Re: Conscious reply to Stathis
On Sun, Dec 30, 2012 at 10:17 AM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: Stathis, I am afraid you took the easy way out. Let me interject in ITALICS into your post-text below JohnM On Sat, Dec 29, 2012 at 8:05 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Dec 29, 2012 at 9:41 AM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: Stathis!!! (See after your remark) - John M On Thu, Dec 27, 2012 at 7:38 PM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: It's possible to prove that computers can be conscious if it can be proved that the physical movement of the parts of the brain can be simulated by a computer. Firstly: did we agree in a working identification of 'conscious'? It's a mysterious thing you know you have when you have it. For the purposes of this discussion that suffices. Please do not denigrate THIS DISCUSSION! you THINK you know, when you THINK you have it. I rather state my ignorance. Are you unsure if you're conscious? Secondly: is such 'conscious' phenomenon PHYSICAL? It appears to be associated with or supervene on or be caused by certain brain processes, since when those brain processes are present consciousness (whatever it is) is also present, and when those brain processes are not present consciousness is not present. ASSOCIATED WITH, or SUPERVENE ON? that is our human addition to ideas we generate. Caused by is totally imaginary. Do you deny that there is even an APPEARANCE of an association or supervenience or causation? Thirdly: do we know ALL (even restricted to 'physical(?)') movements of (all) the parts of the brain involved in mental actiity to state ALL their movements can be simulated by a computer? No, we can't be sure. There may be non-computable physical processes in the universe. But the evidence is that physics is computable. What I meant was different: in the present phase of our gathering of information we must be sure NOT to know ALL movements of mental activity so our (embryonic) computers cannot simulate them all. Is your evidence based on our nomenclature of a computable physics? In my (tentative) ID for Ccness (response to relations) non-brainfunction- based responses (call them physical?) are also observable. Hence my questioning of the adjective 'conscious'. - T H A T - may be PHYSICAL (ha ha) - of course also 'mental' (=ideational). That the brain is computable means only that the physics determining the brain's observable behaviour can be simulated by a computer with an arbitrarily large amount of memory. But nothing is implied about the technical feasibility of this. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
1p, 3p and the black box of 2p
Hi Bruno Marchal
.
IMHO, which you don't have to agree with, 3p is completely differnt from 1p
Here's how I see the whole picture:
1p = physical input signal from outside world into brain - (2p = the
mind's black box of mental (not brain) signal processing) ---
--- 3p = physical signal output to outside world through brain.
1p = physical input of outside world as part of the brain.
2p = black box mental signal processing of 1p
3p = physical output from 2p as through the brain to outside world.
[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/30/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. - Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-29, 14:36:58
Subject: Re: A few definitions of the categories and two examples of their
use(in perception)
On 29 Dec 2012, at 16:07, Roger Clough wrote:
The classic example
3p= thirdness= is when I react to the pain
Hmm.. this is the idea, except that with comp, this will be only plural_1p. But
no problem as, locally, first person plural behaves like a 3p notion. That is
indeed why we confuse them and believe the mind comes from matter activity,
when eventually matter activity is a way mind articulate the information about
its the most probable computations.
2p = secondness = is when I feel the pain
1p = firstness = is when somebody stick me with a pin (Quale)
Is not I feel pain a quale?
Also
3p is when I know and/or say that the coffee tastes bad (mind or reason)
? If you can use reason to explain a taste, I will ask you the method.
In french we say popularly that about taste and color we don't argue. (Des
go?s et des couleurs on ne discute pas).
2p is when I am tasting something funny about the coffee. (feeling or sensing)
I will ask you for the coffee recipe.
Funny?
Cannabis, salvia or even alcohol, I can imagine. But Coffee!?!
1p is when I take a sip of coffee.(body-QUALE- input to sensing nerves)
OK, I see why you say this.
Keep in mind in UDA 1p is just defined by the content of the diary of the guy
or girl annihilated and reconstituted, with their diary, as opposed to the
diary of an external observer (3p). In AUDA the 1p is defined by a correct
belief with respect to a probable situation.
Just to help you for other threads.
Bruno
---
A Few Definitions of the categories
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/newlist/nl-frame.htm
The Categories as used in perception:
I 1p--Quality (Reference to a Ground),
II 2p-- Relation (Reference to a Correlate),
II 3p--Representation (Reference to an Interpretant),
I 1p-- Quale (that which refers to a ground),
II 2p--Relate (that which refers to a ground and correlate, )
III 3p--Representamen (that which refers to ground, correlate, and
interpretant. )
http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/secondness.html
Careful analysis shows that to the three grades of valency of indecomposable
concepts correspond
three classes of characters or predicates.
Firstly come firstnesses, or positive internal characters of the subject in
itself;
secondly come secondnesses, or brute actions of one subject or substance on
another,
regardless of law or of any third subject;
thirdly comes thirdnesses, or the mental or quasi-mental influence of one
subject on
another relatively to a third. ('Pragmatism', CP 5.469, 1907)
Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, positively and
without reference to anything else.
Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, with respect to
a second but regardless of any third.
Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in bringing a
second and third into relation to each other.
The following equivalences should hold
3p = Thirdness or III
2p = Secondness or II
1p = Firstness or I.
Comp seems to only use analytic or deductive logic,
while Peirce's categories are epistemological (synthetic
logic) categories, in which secondness is an integral part.
So .
Here's what Peirce has to say about his categorioes:
http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/secondness.html
Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is,
positively and without reference to anything else.
Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is,
with respect to a second but regardless of any third.
Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is,
in bringing a second and third into relation to each other.
(A Letter to Lady Welby, CP 8.328, 1904)
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The Black Box Consciousness Model [Objective Brain/Body-Subjective Mind/Mental-Objective Brain/Body].
The Black Box Consciousness Model [Objective Brain/Body-Subjective Mind/Mental-Objective Brain/Body]. Here's how I now see the whole mindbrain consciousness complex: I (physical input signal, brain/body, objective) --- II (Consciousness [nonphysical black box signal processing] , mind/mental, subjective) III (physical output signal, brain/body, objective) I= Firstness (1p) = physical input signal from outside world into brain - II=Secondness (2p) = the mind's black box of mental (not brain) signal processing --- III=Thirdness (3p) = physical signal output to outside world through brain. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/30/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. - Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: A few definitions of the categories and two examples of their use (in perception)
On Sat, Dec 29, 2012 at 10:08 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 12/29/2012 12:32 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: In french we say popularly that about taste and color we don't argue. (Des goûts et des couleurs on ne discute pas). That's because Francophones have no taste, they just try to sell the notion that they do for marketing ;) In Germany this is more ambiguous, as we have the equivalent statement but also its negation: a popular turn-of-phrase is Über Geschmack lässt sich bekanntlich streiten. Roughly translates On matters taste, we can argue/negotiate/dispute, which fits with the fuzzy linguistic statement above. I thought every body just quoted the latin, De gustibus non est disputandum., which is literally the opposite of the German (the Romans were more tolerant?) but probably means the same. It does go both ways in German usage. Is somebody tolerant for letting other views or tastes prevail, like tolerance of bad music or political corruption? Or is somebody tolerant for engaging other views verbally, facing the possibility that one's views might be wrong, therefore tolerating the insecurity of exposure and dispute (unlike most forums and lists)? A tolerant attitude has to include, in this frame, not merely accepting other tastes' potential nonsense, but also accepting possibility of one's own bad taste, engaging such possibility by discussion and interaction without shame. I guess capacity of aesthetic judgement, what taste boils down to both internally and in our ability to convey such through some language, formal or not, or means of interaction, e.g. music, cooking, or making love, is graded and can always become more refined as we grow; which is why my ear is better than when I first picked up a guitar, and why it is so much worse than somebody who has played 20 years more than me. This also translates to the ability to communicate that. An overly defensive, insecure or arrogant attitude is what leads to disputes feared in the Latin quote and marks to some extent everybody being close-minded. When are we tolerant and when are we too afraid to step in when ugly stuff happens? Good point, Brent. Mark Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Three things that one cannot prove or disprove
Hi Jason Resch Yes, that I am reading this proves to me that I am conscious, but not to you, which is what I mean by proof. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/30/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. - Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-29, 17:05:08 Subject: Re: Three things that one cannot prove or disprove On Wed, Dec 26, 2012 at 6:22 PM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Three things that one cannot prove or disprove 1. That God exists or does not exist. 2. That I exist or do not exist. Proof that you exist: If you are reading this you exist. ?.E.D. Or at least it is proof that your thought exists. ?t is not clear to me how you define I. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
On John Dewey
Hi Platonist Guitar Cowboy Dewey has always fascinated me because of the sweeping power of his ideas, his blunt originality, and his emphasis on doing. But his relativism is nowadays a bit too much for me (IMHO), in my conservative old age. He might be called the father of progressivism, so I can understand your more positive view of him. He would be the darling of progressive politics. Unfortunately for me, Dewey differs from Peirce and James in defining truth too relatively. His relativism seems to me to say that for him, whatever works is true, period. He doesn't qualify that with true in this particular pragmatic sense, but true, period. This is a bit too heavy-handed for me. P and J are much tighter with their definition, namely that the result of an action is merely the truth of that action, not the absolute truth. I find this to be more in line with what I would call classic pragmatism, which is suspicious of all truth, but does not deny all of it. They admitted the possible existence of God, while Dewey, in his heavy-handed manner, simply said that God does not exist, period. So in the end, while the sweeping power of his ideas still holds some fascination to me, I think he tended more to being a dictator than a modest seeker of truth, whatever that is. But there is much in his thought to yet consider. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/30/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. - Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Platonist Guitar Cowboy Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-29, 14:43:11 Subject: Re: Re: Re: Ten top-of-my-head arguments against multiverses Hi Roger, On Wed, Dec 26, 2012 at 9:46 PM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Platonist Guitar Cowboy Pragmatism is does not provide truth in, say a Platonic or Aristotelian sense. It only provides truth as pragmatists define truth: namely that if A causes B, B is the truth of A. This is the same as scientific truth or experimental truth. I don't think that pragmatists like Dewey, which is how I'd frame pragmatism semantically, would agree with that. Whenever the word pops up, I raise an eyebrow: Let's be pragmatic here... used for argument's sake, I do not take to be a valid move, unless the party making the statement specifies some context they are referring to + some degree of congruence with the same. Without that, I find it usually nonsense, referring to some unspecified universe that is inflated to absolute reality which necessitates x. And everybody knows cui bono with x. And if Christian rhetoric makes such a pragmatic move, say republicans for denying healthcare to poor, my question is naturally: Your universe is based on that book, that you guys use to ceremonially inaugurate presidents, instantiate judicial laws, make statements in courts etc. Why is your policy in direct contradiction with Jesus teachings, ? la love thy neighbor, help the poor and so on? I have yet to hear a convincing answer to that one. But I'm patient (unless I sense they're ripping me off) with such things. Platonistically pragmatic Guitar Cowboy ? [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/26/2012 The one thing a woman looks for in a man is to be needed. - Ethan Frome, by Edith Wharton - Receiving the following content - From: Platonist Guitar Cowboy Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-26, 12:53:21 Subject: Re: Re: Ten top-of-my-head arguments against multiverses On Wed, Dec 26, 2012 at 4:17 PM, Roger Clough ?rote: Hi Bruno Marchal It all boils down to this: is something that is mathematically true necessarily physically true ? This question can be restated as are mathematical truth and pragmatic truth the same ? ?MHO No, because theory can be wrong but what works works. Dear Roger, What's wrong with: Theory always works (in some mind, no matter truth) and pragmatism can be used to justify or conceal discrimination, violence, false problems and examples like US style conservative rhetoric that pretends to be Christian, with its elements of compassion, love thy neighbor, share your wealth, anti-materialism etc. but in fact is pushing for policies that deny health to weak/poor, consolidate power and horde wealth, and promote the myth of people as isolated Islands, defending only their own interests, implying some Citizen Kane ideal, that everybody should aspire to? It's a rather transparent trick for this rhetoric to mask its anti-Christian individualism with the Christian cloak of truth, faith, piety, charity, and probity; while pragmatically reasoning to themselves that it's advantageous to pose with the moral authority of ruling Christian dogma + liberty of individual, freedom from tyrannical forces. For this reason, this form of Christian-conservative rhetoric is not an expression of liberty; it's more an instrument of control to stop people from entering political process via distraction and shared moral
Re: Ten top-of-my-head arguments against multiverses
On 29 Dec 2012, at 20:51, Brian Tenneson wrote: Why not take the categories of all categories (besides that Lawyere tried that without to much success, except rediscovering Grothendieck topoi). I'm more interested in the smallest mathematical object in which all mathematical structures are embedded but the category of all categories will do. Except that it is too big, and eventually lawvere extract the topi from this, which model well, not the mathematical reality, but the mathematician itself. Also, we have already discuss this, but the embedding notion does not seem the right think to study, compared to emulation, at least with the comp hypothesis. But if you assume comp, elementary arithmetic is enough, and it is better to keep the infinities and categories into the universal machine's mind tools. Enough for what, in what sense? Enough for a basic ontology (and notion of existence) to explain all the different sort of existence, notably of persons, consciousness, matter appearances, etc. See my papers, as I pretend that with comp we have no choice in those matter, except for pedagogical variants and practice. To have a single mathematical object that all mathematical structures can be embedded would give us an object that, in a sense, contains all structures. If one follows Tegmark's idea that ME=PE, then a definition for universe just might be a mathematical object (which by ME=PE is a physical object) that contains, in a sense, all mathematical objects (i.e., all physical objects). I think that this is deeply flawed. We cannot identify the physical and the mathematical. We might try theory on the physical, or on the mental, or on the mathematical, which might suggest relation between those thing, but I doubt any non trivial theory would identify them, unless enlarging the sense of the words like mental, physical. Isn't it simpler to assume there is only one type of existence? It seems to me part of the data that this is not the case. My pain in a leg has a type of existence different from a quark. The game of bridge as a different type of existence than the moon material constitution. Then for machine, once we distinguish their different points of view (intuoitively like in UDA) or formally like in AUDA, we get many different sort of existence. The ontic one is the simpler ExP(x), but we have also []ExP(x), []Ex[]P(x), []P(x), []Ex[]P(x), etc. All this in 8 different modal logics extracted from self-reference. What are the actual flaws of a mathematical universe? Too big. It is a metaphor. A physical system can be mathematically encoded by its corresponding set of world lines. This encoding is an isomorphism. A very simple example of what I mean is the nearly parabolic path taken by a projectile. The set of world lines would be some subset of R^4 or R^n if it turns out that n != 4. I am aware that indeterminacy due to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle kicks in here so we may never know which subset of R^n a physical system is isomorphic to but by a pigeonhole principle, the physical system must be isomorphic to some subset of R^n, several in fact. May be. But I am driven by the mind-body problem, and what you show above is mathematical physics. With comp, by UDA, we have to extract the belief in such physical idea by ultimately explaining them in term probabilities on computations (that the result I invite you to study and criticize). With computationalism, the coupling consciousness/physical is a phenomenon, person perceptible through numbers relations when they (the persons) bet on their relative self-consistency. This explains the appearance of the physical, without going out of the arithmetical. It works thanks to Church thesis and the closure of the comp everything (UD*, sigma_1 completeness). How are you defining consciousness here? I can't define it. I just hope you know what I mean. Basically something true but non provable about yourself, and, by comp, invariant for some local digital substitution. It's not super clear to me that the cocompletion of the category of all structures C exists though since C is not a small category and thus Yoneda's lemma doesn't apply. I would have to fine-tune the argument to work in the case of the category C I have in mind. The n-categories might be interesting, but we don't need so rich ontology. If we are machine, the cardinality of the basic TOE is absolutely undecidable from inside. Omega is enough. Do you have an argument that proves that our minds can't transcend inside? The mind can do that. Math, by diagonalization, does that, actually, even in a 3p way. But the fact that number's mind can do that invite us to not reify the transcendental. This is what lead to superstition and non necessarily complex ontologies. If the cocompletion of C is the
Re: Three things that one cannot prove or disprove
On 29 Dec 2012, at 21:15, meekerdb wrote: On 12/29/2012 4:56 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Sat, Dec 29, 2012 at 6:12 AM, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: It's possible to prove that computers can be conscious if it can be proved that the physical movement of the parts of the brain can be simulated by a computer. Assuming you can prove consciousness is related to those physical movements. OK. It goes like this: 1. Assume consciousness is caused by movement in the brain. 2. Assume that the brain movement is computable. 3. Then consciousness is computable. (4. But if consciousness is computable, then the physical world must be a product of consciousness rather than the other way around.) But 4 doesn't follow. In fact 1 already assumes consciousness is a product of physics; so 4 would be a contradiction. Not really. 1 might assume that consciousness is caused by movement in the brain, in virtue of the fact that those movements (whatever they truly are) emulate a computation. In that case 4 does follow (although this is not entirely obvious). Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: A few definitions of the categories and two examples of their use (in perception)
On 29 Dec 2012, at 21:32, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: Hi Bruno, On Sat, Dec 29, 2012 at 8:36 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 29 Dec 2012, at 16:07, Roger Clough wrote: The classic example 3p= thirdness= is when I react to the pain Hmm.. this is the idea, except that with comp, this will be only plural_1p. But no problem as, locally, first person plural behaves like a 3p notion. That is indeed why we confuse them and believe the mind comes from matter activity, when eventually matter activity is a way mind articulate the information about its the most probable computations. 2p = secondness = is when I feel the pain 1p = firstness = is when somebody stick me with a pin (Quale) Is not I feel pain a quale? Also 3p is when I know and/or say that the coffee tastes bad (mind or reason) ? If you can use reason to explain a taste, I will ask you the method. The method is specializing in summing magnitudes of local infinities. With long enough computational history, you can thus explain a taste, even with fuzzy linguistic markers. Like wine tasters will agree that a vintage has a layer of shoe leather. This means you can educate taste, not really explaining it. Here I meant explaining taste to someone having no taste, or explaining what is taste. Whether the receiver of the message understands is a different question and is domain related. Say math, you cannot communicate with me some funky tensor equation with words alone, unless I have enough computational history with the concept in question. Here you are right, in the sense that I can't explain the natural numbers, if you don't have some intuition of them already. Once you agree on numbers, I can explain the tensor, even if it can take time. Music is deceptive, in that everybody has apparent access but I don't think I have to make the case that some music is tasteless. Therefore, not everybody has musical taste. Same for wine. Having said that, I'll grant, with sufficient computational history, there are schools of taste that differ. Like the styles that different architects come to prefer. But with such history, even a romantic-school architect, will concede that a building is well designed by a minimalist Bauhaus style architect and can get versed in that style, or the magnitudes of those local infinities. Yes. In french we say popularly that about taste and color we don't argue. (Des goûts et des couleurs on ne discute pas). That's because Francophones have no taste, they just try to sell the notion that they do for marketing ;) In Germany this is more ambiguous, as we have the equivalent statement but also its negation: a popular turn-of-phrase is Über Geschmack lässt sich bekanntlich streiten. Roughly translates On matters taste, we can argue/negotiate/dispute, which fits with the fuzzy linguistic statement above. But alas, Germans are known for their lack of taste and world wars and we don't market our wines and cheeses so well. It is still fact however, that Germany exports more cheese to France than the opposite. We just give it some Italian name, and the French buy it, as anybody with culinary taste will not buy from the Krauts: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambozola Yup, that's German and the French buy more of that from the supermarket shelves than Germans buy Roquefort and co. I like both culinary arts, but then my country is influenced by both. I think we develop taste early in the childhood. 2p is when I am tasting something funny about the coffee. (feeling or sensing) I will ask you for the coffee recipe. Funny? Cannabis, salvia or even alcohol, I can imagine. But Coffee!?! Same. I want that coffee :) PGC :) Bruno 1p is when I take a sip of coffee.(body-QUALE- input to sensing nerves) OK, I see why you say this. Keep in mind in UDA 1p is just defined by the content of the diary of the guy or girl annihilated and reconstituted, with their diary, as opposed to the diary of an external observer (3p). In AUDA the 1p is defined by a correct belief with respect to a probable situation. Just to help you for other threads. Bruno --- A Few Definitions of the categories http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/newlist/nl-frame.htm The Categories as used in perception: I 1p--Quality (Reference to a Ground), II 2p-- Relation (Reference to a Correlate), II 3p--Representation (Reference to an Interpretant), I 1p-- Quale (that which refers to a ground), II 2p--Relate (that which refers to a ground and correlate, ) III 3p--Representamen (that which refers to ground, correlate, and interpretant. ) http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/secondness.html Careful analysis shows that to the three grades of valency of indecomposable concepts correspond three
Re: A few definitions of the categories and two examples of their use (in perception)
On 29 Dec 2012, at 22:08, meekerdb wrote: On 12/29/2012 12:32 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: In french we say popularly that about taste and color we don't argue. (Des goûts et des couleurs on ne discute pas). That's because Francophones have no taste, they just try to sell the notion that they do for marketing ;) In Germany this is more ambiguous, as we have the equivalent statement but also its negation: a popular turn-of-phrase is Über Geschmack lässt sich bekanntlich streiten. Roughly translates On matters taste, we can argue/negotiate/dispute, which fits with the fuzzy linguistic statement above. I thought every body just quoted the latin, De gustibus non est disputandum., You are right. I forget my latin! which is literally the opposite of the German (the Romans were more tolerant?) but probably means the same. Yes. Arguing is the stage before stopping arguing :) Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: 1p, 3p and the black box of 2p
On 30 Dec 2012, at 13:35, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
.
IMHO, which you don't have to agree with, 3p is completely differnt
from 1p
Better not agreeing, as this limit the interest of conversing.
Here's how I see the whole picture:
1p = physical input signal from outside world into brain - (2p
= the mind's black box of mental (not brain) signal processing) ---
--- 3p = physical signal output to outside world through brain.
Usually, 1p = the subjective personal account of the experience.
And 3p is some objective view.
1p is not communicable (except approximately by artists)
3p is usually communicable, or locally communicable.
All scientific statement is 3p. Even when talking about 1p.
1p = physical input of outside world as part of the brain.
2p = black box mental signal processing of 1p
3p = physical output from 2p as through the brain to outside world.
You might give too much importance to the physical, which with comp
appear to be only 1p plural. Eventually, we can limit ourself to
arithmetic for the 3p. Then the 1p Co. are numbers with an angle,
or a point of view.
Bruno
[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/30/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. - Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-29, 14:36:58
Subject: Re: A few definitions of the categories and two examples of
their use(in perception)
On 29 Dec 2012, at 16:07, Roger Clough wrote:
The classic example
3p= thirdness= is when I react to the pain
Hmm.. this is the idea, except that with comp, this will be only
plural_1p. But no problem as, locally, first person plural behaves
like a 3p notion. That is indeed why we confuse them and believe the
mind comes from matter activity, when eventually matter activity
is a way mind articulate the information about its the most probable
computations.
2p = secondness = is when I feel the pain
1p = firstness = is when somebody stick me with a pin (Quale)
Is not I feel pain a quale?
Also
3p is when I know and/or say that the coffee tastes bad (mind or
reason)
? If you can use reason to explain a taste, I will ask you the method.
In french we say popularly that about taste and color we don't
argue. (Des go鹴s et des couleurs on ne discute pas).
2p is when I am tasting something funny about the coffee. (feeling
or sensing)
I will ask you for the coffee recipe.
Funny?
Cannabis, salvia or even alcohol, I can imagine. But Coffee!?!
1p is when I take a sip of coffee.(body-QUALE- input to sensing
nerves)
OK, I see why you say this.
Keep in mind in UDA 1p is just defined by the content of the diary
of the guy or girl annihilated and reconstituted, with their diary,
as opposed to the diary of an external observer (3p). In AUDA the 1p
is defined by a correct belief with respect to a probable situation.
Just to help you for other threads.
Bruno
---
A Few Definitions of the categories
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/newlist/nl-frame.htm
The Categories as used in perception:
I 1p--Quality (Reference to a Ground),
II 2p-- Relation (Reference to a Correlate),
II 3p--Representation (Reference to an Interpretant),
I 1p-- Quale (that which refers to a ground),
II 2p--Relate (that which refers to a ground and correlate, )
III 3p--Representamen (that which refers to ground, correlate, and
interpretant. )
http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/secondness.html
Careful analysis shows that to the three grades of valency of
indecomposable concepts correspond
three classes of characters or predicates.
Firstly come firstnesses, or positive internal characters of the
subject in itself;
secondly come secondnesses, or brute actions of one subject or
substance on another,
regardless of law or of any third subject;
thirdly comes thirdnesses, or the mental or quasi-mental
influence of one subject on
another relatively to a third. ('Pragmatism', CP 5.469, 1907)
Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is,
positively and without reference to anything else.
Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is,
with respect to a second but regardless of any third.
Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in
bringing a second and third into relation to each other.
The following equivalences should hold
3p = Thirdness or III
2p = Secondness or II
1p = Firstness or I.
Comp seems to only use analytic or deductive logic,
while Peirce's categories are epistemological (synthetic
logic) categories, in which secondness is an integral part.
So .
Here's what Peirce has to say about his categorioes:
http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/secondness.html
Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is,
A Systems Theory Approach to the Mind/Body Problem (ver. 1)
A Systems Theory Approach to the Mind/Body Problem (ver. 1) The Black Box theory of Mind as given below suggests that the mind/body problem may be expressed analogously as a system theory in which mental consciousness or subjectivity is the time activity of the physical brain expressed in Fourier frequency space. A spacial transform may also be involved, but for the moment we will only consider the frequency transform. And it may be added that perhaps some different type of transform might succeed this version The ultimate model for the mind is what is sometimes called Platonia, a timeless perfect Heavenly world of reason. Being timeless, it is not unreasonable to characterize it as being subjective, that is, in frequency space. The objective physical Aristotelian world (down here below, so to speak) is more suitably chartacterizes as in time. Thus I propose that we have a dual-aspect reality, (a). The world from the objective, physical point of view, in time. (a)^-1, The world from the subjective, mental point of view, in frequency space ___ The Black Box Consciousness Model [Objective Brain/Body-Subjective Mind/Mental-Objective Brain/Body]. Here's how I now see the whole mindbrain consciousness complex: I (physical input signal, brain/body, objective) --- II (Consciousness [nonphysical black box signal processing] , mind/mental, subjective) -III (physical output signal, brain/body, objective) I= Firstness (1p) = physical input signal from outside world into brain - II=Secondness (2p) = the mind's black box of mental (not brain) signal processing --- III=Thirdness (3p) = physical signal output to outside world through brain. Without going into more detail at this point, the theory can be stated from: F (t) = Firstness or the objective (ohysical) input signal of the brain in time, F(w) = the subjective, mental or form of F(t) S (t) = Secondness or the System function in the t or objective world S (w) = Secondness or the System function in the w or subjective world T(t) = Thirdness or objective output signal of the brain in time, T(w) = the subjective, mental or form of T(t) The overall theory being: T(w) = F(w)+S(w) One might then define consciousness as S(w) = T(w)/F(w) -- [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/30/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. - Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Fw: the world as mathematical. was pythagoras right after all ?
Is there a physical object that exists physically which is not isomorphic to a mathematical object, having mathematical existence? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/wB785ntkfK0J. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: A Systems Theory Approach to the Mind/Body Problem (ver. 1)
On Sunday, December 30, 2012 12:41:33 PM UTC-5, rclough wrote:
A Systems Theory Approach to the Mind/Body Problem (ver. 1)
The Black Box theory of Mind as given below suggests that the mind/body
problem
may be expressed analogously as a system theory in which mental
consciousness or subjectivity
is the time activity of the physical brain expressed in Fourier frequency
space.
A spacial transform may also be involved, but for the moment we will only
consider the frequency
transform. And it may be added that perhaps some different type of
transform
might succeed this version
The ultimate model for the mind is what is sometimes called Platonia, a
timeless
perfect Heavenly world of reason. Being timeless, it is not unreasonable
to characterize
it as being subjective, that is, in frequency space. The objective
physical Aristotelian world
(down here below, so to speak) is more suitably chartacterizes as in time.
Thus I propose that we have a dual-aspect reality,
(a). The world from the objective, physical point of view, in time.
(a)^-1, The world from the subjective, mental point of view, in frequency
space
___
The Black Box Consciousness Model [Objective Brain/Body-Subjective
Mind/Mental-Objective Brain/Body].
Here's how I now see the whole mindbrain consciousness complex:
I (physical input signal, brain/body, objective) --- II
(Consciousness [nonphysical black box signal processing] , mind/mental,
subjective)
-III (physical output signal, brain/body, objective)
I= Firstness (1p) = physical input signal from outside world into
brain -
II=Secondness (2p) = the mind's black box of mental (not brain) signal
processing ---
III=Thirdness (3p) = physical signal output to outside world through
brain.
Without going into more detail at this point, the theory can be stated
from:
F (t) = Firstness or the objective (ohysical)
input signal of the brain in time,
F(w) = the subjective, mental or form of F(t)
S (t) = Secondness or the System function in the t or objective world
S (w) = Secondness or the System function in the w or subjective world
T(t) = Thirdness or objective output signal of the brain in time,
T(w) = the subjective, mental or form of T(t)
The overall theory being:
T(w) = F(w)+S(w)
One might then define consciousness as
S(w) = T(w)/F(w)
--
Why does the objective signal get transformed into something else? Why
wouldn't consciousness just be:
S(t) = T(t)/F(t)?
By beginning with the presumption of signal, you already have taken
awareness of some kind for granted. What is a signal? What responds to a
signal and how does it accomplish that?
Also if you consider the idea of frequency space, you should find that it
is an abstraction and ultimately impossible. Frequency is the expected
repetition of events juxtaposed against their absence - an experience
dependent on time but not space at all. Projecting a spatialized model of
frequency shifts the native subjective presentation of time into an
objective re-presentation which is simultaneous rather than sequential. The
graph of a wave function is a meaningless line-curve unless interpreted
with a narrative metaphor.
If you flip your model over, you'll see that time is not an exterior
reality but an interior experience, and that interior experience is the
actual monadic ground of being. There is no detached physical point of
view, that is just an idea which makes it easier for us to model our
experiences intellectually, but in reality, all time is an interior
experience.
[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net javascript:]
12/30/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. - Woody Allen
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Re: Conscious reply to Stathis
On Sun, Dec 30, 2012 at 4:36 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.comwrote: St: --Are you unsure if you're conscious?-- *No, I am human, so I THINK I am sure. That is no evidence. See my note to your next * *remark:* - St: --Do you deny that there is even an APPEARANCE of an association or supervenience or causation?-- *Of course not! appearance, or imagination are human treats. * *We assign them to the already absorbed world-knowledge at all times (from the cabe on). Our present level is a fine one.* *Not the final, for sure. We continually learn more and more.* -- St: --That the brain is computable means only that the physics determining the brain's observable behaviour can be simulated by a computer with an arbitrarily large amount of memory. But nothing is implied about the technical feasibility of this.-- *The BRAIN?? was it ever justified how mentality is generated BY the brain? I asked lots of questions, about topically slanted (colored??) mAmps or meaning-carrying blood-flows, even idea-loaded astrocytes(?), or those 'codes' (?) said applicable when retrieving memories (stored allegedly by those same configurational codes) - I got no reply. * * * *And you emphasised OBSERVABLE (meaning as of today).* * * *I call the brain a tool, which - of course - can be simulated on a suitable computer. Your last phrase may even be my reply. Science still lacks the guts to say I dunno. Which may be interfering with many new discoveries contradicting the ' so far scientifically believed'. * *Regards* *JM* -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Can the physical brain possibly store our memories ? No.
Bruno: thanks for the TITLE of your post including the * N O * . John Mikes (*Subject:* Re: Can the physical brain possibly store our memories ? No.) ) On Wed, Dec 26, 2012 at 5:34 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Dec 2012, at 12:16, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal 1) Your concept of relative bits probably deflates my proposed idea, but I don't understand what they are. Maybe you can give a brief explanation. The UDA in sane04 should be the explanation. Have you progress in it? Feel free to ask question. 2) Also, I am aware that due to networks, a brain can process an almost infinite amount of information. But presumably that estimate would not include a noise or entropy limitation. I imagine that this has been estimated, but not sure. Below our subst level there is a priori infinite noise/energy. yes we have to take that into account. The winner physics is probably the one which couple genuinely the computable and the non computable. Bruno [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] rclo...@verizon.net] 12/22/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - *From:* Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be *Receiver:* everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-12-21, 13:25:36 *Subject:* Re: Can the physical brain possibly store our memories ? No. On 20 Dec 2012, at 19:01, Roger Clough wrote: Hi A simpler way to make my point is the axiom that no information can be stand alone, it must have context to give it meaning. The information needs a universal machine to interpret it. Universal machines needs also a universal machine to be themselves interpreted. That is why we have to assume at least one universal machine. Then if you accept Church thesis, it is a long, tedious, and not so easy task to prove that the elementary arithmetic taught in school is Turing universal, so we can start from this well know one. But that context can not be stored alone, it in turn must have context. And so forth. Thus one bit of information cannot simply be physically stored, it would extend to take up the entire physical universe. I don't follow you here. Your argument above only shows that we cannot store the one bit of information + some interpreter of that bit, + the universal environment supporting that bit, etc. But we don't need bits, we need only relative bits, and this store easily in any universal machine's memory. But our brains do apparently store enormous amounts of information. The above argument suggests that the bulk of this must be stored Platonically (mentally). OK. Because our states makes sense only relatively to many other states, and all that fit in arithmetic. BTW, I conjecture that this fits also on the border of the Mandelbrot set, making it a nice picture of a compact universal dovetailing. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9G6uO7ZHtK8list=PL70D5F39E3EFE6136index=1 [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] rclo...@verizon.net] 12/20/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - *From:* Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net *Receiver:* everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-12-20, 12:40:21 *Subject:* Jason and the Dragon's Teeth Hi meekerdb How can you store info on a particle ? Let's make this as simple as possible and say that you decide to write some information on a piece of paper in the form of 1's and 0's. Is that really information ? No. Not unless you provide additional information such as a) a definition of what information is b) where the information is (address) c) could this just be junk ? d) how to read the 1's and 0's apart from the blank spaces e) what spurious info from the blank spaces means j) how to tell that spurious information from 1's and 0's. e) how to. For every step I add, hoping to clear up the issue once and for all, other problems come to life, as in the Greek myth of Jason and the Dragon's teeth: http://www.mythweb.com/heroes/jason/jason14.html The Dragon's Teeth Aeetes, it turns out, had got his hands on some dragon's teeth with unique agricultural properties. As soon as these hit the soil they began to sprout, which was good from the point of view of Jason accomplishing his task by nightfall, but bad in terms of the harvest. For each seed germinated into a fully-armed warrior, who popped up from the ground and joined the throng now menacing poor Jason. You need info to store and read info, and info on what that means, etc. about the warrior killling enemy, and for each enemy that n gtell info have an decoding aparatus. Suppose you decide to store information on a computer disk. You say 'all I have to do is put a + charge here and nothing there. I don't think it's that simple. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net
Re: A Systems Theory Approach to the Mind/Body Problem (ver. 1)
On 12/30/2012 3:36 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, December 30, 2012 12:41:33 PM UTC-5, rclough wrote: A Systems Theory Approach to the Mind/Body Problem (ver. 1) The Black Box theory of Mind as given below suggests that the mind/body problem may be expressed analogously as a system theory in which mental consciousness or subjectivity is the time activity of the physical brain expressed in Fourier frequency space. A spacial transform may also be involved, but for the moment we will only consider the frequency transform. And it may be added that perhaps some different type of transform might succeed this version The ultimate model for the mind is what is sometimes called Platonia, a timeless perfect Heavenly world of reason. Being timeless, it is not unreasonable to characterize it as being subjective, that is, in frequency space. The objective physical Aristotelian world (down here below, so to speak) is more suitably chartacterizes as in time. Thus I propose that we have a dual-aspect reality, (a). The world from the objective, physical point of view, in time. (a)^-1, The world from the subjective, mental point of view, in frequency space ___ The Black Box Consciousness Model [Objective Brain/Body-Subjective Mind/Mental-Objective Brain/Body]. Here's how I now see the whole mindbrain consciousness complex: I (physical input signal, brain/body, objective) --- II (Consciousness [nonphysical black box signal processing] , mind/mental, subjective) -III (physical output signal, brain/body, objective) I= Firstness (1p) = physical input signal from outside world into brain - II=Secondness (2p) = the mind's black box of mental (not brain) signal processing --- III=Thirdness (3p) = physical signal output to outside world through brain. Without going into more detail at this point, the theory can be stated from: F (t) = Firstness or the objective (ohysical) input signal of the brain in time, F(w) = the subjective, mental or form of F(t) S (t) = Secondness or the System function in the t or objective world S (w) = Secondness or the System function in the w or subjective world T(t) = Thirdness or objective output signal of the brain in time, T(w) = the subjective, mental or form of T(t) The overall theory being: T(w) = F(w)+S(w) One might then define consciousness as S(w) = T(w)/F(w) -- Why does the objective signal get transformed into something else? Why wouldn't consciousness just be: S(t) = T(t)/F(t)? By beginning with the presumption of signal, you already have taken awareness of some kind for granted. What is a signal? What responds to a signal and how does it accomplish that? Also if you consider the idea of frequency space, you should find that it is an abstraction and ultimately impossible. Frequency is the expected repetition of events juxtaposed against their absence - an experience dependent on time but not space at all. Projecting a spatialized model of frequency shifts the native subjective presentation of time into an objective re-presentation which is simultaneous rather than sequential. The graph of a wave function is a meaningless line-curve unless interpreted with a narrative metaphor. If you flip your model over, you'll see that time is not an exterior reality but an interior experience, and that interior experience is the actual monadic ground of being. There is no detached physical point of view, that is just an idea which makes it easier for us to model our experiences intellectually, but in reality, all time is an interior experience. Hear Hear! Time is a 1p phenomenon, it has no 3p existence. The idea of time (and space!) as an external dimension is a mathematically convenient illusion. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Fw: the world as mathematical. was pythagoras right after all ?
On 12/30/2012 11:23 AM, Brian Tenneson wrote: Is there a physical object that exists physically which is not isomorphic to a mathematical object, having mathematical existence? If it exists physically then it has at least one attribute that no mathematical object has. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
