still experience > continuity of > > > consciousness as if nothing had happened, piggy-backing on someone > > > else's thoughts: all equivalent observer moments are internally > > > indistinguishable, by definition. However, such a thing could only > > > happen momentarily, because very quickly I might reflect on my > > > situation, and it is here that having a store of memories, > motivations, > > > personality style etc. instantly accessible (even if not continuously > > > accessed) makes me, me. > > > > Yes I understand that you would eventually, say when waking from > anesthesia, have some memories unique to Stathis Papaioannou. But in the > meantime I think you are still you - and not all those other people who > shared those vague thoughts in the recovery room. And it can't be > because your memories are "instantly accessible"; that's a mere > potentiality not a state. If we start to reify potentialities in a > multi-verse where we already have a white rabbit problem, we'll really > be in trouble. > > Perhaps even in a minimally conscious state your experiences are > specific enough to distinguish them from those of everyone else in a > superficially similar state. But what if, through amazing coincidence, > you had a 5 second period of consciousness which exactly matched that of > a stranger on the other side of the world? During that period it would > be impossible to say (from a 1st person perspective) where you were > being run or which person you were, in the same way as it would be > impossible to say where you were being run if your consciousness were > implemented on two computers running in perfect lockstep. > > Stathis Papaioannou Which is to say there is no "you", or at least you are not your consciousness. This raises the question again of "what is the minimum duration of a conscious state"? You mention 5sec as being a long time for a coincidental match (would there still be two consciousnesses for that 5sec - I think not), but what about 300msec, or 100msec. There's not much consciousness in 100msec; so little that it may be occuring hundreds of times over in different brains. Brent Meeker Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds
Brent meeker writes:> > > As I understand it, Bruno's theory is that you are all the > > "consistent continuations" of your consciousness. I'm not exactly sure > > what constitutes a consistent continuation, but it must be something > > other than just sharing memories. At any given time my consciousness is > > accessing only a tiny fraction of my memories. Further I'm continually > > forming and forgetting short-term memories as well as forgetting some > > long-term memories.> > >> > > Basing identity on memory seems inconsistent with supposing that > > identity is some property of consciousness alone. A digital computation > > doesn't depend on memory/data that isn't accessed.> > > > Identity from moment to moment is not just memory, it is the entire > > content of conscious experience, perhaps accessing at any one time only > > a small portion of memory. It may be just a sense that I am the same > > person continuing the same thought as I was a moment ago, or even less > > than this when I am waking up from sleep, for example. At such > > sufficiently vague moments, my consciousness may even be > > indistinguishable with that of many other people in the world, such that > > if I ceased to exist momentarily I would still experience continuity of > > consciousness as if nothing had happened, piggy-backing on someone > > else's thoughts: all equivalent observer moments are internally > > indistinguishable, by definition. However, such a thing could only > > happen momentarily, because very quickly I might reflect on my > > situation, and it is here that having a store of memories, motivations, > > personality style etc. instantly accessible (even if not continuously > > accessed) makes me, me.> > Yes I understand that you would eventually, say when waking from anesthesia, have some memories unique to Stathis Papaioannou. But in the meantime I think you are still you - and not all those other people who shared those vague thoughts in the recovery room. And it can't be because your memories are "instantly accessible"; that's a mere potentiality not a state. If we start to reify potentialities in a multi-verse where we already have a white rabbit problem, we'll really be in trouble.Perhaps even in a minimally conscious state your experiences are specific enough to distinguish them from those of everyone else in a superficially similar state. But what if, through amazing coincidence, you had a 5 second period of consciousness which exactly matched that of a stranger on the other side of the world? During that period it would be impossible to say (from a 1st person perspective) where you were being run or which person you were, in the same way as it would be impossible to say where you were being run if your consciousness were implemented on two computers running in perfect lockstep. Stathis Papaioannou _ Get the new Windows Live Messenger! http://get.live.com/messenger/overview --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds
Moreover, even if we constrain the definition of computer to include only the operations of factory-made devices plugged in and appropriately programmed, the fact that a digital computation at any instant does not access all of memory and data allows for the computation to be distributed over multiple machines in a network which accidentally have the appropriate configuration for that part of the computation. The only requirement is that the network be large enough in space and time to provide these configurations: from its point of view, the computation cannot be aware that the various steps of its implementation are disjointed and not causally connnected.Stathis PapaioannouFrom: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: RE: ASSA and Many-WorldsDate: Sat, 27 Jan 2007 14:41:07 +1100 Brent Meeker writes:> > > I think Bruno already remarked that it may well be more probable that > > a continuation of your consciousness arises in some other branch of the > > multiverse "by chance", rather than as a state of "your" erstwhile body. > > This would seem particularly more probable as your consciousness > > simplifies due to deterioration of your brain - how hard can it be to > > find a continuation of a near coma. Perhaps this continuation is the > > consciousness of a fish - and it's the Hindus rather than the Bhuddists > > who are right.> > > > Then we come up against the question of what we can expect to experience > > in the case of duplication with partial memory loss. For example, if you > > are duplicated 101 times such that one copy has 100% of your memories > > while the other 100 copies each have 1% of your memories, does this mean > > that you have an even chance of ending up as either the 100% or the 1% > > version of yourself? We need not invoke duplication experiments or the > > MWI to ask this question either. Suppose there are a billion people in > > the world each with 1/billion of my memories: does this mean I will find > > myself becoming one of these people either now or after I have died?> > As I understand it, Bruno's theory is that you are all the "consistent continuations" of your consciousness. I'm not exactly sure what constitutes a consistent continuation, but it must be something other than just sharing memories. At any given time my consciousness is accessing only a tiny fraction of my memories. Further I'm continually forming and forgetting short-term memories as well as forgetting some long-term memories. > > Basing identity on memory seems inconsistent with supposing that identity is some property of consciousness alone. A digital computation doesn't depend on memory/data that isn't accessed.Identity from moment to moment is not just memory, it is the entire content of conscious experience, perhaps accessing at any one time only a small portion of memory. It may be just a sense that I am the same person continuing the same thought as I was a moment ago, or even less than this when I am waking up from sleep, for example. At such sufficiently vague moments, my consciousness may even be indistinguishable with that of many other people in the world, such that if I ceased to exist momentarily I would still experience continuity of consciousness as if nothing had happened, piggy-backing on someone else's thoughts: all equivalent observer moments are internally indistinguishable, by definition. However, such a thing could only happen momentarily, because very quickly I might reflect on my situation, and it is here that having a store of memories, motivations, personality style etc. instantly accessible (even if not continuously accessed) makes me, me.Stathis Papaioannou Live Search: Better results, fast Try it now! _ Get the new Windows Live Messenger! http://get.live.com/messenger/overview --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Brent Meeker writes: > > > > > I think Bruno already remarked that it may well be more probable > that > > > a continuation of your consciousness arises in some other branch of > the > > > multiverse "by chance", rather than as a state of "your" erstwhile > body. > > > This would seem particularly more probable as your consciousness > > > simplifies due to deterioration of your brain - how hard can it be to > > > find a continuation of a near coma. Perhaps this continuation is the > > > consciousness of a fish - and it's the Hindus rather than the > Bhuddists > > > who are right. > > > > > > Then we come up against the question of what we can expect to > experience > > > in the case of duplication with partial memory loss. For example, > if you > > > are duplicated 101 times such that one copy has 100% of your memories > > > while the other 100 copies each have 1% of your memories, does this > mean > > > that you have an even chance of ending up as either the 100% or the 1% > > > version of yourself? We need not invoke duplication experiments or the > > > MWI to ask this question either. Suppose there are a billion people in > > > the world each with 1/billion of my memories: does this mean I will > find > > > myself becoming one of these people either now or after I have died? > > > > As I understand it, Bruno's theory is that you are all the > "consistent continuations" of your consciousness. I'm not exactly sure > what constitutes a consistent continuation, but it must be something > other than just sharing memories. At any given time my consciousness is > accessing only a tiny fraction of my memories. Further I'm continually > forming and forgetting short-term memories as well as forgetting some > long-term memories. > > > > Basing identity on memory seems inconsistent with supposing that > identity is some property of consciousness alone. A digital computation > doesn't depend on memory/data that isn't accessed. > > Identity from moment to moment is not just memory, it is the entire > content of conscious experience, perhaps accessing at any one time only > a small portion of memory. It may be just a sense that I am the same > person continuing the same thought as I was a moment ago, or even less > than this when I am waking up from sleep, for example. At such > sufficiently vague moments, my consciousness may even be > indistinguishable with that of many other people in the world, such that > if I ceased to exist momentarily I would still experience continuity of > consciousness as if nothing had happened, piggy-backing on someone > else's thoughts: all equivalent observer moments are internally > indistinguishable, by definition. However, such a thing could only > happen momentarily, because very quickly I might reflect on my > situation, and it is here that having a store of memories, motivations, > personality style etc. instantly accessible (even if not continuously > accessed) makes me, me. Yes I understand that you would eventually, say when waking from anesthesia, have some memories unique to Stathis Papaioannou. But in the meantime I think you are still you - and not all those other people who shared those vague thoughts in the recovery room. And it can't be because your memories are "instantly accessible"; that's a mere potentiality not a state. If we start to reify potentialities in a multi-verse where we already have a white rabbit problem, we'll really be in trouble. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds
John, I guess my brain is generating my consciousness, but I regard this as a
contingent fact. My conciousness is that which I experience, and if I found
myself continuing to have similar experiences despite teleportation, brain
transplant, resurrection in Heaven or whatever, then I would have survived as
me. Note that I am not saying these things are possible (perhaps this is where
you are scornful of the fantastic scenarios), just that IF in these situations
I continued to think I was me, THEN ipso facto, I would still be me, despite
losing the original body and brain.Stathis PapaioannouFrom: [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: ASSA and Many-WorldsDate: Fri, 26 Jan 2007 15:54:32 -0500
Stathis:
interesting. See my additional question after your
reply
John
- Original Message -
From:
Stathis Papaioannou
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Friday, January 26, 2007 9:03
AM
Subject: RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds
John Mikes writes: > Stathis:> your
concluding sentence is> " But my brain just won't let me think this
way."> *> Have you been carried away?> Who is "your
brain" to make decisions upon you? (maybe you mean only that the mechanism of
your brain, the main tool "YOU" use in mental activity, is not
predesigned for such action?) So: is there a pre-design (ha ha)?> More
importantly: who is that "me" in conflict with 'your' brain?> How
do you 'want' to 'think' something (which involves your brain) when 'your
brain' won't let it happen?> OK, let's introduce "you", the homunculus,
who wants to think some way and your 'brain' did not reach the sophistication
of the design (yet?) to comply - as a reason for "won't let me".> With
what 'tool' did "you" WANT to "think this way"? How many people are you
indeed?> *> I am asking these stupid qiestions in the line of my
search for SELF ("I"), vs. the total interconnectedness of our personal
existence with 'the rest of the world'. I expect that you may provide useful
hooks for me in such respect.> John"I" am the product of a
consciousness-generating mechanism, my brain, in the same way as "walking" is
the product of a locomotion-generating mechanism, my legs. "I" am not
identical to my brain just as "walking" is not identical to my legs. Now, of
course "I can only think what my brain will let me think", and of course "I
can only walk where my legs will let me walk", but these statements are not
tautologies in the way that saying "I can only think what I can think" or "I
can only walk where I can walk" are. Stathis
Papaioannou---
JM:
so you consider the biologic tissue-grown (stem-cell
initiated) BRAIN the origin of a thinking person? Life growing out from
'matter' - which is the figment of our explanatory effort to poorly and
incompletely observed impact received from parts unknown? Funny: you invested
so many posts into the (partial) teleportation and copying into other
universes - did you really MEAN
the transfer of tissues (like in StarTrek?) How 'bout the
multiple 'copying' of matter? How can you duplicate the atoms for
copying? StarTrek had only 1 copy and that, too, by 'physical'
transfer.
Save the wrong conclusion: I am not defending this line, I
find it unreal and just mention the position of yours and others on this list
for argument's sake.
I find it 'interesting, but amazing' that different brains
(see: the multiplicity of humans and other animals among themselves) behave
like mental clones in accepting very similar "3rd person views" into their
1st
person ideas, to form images of the 'material world' etc. Mental images, that
is, which, however you would make into their own origination? Are we
all (and the world, the existnce etc.) only fiction of ourselves?
Then again I feel that the 'consciousness' you generate by
the brain may be very close to personality, self, the "I" we are talking
about. Which would close the loop: "there must be the 'primitive matter'
forming the brain and out of that comes the 'not-so-primitive' matter, the
mental complexity and all"???
I agree withBruno to disagree in the absolute primitive
matter concept. IMO
It is only an explanatory imaging in this universe's
consciousness activity to order the part of the system we so far detected.
Together with space-time and OUR pet-causality - the 'within model'
ordering.
John
PS I still would appreciate to be directed to a short text
explaining the essence of ASSA (RSSA?). J
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RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds
Brent Meeker writes:> > > I think Bruno already remarked that it may well be more probable that > > a continuation of your consciousness arises in some other branch of the > > multiverse "by chance", rather than as a state of "your" erstwhile body. > > This would seem particularly more probable as your consciousness > > simplifies due to deterioration of your brain - how hard can it be to > > find a continuation of a near coma. Perhaps this continuation is the > > consciousness of a fish - and it's the Hindus rather than the Bhuddists > > who are right.> > > > Then we come up against the question of what we can expect to experience > > in the case of duplication with partial memory loss. For example, if you > > are duplicated 101 times such that one copy has 100% of your memories > > while the other 100 copies each have 1% of your memories, does this mean > > that you have an even chance of ending up as either the 100% or the 1% > > version of yourself? We need not invoke duplication experiments or the > > MWI to ask this question either. Suppose there are a billion people in > > the world each with 1/billion of my memories: does this mean I will find > > myself becoming one of these people either now or after I have died?> > As I understand it, Bruno's theory is that you are all the "consistent continuations" of your consciousness. I'm not exactly sure what constitutes a consistent continuation, but it must be something other than just sharing memories. At any given time my consciousness is accessing only a tiny fraction of my memories. Further I'm continually forming and forgetting short-term memories as well as forgetting some long-term memories. > > Basing identity on memory seems inconsistent with supposing that identity is some property of consciousness alone. A digital computation doesn't depend on memory/data that isn't accessed.Identity from moment to moment is not just memory, it is the entire content of conscious experience, perhaps accessing at any one time only a small portion of memory. It may be just a sense that I am the same person continuing the same thought as I was a moment ago, or even less than this when I am waking up from sleep, for example. At such sufficiently vague moments, my consciousness may even be indistinguishable with that of many other people in the world, such that if I ceased to exist momentarily I would still experience continuity of consciousness as if nothing had happened, piggy-backing on someone else's thoughts: all equivalent observer moments are internally indistinguishable, by definition. However, such a thing could only happen momentarily, because very quickly I might reflect on my situation, and it is here that having a store of memories, motivations, personality style etc. instantly accessible (even if not continuously accessed) makes me, me.Stathis Papaioannou _ Live Search: Better results, fast http://get.live.com/search/overview --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds
On Fri, Jan 26, 2007 at 03:54:32PM -0500, John M wrote:
>
> PS I still would appreciate to be directed to a short text explaining the
> essence of ASSA (RSSA?). J
>
It is in my book. Here is the relevant excerpt:
\section[ASSA vs RSSA]{Absolute vs Relative Self Sampl\-ing Assumption}
In the course of a lengthy, and at times heated debate between Jacques
Mallah and myself, it became clear we were always arguing from
disparate positions\cite{Mallah-Standish}. At the heart of our
difference of opinion was how the strong self sampling
assumption\index{self sampling assumption!strong|emph} should be
applied. Jacques Mallah assumed that each observer moment had an
absolute positive measure, and that our current observer moment is
selected at random from that distribution.
Since I accept the TIME postulate,\index{TIME postulate} only the
birth moment is selected at random, according to the self sampling
assumption. Thereafter, each observer moment's measure can be
determined {\em relative} to its predecessor by means of Born's
rule\index{Born rule}
(\ref{proj-prob}). Arguing with this notion of observer measure, first
person immortality follows provided the no cul-de-sac conjecture\index{no
cul-de-sac conjecture} is
true.
The Everything List adopted the term {\em Absolute Self Sampling
Assumption}\index{self sampling assumption!absolute|emph} to
refer to Mallah's use of strong self sampling, and the {\em Relative
Self Sampling Assumption}\index{self sampling assumption!relative|emph} for
the version I use. Since this
debate took place, other debates have taken place between members of
the ``absolute'' camp, which includes such names as Jacques
Mallah,\index{Mallah, Jacques}
Saibal Mitra,\index{Mitra, Saibal} Hal Finney\index{Finney, Hal} and the
``relative'' camp which includes
Bruno Marchal,\index{Marchal, Bruno} Stathis
Papaioannou, and myself.
\index{Papaioannou, Stathis}\index{Standish, Russell}
Both of these ``camps'' appear to have internally consistent pictures.
The fact that I'm not currently experiencing childhood, is for me
strong evidence that the ASSA is an incorrect application of the
strong self sampling assumption.
A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au
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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds
Stathis:
interesting. See my additional question after your reply
John
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Friday, January 26, 2007 9:03 AM
Subject: RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds
John Mikes writes:
> Stathis:
> your concluding sentence is
> " But my brain just won't let me think this way."
> *
> Have you been carried away?
> Who is "your brain" to make decisions upon you? (maybe you mean only that
the mechanism of your brain, the main tool "YOU" use in mental activity, is
not predesigned for such action?) So: is there a pre-design (ha ha)?
> More importantly: who is that "me" in conflict with 'your' brain?
> How do you 'want' to 'think' something (which involves your brain) when
'your brain' won't let it happen?
> OK, let's introduce "you", the homunculus, who wants to think some way and
your 'brain' did not reach the sophistication of the design (yet?) to comply -
as a reason for "won't let me".
> With what 'tool' did "you" WANT to "think this way"? How many people are
you indeed?
> *
> I am asking these stupid qiestions in the line of my search for SELF ("I"),
vs. the total interconnectedness of our personal existence with 'the rest of
the world'. I expect that you may provide useful hooks for me in such respect.
> John
"I" am the product of a consciousness-generating mechanism, my brain, in the
same way as "walking" is the product of a locomotion-generating mechanism, my
legs. "I" am not identical to my brain just as "walking" is not identical to my
legs. Now, of course "I can only think what my brain will let me think", and of
course "I can only walk where my legs will let me walk", but these statements
are not tautologies in the way that saying "I can only think what I can think"
or "I can only walk where I can walk" are.
Stathis Papaioannou
---
JM:
so you consider the biologic tissue-grown (stem-cell initiated) BRAIN the
origin of a thinking person? Life growing out from 'matter' - which is the
figment of our explanatory effort to poorly and incompletely observed impact
received from parts unknown? Funny: you invested so many posts into the
(partial) teleportation and copying into other universes - did you really MEAN
the transfer of tissues (like in StarTrek?) How 'bout the multiple 'copying'
of matter? How can you duplicate the atoms for copying? StarTrek had only 1
copy and that, too, by 'physical' transfer.
Save the wrong conclusion: I am not defending this line, I find it unreal and
just mention the position of yours and others on this list for argument's sake.
I find it 'interesting, but amazing' that different brains (see: the
multiplicity of humans and other animals among themselves) behave like mental
clones in accepting very similar "3rd person views" into their 1st person
ideas, to form images of the 'material world' etc. Mental images, that is,
which, however you would make into their own origination? Are we all (and the
world, the existnce etc.) only fiction of ourselves?
Then again I feel that the 'consciousness' you generate by the brain may be
very close to personality, self, the "I" we are talking about. Which would
close the loop: "there must be the 'primitive matter' forming the brain and
out of that comes the 'not-so-primitive' matter, the mental complexity and
all"???
I agree withBruno to disagree in the absolute primitive matter concept. IMO
It is only an explanatory imaging in this universe's consciousness activity
to order the part of the system we so far detected. Together with space-time
and OUR pet-causality - the 'within model' ordering.
John
PS I still would appreciate to be directed to a short text explaining the
essence of ASSA (RSSA?). J
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Re: Rép : The Meaning of Life
On Jan 26, 9:22 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > Also, I still don't understand how you will avoid the white rabbits. > > By extracting the physical laws from some 1-person machine measure. > This one can be extracted from some interview of an honest > self-observing machine. Well, to be sure, I'm saying this since 1973 > but it is only in 1991 that I have find a "formal" clue of the reason > why the rabbits could disappear: the logic of certainty, corresponding > to the godelian sort of undeterminateness, allows a formal quantization > of the true Sigma_1 propositions (= those corresponding to the > accessible state of the UD). This is by far NOT enough for already > pretending that comp will avoid the white rabbits, but, imo, it is > enough to make very plausible they can disappear through purely number > theoretical reason, so that we don't have to rely on some material > assumption, which puts the mind body problem (my basic motivation) > under the aristotelian rug. > > But sure, the disappearance of white rabbits with comp is still an open > problem. Brent seems to believe it is yet open in QM too, which is > coherent with the fact that most MWI relies implicitly or not on some > comp assumption. I sum up this sometimes by saying that decoherence + > MWI avoids 3-person rabbits, but not the 1-person one. Actually I have > argue that ASSA does the same. Some bayesian stuff seems to be able to > eliminate the 3-rabbits (or the first plural person one), but hardly > the first person one (I refer to my oldest post to this list, but I can > repeat, especially when encouraged, the subject matter is tricky). > > Bruno Why do we need to eliminate first-person white rabbits? For purposes of science, is not elimination of third-person (or first-person plural) white rabbits sufficient? So what if we hallucinate, or dream about a talking white rabbit? We can come back to "scientific reality" through the third-person or first-person plural, i.e. methods of "objectivity" (third-person/first-person plural view by our own definition). By the way, I'm not implying that scientific reality is sufficient for meaning of life. ;) My above questions are perhaps a bit rhetorical in this sense. I think the answer is that we long to find meaning solely through science so that we can control everything, and so we *try* to erect science as the god over all meaning. Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Brent Meeker writes: > > > Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2007 17:00:11 -0800 > > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com > > Subject: Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds > > > > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > > > Johnathan Corgan writes: > > > > > >> Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > >> > > >>> If some multiverse theory happens to be true then by your way of > argument we > > >>> should all be extremely anxious all the time, because every > moment terrible things > > >>> are definitely happening to some copy of us. For example, we > should be constantly > > >>> be worrying that we will be struck by lightning, because we > *will* be struck by lightning. > > >> If MWI is true, *and* there isn't a lowest quantum of > > >> probability/measure as Brent Meeker speculates, there is an > interesting > > >> corollary to the quantum theory of immortality. > > >> > > >> While one branch always exists which continues our consciousness > > >> forward, indeed we are constantly "shedding" branches where the most > > >> brutal and horrific things happen to us and result in our death. Their > > >> measure is extremely small, so from a subjectively probability > > >> perspective, we don't worry about them. > > >> > > >> I'd speculate that there are far more logically possible ways to > > >> experience an agonizing, lingering death than to live. Some have a > > >> relatively high measure, like getting hit by a car, or getting lung > > >> cancer (if you're a smoker), so we take steps to avoid these (though > > >> they still happen in some branch.) Others, like having all our > > >> particles spontaneously quantum tunnel into the heart of a burning > > >> furnace, are so low in measure, we can blissfully ignore the > > >> possibility. Yet if MWI is true, there is some branch where this has > > >> just happened to us. (modulo Brent's probability quantum.) > > >> > > >> If there are many more ways to die than to live, even of low > individual > > >> measure, I wonder how the "integral of the measure" across all of them > > >> comes out. > > > > > > It's not death that is the problem (you always get out of that), > it's suffering. Final death > > > would be better than a living hell, but QTI denies you final death. > I take comfort in the > > > speculation that if I'm still alive in a few hundred years, most > likely this will be as a result > > > of some advanced medical or cybernetic intervention, and if science > understands the brain > > > well enough to do that, it would be a relatively simple matter by > comparison to ensure that I > > > am content. I think the hellish routes to immortality would occur > mostly by chance and would > > > be of much lower total measure than the deliberate, happy routes. > > > > I think Bruno already remarked that it may well be more probable that > a continuation of your consciousness arises in some other branch of the > multiverse "by chance", rather than as a state of "your" erstwhile body. > This would seem particularly more probable as your consciousness > simplifies due to deterioration of your brain - how hard can it be to > find a continuation of a near coma. Perhaps this continuation is the > consciousness of a fish - and it's the Hindus rather than the Bhuddists > who are right. > > Then we come up against the question of what we can expect to experience > in the case of duplication with partial memory loss. For example, if you > are duplicated 101 times such that one copy has 100% of your memories > while the other 100 copies each have 1% of your memories, does this mean > that you have an even chance of ending up as either the 100% or the 1% > version of yourself? We need not invoke duplication experiments or the > MWI to ask this question either. Suppose there are a billion people in > the world each with 1/billion of my memories: does this mean I will find > myself becoming one of these people either now or after I have died? As I understand it, Bruno's theory is that you are all the "consistent continuations" of your consciousness. I'm not exactly sure what constitutes a consistent continuation, but it must be something other than just sharing memories. At any given time my consciousness is accessing only a tiny fraction of my memories. Further I'm continually forming and forgetting short-term memories as well as forgetting some long-term memories. Basing identity on memory seems inconsistent with supposing that identity is some property of consciousness alone. A digital computation doesn't depend on memory/data that isn't accessed. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more option
Re: Rép : The Meaning of Life
Le 26-janv.-07, à 11:11, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > > It seems to me that abstract machines have been created for our > benefit, rather like mathematical notation or human language. That is, > they allow us to think about algorithms and to consider how we might > build a physical machine to carry them out, even if this is not > actually done in practice. I could agree that mathematical notation are our own invention, unlike number, OK? Now, and I know I have to come back on this with more details, if you get what really is CHURCH'S THESIS, I can explain that "abstract machine" are mathematical object like numbers, having objective and general mathematical properties which does not depend on the choice of language or notation. There is an intrinsical, machine independent computer science. > If you do away with the possibility of physical implementation and if > you consider only first person experience, what purpose is served by > an abstract machine? But I do not consider only first person experiences. I consider the 0-person (roughly: truth), the 3-person (roughly: provability), the 1-person captured by the conjunction of provability and truth, the first person plural or "intelligible matter" (conjunction of provability and consistency) and the "sensible matter" (conjunction of provability, consistency and truth). This makes five notion of person points of view. And thus it makes 10 such notion when you distinguish machine discourse on them and divine (true) discourse on them (you can do that by using G and G*). And then, for technical but important reason, two of them collapse, so in reality there are 8 hypostases. I don't either do completely away with the physical implementation, only they are "abstract" or "immaterial" themselves, by relating "abstract machine state" with their possible abstract computational "most probable" continuations. > The quotient of two numbers does not depend on a long division > algorithm, or any algorithm running on any machine; it simply *is*. Yes, but with Church thesis, the many abstract machine computing the quotient simply *are*, too. And the first person observer, if he believe in comp, know that if he want to take localise himself in its most probable computational history has to take those many machine into considerations. The UD compute the quotient in all possible way (a little bit like an electron who follows all possible path). > > OK, but as far as they can communicate from their inside points of > view > > (btw: thanks for the spelling!) you are adding implicitly some > addition > > and multiplication laws. Once we stop to take for granted what exists > > or not, such little nuance have some importance, especially for > > deriving concretely physics from something else. > > Communicating with the outside world changes everything, but we can > put a box around the whole system and declare it closed. This closed > system (which may contain many interacting conscious entities) exists > somewhere in the Library of Babel, in the output of the "count" > program, in noise, in the decimal expansion of pi, etc., and even > though we outside the the system cannot find it or interact with it, > its inhabitants are going about their business regardless. Yes but, after the UDA, unless we abandon comp, we just cannot refer to an outside world so easily, nor can we reify any piece of matter. Then if comp allows such rich piece of matter, embedding interacting consciousness (which I doubt) will be relevant only as far as they perturb the relative first person (plural) SSA measure. > > > Of course, such measure is a bit too much intuitive: a priori all > > probabilities of histories add up, and we could a bit naively take > this > > as a refutation of comp. What refrains us to jump toward that > > conclusion, is that such intuitive probabilities have not enough > taken > > into account the difference between the points of view, something any > > self-referentially correct universal machine can be shown to be able > to > > do, thanks, not really to incompleteness, but thanks to the fact that > > machine can reason about their own incompleteness (leading to the > > arithmetical points of view/hypostases). This motivates then the AUDA > > (Arithmetical version of UDA, ... or of Plotinus, actually). > > OK, I think I understand why you can see all the arbitrary sequences > from inside the UD but not the outside (it relates to the irrelevance > of delays from the inside), but I don't see why these extra sequences > should be more likely to encode white rabbit universes than the 3rd > person observable ones. Because the arbitrary sequences are much more numerous (a continuum) than the computable one. Matter, Nature and Life "occur" on the boundary of the computable and the uncomputable, where the first person view and the third person view get conflicting. Frankly, here computer science provides man
Re: Rép : The Meaning of Life
Bruno: " 4) Mark Peaty wrote (to Brent): As I say, the essence of evil is the act of treating other persons as things. I so agree with you. And then, with Church thesis (less than comp, thus) you can understand the reason why even some (relative) machine and some (relative) numbers should not be confused with any of their third person description. " MP: There is too much packed in this for me to be clear of the scope. For example: by 'machine' do you mean, generically, any hypothetical self-referencing, sufficiently complex device - or virtual emulation of such - smart enough to think it knows who it is? and Which numbers have anything BUT a third person description? I am of course very ignorant about higher mathematics, so the way I use words is that a number is a mathematical object that has/is a [or of a] particular value. I guess that means that a number, for me anyway, is a thing not a process. People use processes to generate, define and compare numbers. These processes are to mathematica what verbs, adverbs, adjectives, complex nouns and all the phrases [noun phr, adjectival phr, etc.] are to natural languages. Because of the precise specifications required for such mathematical processes, which I suppose means their algorithmic qualities, many of them are mathematical objects in their own right, so they do what they do and not anything else. Bruno [quote continued]: " On another tack: it seems to me the extent and scope of suffering in the world is one of the most powerful arguments in favour of the total irrelevance of the concept of G/god/s. However it is not for me to go around telling those who believe in some G/god/s that they are deluded. Do you agree that those who believe in a primitive physical universe could be deluded in the same manner than those who believe in some notion of God. Perhaps even in a worse manner, because many people believe that the existence of a primitive material universe is a "scientific fact". Of course not. At least in many theological text, the word "God" is used in a more axiomatic way than "Matter" is by some scientist (at lunch or during the week-end). Most religious people will never say that the existence of God is a scientific fact, and in that sense are less deluded than many materialist. " MP: I don't see how people who believe in 'some notion of God' can honestly get past the intelligent child's question of 'Well alright, where did G/god/s come from then'. It is a simple question without an answer except something like: 'Shut up you little smart a*se!' or 'BLASPHEMY!! Thou deservest to be burnt at the stake!' For me a very important aspect of this latter issue is that any purported supernatural being cannot have a coherent explanation in terms of natural science and, if taken of itself to be an explanation for any of that which is and/or that which transpires, it disempowers the believers concerned and any of those in their care. Why? Because, as I think I said before, one of the several Earth shaking things that the advent of scientific method has brought to the human race is the objective demonstration that no publicly stated belief or public assertion of the nature of things is immune from sceptical examination which is conducted in an ethical manner. That said, I can now return to the deeper question which is: Is it coherent to assert that there is no universe? In common sense, plain English terms that is pretty much like saying that 'Nothing really exists!' ... which Does not compute! Like dividing or multiplying by zero, you either lock up your system or get no useful extra result. It is therefore necessary to accept that one exists, with the bookmarked proviso that 'exists' needs further research, and accept that for the time being there is no really coherent substitute for taking as /given/ one's own existence in a world of some sort. In fact as I said somewhere else it is one of only two completely free things in life. [The other if you remember is the benefits which come from saying 'Think positive, it is better for you' and acting as if you believe it.] My point in harping on in this way is simply so as to point out that: whilst it IS necessary to assert an assumption of existence beyond oneself, and to be ethical it is necessary to acknowledge the independent existence of the other people one meets, there is no such more-or-less a priori reason for positing the existence of supernatural beings of any sort whatever. The assertion of the existence of G/god/s is gratuitous, and the very concept is characteristically pre-scientific. Furthermore, the very concept of an omniscient being, never mind omnipotent, depends for its credibility upon the acceptance of some kind of naive realism. That is to say, the truth concerning the types of awareness we actually experience and for which credible sceptically proficient observation has been made, always entails
RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds
John Mikes writes:
> Stathis:
> your concluding sentence is
> " But my brain just won't let me think this way."
> *
> Have you been carried away?
> Who is "your brain" to make decisions upon you? (maybe you mean only that the
> mechanism of your brain, the main tool "YOU" use in mental activity, is not
> predesigned for such action?) So: is there a pre-design (ha ha)?
> More importantly: who is that "me" in conflict with 'your' brain?
> How do you 'want' to 'think' something (which involves your brain) when 'your
> brain' won't let it happen?
> OK, let's introduce "you", the homunculus, who wants to think some way and
> your 'brain' did not reach the sophistication of the design (yet?) to comply
> - as a reason for "won't let me".
> With what 'tool' did "you" WANT to "think this way"? How many people are you
> indeed?
> *
> I am asking these stupid qiestions in the line of my search for SELF ("I"),
> vs. the total interconnectedness of our personal existence with 'the rest of
> the world'. I expect that you may provide useful hooks for me in such respect.
> John
"I" am the product of a consciousness-generating mechanism, my brain, in the
same way as "walking" is the product of a locomotion-generating mechanism, my
legs. "I" am not identical to my brain just as "walking" is not identical to my
legs. Now, of course "I can only think what my brain will let me think", and of
course "I can only walk where my legs will let me walk", but these statements
are not tautologies in the way that saying "I can only think what I can think"
or "I can only walk where I can walk" are.
Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds
Stathis:
your concluding sentence is
" But my brain just won't let me think this way."
*
Have you been carried away?
Who is "your brain" to make decisions upon you? (maybe you mean only that the
mechanism of your brain, the main tool "YOU" use in mental activity, is not
predesigned for such action?) So: is there a pre-design (ha ha)?
More importantly: who is that "me" in conflict with 'your' brain?
How do you 'want' to 'think' something (which involves your brain) when 'your
brain' won't let it happen?
OK, let's introduce "you", the homunculus, who wants to think some way and your
'brain' did not reach the sophistication of the design (yet?) to comply - as a
reason for "won't let me".
With what 'tool' did "you" WANT to "think this way"? How many people are you
indeed?
*
I am asking these stupid qiestions in the line of my search for SELF ("I"), vs.
the total interconnectedness of our personal existence with 'the rest of the
world'. I expect that you may provide useful hooks for me in such respect.
John
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thursday, January 25, 2007 7:08 AM
Subject: RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds
Jason Resch writes:
> > Jason Resch writes:
> >
> >My appologies to those on this list, this is how I should have worded
> >my conclusion:
> >Positive spared lives = Take replication
> >Neutral spared lives = Take coin flip
> >Negative spared lives = Take coin flip
[SP]
> This is an analysis from an altruistic viewpoint, i.e. which choice will
increase
> the net happiness in the world. What I am asking is the selfish question,
what
> should I do to avoid being tortured? If I choose the replication it won't
worry
> me from a selfish point of view if one person will definitely be tortured
because
> I am unlikely to be that person. Indeed, after the replication it won't
affect me
> if *all* the other copies are tortured, because despite sharing the same
psychology
> up to the point of replication, I am not going to experience their pain.
[JR]
> I think our disagreement stems from our different conceptions of
consciousness. You seem to believe that once you experience an observer
moment, that you are destined to experience all future observer moments of that
observer. While this is the way most people see the world, I consider that to
be an illusion caused by memory. i.e. "We remember past observer moments so we
must be moving into the future."
> I believe that its is just as beneficial to do something that will improve
someone else's observer moments as it is to improve one's future observer
moments. Just think: your current observer moment never gets to experience the
fruits of its current labors, it remains in that observer moment for all time.
Yet we still go to work. That is why altruism is indistinguishable from
selfish behavior in my philosophy. There is no consciousness outside of brain
states, brain states are consciousness, since they exist they are experienced,
no one can say by who or by what, their existance is experience. Therefore it
is in everyone's interest to improve reality's first person, of which every
observer moment is a part.
> It's easy to see how evolution taught us to work for one individual's
future observer moments, we defer gratification all time in order to increase
the average quality of all future observer moments. I'm not advocating we all
become like Mother Teresa, but I think we should understand that we are no more
(or less) our future observer moments than we are other individual's observer
moments.
I completely agree with your view of observer moments: the person who wakes
up
in my bed tomorrow won't be me-now, he'll just be someone who shares most of
my
memories and believes he is me. In fact, if I were killed with an axe during
the night
and replaced with an exact copy, it wouldn't make any difference to me or
anyone
else, because I "die" every moment anyway. But the problem is, I am very
attached to
the illusion of continuity of conscious and personal identity even though I
know how it
is generated. If I give in to it, I might decide to treat everyone the same
as I do myself,
but just as likely I might decide to be completely reckless with my life, or
even with
everyone else's life. But my brain just won't let me think this way.
Stathis Papaioannou
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RE: Rép : The Meaning of Life
Bruno Marchal writes:> >> Let us define what is a computable infinite sequence. A sequence is> >> computable if there is a program (a machine) which generates> >> specifically the elements of that sequence in the right order, and> >> nothing else. The set of programs is enumerable, but by Cantor theorem> >> the set of *all* sequences is not enumerable. So the set of computable> >> sequences is almost negligible compared to the arbitrary one.> >>> >> Does it mean there is no program capable of generating a non > >> computable> >> sequence?> >>> >> Not at all. A universal dovetailer generates all the infinite> >> sequences. The computable one, (that is, those nameable by special> >> purpose, specific, program) and the non computable one (how? by> >> generating them all).> >>> >> I give another example of the same subtlety. One day a computer> >> scientist told me that it was impossible to write a program of n bits> >> capable of generating an incompressible finite sequence or string of> >> length m with m far greater than n. I challenge him.> >> Of course, what is true is that there is no program of n bit capable > >> of> >> generating that m bits incompressible string, AND ONLY, SPECIFICALLY,> >> THAT STRING.> >> But it is really easy to write a little program capable of generating> >> that incompressible string by letting him generate ALL strings: the> >> program COUNT is enough.> >>> >> I think this *is* the main line of the *everything* list, or a> >> miniature version of it if you want.> >> > Yes, and there are many related examples, like Borges' library; I > > would include> > the computations that might be hiding in noise as another such example.> > > We will have to go back on this. I would compare the Borges' library > (or its countable infinite generalization) as equivalent with the > counting algorithm. It generates all (finite) strings, and a lot of > computations can be considered as being embedded in those strings. > Still I consider that the counting algorithm is not equivalent with a > universal dovetailer. I will try to explain the difference with some > details, but roughly speaking, what the UD does, and what neither the > rock nor the counting algorithm really do, is that the UD generates > both the program codes and their finite and infinite running. Saying > that all computations are generated by the counting algorithm makes > sense only if we add a universal interpreter in the description.> I can anticipate that you will say this does not change anything from > inside. But remember that once we abandon the "physical" supervenience > thesis, we will replace it by the computational supervenience thesis > which ask us to be precise of what is a mathematical computations. We > can no more relate on notion of time space, energy, etc.> The easy way to do that consists in defining in some axiomatics what > will be necessary for both the existence of computations and the > existence of internal observer related to those computations. In that > case a counting algorithm is just equivalent to the first three axiom > of Peano Arithmetic. This is provably not enough to define or execute > all programs. It appears that by adding the definition of addition and > multiplication (and order) you get the turing universal level (and then > with the induction axioms you get the internal lobian observer. > Everything will emerge from (mathematical interrelation between those > beings).> I'm afraid I'm not clear, and I will think how to make this clearer > without going to much into the technics.It seems to me that abstract machines have been created for our benefit, rather like mathematical notation or human language. That is, they allow us to think about algorithms and to consider how we might build a physical machine to carry them out, even if this is not actually done in practice. If you do away with the possibility of physical implementation and if you consider only first person experience, what purpose is served by an abstract machine? The quotient of two numbers does not depend on a long division algorithm, or any algorithm running on any machine; it simply *is*.> > The> > significant thing in all these cases is that from the third person > > perspective, the> > information or computation is inaccessible. You need to have the book > > you want> > already before you can find it in the Library of Babel. However, if > > computations> > (or books) can be conscious, then they will still be conscious despite > > being unable> > to communicate with the world at the level of their implementation. > > The first person> > perspective makes these situations non-trivial.> > OK, but as far as they can communicate from their inside points of view > (btw: thanks for the spelling!) you are adding implicitly some addition > and multiplication laws. Once we stop to take for granted what exists > or not, such little nuance have some importance, especi
RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds
Brent Meeker writes:> Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2007 17:00:11 -0800> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com> Subject: Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds> > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:> > > > Johnathan Corgan writes:> > > >> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:> >>> >>> If some multiverse theory happens to be true then by your way of argument we > >>> should all be extremely anxious all the time, because every moment terrible things > >>> are definitely happening to some copy of us. For example, we should be constantly > >>> be worrying that we will be struck by lightning, because we *will* be struck by lightning. > >> If MWI is true, *and* there isn't a lowest quantum of> >> probability/measure as Brent Meeker speculates, there is an interesting> >> corollary to the quantum theory of immortality.> >>> >> While one branch always exists which continues our consciousness> >> forward, indeed we are constantly "shedding" branches where the most> >> brutal and horrific things happen to us and result in our death. Their> >> measure is extremely small, so from a subjectively probability> >> perspective, we don't worry about them.> >>> >> I'd speculate that there are far more logically possible ways to> >> experience an agonizing, lingering death than to live. Some have a> >> relatively high measure, like getting hit by a car, or getting lung> >> cancer (if you're a smoker), so we take steps to avoid these (though> >> they still happen in some branch.) Others, like having all our> >> particles spontaneously quantum tunnel into the heart of a burning> >> furnace, are so low in measure, we can blissfully ignore the> >> possibility. Yet if MWI is true, there is some branch where this has> >> just happened to us. (modulo Brent's probability quantum.)> >>> >> If there are many more ways to die than to live, even of low individual> >> measure, I wonder how the "integral of the measure" across all of them> >> comes out.> > > > It's not death that is the problem (you always get out of that), it's suffering. Final death > > would be better than a living hell, but QTI denies you final death. I take comfort in the > > speculation that if I'm still alive in a few hundred years, most likely this will be as a result > > of some advanced medical or cybernetic intervention, and if science understands the brain > > well enough to do that, it would be a relatively simple matter by comparison to ensure that I > > am content. I think the hellish routes to immortality would occur mostly by chance and would > > be of much lower total measure than the deliberate, happy routes. > > I think Bruno already remarked that it may well be more probable that a continuation of your consciousness arises in some other branch of the multiverse "by chance", rather than as a state of "your" erstwhile body. This would seem particularly more probable as your consciousness simplifies due to deterioration of your brain - how hard can it be to find a continuation of a near coma. Perhaps this continuation is the consciousness of a fish - and it's the Hindus rather than the Bhuddists who are right.Then we come up against the question of what we can expect to experience in the case of duplication with partial memory loss. For example, if you are duplicated 101 times such that one copy has 100% of your memories while the other 100 copies each have 1% of your memories, does this mean that you have an even chance of ending up as either the 100% or the 1% version of yourself? We need not invoke duplication experiments or the MWI to ask this question either. Suppose there are a billion people in the world each with 1/billion of my memories: does this mean I will find myself becoming one of these people either now or after I have died? Stathis Papaioannou _ Live Search: New search found http://get.live.com/search/overview --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
