Re: Many-minds interpretation?

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, Aug 7, 2018 at 9:05 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 8/7/2018 5:27 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Aug 7, 2018 at 6:39 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> From: Bruno Marchal 
>>
>>
>> If there is a FTL physical influence, even if there is no information
>> transfer possible, it leads to big problems with any reality interpretation
>> of special relativity, notably well described by Maudlin. Maudlin agrees
>> that many-mind restore locality, and its “many-mind” theory is close to
>> what I think Everett had in mind, and is close to what I defended already
>> from the mechanist hypothesis. To be sure, Albert and Lower Many-Minds
>> assumes an infinity of mind for one body, where in mechanism we got an
>> infinity of relative body for one mind, but the key issue is that all
>> measurement outcomes belongs to some mind. The measurement splits locally
>> the observers, and propagate at subliminal speed.
>>
>>
>> I don't think that the many-minds interpretation is really what you would
>> want to support. In many-minds, the physical body is always in the
>> superposition of all possible results, but the 'mind' can never be in such
>> a superposition, so stochastically chooses to record only one definite
>> result from the mix. In the Wikipedia article on the many-minds
>> interpretation, the following comment might be relevant for you:
>>
>
> The mind is implemented by a classical computation (computed by the brain
> which is a classical computer).  Brain states don't interfere because the
> brain is a macroscopic object.
>
> I think it is incorrect to say the mind choose to record one definite
> result, because there is an infinity of minds, and each possible result is
> recorded (by at least one of the infinity of minds).
>
>
>>
>> "Finally, [many-minds] supposes that there is some physical distinction
>> between a conscious observer and a non-conscious measuring device,
>>
>
> While there may be a distinction, I think its a mistake to call it is a
> physical distinction.  Or at least, calling this a physical distinction can
> easily lead to confusion.  I would say that the distinction is between
> non-physical entities (mind) and and physical (not mind) rather than
> between an observer and a measuring device, as both are physical objects.
>
> Mind (consciousness), however, is non-physical in that it is more
> accurately described as a computational/arithmetical/mathematical notion.
> It is the difference between a story and a book.  A story is non physical,
> as it is abstract and informational, a book is however physical.  A mind
> has no physical location, mass, energy, etc., a brain does.
>
>
>> so it seems to require eliminating the strong Church–Turing hypothesis
>> 
>>  or postulating a physical model for consciousness."
>>
>
> I don't see how this follows. Could you explain?
>
>
>>
>> If machines can do something that the mind cannot do (viz., be in a
>> superposition of all possible results, when the mind cannot participate in
>> any such superposition), the Church-Turing thesis goes out the window --
>> and you might not want to say "Yes, Doctor".
>>
>
> Brains and bodies can be in superpositions, a conscious state, however
> cannot be.
>
>
> Conscious state of what?...a brain.
>

I mean a conscious state as in "what is the conscious state
experiencing/aware of".  Not in the sense of a physical brain state as a
collection of physical particles.


> If consciousness cannot be in a superposition then what is it's relation
> to brains structures which can?
>

A one-to-many relationship.  (one conscious computation state-to-many
different instantiations and environments supporting that computation)


>   Why would we suppose that the doctor can implement this relation using
> some other medium?
>

Faith.

Jason

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Re: Many-minds interpretation?

[Brent Meeker]

On 8/7/2018 6:51 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

  "Yes, Doctor" appears to wrap up the idea that the computational mind
 cannot be in superposition of mind states, supporting Albert and Loewer's
 position over that of primitive physical supervenience. Nevertheless,
 physical supervenience can be rescued in a weaker form (as I argue it must)
 of mind supervenience on phenomenal physics (experienced physics of the
 observer).


That seems a bit circular.


Why is it circular?

Kind of depends on what you mean by "experienced physics of the 
observer". Does that mean experience of the classical world or does it 
include the physics of QM which is inferred by the observer but not 
directly experienced.  If the former, supervenience might well fail, 
while still holding for the latter.


Brent

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Re: Many-minds interpretation?

[Brent Meeker]

On 8/7/2018 5:27 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Aug 7, 2018 at 6:39 PM Bruce Kellett 
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:


From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>



If there is a FTL physical influence, even if there is no
information transfer possible, it leads to big problems with any
reality interpretation of special relativity, notably well
described by Maudlin. Maudlin agrees that many-mind restore
locality, and its “many-mind” theory is close to what I think
Everett had in mind, and is close to what I defended already from
the mechanist hypothesis. To be sure, Albert and Lower Many-Minds
assumes an infinity of mind for one body, where in mechanism we
got an infinity of relative body for one mind, but the key issue
is that all measurement outcomes belongs to some mind. The
measurement splits locally the observers, and propagate at
subliminal speed.


I don't think that the many-minds interpretation is really what
you would want to support. In many-minds, the physical body is
always in the superposition of all possible results, but the
'mind' can never be in such a superposition, so stochastically
chooses to record only one definite result from the mix. In the
Wikipedia article on the many-minds interpretation, the following
comment might be relevant for you:


The mind is implemented by a classical computation (computed by the 
brain which is a classical computer). Brain states don't interfere 
because the brain is a macroscopic object.


I think it is incorrect to say the mind choose to record one definite 
result, because there is an infinity of minds, and each possible 
result is recorded (by at least one of the infinity of minds).



"Finally, [many-minds] supposes that there is some physical
distinction between a conscious observer and a non-conscious
measuring device,


While there may be a distinction, I think its a mistake to call it is 
a physical distinction.  Or at least, calling this a physical 
distinction can easily lead to confusion.  I would say that the 
distinction is between  non-physical entities (mind) and and physical 
(not mind) rather than between an observer and a measuring device, as 
both are physical objects.


Mind (consciousness), however, is non-physical in that it is more 
accurately described as a computational/arithmetical/mathematical 
notion.  It is the difference between a story and a book.  A story is 
non physical, as it is abstract and informational, a book is however 
physical.  A mind has no physical location, mass, energy, etc., a 
brain does.


so it seems to require eliminating thestrong Church–Turing
hypothesis

or
postulating a physical model for consciousness."


I don't see how this follows. Could you explain?


If machines can do something that the mind cannot do (viz., be in
a superposition of all possible results, when the mind cannot
participate in any such superposition), the Church-Turing thesis
goes out the window -- and you might not want to say "Yes, Doctor".


Brains and bodies can be in superpositions, a conscious state, however 
cannot be.


Conscious state of what?...a brain.  If consciousness cannot be in a 
superposition then what is it's relation to brains structures which 
can?  Why would we suppose that the doctor can implement this relation 
using some other medium?


Brent

It is self-contained and accessible to only one point of view.  This 
doesn't effect the Church-Turing thesis, as far as I can see.  The 
Church-Turing thesis is about what a computer can compute, not what 
can perceive itself to be in a superposition.  I would say if a 
measuring device could read itself, it too would never see itself to 
in a superposition.


Jason
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Re: Many-minds interpretation?

[Russell Standish]

On Wed, Aug 08, 2018 at 11:09:37AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> From: Russell Standish 
> 
> 
> On Wed, Aug 08, 2018 at 09:39:06AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > From: Bruno Marchal 
> >
> >   
> >     If there is a FTL physical influence, even if there is no 
> information
> >     transfer possible, it leads to big problems with any reality
> interpretation
> >     of special relativity, notably well described by Maudlin. Maudlin
> agrees
> >     that many-mind restore locality, and its “many-mind” theory is close
> to
> >     what I think Everett had in mind, and is close to what I defended
> already
> >     from the mechanist hypothesis. To be sure, Albert and Lower
> Many-Minds
> >     assumes an infinity of mind for one body, where in mechanism we got
> an
> >     infinity of relative body for one mind, but the key issue is that 
> all
> >     measurement outcomes belongs to some mind. The measurement splits
> locally
> >     the observers, and propagate at subliminal speed.
> >
> >
> > I don't think that the many-minds interpretation is really what you 
> would
> want
> > to support. In many-minds, the physical body is always in the
> superposition of
> > all possible results, but the 'mind' can never be in such a
> superposition, so
> > stochastically chooses to record only one definite result from the mix.
> In the
> > Wikipedia article on the many-minds interpretation, the following 
> comment
> might
> > be relevant for you:
> >
> > "Finally, [many-minds] supposes that there is some physical distinction
> between
> > a conscious observer and a non-conscious measuring device, so it seems 
> to
> > require eliminating the strong Church–Turing hypothesis or postulating a
> > physical model for consciousness."
> 
> It seems this final sentence contradicts earlier statements, such as
> 
> 
> I think there is an implied bracketing of the last two points; i.e.,
> eliminating BOTH the strong CT thesis AND a physical model for consciousness.
> 

Although the actual word used is or, rather than and. Perhaps one could keep 
one or other hypothesis.

IIUC, the strong CT thesis referred to above is the thesis that the universe 
_is_ a computation, aka "digital physics". This thesis rules out the presence 
of random oracles (all seemingly random source (eg beta decay) will turn out to 
have an underlying computable algorithm). As Bruno points out, a corollory of 
the UDA is that random oracles must exist, therefore computationalism is 
incompatible with the strong CT thesis. The same considerations apply with many 
minds, or even various other many worlds interpretations AFAICS.

"Physical model of consciousness" is a bit ambiguous - I can only interpret 
this as physical supervenience. ISTM phenomenal physical supervenience is a 
required feature of reality, but primitive physical supervenience may well be 
incompatible with computationalism (Bruno's argument), or possibly even just 
plain incoherent - a suspicion I think I share with Brent.

> 
> 
> "Nonetheless, it is not what we experience within physical reality. Albert
> and Loewer argue that the mind must be intrinsically different than the
> physical reality as described by quantum theory.[6] "
>
> 
> >
> > If machines can do something that the mind cannot do (viz., be in a
> > superposition of all possible results, when the mind cannot participate
> in any
> > such superposition), the Church-Turing thesis goes out the window -- and
> you
> > might not want to say "Yes, Doctor".
> 
> "Yes, Doctor" appears to wrap up the idea that the computational mind
> cannot be in superposition of mind states, supporting Albert and Loewer's
> position over that of primitive physical supervenience. Nevertheless,
> physical supervenience can be rescued in a weaker form (as I argue it 
> must)
> of mind supervenience on phenomenal physics (experienced physics of the
> observer).
> 
> 
> That seems a bit circular.
>

Why is it circular?

> 
> 
> This goes to the heart of JC and BM's argument over UDA step 3. Helsinki
> guy does not experience a superposition of Moscow and Washington, but one
> or the other.
> 
> I do not follow the comment for why the strong CT thesis (aka Deutsch's
> Turing tropic principle) needs to be abandoned, though.
> 
> 
> Possibly the idea that a machine can calculate anything that a human can with
> pencil and paper. If the physical is in superposition but the mind is not, 
> this
> seems to make no sense.
> 
> However, I think that the problems with the many-minds interpretation is that
> it ignores decoherence and the FAPP orthogonality of the superposed states.
> Most many-minds interpretations that make any sense are just re-workings of 
> the
> standard many-worlds approach. E.g., Lockwood

Re: Many-minds interpretation?

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Russell Standish* >


On Wed, Aug 08, 2018 at 09:39:06AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>
>
>     If there is a FTL physical influence, even if there is no 
information
>     transfer possible, it leads to big problems with any reality 
interpretation
>     of special relativity, notably well described by Maudlin. 
Maudlin agrees
>     that many-mind restore locality, and its “many-mind” theory is 
close to
>     what I think Everett had in mind, and is close to what I 
defended already
>     from the mechanist hypothesis. To be sure, Albert and Lower 
Many-Minds
>     assumes an infinity of mind for one body, where in mechanism we 
got an
>     infinity of relative body for one mind, but the key issue is 
that all
>     measurement outcomes belongs to some mind. The measurement 
splits locally

>     the observers, and propagate at subliminal speed.
>
>
> I don't think that the many-minds interpretation is really what you 
would want
> to support. In many-minds, the physical body is always in the 
superposition of
> all possible results, but the 'mind' can never be in such a 
superposition, so
> stochastically chooses to record only one definite result from the 
mix. In the
> Wikipedia article on the many-minds interpretation, the following 
comment might

> be relevant for you:
>
> "Finally, [many-minds] supposes that there is some physical 
distinction between
> a conscious observer and a non-conscious measuring device, so it 
seems to

> require eliminating the strong Church–Turing hypothesis or postulating a
> physical model for consciousness."

It seems this final sentence contradicts earlier statements, such as


I think there is an implied bracketing of the last two points; i.e., 
eliminating BOTH the strong CT thesis AND a physical model for 
consciousness.




"Nonetheless, it is not what we experience within physical reality. 
Albert and Loewer argue that the mind must be intrinsically different 
than the physical reality as described by quantum theory.[6] "



>
> If machines can do something that the mind cannot do (viz., be in a
> superposition of all possible results, when the mind cannot 
participate in any
> such superposition), the Church-Turing thesis goes out the window -- 
and you

> might not want to say "Yes, Doctor".

"Yes, Doctor" appears to wrap up the idea that the computational mind 
cannot be in superposition of mind states, supporting Albert and 
Loewer's position over that of primitive physical supervenience. 
Nevertheless, physical supervenience can be rescued in a weaker form 
(as I argue it must) of mind supervenience on phenomenal physics 
(experienced physics of the observer).


That seems a bit circular.


This goes to the heart of JC and BM's argument over UDA step 3. 
Helsinki guy does not experience a superposition of Moscow and 
Washington, but one or the other.


I do not follow the comment for why the strong CT thesis (aka 
Deutsch's Turing tropic principle) needs to be abandoned, though.


Possibly the idea that a machine can calculate anything that a human can 
with pencil and paper. If the physical is in superposition but the mind 
is not, this seems to make no sense.


However, I think that the problems with the many-minds interpretation is 
that it ignores decoherence and the FAPP orthogonality of the superposed 
states. Most many-minds interpretations that make any sense are just 
re-workings of the standard many-worlds approach. E.g., Lockwood in BJPS 
(1996).


Bruce

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Re: Many-minds interpretation?

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Tuesday, August 7, 2018 at 6:39:11 PM UTC-5, Bruce wrote:
>
> From: Bruno Marchal >
>
>
> If there is a FTL physical influence, even if there is no information 
> transfer possible, it leads to big problems with any reality interpretation 
> of special relativity, notably well described by Maudlin. Maudlin agrees 
> that many-mind restore locality, and its “many-mind” theory is close to 
> what I think Everett had in mind, and is close to what I defended already 
> from the mechanist hypothesis. To be sure, Albert and Lower Many-Minds 
> assumes an infinity of mind for one body, where in mechanism we got an 
> infinity of relative body for one mind, but the key issue is that all 
> measurement outcomes belongs to some mind. The measurement splits locally 
> the observers, and propagate at subliminal speed.
>
>
> I don't think that the many-minds interpretation is really what you would 
> want to support. In many-minds, the physical body is always in the 
> superposition of all possible results, but the 'mind' can never be in such 
> a superposition, so stochastically chooses to record only one definite 
> result from the mix. In the Wikipedia article on the many-minds 
> interpretation, the following comment might be relevant for you:
>
> "Finally, [many-minds] supposes that there is some physical distinction 
> between a conscious observer and a non-conscious measuring device, so it 
> seems to require eliminating the strong Church–Turing hypothesis 
> 
>  or postulating a physical model for consciousness."
>
> If machines can do something that the mind cannot do (viz., be in a 
> superposition of all possible results, when the mind cannot participate in 
> any such superposition), the Church-Turing thesis goes out the window -- 
> and you might not want to say "Yes, Doctor". 
>

This is my understanding as well. The many mind interpretation says that 
the mind is what splits, or that the mind can only perceive on world at a 
time. The mind then generates the illusion of there being a single world at 
one time.

LC 

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Re: Many-minds interpretation?

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, Aug 7, 2018 at 6:39 PM Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> From: Bruno Marchal 
>
>
> If there is a FTL physical influence, even if there is no information
> transfer possible, it leads to big problems with any reality interpretation
> of special relativity, notably well described by Maudlin. Maudlin agrees
> that many-mind restore locality, and its “many-mind” theory is close to
> what I think Everett had in mind, and is close to what I defended already
> from the mechanist hypothesis. To be sure, Albert and Lower Many-Minds
> assumes an infinity of mind for one body, where in mechanism we got an
> infinity of relative body for one mind, but the key issue is that all
> measurement outcomes belongs to some mind. The measurement splits locally
> the observers, and propagate at subliminal speed.
>
>
> I don't think that the many-minds interpretation is really what you would
> want to support. In many-minds, the physical body is always in the
> superposition of all possible results, but the 'mind' can never be in such
> a superposition, so stochastically chooses to record only one definite
> result from the mix. In the Wikipedia article on the many-minds
> interpretation, the following comment might be relevant for you:
>

The mind is implemented by a classical computation (computed by the brain
which is a classical computer).  Brain states don't interfere because the
brain is a macroscopic object.

I think it is incorrect to say the mind choose to record one definite
result, because there is an infinity of minds, and each possible result is
recorded (by at least one of the infinity of minds).


>
> "Finally, [many-minds] supposes that there is some physical distinction
> between a conscious observer and a non-conscious measuring device,
>

While there may be a distinction, I think its a mistake to call it is a
physical distinction.  Or at least, calling this a physical distinction can
easily lead to confusion.  I would say that the distinction is between
non-physical entities (mind) and and physical (not mind) rather than
between an observer and a measuring device, as both are physical objects.

Mind (consciousness), however, is non-physical in that it is more
accurately described as a computational/arithmetical/mathematical notion.
It is the difference between a story and a book.  A story is non physical,
as it is abstract and informational, a book is however physical.  A mind
has no physical location, mass, energy, etc., a brain does.


> so it seems to require eliminating the strong Church–Turing hypothesis
> 
>  or postulating a physical model for consciousness."
>

I don't see how this follows. Could you explain?


>
> If machines can do something that the mind cannot do (viz., be in a
> superposition of all possible results, when the mind cannot participate in
> any such superposition), the Church-Turing thesis goes out the window --
> and you might not want to say "Yes, Doctor".
>

Brains and bodies can be in superpositions, a conscious state, however
cannot be. It is self-contained and accessible to only one point of view.
This doesn't effect the Church-Turing thesis, as far as I can see.  The
Church-Turing thesis is about what a computer can compute, not what can
perceive itself to be in a superposition.  I would say if a measuring
device could read itself, it too would never see itself to in a
superposition.

Jason

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Re: Many-minds interpretation?

[Russell Standish]

On Wed, Aug 08, 2018 at 09:39:06AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> From: Bruno Marchal 
> 
>
> If there is a FTL physical influence, even if there is no information
> transfer possible, it leads to big problems with any reality 
> interpretation
> of special relativity, notably well described by Maudlin. Maudlin agrees
> that many-mind restore locality, and its “many-mind” theory is close to
> what I think Everett had in mind, and is close to what I defended already
> from the mechanist hypothesis. To be sure, Albert and Lower Many-Minds
> assumes an infinity of mind for one body, where in mechanism we got an
> infinity of relative body for one mind, but the key issue is that all
> measurement outcomes belongs to some mind. The measurement splits locally
> the observers, and propagate at subliminal speed.
> 
> 
> I don't think that the many-minds interpretation is really what you would want
> to support. In many-minds, the physical body is always in the superposition of
> all possible results, but the 'mind' can never be in such a superposition, so
> stochastically chooses to record only one definite result from the mix. In the
> Wikipedia article on the many-minds interpretation, the following comment 
> might
> be relevant for you:
> 
> "Finally, [many-minds] supposes that there is some physical distinction 
> between
> a conscious observer and a non-conscious measuring device, so it seems to
> require eliminating the strong Church–Turing hypothesis or postulating a
> physical model for consciousness."

It seems this final sentence contradicts earlier statements, such as

"
Nonetheless, it is not what we experience within physical reality. Albert and 
Loewer argue that the mind must be intrinsically different than the physical 
reality as described by quantum theory.[6] "


> 
> If machines can do something that the mind cannot do (viz., be in a
> superposition of all possible results, when the mind cannot participate in any
> such superposition), the Church-Turing thesis goes out the window -- and you
> might not want to say "Yes, Doctor".

"Yes, Doctor" appears to wrap up the idea that the computational mind cannot be 
in superposition of mind states, supporting Albert and Loewer's position over 
that of primitive physical supervenience. Nevertheless, physical supervenience 
can be rescued in a weaker form (as I argue it must) of mind supervenience on 
phenomenal physics (experienced physics of the observer).

This goes to the heart of JC and BM's argument over UDA step 3. Helsinki guy 
does not experience a superposition of Moscow and Washington, but one or the 
other.

I do not follow the comment for why the strong CT thesis (aka Deutsch's Turing 
tropic principle) needs to be abandoned, though. The only additional feature of 
the phenomenal physics is the existence of random oracles, which does not 
enlarge the class of computable functions, as an old paper by Shannon showed.


-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Many-minds interpretation?

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>



If there is a FTL physical influence, even if there is no information 
transfer possible, it leads to big problems with any reality 
interpretation of special relativity, notably well described by 
Maudlin. Maudlin agrees that many-mind restore locality, and its 
“many-mind” theory is close to what I think Everett had in mind, and 
is close to what I defended already from the mechanist hypothesis. To 
be sure, Albert and Lower Many-Minds assumes an infinity of mind for 
one body, where in mechanism we got an infinity of relative body for 
one mind, but the key issue is that all measurement outcomes belongs 
to some mind. The measurement splits locally the observers, and 
propagate at subliminal speed.


I don't think that the many-minds interpretation is really what you 
would want to support. In many-minds, the physical body is always in the 
superposition of all possible results, but the 'mind' can never be in 
such a superposition, so stochastically chooses to record only one 
definite result from the mix. In the Wikipedia article on the many-minds 
interpretation, the following comment might be relevant for you:


"Finally, [many-minds] supposes that there is some physical distinction 
between a conscious observer and a non-conscious measuring device, so it 
seems to require eliminating thestrong Church–Turing hypothesis 
or 
postulating a physical model for consciousness."


If machines can do something that the mind cannot do (viz., be in a 
superposition of all possible results, when the mind cannot participate 
in any such superposition), the Church-Turing thesis goes out the window 
-- and you might not want to say "Yes, Doctor".


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Re: The Ilusion of Branching and the MWI

[Brent Meeker]

On 8/7/2018 4:32 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 7 Aug 2018, at 01:33, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 8/5/2018 9:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 4 Aug 2018, at 23:32, agrayson2...@gmail.com 
 wrote:


AFAIK, no one has ever observed a probability wave, from which I 
conclude the wave function has only epistemic content.



Then you need to explain how that epistemic content interfere in 
nature.
??  The epistemic content IS how interference occurs in nature.  The 
wave function is one's estimation/knowledge of how events will 
infold, including intereference.


That will follow from mechanism indeed, but is not the standard way 
most people interpret the physical laws. The *physical* antic will 
indeed be epistemic, but that is what we need to test (and indeed the 
quantum confirms this, but you give the answer before the question). 
What I meant is that the quantum wave has to be taken as real, as we 
can put it in a box and send it to a colleague to ask if he get the 
same results.


The epistemic view is that he will get the same result only if he has 
the same information, which is represented in his calculation of the 
wave function.  That's the idea of QBism.  The probabilistic nature of 
QM allows that persons with different information can still get a result 
consistent with both wf.  It is different from the early ideas of 
consciousness collapses the wf in that it supposes a wf is relative to a 
person and so its collapse is also relative to a particular person 
observing a result.


I would think this interpretation would be close to your ideas in that 
it keeps a close link between individual consciousness and QM, i.e. 
there is a relative state even before observation.


Brent

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Re: Decoherence Theory according to Schlosshauer

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Monday, August 6, 2018 at 4:54:28 PM UTC-5, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, August 4, 2018 at 10:16:17 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>> As long as the universe is not resolved into individual subsystems *(that 
>> is, no tensor decomposition of the WF)*, there is no measurement problem.
>>
>> IMO, highly doubtful, or minimally outside the domain of quantum theory 
>> where there is such a thing as measurements, and thus the dualism being 
>> denied as the conceptual solution of the measurement problem. (
>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0312059.pdf, page 8, bold added). AG
>>
>
> He does say that decoherence theory doesn't solve the measurement problem, 
> yet he attributes it to decomposing the universe into individual 
> subsystems. Why would the decomposition have that result? Am I misreading 
> his position? AG 
>

This is a long paper and will take considerable time to go through with 
even minimal diligence.

LC

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Re: The Ilusion of Branching and the MWI

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 7 Aug 2018, at 01:33, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 8/5/2018 9:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 4 Aug 2018, at 23:32, agrayson2...@gmail.com 
>>>  wrote:
>>> 
>>> AFAIK, no one has ever observed a probability wave, from which I conclude 
>>> the wave function has only epistemic content.
>> 
>> 
>> Then you need to explain how that epistemic content interfere in nature.
> ??  The epistemic content IS how interference occurs in nature.  The wave 
> function is one's estimation/knowledge of how events will infold, including 
> intereference.

That will follow from mechanism indeed, but is not the standard way most people 
interpret the physical laws. The *physical* antic will indeed be epistemic, but 
that is what we need to test (and indeed the quantum confirms this, but you 
give the answer before the question). What I meant is that the quantum wave has 
to be taken as real, as we can put it in a box and send it to a colleague to 
ask if he get the same results. It is not like the subjective probabilities 
based on ignorance and big numbers like in statistical physics. 




> 
>> Your idea might make sense, and indeed if we believe in a collapse (as you 
>> have to do if you believe in QM and that the superposition does not apply to 
>> us) the idea that consciousness collapse the wave is perhaps the less 
>> ridiculous idea. That idea has indeed be defended by von Neumann, Wigner, 
>> and some others. But has been shown to lead to many difficulties when taken 
>> seriously by Abner Shimony, as well guessed by Wigner itself. Obviously that 
>> idea would be inconsistent with Mechanism.
>> 
>> There is no probability waves. There is only an amplitude of probability 
>> wave, and the weirdness is that we have strong indirect evidence that the 
>> amplitude of that wave is as physically real as the particles that we can 
>> observe, because the particle location is determined by that wave having 
>> interfered like wave usually do. In particular, even if send one by one, the 
>> particles will never been found where the wave interfere destructively, and 
>> the pattern on the screen will reflect the number of holes, and their 
>> disposition. 
> 
> That's like arguing that the map is the territory because if you follow it 
> you get where you want to go.

?

I don’t see that at all. It is more saying that the map is correct as it 
indicates where we can visit this and that, and indeed, all participant 
acknowledge that it is the case. 

Again I discuss physics here, not Mechanism. 

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
>> 
>> It is OK to say that probability comes from ignorance, and that the wave 
>> describe that ignorance, the extraordinary thing is then that  this 
>> ignorance interfere independently of you.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> So I have embraced the "shut up and calculate" interpretation of the wave 
>>> function.
>> 
>> 
>> That can be wise. Nobody can enforce the search of the truth. It is 
>> frustrating because we can’t be sure if we progress toward it or the 
>> contrary, and it is shocking because truth always beat fictions.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> I also see a connection between the True Believers of the MWI, and Trump 
>>> sycophants; they seem immune to simple facts, such as the foolishness of 
>>> thinking copies of observers can occur, or be created, willy-nilly. AG
>> 
>> That remark deserves your point and diminish your credibility. It also 
>> suggests that you are a “True Believer” in something.
>> 
>> Assuming Mechanism in cognitive science, you don’t need quantum mechanics to 
>> understand that there are infinitely many relative computational states 
>> corresponding to you here and now emulated by infinitely many universal 
>> machines.
> 
> No, but you need to believe that abstractions like universal Turing machines 
> exist and are running a UD and that you and your whole world are just 
> computations. 
> 
> Brent
> 
>> Even without mechanism this is a theorem of arithmetic using only Church 
>> thesis. With mechanism, we have to derive the “guessable wave" from a 
>> statistics on those computations, and so we can test Mechanism if it leads 
>> to more, or less extravaganza than Nature. It fits up to now. So with 
>> Mechanism, we get the *appearance* of many interfering “worlds”, and this 
>> without any worlds, from just the natural numbers and the laws of addition 
>> and multiplication. I will show that with the combinators as it is much 
>> shorter (but still long) than showing this with the numbers. This is known 
>> by logicians since the 1930s (I mean that a universal Turing machine is an 
>> arithmetical object). Computationalism, or Indexical Digital Mechanism 
>> imposes a Many-Dreams internal interpretation of Arithmetic (or combinator 
>> theory, or game-of-life theory, … we have to assume only one universal 
>> machinery).
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> -- 
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Gro

Re: The Ilusion of Branching and the MWI

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 6 Aug 2018, at 22:47, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, August 6, 2018 at 6:22:45 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 6 Aug 2018, at 09:23, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, August 5, 2018 at 5:50:56 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>>  wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, August 5, 2018 at 4:43:21 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 4 Aug 2018, at 23:32, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> 
>>> AFAIK, no one has ever observed a probability wave, from which I conclude 
>>> the wave function has only epistemic content.
>> 
>> 
>> Then you need to explain how that epistemic content interfere in nature. 
>> Your idea might make sense, and indeed if we believe in a collapse (as you 
>> have to do if you believe in QM and that the superposition does not apply to 
>> us) the idea that consciousness collapse the wave is perhaps the less 
>> ridiculous idea. That idea has indeed be defended by von Neumann, Wigner, 
>> and some others. But has been shown to lead to many difficulties when taken 
>> seriously by Abner Shimony, as well guessed by Wigner itself. Obviously that 
>> idea would be inconsistent with Mechanism.
>> 
>> Easy to show that consciousness doesn't collapse the wf. Just do repeated 
>> trials and don't look at the screen until the experiment is finished. I 
>> forget; what is mechanism? AG 
>> 
>> There is no probability waves.
>> 
>> IIUC, the wf has the mathematical form of a wave, of which the amplitude is 
>> part of. AG
> 
> The point is that it behave also like a wave. Even if I send only one 
> particle, the position of the screen is determine by a wave which take into 
> account all physical available path. 
> 
> You have proposed an instrumentalist interpretation, and that is OK if you 
> goal is to build microscopic transistor or atomic bombs. Here we try to make 
> sense of a theory. The choice is between a non-local guiding potential, the 
> relative states or a (magical) collapse, also non local.
> 
> 
> 
>>  
>> There is only an amplitude of probability wave, and the weirdness is that we 
>> have strong indirect evidence that the amplitude of that wave is as 
>> physically real as the particles that we can observe, because the particle 
>> location is determined by that wave having interfered like wave usually do. 
>> In particular, even if send one by one, the particles will never been found 
>> where the wave interfere destructively, and the pattern on the screen will 
>> reflect the number of holes, and their disposition. 
>> 
>> The fact that the wf gives information about the constructive and 
>> destructive inference pattern on the screen, say, is within the meaning of 
>> having an epistemic property.
> 
> Not at all. It is based on inter-observer sharable documentation. The whole 
> mystery is in the double slit, or all the many-slits elaboration, like the 
> “joke” of Feynman asking what if we put slit everywhere.
>> If you want to claim it has ontic property, you need to define what that 
>> means. AG
> 
> That it predicts result sharable by many people, who can then repeat the 
> experience, and see indeed that te arrival or non arrival of one election 
> depend on the sum of the amplitude of the happening events relative to 
> sharable device and device plan.
> 
> Epistemic has this property.You haven't distinguished epistemic from ontic.


I did, but perhaps you have other definitions. You might give them for 
proceeding.




> If you want to know what's "real", or ontic, compare an EM wave with a 
> probability wave. In the former case it can be detected when it passes, say 
> with an antenna, in the latter case not.

The “probability wave” can de detected by the interference fringe. 



> No device exists that can detect a probability wave when it passes. AG 

Two slits or an interferometer do that all the time. That is why we postulate 
the wave to begin with.

I really insist that you bought the little book by David Albert “Quantum 
Mechanics and Experience” (Harvard University Press, 1992). That would be a 
good base to progress in the discussion. 

Bruno





> 
> If this contains epistemic (and it does with mechanism), that epistemic part 
> can share the fact that some happening, and perhaps all, is a sum on 
> infinitely many virtual path. With mechanism, there might still be too much 
> parts, but that is testable.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> It is OK to say that probability comes from ignorance, and that the wave 
>> describe that ignorance, the extraordinary thing is then that  this 
>> ignorance interfere independently of you.
>>> So I have embraced the "shut up and calculate" interpretation of the wave 
>>> function.
>> That can be wise. Nobody can enforce the search of the truth. It is 
>> frustrating because we can’t be sure if we progress toward it or the 
>> contrary, and it is shocking because truth always beat fictions.
>>> I also see a connection between the True Believers of the MWI, and Trump 

Re: The Ilusion of Branching and the MWI

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 6 Aug 2018, at 22:37, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, August 6, 2018 at 6:22:45 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 6 Aug 2018, at 09:23, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, August 5, 2018 at 5:50:56 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>>  wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, August 5, 2018 at 4:43:21 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 4 Aug 2018, at 23:32, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> 
>>> AFAIK, no one has ever observed a probability wave, from which I conclude 
>>> the wave function has only epistemic content.
>> 
>> 
>> Then you need to explain how that epistemic content interfere in nature. 
>> Your idea might make sense, and indeed if we believe in a collapse (as you 
>> have to do if you believe in QM and that the superposition does not apply to 
>> us) the idea that consciousness collapse the wave is perhaps the less 
>> ridiculous idea. That idea has indeed be defended by von Neumann, Wigner, 
>> and some others. But has been shown to lead to many difficulties when taken 
>> seriously by Abner Shimony, as well guessed by Wigner itself. Obviously that 
>> idea would be inconsistent with Mechanism.
>> 
>> Easy to show that consciousness doesn't collapse the wf. Just do repeated 
>> trials and don't look at the screen until the experiment is finished. I 
>> forget; what is mechanism? AG 
>> 
>> There is no probability waves.
>> 
>> IIUC, the wf has the mathematical form of a wave, of which the amplitude is 
>> part of. AG
> 
> The point is that it behave also like a wave.
> 
> Yes, we all know that, but above you assert there are no probability waves -- 
> but mathematically they exist, but no one has ever seen one. That's MY point! 
> AG

The expression probability wave is bad. Only the amplitude oscillate and 
interfere. The probability is the square of the amplitude, which typically do 
not behave as a wave. If you track the particles, you see a particles, going 
through one slit, and the interference fringe disappear. Some would say that 
nature behave like a wave, when fuming not observed, but that makes not much 
sense. No such problem with the relative-state theory, as far as I can see, 
except for the mind-body problem, but that is another story.

Bruno







> 
> Even if I send only one particle, the position of the screen is determine by 
> a wave which take into account all physical available path. 
> 
> You have proposed an instrumentalist interpretation, and that is OK if you 
> goal is to build microscopic transistor or atomic bombs. Here we try to make 
> sense of a theory. The choice is between a non-local guiding potential, the 
> relative states or a (magical) collapse, also non local.
> 
> 
> 
>>  
>> There is only an amplitude of probability wave, and the weirdness is that we 
>> have strong indirect evidence that the amplitude of that wave is as 
>> physically real as the particles that we can observe, because the particle 
>> location is determined by that wave having interfered like wave usually do. 
>> In particular, even if send one by one, the particles will never been found 
>> where the wave interfere destructively, and the pattern on the screen will 
>> reflect the number of holes, and their disposition. 
>> 
>> The fact that the wf gives information about the constructive and 
>> destructive inference pattern on the screen, say, is within the meaning of 
>> having an epistemic property.
> 
> Not at all. It is based on inter-observer sharable documentation. The whole 
> mystery is in the double slit, or all the many-slits elaboration, like the 
> “joke” of Feynman asking what if we put slit everywhere.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> If you want to claim it has ontic property, you need to define what that 
>> means. AG 
> 
> 
> That it predicts result sharable by many people, who can then repeat the 
> experience, and see indeed that te arrival or non arrival of one election 
> depend on the sum of the amplitude of the happening events relative to 
> sharable device and device plan.
> 
> If this contains epistemic (and it does with mechanism), that epistemic part 
> can share the fact that some happening, and perhaps all, is a sum on 
> infinitely many virtual path. With mechanism, there might still be too much 
> parts, but that is testable.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> It is OK to say that probability comes from ignorance, and that the wave 
>> describe that ignorance, the extraordinary thing is then that  this 
>> ignorance interfere independently of you.
>>> So I have embraced the "shut up and calculate" interpretation of the wave 
>>> function.
>> That can be wise. Nobody can enforce the search of the truth. It is 
>> frustrating because we can’t be sure if we progress toward it or the 
>> contrary, and it is shocking because truth always beat fictions.
>>> I also see a connection between the True Believers of the MWI, and Trump 
>>> sycophants; they seem immune to simple facts, such as the foolishness of 
>>> thinking cop

Re: The Ilusion of Branching and the MWI

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 6 Aug 2018, at 20:31, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, August 6, 2018 at 5:50:58 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 5 Aug 2018, at 19:50, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, August 5, 2018 at 4:43:21 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 4 Aug 2018, at 23:32, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> 
>>> AFAIK, no one has ever observed a probability wave, from which I conclude 
>>> the wave function has only epistemic content.
>> 
>> 
>> Then you need to explain how that epistemic content interfere in nature. 
>> Your idea might make sense, and indeed if we believe in a collapse (as you 
>> have to do if you believe in QM and that the superposition does not apply to 
>> us) the idea that consciousness collapse the wave is perhaps the less 
>> ridiculous idea. That idea has indeed be defended by von Neumann, Wigner, 
>> and some others. But has been shown to lead to many difficulties when taken 
>> seriously by Abner Shimony, as well guessed by Wigner itself. Obviously that 
>> idea would be inconsistent with Mechanism.
>> 
>> Easy to show that consciousness doesn't collapse the wf. Just do repeated 
>> trials and don't look at the screen until the experiment is finished.
> 
> The idea that consciousness collapses the wave is that the wave is described 
> by a sum of two waves which are the one diffracted by the two slits. The 
> *final* probability is the square of the amplitude on that screen, and the 
> absence of particles ever on some part of the screen is due to the 
> destructive interference of the wave. We have a superposition, and it works 
> because I have not been conscious of which path the particle has chosen. It 
> is the unconsciousness of which hole took the electron which interferes in 
> this picture, and consciousness which select the eigenstate in its favourite 
> base.
> 
> Consciousness used to be the explanation for collapse. When it doesn't work, 
> try unconsciousness. AG


It is the same theory. If consciousness is needed to actualise a particle 
position and preventing further interference, it is means that the interference 
are produced when we are not conscious of the path undertaken by the particles.

You don’t believe in that theory, and me neither, but the idea makes some sense 
at first sight, as only consciousness could reduce the wave packet in any 
theory which accept that the device and the body are made of matter obeying QM. 

Yet, that idea simply not works well when pushed on the details. That has been 
shown by Abner Shimony. Wigner and its Wigner’s friend illustrate already the 
problem for the use of consciousness to solve the QM (with collapse) 
interpretation problem.

Bruno




> 
> The idea is that if I look at u + d, QM describes that as O(u+d) = O u + O d. 
> The collapse is the inference that [1/sqrt(2)Ou + 1/sqrt(2)Od] collapses into 
> either Ou or Od with a probability (1/sqrt(2)^2. Everett is the theory that 
> there is no collapse, and it explains why the observer O will still describes 
> in its diary something like a collapse, using Mechanism (identifying a person 
> with its personal memory sequences of experiences, like looking at a particle 
> state)..
> 
> I think more and more that the appellation “Relativise state theory” is 
> better that many-worlds, because the notion of worlds is more tricky to 
> defined than the word “state”.
> 
> With mechanism we know at the start that the notion of world does not make 
> sense, there are only relative sharable dreams.
> 
> 
>> I forget; what is mechanism? AG 
> 
> 
> It is the hypothesis/theory/assumption that it exists a level of description 
> of your brain, or body (including any finite part of the environment if you 
> insist), such that a digital emulation executed by some physical computer, at 
> that level, would support your consciousness and subjective life and 
> character, etc. To simplify the reasoning I use often the brain metabolical 
> level, allowing you to survive with a digital brain. My contribution is that 
> entails you do survive also in the arithmetical reality, and that we have to 
> explain the origin of the wave trough a Pythagorean theology, and the work of 
> Gödel, Löb and Solovay provides exactly that, and the tests (the comparison 
> between the theological physics of the universal Turing machine with the 
> observation fits. The wave itself is a phenomenological first person plural 
> product on the sum of all universal machine computations/dreams.
> 
> Let me describe you the possible progress in the field, 
> 
> I. Copenhagen: the assumptions are
> 
> 1) the sigma_1 true propositions (a little part of arithmetic)
> 2) The SWE
> 3) a dualist unintelligible theory of mind
> 
> II. Everett: the assumptions are
> 
> 1) the sigma_1 true propositions
> 2) The SWE
> 3) Mechanism
> 
> III) … and you can see this as a problem to solve, but the propositional 
> parts can be shown offered on a plate by the (Löbian) Universal Machine:
> 
> 

Re: The Ilusion of Branching and the MWI

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 6 Aug 2018, at 21:11, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 8/6/2018 11:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 6 Aug 2018, at 09:23, agrayson2...@gmail.com 
>>>  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, August 5, 2018 at 5:50:56 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>>>  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, August 5, 2018 at 4:43:21 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 4 Aug 2018, at 23:32, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
 
 AFAIK, no one has ever observed a probability wave, from which I conclude 
 the wave function has only epistemic content.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Then you need to explain how that epistemic content interfere in nature. 
>>> Your idea might make sense, and indeed if we believe in a collapse (as you 
>>> have to do if you believe in QM and that the superposition does not apply 
>>> to us) the idea that consciousness collapse the wave is perhaps the less 
>>> ridiculous idea. That idea has indeed be defended by von Neumann, Wigner, 
>>> and some others. But has been shown to lead to many difficulties when taken 
>>> seriously by Abner Shimony, as well guessed by Wigner itself. Obviously 
>>> that idea would be inconsistent with Mechanism.
>>> 
>>> Easy to show that consciousness doesn't collapse the wf. Just do repeated 
>>> trials and don't look at the screen until the experiment is finished. I 
>>> forget; what is mechanism? AG 
>>> 
>>> There is no probability waves.
>>> 
>>> IIUC, the wf has the mathematical form of a wave, of which the amplitude is 
>>> part of. AG
>> 
>> The point is that it behave also like a wave. Even if I send only one 
>> particle, the position of the screen is determine by a wave which take into 
>> account all physical available path. 
>> 
>> You have proposed an instrumentalist interpretation, and that is OK if you 
>> goal is to build microscopic transistor or atomic bombs. Here we try to make 
>> sense of a theory. The choice is between a non-local guiding potential, the 
>> relative states or a (magical) collapse, also non local.
> 
> You want to make sense of a theory that is defined by complex valued fields 
> in a Hilbert space built on spacetime. 

In this thread, yes. We just discuss Everett’s QM theory.




> You begin by assuming mechanism,

Everett assumes it, more or less explicitly. The important idea is that he 
defines the personal identity by the personal diary of an observer involved in 
a superposition. 



> which implicitly replaces everything physical, including the spacetime, with 
> conscious thoughts which are realized as theorems in arithmetic (or 
> equivalent computation). 

Not in this thread, where we discuss QM, not Mechanism. That concerns my 
critics of Everett, and physicalist metaphysicians. Once we use a measure on 
computations, we must explain why the quantum computation win the measure on 
all sigma_1 sentences. That is what I ahem done.



> You have not shown how this entails conscious thoughts about a 
> quasi-classical world, i.e. one in which there appears a shared reality.

See my papers for the progress in that direction. The point is that there ara 
no other ways, and it works up to now. That just means that mechanism is 
confirmed and not yet refuted, unlike physicalism (when we assume mechanism of 
course).



> So wouldn't it be simpler to just adopt the interpretation of QBism.


I just forgot what you mean by that. Can you repeat it? Thanks.



>   It seems compatible with the idea of a computational substrate, but it 
> doesn't need to assume one. 


If you believe in the SWE, you need to believe in elementary arithmetic, and 
from that you can prove the existence of all computations, and you face the 
measure problem.


> That fact tells me the computational substrate is an independent assumption 
> that does not follow from QM.


There is no computational substrate, as with computationalism there is no 
notion of substrate which makes sense. Then in today’s QM, all hamiltonian used 
are computable. Logically, you are right, we can build ad hoc non computable 
wave function, but using them in a theory of mind is a bit like invoking a 
miracle.

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
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