On 7/26/2011 1:48 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I don't believe in a "granted" (primitive) cosmos, nor in any thing
primitively physical. Nor do I believe in their inexistence. I heard
only rumor. I am agnostic on that issue. But I don't believe in the
compatibility of such beliefs with comp.
Why
On 7/26/2011 12:56 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I don't see how I'm begging the question. I'm just saying that feeling
is the interior topology of biological cells, and so a brain made of
non-biological cells won't feel the same.
That's fine. I'm OK with that as an hypothesis. But it means t
On 26 Jul 2011, at 21:56, Craig Weinberg wrote:
unless it's made of living biological organisms,
And here you beg the question.
But aren't you saying that it doesn't have to be biological to act
like a brain?
I am neutral on this. I discovered computer science in biology (in the
gene
On 26 Jul 2011, at 20:26, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/26/2011 9:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Not at all. If comp is true, consciousness is not the result of a
computation.
This confuses me. I understand consciousness (according to your
theory) is not the result of computing some function, i.e. o
On Jul 26, 12:50 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > There's a difference between hurtling forward on momentum and having
> > functioning engines. Just because a chicken runs around for a while
> > after losing it's head doesn't mean that headless chickens are viable.
>
> But it means that he is still n
On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:
Yes. A tiny part of arithmetic is already sufficiently rich to
implement (in the original mathematical sense) very complex emulation
bearing entities much powerfull than that tiny arithmetical entities,
and those can become lucid on the web of arithmeti
On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:
Exercise:
1) show that 1 has 8 clothes. (easy) example of clothes for 1
(1^2+0^2+0^2+0^2, 0^2+1^2+0^2+0^2, (-1)^2+0^2+0^2+0^2, ...)
2) show that 2 has 24 clothes (easy but longer)
3) show that all numbers have clothes (very difficult)
4) well Jacobi res
On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
And once the observer is defined by the LUM (Löbian universal
machine), we can extract from addition and multiplication, the whole
UP-theology (GOD, NOÙS and UNIVERSAL SOUL, and the down-theology:
INTELLIGIBLE MATTER and SENSIBLE
On Jul 26, 12:38 pm, meekerdb wrote:
> > In order to understand my position you have to let go of the
> > fundamental ontological assumption that mechanics drive feeling.
>
> You don't seem to grasp that the assumption is *not* that mechanics
> drive feelings. The "assumption" (one extensively co
On 7/26/2011 10:11 AM, benjayk wrote:
Peace really only comes when you get
comfortable with falling
As an old motorcycle racer, I agree completely.
Brent
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On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:
OK. Remember the goal, to find the, or a, TOE.
What I suggest, at least, is that with comp, any first order logical
specification of any universal machine, will do.
Well, okay. I just get the feeling that a TOE doesn't really exist.
You
"just" have a
On 7/26/2011 9:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Not at all. If comp is true, consciousness is not the result of a
computation.
This confuses me. I understand consciousness (according to your theory)
is not the result of computing some function, i.e. one of the infinitely
many programs the UD is
On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Well, bad luck. Then you have to play this game until you get tired
of it.
If that can happen.
I hope so! Playing is great, but every particular game is boring at
some
point.
Not the infinite games. In infinite games (like
On Jul 26, 8:58 am, ronaldheld wrote:
> http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1107/1107.4028.pdf
> Sorry about my title choice. Any comments?
> Ronald
I like this a lot. Some Highlights:
[…Turing machine computation (like any other form of programmable
computation) trans
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Hi benjayk,
>
> I might comment other paragraphs later, but for reason of time and
> business, I will just go on some points.
No problem, comment on what you want and when you feel like doing it.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>> You can expect that a theory which unify a
On 26 Jul 2011, at 16:51, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jul 26, 4:22 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Jul 2011, at 21:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jul 25, 1:57 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Jul 2011, at 15:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Not exactly. I'm saying that a plane that is crashing might b
In order to understand my position you have to let go of the
fundamental ontological assumption that mechanics drive feeling.
You don't seem to grasp that the assumption is *not* that mechanics
drive feelings. The "assumption" (one extensively confirmed in
laboratories) is that mechanics dri
On 26 Jul 2011, at 14:58, ronaldheld wrote:
http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1107/1107.4028.pdf
Sorry about my title choice. Any comments?
Ronald
The author would be 100% correct, this is still computationalism. And
I agree with its critics of the computation *m
On Jul 26, 4:22 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 25 Jul 2011, at 21:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > On Jul 25, 1:57 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 25 Jul 2011, at 15:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > Not exactly. I'm saying that a plane that is crashing might be a sign
> > that the engines don't work
On Jul 25, 10:53 pm, meekerdb wrote:
> > Not zombie neurons, just zombie imitation neurons. A natural neuron
> > could not be a zombie, but you could make a neuron that you think
> > should function like a natural neuron and it would not be able to be
> > well integrated into the person's consciou
On Jul 25, 10:08 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> You say the question is meaningless but then answer it in the affirmative.
The answer is as affirmative as it is negative. Consciousness is
partially separable and partially inseparable from brain function.
> > Not zombie neurons, just zombie imi
http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1107/1107.4028.pdf
Sorry about my title choice. Any comments?
Ronald
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Hi benjayk,
I might comment other paragraphs later, but for reason of time and
business, I will just go on some points.
On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:
You can expect that a theory which unify all force will not be *that*
simple. Now, with comp, if you like simplicity, you should l
On 25 Jul 2011, at 21:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jul 25, 1:57 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Jul 2011, at 15:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:
If they can only function for a few minutes, then that function may
not be 'normal' to anything except us as distantly removed
observers.
This like s
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