On 29/07/2016 4:30 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 7/28/2016 11:11 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/07/2016 3:59 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
But they are not "one person". Although they share the same
memories of before the duplication that have different memories
afterward.
According to that argume
On 7/28/2016 11:11 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/07/2016 3:59 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 7/28/2016 10:20 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/07/2016 2:42 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 7/28/2016 9:20 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
That is one of the paradoxical aspects of duplication -- the
duplicat
On 29/07/2016 3:59 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 7/28/2016 10:20 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/07/2016 2:42 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 7/28/2016 9:20 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
That is one of the paradoxical aspects of duplication -- the
duplicates become different persons because of the dive
On 7/28/2016 10:20 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/07/2016 2:42 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 7/28/2016 9:20 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/07/2016 12:32 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 7/28/2016 6:55 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/07/2016 5:56 am, John Clark wrote:
If
computationalism
is co
On 29/07/2016 2:42 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 7/28/2016 9:20 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/07/2016 12:32 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 7/28/2016 6:55 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/07/2016 5:56 am, John Clark wrote:
If
computationalism
is correct then everything about "you" can be duplic
On 7/28/2016 9:20 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/07/2016 12:32 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 7/28/2016 6:55 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/07/2016 5:56 am, John Clark wrote:
If
computationalism
is correct then everything about "you" can be duplicated as long
at the atoms have the correct
On 29/07/2016 12:32 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 7/28/2016 6:55 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/07/2016 5:56 am, John Clark wrote:
If
computationalism
is correct then everything about "you" can be duplicated as long
at the atoms have the correct position and velocity, not almost
everything,
On 7/28/2016 6:55 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/07/2016 5:56 am, John Clark wrote:
If
computationalism
is correct then everything about "you" can be duplicated as long at
the atoms have the correct position and velocity, not almost
everything, not everything except for the 1-view, EVERYT
On 29/07/2016 5:56 am, John Clark wrote:
If
computationalism
is correct then everything about "you" can be duplicated as long at
the atoms have the correct position and velocity, not almost
everything, not everything except for the 1-view, EVERYTHING! If the
machine can't do that then
comp
From: Bruno Marchal
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:38 AM
Subject: Re: musings on time
On 26 Jul 2016, at 19:59, 'cdemorse...@yahoo.com' via Everything List wrote:
-- Original message--From: Bruno Marchal Date: Mon, 7/25/2016
7
On Thu, Jul 28, 2016 at 9:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> there are two 3-1 "I",
>
No idea what
"
two 3-1 "I"
" is
and very much doubt it is worth knowing.
> >
> Turing emulable telepathy.
>
No idea what
"
Turing emulable telepathy
" is
and very much doubt it is wo
On Thu, Jul 28, 2016 at 8:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>> >>
>>>
>>> "I" designates the M guy experience in Moscow, and the W experience of
>>> the W-guy in W.
>>
>>
>> >>
>> I know, and that's why that personal pronoun is ambiguous
>>
>
> >
> Only because you forget the 1-3 dif
On 28 Jul 2016, at 01:12, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Jul 27, 2016 at 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
>>> In the 1-view, which remain both unique from the 1-
view.
>> Then which one has THE UNIQUE 1-view, the
Moscow man or the Washington man?
> Both, from the 1-p views,
How
On 27 Jul 2016, at 18:59, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Jul 27, 2016 at 11:06 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
> "I" designates the M guy experience in Moscow, and the W
experience of the W-guy in W.
I know, and that's why that personal pronoun is ambiguous
Only because you forget the 1-3 d
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