On 7/28/2016 11:11 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/07/2016 3:59 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 7/28/2016 10:20 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/07/2016 2:42 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 7/28/2016 9:20 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
That is one of the paradoxical aspects of duplication -- the
duplicates become different persons because of the divergence of
experience. But, by the same token, their experiences differ from
the original, so how come they can be said to be the same person
as the original?
They both remember being that person.
Sure, and if that is your sole criterion of identity, they are still
the one person.
But they are not "one person". Although they share the same memories
of before the duplication that have different memories afterward.
According to that argument, you are not the "one person" from moment
to moment because you have different memories as new things happen to you.
I'm the one person I was a moment ago because I have all the memories of
that person and no one else has the memories I have and he doesn't.
Such considerations led some, such as Parfit, to question whether
personal identity was all that important, considering 'survival'
to be a more significant consideration. Survival as in
psychological continuity. So one could 'survive' as several. But
then, is one psychologically continuous with oneself as a foetus?
Insofar as my fetal state had a psychology, I'd say yes. It
doesn't seem any more problematic than being continuous with my
50yr old self.
Or your 70 yo. self reduced to a vegetative state?
I said "insofar as my state had a psychology". In a vegatative state
I'd say there is probably no survival of any psychology. There's
nothing to be continuous with. It's like following a road that turns
into a trail that turns into a path and finally becomes
unrecognizable from the rest of the terrain. Whether we call it "the
same" along it's length is just a semantic choice, analogous to
having a legal ruling on personhood.
But still, the common intuition is that the body on the bed after
severe head injury is still the same person as before -- just without
memories, though who can say if still conscious or not?
But I agree that it might not be the case empirically. Bruno,
based on his experimentation with salvia, seems to think there is
some essence or soul of Bruno which is indepedent of his memories
and hence of his past experience. If it's independent of
experience then it can't be bifurcated by experience.
That seems to be a perilously dualist position. Experience seems
to be important to personhood.
But maybe not explicit memories. If I suffered amnesia and didn't
remember any of my past life, I would still retain many
characteristics that would make me recognizable to my friends.
These may derive from experience, but they would be encoded in the
physics of my brain and wouldn't imply dualism.
No, but it does imply that memories are only one of the many
dimensions that are important in defining the self, or in
determining personal identity. Is physical continuity one of the
other important dimensions?
Physical continuity is a good indicator in the absence of duplicating
machines, but I don't think it's definitive. Consider the example of
multiple-personality-disorder, in which seemingly different persons
occupy the same body at different times.
Hence the no-branching condition in theories of personal identity.
Branching - recombining, both play havoc with one-one notions of
identity. So how is identity to be defined?
Why does it need to be defined? Why not recognize it is not a well
defined concept...like the end of a road. We need operational legal
definitions as to when a person is still competent to make decisions
about themselves...and those are pretty much in place. I imagine that
multiple-personality disorder has also caused some legal problems: Is
Eve White bound by the contract Eve Black signed? If duplicating
machines are ever invented then we can choose some rough and ready legal
definitions. But all this discussion of theories of personal identity
seems more about semantics and pronouns.
Brent
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