Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia
On 08 Jun 2015, at 15:58, Terren Suydam wrote: On Thu, Jun 4, 2015 at 1:59 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 04 Jun 2015, at 18:01, Terren Suydam wrote: On Wed, Jun 3, 2015 at 9:31 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 03 Jun 2015, at 14:58, Terren Suydam wrote: It would be like saying that bats' echolocation is an illusion. Not a perfect analogy, because a bat's facility for echolocation is rooted in its physiology, not constructed, but the point is that with both the ego and echolocation, the experiencer's consciousness is provided with a particular character it would not otherwise have been able to experience. I usually distinguish 8 forms of ego (the eight hypostases). Each time it is the sigma_1 reality, but viewed from a different angle. The illusion (with the negative connotations) are more in the confusion between two hypostases, than each hypostase per se. I am not sure we disagree, except on some choice of words. Bruno I agree that we agree :-) I agree with this to :) I know you've posted it in the past but can you point me to a summary of the original Plotinus model with the 8 hypostases? My cursory googling reveals only 3 attributed to Plotinus (One, Intellect, Soul). That is what Plotinus called the primary hypostases. But there is no secondary hypostases, but then some sholars, and myself, agree that his two matters ennead describes actually two (degenerate, secondary) hypostases. So in the enneads ypu have the three primary hypostases, which in the machine theology is given by truth (One, p), provable (Intellect, []p) and Soul (that we get with the theatetus idea on the One and Intellect, []p p), and the two matters: intelligible matter ([]p t) and sensible matter ([]p t p). One = p Intellect = []p (splits in two: G and G*) Soul = []p p (does not split: S4Grz) Intelligible matter = []p t (splits in two Z and Z*) Sensible matter = []p t p.(splits in two: X and X*). To get the propositional physics, you have to restrict the p on the sigma_1 truth (the computable, the UD-accessible states). For the neoplatonist; matter is almost where God loses control, and can't intervene, it is close to the FPI idea, as you know that even God cannot predict to you, when in Helsinki, where you will feel to be after the split. For the platonist, matter is really where even the form can't handle the indetermination. It is of the type ~[]#, or #. It is also the place giving rooms for the contingencies, and what we can hope and eventually build or recover. Bruno OK, so given a certain interpretation, some scholars added two hypostases to the original three. It is very natural to do. The ennead VI.1 describes the three initial hypostases, and the subject of what is matter, notably the intelligible matter and the sensible matter, is the subject of the ennead II.4. It is a simplification of vocabulary, more than another interpretation. Then, it appears that you make a third interpretation by splitting the intellect, and the two matters. What justifies these splits? I am not sure I understand? Plotinus splits them too, as they are different subject matter. The intellect is the nous, the worlds of idea, and here the world of what the machine can prove (seen by her, and by God: G and G*). But matter is what you can predict with the FPI, and so it is a different notion, and likewise, in Plotinus, matter is given by a platonist rereading of Aristotle theory of indetermination. This is done in the ennead II-4. Why should we not split intellect and matter, which in appearance are very different, and the problem is more in consistently relating them. If we don't distinguish them, we cannot explain the problem of relating them. And can you make this justification in plain language in a way that doesn't appear to be a just so interpretation that makes it easier for AUDA to go through? God, or the One, is played by the notion of Arithmetical Truth. Machines and humans cannot know it, or explore it mechanically, and it is the roots of the web of machines dreams, but also of their semantics, in a large part. The Nous, is what machine can prove about themselves, and their remation with God, etc. The Soul, is where the machine proves true things, but not accidentally: as it is defined by the conjunction of p and the provability of p, for any (arithmetical) p. It is the idea of Theaetetus, that Plotinus might use implicitly (according to Bréhier), and which just works: it give a logic of an unameable, non-machine, knower. For matter; you want that the measure one for an event/proposition is certain, when it is true in all consistent continuation (this asks for []p, technically), but also, by incompleteness, this asks fro the diamond t (consistency, having a model, having at least one continuation, not belonging to a cul-de-sac world
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 6/8/2015 3:24 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: On 8 June 2015 at 13:30, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: If not, there is no possibility for a time variable in arithmetic per se, and consequently nothing can 'emerge' from arithmetic, since emergence is a temporal concept. No it isn't, not in the sense being used here. The concept that is relevant in this case is ontological priority. If you think emergence is temporal then you will get very confused by discussions of the MUH (or even of how the universe arises as a 4D manifold from the laws of physics) Which law of physics gives rise to the 4D manifold? It is my understanding that a 4D pseudo-Riemannian manifold was a basic postulate underlying general relativity -- if that hypothesis emerged from anything, then it came from the fact that space-time was observed to be a 4 dimensional structure. So the 4D manifold is not actually derived from anything other than observation. Kant made the mistake of thinking that Euclidean space was a necessary law of thought. Observation proved him wrong. Maybe observation also proves the MUH wrong? Observation can't prove anything wrong about a theory that says everything happens in some universe. ;-) Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Review of Bostrom's Superintelligence
Review of Nick Bostrom's _Superintelligence_, Oxford University Press, 2014 by somebody named Rod: we need to be investing much more in figuring out whether developing AI is a good idea. A waste of time, good idea or bad its going to happen it's just a question of when. We may need to put a moratorium on research, Good luck with that. Do you really think politicians in the USA would take China's word that they've stopped all AI research knowing the huge advantage they'd have if they cheated? as was done for a few years with recombinant DNA starting in 1975. The Asilomar moratorium was voluntary and one year later the moratorium was removed and very strict safety standards were set in place; and very soon after that the safety standards were relaxed significantl . Looking back we can see that it didn't slow down recombinant DNA developments at all. I heard John Searle, the philosopher who developed the Chinese Room thought experiment The single stupidest thought experiment in the history of the world. Searle tried to refute the possibility of Strong AI. (I believe he identified strong AI as the idea that a machine will truly be able to think, and will be conscious, as opposed to simply simulating the process; To hell with consciousness! From the human point of view it's irrelevant if computers are conscious, if they're not that's there problem not ours. But computer intelligence is very relevant from the human point of view especially if a computer is smarter than that biped. I really don't see any evidence of the domain-to-domain acceleration that Kurzweil sees, and in particular the shift from biological to digital beings will result in a radical shift in the evolutionary pressures. I see no reason why any sort of law should dictate that digital beings will evolve at a rate that *must* be faster than the biological one. The fastest signals in the human brain move at about 100 meters a second, many are far slower, light moves at 300 million meters per second. So if you insist that the 2 most distant parts of a brain communicate as fast as they do in a human brain (and I'm not entirely sure why that constraint would be necessary) then parts in the brain of a AI could be at least 3 million times as distant. The volume increases by the cube of the distance so such a brain would physically be 27 million trillion times larger than a human brain. Even if 99.9% of that space were used just to deliver power and get rid of waste heat you'd still have a thousand trillion times as much volume for logic and memory components as humans have room for inside their heads. And the components would be considerably smaller than the human ones too. That's why I think talk about how to make sure the AI always remains friendly that is ubiquitous in some parts of the internet is just futile, maybe it will be friendly and maybe it won't, but whatever it is we won't have any say in the matter. The AI will do what it wants to do and we're just in it for the ride. Exponentials can't continue forever, Moore's Law doesn't need to last forever, it doesn't even need to last for very long to leave humanity in the dust. Being smart is hard. And making yourself smarter is also hard. And it takes a long time too. It takes a human being 4 years to learn enough to graduate from Harvard, an electronic AI whose brain components send messages at 300 million meters a second rather than 100 meters a second as in a human brain could graduate from Harvard in 64 minutes. That is assuming the AI's brain component would be as small as biological ones, but in reality they wouldn't be, they would be far smaller. if you accidentally knock a bucket of baseballs down a set of stairs, better data and faster computing are unlikely to help you predict the exact order in which the balls will reach the bottom Why not? To a mind that worked 3 million (or more) times as fast as yours or mine the balls would be almost be stationary; if it took one second for the baseballs to reach the bottom of the stairs to the AI it would seem like about 6 hours. And to a mind with a memory 3 million times as capacious as yours keeping track of all the balls would be easy. Go players like to talk about how close the top pros are to God They said the same thing about Chess top pros until Deep Blue came along. Top pros could sit across the board from an almost infinitely strong AI and still hold their heads up. I don't think so. In 2012 a computer beat 5 times Japanese Go champion Yoshio Ishia, granted he had a 4 stone handicap but it was still impressive, especially considering that far less resources have been devoted to computer Go programs than computer Chess programs. I'm no expert in creativity, and I know researchers study it intensively, so I'm going to weasel through by saying it is the ability to generate completely new material, which involves some random process. I have a different definition,
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hmm Let us be precise. That the computation take place in arithmetic is a mathematical fact that nobody doubt today. UDA explains only that we cannot use a notion of primitive matter for making more real some computations in place of others. It makes the physics supervening on all computations in arithmetic. But my computer does some computations and not others. So there must be some sense in which some computations are real and others aren't. Handwaving that they're all there in arithmetic proves too much. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Pigeons offend Islam
A Coo-Coo Fatwa -Original Message- From: John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sat, Jun 6, 2015 12:15 pm Subject: Pigeons offend Islam ISIS recently banned pigeon breeding because when the birds fly overhead they expose their genitals and that is a sin against Islam. Violators will be publicly flogged. http://rt.com/news/264673-isis-breeding-birds-islam/ John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hence what I've called comp1 is the default materialist hypothesis (also known as the strong AI thesis, I think) Comp1 is not comp, even if it is comp for a materialist: but that position is proved to be nonsense. Comp is just I am a digitalizable machine. String AI is the thesis that machine can think (be conscious). It does not logically entail comp. Machine can think, but does not need to be the only thinking entities. Gods and goddesses might be able to think too. But in saying I am a digitalizable machine you implicitly assume that machine exists in the environment that you exist in. It is this environment and your potential interaction with it that provides meaning to the digital thoughts of the machine. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 6/8/2015 1:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2015, at 06:31, LizR wrote (to Brent) Note that Bruno rejects the conditioning on justified. Plato'sTheaetetusdialogue defines knowledge as true belief. I think that's a deficiency in modal logic insofar as it's supposed to formalize good informal reasoning. But I can see why it's done; it's difficult if not impossible to give formal definition of justified. Yes. See my answer to brent. The whole AUDA is made possible because we do have an excellent axiomatisation of justification. It's an excellent axiomatization that relies on inference from axioms. To say it formalizes good reasoning would mean that I would have to axiomatize vision before I could see anything. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 08 Jun 2015, at 15:13, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2015, at 03:30, Bruce Kellett wrote: My point was that in order for time to emerge from a block universe certain structure was necessary -- Well, this is doirectly false with comp, in the sense that all you need is the emulation of a brain of a person believing in time, and those exists all in the block mindscape constituted in a tiny part of arithmetic. No, it is not false. Even with comp. If the block universe is to have an inherent time dimension, than that structure is essential, whether it comes from primitive materialism or from comp, it cannot be avoided. If for no other reason than that is what we see when we look around us. I agree, if the block universe is to have an inherent time dimension. In that case it would have to follow from computationalism. we need a 4-dim manifold with a local Lorentzian metric, and physical events must be arranged with a particular structure on this manifold -- they cannot just be arranged at haphazard. So the way events are embedded is in fact crucial. Yes, but that occurs easily, as we need only the brain emulation. The problem is that we get too much aberrant dreams, and thus an inflation of possibilities. But the math parts shows that self- reference put the eaxct constraints required to have a measure on the consistent continuations, even a quantum one. So then why do we get too many aberrant dreams? You contradict yourself. If the necessary structure drops out easily from comp, then show it, and show why we see what we see and not the white rabbits. But that is what I have done. It *is* the entire subject of my enterprise. To show that at first sight comp looks crazy, with an inflation of dreams, and then to show that the theoretical computer science constraints are enough to put a structure giving sense to the normal measure. This means that comp does explain, today, both consciousness (A large part of it), and matter, as a stable appearance. Now, it would be astonishing that the first machine interview get the physics right, but u to now, it works. Not for doing physics (that has never been the goal), but for explaining where physics come from, in frame where consciousness is not eliminated. The question is then whether this 4 dimensional manifold with a local Lorentzian metric exists in arithmetic? It does not have to exist in arithmetic, it needs to be recoverable from the FPI in arithmetic. Is there a difference? There might be. We just cannot equate those things by decision. It might exist in arithmetic, and not have the right measure. it might also not exist in arithmetic, but recoverable from the FPI. or both case can be true: it exists in arithmetic, and is recoverable from the FPI. In that case the measure would be computable, and I doubt this is possible, but fundamentally, it is an open problem. of course, approximation of it exists in arithmetic. Arithmetic contains all simulations of all physical phenomena, with 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, ... 100^100, ... decimals exact. In other words, you don't have a clue either. ? I am the one formulating the problem. Making it mathematical. Then the clues toward the solution is the object of the second part of the sane04 paper (or other papers, or the thesis). If not, there is no possibility for a time variable in arithmetic per se, and consequently nothing can 'emerge' from arithmetic, since emergence is a temporal concept. We need only the dital time to get the digital brain emulation, to get the arithmetical mindscape. If a physical time emerges or not remains to be seen. Note that S4Grz1 and X1* logic already brought a subjective time. If you don't get physical time, then your theory is a failure. Only if you have a proof of the existence of time. Then your theory is known to be a failure on consciousness, souls, intelligence, etc. And my theory is believed by everyone, if not by default most of the time. the negation of comp needs actual infnities, of very special sorts. That theory does not yet even exists. Evolution theory, molecular biology, quantum computing, all that relies on computationalism. I am not of the type of proposing new theories. I show that comp leads to a curious view of reality, but that up to now, Physics confirms it, including in its most weird aspect. Those are results. Unless you find a flaw, you have to deal with them. Getting subjective or mental time is not enough, since clocks do not run according to our subjective impression of the passage of time. Nor does the best clock ever: 0, 1, 2, 3, Note that it is important to distinguish between structures that can be described mathematically and the structure of arithmetic or mathematics themselves. Yes. Quite important. Even after the reversal, although physics is made purely arithmetical,
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: or that maths exists independently of mathematicians. That even just arithmetical truth is independent of mathematician. This is important because everyone agree with any axiomatic of the numbers, but that is not the case for analysis, real numbers, etc. Everyone agrees on ZFC in the same sense. So does that make set theory and its consequences real? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Recent methane spikes in the arctic
The business as usual position seemingly seeks to ignore this kind of data. After all it is rather inconvenient for the position that they hold that: either no warming is going on; or else all measured warming is just the result of some hypothetical mysterious natural cycle that has little to do with industrial era emissions.And if all of that fails then to the fall back position of warming... it is good for the planet. From: LizR lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sunday, June 7, 2015 7:40 PM Subject: Re: Recent methane spikes in the arctic The Doomsday argument is looking increasingly realistic. On 8 June 2015 at 14:20, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com wrote: https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embeddedv=p2ckkxEnWpA-- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia
On Mon, Jun 8, 2015 at 2:20 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 08 Jun 2015, at 15:58, Terren Suydam wrote: On Thu, Jun 4, 2015 at 1:59 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 04 Jun 2015, at 18:01, Terren Suydam wrote: OK, so given a certain interpretation, some scholars added two hypostases to the original three. It is very natural to do. The ennead VI.1 describes the three initial hypostases, and the subject of what is matter, notably the intelligible matter and the sensible matter, is the subject of the ennead II.4. It is a simplification of vocabulary, more than another interpretation. Then, it appears that you make a third interpretation by splitting the intellect, and the two matters. What justifies these splits? I am not sure I understand? Plotinus splits them too, as they are different subject matter. The intellect is the nous, the worlds of idea, and here the world of what the machine can prove (seen by her, and by God: G and G*). But matter is what you can predict with the FPI, and so it is a different notion, and likewise, in Plotinus, matter is given by a platonist rereading of Aristotle theory of indetermination. This is done in the ennead II-4. Why should we not split intellect and matter, which in appearance are very different, and the problem is more in consistently relating them. If we don't distinguish them, we cannot explain the problem of relating them. Sorry, my question was ambiguous. What I mean is that after adding the two hypostases for the two matters, you have five hypostases, the initial three plus the two for matter. Then, you arrive at 8 hypostases by splitting the intellect into two, and you do the same for each of the matter hyspostases. My question is what plain-language rationale justifies creating these three extra hypostases? And can we really say we're still talking about Plotinus's hypostases at this point? Terren And can you make this justification in plain language in a way that doesn't appear to be a just so interpretation that makes it easier for AUDA to go through? God, or the One, is played by the notion of Arithmetical Truth. Machines and humans cannot know it, or explore it mechanically, and it is the roots of the web of machines dreams, but also of their semantics, in a large part. The Nous, is what machine can prove about themselves, and their remation with God, etc. The Soul, is where the machine proves true things, but not accidentally: as it is defined by the conjunction of p and the provability of p, for any (arithmetical) p. It is the idea of Theaetetus, that Plotinus might use implicitly (according to Bréhier), and which just works: it give a logic of an unameable, non-machine, knower. For matter; you want that the measure one for an event/proposition is certain, when it is true in all consistent continuation (this asks for []p, technically), but also, by incompleteness, this asks fro the diamond t (consistency, having a model, having at least one continuation, not belonging to a cul-de-sac world (all those things are mathematically equivalent in our setting). So prediction 1 (like the coffee-cup in the WM-duplication + promise of coffee made at both reconstitution place) would be []coffee coffee. There is a coffee in all my extensions, and there is at least one extension (the act of faith made explicit). So the logic of physical yes is given by []p t, with p sigma_1 (to get the restriction on the universal dovetailing). That corresponds to Plotinus theory of the intelligible matter, and that gives a pair of quantum logic (by applying a result of Goldblatt). The same with the sensible matter, where we replay the original idea of Theatetus, on intelligible matter. Actually, we get also a quantum logic with the first application of the Theaetetus, which put some light perhaps why Plotinus ascribe the roots of matter already to the soul activity. I thought at first that arithmetic would refute that idea of Plotinus, but the math confirms this. I will have to go, and will be slowed down more and more, as I have the June exams now. Feel free to ask any question though. But you might need to be patient for the comment/answers. Bruno Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 8 June 2015 at 16:22, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: It seems here that you've snuck an extra assumption into comp1. We know that brains can be conscious, and we assume that computations can also be conscious. But that doesn't mean that only computations can be conscious, nor does it mean that brains are computations. These two latter statements might be true, but they are not necessarily true, even given computationalism. I may not have phrased it very well, but comp1 is the assumption that consciousness is based on computation, and can't be created by anything else (at least that's comp1 in a simple form - actually, I believe it's the assumption that at some level physics is Turing emulable). On that basis, a brain must do computation (at some level), since it's conscious, and an AI could be conscious given the correct programme. (And what's wrong with sneaked ?) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
LizR wrote: On 9 June 2015 at 05:31, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: or that maths exists independently of mathematicians. That even just arithmetical truth is independent of mathematician. This is important because everyone agree with any axiomatic of the numbers, but that is not the case for analysis, real numbers, etc. Everyone agrees on ZFC in the same sense. So does that make set theory and its consequences real? Reality isn't defined by what everyone agrees on. What makes ZFC (or whatever) real, or not, is whether it kicks back. Is it something that was invented, and could equally well have been invented differently, or was it discovered as a result of following a chain of logical reasoning from certain axioms? Why do not those same arguments apply equally to arithmetic? What axioms led to arithmetic? Could one have chosen different axioms? Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On Sat, Jun 06, 2015 at 07:18:19PM -0400, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Jun 6, 2015 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: In a Newtonian world physics is deterministic Yes, but deterministic is not the same as predictable. so there is an exact solution: That doesn't necessarily follow. Actually, there is usually an existence theorem for differential equations showing the existence of an exact solution for given boundary conditions. It may well be that the solution cannot be expressed in closed form using our existing catalogue of transcendental functions, but our catalogue can always be added to, such that it becomes possible to express the exact solution in closed form. Indeed, before computers were invented, it was popular to enlarge the catalogue with solutions to certain strategic differential equations - think gamma function, Bessel functions etc, so as to tabulate numerical values to help solve other DEs. But now, with general availability of electronic computers, you may as well do it directly for the DE of interest. Approximations can be made but in general an exact solution to the 3 body problem would require an infinite (and not just astronomical) number of numerical calculations. Numerical approximations are a different matter. Even having a closed form exact solution will not help numerical predictions if the algorithms for computing it are numerically unstable. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On Tuesday, June 9, 2015, LizR lizj...@gmail.com javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','lizj...@gmail.com'); wrote: On 8 June 2015 at 16:22, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: It seems here that you've snuck an extra assumption into comp1. We know that brains can be conscious, and we assume that computations can also be conscious. But that doesn't mean that only computations can be conscious, nor does it mean that brains are computations. These two latter statements might be true, but they are not necessarily true, even given computationalism. I may not have phrased it very well, but comp1 is the assumption that consciousness is based on computation, and can't be created by anything else (at least that's comp1 in a simple form - actually, I believe it's the assumption that at some level physics is Turing emulable). On that basis, a brain must do computation (at some level), since it's conscious, and an AI could be conscious given the correct programme. There are two good justifications for computationalism that I can think of. One is the evolutionary one: that consciousness produces no effects of its own, so must be a side-effect of intelligent behaviour. The other is Chalmers' fading qualia argument. Neither of these justifications make a case for computation *exclusively* being responsible for consciousness. That is an added assumption, and at least in the first instance seems unnecessary. (And what's wrong with sneaked ?) I was trying to be faintly amusing, but I see that snuck may have sneaked into the language: http://dictionary.reference.com/help/faq/language/g08.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Quran Audio
A good resource for listening to Quran Recitation in Arabic plus Translation for anyone interested in listening to he Quran: http://www.quranexplorer.com/quran/ Samiya -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
What comp - or any theory of physics - has to show is that observers will experience the passage of time. SR for example posits a block universe, which at first sight might not seem to allow for us to experience time. But of course it does, even though the whole 4D structure is already there in some sense. Not because we crawl up world-lines as Weyl poetically put it, but because each moment along our world-line contains a capsule memory of earlier moments, but not later ones. (The later ones are just as already there as the earlier ones, according to the theory, but the laws of physics are structured in a way that means they aren't accessible.) Similarly, comp needs to show that observer moments will contain memories of other observer moments, but only those that existed earlier in the sequences of computations that gave rise to the current moment. This isn't physical time, whatever that is, but it does involve that certain laws apply to computation. None of this is known, or proven, of course, but the concept is well understood (as fro example in October the First is too Late) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On Tue, Jun 09, 2015 at 02:32:13PM +1200, LizR wrote: On 9 June 2015 at 14:10, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Tuesday, June 9, 2015, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: (And what's wrong with sneaked ?) I was trying to be faintly amusing, but I see that snuck may have sneaked into the language: http://dictionary.reference.com/help/faq/language/g08.html Not yet, by gad! It's still non-standard... Also, I see 'slinked' has slunk off. I have a theory that some verbs oscilate between weak and strong forms on some kind of multigenerational timescale. I was brought up saying snuck, lit, dove rather than sneaked, lighted and dived, for example. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 9 June 2015 at 05:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hmm Let us be precise. That the computation take place in arithmetic is a mathematical fact that nobody doubt today. UDA explains only that we cannot use a notion of primitive matter for making more real some computations in place of others. It makes the physics supervening on all computations in arithmetic. But my computer does some computations and not others. So there must be some sense in which some computations are real and others aren't. Handwaving that they're all there in arithmetic proves too much. I don't see that. Surely the problem is that it doesn't prove *enough* - assuming all computations exist (in some sense) in arithmetic, which I believe is trivially true to most mathematicians, how does this produce physics? If you're going to use a comp style explanation, your computer isn't defining which computations are real, it's somehow being generated by all those abstract computations. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 6/8/2015 4:16 PM, LizR wrote: On 9 June 2015 at 05:31, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: or that maths exists independently of mathematicians. That even just arithmetical truth is independent of mathematician. This is important because everyone agree with any axiomatic of the numbers, but that is not the case for analysis, real numbers, etc. Everyone agrees on ZFC in the same sense. So does that make set theory and its consequences real? Reality isn't defined by what everyone agrees on. Tell it to Bruno, I was just following him. What makes ZFC (or whatever) real, or not, is whether it kicks back. Mathematics doesn't kick back - except metaphorically. Is it something that was invented, and could equally well have been invented differently, or was it discovered as a result of following a chain of logical reasoning from certain axioms? I'd say ZFC and arithmetic were both invented and then an axiomatization was invented for each of them. I'm not sure what invented differently means?...getting to the same axiomatization by a different historical path? Or inventing something similar, but not identical, as ZF is different from ZFC. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 9 June 2015 at 14:00, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 6/8/2015 4:16 PM, LizR wrote: On 9 June 2015 at 05:31, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: or that maths exists independently of mathematicians. That even just arithmetical truth is independent of mathematician. This is important because everyone agree with any axiomatic of the numbers, but that is not the case for analysis, real numbers, etc. Everyone agrees on ZFC in the same sense. So does that make set theory and its consequences real? Reality isn't defined by what everyone agrees on. Tell it to Bruno, I was just following him. If it was then the religious majority throughout history would have been right. What makes ZFC (or whatever) real, or not, is whether it kicks back. Mathematics doesn't kick back - except metaphorically. Are you claiming an alien in another galaxy wouldn't find that arithmetic works? I'm not making any metaphysical claims about the status of maths, merely saying that most mathematicians would, I think, agree that two people working independently can make the same mathematical discovery by different routes, and that some maths has real-world applications, and that when it does, it works. (But I'm not sure how much kicking back you need from something, maybe being independently discoverable and working isn't enough?) Is it something that was invented, and could equally well have been invented differently, or was it discovered as a result of following a chain of logical reasoning from certain axioms? I'd say ZFC and arithmetic were both invented and then an axiomatization was invented for each of them. I'm not sure what invented differently means?...getting to the same axiomatization by a different historical path? Or inventing something similar, but not identical, as ZF is different from ZFC. It means that two people starting from the same axioms and using the same system of logic came up with two different results (and neither made a mistake). If within a given system A always leads to B, then it's reasonable to say B is discovered - like, for example, a certain endgame in chess leading to a particular set of possible conclusions. But if within a system A can lead to B, C, D etc then it's reasonable to say it's invented, like a competition to finish (within the grammatical system of English) a poem that begins And now the end is near... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 9 June 2015 at 11:26, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: LizR wrote: Reality isn't defined by what everyone agrees on. What makes ZFC (or whatever) real, or not, is whether it kicks back. Is it something that was invented, and could equally well have been invented differently, or was it discovered as a result of following a chain of logical reasoning from certain axioms? Why do not those same arguments apply equally to arithmetic? What axioms led to arithmetic? Could one have chosen different axioms? The arguments do apply. The point is that once the axioms are chosen, the results that follow are not a matter of choice. Arithmetical truths appear to take the form if A, then (necessarily) B. However, some of the elementary axioms (or even perhaps axions! :-) do appear to be demonstrated by nature - certain numerical quantities are (apparently) conserved in fundamental particle interactions, quantum fluctuations can only occur in ways that balance energy budgets, etc. So one could say that for anyone of a materialist persuasion, the assumptions of elementary arithmetic aren't unreasonable, at least (Bruno often mentions that comp only assumes some very simple arithmetical axioms - the existence of numbers and the correctness of addition and multiplication, I think) So if you choose Peano arithmetic, then such-and-such follows, while if you choose modular arithmetic, something else follows. The kicking back part is simply the fact that the same result always follows from a given set of assumptions. To put it a bit more dramatically, an alien being in a different galaxy, or even in another universe, would still get the same results. Nature is telling us that given A, we always get B. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Pigeons offend Islam
This is stupid on so many levels, even on the most basic factual one: You can't see the genitals of a pigeon. They're covered by feathers. You have to poke them to get them even expose their genitals. Brent On 6/8/2015 4:52 PM, LizR wrote: Support for this is (ahem) dropping... On 9 June 2015 at 07:35, spudboy100 via Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com wrote: A Coo-Coo Fatwa -Original Message- From: John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sat, Jun 6, 2015 12:15 pm Subject: Pigeons offend Islam ISIS recently banned pigeon breeding because when the birds fly overhead they expose their genitals and that is a sin against Islam. Violators will be publicly flogged. http://rt.com/news/264673-isis-breeding-birds-islam/ John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 9 June 2015 at 14:10, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Tuesday, June 9, 2015, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: (And what's wrong with sneaked ?) I was trying to be faintly amusing, but I see that snuck may have sneaked into the language: http://dictionary.reference.com/help/faq/language/g08.html Not yet, by gad! It's still non-standard... Also, I see 'slinked' has slunk off. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 6/8/2015 7:41 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Jun 09, 2015 at 02:32:13PM +1200, LizR wrote: On 9 June 2015 at 14:10, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Tuesday, June 9, 2015, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: (And what's wrong with sneaked ?) I was trying to be faintly amusing, but I see that snuck may have sneaked into the language: http://dictionary.reference.com/help/faq/language/g08.html Not yet, by gad! It's still non-standard... Also, I see 'slinked' has slunk off. I have a theory that some verbs oscilate between weak and strong forms on some kind of multigenerational timescale. I was brought up saying snuck, lit, dove rather than sneaked, lighted and dived, for example. I recently heard a linguist speak on this and his theory was that as a language spreads as a second language, i.e. is learned by adults, it tends to become more regular - and English is the prime example. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 9 June 2015 at 05:31, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: or that maths exists independently of mathematicians. That even just arithmetical truth is independent of mathematician. This is important because everyone agree with any axiomatic of the numbers, but that is not the case for analysis, real numbers, etc. Everyone agrees on ZFC in the same sense. So does that make set theory and its consequences real? Reality isn't defined by what everyone agrees on. What makes ZFC (or whatever) real, or not, is whether it kicks back. Is it something that was invented, and could equally well have been invented differently, or was it discovered as a result of following a chain of logical reasoning from certain axioms? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 6/8/2015 4:13 PM, LizR wrote: On 9 June 2015 at 05:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hmm Let us be precise. That the computation take place in arithmetic is a mathematical fact that nobody doubt today. UDA explains only that we cannot use a notion of primitive matter for making more real some computations in place of others. It makes the physics supervening on all computations in arithmetic. But my computer does some computations and not others. So there must be some sense in which some computations are real and others aren't. Handwaving that they're all there in arithmetic proves too much. I don't see that. Surely the problem is that it doesn't prove /enough/ - assuming all computations exist (in some sense) in arithmetic, which I believe is trivially true to most mathematicians, how does this produce physics? If you're going to use a comp style explanation, your computer isn't defining which computations are real, it's somehow being generated by all those abstract computations. And all those abstract computations are also generating all possible instances of my computer computing all possible computations, plus many others which are not nomologically possible. So when Bruno says we cannot use a notion of primitive matter for making more real some computations in place of others my question becomes, Ok, what can we use, because some computations ARE more real than others. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Pigeons offend Islam
Support for this is (ahem) dropping... On 9 June 2015 at 07:35, spudboy100 via Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com wrote: A Coo-Coo Fatwa -Original Message- From: John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sat, Jun 6, 2015 12:15 pm Subject: Pigeons offend Islam ISIS recently banned pigeon breeding because when the birds fly overhead they expose their genitals and that is a sin against Islam. Violators will be publicly flogged. http://rt.com/news/264673-isis-breeding-birds-islam/ John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On Monday, June 8, 2015, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2015, at 03:30, Bruce Kellett wrote: My point was that in order for time to emerge from a block universe certain structure was necessary -- Well, this is doirectly false with comp, in the sense that all you need is the emulation of a brain of a person believing in time, and those exists all in the block mindscape constituted in a tiny part of arithmetic. No, it is not false. Even with comp. If the block universe is to have an inherent time dimension, than that structure is essential, whether it comes from primitive materialism or from comp, it cannot be avoided. If for no other reason than that is what we see when we look around us. we need a 4-dim manifold with a local Lorentzian metric, and physical events must be arranged with a particular structure on this manifold -- they cannot just be arranged at haphazard. So the way events are embedded is in fact crucial. Yes, but that occurs easily, as we need only the brain emulation. The problem is that we get too much aberrant dreams, and thus an inflation of possibilities. But the math parts shows that self-reference put the eaxct constraints required to have a measure on the consistent continuations, even a quantum one. So then why do we get too many aberrant dreams? You contradict yourself. If the necessary structure drops out easily from comp, then show it, and show why we see what we see and not the white rabbits. The question is then whether this 4 dimensional manifold with a local Lorentzian metric exists in arithmetic? It does not have to exist in arithmetic, it needs to be recoverable from the FPI in arithmetic. Is there a difference? It might exist in arithmetic, and not have the right measure. it might also not exist in arithmetic, but recoverable from the FPI. or both case can be true: it exists in arithmetic, and is recoverable from the FPI. In that case the measure would be computable, and I doubt this is possible, but fundamentally, it is an open problem. of course, approximation of it exists in arithmetic. Arithmetic contains all simulations of all physical phenomena, with 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, ... 100^100, ... decimals exact. In other words, you don't have a clue either. If not, there is no possibility for a time variable in arithmetic per se, and consequently nothing can 'emerge' from arithmetic, since emergence is a temporal concept. We need only the dital time to get the digital brain emulation, to get the arithmetical mindscape. If a physical time emerges or not remains to be seen. Note that S4Grz1 and X1* logic already brought a subjective time. If you don't get physical time, then your theory is a failure. Getting subjective or mental time is not enough, since clocks do not run according to our subjective impression of the passage of time. Note that it is important to distinguish between structures that can be described mathematically and the structure of arithmetic or mathematics themselves. Yes. Quite important. Even after the reversal, although physics is made purely arithmetical, it is only through machine's psychology and theology that this happens, and the science physics are explained to be different from the mathematical science. For example mathematical (arithmetical) existence is some thing like ExP(x), but physical existence is [2]2Ex [2]2P(x). Physics remains untouched by comp., except it is put on logico-arithmetical grounds. What change is physicalism in metaphysics. It becomes testable, and false if comp is true. But comp is false, as has been demonstrated by many observations. Strong AI, or the possibility that part or all of your brain can be emulated by a computer does not entail that consciousness is only a computation. Nor does it entail that only computations can be conscious. In fact, it is quite difficult to come up with a definition of computation such that only computers and brains perform computations. The structure of a Turing machine can be emulated by a rock, for instance. On that last point, the conclusion is either that computationalism is false or the physical supervenience part of computationalism is false, as Bruno claims. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
LizR wrote: What comp - or any theory of physics - has to show is that observers will experience the passage of time. SR for example posits a block universe, which at first sight might not seem to allow for us to experience time. But of course it does, even though the whole 4D structure is already there in some sense. The block universe idea is just a picturesque way of describing the way space and time are 'mixed up' (within the bounds of the light cone) by Lorentz transformations in special relativity. As I have said before, the important feature of the SR structure is that there is an absolute separation between spacelike and timelike surfaces or world lines. The subjective experience of time is not part of the relativistic model -- time is given by the behaviour of clocks, and specifically, clocks are physical systems that obey the laws of physics. The oscillations of certain defined transitions in the caesium atom are used to define the standard for physical time. Not because we crawl up world-lines as Weyl poetically put it, but because each moment along our world-line contains a capsule memory of earlier moments, but not later ones. The 'time capsule' idea is a recent proposal by Julian Barbour. Special relativity says nothing about such things. SR is, in fact, completely indifferent to the direction of time -- the equations are time symmetric. (The later ones are just as already there as the earlier ones, according to the theory, but the laws of physics are structured in a way that means they aren't accessible.) Similarly, comp needs to show that observer moments will contain memories of other observer moments, but only those that existed earlier in the sequences of computations that gave rise to the current moment. This isn't physical time, whatever that is, but it does involve that certain laws apply to computation. Well, maybe comp can do this, but it seems to me that it is more important to extract the behaviour of caesium atoms (physical clocks). The 1p experience of time comes from the fact that we are physical creatures embedded in a physical world that has a well-defined concept of time, given in terms of dynamical physical processes. Either comp can give this, or comp is totally useless. The 1p experience has to relate to intersubjective agreement (the 3p picture), or it cannot reproduce physics. None of this is known, or proven, of course, but the concept is well understood (as fro example in October the First is too Late) You should not get your physics from science fiction stories -- they are seldom a reliable source. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 6/8/2015 7:30 PM, LizR wrote: On 9 June 2015 at 14:00, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 6/8/2015 4:16 PM, LizR wrote: On 9 June 2015 at 05:31, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: or that maths exists independently of mathematicians. That even just arithmetical truth is independent of mathematician. This is important because everyone agree with any axiomatic of the numbers, but that is not the case for analysis, real numbers, etc. Everyone agrees on ZFC in the same sense. So does that make set theory and its consequences real? Reality isn't defined by what everyone agrees on. Tell it to Bruno, I was just following him. If it was then the religious majority throughout history would have been right. What makes ZFC (or whatever) real, or not, is whether it kicks back. Mathematics doesn't kick back - except metaphorically. Are you claiming an alien in another galaxy wouldn't find that arithmetic works? No. Is that what you mean by kicks back? I'm not making any metaphysical claims about the status of maths, merely saying that most mathematicians would, I think, agree that two people working independently can make the same mathematical discovery by different routes, and that some maths has real-world applications, and that when it does, it works. Arithmetic is a hard example to discuss because it is so simple and probably even hardwired into our thinking by evolution (crows can supposedly add and subtract up to six), but it's not really so inevitable as it seems. In order to count you have to discern distinct objects and group them in imagination into a whole: So you count the players on a college football team (U.S.) and you get 105. Then you count the number on the basketball team of the same school, 35, and you add them to the football team you get 140 - but that may well be wrong. Of course you will say that's just a misapplication; but that's the point, that arithmetic is an abstraction that is invented to apply to certain cases and it is no more out there than other aspects of language. I agree that it's hard to imagine an intelligent species that doesn't perceive discrete countable objects and didn't invent arithmetic to describe them; maybe some plasma being on the surface of the the Sun that thinks only in continua. (But I'm not sure how much kicking back you need from something, maybe being independently discoverable and working isn't enough?) Is it something that was invented, and could equally well have been invented differently, or was it discovered as a result of following a chain of logical reasoning from certain axioms? I'd say ZFC and arithmetic were both invented and then an axiomatization was invented for each of them. I'm not sure what invented differently means?...getting to the same axiomatization by a different historical path? Or inventing something similar, but not identical, as ZF is different from ZFC. It means that two people starting from the same axioms and using the same system of logic came up with two different results (and neither made a mistake). That would mean either the axiom system was inconsistent or there was a mistake in logic. Note that Graham Priest has written several books on para-consistent logics, ones in which there can be contradictions but don't support /ex falso quodlibet/. If within a given system A always leads to B, then it's reasonable to say B is discovered - like, for example, a certain endgame in chess leading to a particular set of possible conclusions. ?? At first reading I thought you meant A logically implies B, which means B is implicit in A. And so I thought the example was a chess endgame in which every move is forced (except resignation), A would be the board position and B the sequence of endgame moves. But then you say B is a set of possible conclusions. Since chess is a finite game the starting position already leads to a */set/* of possible conclusions. But if within a system A can lead to B, C, D etc then it's reasonable to say it's invented, So does the fact that Peano arithmetic lead to many different theorems mean it's invented? Does the fact that it's incomplete and can have infinitely many new axioms added to it mean it's invented? I don't think your criterion for distinguishing invented from discovered reflects common usage. like a competition to finish (within the grammatical system of English) a poem that begins And now the end is near... And so I face the final curtain My friend I'll say it clear I'll state my case of which I'm certain Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
LizR wrote: On 9 June 2015 at 11:26, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: LizR wrote: Reality isn't defined by what everyone agrees on. What makes ZFC (or whatever) real, or not, is whether it kicks back. Is it something that was invented, and could equally well have been invented differently, or was it discovered as a result of following a chain of logical reasoning from certain axioms? Why do not those same arguments apply equally to arithmetic? What axioms led to arithmetic? Could one have chosen different axioms? The arguments do apply. The point is that once the axioms are chosen, the results that follow are not a matter of choice. Arithmetical truths appear to take the form if A, then (necessarily) B. However, some of the elementary axioms (or even perhaps axions! :-) do appear to be demonstrated by nature - certain numerical quantities are (apparently) conserved in fundamental particle interactions, quantum fluctuations can only occur in ways that balance energy budgets, etc. Yes, exactly. That is why I would say that arithmetic is invented as a codification of our experience of the physical world. If we had chosen a set of axioms that did not reproduce the results of simple addition -- add two pebbles to the two already there, to give four in total -- then we would have abandoned that set of axioms long ago. Axiom systems are evaluated in terms of their utility, nothing else. In more advanced mathematics, utility might be measured in terms of simplicity and fruitfulness for further applications. But in the beginning, as with arithmetic and simple geometry/trigonometry and so on, utility is measured entirely in terms of the applicability to the experienced physical world, and of the utility of the system in helping us live in that world. So one could say that for anyone of a materialist persuasion, the assumptions of elementary arithmetic aren't unreasonable, at least (Bruno often mentions that comp only assumes some very simple arithmetical axioms - the existence of numbers and the correctness of addition and multiplication, I think) So if you choose Peano arithmetic, then such-and-such follows, while if you choose modular arithmetic, something else follows. The kicking back part is simply the fact that the same result always follows from a given set of assumptions. Given a set of axioms and some agreed rules of inference, the same results always follow, regardless of by whom or at what time the application is made. This is not what is usually referred to as kicking back. Johnson did not apply some axioms and rules of inference in answer to the idealists, he kicked a stone. To put it a bit more dramatically, an alien being in a different galaxy, or even in another universe, would still get the same results. Nature is telling us that given A, we always get B. Nature doesn't particularly tell us that. Rigorous application of the rules of inference to certain axioms tells us that. The physics might, after all, be different in a different universe, but using the same rules of inference on the same axioms will give the same result, regardless of the local physical laws. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 08 Jun 2015, at 04:14, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Jun 7, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: that is enough to conceive the set of the Gödel number of true sentences of arithmetic, and prove theorems about that set. That set can be defined in standard set theory YOU CAN'T MAKE A COMPUTATION WITH A DEFINITION! I can do better. I can prove their existence in arithmetic. Half of your theory is true but trivial, the other half is not trivial and not true. You don't know the other half. You said repeatedly that you never find the need to read after step 3. Because step 3 of you proof was S-T-U-P-I-D. Fix it We have shown that my proof fix it at the start, but you made only one half of the proof. You forget to put yourself at the place of each continuators, and analyse their first person discourses. More than 4 people have tried to explain this to you, and you are the only person disagreeing with this, for still unknown reason, as we have shown you were invalid. Bruno and I'll keep reading until I see the next stupid thing. . John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 08 Jun 2015, at 06:31, LizR wrote (to Brent) Note that Bruno rejects the conditioning on justified. Plato's Theaetetus dialogue defines knowledge as true belief. I think that's a deficiency in modal logic insofar as it's supposed to formalize good informal reasoning. But I can see why it's done; it's difficult if not impossible to give formal definition of justified. Yes. See my answer to brent. The whole AUDA is made possible because we do have an excellent axiomatisation of justification. The theory applies to all consistent continuations of anyone believing in RA or PA axioms. Then INFORMAL justification, is obtained by the move []p to []p p, made possible by the fact that incompleteness implies they obey quite different logics. There is no modal logic. Only arithmetical machine self-reference logics. It just happens that modal logic simplifies a lot the calculus. Like tensor analysis simplifies general relativity, but is not part of the theory itself which is concerned with space-time and gravity. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 08 Jun 2015, at 01:14, meekerdb wrote: On 6/7/2015 3:00 PM, LizR wrote: On 8 June 2015 at 05:08, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 07 Jun 2015, at 18:35, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Jun 6, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: An event is just a place and a time; are you saying that mathematics is incapable of handling 4 coordinates? Of course, applied mathematics exists, and you can represent event in mathematics, but you shopuld not confuse something (a physical event) and its mathematical representation. I am not confusing that but I think sometimes you might be confusing a physical thing with the language (mathematics) the descriptive representation of the thing is presented in. Or maybe not, maybe you're right and mathematics is more than just a language and is more fundamental than physics; nobody knows including you. Nobody can know. But we can reason from hypothesis. With the computationalist hypothesis, the immateriality of consciousness is contagious on the possible environment. Nobody pretends this is obvious, especially for people stuck at the step 3. The question being asked is, why hypothesis best explains consciousness? Comp attempts to take the default materialist assumption, that consciousness is a (very, very complicated) form of computation, and to derive results from that assumption. Hence what I've called comp1 is the default materialist hypothesis (also known as the strong AI thesis, I think) - this is more or less equivalent to the idea that a computer could, given a suitable programme and resources, be conscious. From this Bruno attempts to show, via a chain of reasoning, that the computations involved have to take place in arithmetical reality (Platonia). This conclusion I call comp2. The task of anyone who disagrees is simply to show that comp2 doesn't follow from comp1. There are various ways to try to show this. One is to doubt the starting assumptions (comp1). The starting assumptions include the idea that simple arithmetic exists independently of mathematicians - that 2+2=4 was true in the big bang, for example. I think that assumes that true and exist are the same thing. You have said this often, but that does not make sense. But we do believe in classical logic, and so accept the rule P(n) === ExP(x), for n being any number. So we do accept that 2+2=4 is enough to infer that it exist a number x such that 2 + x = 4. One can affirm that Watson was Holmes assistant without admitting that either one existed. ... existed in our local physical reality. But if define precisely enough, we can show that Watson exists in arithmetic, plausibly not in a way directly accessible to us. So while everyone agrees that 2+2=4 by definition, it's not so clear that arithmetic objects exist. It is as much clear than when you say that prime number exists. And it is explained how to recover physical existence from it. It is phenomenologic existence, of the type [2]2Ex [2]2 P(x), with [2] being the box of the Z1*, X1* or the S4Grz1 mathematics. The universe appears to obey certain bits of methematics to high precision, or alternatively you could say that various bits of maths appear to correctly describe the behaviour of the universe and its constituents to high precision. So that is the which comes first? question, which as you correctly say we can't know (indeed we can't know anything, if know means justified true belief, apart from the fact that we are conscious, as Descartes mentioned). Note that Bruno rejects the conditioning on justified. Plato's Theaetetus dialogue defines knowledge as true belief. I think that's a deficiency in modal logic insofar as it's supposed to formalize good informal reasoning. But I can see why it's done; it's difficult if not impossible to give formal definition of justified. On the contrary. Gödel provides a formal justification of justify which I take as equiavalent with proof, that is Gödel's beweisbar. So I don't reject the conditionning on justify, I exploit it. Then informal justification is given by the Thaetetical variant []p p. It obeys S4, it is not 3p definable by the machine, and so is not formalizable (although it is meta-formalizable at the proposotional level), ... So one can doubt comp1 by doubting either that consciousness is a computation, or that maths exists independently of mathematicians. Then one can doubt the steps of the argument. I personally find little to doubt, assuming comp1, until we reach step 7 or 8, or whichever step is the MGA. (There has been a lot of heat about pronouns, but as far as I can see this hasn't made a dent in the arguments presented.) So the other main point of attack is at the comp2 end, so to speak, with the MGA. There is Brent's light cone argument, which IMHO seems unconvincing because one can make a cut
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 08 Jun 2015, at 04:31, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Jun 7, 2015 at meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: everyone agrees that 2+2=4 by definition, it's not so clear that arithmetic objects exist. If 2+2=4 exists then 2+2=5 does too. 2+2 is true. That's all. Platonia may contain all true statements but it contains all false statement as well The physical reality too, once we make sense of what you say. This does not make the Moon into Mars. Same in Platonia: 2+2=5 is false there, and that is enough. and even Platonia has no way to completely separate the two. Platonia separates them by definition of Platonia. And that can be proved in set theory, or second order arithmetic (that you need to define mathematically Platonia (arithmetical truth). Bruno And there are many ways to be wrong but only one way to be right. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On 08 Jun 2015, at 00:00, LizR wrote: On 8 June 2015 at 05:08, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 07 Jun 2015, at 18:35, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Jun 6, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: An event is just a place and a time; are you saying that mathematics is incapable of handling 4 coordinates? Of course, applied mathematics exists, and you can represent event in mathematics, but you shopuld not confuse something (a physical event) and its mathematical representation. I am not confusing that but I think sometimes you might be confusing a physical thing with the language (mathematics) the descriptive representation of the thing is presented in. Or maybe not, maybe you're right and mathematics is more than just a language and is more fundamental than physics; nobody knows including you. Nobody can know. But we can reason from hypothesis. With the computationalist hypothesis, the immateriality of consciousness is contagious on the possible environment. Nobody pretends this is obvious, especially for people stuck at the step 3. The question being asked is, why hypothesis best explains consciousness? Comp attempts to take the default materialist assumption, that consciousness is a (very, very complicated) form of computation, and to derive results from that assumption. The materialist assumption is that there is a primitive physical universe, and that we are conscious because we have a phsical body containing a computer doing relevant computation. This is shown to be an epistemological nonsense, or to be based on a god-of-the-gap type of move. The way I define comp1 is a much weaker hypothesis, a priori neutral. It is the hypothesis that my consciousness does not change if my brain is replaced by a digital physical brain emulating my brain at some level. It is ontologically neutral (matter is not taken as primitively existing). Then, the goal is not to explain consciousness per se, but to show that any explanation of consciousness will necessitate an entire explanation of the physical appearance without using the assumption of primitive matter. UDA shows that the materialist assumption is incompatible with the computationalist one, even when used in that weak sense. Consciousness itself is then explained by computer science, but that is done in AUDA, not in UDA, which strictly speaking just expose the problem. Hence what I've called comp1 is the default materialist hypothesis (also known as the strong AI thesis, I think) Comp1 is not comp, even if it is comp for a materialist: but that position is proved to be nonsense. Comp is just I am a digitalizable machine. String AI is the thesis that machine can think (be conscious). It does not logically entail comp. Machine can think, but does not need to be the only thinking entities. Gods and goddesses might be able to think too. - this is more or less equivalent to the idea that a computer could, given a suitable programme and resources, be conscious. From this Bruno attempts to show, via a chain of reasoning, that the computations involved have to take place in arithmetical reality (Platonia). Hmm Let us be precise. That the computation take place in arithmetic is a mathematical fact that nobody doubt today. UDA explains only that we cannot use a notion of primitive matter for making more real some computations in place of others. It makes the physics supervening on all computations in arithmetic. This conclusion I call comp2. The task of anyone who disagrees is simply to show that comp2 doesn't follow from comp1. There are various ways to try to show this. One is to doubt the starting assumptions (comp1). The starting assumptions include the idea that simple arithmetic exists independently of mathematicians - that 2+2=4 was true in the big bang, for example. I always intuit that you get the thing, but express it in a slightly misleading way. To say that 2+2=4 was true in the big bang does not really make sense, as an arithmetical proposition is true out of time and space. mathematical propositions are not depending on physics. The universe appears to obey certain bits of methematics to high precision, or alternatively you could say that various bits of maths appear to correctly describe the behaviour of the universe and its constituents to high precision. So that is the which comes first? question, which as you correctly say we can't know (indeed we can't know anything, if know means justified true belief, apart from the fact that we are conscious, as Descartes mentioned). Why? If you define to know by true belief, then we might be able to know things. may be we do know that 2+2=4, because we believe it, and it might also be true. (It is my fault, because someone I use to know in the non theaetetical sense of know for sure. So one can doubt comp1 by doubting either that
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 8 June 2015 at 13:30, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: You started with Tegmark's idea that time and events are emergent from an underlying timeless mathematical structure. My point was that in order for time to emerge from a block universe certain structure was necessary -- we need a 4-dim manifold with a local Lorentzian metric, and physical events must be arranged with a particular structure on this manifold -- they cannot just be arranged at haphazard. So the way events are embedded is in fact crucial. Yes. In fact that's what I said, too, so I'm hardly going to argue. The question is then whether this 4 dimensional manifold with a local Lorentzian metric exists in arithmetic? Or whatever TOE underlies it, yes. If not, there is no possibility for a time variable in arithmetic per se, and consequently nothing can 'emerge' from arithmetic, since emergence is a temporal concept. No it isn't, not in the sense being used here. The concept that is relevant in this case is ontological priority. If you think emergence is temporal then you will get very confused by discussions of the MUH (or even of how the universe arises as a 4D manifold from the laws of physics) Note that it is important to distinguish between structures that can be described mathematically and the structure of arithmetic or mathematics themselves. Of course. I hope we all agree that the finger isn't the Moon. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 08 Jun 2015, at 03:30, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: On 6 June 2015 at 11:26, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: LizR wrote: This is true if events have an existence apart from maths. However, that is still being debated. Tegmark's mathematical universe hypothesis suggests that time and events are emergent from an underlying timeless mathematical structure. To take something that is (hopefully) less contentious, the block universe of special relativity already suggests something similar to this. In relativity, all chains of events are embedded in a space-time manifold, and hence causation comes down to how world-lines are arranged within this structure. This is not true. Causality is still a fundamental consideration in SR, and that carries over into the basic structure of quantum field theory. Even within the block universe model, the light cone structure of spacetime is fundamental. The light cone encapsulates the fundamental insight of SR that causal influences cannot propagate faster than the speed of light -- the light cone is the limiting extent of causal structure. The laws of physics consistent with this structure in SR and beyond are have a (local) Lorentz symmetry, which preserves the causal structure between different Lorentz frames. The distinction between time-like and space-like separations of events is aa fundamental tenet of physical law. None of this contradicts what I said. All I am concerned with is that SR indicates that events are embedded in a 4D continuum. Describing how they're embedded doesn't change that. You started with Tegmark's idea that time and events are emergent from an underlying timeless mathematical structure. Something proved to be the case, well before, in the case we assume computationalism. In that case, there is no more choice in the matter. tegmark assumption becomes (well was already before) a theorem of computationalist cognitive science. My point was that in order for time to emerge from a block universe certain structure was necessary -- Well, this is doirectly false with comp, in the sense that all you need is the emulation of a brain of a person believing in time, and those exists all in the block mindscape constituted in a tiny part of arithmetic. we need a 4-dim manifold with a local Lorentzian metric, and physical events must be arranged with a particular structure on this manifold -- they cannot just be arranged at haphazard. So the way events are embedded is in fact crucial. Yes, but that occurs easily, as we need only the brain emulation. The problem is that we get too much aberrant dreams, and thus an inflation of possibilities. But the math parts shows that self-reference put the eaxct constraints required to have a measure on the consistent continuations, even a quantum one. The question is then whether this 4 dimensional manifold with a local Lorentzian metric exists in arithmetic? It does not have to exist in arithmetic, it needs to be recoverable from the FPI in arithmetic. It might exist in arithmetic, and not have the right measure. it might also not exist in arithmetic, but recoverable from the FPI. or both case can be true: it exists in arithmetic, and is recoverable from the FPI. In that case the measure would be computable, and I doubt this is possible, but fundamentally, it is an open problem. of course, approximation of it exists in arithmetic. Arithmetic contains all simulations of all physical phenomena, with 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, ... 100^100, ... decimals exact. If not, there is no possibility for a time variable in arithmetic per se, and consequently nothing can 'emerge' from arithmetic, since emergence is a temporal concept. We need only the dital time to get the digital brain emulation, to get the arithmetical mindscape. If a physical time emerges or not remains to be seen. Note that S4Grz1 and X1* logic already brought a subjective time. Note that it is important to distinguish between structures that can be described mathematically and the structure of arithmetic or mathematics themselves. Yes. Quite important. Even after the reversal, although physics is made purely arithmetical, it is only through machine's psychology and theology that this happens, and the science physics are explained to be different from the mathematical science. For example mathematical (arithmetical) existence is some thing like ExP(x), but physical existence is [2]2Ex [2]2P(x). Physics remains untouched by comp., except it is put on logico-arithmetical grounds. What change is physicalism in metaphysics. It becomes testable, and false if comp is true. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
LizR wrote: On 8 June 2015 at 13:30, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: If not, there is no possibility for a time variable in arithmetic per se, and consequently nothing can 'emerge' from arithmetic, since emergence is a temporal concept. No it isn't, not in the sense being used here. The concept that is relevant in this case is ontological priority. If you think emergence is temporal then you will get very confused by discussions of the MUH (or even of how the universe arises as a 4D manifold from the laws of physics) Which law of physics gives rise to the 4D manifold? It is my understanding that a 4D pseudo-Riemannian manifold was a basic postulate underlying general relativity -- if that hypothesis emerged from anything, then it came from the fact that space-time was observed to be a 4 dimensional structure. So the 4D manifold is not actually derived from anything other than observation. Kant made the mistake of thinking that Euclidean space was a necessary law of thought. Observation proved him wrong. Maybe observation also proves the MUH wrong? Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia
On Thu, Jun 4, 2015 at 1:59 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 04 Jun 2015, at 18:01, Terren Suydam wrote: On Wed, Jun 3, 2015 at 9:31 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 03 Jun 2015, at 14:58, Terren Suydam wrote: It would be like saying that bats' echolocation is an illusion. Not a perfect analogy, because a bat's facility for echolocation is rooted in its physiology, not constructed, but the point is that with both the ego and echolocation, the experiencer's consciousness is provided with a particular character it would not otherwise have been able to experience. I usually distinguish 8 forms of ego (the eight hypostases). Each time it is the sigma_1 reality, but viewed from a different angle. The illusion (with the negative connotations) are more in the confusion between two hypostases, than each hypostase per se. I am not sure we disagree, except on some choice of words. Bruno I agree that we agree :-) I agree with this to :) I know you've posted it in the past but can you point me to a summary of the original Plotinus model with the 8 hypostases? My cursory googling reveals only 3 attributed to Plotinus (One, Intellect, Soul). That is what Plotinus called the primary hypostases. But there is no secondary hypostases, but then some sholars, and myself, agree that his two matters ennead describes actually two (degenerate, secondary) hypostases. So in the enneads ypu have the three primary hypostases, which in the machine theology is given by truth (One, p), provable (Intellect, []p) and Soul (that we get with the theatetus idea on the One and Intellect, []p p), and the two matters: intelligible matter ([]p t) and sensible matter ([]p t p). One = p Intellect = []p (splits in two: G and G*) Soul = []p p (does not split: S4Grz) Intelligible matter = []p t (splits in two Z and Z*) Sensible matter = []p t p.(splits in two: X and X*). To get the propositional physics, you have to restrict the p on the sigma_1 truth (the computable, the UD-accessible states). For the neoplatonist; matter is almost where God loses control, and can't intervene, it is close to the FPI idea, as you know that even God cannot predict to you, when in Helsinki, where you will feel to be after the split. For the platonist, matter is really where even the form can't handle the indetermination. It is of the type ~[]#, or #. It is also the place giving rooms for the contingencies, and what we can hope and eventually build or recover. Bruno OK, so given a certain interpretation, some scholars added two hypostases to the original three. Then, it appears that you make a third interpretation by splitting the intellect, and the two matters. What justifies these splits? And can you make this justification in plain language in a way that doesn't appear to be a just so interpretation that makes it easier for AUDA to go through? Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2015, at 03:30, Bruce Kellett wrote: My point was that in order for time to emerge from a block universe certain structure was necessary -- Well, this is doirectly false with comp, in the sense that all you need is the emulation of a brain of a person believing in time, and those exists all in the block mindscape constituted in a tiny part of arithmetic. No, it is not false. Even with comp. If the block universe is to have an inherent time dimension, than that structure is essential, whether it comes from primitive materialism or from comp, it cannot be avoided. If for no other reason than that is what we see when we look around us. we need a 4-dim manifold with a local Lorentzian metric, and physical events must be arranged with a particular structure on this manifold -- they cannot just be arranged at haphazard. So the way events are embedded is in fact crucial. Yes, but that occurs easily, as we need only the brain emulation. The problem is that we get too much aberrant dreams, and thus an inflation of possibilities. But the math parts shows that self-reference put the eaxct constraints required to have a measure on the consistent continuations, even a quantum one. So then why do we get too many aberrant dreams? You contradict yourself. If the necessary structure drops out easily from comp, then show it, and show why we see what we see and not the white rabbits. The question is then whether this 4 dimensional manifold with a local Lorentzian metric exists in arithmetic? It does not have to exist in arithmetic, it needs to be recoverable from the FPI in arithmetic. Is there a difference? It might exist in arithmetic, and not have the right measure. it might also not exist in arithmetic, but recoverable from the FPI. or both case can be true: it exists in arithmetic, and is recoverable from the FPI. In that case the measure would be computable, and I doubt this is possible, but fundamentally, it is an open problem. of course, approximation of it exists in arithmetic. Arithmetic contains all simulations of all physical phenomena, with 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, ... 100^100, ... decimals exact. In other words, you don't have a clue either. If not, there is no possibility for a time variable in arithmetic per se, and consequently nothing can 'emerge' from arithmetic, since emergence is a temporal concept. We need only the dital time to get the digital brain emulation, to get the arithmetical mindscape. If a physical time emerges or not remains to be seen. Note that S4Grz1 and X1* logic already brought a subjective time. If you don't get physical time, then your theory is a failure. Getting subjective or mental time is not enough, since clocks do not run according to our subjective impression of the passage of time. Note that it is important to distinguish between structures that can be described mathematically and the structure of arithmetic or mathematics themselves. Yes. Quite important. Even after the reversal, although physics is made purely arithmetical, it is only through machine's psychology and theology that this happens, and the science physics are explained to be different from the mathematical science. For example mathematical (arithmetical) existence is some thing like ExP(x), but physical existence is [2]2Ex [2]2P(x). Physics remains untouched by comp., except it is put on logico-arithmetical grounds. What change is physicalism in metaphysics. It becomes testable, and false if comp is true. But comp is false, as has been demonstrated by many observations. Strong AI, or the possibility that part or all of your brain can be emulated by a computer does not entail that consciousness is only a computation. Nor does it entail that only computations can be conscious. In fact, it is quite difficult to come up with a definition of computation such that only computers and brains perform computations. The structure of a Turing machine can be emulated by a rock, for instance. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level
On Mon, Jun 8, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: that is enough to conceive the set of the Gödel number of true sentences of arithmetic, and prove theorems about that set. That set can be defined in standard set theory YOU CAN'T MAKE A COMPUTATION WITH A DEFINITION! I can do better. You can't do better than a demonstration! Just make one calculation without using matter that obeys the laws of physics and you've won and this debate is over. I can prove their existence in arithmetic. Nobody denies that true statements exist in arithmetic, but the trouble is false ones do too, and the only way known to sort one from the other is to use matter that obeys the laws of physics to make a calculation. You forget to put yourself at the place of each continuators, and analyse their first person discourses. And you forgot that when creating thought experiments designed to illuminate aspects of personal identity you can't talk about yourself and use personal pronouns in a casual willy nilly manner as you do in everyday life! More than 4 people have tried to explain this to you, and you are the only person disagreeing with this, Then I must be smarter than those 4 unnamed people. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
