On 29/07/2016 4:30 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 7/28/2016 11:11 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/07/2016 3:59 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
But they are not "one person". Although they share the same
memories of before the duplication that have different memories
afterward.
According to that argument, you are not the "one person" from moment
to moment because you have different memories as new things happen to
you.
I'm the one person I was a moment ago because I have all the memories
of that person and no one else has the memories I have and he doesn't.
That adds another criterion to the argument. I have no difficulty with
that, but it needs to be made explicit that memories are not the only
criterion. But you have a problem if someone else does have the same
memories as you -- the case of ties in a closest continuer theory.
No, but it does imply that memories are only one of the many
dimensions that are important in defining the self, or in
determining personal identity. Is physical continuity one of the
other important dimensions?
Physical continuity is a good indicator in the absence of
duplicating machines, but I don't think it's definitive. Consider
the example of multiple-personality-disorder, in which seemingly
different persons occupy the same body at different times.
Hence the no-branching condition in theories of personal identity.
Branching - recombining, both play havoc with one-one notions of
identity. So how is identity to be defined?
Why does it need to be defined? Why not recognize it is not a well
defined concept...like the end of a road. We need operational legal
definitions as to when a person is still competent to make decisions
about themselves...and those are pretty much in place. I imagine that
multiple-personality disorder has also caused some legal problems: Is
Eve White bound by the contract Eve Black signed? If duplicating
machines are ever invented then we can choose some rough and ready
legal definitions. But all this discussion of theories of personal
identity seems more about semantics and pronouns.
I think the trouble originated in the use of personal pronouns. We have
legal problems which require working definitions that do not do too much
violence to intuition in difficult cases (duplicates, multiple
personalities, recombinations, etc). Normally, personal identity is a
transitive relation and there are no problems. However, I think it is
more than a merely semantic issue to sort out the meaning of identity
and/or survival in the difficult cases such as teletransportation and
duplication. Otherwise you end up in the muddle that characterizes the
exchange between Bruno and JKC.
Bruce
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