Re: Equivalence Principle and Einstein Field Equations

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/21/2017 11:06 PM, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:



On Friday, December 22, 2017 at 4:46:10 AM UTC, Brent wrote:



On 12/21/2017 4:22 PM, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:



On Thursday, December 21, 2017 at 11:03:53 PM UTC, Brent wrote:



On 12/21/2017 2:04 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



On Tuesday, December 19, 2017 at 8:51:51 PM UTC, Brent wrote:



On 12/18/2017 11:44 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:


Invariants are always the important things in
physics because they are what we can have
intersubjective agreement on.

Brent


*IIUC, the field equations are covariant, which means
coordinate system independent. *


Right.  Covariant means that something that changes in
such a way that invariant things remain the same.  So
vectors components transform covariantly so that they
keep the vector physically the same.


*Isn't Newton's Law of Gravitation also coordinate
independent? That is, if we use Newton to calculate the
planetary orbits, won't we get the same results in
different coordinate systems? *

Right.

*
If Newton's Law of Gravitation is covariant -- that is,
coordinate frame independent -- I'd expect it to to be
invariant between inertial frames, but I don't believe it
is. That is, I don't think a LT between inertial frames will
leave the form of the law unchanged. How do you resolve this
problem? TIA, AG
*


Don't use a Lorentz transform between frames in a Galilean
invariant theory.


*OK, So why didn't Einstein do what he did for classical
mechanics which is not Lorentz invariant, and directly modify
Newton's Law of Gravitation? AG*


(a) I don't read minds, and especially not Einstein's  and (b) I
don't know what "directly modify" means.

Brent


*He changed (= directly modified) the laws of mechanics to make them 
Lorentz invariant. So why can't that be done for Newton's Law of 
Gravitation?  Does that law work for any inertial frame? AG*


Newton's gravity is a field theory.  It implies an infinite speed of 
changes in the gravitational field.  That wasn't consistent with 
relativity.  What you're calling "directly modified" was just local 
mechanics, not fields.


Brent


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Re: Equivalence Principle and Einstein Field Equations

[agrayson2000]

On Friday, December 22, 2017 at 4:46:10 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/21/2017 4:22 PM, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, December 21, 2017 at 11:03:53 PM UTC, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 12/21/2017 2:04 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 19, 2017 at 8:51:51 PM UTC, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/18/2017 11:44 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>> Invariants are always the important things in physics because they are 
 what we can have intersubjective agreement on.

 Brent

>>>
>>> *IIUC, the field equations are covariant, which means coordinate system 
>>> independent. *
>>>
>>>
>>> Right.  Covariant means that something that changes in such a way that 
>>> invariant things remain the same.  So vectors components transform 
>>> covariantly so that they keep the vector physically the same.
>>>
>>> *Isn't Newton's Law of Gravitation also coordinate independent? That is, 
>>> if we use Newton to calculate the planetary orbits, won't we get the same 
>>> results in different coordinate systems? *
>>>
>>> Right.
>>>
>>
>>
>> * If Newton's Law of Gravitation is covariant -- that is, coordinate 
>> frame independent -- I'd expect it to to be invariant between inertial 
>> frames, but I don't believe it is. That is, I don't think a LT between 
>> inertial frames will leave the form of the law unchanged. How do you 
>> resolve this problem? TIA, AG *
>>
>>
>> Don't use a Lorentz transform between frames in a Galilean invariant 
>> theory.
>>
>
> *OK, So why didn't Einstein do what he did for classical mechanics which 
> is not Lorentz invariant, and directly modify Newton's Law of Gravitation? 
> AG*
>
>
> (a) I don't read minds, and especially not Einstein's  and (b) I don't 
> know what "directly modify" means.
>
> Brent
>

*He changed (= directly modified) the laws of mechanics to make them 
Lorentz invariant. So why can't that be done for Newton's Law of 
Gravitation?  Does that law work for any inertial frame? AG*

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Re: Equivalence Principle and Einstein Field Equations

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/21/2017 4:22 PM, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:



On Thursday, December 21, 2017 at 11:03:53 PM UTC, Brent wrote:



On 12/21/2017 2:04 PM, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:



On Tuesday, December 19, 2017 at 8:51:51 PM UTC, Brent wrote:



On 12/18/2017 11:44 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:


Invariants are always the important things in physics
because they are what we can have intersubjective
agreement on.

Brent


*IIUC, the field equations are covariant, which means
coordinate system independent. *


Right.  Covariant means that something that changes in such a
way that invariant things remain the same.  So vectors
components transform covariantly so that they keep the vector
physically the same.


*Isn't Newton's Law of Gravitation also coordinate
independent? That is, if we use Newton to calculate the
planetary orbits, won't we get the same results in different
coordinate systems? *

Right.

*
If Newton's Law of Gravitation is covariant -- that is,
coordinate frame independent -- I'd expect it to to be invariant
between inertial frames, but I don't believe it is. That is, I
don't think a LT between inertial frames will leave the form of
the law unchanged. How do you resolve this problem? TIA, AG
*


Don't use a Lorentz transform between frames in a Galilean
invariant theory.


*OK, So why didn't Einstein do what he did for classical mechanics 
which is not Lorentz invariant, and directly modify Newton's Law of 
Gravitation? AG*


(a) I don't read minds, and especially not Einstein's  and (b) I don't 
know what "directly modify" means.


Brent

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Re: Equivalence Principle and Einstein Field Equations

[agrayson2000]

On Friday, December 22, 2017 at 12:54:50 AM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>
> On 22/12/2017 11:22 am, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
> On Thursday, December 21, 2017 at 11:03:53 PM UTC, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>> On 12/21/2017 2:04 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> *If Newton's Law of Gravitation is covariant -- that is, coordinate frame 
>> independent -- I'd expect it to to be invariant between inertial frames, 
>> but I don't believe it is. That is, I don't think a LT between inertial 
>> frames will leave the form of the law unchanged. How do you resolve this 
>> problem? TIA, AG * 
>>
>>
>> Don't use a Lorentz transform between frames in a Galilean invariant 
>> theory.
>>
>
> *OK, So why didn't Einstein do what he did for classical mechanics which 
> is not Lorentz invariant, and directly modify Newton's Law of Gravitation? 
> AG*
>
>
> Special relativity is kinematics, gravitation is a dynamical theory -- one 
> doesn't go into the other. You need a new dynamical theory.
>

*I don't understand the distinction. I'll have to consult Wiki. AG *

>
> Bruce
>

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Re: Equivalence Principle and Einstein Field Equations

[Bruce Kellett]

On 22/12/2017 11:22 am, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:

On Thursday, December 21, 2017 at 11:03:53 PM UTC, Brent wrote:


On 12/21/2017 2:04 PM, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:


*If Newton's Law of Gravitation is covariant -- that is,
coordinate frame independent -- I'd expect it to to be invariant
between inertial frames, but I don't believe it is. That is, I
don't think a LT between inertial frames will leave the form of
the law unchanged. How do you resolve this problem? TIA, AG
*


Don't use a Lorentz transform between frames in a Galilean
invariant theory.


*OK, So why didn't Einstein do what he did for classical mechanics 
which is not Lorentz invariant, and directly modify Newton's Law of 
Gravitation? AG*


Special relativity is kinematics, gravitation is a dynamical theory -- 
one doesn't go into the other. You need a new dynamical theory.


Bruce

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Re: Equivalence Principle and Einstein Field Equations

[agrayson2000]

On Thursday, December 21, 2017 at 11:03:53 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/21/2017 2:04 PM, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, December 19, 2017 at 8:51:51 PM UTC, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 12/18/2017 11:44 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>> Invariants are always the important things in physics because they are 
>>> what we can have intersubjective agreement on.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>> *IIUC, the field equations are covariant, which means coordinate system 
>> independent. *
>>
>>
>> Right.  Covariant means that something that changes in such a way that 
>> invariant things remain the same.  So vectors components transform 
>> covariantly so that they keep the vector physically the same.
>>
>> *Isn't Newton's Law of Gravitation also coordinate independent? That is, 
>> if we use Newton to calculate the planetary orbits, won't we get the same 
>> results in different coordinate systems? *
>>
>> Right.
>>
>
>
> * If Newton's Law of Gravitation is covariant -- that is, coordinate frame 
> independent -- I'd expect it to to be invariant between inertial frames, 
> but I don't believe it is. That is, I don't think a LT between inertial 
> frames will leave the form of the law unchanged. How do you resolve this 
> problem? TIA, AG *
>
>
> Don't use a Lorentz transform between frames in a Galilean invariant 
> theory.
>

*OK, So why didn't Einstein do what he did for classical mechanics which is 
not Lorentz invariant, and directly modify Newton's Law of Gravitation? AG*

>
> Brent
>

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Re: Equivalence Principle and Einstein Field Equations

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/21/2017 2:04 PM, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:



On Tuesday, December 19, 2017 at 8:51:51 PM UTC, Brent wrote:



On 12/18/2017 11:44 PM, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:


Invariants are always the important things in physics because
they are what we can have intersubjective agreement on.

Brent


*IIUC, the field equations are covariant, which means coordinate
system independent. *


Right.  Covariant means that something that changes in such a way
that invariant things remain the same.  So vectors components
transform covariantly so that they keep the vector physically the
same.


*Isn't Newton's Law of Gravitation also coordinate independent?
That is, if we use Newton to calculate the planetary orbits,
won't we get the same results in different coordinate systems? *

Right.

*
If Newton's Law of Gravitation is covariant -- that is, coordinate 
frame independent -- I'd expect it to to be invariant between inertial 
frames, but I don't believe it is. That is, I don't think a LT between 
inertial frames will leave the form of the law unchanged. How do you 
resolve this problem? TIA, AG

*


Don't use a Lorentz transform between frames in a Galilean invariant theory.

Brent

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Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[agrayson2000]

On Thursday, December 21, 2017 at 7:18:31 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 21 Dec 2017, at 01:41, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
> On Wednesday, December 20, 2017 at 11:44:47 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 19 Dec 2017, at 11:27, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 19, 2017 at 8:03:00 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, December 18, 2017 at 6:37:39 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 16 Dec 2017, at 19:00, John Clark wrote:

 On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 9:20 PM,  wrote:

 ​> ​
> I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for Copenhagen. 
> According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system measured, which is 
> when the box is opened. What am I missing?
>

 ​
 According to
 ​ ​
 Copenhagen
 ​ ​
 Wigner's friend
 ​ ​
 opens the cat box and that 
 ​​
 collapses
 ​ ​
 the cat's wave function, and so Wigner's friend
 ​ ​
 now knows the cat's fate, but Wigner's friend
 ​ ​
 is also in a box and Wigner
 ​ ​
 himself is outside that box, so until Wigner opens his friend's box his 
 friend is in a "I see a dead cat" state AND a "I see a live cat state".  
 And of course you could put Wigner himself in a box with somebody outside 
 it and you could keep increasing the number of nested boxes until the 
 entire universe is included, and that is why the Copenhagen
 ​ ​
 interpretation is useless if you're 
 ​interest is in ​
 dealing in cosmology because there is nobody outside 
 ​to​
  universe observe it.

  And God 
 ​is of no help unless somebody knows who collapses God's wave function, 
 ​and even then there would be another unanswered question too obvious to 
 mention.


 And with Digital Mechanism, even a Universe cannot help. How could 
 *anything* select a computation, or a class of computations, among all 
 computations?
 But the first person associated to the universal numbers, involved in 
 the semi-computable relations, localized themselves in the relative way 
 allowed by the local self-referential correctness, apparently.

 Gödel's arithmetization of metamathematics  embed the mathematicians in 
 the arithmetical reality/truth/model (the structure (N, 0, +, x).

 Remarkably, incompleteness justfies the equivalence, at the truth 
 level, of all modes p, Bp, Bp & p, etc. , and the fact that the 
 machine cannot justify those equivalences, and that they obey quite 
 different logics.

 Kant can be tested, by looking for time, space and the quantum "in the 
 head" of the universal machine. Apparently he is right.

 Bruno

>>>
>>> *Translation: CMIIAW: Mumbo Jumbo  OR  There is a God. His name is 
>>> Plato. He knows arithmetic. (Since he learned it from his father, we have 
>>> an infinite regression of turtles within turtles.) AG *
>>>
>>
>> *Alternatively, you're putting WILL at the core of creation manifested by 
>> a Mathematician. AG*
>>
>> Not at all. I assume (besides the Mechanist hypothesis) only very 
>> elementary arithmetic:
>>
>> That is classical logic +
>>
>> 0 ≠ s(x) (= 0 is not the successor of a number)
>> s(x) = s(y) -> x = y (different numbers have different successors)
>> x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))(except for 0, all numbers have a predecessor)
>> x+0 = x  (if you add zero to a number, you get that 
>> number)
>> x+s(y) = s(x+y)  (if you add a number x to the successor of a number y, 
>> you get the successor of x added to y)
>> x*0=0   (if you multiply a number by 0, you get 0)
>> x*s(y)=(x*y)+x(if you multiply a number x by the successor of y, you 
>> get the number x added to the multiplication of the number x with y)
>>
>> I do not assume anything more than this. 
>>
>
> *You sound like a Platonist who believes that a "world of ideas" exists 
> that LOGICALLY PRECEDES what most regard as the physical world,*
>
> Yes, but eventually it is limited to a tiny part of math. And yes, I tend 
> to believe more in 2+2=4 than in F=GmM/r^2.
>
> *with the addition of what you call computationalism, presumably something 
> immaterial that can do calculations, and/or is in some sense conscious. 
> Those are HUGE ADDITIONAL ASSUMPTI0NS. *
>
> You might need to study my papers. You might also study computer science. 
> The notion of computation has been discovered by mathematician, working on 
> the foundations of mathematics (Gödel, Post, Kleene, Turing, Church, ...). 
> Do not confuse the arithmetical notion of universal machine with the 
> physical implementations of universal machine (like brain, computer, cells, 
> ...).
>
 
*I've worked with the computer operating system on the Galileo spacecraft 
which orbited Jupiter, a very complex system, but I have no idea what you 
mean by 

Re: Dreamless Sleep?

[David Nyman]

On 21 Dec 2017 20:47, "Brent Meeker"  wrote:



On 12/21/2017 12:37 PM, David Nyman wrote:



On 21 Dec 2017 19:25, "Brent Meeker"  wrote:



On 12/21/2017 5:01 AM, David Nyman wrote:

On 21 December 2017 at 11:34, Telmo Menezes  wrote:

> > So we are told.  But what if someone could look at a recorded MRI of you
> > brain and tell you what you were thinking?
>
> Why do you need the MRI? You can look at the text that I write and
> know what I'm thinking. We've been doing that all along.
> The text I write comes from my fingers hitting the keyboard, and the
> fingers move in a certain pattern because the muscles are activated by
> nerves that are connected to my brain and completely correlated to my
> neural activity. What does the MRI add beyond precision? How does this
> help solve the mystery that I am conscious, instead of a zombie?
>

​Well put.

However if we follow Bruno in taking the antique Dream Argument as our
point of departure (which to a certain extent can be made distinct from an
explicitly computationalist hypothesis) then the question becomes:

Starting from the position that these present thoughts and sensations (i.e.
the 'waking' dream) are beyond doubt, and that they appear also to refer to
events in an externalised field of action, how does it come to be the case
that all this appears to play out in the very particular way it does?

When the question is asked in some such way, it should perhaps not then be
unexpected that brains, nervous systems and bodies, as intrinsic components
of the field of action in question, appear precisely to be mechanisms (in
the generalised sense for now) for translating transactions, between
themselves and the remainder of that field, into action. And also
unsurprising that this continues to generalise whatever detailed level of
analysis is applied to the field in question, whether 'narrower' or 'wider'
in focus (i.e. the consistency requirement). And further that this is just
the sort of tightly-constrained and consistent set of mechanisms that we
might expect to be picked out from an even more generalised 'mechanistic'
environment, owing to the very particular requirements of the
'self-observation' with which we began.

So far, perhaps so un-Hard. But the question then still remains of the
precise relation between the phenomena of the dream itself and the
transactional mechanisms that make their appearance within it, including
and especially the aforementioned brains. If we turn for a moment to an
analogy, it doesn't surprise us, when watching a movie play out on an LCD
screen, that the mechanism that implements this playing out fails to
resemble point for point, although is obviously systematically correlated
with, the ultimate phenomena it stimulates the viewer into realising. But
the reason of course for our lack of surprise is that we consider the bulk
of the burden of such realisation to be shouldered by the viewer's brain,
not by the LCD device alone. So for that reason, no such loophole seems
possible for the final relation between the phenomena of the dream and the
mechanisms of the brain itself. It must somehow shoulder the final burden
of 'self-observation' and 'self-interpretation'; the matter can no longer
be 'externalised'.


Good explication.  And I think I agree on the reason for the scare quotes.
The 'self-observation' by introspection is really very limited and it seems
that external observation of action tells us things about what someone is
thinking that are not available to introspection.  One of the nice things
about Bruno's theory is that implies this division...but in an extremely
idealized form.


I don't get it Brent. You seem to either violently agree or equally
disagree with what I say, as in the case of your other most recent
comments. Can you clarify for me what differentiates the two cases?


OK, I'll try to agree and disagree more gently.


Thanks, but bear in mind that I meant it more as a plea for clarity than
charity. ;-)

David



Brent

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Re: Dreamless Sleep?

[David Nyman]

On 21 Dec 2017 20:46, "Brent Meeker"  wrote:



On 12/21/2017 12:28 PM, David Nyman wrote:



On 21 Dec 2017 18:58, "Brent Meeker"  wrote:



On 12/21/2017 3:27 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

> Hi David,
>
> Sometimes your responses really puzzle me Brent. What you say above almost
>> makes it sound as though you just don't get the distinction Telmo is
>> pointing to. But based on what you have said at other times I think you do
>> get it, but because you also know that there's really no explicating that
>> distinction in a purely third person way, you sometimes want to say that
>> that's as far as explanation can legitimately go and the rest is just woo.
>>
>
Actually I think of it the other way around.  You and Chalmers et al are so
invested in the "hard problem" being hard


Please be advised that you have no sound basis for expounding on what I'm
supposedly 'invested' in. For the record, I would admit to being invested
in not sweeping a problem under the carpet because it's inconvenient. That
said, I have no particular commitment to one style of explanation above
another except to the extent that it seems to promise an advance or
impediment to understanding. For my part, any disagreement between us rests
wholly on those considerations, as in the present case.


that you overlook the fact that almost all problems are "hard"; they have
no fixed, objective ontological foundation.


You're changing the subject, not for the first time. That's not the
relevant sense of the term in this case, as I assumed you accepted. I said
I thought you understood what clearly and categorically differentiates this
problem from the ones you mention, or any other in the canon. But I'm
prepared to revise my opinion if you insist.

We showed that life was based on chemistry, and chemistry was based on
molecular physics, which was based on atomic physics, which was based on
quantum field theory, which assumes spacetime, which we don't understand.
Seems hard.  If we succeed in explaining spacetime in terms of entanglement
of quantum states will that be the end?  I doubt it.  "The end" may just be
the end of our grasp.


Well, yes it may be. That's even a philosophical position of sorts. But my
interest in Bruno's work is precisely because in my experience it's an
approach to the elusive relation between the mental and the physical that
seems capable of working with the relevant categories of both without
ignoring or distorting either. I haven't in all honesty encountered any
others about which I could say the same. That doesn't make it correct of
course, but it does, in my view, render your effective dismissal of the
problem area, as either illusory, irrelevant or insoluble, somewhat
premature.


When you write "there's really no explicating that distinction in a purely
third person way"  it seems analogous to a vitalist saying, "Sure, maybe
life is chemistry, but that doesn't explain what it feels like to be
alive."


That's a distortion of the vitalist position. What you say here about the
feeling of being alive is more like a restatement of the HP. Vitalism was
first and foremost an inability to clearly specify and hence differentiate
living and non-living processes, which seemed at a gross level of analysis
to be so unlike each other as to require the intervention of an additional
causal principle. When the the relation between chemistry and biology was
better understood, it became apparent that this was not the case. But the
matter never strayed, nor needed to, from the detailed explication of third
person processes of one sort or another. Hence nothing 'vital' is thereby
omitted.


You're insisting that the feeling of being conscious must be explicated in
a non-third person way...which is a contradiction in terms.  "Explication"
is a third person relation. You want an explanation but you want to keep
the mystery too.


It must be explicated in a way that differentiates first and third person
categories in the relevant and indispensable ways. Bruno for one has given
us at least a start in seeing how that could be handled at least in
principle. In particular, it must show why and how the first person is not
consigned, from a merely a posteriori position, to the status of an
arbitrarily superadded category, as it is and must always be in any purely
third person explication.


Suppose it were found, in the course of my "engineering solution" that
certain kinds of self referential information processing (which of course
would obey Goedel's limitations) were necessary or evolutionarily favored
aspects of AI.  Why would that not be just as satisfactory a solution as
Bruno's?  Why is self reference in abstract mathematical proofs a solution,
while an evolutionary explication not?


That would be a very interesting result, and indeed indispensable in its
own terms, but it would be indeterminate on the specifics of the relation
with first person experience, except as a a brute a posteriori 

Re: Equivalence Principle and Einstein Field Equations

[agrayson2000]

On Tuesday, December 19, 2017 at 8:51:51 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/18/2017 11:44 PM, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
> Invariants are always the important things in physics because they are 
>> what we can have intersubjective agreement on.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> *IIUC, the field equations are covariant, which means coordinate system 
> independent. *
>
>
> Right.  Covariant means that something that changes in such a way that 
> invariant things remain the same.  So vectors components transform 
> covariantly so that they keep the vector physically the same.
>
> *Isn't Newton's Law of Gravitation also coordinate independent? That is, 
> if we use Newton to calculate the planetary orbits, won't we get the same 
> results in different coordinate systems? *
>
> Right.
>


*If Newton's Law of Gravitation is covariant -- that is, coordinate frame 
independent -- I'd expect it to to be invariant between inertial frames, 
but I don't believe it is. That is, I don't think a LT between inertial 
frames will leave the form of the law unchanged. How do you resolve this 
problem? TIA, AG*

>
> *... Is there a distinction in GR between frame independence and 
> coordinate independence? AG*
>
>
> I'd say frame independence is a special case of coordinate independence.  
> It refers only to relative motion of coordinate frames.
>
> Brent
>
>

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Re: Dreamless Sleep?

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/21/2017 12:37 PM, David Nyman wrote:



On 21 Dec 2017 19:25, "Brent Meeker" > wrote:




On 12/21/2017 5:01 AM, David Nyman wrote:

On 21 December 2017 at 11:34, Telmo Menezes
> wrote:

> So we are told.  But what if someone could look at a
recorded MRI of you
> brain and tell you what you were thinking?

Why do you need the MRI? You can look at the text that I
write and
know what I'm thinking. We've been doing that all along.
The text I write comes from my fingers hitting the keyboard,
and the
fingers move in a certain pattern because the muscles are
activated by
nerves that are connected to my brain and completely
correlated to my
neural activity. What does the MRI add beyond precision? How
does this
help solve the mystery that I am conscious, instead of a zombie?


​Well put.

However if we follow Bruno in taking the antique Dream Argument
as our point of departure (which to a certain extent can be made
distinct from an explicitly computationalist hypothesis) then the
question becomes:

Starting from the position that these present thoughts and
sensations (i.e. the 'waking' dream) are beyond doubt, and that
they appear also to refer to events in an externalised field of
action, how does it come to be the case that all this appears to
play out in the very particular way it does?

When the question is asked in some such way, it should perhaps
not then be unexpected that brains, nervous systems and bodies,
as intrinsic components of the field of action in question,
appear precisely to be mechanisms (in the generalised sense for
now) for translating transactions, between themselves and the
remainder of that field, into action. And also unsurprising that
this continues to generalise whatever detailed level of analysis
is applied to the field in question, whether 'narrower' or
'wider' in focus (i.e. the consistency requirement). And further
that this is just the sort of tightly-constrained and consistent
set of mechanisms that we might expect to be picked out from an
even more generalised 'mechanistic' environment, owing to the
very particular requirements of the 'self-observation' with which
we began.

So far, perhaps so un-Hard. But the question then still remains
of the precise relation between the phenomena of the dream itself
and the transactional mechanisms that make their appearance
within it, including and especially the aforementioned brains. If
we turn for a moment to an analogy, it doesn't surprise us, when
watching a movie play out on an LCD screen, that the mechanism
that implements this playing out fails to resemble point for
point, although is obviously systematically correlated with, the
ultimate phenomena it stimulates the viewer into realising. But
the reason of course for our lack of surprise is that we consider
the bulk of the burden of such realisation to be shouldered by
the viewer's brain, not by the LCD device alone. So for that
reason, no such loophole seems possible for the final relation
between the phenomena of the dream and the mechanisms of the
brain itself. It must somehow shoulder the final burden of
'self-observation' and 'self-interpretation'; the matter can no
longer be 'externalised'.


Good explication.  And I think I agree on the reason for the scare
quotes.  The 'self-observation' by introspection is really very
limited and it seems that external observation of action tells us
things about what someone is thinking that are not available to
introspection.  One of the nice things about Bruno's theory is
that implies this division...but in an extremely idealized form.


I don't get it Brent. You seem to either violently agree or equally 
disagree with what I say, as in the case of your other most recent 
comments. Can you clarify for me what differentiates the two cases?


OK, I'll try to agree and disagree more gently.

Brent

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Re: Dreamless Sleep?

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/21/2017 12:28 PM, David Nyman wrote:



On 21 Dec 2017 18:58, "Brent Meeker" > wrote:




On 12/21/2017 3:27 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

Hi David,

Sometimes your responses really puzzle me Brent. What you
say above almost
makes it sound as though you just don't get the
distinction Telmo is
pointing to. But based on what you have said at other
times I think you do
get it, but because you also know that there's really no
explicating that
distinction in a purely third person way, you sometimes
want to say that
that's as far as explanation can legitimately go and the
rest is just woo.


Actually I think of it the other way around.  You and Chalmers et
al are so invested in the "hard problem" being hard


Please be advised that you have no sound basis for expounding on what 
I'm supposedly 'invested' in. For the record, I would admit to being 
invested in not sweeping a problem under the carpet because it's 
inconvenient. That said, I have no particular commitment to one style 
of explanation above another except to the extent that it seems to 
promise an advance or impediment to understanding. For my part, any 
disagreement between us rests wholly on those considerations, as in 
the present case.


that you overlook the fact that almost all problems are "hard";
they have no fixed, objective ontological foundation.


You're changing the subject, not for the first time. That's not the 
relevant sense of the term in this case, as I assumed you accepted. I 
said I thought you understood what clearly and categorically 
differentiates this problem from the ones you mention, or any other in 
the canon. But I'm prepared to revise my opinion if you insist.


We showed that life was based on chemistry, and chemistry was
based on molecular physics, which was based on atomic physics,
which was based on quantum field theory, which assumes spacetime,
which we don't understand. Seems hard.  If we succeed in
explaining spacetime in terms of entanglement of quantum states
will that be the end?  I doubt it.  "The end" may just be the end
of our grasp.


Well, yes it may be. That's even a philosophical position of sorts. 
But my interest in Bruno's work is precisely because in my experience 
it's an approach to the elusive relation between the mental and the 
physical that seems capable of working with the relevant categories of 
both without ignoring or distorting either. I haven't in all honesty 
encountered any others about which I could say the same. That doesn't 
make it correct of course, but it does, in my view, render your 
effective dismissal of the problem area, as either illusory, 
irrelevant or insoluble, somewhat premature.



When you write "there's really no explicating that distinction in
a purely third person way"  it seems analogous to a vitalist
saying, "Sure, maybe life is chemistry, but that doesn't explain
what it feels like to be alive." 



That's a distortion of the vitalist position. What you say here about 
the feeling of being alive is more like a restatement of the HP. 
Vitalism was first and foremost an inability to clearly specify and 
hence differentiate living and non-living processes, which seemed at a 
gross level of analysis to be so unlike each other as to require the 
intervention of an additional causal principle. When the the relation 
between chemistry and biology was better understood, it became 
apparent that this was not the case. But the matter never strayed, nor 
needed to, from the detailed explication of third person processes of 
one sort or another. Hence nothing 'vital' is thereby omitted.


You're insisting that the feeling of being conscious must be
explicated in a non-third person way...which is a contradiction in
terms.  "Explication" is a third person relation. You want an
explanation but you want to keep the mystery too.


It must be explicated in a way that differentiates first and third 
person categories in the relevant and indispensable ways. Bruno for 
one has given us at least a start in seeing how that could be handled 
at least in principle. In particular, it must show why and how the 
first person is not consigned, from a merely a posteriori position, to 
the status of an arbitrarily superadded category, as it is and must 
always be in any purely third person explication.


Suppose it were found, in the course of my "engineering solution" that 
certain kinds of self referential information processing (which of 
course would obey Goedel's limitations) were necessary or evolutionarily 
favored aspects of AI.  Why would that not be just as satisfactory a 
solution as Bruno's?  Why is self reference in abstract mathematical 
proofs a solution, while an evolutionary explication 

Re: Dreamless Sleep?

[David Nyman]

On 21 Dec 2017 19:25, "Brent Meeker"  wrote:



On 12/21/2017 5:01 AM, David Nyman wrote:

On 21 December 2017 at 11:34, Telmo Menezes  wrote:

> > So we are told.  But what if someone could look at a recorded MRI of you
> > brain and tell you what you were thinking?
>
> Why do you need the MRI? You can look at the text that I write and
> know what I'm thinking. We've been doing that all along.
> The text I write comes from my fingers hitting the keyboard, and the
> fingers move in a certain pattern because the muscles are activated by
> nerves that are connected to my brain and completely correlated to my
> neural activity. What does the MRI add beyond precision? How does this
> help solve the mystery that I am conscious, instead of a zombie?
>

​Well put.

However if we follow Bruno in taking the antique Dream Argument as our
point of departure (which to a certain extent can be made distinct from an
explicitly computationalist hypothesis) then the question becomes:

Starting from the position that these present thoughts and sensations (i.e.
the 'waking' dream) are beyond doubt, and that they appear also to refer to
events in an externalised field of action, how does it come to be the case
that all this appears to play out in the very particular way it does?

When the question is asked in some such way, it should perhaps not then be
unexpected that brains, nervous systems and bodies, as intrinsic components
of the field of action in question, appear precisely to be mechanisms (in
the generalised sense for now) for translating transactions, between
themselves and the remainder of that field, into action. And also
unsurprising that this continues to generalise whatever detailed level of
analysis is applied to the field in question, whether 'narrower' or 'wider'
in focus (i.e. the consistency requirement). And further that this is just
the sort of tightly-constrained and consistent set of mechanisms that we
might expect to be picked out from an even more generalised 'mechanistic'
environment, owing to the very particular requirements of the
'self-observation' with which we began.

So far, perhaps so un-Hard. But the question then still remains of the
precise relation between the phenomena of the dream itself and the
transactional mechanisms that make their appearance within it, including
and especially the aforementioned brains. If we turn for a moment to an
analogy, it doesn't surprise us, when watching a movie play out on an LCD
screen, that the mechanism that implements this playing out fails to
resemble point for point, although is obviously systematically correlated
with, the ultimate phenomena it stimulates the viewer into realising. But
the reason of course for our lack of surprise is that we consider the bulk
of the burden of such realisation to be shouldered by the viewer's brain,
not by the LCD device alone. So for that reason, no such loophole seems
possible for the final relation between the phenomena of the dream and the
mechanisms of the brain itself. It must somehow shoulder the final burden
of 'self-observation' and 'self-interpretation'; the matter can no longer
be 'externalised'.


Good explication.  And I think I agree on the reason for the scare quotes.
The 'self-observation' by introspection is really very limited and it seems
that external observation of action tells us things about what someone is
thinking that are not available to introspection.  One of the nice things
about Bruno's theory is that implies this division...but in an extremely
idealized form.


I don't get it Brent. You seem to either violently agree or equally
disagree with what I say, as in the case of your other most recent
comments. Can you clarify for me what differentiates the two cases?

David



Brent



Hence to explicate the matter further, what is needed is a conceptual
apparatus - i.e. in the Western tradition, a mathematical theory - adequate
to the explication of an entirely 'internal' relation between the dream
phenomena and their transactional mechanisms.  At this point, enter the
Computationalist Hypothesis, or of course any other theory that cares to
test its mettle for the purpose. ISTM that formulating the matter in this
way genuinely makes any putatively remaining 'Hard' problems seem less
intractable, at the cost of putting the 'Aristotelian' position on matter
into question (but arguably this is already a lost cause even within
physics itself). However in a sense it's also a different form of WYSIWYG,
in that the dream always and forever is both what you see and what you get.
But if you want to study its detailed mechanisms of action you need to
delve into the realms of unobservable abstraction. The slogan might then
be: The concrete is the subjective reflection of the abstract.

David


> Telmo.
>
> --
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Re: Dreamless Sleep?

[David Nyman]

On 21 Dec 2017 18:58, "Brent Meeker"  wrote:



On 12/21/2017 3:27 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

> Hi David,
>
> Sometimes your responses really puzzle me Brent. What you say above almost
>> makes it sound as though you just don't get the distinction Telmo is
>> pointing to. But based on what you have said at other times I think you do
>> get it, but because you also know that there's really no explicating that
>> distinction in a purely third person way, you sometimes want to say that
>> that's as far as explanation can legitimately go and the rest is just woo.
>>
>
Actually I think of it the other way around.  You and Chalmers et al are so
invested in the "hard problem" being hard


Please be advised that you have no sound basis for expounding on what I'm
supposedly 'invested' in. For the record, I would admit to being invested
in not sweeping a problem under the carpet because it's inconvenient. That
said, I have no particular commitment to one style of explanation above
another except to the extent that it seems to promise an advance or
impediment to understanding. For my part, any disagreement between us rests
wholly on those considerations, as in the present case.


that you overlook the fact that almost all problems are "hard"; they have
no fixed, objective ontological foundation.


You're changing the subject, not for the first time. That's not the
relevant sense of the term in this case, as I assumed you accepted. I said
I thought you understood what clearly and categorically differentiates this
problem from the ones you mention, or any other in the canon. But I'm
prepared to revise my opinion if you insist.

We showed that life was based on chemistry, and chemistry was based on
molecular physics, which was based on atomic physics, which was based on
quantum field theory, which assumes spacetime, which we don't understand.
Seems hard.  If we succeed in explaining spacetime in terms of entanglement
of quantum states will that be the end?  I doubt it.  "The end" may just be
the end of our grasp.


Well, yes it may be. That's even a philosophical position of sorts. But my
interest in Bruno's work is precisely because in my experience it's an
approach to the elusive relation between the mental and the physical that
seems capable of working with the relevant categories of both without
ignoring or distorting either. I haven't in all honesty encountered any
others about which I could say the same. That doesn't make it correct of
course, but it does, in my view, render your effective dismissal of the
problem area, as either illusory, irrelevant or insoluble, somewhat
premature.


When you write "there's really no explicating that distinction in a purely
third person way"  it seems analogous to a vitalist saying, "Sure, maybe
life is chemistry, but that doesn't explain what it feels like to be
alive."


That's a distortion of the vitalist position. What you say here about the
feeling of being alive is more like a restatement of the HP. Vitalism was
first and foremost an inability to clearly specify and hence differentiate
living and non-living processes, which seemed at a gross level of analysis
to be so unlike each other as to require the intervention of an additional
causal principle. When the the relation between chemistry and biology was
better understood, it became apparent that this was not the case. But the
matter never strayed, nor needed to, from the detailed explication of third
person processes of one sort or another. Hence nothing 'vital' is thereby
omitted.


You're insisting that the feeling of being conscious must be explicated in
a non-third person way...which is a contradiction in terms.  "Explication"
is a third person relation. You want an explanation but you want to keep
the mystery too.


It must be explicated in a way that differentiates first and third person
categories in the relevant and indispensable ways. Bruno for one has given
us at least a start in seeing how that could be handled at least in
principle. In particular, it must show why and how the first person is not
consigned, from a merely a posteriori position, to the status of an
arbitrarily superadded category, as it is and must always be in any purely
third person explication. Which was Telmo's point.

David



Brent
"One cannot guess the real difficulties of a problem before
having solved it."
   --- Carl Ludwig Siegel

Thanks for saying. This puzzles me too. It's not just Brent, I know a
> lot of smart people that do exactly the same.
>
> Cute but irrelevant. As has been said when we've discussed Telmo's point in
>> the past, the fact of the matter is that ontological reduction *just is*
>> ontological elimination. That's the whole point of the reductive project
>> and
>> precisely therein lies its explanatory power. But somehow that same
>> ontological reduction doesn't entail *epistemological* elimination.
>> There's
>> the rub.
>>
> Precisely.
> For me, and for these reasons, emergentism in its 

Re: Dreamless Sleep?

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/21/2017 5:01 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 21 December 2017 at 11:34, Telmo Menezes > wrote:


> So we are told.  But what if someone could look at a recorded MRI
of you
> brain and tell you what you were thinking?

Why do you need the MRI? You can look at the text that I write and
know what I'm thinking. We've been doing that all along.
The text I write comes from my fingers hitting the keyboard, and the
fingers move in a certain pattern because the muscles are activated by
nerves that are connected to my brain and completely correlated to my
neural activity. What does the MRI add beyond precision? How does this
help solve the mystery that I am conscious, instead of a zombie?


​Well put.

However if we follow Bruno in taking the antique Dream Argument as our 
point of departure (which to a certain extent can be made distinct 
from an explicitly computationalist hypothesis) then the question becomes:


Starting from the position that these present thoughts and sensations 
(i.e. the 'waking' dream) are beyond doubt, and that they appear also 
to refer to events in an externalised field of action, how does it 
come to be the case that all this appears to play out in the very 
particular way it does?


When the question is asked in some such way, it should perhaps not 
then be unexpected that brains, nervous systems and bodies, as 
intrinsic components of the field of action in question, appear 
precisely to be mechanisms (in the generalised sense for now) for 
translating transactions, between themselves and the remainder of that 
field, into action. And also unsurprising that this continues to 
generalise whatever detailed level of analysis is applied to the field 
in question, whether 'narrower' or 'wider' in focus (i.e. the 
consistency requirement). And further that this is just the sort of 
tightly-constrained and consistent set of mechanisms that we might 
expect to be picked out from an even more generalised 'mechanistic' 
environment, owing to the very particular requirements of the 
'self-observation' with which we began.


So far, perhaps so un-Hard. But the question then still remains of the 
precise relation between the phenomena of the dream itself and the 
transactional mechanisms that make their appearance within it, 
including and especially the aforementioned brains. If we turn for a 
moment to an analogy, it doesn't surprise us, when watching a movie 
play out on an LCD screen, that the mechanism that implements this 
playing out fails to resemble point for point, although is obviously 
systematically correlated with, the ultimate phenomena it stimulates 
the viewer into realising. But the reason of course for our lack of 
surprise is that we consider the bulk of the burden of such 
realisation to be shouldered by the viewer's brain, not by the LCD 
device alone. So for that reason, no such loophole seems possible for 
the final relation between the phenomena of the dream and the 
mechanisms of the brain itself. It must somehow shoulder the final 
burden of 'self-observation' and 'self-interpretation'; the matter can 
no longer be 'externalised'.


Good explication.  And I think I agree on the reason for the scare 
quotes.  The 'self-observation' by introspection is really very limited 
and it seems that external observation of action tells us things about 
what someone is thinking that are not available to introspection.  One 
of the nice things about Bruno's theory is that implies this 
division...but in an extremely idealized form.


Brent



Hence to explicate the matter further, what is needed is a conceptual 
apparatus - i.e. in the Western tradition, a mathematical theory - 
adequate to the explication of an entirely 'internal' relation between 
the dream phenomena and their transactional mechanisms.  At this 
point, enter the Computationalist Hypothesis, or of course any other 
theory that cares to test its mettle for the purpose. ISTM that 
formulating the matter in this way genuinely makes any putatively 
remaining 'Hard' problems seem less intractable, at the cost of 
putting the 'Aristotelian' position on matter into question (but 
arguably this is already a lost cause even within physics itself). 
However in a sense it's also a different form of WYSIWYG, in that the 
dream always and forever is both what you see and what you get. But if 
you want to study its detailed mechanisms of action you need to delve 
into the realms of unobservable abstraction. The slogan might then be: 
The concrete is the subjective reflection of the abstract.


David


Telmo.

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Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Bruno Marchal]

On 21 Dec 2017, at 01:41, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:




On Wednesday, December 20, 2017 at 11:44:47 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 19 Dec 2017, at 11:27, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:




On Tuesday, December 19, 2017 at 8:03:00 AM UTC,  
agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



On Monday, December 18, 2017 at 6:37:39 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Dec 2017, at 19:00, John Clark wrote:


On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 9:20 PM,  wrote:

​> ​I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for  
Copenhagen. According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system  
measured, which is when the box is opened. What am I missing?


​According to​ ​Copenhagen​ ​Wigner's friend​ ​opens  
the cat box and that ​​collapses​ ​the cat's wave function,  
and so Wigner's friend​ ​now knows the cat's fate, but Wigner's  
friend​ ​is also in a box and Wigner​ ​himself is outside  
that box, so until Wigner opens his friend's box his friend is in  
a "I see a dead cat" state AND a "I see a live cat state".  And of  
course you could put Wigner himself in a box with somebody outside  
it and you could keep increasing the number of nested boxes until  
the entire universe is included, and that is why the  
Copenhagen​ ​interpretation is useless if you're ​interest is  
in ​dealing in cosmology because there is nobody outside ​to​  
universe observe it.


 And God ​is of no help unless somebody knows who collapses God's  
wave function, ​and even then there would be another unanswered  
question too obvious to mention.


And with Digital Mechanism, even a Universe cannot help. How could  
*anything* select a computation, or a class of computations, among  
all computations?
But the first person associated to the universal numbers, involved  
in the semi-computable relations, localized themselves in the  
relative way allowed by the local self-referential correctness,  
apparently.


Gödel's arithmetization of metamathematics  embed the  
mathematicians in the arithmetical reality/truth/model (the  
structure (N, 0, +, x).


Remarkably, incompleteness justfies the equivalence, at the truth  
level, of all modes p, Bp, Bp & p, etc.	, and the fact that the  
machine cannot justify those equivalences, and that they obey quite  
different logics.


Kant can be tested, by looking for time, space and the quantum "in  
the head" of the universal machine. Apparently he is right.


Bruno

Translation: CMIIAW: Mumbo Jumbo  OR  There is a God. His name is  
Plato. He knows arithmetic. (Since he learned it from his father,  
we have an infinite regression of turtles within turtles.) AG


Alternatively, you're putting WILL at the core of creation  
manifested by a Mathematician. AG



Not at all. I assume (besides the Mechanist hypothesis) only very  
elementary arithmetic:


That is classical logic +

0 ≠ s(x) (= 0 is not the successor of a number)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y (different numbers have different successors)
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))(except for 0, all numbers have a predecessor)
x+0 = x  (if you add zero to a number, you get  
that number)
x+s(y) = s(x+y)  (if you add a number x to the successor of a number  
y, you get the successor of x added to y)

x*0=0   (if you multiply a number by 0, you get 0)
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x(if you multiply a number x by the successor of y,  
you get the number x added to the multiplication of the number x  
with y)


I do not assume anything more than this.

You sound like a Platonist who believes that a "world of ideas"  
exists that LOGICALLY PRECEDES what most regard as the physical world,


Yes, but eventually it is limited to a tiny part of math. And yes, I  
tend to believe more in 2+2=4 than in F=GmM/r^2.





with the addition of what you call computationalism, presumably  
something immaterial that can do calculations, and/or is in some  
sense conscious. Those are HUGE ADDITIONAL ASSUMPTI0NS.



You might need to study my papers. You might also study computer  
science. The notion of computation has been discovered by  
mathematician, working on the foundations of mathematics (Gödel, Post,  
Kleene, Turing, Church, ...). Do not confuse the arithmetical notion  
of universal machine with the physical implementations of universal  
machine (like brain, computer, cells, ...).


I assume only that the brain is Turing emulable, which is not much as  
we don't have any evidence that there is something in nature which is  
not Turing emulable, except for the controversial wave packet reduction.


Then, I show, by a reasoning, that Mechanism makes Primary Matter not  
able to justify our first person impression with the observable, and  
that reasoning shows that we cannot eventually assume more than RA,  
for the ontology. Then PA or ZF are enough for the epistemology and  
the physics, but we look only to its internal mimic in Q (RA).







Also, you make the claim that from this you can derive or infer QM.  
Sounds like the 

Re: Dreamless Sleep?

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/21/2017 3:34 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

So we are told.  But what if someone could look at a recorded MRI of you
brain and tell you what you were thinking?

Why do you need the MRI? You can look at the text that I write and
know what I'm thinking. We've been doing that all along.
The text I write comes from my fingers hitting the keyboard, and the
fingers move in a certain pattern because the muscles are activated by
nerves that are connected to my brain and completely correlated to my
neural activity. What does the MRI add beyond precision? How does this
help solve the mystery that I am conscious, instead of a zombie?


Well, you can't lie to the MRI.  But otherwise I agree.  Except that I 
then ask, "What mystery?"  If having thoughts, however expressed or 
detected, is consciousness then problem solved...or more accurately 
pushed back to why do we believe a philosophical zombie is impossible.


Brent

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Re: Dreamless Sleep?

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/21/2017 3:27 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

Hi David,


Sometimes your responses really puzzle me Brent. What you say above almost
makes it sound as though you just don't get the distinction Telmo is
pointing to. But based on what you have said at other times I think you do
get it, but because you also know that there's really no explicating that
distinction in a purely third person way, you sometimes want to say that
that's as far as explanation can legitimately go and the rest is just woo.


Actually I think of it the other way around.  You and Chalmers et al are 
so invested in the "hard problem" being hard that you overlook the fact 
that almost all problems are "hard"; they have no fixed, objective 
ontological foundation.  We showed that life was based on chemistry, and 
chemistry was based on molecular physics, which was based on atomic 
physics, which was based on quantum field theory, which assumes 
spacetime, which we don't understand.  Seems hard.  If we succeed in 
explaining spacetime in terms of entanglement of quantum states will 
that be the end?  I doubt it.  "The end" may just be the end of our grasp.


When you write "there's really no explicating that distinction in a 
purely third person way"  it seems analogous to a vitalist saying, 
"Sure, maybe life is chemistry, but that doesn't explain what it feels 
like to be alive."  You're insisting that the feeling of being conscious 
must be explicated in a non-third person way...which is a contradiction 
in terms.  "Explication" is a third person relation. You want an 
explanation but you want to keep the mystery too.


Brent
"One cannot guess the real difficulties of a problem before
having solved it."
   --- Carl Ludwig Siegel


Thanks for saying. This puzzles me too. It's not just Brent, I know a
lot of smart people that do exactly the same.


Cute but irrelevant. As has been said when we've discussed Telmo's point in
the past, the fact of the matter is that ontological reduction *just is*
ontological elimination. That's the whole point of the reductive project and
precisely therein lies its explanatory power. But somehow that same
ontological reduction doesn't entail *epistemological* elimination. There's
the rub.

Precisely.
For me, and for these reasons, emergentism in its current form is woo.



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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 20 Dec 2017, at 23:14, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 12/20/2017 5:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 19 Dec 2017, at 23:03, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 12/19/2017 9:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 18 Dec 2017, at 07:48, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 12/17/2017 8:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 15 Dec 2017, at 22:19, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 12/15/2017 9:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
that the statistics of the observable, in arithmetic from  
inside, have to "interfere" to make Digital Mechanism making  
sense in cognitive science, so MW-appearances is not bizarre  
at all: it has to be like that. Eventually, the "negative  
amplitude of probability" comes from the self-referential  
constraints (the logic of []p & <>p on p sigma_1, for those  
who have studied a little bit).


Can you explicate this.


Usually, notions like necessity, certainty, probability 1, etc.  
are assumed to obey []p -> p. This implies also []~p -> ~p, and  
thus p -> <>p, and so, if we have []p -> p, we have [] -> <>p  
(in classical normal modal logics).


Then provability, and even more "formal provability" was  
considered as as *the* closer notion to knowledge we could hope  
for,


Something a mathematician or logician might dream, but not a  
mistake any physicist would ever make. Knowledge is  
correspondence with reality, notdeducibility  
from axioms.


Which reality?

Since Gödel we do distinguish correspondence with the  
arithmetical reality and deducibilty from axioms. We know that  
*all* effective theories can only scratch the arithmetical truth.


You seem to identify reality with physical reality. That is a  
strong physicalist axiom. When doing metaphysics with the  
scientific method, especially on the mind-body problem, it is  
better to be more neutral.


I identify reality with what we can empirically agree on.


That is close to Aristotle metaphysics. It does not work with  
Mechanism.


But even without mechanism, I prefer to be metaphysically neutral,  
and identify reality with whatever is the reason why we can agree  
on an empirical reality. It does not need to be the empirical  
reality itself, as there is no evidence for that up to now.


That's the epitome of question begging:  "What you gonna take as  
evidence for empirical reality?  Your lyin' eyes or my beautiful  
theory?"


We must distinguish between the numbers that we measure, the relations  
that we infer, the metaphysical interpretation of those relations, etc.


We just need to be clear of what we assume at the start. You seem to  
assume an Aristotelian God (Primary Matter), and I assumed a  
Pythagorean God (elementary arithmetic).


Note that you assume also, at the meta level though, elementary  
arithmetic, to get predictions in the frame of your metaphysics. But  
you need an identiy thesis (à-la mind-brain) which does not work when  
assuming Mechanism (without adding Ptolemaic ad hoc metaphysical  
epicycles).







Would the logic S4Grz1, Z1* and X1* be different from quantum logic  
(soemthing we can measure) then we would have an evidence that the  
reality is the empirical reality, but up to now, it fits, and so  
there is no evidences that the physical empirical reality is the  
fundamental one.


Quantum mechanics is entirely based on empirical observation.   
Nobody proposed to derive it from meta-physics.


Yes, but with mechanism we have no choice, except for hiding the mind- 
body problem under the rug (a bad habit since a very long time).






















and so it came as a shock that no ("rich enough") theory can  
prove its own consistency. This means for example that neither  
ZF nor PA can prove ~[]f, that is []f -> f,


This seems to me incorrectly rely on []f->f  being equivalent to  
~f->~[]f and ~f=t.  I know that is standard first order logic,  
but in this case we're talking about the whole infinite set of  
expressible propositions.  It's not so clear to me that you can  
rely on the law of the excluded middle over this set.



We limit ourself to correct machine, by construction. It does not  
matter how they are implemented below their substitution level,  
and this is only what correct machine can prove on themselves at  
their correct substitution level, and any higher order correct 3p  
description.


That is all what we need to extract the "correct physics". No  
need to interview machines which believe they are Napoleons. I  
mean it is premature to invoke them in the fabric of the physical  
reality (despite it is unclear what is the part of possible lie  
at play here, cf Descarte's malin démons)








and so such machine cannot prove generally []p ->, and  
provability, for them, cannot works as a predicate for  
knowledge, and is at most a (hopefully correct) belief.


Now, this makes also possible to retrieve a classical notion of  
knowledge, by defining, for all arithmetical proposition p, the  
knowledge of p by []p & true(p).


I'm not impressed.


You should!

The 

Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Bruno Marchal]

On 20 Dec 2017, at 21:53, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 12/20/2017 3:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 19 Dec 2017, at 11:27, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:




On Tuesday, December 19, 2017 at 8:03:00 AM UTC,  
agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



On Monday, December 18, 2017 at 6:37:39 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Dec 2017, at 19:00, John Clark wrote:


On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 9:20 PM,  wrote:

​> ​ I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for  
Copenhagen. According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system  
measured, which is when the box is opened. What am I missing?


​ According to ​ ​ Copenhagen ​ ​ Wigner's  
friend ​ ​ opens the cat box and that ​​ collapses ​ ​  
the cat's wave function, and so Wigner's friend ​ ​ now knows  
the cat's fate, but Wigner's friend ​ ​ is also in a box and  
Wigner ​ ​ himself is outside that box, so until Wigner opens  
his friend's box his friend is in a "I see a dead cat" state AND  
a "I see a live cat state".  And of course you could put Wigner  
himself in a box with somebody outside it and you could keep  
increasing the number of nested boxes until the entire universe  
is included, and that is why the Copenhagen ​ ​ interpretation  
is useless if you're ​interest is in ​ dealing in cosmology  
because there is nobody outside ​to​  universe observe it.


 And God  ​is of no help unless somebody knows who collapses  
God's wave function, ​and even then there would be another  
unanswered question too obvious to mention.


And with Digital Mechanism, even a Universe cannot help. How could  
*anything* select a computation, or a class of computations, among  
all computations?
But the first person associated to the universal numbers, involved  
in the semi-computable relations, localized themselves in the  
relative way allowed by the local self-referential correctness,  
apparently.


Gödel's arithmetization of metamathematics  embed the  
mathematicians in the arithmetical reality/truth/model (the  
structure (N, 0, +, x).


Remarkably, incompleteness justfies the equivalence, at the truth  
level, of all modes p, Bp, Bp & p, etc.	, and the fact that the  
machine cannot justify those equivalences, and that they obey  
quite different logics.


Kant can be tested, by looking for time, space and the quantum "in  
the head" of the universal machine. Apparently he is right.


Bruno

Translation: CMIIAW: Mumbo Jumbo  OR  There is a God. His name is  
Plato. He knows arithmetic. (Since he learned it from his father,  
we have an infinite regression of turtles within turtles.) AG


Alternatively, you're putting WILL at the core of creation  
manifested by a Mathematician. AG



Not at all. I assume (besides the Mechanist hypothesis) only very  
elementary arithmetic:


That is classical logic +

0 ≠ s(x) (= 0 is not the successor of a number)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y (different numbers have different  
successors)
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))(except for 0, all numbers have a  
predecessor)
x+0 = x  (if you add zero to a number, you get  
that number)
x+s(y) = s(x+y)  (if you add a number x to the successor of a  
number y, you get the successor of x added to y)

x*0=0   (if you multiply a number by 0, you get 0)
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x(if you multiply a number x by the successor of  
y, you get the number x added to the multiplication of the number x  
with y)


I do not assume anything more than this.

I do not see what I could have said making you believe that I  
assume some WILL at the core of the creation. With  
computationalism, a will can be ascribed to a machine/number,  
relatively to universal machine/numbers and their computations,  
which provably exist in the theory above.


It is the physicalist who do the speculation on a primary universe,  
without any evidence for it. So people knock on the table, and take  
that as an evidence, but this was already refuted by the antic  
philosophers with the dream argument. No experience, nor  
experiments can lead to an ontology, except for the personal  
consciousness. Physics is not metaphysics, unless you assume  
Aristotle theology, i.e. you assume a PRIMARY physical universe,  
that is, if you assume physicalism at the start. But then you need  
to abandon the idea that a brain is Turing emulable.


No you don't.


Digital mechanism logically reverse the charge. If you commit yourself  
in some deity (in the greek sense, it can be non personal), like  
Primary Matter, it is up to you to explain how that deity can make  
some computation more real ... but still Turing emulable. You have to  
explain how your deity can make the selection, and yet without rising  
doubt that the digitalist doctor might not been always missing  
something.


That the physical relations originates from number relations does not  
seem to me more astonishing than the fact that the human relations  
originate from chemo-physical reactions.


Keep in 

Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Bruno Marchal]

On 20 Dec 2017, at 21:49, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 12/20/2017 3:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
You need to read the papers or ask question. The starting point  
(which is not obvious and requires the reading of the Universal  
Doevtailer Argument) is that you cannot have both a mechanist  
explanation of the mind, and physicalism.


This is false.  The argument doesn't show that.  In fact I think it  
implies that the physical is necessary.


That is the point. We assume only arithmetic, and derive that the  
physical is necessary, from the relative machine's pov, and without  
adding any ontologial commitment. So physics is shown, in that frame,  
to be derivable from machine's theology.



Bruno is found of saying that it makes computation basic.  But  
computation apparently explains too much.  So it is only by saying  
that somehow what we experience as mental and physical is picked out  
does computationalism "explain" the world.


That is right, but the "picking up" avoid magic invocation to  
metaphysical principle. It is only the first person indeterminacy, and  
both intuition (by the many-worlds or many histories) and math  
confirms this. So why add an ontologcal commitment ton just prevent a  
simple explanation. That is "bad religion".






I don't know why he insists on calling computationalism "mechanist"  
since it has nothing to do with "mechanisms" or "mechanical".


?

Computationalism, that is the weak version I study, is Church-Turing  
thesis, or the equivalent one by Post and Kleene in terms of set  
instead of functions, and this should made clear the relation between  
digital machines, programs, computers, and ... computations,  
emulations, simulations, ... And with the mechanist hypothesis, this  
automatically concerns dreams, subjective experiences, first person  
phenomena, consciousness, etc.


I do not need Mechanism to doubt materialism. there are just not one  
evidence for materialism, except the natural extrapolation enforced by  
nature wanting us taking seriously predators and preys. Nobody has  
seen either primary matter, or any indirect evidence for it. What I  
see are human persons doing measurements, obtaining numbers, and  
inferring mathematical (usually computable) relations between those  
numbers.


Feynman formulation is close to the Mechanist explanation; all Turing  
emulable histories happens (that is a theorem *about* RA, provable  
*in*, or *by* PA), but we have to add a "phase" to each step of the  
universal machines so that we can make the white rabbit (the long  
stupid explanations) disappearing by phase randomization. The problem  
is that he derives this from observation, so he missed (like all  
physicists) the qualia/consciousness aspect of the phenomenology.


To get it, it is enough to take into consideration that the observer  
are locally Turing emulable, and that all predictions are relative  
fromal 3p indexicals, and so are concerned by the the logic of self- 
reference. The thought experiences, or the antic greek philosophy,  
justifies the standard classical definitions of belief, knowledge,  
observation (intelligible matter and sensible matter), and it works  
(until now).


Physicalism does not work. It can push people into believing that  
consciousness does not really exist, or is an illusion (!). We, the  
universal numbers, are innumerable in arithmetic to have some doubts  
about that.


Kind grin,

Bruno




Brent

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Dreamless Sleep?

[David Nyman]

On 21 December 2017 at 11:34, Telmo Menezes  wrote:

> > So we are told.  But what if someone could look at a recorded MRI of you
> > brain and tell you what you were thinking?
>
> Why do you need the MRI? You can look at the text that I write and
> know what I'm thinking. We've been doing that all along.
> The text I write comes from my fingers hitting the keyboard, and the
> fingers move in a certain pattern because the muscles are activated by
> nerves that are connected to my brain and completely correlated to my
> neural activity. What does the MRI add beyond precision? How does this
> help solve the mystery that I am conscious, instead of a zombie?
>

​Well put.

However if we follow Bruno in taking the antique Dream Argument as our
point of departure (which to a certain extent can be made distinct from an
explicitly computationalist hypothesis) then the question becomes:

Starting from the position that these present thoughts and sensations (i.e.
the 'waking' dream) are beyond doubt, and that they appear also to refer to
events in an externalised field of action, how does it come to be the case
that all this appears to play out in the very particular way it does?

When the question is asked in some such way, it should perhaps not then be
unexpected that brains, nervous systems and bodies, as intrinsic components
of the field of action in question, appear precisely to be mechanisms (in
the generalised sense for now) for translating transactions, between
themselves and the remainder of that field, into action. And also
unsurprising that this continues to generalise whatever detailed level of
analysis is applied to the field in question, whether 'narrower' or 'wider'
in focus (i.e. the consistency requirement). And further that this is just
the sort of tightly-constrained and consistent set of mechanisms that we
might expect to be picked out from an even more generalised 'mechanistic'
environment, owing to the very particular requirements of the
'self-observation' with which we began.

So far, perhaps so un-Hard. But the question then still remains of the
precise relation between the phenomena of the dream itself and the
transactional mechanisms that make their appearance within it, including
and especially the aforementioned brains. If we turn for a moment to an
analogy, it doesn't surprise us, when watching a movie play out on an LCD
screen, that the mechanism that implements this playing out fails to
resemble point for point, although is obviously systematically correlated
with, the ultimate phenomena it stimulates the viewer into realising. But
the reason of course for our lack of surprise is that we consider the bulk
of the burden of such realisation to be shouldered by the viewer's brain,
not by the LCD device alone. So for that reason, no such loophole seems
possible for the final relation between the phenomena of the dream and the
mechanisms of the brain itself. It must somehow shoulder the final burden
of 'self-observation' and 'self-interpretation'; the matter can no longer
be 'externalised'.

Hence to explicate the matter further, what is needed is a conceptual
apparatus - i.e. in the Western tradition, a mathematical theory - adequate
to the explication of an entirely 'internal' relation between the dream
phenomena and their transactional mechanisms.  At this point, enter the
Computationalist Hypothesis, or of course any other theory that cares to
test its mettle for the purpose. ISTM that formulating the matter in this
way genuinely makes any putatively remaining 'Hard' problems seem less
intractable, at the cost of putting the 'Aristotelian' position on matter
into question (but arguably this is already a lost cause even within
physics itself). However in a sense it's also a different form of WYSIWYG,
in that the dream always and forever is both what you see and what you get.
But if you want to study its detailed mechanisms of action you need to
delve into the realms of unobservable abstraction. The slogan might then
be: The concrete is the subjective reflection of the abstract.

David


> Telmo.
>
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Re: Dreamless Sleep?

[Telmo Menezes]

> So we are told.  But what if someone could look at a recorded MRI of you
> brain and tell you what you were thinking?

Why do you need the MRI? You can look at the text that I write and
know what I'm thinking. We've been doing that all along.
The text I write comes from my fingers hitting the keyboard, and the
fingers move in a certain pattern because the muscles are activated by
nerves that are connected to my brain and completely correlated to my
neural activity. What does the MRI add beyond precision? How does this
help solve the mystery that I am conscious, instead of a zombie?

Telmo.

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Re: Dreamless Sleep?

[Telmo Menezes]

Hi David,

> Sometimes your responses really puzzle me Brent. What you say above almost
> makes it sound as though you just don't get the distinction Telmo is
> pointing to. But based on what you have said at other times I think you do
> get it, but because you also know that there's really no explicating that
> distinction in a purely third person way, you sometimes want to say that
> that's as far as explanation can legitimately go and the rest is just woo.

Thanks for saying. This puzzles me too. It's not just Brent, I know a
lot of smart people that do exactly the same.

> Cute but irrelevant. As has been said when we've discussed Telmo's point in
> the past, the fact of the matter is that ontological reduction *just is*
> ontological elimination. That's the whole point of the reductive project and
> precisely therein lies its explanatory power. But somehow that same
> ontological reduction doesn't entail *epistemological* elimination. There's
> the rub.

Precisely.
For me, and for these reasons, emergentism in its current form is woo.

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Re: abc conjecture

[Telmo Menezes]

On Tue, Dec 19, 2017 at 5:06 AM, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
> http://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/wordpress/?p=5104
>
> How much more acute this problem will become when AI reaches human and
> super-human levels.

Once AIs reaches super-human levels, I don't think they will care if
us humans believe their proofs or not...

Telmo.

> Brent
>
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