Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Wednesday, December 20, 2017 at 2:49:19 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/20/2017 3:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > You need to read the papers or ask question. The starting point (which 
> > is not obvious and requires the reading of the Universal Doevtailer 
> > Argument) is that you cannot have both a mechanist explanation of the 
> > mind, and physicalism. 
>
> This is false.  The argument doesn't show that.  In fact I think it 
> implies that the physical is necessary.  Bruno is found of saying that 
> it makes computation basic.  But computation apparently explains too 
> much.  So it is only by saying that somehow what we experience as mental 
> and physical is picked out does computationalism "explain" the world.  I 
> don't know why he insists on calling computationalism "mechanist" since 
> it has nothing to do with "mechanisms" or "mechanical". 
>
> Brent 
>

Without necessarily getting into information theory too deeply we can see 
that computation has some impact on the information theoretic scale of a 
system. An easy example is SU(2) vs SU(3). SU(2) has one weight, 
corresponding to two eigenvalues, and two roots that act as raising and 
lowering operation on the weight. This is seen in the standard spin model 
of fermions. The SU(3) model has two weights with three values, 
corresponding to the 3,3-bar representations of color charges, and 6 roots 
that transform between the weights. This has more computation and also more 
degrees of freedom. So the more computation there is, where a Feynman 
diagram could be thought of as a succession of operations or computations 
that raise or lower various quantum numbers by exchanging with other 
quantum numbers, the more degrees of freedom there are. 

LC

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[agrayson2000]

On Wednesday, December 20, 2017 at 11:44:47 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 19 Dec 2017, at 11:27, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, December 19, 2017 at 8:03:00 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, December 18, 2017 at 6:37:39 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 16 Dec 2017, at 19:00, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 9:20 PM,  wrote:
>>>
>>> ​> ​
 I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for Copenhagen. 
 According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system measured, which is 
 when the box is opened. What am I missing?

>>>
>>> ​
>>> According to
>>> ​ ​
>>> Copenhagen
>>> ​ ​
>>> Wigner's friend
>>> ​ ​
>>> opens the cat box and that 
>>> ​​
>>> collapses
>>> ​ ​
>>> the cat's wave function, and so Wigner's friend
>>> ​ ​
>>> now knows the cat's fate, but Wigner's friend
>>> ​ ​
>>> is also in a box and Wigner
>>> ​ ​
>>> himself is outside that box, so until Wigner opens his friend's box his 
>>> friend is in a "I see a dead cat" state AND a "I see a live cat state".  
>>> And of course you could put Wigner himself in a box with somebody outside 
>>> it and you could keep increasing the number of nested boxes until the 
>>> entire universe is included, and that is why the Copenhagen
>>> ​ ​
>>> interpretation is useless if you're 
>>> ​interest is in ​
>>> dealing in cosmology because there is nobody outside 
>>> ​to​
>>>  universe observe it.
>>>
>>>  And God 
>>> ​is of no help unless somebody knows who collapses God's wave function, 
>>> ​and even then there would be another unanswered question too obvious to 
>>> mention.
>>>
>>>
>>> And with Digital Mechanism, even a Universe cannot help. How could 
>>> *anything* select a computation, or a class of computations, among all 
>>> computations?
>>> But the first person associated to the universal numbers, involved in 
>>> the semi-computable relations, localized themselves in the relative way 
>>> allowed by the local self-referential correctness, apparently.
>>>
>>> Gödel's arithmetization of metamathematics  embed the mathematicians in 
>>> the arithmetical reality/truth/model (the structure (N, 0, +, x).
>>>
>>> Remarkably, incompleteness justfies the equivalence, at the truth level, 
>>> of all modes p, Bp, Bp & p, etc. , and the fact that the machine cannot 
>>> justify those equivalences, and that they obey quite different logics.
>>>
>>> Kant can be tested, by looking for time, space and the quantum "in the 
>>> head" of the universal machine. Apparently he is right.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>
>> *Translation: CMIIAW: Mumbo Jumbo  OR  There is a God. His name is Plato. 
>> He knows arithmetic. (Since he learned it from his father, we have an 
>> infinite regression of turtles within turtles.) AG *
>>
>
>
> *Alternatively, you're putting WILL at the core of creation manifested by 
> a Mathematician. AG *
>
>
>
> Not at all. I assume (besides the Mechanist hypothesis) only very 
> elementary arithmetic:
>
> That is classical logic +
>
> 0 ≠ s(x) (= 0 is not the successor of a number)
> s(x) = s(y) -> x = y (different numbers have different successors)
> x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))(except for 0, all numbers have a predecessor)
> x+0 = x  (if you add zero to a number, you get that 
> number)
> x+s(y) = s(x+y)  (if you add a number x to the successor of a number y, 
> you get the successor of x added to y)
> x*0=0   (if you multiply a number by 0, you get 0)
> x*s(y)=(x*y)+x(if you multiply a number x by the successor of y, you 
> get the number x added to the multiplication of the number x with y)
>
> I do not assume anything more than this. 
>

*You sound like a Platonist who believes that a "world of ideas" exists 
that LOGICALLY PRECEDES what most regard as the physical world, with the 
addition of what you call computationalism, presumably something immaterial 
that can do calculations, and/or is in some sense conscious. Those are HUGE 
ADDITIONAL ASSUMPTI0NS.  Also, you make the claim that from this you can 
derive or infer QM. Sounds like the case of a monkey at a typewriter, 
which, when given sufficient time, can type out Hamlet, or better yet a 
numerical representation of Beethoven's 9th Symphony. I give you credit for 
the guts to tackle the mind-body problem, but I never found Plato's theory 
of knowledge persuasive. Also, it could very well be the case that our 
concept of arithmetic is Darwinian based; namely, that it originates from 
the primitive observation of self and other, or one and many; that is, 
empirically based. AG*

>
> I do not see what I could have said making you believe that I assume some 
> WILL at the core of the creation. With computationalism, a will can be 
> ascribed to a machine/number, relatively to universal machine/numbers and 
> their computations, which provably exist in the theory above.
>
> It is the physicalist who do the 

Fwd: Time's Arrow in a Quantum Universe I: On the Simplicity and Uniqueness of the Initial Quantum State

[Brent Meeker]

This is something that computationalism might have something to say about.

Brent


 Forwarded Message 

Chen, Eddy Keming (2017) Time's Arrow in a Quantum Universe I: On the 
Simplicity and Uniqueness of the Initial Quantum State. [Preprint]


Abstract


In a quantum universe with a strong arrow of time, we postulate a 
low-entropy boundary condition (the Past Hypothesis) to account for the 
temporal asymmetry. In this paper, I show that the Past Hypothesis also 
contains enough information to significantly simplify the quantum 
ontology and clearly define a unique initial condition in such a world. 
First, I introduce Density Matrix Realism, the thesis that the quantum 
universe is described by a fundamental density matrix (a mixed state) 
that corresponds to some physical degrees of freedom in the world. This 
stands in sharp contrast to Wave Function Realism, the thesis that the 
quantum universe is described by a wave function (a pure state) that 
represents something physical. Second, I suggest that the Past 
Hypothesis is sufficient to determine a unique and simple density 
matrix. This is achieved by what I call the Initial Projection 
Hypothesis: the initial density matrix of the universe is the projection 
onto the special low-dimensional Hilbert space. Third, because the 
initial quantum state is unique and simple, we have a strong case for 
the Nomological Thesis: the initial quantum state of the universe is 
completely specified by a law of nature. This new package of ideas has 
several interesting implications, including on the dynamic unity of the 
universe and the subsystems, the theoretical unity of statistical 
mechanics and quantum mechanics, and the alleged conflict between Humean 
supervenience and quantum entanglement.


http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14200/7/IPH2.pdf

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/20/2017 5:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 19 Dec 2017, at 23:03, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 12/19/2017 9:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 18 Dec 2017, at 07:48, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 12/17/2017 8:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 15 Dec 2017, at 22:19, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 12/15/2017 9:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
that the statistics of the observable, in arithmetic from 
inside, have to "interfere" to make Digital Mechanism making 
sense in cognitive science, so MW-appearances is not bizarre at 
all: it has to be like that. Eventually, the "negative amplitude 
of probability" comes from the self-referential constraints (the 
logic of []p & <>p on p sigma_1, for those who have studied a 
little bit).


Can you explicate this.


Usually, notions like necessity, certainty, probability 1, etc. 
are assumed to obey []p -> p. This implies also []~p -> ~p, and 
thus p -> <>p, and so, if we have []p -> p, we have [] -> <>p (in 
classical normal modal logics).


Then provability, and even more "formal provability" was 
considered as as *the* closer notion to knowledge we could hope for, 


Something a mathematician or logician might dream, but not a 
mistake any physicist would ever make. Knowledge is correspondence 
with reality, not deducibility from axioms.


Which reality?

Since Gödel we do distinguish correspondence with the arithmetical 
reality and deducibilty from axioms. We know that *all* effective 
theories can only scratch the arithmetical truth.


You seem to identify reality with physical reality. That is a strong 
physicalist axiom. When doing metaphysics with the scientific 
method, especially on the mind-body problem, it is better to be more 
neutral.


I identify reality with what we can empirically agree on.


That is close to Aristotle metaphysics. It does not work with Mechanism.

But even without mechanism, I prefer to be metaphysically neutral, and 
identify reality with whatever is the reason why we can agree on an 
empirical reality. It does not need to be the empirical reality 
itself, as there is no evidence for that up to now.


That's the epitome of question begging:  "What you gonna take as 
evidence for empirical reality?  Your lyin' eyes or my beautiful theory?"


Would the logic S4Grz1, Z1* and X1* be different from quantum logic 
(soemthing we can measure) then we would have an evidence that the 
reality is the empirical reality, but up to now, it fits, and so there 
is no evidences that the physical empirical reality is the fundamental 
one.


Quantum mechanics is entirely based on empirical observation. Nobody 
proposed to derive it from meta-physics.

















and so it came as a shock that no ("rich enough") theory can prove 
its own consistency. This means for example that neither ZF nor PA 
can prove ~[]f, that is []f -> f, 


This seems to me incorrectly rely on []f->f being equivalent to 
~f->~[]f and ~f=t.  I know that is standard first order logic, but 
in this case we're talking about the whole infinite set of 
expressible propositions.  It's not so clear to me that you can 
rely on the law of the excluded middle over this set.



We limit ourself to correct machine, by construction. It does not 
matter how they are implemented below their substitution level, and 
this is only what correct machine can prove on themselves at their 
correct substitution level, and any higher order correct 3p description.


That is all what we need to extract the "correct physics". No need 
to interview machines which believe they are Napoleons. I mean it is 
premature to invoke them in the fabric of the physical reality 
(despite it is unclear what is the part of possible lie at play 
here, cf Descarte's malin démons)








and so such machine cannot prove generally []p ->, and 
provability, for them, cannot works as a predicate for knowledge, 
and is at most a (hopefully correct) belief.


Now, this makes also possible to retrieve a classical notion of 
knowledge, by defining, for all arithmetical proposition p, the 
knowledge of p by []p & true(p).


I'm not impressed.


You should!

The beauty is that "Bp & p" leads to an explanation of why the 
machine get suck in infinities when trying to know who she is. from 
the machine's view, this looks quite like a soul, or subject of 
consciousness, which "of course" cannot justify any 3p account of 
him. from its point of view, the doppelganger is a construction 
which proves that he is not a machine, and that the doppelganger is 
an impostor! The beauty of "Bp & p" is that it says "no" to the 
doctor! The machine's elementary first insight is that she is no 
machines at all, and she is right from that points of view, as G* 
can justify.







Unfortunately, we cannot define true(p) in arithmetic (Tarski), 
nor can we define knowledge at all (Thomason, Scott-Montague). But 
for eaxh arithmetical p, we can still mimic knowledge by []p & p, 


Since you can't define knowledge, how can you say you can mimic it?

Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/20/2017 3:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 19 Dec 2017, at 11:27, agrayson2...@gmail.com 
 wrote:





On Tuesday, December 19, 2017 at 8:03:00 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:




On Monday, December 18, 2017 at 6:37:39 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 16 Dec 2017, at 19:00, John Clark wrote:


On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 9:20 PM, wrote:

​> ​
I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for
Copenhagen. According to the CI, the wf collapses when
the system measured, which is when the box is opened.
What am I missing?


​
According to
​ ​
Copenhagen
​ ​
Wigner's friend
​ ​
opens the cat box and that
​​
collapses
​ ​
the cat's wave function, and so Wigner's friend
​ ​
now knows the cat's fate, but Wigner's friend
​ ​
is also in a box and Wigner
​ ​
himself is outside that box, so until Wigner opens his
friend's box his friend is in a "I see a dead cat" state AND
a "I see a live cat state". And of course you could put
Wigner himself in a box with somebody outside it and you
could keep increasing the number of nested boxes until the
entire universe is included, and that is why the Copenhagen
​ ​
interpretation is useless if you're
​interest is in ​
dealing in cosmology because there is nobody outside
​to​
 universe observe it.

 And God
​is of no help unless somebody knows who collapses God's
wave function, ​and even then there would be another
unanswered question too obvious to mention.


And with Digital Mechanism, even a Universe cannot help. How
could *anything* select a computation, or a class of
computations, among all computations?
But the first person associated to the universal numbers,
involved in the semi-computable relations, localized
themselves in the relative way allowed by the local
self-referential correctness, apparently.

Gödel's arithmetization of metamathematics  embed the
mathematicians in the arithmetical reality/truth/model (the
structure (N, 0, +, x).

Remarkably, incompleteness justfies the equivalence, at the
truth level, of all modes p, Bp, Bp & p, etc., and the fact
that the machine cannot justify those equivalences, and that
they obey quite different logics.

Kant can be tested, by looking for time, space and the
quantum "in the head" of the universal machine. Apparently he
is right.

Bruno


*Translation: CMIIAW: Mumbo Jumbo OR  There is a God. His name is
Plato. He knows arithmetic. (Since he learned it from his father,
we have an infinite regression of turtles within turtles.) AG *


*Alternatively, you're putting WILL at the core of creation 
manifested by a Mathematician. AG

*



Not at all. I assume (besides the Mechanist hypothesis) only very 
elementary arithmetic:


That is classical logic +

0 ≠ s(x)                     (= 0 is not the successor of a number)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y     (different numbers have different successors)
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))    (except for 0, all numbers have a predecessor)
x+0 = x                      (if you add zero to a number, you get 
that number)
x+s(y) = s(x+y)  (if you add a number x to the successor of a number 
y, you get the successor of x added to y)

x*0=0                   (if you multiply a number by 0, you get 0)
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x    (if you multiply a number x by the successor of y, 
you get the number x added to the multiplication of the number x with y)


I do not assume anything more than this.

I do not see what I could have said making you believe that I assume 
some WILL at the core of the creation. With computationalism, a will 
can be ascribed to a machine/number, relatively to universal 
machine/numbers and their computations, which provably exist in the 
theory above.


It is the physicalist who do the speculation on a primary universe, 
without any evidence for it. So people knock on the table, and take 
that as an evidence, but this was already refuted by the antic 
philosophers with the dream argument. No experience, nor experiments 
can lead to an ontology, except for the personal consciousness. 
Physics is not metaphysics, unless you assume Aristotle theology, i.e. 
you assume a PRIMARY physical universe, that is, if you assume 
physicalism at the start. But then you need to abandon the idea that a 
brain is Turing emulable.


No you don't.

Brent

personally, I don't know, but I study the logical consequence of 
mechanism, and it predicts that all machine must find quantum physics 
in their head, and this has been partially tested and verified. It is 
all we 

Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/20/2017 3:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
You need to read the papers or ask question. The starting point (which 
is not obvious and requires the reading of the Universal Doevtailer 
Argument) is that you cannot have both a mechanist explanation of the 
mind, and physicalism. 


This is false.  The argument doesn't show that.  In fact I think it 
implies that the physical is necessary.  Bruno is found of saying that 
it makes computation basic.  But computation apparently explains too 
much.  So it is only by saying that somehow what we experience as mental 
and physical is picked out does computationalism "explain" the world.  I 
don't know why he insists on calling computationalism "mechanist" since 
it has nothing to do with "mechanisms" or "mechanical".


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: God vs the Multiverse

[Bruno Marchal]

On 20 Dec 2017, at 07:16, Danish Rizwan wrote:


Hi @Russel, Kindly share the PDF. (blogspot link isn't working. Thanks

On Sunday, 7 February 2016 11:28:18 UTC+5, Russell Standish wrote:
A really interesting article I just read in New Scientist.

https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22830520-800-god-vs-the-multiverse-the-2500-year-war/

Its behind a paywall - please ask me for a PDF if you don't have
access to New Scientist.

Interesting view that the subversion of theology in 300CE that Bruno
Marchal refers to (closure of the academy) can be blamed almost
completely on both Aristotle and Plato (pox on both their houses :).



I think we have discussed this. Maybe you can recall their argument.  
Note that the closure of the academy happened in 527.


300CE is the time of Plotinus, and the beginning of neoplatonism,  
which is what Justinien will end in occident by closing the academy,  
and persecuting the "pagan philosopher". From Plato (-300 to Damascius  
+500) theology is still a science. Only after 527 has that science  
been leaved to a clergy and argument-per-authority.


Bruno




Also interesting is the view that pantheism (what I'd call Spinoza's
god) and atheism are not that far removed from each other.











Cheers

--


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpc...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


On Sunday, 7 February 2016 11:28:18 UTC+5, Russell Standish wrote:
A really interesting article I just read in New Scientist.

https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22830520-800-god-vs-the-multiverse-the-2500-year-war/

Its behind a paywall - please ask me for a PDF if you don't have
access to New Scientist.

Interesting view that the subversion of theology in 300CE that Bruno
Marchal refers to (closure of the academy) can be blamed almost
completely on both Aristotle and Plato (pox on both their houses :).

Also interesting is the view that pantheism (what I'd call Spinoza's
god) and atheism are not that far removed from each other.

Cheers

--


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpc...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


On Sunday, 7 February 2016 11:28:18 UTC+5, Russell Standish wrote:
A really interesting article I just read in New Scientist.

https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22830520-800-god-vs-the-multiverse-the-2500-year-war/

Its behind a paywall - please ask me for a PDF if you don't have
access to New Scientist.

Interesting view that the subversion of theology in 300CE that Bruno
Marchal refers to (closure of the academy) can be blamed almost
completely on both Aristotle and Plato (pox on both their houses :).

Also interesting is the view that pantheism (what I'd call Spinoza's
god) and atheism are not that far removed from each other.

Cheers

--


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpc...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Dec 2017, at 23:03, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 12/19/2017 9:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 18 Dec 2017, at 07:48, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 12/17/2017 8:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 15 Dec 2017, at 22:19, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 12/15/2017 9:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
that the statistics of the observable, in arithmetic from  
inside, have to "interfere" to make Digital Mechanism making  
sense in cognitive science, so MW-appearances is not bizarre at  
all: it has to be like that. Eventually, the "negative  
amplitude of probability" comes from the self-referential  
constraints (the logic of []p & <>p on p sigma_1, for those who  
have studied a little bit).


Can you explicate this.


Usually, notions like necessity, certainty, probability 1, etc.  
are assumed to obey []p -> p. This implies also []~p -> ~p, and  
thus p -> <>p, and so, if we have []p -> p, we have [] -> <>p (in  
classical normal modal logics).


Then provability, and even more "formal provability" was  
considered as as *the* closer notion to knowledge we could hope  
for,


Something a mathematician or logician might dream, but not a  
mistake any physicist would ever make. Knowledge is correspondence  
with reality, not deducibility from axioms.


Which reality?

Since Gödel we do distinguish correspondence with the arithmetical  
reality and deducibilty from axioms. We know that *all* effective  
theories can only scratch the arithmetical truth.


You seem to identify reality with physical reality. That is a  
strong physicalist axiom. When doing metaphysics with the  
scientific method, especially on the mind-body problem, it is  
better to be more neutral.


I identify reality with what we can empirically agree on.


That is close to Aristotle metaphysics. It does not work with Mechanism.

But even without mechanism, I prefer to be metaphysically neutral, and  
identify reality with whatever is the reason why we can agree on an  
empirical reality. It does not need to be the empirical reality  
itself, as there is no evidence for that up to now. Would the logic  
S4Grz1, Z1* and X1* be different from quantum logic (soemthing we can  
measure) then we would have an evidence that the reality is the  
empirical reality, but up to now, it fits, and so there is no  
evidences that the physical empirical reality is the fundamental one.















and so it came as a shock that no ("rich enough") theory can  
prove its own consistency. This means for example that neither ZF  
nor PA can prove ~[]f, that is []f -> f,


This seems to me incorrectly rely on []f->f  being equivalent to  
~f->~[]f and ~f=t.  I know that is standard first order logic, but  
in this case we're talking about the whole infinite set of  
expressible propositions.  It's not so clear to me that you can  
rely on the law of the excluded middle over this set.



We limit ourself to correct machine, by construction. It does not  
matter how they are implemented below their substitution level, and  
this is only what correct machine can prove on themselves at their  
correct substitution level, and any higher order correct 3p  
description.


That is all what we need to extract the "correct physics". No need  
to interview machines which believe they are Napoleons. I mean it  
is premature to invoke them in the fabric of the physical reality  
(despite it is unclear what is the part of possible lie at play  
here, cf Descarte's malin démons)








and so such machine cannot prove generally []p ->, and  
provability, for them, cannot works as a predicate for knowledge,  
and is at most a (hopefully correct) belief.


Now, this makes also possible to retrieve a classical notion of  
knowledge, by defining, for all arithmetical proposition p, the  
knowledge of p by []p & true(p).


I'm not impressed.


You should!

The beauty is that "Bp & p" leads to an explanation of why the  
machine get suck in infinities when trying to know who she is. from  
the machine's view, this looks quite like a soul, or subject of  
consciousness, which "of course" cannot justify any 3p account of  
him. from its point of view, the doppelganger is a construction  
which proves that he is not a machine, and that the doppelganger is  
an impostor! The beauty of "Bp & p" is that it says "no" to the  
doctor! The machine's elementary first insight is that she is no  
machines at all, and she is right from that points of view, as G*  
can justify.







Unfortunately, we cannot define true(p) in arithmetic (Tarski),  
nor can we define knowledge at all (Thomason, Scott-Montague).  
But for eaxh arithmetical p, we can still mimic knowledge by []p  
& p,


Since you can't define knowledge, how can you say you can mimic it?


All (serious) philosophers agree that knowledge is well axiomatized  
by the modal logic T and S4 (T + Bp -> BBp).


I've had Edmund Gettier over for dinner and he definitely does not  
agree with this idea of knowledge.  If I'm right in assuming that 

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Dec 2017, at 22:40, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 12/19/2017 9:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 18 Dec 2017, at 07:17, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 12/17/2017 7:32 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

  But in fact the box is not isolated.


Oh? Just isolate the whole universe. That should be easy.




The box too is interacting with the environment.  So it's like  
the Zeno effect.  Although there is a probability at each impact  
of producing a coherent tails component, those components don't  
sum to a finite component over a finite number of impacts.


The Zeno effect makes you "staying statistically" in the  
universe, like the non-isolation of the box makes you impossible  
to have access to the universe where the coin felt on the  
opposite side, but without collapse, the superposition can simply  
never disappear.


I can never disappear, but it cannot reach a significant  
probability for tails in several ages of the universe.


I am not good with unities. My last attempt to evaluate the time to  
get the six outcomes of a dice, in a lattice version of the problem  
lead to only few minutes. When I have the time and the courage, I  
will compute that again. Note that the wall was an irregular  
lattice, to ensure that the dices did not get trapped in a cycle.  
It did use some "quantum chaos" idea if I remember well. Of course,  
we do agree that there is no quantum chaos, and everything is  
reversible, but all explanations that this still plays a role FAPP,  
by partial tracing out + big numbers, can be translated into the  
"many-world" as explanation of how feeling the splits and keeping  
trace of the "other terms of the wave) is close to impossible.


I might be wrong on this. No problem. Shaking the box for several  
ages of the universe would astonished me (and force me to revise  
quantum chaos theory, if not the prime numbers!). Or it could be my  
poor handling of the scientific notation of real numbers, common  
for *some* "pure mathematician" (yellow grin).


Keep in mind that all object diffuse, so, even without shacking the  
dice, if we wait long enough, it diffuses so as we get in few  
shakings the six alternate worlds, but I guess that in this case,  
we do have to wait a very long time. The bouncing of the dies are  
crucial, as is the shape of the box.


But remember that you have to consider the classical processes as  
well, which compete with quantum diffusion.


Relatively to the mind of each multiple observers. OK. But that is  
what brings the superposed macro-differences.





You may say, "Well it's all quantum." but that's not to the point.   
The classical processes are different in that they can, in  
principle, be measured without changing them by making measurements  
on the environment.


OK. So our problem is only on the quantitative. We might tackle it one  
day.


Bruno





Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Dec 2017, at 20:08, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:




On Tuesday, December 19, 2017 at 4:48:48 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 18 Dec 2017, at 00:34, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Sunday, December 17, 2017 at 10:28:17 PM UTC,  
agrays...@gmail.com wrote:


On Sunday, December 17, 2017 at 3:26:05 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 15 Dec 2017, at 23:54, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Friday, December 15, 2017 at 5:24:39 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 Dec 2017, at 03:01, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Thursday, December 14, 2017 at 1:41:37 AM UTC, Brent wrote:

On 12/13/2017 5:24 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Wednesday, December 13, 2017 at 10:44:14 PM UTC, Brent wrote:

On 12/13/2017 2:20 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Wednesday, December 13, 2017 at 9:15:36 PM UTC, Brent wrote:


On 12/13/2017 2:45 AM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
BUT for a nucleus of a radioactive element, the nucleus is never  
Decayed and Undecayed SIMULTANEOUSLY.
Sure it is.  It's in a coherent superposition of those states  
until it interacts with the environment.


Brent

That's the conventional QM wisdom and the cause of the paradox of  
a cat Alive and Dead simultaneously. As I explained, the fallacy  
is rooted in an unjustified generalization of the double slit  
experiment where the probability waves do, in fact, exist  
simultaneously.  What waves do you claim are interacting for the  
radioactive nucleus to produce coherence? Tell me about them. I  
am from Missouri. AG


You seem to think that coherence requires two different waves.   
This is the wrong way to look at it.  In Young's slits experiment  
there is only one wave, which goes through both slits and  
interferes with itself.


That's exactly how I see it! Interference requires two waves  
which interact with each other.


NO.  This is false!  There are not two waves.  You can write it  
as two parts, just as you can write a description of an ocean  
wave as the part on your left and the part on your right.  But so  
long as they are coherent, maintaining a fixed phase relation,  
they are one wave.


You're splitting hairs, engaging in sophism. For the single wave  
going through both slits, Feynman calculates the norm squared of  
| A + B |, where A and B denote the waveS going through left and  
right slits respectively. Both are obviously identical, with the  
result of coherent interference. From this analysis we get the  
interpretation that the the system is simultaneously in all  
states of a superposition. AG


Noteworthy is that fact that if you reference "coherence" on  
Wiki, the description always invokes multiple waves of the same  
frequency. If you want to assert coherence without multiple  
waves, and NOT using the double slit result, you have some heavy  
lifting to do. AG



This is exactly what we see in Young's slits experiments. AG

And unstable nucleus has a probability amplitude that includes a  
"decayed" part and a "not decayed" part.  It's a tunneling  
problem.


I don't doubt the existence of amplitudes. What I do doubt. and  
in fact deny, is interference between two waves that don't exist  
simultaneously.


You keep referring to two waves.  There are not two waves.   
There's only one wave which interferes with itself.  It is  
typically written as |not-decayed> + |decayed>, but that's just a  
choice of basis.  It could as well be written |unstable nucleus>.


OK, unstable nucleus. Makes no difference to what I am arguing;  
namely, that coherence requires more than one wave,  
simultaneously, which is what double slit SHOWS, even though the  
experiment obviously starts out with one wave. AG


If there's no interference, then the cat cannot be Alive and  
Dead simultaneously. Tunneling can exist, but still, no  
simultaneous interacting, interfering waves. Is there any  
advantage to believing in two waves which don't exist  
simultaneous, can interfere with each other? AG


You are confused.

You're the one with a cat which Alive and Dead simultaneously for  
the very short time until decoherence occurs. So it is arguable  
who is really confused. AG

I agree with Brent. It is elementary quantum mechanics.

I seriously doubt you have a clue what we're discussing. If you  
take the time to read any definition of 'coherence', you will see  
it involves two or more interfering waves.
You can use two, or one wave. All you need is to gives them a  
similar phase, and it is easy to use only one wave, like the one  
going through two slit when sending, even one, photon.


You have an elaborate theory of the universe based on arithmetic  
but have difficulty counting to two. A single wave cannot exhibit  
interference. You need TWO waves! In double slit experiment, the  
slits split the original wave into TWO waves which interfere with  
each other, yielding the interference pattern. Got it? So the  
question is, how does one get interference in an experiment with a  
binary result? You can call it what you want, or 

Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Dec 2017, at 11:27, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:




On Tuesday, December 19, 2017 at 8:03:00 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com  
wrote:



On Monday, December 18, 2017 at 6:37:39 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Dec 2017, at 19:00, John Clark wrote:


On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 9:20 PM,  wrote:

​> ​I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for  
Copenhagen. According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system  
measured, which is when the box is opened. What am I missing?


​According to​ ​Copenhagen​ ​Wigner's friend​ ​opens  
the cat box and that ​​collapses​ ​the cat's wave function,  
and so Wigner's friend​ ​now knows the cat's fate, but Wigner's  
friend​ ​is also in a box and Wigner​ ​himself is outside  
that box, so until Wigner opens his friend's box his friend is in a  
"I see a dead cat" state AND a "I see a live cat state".  And of  
course you could put Wigner himself in a box with somebody outside  
it and you could keep increasing the number of nested boxes until  
the entire universe is included, and that is why the  
Copenhagen​ ​interpretation is useless if you're ​interest is  
in ​dealing in cosmology because there is nobody outside ​to​  
universe observe it.


 And God ​is of no help unless somebody knows who collapses God's  
wave function, ​and even then there would be another unanswered  
question too obvious to mention.


And with Digital Mechanism, even a Universe cannot help. How could  
*anything* select a computation, or a class of computations, among  
all computations?
But the first person associated to the universal numbers, involved  
in the semi-computable relations, localized themselves in the  
relative way allowed by the local self-referential correctness,  
apparently.


Gödel's arithmetization of metamathematics  embed the mathematicians  
in the arithmetical reality/truth/model (the structure (N, 0, +, x).


Remarkably, incompleteness justfies the equivalence, at the truth  
level, of all modes p, Bp, Bp & p, etc.	, and the fact that the  
machine cannot justify those equivalences, and that they obey quite  
different logics.


Kant can be tested, by looking for time, space and the quantum "in  
the head" of the universal machine. Apparently he is right.


Bruno

Translation: CMIIAW: Mumbo Jumbo  OR  There is a God. His name is  
Plato. He knows arithmetic. (Since he learned it from his father, we  
have an infinite regression of turtles within turtles.) AG


Alternatively, you're putting WILL at the core of creation  
manifested by a Mathematician. AG



Not at all. I assume (besides the Mechanist hypothesis) only very  
elementary arithmetic:


That is classical logic +

0 ≠ s(x) (= 0 is not the successor of a number)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y (different numbers have different successors)
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))(except for 0, all numbers have a predecessor)
x+0 = x  (if you add zero to a number, you get  
that number)
x+s(y) = s(x+y)  (if you add a number x to the successor of a number  
y, you get the successor of x added to y)

x*0=0   (if you multiply a number by 0, you get 0)
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x(if you multiply a number x by the successor of y,  
you get the number x added to the multiplication of the number x with y)


I do not assume anything more than this.

I do not see what I could have said making you believe that I assume  
some WILL at the core of the creation. With computationalism, a will  
can be ascribed to a machine/number, relatively to universal machine/ 
numbers and their computations, which provably exist in the theory  
above.


It is the physicalist who do the speculation on a primary universe,  
without any evidence for it. So people knock on the table, and take  
that as an evidence, but this was already refuted by the antic  
philosophers with the dream argument. No experience, nor experiments  
can lead to an ontology, except for the personal consciousness.  
Physics is not metaphysics, unless you assume Aristotle theology, i.e.  
you assume a PRIMARY physical universe, that is, if you assume  
physicalism at the start. But then you need to abandon the idea that a  
brain is Turing emulable. personally, I don't know, but I study the  
logical consequence of mechanism, and it predicts that all machine  
must find quantum physics in their head, and this has been partially  
tested and verified. It is all we can say.


Bruno












​ John K Clark​




--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




--
You received this message because you 

Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Dec 2017, at 09:03, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:




On Monday, December 18, 2017 at 6:37:39 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Dec 2017, at 19:00, John Clark wrote:


On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 9:20 PM,  wrote:

​> ​I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for  
Copenhagen. According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system  
measured, which is when the box is opened. What am I missing?


​According to​ ​Copenhagen​ ​Wigner's friend​ ​opens  
the cat box and that ​​collapses​ ​the cat's wave function,  
and so Wigner's friend​ ​now knows the cat's fate, but Wigner's  
friend​ ​is also in a box and Wigner​ ​himself is outside  
that box, so until Wigner opens his friend's box his friend is in a  
"I see a dead cat" state AND a "I see a live cat state".  And of  
course you could put Wigner himself in a box with somebody outside  
it and you could keep increasing the number of nested boxes until  
the entire universe is included, and that is why the  
Copenhagen​ ​interpretation is useless if you're ​interest is  
in ​dealing in cosmology because there is nobody outside ​to​  
universe observe it.


 And God ​is of no help unless somebody knows who collapses God's  
wave function, ​and even then there would be another unanswered  
question too obvious to mention.


And with Digital Mechanism, even a Universe cannot help. How could  
*anything* select a computation, or a class of computations, among  
all computations?
But the first person associated to the universal numbers, involved  
in the semi-computable relations, localized themselves in the  
relative way allowed by the local self-referential correctness,  
apparently.


Gödel's arithmetization of metamathematics  embed the mathematicians  
in the arithmetical reality/truth/model (the structure (N, 0, +, x).


Remarkably, incompleteness justfies the equivalence, at the truth  
level, of all modes p, Bp, Bp & p, etc.	, and the fact that the  
machine cannot justify those equivalences, and that they obey quite  
different logics.


Kant can be tested, by looking for time, space and the quantum "in  
the head" of the universal machine. Apparently he is right.


Bruno

Translation: CMIIAW: Mumbo Jumbo  OR  There is a God. His name is  
Plato. He knows arithmetic. (Since he learned it from his father, we  
have an infinite regression of turtles within turtles.) AG


You need to read the papers or ask question. The starting point (which  
is not obvious and requires the reading of the Universal Doevtailer  
Argument) is that you cannot have both a mechanist explanation of the  
mind, and physicalism.  Then what I say above requires the study of  
the "theology of the universal machine", alias Gödel-Löb-Solovay  
modal logic G*, and the understanding of its interpretation in  
arithmetic, and this requires a bit of mathematical logic.
Then the result is that original, as we just find back the  
neoplatonist conception of reality (where matter is derived from  
theology), but here, the math makes this precise enough to be tested,  
and we do recover a quantum formalism where expected (the statistics  
on all computations). Now, this is usually understood and judged  
conceivable by people open to the idea that there is no collapse in  
nature, or other "everything-like" philosophy. To assume "all" is  
simpler than to assume a specific reality, in general. That is the  
basic guiding principle of this list.


And, no, Plato is not a God, but with Mechanism, the arithmetical  
reality is a god in the sense of Plato. That is a reality which  
explains both matter, consciousness and which is conceptually simple.


Bruno












​ John K Clark​




--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at 

Re: Equivalence Principle and Einstein Field Equations

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, December 18, 2017 at 8:36:29 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/17/2017 2:39 PM, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, December 17, 2017 at 12:21:27 AM UTC, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 12/16/2017 2:59 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>> There's a problem applying SR in this situation because neither the 
>> ground or orbiting clock is an inertial frame.AG
>>
>>
>> An orbiting clock is in an inertial frame.  An inertial frame is just one 
>> in which no forces are acting (and gravity is not a force) so that it moves 
>> with constant momentum along a geodesic.  Although it's convenient for 
>> engineering calculations, from a fundamental veiwpoint there is no separate 
>> special relativity and general relativity and no separate clock 
>> corrections.  General relativity is just special relativity in curved 
>> spacetime.  So clocks measure the 4-space interval along their path - 
>> whether that path is geodesic (i.e. inertial) or accelerated.
>>
>
> *Interesting way to look at it. So free falling in a gravity field is an 
> extension of SR. But the thing I find puzzling is that in GR the curvature 
> of space-time is caused by the presence of mass, yet I can draw the path of 
> an accelerated body as necessarily a curve in a space-time diagram. I am 
> having trouble resolving these different sources of curvature. AG*
>
>
> An accelerated body, i.e. one a force is acting on (a rocket, you standing 
> on the ground) is following a curved path that is more curved than the 
> "straightest" path.  I put "straightest" in scare quotes because in the 
> curved spacetime the "straight" path is a geodesic which is still 
> curved...it's just the straightest possible path in the given spacetime.  
>
> It is not true that "I can draw the path of an accelerated body as 
> necessarily a curve in a space-time diagram". 
>



*I was referring to flat space-time, for example as a two dimensional 
representation using x and t coordinates. If one models an accelerating 
particle, it necessarily moves on a curved path. So I think this is very 
suggestive; that one can substitute acceleration for space-time curvature 
induced by gravity or mass-energy, insofar as gravity produces an 
acceleration field. AG *

> In general, if you drew a straight line in some coordinate representation 
> of a curved spacetime, it would correspond to an accelerated (non-geodesic) 
> path.  Imagine drawing a straight line past the Earth.  It would take 
> thrust to fly a rocket along that path.  Of course you could construct a 
> coordinate system around the Earth such that straight lines on the diagram 
> corresponded to geodesics, but it would be a very messy and distorted 
> coordinate system.  
>   
> Brent
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Dec 2017, at 00:56, Russell Standish wrote:


On Mon, Dec 18, 2017 at 05:25:12PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:



What is the difference you make between an instrument recording the  
result
and an observer? Consciousness? But that is what "Wigner's friend"  
shows
difficult to admit, and besides, I thought we all agree that it is  
better

that QM is the same for conscious and non conscious beings?



For me, the most important thing is the continuous/discrete
transition. I am ambivalent on whether this requires consciousness or
not. The best examplar to think about IMHO is an analogue-digital
converter (aka A/D converter), for example the microphone input
circuit on your computer. Conceptually, this device converts an input
voltage into a distinct number (eg 0-255). However, in actual fact
what it does physically is convert a voltage into a time-varying
voltage signal, conventionally interpreted as the zeros and ones of a
number communicated serially into the computer (or alternatively, fans
the voltages out into a parallel array of volatages). That
"conventionally interpreted" is the wiggle room that smuggles
consciousness back in the picture.

Nevertheless, the most important aspect is the contrast between the
continuous and the discrete. Its the FAPP in the zeroing out of
offdiagonal terms in the einselection picture, as just another
example. We could probably make most progress on the measurement
problem by focussing on just that distinction, and ignoring any other
aspect of consciousness or observerhood, since the continuous/discrete
distinction should not be controversial to anyone, and a lot in known
mathematically about it.


It seems that you are assuming some physical universe, or at least  
some analytical universe. But with digital mechanism we can (and  
apparently should) assume only a digital discrete inductive structure  
(natural number with add and times, combinators with application and  
reduction, etc.), and the analytical becomes tools of the mind (and  
their appearance are justified from the discrete entities pov). If you  
attribute some role to the analytical (real numbers) in the brain (as  
opposed to the first person), it is OK in a non mechanist context, but  
problematic with Digital Mechanism.
In my opinion, there is no measurement problem. That problem comes  
only from a wrong axiom (the collapse). Everett, imo, solves  
completely the "measurement problem", except it is incomplete, because  
with the mechanist assumption the wave/matrix itself must be derived  
from the formalism (any universal machinery).


Bruno







--


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.