date:20121229


On 12/29/2012 2:51 PM, Brian Tenneson wrote:





Why not take the categories of all categories (besides that
Lawyere tried that without to much success, except rediscovering
Grothendieck topoi).


I'm more interested in the smallest mathematical object in which all 
mathematical structures are embedded but the category of all 
categories will do.


Hi Brian,

Check out this proposed structure: a compressed PS file: 
boole.stanford.edu/pub/*gamut*.ps.gz or pdf: 
http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/gamut.pdf




But if you assume comp, elementary arithmetic is enough, and it is
better to keep the infinities and categories into the universal
machine's mind tools.

Enough for what, in what sense?




To have a single mathematical object that all mathematical
structures can be /embedded/ would give us an object that, in a
sense, contains all structures.  If one follows Tegmark's idea
that ME=PE, then a definition for universe just might be a
mathematical object (which by ME=PE is a physical object) that
contains, in a sense, all mathematical objects (i.e., all
physical objects). 


I think that this is deeply flawed. We cannot identify the
physical and the mathematical. We might try theory on the
physical, or on the mental, or on the mathematical, which might
suggest relation between those thing, but I doubt any non trivial
theory would identify them, unless enlarging the sense of the
words like mental, physical.


Isn't it simpler to assume there is only one type of existence? What 
are the actual flaws of a mathematical universe?  A physical system 
can be mathematically encoded by its corresponding set of world 
lines.  This encoding is an isomorphism.  A very simple example of 
what I mean is the nearly parabolic path taken by a projectile.  The 
set of world lines would be some subset of R^4 or R^n if it turns out 
that n != 4. I am aware that indeterminacy due to Heisenberg's 
uncertainty principle kicks in here so we may never "know" which 
subset of R^n a physical system is isomorphic to but by a pigeonhole 
principle, the physical system must be isomorphic to some subset of 
R^n, several in fact.


Is it possible that this isomorphism is one example of a more 
general relation?





With computationalism, the coupling consciousness/physical is a
phenomenon, person perceptible through numbers relations when they
(the persons) bet on their relative self-consistency. This
explains the appearance of the physical, without going out of the
arithmetical. It works thanks to Church thesis and the closure of
the comp everything (UD*, sigma_1 completeness).


How are you defining consciousness here?



It's not super clear to me that the cocompletion of the category
of all structures C exists though since C is not a small category
and thus Yoneda's lemma doesn't apply.  I would have to fine-tune
the argument to work in the case of the category C I have in mind.


The n-categories might be interesting, but we don't need so rich
ontology. If we are machine, the cardinality of the basic TOE is
absolutely undecidable from inside. Omega is enough.

Do you have an argument that proves that our minds can't transcend 
"inside"?


ISTM, that to transcend from 'inside' would be to contradict 
Godel's incompleteness theorems, no?







If the cocompletion of C is the One, that which all mathematical
structures can be embedded, then the parallel universe question
would be a matter of logic and category theory; it would depend
on how you defined "the visible universe" and "parallel" universe.


You will have to define an observer, its points of view, and to
take into account its many distributions in that
super-mathematical structure, but you can't do that, as you will
need an even bigger structure to define and study the
indeterminacy. So you will have to limit your notion of observer
and use some "comp" hypothesis (an infinite variant if you want).

With comp, it is easier: you cannot really take more than
arithmetic. God created the Natural Numbers, all the rest belong
to the (singular and collective) number's imagination. If nature
refutes this, it will still remain time to add the infinities
needed. I think.


How is the arithmetical structure going to give rise to a description 
of reality that takes into account observer, its points of view, and 
its many distributions without the need to study the indeterminacy?

--


I think that Bruno is assuming an ensemble or collection of 
possible encodings within the relations between numbers (or equivalent) 
to account for every possible description and thus would include any 
observer, its points of view and its many distributions. All of it 
exists a priori in Platonia. No?


--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: A few definitions of the categories and two examples of their use (in perception)


On 12/29/2012 12:32 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:


In french we say popularly that "about taste and color we don't argue". 
(Des goûts
et des couleurs on ne discute pas).


That's because Francophones have no taste, they just try to sell the notion that they do 
for marketing ;)


In Germany this is more ambiguous, as we have the equivalent statement but also its 
negation: a popular turn-of-phrase is "Über Geschmack lässt sich bekanntlich streiten." 
Roughly translates "On matters taste, we can argue/negotiate/dispute", which fits with 
the fuzzy linguistic statement above.


I thought every body just quoted the latin, "De gustibus non est disputandum.",  which is 
literally the opposite of the German (the Romans were more tolerant?) but probably means 
the same.


Brent

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Re: A few definitions of the categories and two examples of their use (in perception)

2012-12-29 Thread Platonist Guitar Cowboy

Hi Bruno,

On Sat, Dec 29, 2012 at 8:36 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 29 Dec 2012, at 16:07, Roger Clough wrote:
>
>  The classic example
>
> 3p= thirdness= is when I react to the pain
>
>
> Hmm.. this is the idea, except that with comp, this will be only
> plural_1p. But no problem as, locally, first person plural behaves like a
> 3p notion. That is indeed why we confuse them and believe the mind comes
> from matter activity, when eventually matter activity is a way mind
> articulate the information about its the most probable computations.
>
>
>
> 2p = secondness = is when I feel the pain
>
> 1p = firstness = is when somebody stick me with a pin (Quale)
>
>
> Is not "I feel pain" a quale?
>
>
>
>
>
> Also
>
> 3p is when I know and/or say that the coffee tastes bad (mind or reason)
>
>
> ? If you can use reason to explain a taste, I will ask you the method.
>
>
The method is specializing in summing magnitudes of local infinities. With
long enough computational history, you can thus explain a taste, even with
fuzzy linguistic markers. Like wine tasters will agree that a vintage has a
layer of "shoe leather".

Whether the receiver of the message "understands" is a different question
and is domain related. Say math, you cannot communicate with me some funky
tensor equation with words alone, unless I have enough computational
history with the concept in question.

Music is deceptive, in that everybody has apparent access but I don't think
I have to make the case that some music is tasteless. Therefore, not
everybody has musical taste.

Having said that, I'll grant, with sufficient computational history, there
are schools of taste that differ. Like the styles that different architects
come to prefer. But with such history, even a romantic-school architect,
will concede that a building is well designed by a minimalist Bauhaus style
architect and can get versed in that style, or the magnitudes of those
local infinities.

> In french we say popularly that "about taste and color we don't argue".
> (Des goûts et des couleurs on ne discute pas).
>
>
That's because Francophones have no taste, they just try to sell the notion
that they do for marketing ;)

In Germany this is more ambiguous, as we have the equivalent statement but
also its negation: a popular turn-of-phrase is "Über Geschmack lässt sich
bekanntlich streiten." Roughly translates "On matters taste, we can
argue/negotiate/dispute", which fits with the fuzzy linguistic statement
above.

But alas, Germans are known for their lack of taste and world wars and we
don't market our wines and cheeses so well. It is still fact however, that
Germany exports more cheese to France than the opposite. We just give it
some Italian name, and the French buy it, as anybody with culinary taste
will not buy from the Krauts:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambozola

Yup, that's German and the French buy more of that from the supermarket
shelves than Germans buy Roquefort and co.

>
>
> 2p is when I am tasting something funny about the coffee. (feeling or
> sensing)
>
>
> I will ask you for the coffee recipe.
>
> Funny?
>
> Cannabis, salvia or even alcohol, I can imagine. But Coffee!?!
>
>
Same. I want that coffee :)

PGC

>
>
>
> 1p is when I take a sip of coffee.(body-QUALE- input to sensing nerves)
>
>
>
> OK, I see why you say this.
>
> Keep in mind in UDA 1p is just defined by the content of the diary of the
> guy or girl annihilated and reconstituted, with their diary, as opposed to
> the diary of an external observer (3p). In AUDA the 1p is defined by "a
> correct belief" with respect to a probable situation.
>
> Just to help you for other threads.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> ---
>
> A Few Definitions of the categories
>
> http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/newlist/nl-frame.htm
>
>
> The Categories as used in perception:
>
> I 1p--Quality (Reference to a Ground),
> II 2p-- Relation (Reference to a Correlate),
> II 3p--Representation (Reference to an Interpretant),
>
> I 1p-- Quale (that which refers to a ground),
> II 2p--Relate (that which refers to a ground and correlate, )
> III 3p--Representamen (that which refers to ground, correlate, and
> interpretant. )
>
>
> http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/secondness.html
>
> "Careful analysis shows that to the three grades of valency of
> indecomposable concepts correspond
> three classes of characters or predicates.
>
> Firstly come " firstnesses," or positive internal characters of the
> subject in itself;
>
> secondly come "secondnesses," or brute actions of one subject or substance
> on another,
> regardless of law or of any third subject;
>
> thirdly comes "thirdnesses," or the mental or quasi-mental influence of
> one subject on
> another relatively to a third." ('Pragmatism', CP 5.469, 1907)
>
>
>
> Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, positively
> and without reference to anything else.
> Secondnes

Re: Three things that one cannot prove or disprove


On 12/29/2012 5:05 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Sat, Dec 29, 2012 at 9:41 AM, John Mikes  wrote:

Stathis!!! (See after your remark)  -  John M


On Thu, Dec 27, 2012 at 7:38 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
wrote:


It's possible to prove that computers can be conscious if it can be
proved that the physical movement of the parts of the brain can be
simulated by a computer.



Firstly: did we agree in a working identification of 'conscious'?

It's a mysterious thing you know you have when you have it. For the
purposes of this discussion that suffices.


 Secondly: is such 'conscious' phenomenon PHYSICAL?

It appears to be associated with or supervene on or be caused by
certain brain processes, since when those brain processes are present
consciousness (whatever it is) is also present, and when those brain
processes are not present consciousness is not present.


 Thirdly: do we know ALL (even restricted to 'physical(?)') movements of
(all) the parts of the brain involved in mental actiity to state ALL their
movements can be simulated by a computer?

No, we can't be sure. There may be non-computable physical processes
in the universe. But the evidence is that physics is computable.


Of course since we invent physical theories to explain and predict, it behooves us to 
invent computable ones.  What is not computed we push off to 'boundary conditions' or 
'chance'.


Brent

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Re: Three things that one cannot prove or disprove


On 12/29/2012 4:56 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Sat, Dec 29, 2012 at 6:12 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:


It's possible to prove that computers can be conscious if it can be
proved that the physical movement of the parts of the brain can be
simulated by a computer.


Assuming you can prove consciousness is related to those physical movements.
OK.

It goes like this:

1. Assume consciousness is caused by movement in the brain.
2. Assume that the brain movement is computable.
3. Then consciousness is computable.
(4. But if consciousness is computable, then the physical world must
be a product of consciousness rather than the other way around.)
But 4 doesn't follow.  In fact 1 already assumes consciousness is a product of physics; so 
4 would be a contradiction.


Brent


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Re: Escaping from the world of 3p Flatland


On 12/29/2012 4:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



3p is when we agree that the coffee is too hot.
1p is when we find it tastes very bad.
2p is when your wife ask you to clean the coffee machine. 


So THAT'S why philosophers don't talk about 2p.

Brent

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Re: Ten top-of-my-head arguments against multiverses

2012-12-29 Thread Brian Tenneson


>
>
>
>
> Why not take the categories of all categories (besides that Lawyere tried 
> that without to much success, except rediscovering Grothendieck topoi).
>

I'm more interested in the smallest mathematical object in which all 
mathematical structures are embedded but the category of all categories 
will do.
 

>
> But if you assume comp, elementary arithmetic is enough, and it is better 
> to keep the infinities and categories into the universal machine's mind 
> tools. 
>
> Enough for what, in what sense? 

>
>
> To have a single mathematical object that all mathematical structures can 
> be *embedded* would give us an object that, in a sense, contains all 
> structures.  If one follows Tegmark's idea that ME=PE, then a definition 
> for universe just might be a mathematical object (which by ME=PE is a 
> physical object) that contains, in a sense, all mathematical objects (i.e., 
> all physical objects). 
>
>
> I think that this is deeply flawed. We cannot identify the physical and 
> the mathematical. We might try theory on the physical, or on the mental, or 
> on the mathematical, which might suggest relation between those thing, but 
> I doubt any non trivial theory would identify them, unless enlarging the 
> sense of the words like mental, physical.
>
>
Isn't it simpler to assume there is only one type of existence?  What are 
the actual flaws of a mathematical universe?  A physical system can be 
mathematically encoded by its corresponding set of world lines.  This 
encoding is an isomorphism.  A very simple example of what I mean is the 
nearly parabolic path taken by a projectile.  The set of world lines would 
be some subset of R^4 or R^n if it turns out that n != 4.  I am aware that 
indeterminacy due to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle kicks in here so we 
may never "know" which subset of R^n a physical system is isomorphic to but 
by a pigeonhole principle, the physical system must be isomorphic to some 
subset of R^n, several in fact.


 

> With computationalism, the coupling consciousness/physical is a 
> phenomenon, person perceptible through numbers relations when they (the 
> persons) bet on their relative self-consistency. This explains the 
> appearance of the physical, without going out of the arithmetical. It works 
> thanks to Church thesis and the closure of the comp everything (UD*, 
> sigma_1 completeness).
>
>
> How are you defining consciousness here? 

>
> It's not super clear to me that the cocompletion of the category of all 
> structures C exists though since C is not a small category and thus 
> Yoneda's lemma doesn't apply.  I would have to fine-tune the argument to 
> work in the case of the category C I have in mind.
>
>
> The n-categories might be interesting, but we don't need so rich ontology. 
> If we are machine, the cardinality of the basic TOE is absolutely 
> undecidable from inside. Omega is enough.
>
> Do you have an argument that proves that our minds can't transcend 
"inside"? 

>
>
> If the cocompletion of C is the One, that which all mathematical 
> structures can be embedded, then the parallel universe question would be a 
> matter of logic and category theory; it would depend on how you defined 
> "the visible universe" and "parallel" universe.
>
>
> You will have to define an observer, its points of view, and to take into 
> account its many distributions in that super-mathematical structure, but 
> you can't do that, as you will need an even bigger structure to define and 
> study the indeterminacy. So you will have to limit your notion of observer 
> and use some "comp" hypothesis (an infinite variant if you want).
>
> With comp, it is easier: you cannot really take more than arithmetic. God 
> created the Natural Numbers, all the rest belong to the (singular and 
> collective) number's imagination. If nature refutes this, it will still 
> remain time to add the infinities needed. I think.
>
>
> How is the arithmetical structure going to give rise to a description of 
reality that takes into account observer, its points of view, and its many 
distributions without the need to study the indeterminacy? 

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Re: Re: Re: Ten top-of-my-head arguments against multiverses

2012-12-29 Thread Platonist Guitar Cowboy

Hi Roger,

On Wed, Dec 26, 2012 at 9:46 PM, Roger Clough  wrote:

> Hi Platonist Guitar Cowboy
>
> Pragmatism is does not provide truth in, say a Platonic or Aristotelian
> sense.
> It only provides truth as pragmatists define truth: namely that if A
> causes B,
> B is the truth of A. This is the same as scientific truth or experimental
> truth.
>
>
>

I don't think that pragmatists like Dewey, which is how I'd frame
"pragmatism" semantically, would agree with that.

Whenever the word pops up, I raise an eyebrow: "Let's be pragmatic here..."
used for argument's sake, I do not take to be a valid move, unless the
party making the statement specifies some context they are referring to +
some degree of congruence with the same. Without that, I find it usually
nonsense, referring to some unspecified universe that is inflated to
"absolute reality which necessitates x". And everybody knows cui bono with
x.

And if Christian rhetoric makes such a pragmatic move, say republicans for
denying healthcare to poor, my question is naturally: "Your universe is
based on that book, that you guys use to ceremonially inaugurate
presidents, instantiate judicial laws, make statements in courts etc. Why
is your policy in direct contradiction with Jesus teachings, á la love thy
neighbor, help the poor and so on?"

I have yet to hear a convincing answer to that one. But I'm patient (unless
I sense they're ripping me off) with such things.

Platonistically pragmatic Guitar Cowboy




> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
> 12/26/2012
> "The one thing a woman looks for in a man is to be needed." - "Ethan
> Frome", by Edith Wharton
> - Receiving the following content -
> From: Platonist Guitar Cowboy
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-12-26, 12:53:21
> Subject: Re: Re: Ten top-of-my-head arguments against multiverses
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, Dec 26, 2012 at 4:17 PM, Roger Clough  wrote:
>
> Hi Bruno Marchal
>
> It all boils down to this: is something that is mathematically true
> necessarily physically true ?
> This question can be restated as "are mathematical truth and pragmatic
> truth
> the same ?" ?MHO No, because theory can be wrong but what works works.
>
>
>
>
> Dear Roger,
>
> What's wrong with:
>
> Theory always works (in some mind, no matter truth) and pragmatism can be
> used to justify or conceal discrimination, violence, false problems and
> examples like US style conservative rhetoric that pretends to be Christian,
> with its elements of compassion, love thy neighbor, share your wealth,
> anti-materialism etc. but in fact is pushing for policies that deny health
> to weak/poor, consolidate power and horde wealth, and promote the myth of
> people as isolated Islands, defending only their own interests, implying
> some Citizen Kane ideal, that everybody should aspire to?
>
> It's a rather transparent trick for this rhetoric to mask its
> anti-Christian individualism with the Christian cloak of truth, faith,
> piety, charity, and probity; while "pragmatically" reasoning to themselves
> that it's advantageous to pose with the moral authority of ruling Christian
> dogma + liberty of individual, freedom from tyrannical forces. For this
> reason, this form of "Christian-conservative rhetoric" is not an expression
> of liberty; it's more an instrument of control to stop people from entering
> political process via distraction and shared moral indignation at "what's
> wrong".
>
> I do not buy anymore "left vs. right" as ecology and energy problems make
> resource management much more complex and freedom/monitoring of internet
> activity enters the picture to which both Adam Smith and Marx/Engels were
> mute... but I do know that, if anything, Jesus was a socialist or communist.
>
> Hence, the above mentioned nonsense of rhetoric framing conservative
> Christians as guardians of faith, piety, probity, and charity, while they
> horde their wealth and complain about higher taxes is merely noise to me.
> People parrots. Single function machine. Of course it "works", as you say,
> as anything does when you allow this kind of blatant contradiction. But it
> still is bs.
>
> Ironically, the "atheist left" fights for Christian (New Testament)
> ideals... damn heathens! So the heathens will be judged, for doing Jesus'
> work without believing in him; and the "right" will be judged for
> pretending to believe in him, but for pragmatism sake they do devil's job ?
> la "I am God, my wealth, myself and I won't share or show solidarity with
> people in need, because it's their fault in my final judgement of them,
> even though only God can judge, for practical reason because I cannot see
> him, I will judge them when I vote."
>
> This disparity, the blatant fundamental contradiction in both camps, is
> quite hilarious I must admit, even though it's stupid how many have to
> suffer because of policy decisions based on this charade, and how much cash
> is wasted in keeping these narratives alive. Pragmatism has a coarser bs
> filter t

Re: A few definitions of the categories and two examples of their use (in perception)

On 29 Dec 2012, at 16:07, Roger Clough wrote:

The classic example

3p= thirdness= is when I react to the pain

Hmm.. this is the idea, except that with comp, this will be only  
plural_1p. But no problem as, locally, first person plural behaves  
like a 3p notion. That is indeed why we confuse them and believe the  
mind comes from matter activity, when eventually matter activity is a  
way mind articulate the information about its the most probable  
computations.

2p = secondness = is when I feel the pain

1p = firstness = is when somebody stick me with a pin (Quale)

Is not "I feel pain" a quale?

Also

3p is when I know and/or say that the coffee tastes bad (mind or  
reason)

? If you can use reason to explain a taste, I will ask you the method.

In french we say popularly that "about taste and color we don't  
argue". (Des goûts et des couleurs on ne discute pas).

2p is when I am tasting something funny about the coffee. (feeling  
or sensing)

I will ask you for the coffee recipe.

Funny?

Cannabis, salvia or even alcohol, I can imagine. But Coffee!?!

1p is when I take a sip of coffee.(body-QUALE- input to sensing  
nerves)

OK, I see why you say this.

Keep in mind in UDA 1p is just defined by the content of the diary of  
the guy or girl annihilated and reconstituted, with their diary, as  
opposed to the diary of an external observer (3p). In AUDA the 1p is  
defined by "a correct belief" with respect to a probable situation.

Just to help you for other threads.

Bruno

---

A Few Definitions of the categories

http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/newlist/nl-frame.htm

The Categories as used in perception:

I 1p--Quality (Reference to a Ground),
II 2p-- Relation (Reference to a Correlate),
II 3p--Representation (Reference to an Interpretant),

I 1p-- Quale (that which refers to a ground),
II 2p--Relate (that which refers to a ground and correlate, )
III 3p--Representamen (that which refers to ground, correlate, and  
interpretant. )

http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/secondness.html

"Careful analysis shows that to the three grades of valency of  
indecomposable concepts correspond

three classes of characters or predicates.

Firstly come " firstnesses," or positive internal characters of the  
subject in itself;

secondly come "secondnesses," or brute actions of one subject or  
substance on another,

regardless of law or of any third subject;

thirdly comes "thirdnesses," or the mental or quasi-mental influence  
of one subject on

another relatively to a third." ('Pragmatism', CP 5.469, 1907)

Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is,  
positively and without reference to anything else.
Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, with  
respect to a second but regardless of any third.
Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in  
bringing a second and third into relation to each other."

>>
>> The following equivalences should hold >>

>> 3p = Thirdness or III
>> 2p = Secondness or II
>> 1p = Firstness or I.
>>
>> Comp seems to only use analytic or deductive logic,
>> while Peirce's categories are epistemological (synthetic
>> logic) categories, in which secondness is an integral part.
>> So .
>>
>> Here's what Peirce has to say about his categorioes:
>>
>> http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/secondness.html
>>
>>
>> "Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is,
>> positively and without reference to anything else.
>>
>> Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is,
>> with respect to a second but regardless of any third.
>>
>> Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is,
>> in bringing a second and third into relation to each other."
>> (A Letter to Lady Welby, CP 8.328, 1904)"
>>

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: that the only way to fully understand something is to construct it.


On 12/29/2012 12:29 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 29 Dec 2012, at 17:34, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Stephen P. King

There was also a wise italian philosopher centuries ago who
had a major premiss, namely, that the only way to
fully understand something is to construct it.


OK. That is intuitionism, or constructivism. Proving is constructing, 
for intuitionist. This is a form of solipsism, because we cannot 
"construct the other". It is quite related to the 1p. It is also 
related to the fact that Aristotelism is intuitive and Platonism is  
counter-intuitive.
With comp we keep the "solipsism" for the (our) epistemological 1p 
view, but we justify it from the 3p or 0p view from outside.


Bruno


Hi Bruno,

I am OK with that! It is intuitionistic because, I conjecture, of 
the fallibility of finite minds: we can only know what we might be able 
to understand. ;-) In computational terms, we can see this as how one 
computation can emulate another. Can I emulate a person that has 
understanding that I do not have on my own? Yes, but very carefully...
I like how you don't think of solipsism as something to be avoided 
at all costs, but instead see it as a default position. I see knowledge 
in a similar way but from the opposite direction: as individual entities 
we come to know truths by a relation between internal construction (the 
1p) and the external demonstration (3/0p). This relation is what I am 
describing as a bisimulation! I have adapted the equivalence relation of 
bisimulation (taken from computer science) and use it as a 
transformational relation that is the equivalence in some limit. This 
comes from my philosophical assumption that Becoming is fundamental.
Have you had a chance to read any of the material on process 
philosophy?


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Re: that the only way to fully understand something is to construct it.



On 29 Dec 2012, at 17:34, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Stephen P. King

There was also a wise italian philosopher centuries ago who
had a major premiss, namely, that the only way to
fully understand something is to construct it.


OK. That is intuitionism, or constructivism. Proving is constructing,  
for intuitionist. This is a form of solipsism, because we cannot  
"construct the other". It is quite related to the 1p. It is also  
related to the fact that Aristotelism is intuitive and Platonism is   
counter-intuitive.
With comp we keep the "solipsism" for the (our) epistemological 1p  
view, but we justify it from the 3p or 0p view from outside.


Bruno







[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/29/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Stephen P. King
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-29, 11:11:50
Subject: Re: Show me, don't tell me


On 12/29/2012 10:09 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

I'm trying to recall (but can't) a particular author
who often writes what appears to be a text, but it's
really only an introduction. He never gets to the point
he seemed to be headed toward.

Others seem to have gone to the same composition class.
I have read entire books where the author talks "about"
a subject, but never gets to the meat of the subject.

IMHO the only crucial rule of composition (or of writing a play
or a poem or a letter or any essay) to me is

"Show me, don't tell me".

Dear Roger,

  Are ideas actual objects *in the world* outside of us or are they  
purely internal mental constructs?  Have you ever seen the  
expression: "Don't look at the finger, look at what it is  
pointing."? We must never forget that a representation of an idea is  
itself an idea... A remark about a remark about a remark, is still a  
remark and has meaning - if one can grasp it... I was trying to  
illustrate a concept, to "show it"...


--  
Onward!


Stephen

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Re: that the only way to fully understand something is to construct it.


On 12/29/2012 11:34 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

There was also a wise italian philosopher centuries ago who
had a major premiss, namely, that the only way to
fully understand something is to construct it.


Dear Roger,

Yes, we must construct it for ourselves to fully understand it. I 
cannot construct it for others, thus my method is as it is. I am merely 
attempting to be consistent. ;-)




[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/29/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Stephen P. King
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-29, 11:11:50
Subject: Re: Show me, don't tell me


On 12/29/2012 10:09 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

I'm trying to recall (but can't) a particular author
who often writes what appears to be a text, but it's
really only an introduction. He never gets to the point
he seemed to be headed toward.

Others seem to have gone to the same composition class.
I have read entire books where the author talks "about"
a subject, but never gets to the meat of the subject.

IMHO the only crucial rule of composition (or of writing a play
or a poem or a letter or any essay) to me is

"Show me, don't tell me".

Dear Roger,

Are ideas actual objects *in the world* outside of us or are they purely internal mental 
constructs?  Have you ever seen the expression: "Don't look at the finger, look at what it is 
pointing."? We must never forget that a representation of an idea is itself an idea... A 
remark about a remark about a remark, is still a remark and has meaning - if one can grasp it... I 
was trying to illustrate a concept, to "show it"...

--
Onward!

Stephen




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Stephen


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Re: Three things that one cannot prove or disprove

2012-12-29 Thread John Clark

On Wed, Dec 26, 2012 Roger Clough  wrote:

> Three things that one cannot prove or disprove
> 1. That God exists or does not exist.
>

If God exists then His existence should be obvious to a blind man in a fog
bank, but it is not and the only reason that could be is that God has
engineered things in such a way that we can not find a proof. Being
omnipotent God certainly has the ability to fool us just as we have the
ability to tease a puppy, but to me it would seem to be a very very odd
thing for Him to do and indicative of a sadistic personality; some would
say there is evidence for this in the Old Testament where Jehovah is the
most unpleasant character in all of fiction. On the other hand it's
childishly easy to understand why a human being, like a priest, would push
the idea that God is deliberately preventing us from proving He exists.

> > 2. That I exist or do not exist.
>

I don't need to prove I exist to myself because I have something better,
direct experience; and even if I had such a proof it would not convince
you, if you don't think I exist then you wouldn't think the proof I handed
you existed either.

> > 3. That computers can be conscious or not.
>

There is a fourth thing that I cannot prove or disprove, Roger Clough is
conscious.

  John K Clark

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that the only way to fully understand something is to construct it.

Hi Stephen P. King 

There was also a wise italian philosopher centuries ago who 
had a major premiss, namely, that the only way to  
fully understand something is to construct it.   


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 
12/29/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen 
- Receiving the following content -  
From: Stephen P. King  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-12-29, 11:11:50 
Subject: Re: Show me, don't tell me 


On 12/29/2012 10:09 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 

Hi Bruno Marchal  

I'm trying to recall (but can't) a particular author  
who often writes what appears to be a text, but it's  
really only an introduction. He never gets to the point 
he seemed to be headed toward. 

Others seem to have gone to the same composition class. 
I have read entire books where the author talks "about" 
a subject, but never gets to the meat of the subject. 

IMHO the only crucial rule of composition (or of writing a play 
or a poem or a letter or any essay) to me is  

"Show me, don't tell me". 

Dear Roger, 

   Are ideas actual objects *in the world* outside of us or are they purely 
internal mental constructs?  Have you ever seen the expression: "Don't look at 
the finger, look at what it is pointing."? We must never forget that a 
representation of an idea is itself an idea... A remark about a remark about a 
remark, is still a remark and has meaning - if one can grasp it... I was trying 
to illustrate a concept, to "show it"... 

--  
Onward! 

Stephen

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Re: Re: Three things that one cannot prove or disprove

Hi Stephen P. King

Although I may have criticized you, I think you are very wise
in your remarks about reason (Bruno Also). Thanks.  

Reasoning is probably more frequently conducted by analogy than 
we care to admit.

[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 
12/29/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen 
- Receiving the following content -  
From: Stephen P. King  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-12-29, 10:38:18 
Subject: Re: Three things that one cannot prove or disprove 


On 12/29/2012 7:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 



On 29 Dec 2012, at 03:20, Stephen P. King wrote: 


On 12/28/2012 7:46 PM, meekerdb wrote: 

On 12/28/2012 4:09 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:  
On 12/28/2012 1:29 PM, meekerdb wrote: 

On 12/28/2012 4:45 AM, Roger Clough wrote:  
Hi meekerdb  

Can you suggest a scientific method to prove or disprove 
the solipsism puzzle ? 


Everybody solves it by the scientific method: they observe other people, they 
create a model in which other people are like themselves, they test the model 
and it works.  Problem solved - except for people who don't know what the 
scientific method is. 

Brent 

Hi Brent, 

This is how things actually work! We don't need to have an exact definition 
of this or that, we operate with FAPP models and 'as if' definitions, we don't 
need exactness, so why is it treated as so important? I invite you to check out 
any of Jon Barwise' books, I like The Liar the most. It is a nice change of 
pace from the ordinary treatments of logic and semantics and might help you 
understand this issue of 'as if'. 


What makes you think I don't understand it? 

Brent 


Oh, well good, please go on and finish the point that you where making with 
: "Everybody solves it [the solipsism puzzle] by the scientific method: they 
observe other people, they create a model in which other people are like 
themselves, they test the model and it works.  Problem solved - except for 
people who don't know what the scientific method is. ... " 




Stephen, 


Frankly. 


You cannot make a comment by saying "read that book and you will understand". 
You must make your point explicit (and you can add: see that book which 
inspired my point). If not, you are just saying "I know, you don't", and you 
stop to appear like the beginners/student you pretended to be. You appear as 
the one using argument per authority. 


I would be Brent, I would be rather angry. You did this to many other people 
(including me) too, and it just doesn't work. Always make your point explicit, 
and refer to the book or paper if you have use some idea there, but gives the 
idea explicitly. If not, it is an authoritative argument of the form "I know 
better than you". Only bad philosophers and fundamentalist do this. 


In this precise case, I don't follow your point, and I don't see how Barwise's 
book can help. Nor do I see that book as a change from ordinary logic. 


Bruno 




Dear Bruno, 

Please re-read the content of the thread above. 

I did exactly what you are asking, but I could have added another sentence 
to my initial remark: "There is no need for a priori knowledge of 'scientific 
method'." So to restate my remark on Brent's comment above: We do not need 
exact definitions of models to reason, all we actually use is 'for all 
practical purpose' and 'as if' models to come to conclusions and thus we can 
see the same at work in solving the solipsism puzzle. Not having an explicit a 
priori synthetic knowledge of 'the scientific method' in the sense of a 
memorized sequence of symbols such as "...systematic observation, measurement, 
and experiment, and the formulation, testing, and modification of hypotheses." 
does not change a thing. It does, however, allow some people that are skilled 
in symbol manipulation to feel superior to others that are not so well endowed. 
 

Brent seemed to take for granted this point in his remark to Roger's 
request and seemed to be merely casting aspersions. I then tried to cast 
Brent's remark in a different light to make a point. The reference to Barwise's 
book was, as you write, "..add: see that book which inspired my point.." 
Barwise, with his co-writers, does a magnificent job, IMHO, of illustrating how 
non-well foundedness and reflexivity allow for understanding and knowledge to 
occur in a world where entities are not omniscient. We are fallible, finite and 
definitely not all skilled in linguistics. Some of us have disabilities and can 
still think deeply about complicated ideas. ;-) 



--  
Onward! 

Stephen

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Re: Show me, don't tell me


On 12/29/2012 10:09 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

I'm trying to recall (but can't) a particular author
who often writes what appears to be a text, but it's
really only an introduction. He never gets to the point
he seemed to be headed toward.

Others seem to have gone to the same composition class.
I have read entire books where the author talks "about"
a subject, but never gets to the meat of the subject.

IMHO the only crucial rule of composition (or of writing a play
or a poem or a letter or any essay) to me is

"Show me, don't tell me".

Dear Roger,

   Are ideas actual objects *in the world* outside of us or are they 
purely internal mental constructs?  Have you ever seen the expression: 
"Don't look at the finger, look at what it is pointing."? We must never 
forget that a representation of an idea is itself an idea... A remark 
about a remark about a remark, is still a remark and has meaning - if 
one can grasp it... I was trying to illustrate a concept, to "show it"...


--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Three things that one cannot prove or disprove


On 12/29/2012 7:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 29 Dec 2012, at 03:20, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 12/28/2012 7:46 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/28/2012 4:09 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/28/2012 1:29 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/28/2012 4:45 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi meekerdb
Can you suggest a scientific method to prove or disprove
the solipsism puzzle ?


Everybody solves it by the scientific method: they observe other 
people, they create a model in which other people are like 
themselves, they test the model and it works.  Problem solved - 
except for people who don't know what the scientific method is.


Brent

Hi Brent,

This is how things actually work! We don't need to have an 
exact definition of this or that, we operate with FAPP models and 
'as if' definitions, we don't need exactness, so why is it treated 
as so important? I invite you to check out any of Jon Barwise' 
books, I like/The Liar/ 
 
the most. It is a nice change of pace from the ordinary treatments 
of logic and semantics and might help you understand this issue of 
'as if'.


What makes you think I don't understand it?

Brent


Oh, well good, please go on and finish the point that you where 
making with : "Everybody solves it [the solipsism puzzle] by the 
scientific method: they observe other people, they create a model in 
which other people are like themselves, they test the model and it 
works.  Problem solved - except for people who don't know what the 
scientific method is. ... "




Stephen,

Frankly.

You cannot make a comment by saying "read that book and you will 
understand". You must make your point explicit (and you can add: see 
that book which inspired my point). If not, you are just saying "I 
know, you don't", and you stop to appear like the beginners/student 
you pretended to be. You appear as the one using argument per authority.


I would be Brent, I would be rather angry. You did this to many other 
people (including me) too, and it just doesn't work. Always make your 
point explicit, and refer to the book or paper if you have use some 
idea there, but gives the idea explicitly. If not, it is an 
authoritative argument of the form "I know better than you". Only bad 
philosophers and fundamentalist do this.


In this precise case, I don't follow your point, and I don't see how 
Barwise's book can help. Nor do I see that book as a change from 
ordinary logic.


Bruno



Dear Bruno,

Please re-read the content of the thread above.

I did exactly what you are asking, but I could have added another 
sentence to my initial remark: "There is no need for a priori knowledge 
of 'scientific method'." So to restate my remark on Brent's comment 
above: We do not need exact definitions of models to reason, all we 
actually use is 'for all practical purpose' and 'as if' models to come 
to conclusions and thus we can see the same at work in solving the 
solipsism puzzle. Not having an explicit a priori synthetic knowledge of 
'the scientific method' in the sense of a memorized sequence of symbols 
such as "...systematic observation, measurement, and experiment, and the 
formulation, testing, and modification ofhypotheses 
." does not change a thing. It 
does, however, allow some people that are skilled in symbol manipulation 
to feel superior to others that are not so well endowed.


Brent seemed to take for granted this point in his remark to 
Roger's request and seemed to be merely casting aspersions. I then tried 
to cast Brent's remark in a different light to make a point. The 
reference to Barwise's book was, as you write, "..add: see that book 
which inspired my point.." Barwise, with his co-writers, does a 
magnificent job, IMHO, of illustrating how non-well foundedness and 
reflexivity allow for understanding and knowledge to occur in a world 
where entities are not omniscient. We are fallible, finite and 
definitely not all skilled in linguistics. Some of us have disabilities 
and can still think deeply about complicated ideas. ;-)



--
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Stephen

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Re: Re: Three things that one cannot prove or disprove

Hi Stathis Papaioannou

You could do something like that.  


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/29/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Stathis Papaioannou 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-12-29, 07:56:07
Subject: Re: Three things that one cannot prove or disprove


On Sat, Dec 29, 2012 at 6:12 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> It's possible to prove that computers can be conscious if it can be
>> proved that the physical movement of the parts of the brain can be
>> simulated by a computer.
>
>
> Assuming you can prove consciousness is related to those physical movements.
> OK.

It goes like this:

1. Assume consciousness is caused by movement in the brain.
2. Assume that the brain movement is computable.
3. Then consciousness is computable.
(4. But if consciousness is computable, then the physical world must
be a product of consciousness rather than the other way around.)


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Brain/brainmind/mind

Hi Bruno Marchal  

I think you tend to combine 1p (the nature of the quale or input)   
with 2p (how that feels, which I think should be very personal ). 

These are often confused, some people saying that quale 
is 1p,  others that quale is the actual feeling (2p). 

I think the categories are quite different, however:

1p (brain) is the physical input signal (brain)

2p (brainmind) is the signal while being processed in the (brainmind) 
as it attempt to recognize the signal from memory
 (past experience)


3p (mind) is mental (rational) identification of the perception and 
its implications 



[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 
12/29/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen 
- Receiving the following content -  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-12-29, 07:20:07 
Subject: Re: Escaping from the world of 3p Flatland 




On 29 Dec 2012, at 11:04, Roger Clough wrote: 


Hi Russell Standish  

2p is clearly needed for perception, as explained by Peirce. 


That kind of 2p can be explained in term of 3p and 1p. I don't think it is 
fundamental, and we should try to stay as simple as possible. I do agree with 
Peirce, I think, but I find the notion of 2p quite non pedagogical, and also 
unrelated to the use of the "you", that is the grammatical 2p, where on the 
contrary 1p and 3p refers easily to grammar. 


But that's only my opinion, and it concerns only pedagogy, 


Bruno 







[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 
12/29/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen 
- Receiving the following content -  
From: Russell Standish  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-12-29, 01:21:53 
Subject: Re: Re: Escaping from the world of 3p Flatland 


On Fri, Dec 28, 2012 at 08:29:52AM -0500, Roger Clough wrote: 
> Hi Russell Standish  
>  
> 2p should be a necessary part of comp, espcially if it uses synthetic logic. 
> It doesn't seem to be needed for deductive logic, however. 
>  
> The following equivalences should hold between comp 
> and Peirce's logical categories: 
>  
> 3p = Thirdness or III 
> 2p = Secondness or II 
> 1p = Firstness or I. 
>  
> Comp seems to only use analytic or deductive logic, 
> while Peirce's categories are epistemological (synthetic 
> logic) categories, in which secondness is an integral part. 
> So . 
>  
> Here's what Peirce has to say about his categorioes: 
>  
> http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/secondness.html 
>  
>  
> "Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is,  
> positively and without reference to anything else.  
>  
> Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is,  
> with respect to a second but regardless of any third.  
>  
> Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is,  
> in bringing a second and third into relation to each other."  
> (A Letter to Lady Welby, CP 8.328, 1904)" 
>  

Thanks for the definition, but how does that relate to 1p and 3p? I 
cannot see anything in the definitions of firstness and thirdness that 
relate to subjectivity and objectivity. 

As I said before, I do not even know what 2p could be. 


--  

 
Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
Principal, High Performance Coders 
Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au 
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
 

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Show me, don't tell me

Hi Bruno Marchal 

I'm trying to recall (but can't) a particular author 
who often writes what appears to be a text, but it's 
really only an introduction. He never gets to the point
he seemed to be headed toward.

Others seem to have gone to the same composition class.
I have read entire books where the author talks "about"
a subject, but never gets to the meat of the subject.

IMHO the only crucial rule of composition (or of writing a play
or a poem or a letter or any essay) to me is 

"Show me, don't tell me".


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 
12/29/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen 
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-12-29, 07:07:24 
Subject: Re: Three things that one cannot prove or disprove 




On 29 Dec 2012, at 03:20, Stephen P. King wrote: 


On 12/28/2012 7:46 PM, meekerdb wrote: 

On 12/28/2012 4:09 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: 
On 12/28/2012 1:29 PM, meekerdb wrote: 

On 12/28/2012 4:45 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 
Hi meekerdb 

Can you suggest a scientific method to prove or disprove 
the solipsism puzzle ? 


Everybody solves it by the scientific method: they observe other people, they 
create a model in which other people are like themselves, they test the model 
and it works. Problem solved - except for people who don't know what the 
scientific method is. 

Brent 

Hi Brent, 

This is how things actually work! We don't need to have an exact definition 
of this or that, we operate with FAPP models and 'as if' definitions, we don't 
need exactness, so why is it treated as so important? I invite you to check out 
any of Jon Barwise' books, I like The Liar the most. It is a nice change of 
pace from the ordinary treatments of logic and semantics and might help you 
understand this issue of 'as if'. 


What makes you think I don't understand it? 

Brent 


Oh, well good, please go on and finish the point that you where making with 
: "Everybody solves it [the solipsism puzzle] by the scientific method: they 
observe other people, they create a model in which other people are like 
themselves, they test the model and it works. Problem solved - except for 
people who don't know what the scientific method is. ... " 




Stephen, 


Frankly. 


You cannot make a comment by saying "read that book and you will understand". 
You must make your point explicit (and you can add: see that book which 
inspired my point). If not, you are just saying "I know, you don't", and you 
stop to appear like the beginners/student you pretended to be. You appear as 
the one using argument per authority. 


I would be Brent, I would be rather angry. You did this to many other people 
(including me) too, and it just doesn't work. Always make your point explicit, 
and refer to the book or paper if you have use some idea there, but gives the 
idea explicitly. If not, it is an authoritative argument of the form "I know 
better than you". Only bad philosophers and fundamentalist do this. 


In this precise case, I don't follow your point, and I don't see how Barwise's 
book can help. Nor do I see that book as a change from ordinary logic. 


Bruno 




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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A few definitions of the categories and two examples of their use (in perception)

The classic example 

3p= thirdness= is when I react to the pain 

2p = secondness = is when I feel the pain 

1p = firstness = is when somebody stick me with a pin (Quale) 


Also

3p is when I know and/or say that the coffee tastes bad (mind or reason) 

2p is when I am tasting something funny about the coffee. (feeling or sensing) 

1p is when I take a sip of coffee.(body-QUALE- input to sensing nerves) 

---


A Few Definitions of the categories

http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/newlist/nl-frame.htm


The Categories as used in perception:

I 1p--Quality (Reference to a Ground), 
II 2p-- Relation (Reference to a Correlate), 
II 3p--Representation (Reference to an Interpretant), 

I 1p-- Quale (that which refers to a ground), 
II 2p--Relate (that which refers to a ground and correlate, )
III 3p--Representamen (that which refers to ground, correlate, and 
interpretant. )


http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/secondness.html

"Careful analysis shows that to the three grades of valency of indecomposable 
concepts correspond 
three classes of characters or predicates. 

Firstly come " firstnesses," or positive internal characters of the subject in 
itself; 

secondly come "secondnesses," or brute actions of one subject or substance on 
another, 
regardless of law or of any third subject; 

thirdly comes "thirdnesses," or the mental or quasi-mental influence of one 
subject on 
another relatively to a third." ('Pragmatism', CP 5.469, 1907) 



Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, positively and 
without reference to anything else. 
Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, with respect to 
a second but regardless of any third. 
Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in bringing a 
second and third into relation to each other." 



>> 
>> The following equivalences should hold >> 

>> 3p = Thirdness or III 
>> 2p = Secondness or II 
>> 1p = Firstness or I. 
>> 
>> Comp seems to only use analytic or deductive logic, 
>> while Peirce's categories are epistemological (synthetic 
>> logic) categories, in which secondness is an integral part. 
>> So . 
>> 
>> Here's what Peirce has to say about his categorioes: 
>> 
>> http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/secondness.html 
>> 
>> 
>> "Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, 
>> positively and without reference to anything else. 
>> 
>> Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, 
>> with respect to a second but regardless of any third. 
>> 
>> Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, 
>> in bringing a second and third into relation to each other." 
>> (A Letter to Lady Welby, CP 8.328, 1904)" 
>> 







 

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Re: Three things that one cannot prove or disprove

2012-12-29 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Sat, Dec 29, 2012 at 9:41 AM, John Mikes  wrote:
> Stathis!!! (See after your remark)  -  John M
>
>
> On Thu, Dec 27, 2012 at 7:38 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>> It's possible to prove that computers can be conscious if it can be
>> proved that the physical movement of the parts of the brain can be
>> simulated by a computer.
>
> 
>>
>> Firstly: did we agree in a working identification of 'conscious'?

It's a mysterious thing you know you have when you have it. For the
purposes of this discussion that suffices.

> Secondly: is such 'conscious' phenomenon PHYSICAL?

It appears to be associated with or supervene on or be caused by
certain brain processes, since when those brain processes are present
consciousness (whatever it is) is also present, and when those brain
processes are not present consciousness is not present.

> Thirdly: do we know ALL (even restricted to 'physical(?)') movements of
> (all) the parts of the brain involved in mental actiity to state ALL their
> movements can be simulated by a computer?

No, we can't be sure. There may be non-computable physical processes
in the universe. But the evidence is that physics is computable.

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Three things that one cannot prove or disprove

2012-12-29 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Sat, Dec 29, 2012 at 6:12 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> It's possible to prove that computers can be conscious if it can be
>> proved that the physical movement of the parts of the brain can be
>> simulated by a computer.
>
>
> Assuming you can prove consciousness is related to those physical movements.
> OK.

It goes like this:

1. Assume consciousness is caused by movement in the brain.
2. Assume that the brain movement is computable.
3. Then consciousness is computable.
(4. But if consciousness is computable, then the physical world must
be a product of consciousness rather than the other way around.)

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Escaping from the world of 3p Flatland

On 29 Dec 2012, at 11:04, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Russell Standish

2p is clearly needed for perception, as explained by Peirce.

That kind of 2p can be explained in term of 3p and 1p. I don't think  
it is fundamental, and we should try to stay as simple as possible. I  
do agree with Peirce, I think, but I find the notion of 2p quite non  
pedagogical, and also unrelated to the use of the "you", that is the  
grammatical 2p, where on the contrary 1p and 3p refers easily to  
grammar.

But that's only my opinion, and it concerns only pedagogy,

Bruno

[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/29/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Russell Standish
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-29, 01:21:53
Subject: Re: Re: Escaping from the world of 3p Flatland

On Fri, Dec 28, 2012 at 08:29:52AM -0500, Roger Clough wrote:
> Hi Russell Standish
>
> 2p should be a necessary part of comp, espcially if it uses  
synthetic logic.

> It doesn't seem to be needed for deductive logic, however.
>
> The following equivalences should hold between comp
> and Peirce's logical categories:
>
> 3p = Thirdness or III
> 2p = Secondness or II
> 1p = Firstness or I.
>
> Comp seems to only use analytic or deductive logic,
> while Peirce's categories are epistemological (synthetic
> logic) categories, in which secondness is an integral part.
> So .
>
> Here's what Peirce has to say about his categorioes:
>
> http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/secondness.html
>
>
> "Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is,
> positively and without reference to anything else.
>
> Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is,
> with respect to a second but regardless of any third.
>
> Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is,
> in bringing a second and third into relation to each other."
> (A Letter to Lady Welby, CP 8.328, 1904)"
>

Thanks for the definition, but how does that relate to 1p and 3p? I
cannot see anything in the definitions of firstness and thirdness that
relate to subjectivity and objectivity.

As I said before, I do not even know what 2p could be.

--

Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au

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Re: Escaping from the world of 3p Flatland

On 29 Dec 2012, at 07:21, Russell Standish wrote:

On Fri, Dec 28, 2012 at 08:29:52AM -0500, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Russell Standish

2p should be a necessary part of comp, espcially if it uses
synthetic logic.

It doesn't seem to be needed for deductive logic, however.

The following equivalences should hold between comp
and Peirce's logical categories:

3p = Thirdness or III
2p = Secondness or II
1p = Firstness or I.

Comp seems to only use analytic or deductive logic,
while Peirce's categories are epistemological (synthetic
logic) categories, in which secondness is an integral part.
So .

Here's what Peirce has to say about his categorioes:

http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/secondness.html

"Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is,
positively and without reference to anything else.

Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is,
with respect to a second but regardless of any third.

Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is,
in bringing a second and third into relation to each other."
(A Letter to Lady Welby, CP 8.328, 1904)"

Thanks for the definition, but how does that relate to 1p and 3p? I
cannot see anything in the definitions of firstness and thirdness that
relate to subjectivity and objectivity.

As I said before, I do not even know what 2p could be.

3p is when we agree that the coffee is too hot.
1p is when we find it tastes very bad.
2p is when your wife ask you to clean the coffee machine.

Bruno

Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au

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Re: Three things that one cannot prove or disprove



On 29 Dec 2012, at 03:20, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 12/28/2012 7:46 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/28/2012 4:09 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 12/28/2012 1:29 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/28/2012 4:45 AM, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi meekerdb

Can you suggest a scientific method to prove or disprove
the solipsism puzzle ?


Everybody solves it by the scientific method: they observe other  
people, they create a model in which other people are like  
themselves, they test the model and it works.  Problem solved -  
except for people who don't know what the scientific method is.


Brent

Hi Brent,

This is how things actually work! We don't need to have an  
exact definition of this or that, we operate with FAPP models and  
'as if' definitions, we don't need exactness, so why is it treated  
as so important? I invite you to check out any of Jon Barwise'  
books, I like The Liar the most. It is a nice change of pace from  
the ordinary treatments of logic and semantics and might help you  
understand this issue of 'as if'.


What makes you think I don't understand it?

Brent


Oh, well good, please go on and finish the point that you where  
making with : "Everybody solves it [the solipsism puzzle] by the  
scientific method: they observe other people, they create a model in  
which other people are like themselves, they test the model and it  
works.  Problem solved - except for people who don't know what the  
scientific method is. ... "




Stephen,

Frankly.

You cannot make a comment by saying "read that book and you will  
understand". You must make your point explicit (and you can add: see  
that book which inspired my point). If not, you are just saying "I  
know, you don't", and you stop to appear like the beginners/student  
you pretended to be. You appear as the one using argument per authority.


I would be Brent, I would be rather angry. You did this to many other  
people (including me) too, and it just doesn't work. Always make your  
point explicit, and refer to the book or paper if you have use some  
idea there, but gives the idea explicitly. If not, it is an  
authoritative argument of the form "I know better than you". Only bad  
philosophers and fundamentalist do this.


In this precise case, I don't follow your point, and I don't see how  
Barwise's book can help. Nor do I see that book as a change from  
ordinary logic.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Three things that one cannot prove or disprove



On 28 Dec 2012, at 20:37, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi meekerdb

How do you know-- truly know-- that other
people are like yourself ? What proof can you offer ?


"proving" something makes sense only in a theory, but we never prove a  
theory, we accept or not the evidences we can have.


Example:

We cannot prove that there is a physical universe, but we have tuns of  
evidence for that.
We cannot prove that there is a primitive physical universe, and we  
don't have evidence for that.
We cannot prove that we are conscious, but each of us have direct  
strong evidence for that.
We cannot prove that others are conscious, but we have evidences for  
that (making the theory "humans are conscious" more simple and elegant  
than solipsism).


The problem is that many media use the term "proof" easily in the two  
senses (logical, and inferential).


In a context like the mind-body problem, we have to use the two  
notions of "proof", and so it is better to define "proof" by a  
sequence of formula deducible from some axioms/assumption/hypotheses  
(the theory), and to use "inference" for the "bet" on the assumptions,  
and its consequences, of the theory.


Proving is always theoretical. Inference is always a question of  
practice, but this does not mean that "inference" are not rational.


OK.







[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/28/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: meekerdb
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-28, 13:29:55
Subject: Re: Three things that one cannot prove or disprove

On 12/28/2012 4:45 AM, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi meekerdb

Can you suggest a scientific method to prove or disprove
the solipsism puzzle ?


Everybody solves it by the scientific method: they observe other  
people, they create a model in which other people are like  
themselves, they test the model and it works.  Problem solved -  
except for people who don't know what the scientific method is.


Brent

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The categories once more


The categories once more

Firstness is emptiness, loneliness
Secondness is joining an internet dating site looking for a girlfriend 
Thirdness is finally finding the right girlfriend 


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 
12/29/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen

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Re: Re: Re: Escaping from the world of 3p Flatland

Hi Russell Standish 

2p is clearly needed for perception, as explained by Peirce.

[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/29/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Russell Standish 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-12-29, 01:21:53
Subject: Re: Re: Escaping from the world of 3p Flatland


On Fri, Dec 28, 2012 at 08:29:52AM -0500, Roger Clough wrote:
> Hi Russell Standish 
> 
> 2p should be a necessary part of comp, espcially if it uses synthetic logic.
> It doesn't seem to be needed for deductive logic, however.
> 
> The following equivalences should hold between comp
> and Peirce's logical categories:
> 
> 3p = Thirdness or III
> 2p = Secondness or II
> 1p = Firstness or I.
> 
> Comp seems to only use analytic or deductive logic,
> while Peirce's categories are epistemological (synthetic
> logic) categories, in which secondness is an integral part.
> So .
> 
> Here's what Peirce has to say about his categorioes:
> 
> http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/secondness.html
> 
> 
> "Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, 
> positively and without reference to anything else. 
> 
> Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, 
> with respect to a second but regardless of any third. 
> 
> Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, 
> in bringing a second and third into relation to each other." 
> (A Letter to Lady Welby, CP 8.328, 1904)"
> 

Thanks for the definition, but how does that relate to 1p and 3p? I
cannot see anything in the definitions of firstness and thirdness that
relate to subjectivity and objectivity.

As I said before, I do not even know what 2p could be.


-- 


Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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The use of 2p in perception