Re: Quantum Decision Theory

On Tue, Jan 14, 2003 at 02:45:15PM -0800, Hal Finney wrote: > Another angle on this argument takes an even broader view. Let us > consider all observer-moments in the multiverse. By eliminating those > observer-moments which have a negative quality of life, we improve

Re: Quantum Decision Theory

> > (p. 150, "The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory," 1999.) > > Now in Hal's retelling of your model, Alice occasionally chooses > non-optimal choices of rewards in a game of chance precisely because > she hopes that other Alices in other worlds will do the

Re: Quantum Decision Theory

On Tuesday, January 14, 2003, at 02:27 PM, Russell Standish wrote: Dear Tim, Since you joined the list relatively more recently, you're unlikely to have come across a couple of example in decision theory I mentioned back in 1999 (http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m781.html), namely

Re: Quantum Decision Theory

Russell Standish refers to his earlier post, http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m781.html and now writes: > Noone that I could recall came up with a convincing argument against > the Euthanasia issue - it would seem that committing euthanasia on > someone is actually condemning them to an eterni

Re: Quantum Decision Theory

Dear Tim, Since you joined the list relatively more recently, you're unlikely to have come across a couple of example in decision theory I mentioned back in 1999 (http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m781.html), namely with respect to superannuation (pension insurance) and eutha

Quantum Decision Theory

Answering the last question first, "Do you find this perspective useful?"... I'm not yet convinced of any of the utility of the MWI for any bet or action, but I certainly think you are pursuing something that _might_ be interesting or even useful, with a kind of "qua

Re: R: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

The Borromean ring analogy to the GHZ state is due to Aravind. On the same thematic, i.e., that there may be a simple topological analogy to the structure of multipartite entanglement there are a couple of papers by Zapatrin: http://arXiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0211077 http://arXiv.org/abs/quant-ph/020

R: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

[scerir] > As far as I know you can describe certain classes of entanglement > by means of Borromean rings, which are beautiful and sometimes > also unpredictable. I realize that Kauffman already wrote something ... http://www.math.uic.edu/~kauffman/QETE.pdf

R: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

[Joao Leao] What we lack is a genuinely quantum model of computation that could be mathematically tractable as the Turing or Post models and can account for entanglement in all its glory. As far as I know you can describe certain classes of entanglement by means of Borromean rings, which are beaut

Re: R: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

t;[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Tuesday, December 31, 2002 10:02 AM Subject: Re: R: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory > I don't agree with Tim's suggestion that infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces > are somewhat "ancilliary" in QM and tha

Re: R: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

I don't agree with Tim's suggestion that infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces are somewhat "ancilliary" in QM and that all systems are calculable in finite dimensional modes. In fact infinite sets of spaces are the rule in QM and the finite dimensional subspaces only serve as toy systems. Having s

R: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

[Tim May, in another thread] Any finite system, which of course all systems are, can have all of its quantum mechanics calculations done with finite-dimensional vector spaces. The "full-blown machinery" of an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space is nice to have, in the same way that Fourier analysis

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

Dear Joao, Interleaving. - Original Message - From: "Joao Leao" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Ben Goertzel" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: "Hal Finney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Monday, December 30, 2002 2:11 PM Subject:

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

uot;Hans Moravec" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Monday, December 30, 2002 9:39 PM Subject: Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory > Brent Meeker: > > It seems [factoring] has been proven recently to be in P: > > http://crypto.cs.mcgill.ca/~stiglic/PRIMES_P_FAQ.html#PRIMES > > No, that's primality testing, which has always been > much easier than factoring. > >

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

Brent Meeker: It seems [factoring] has been proven recently to be in P: http://crypto.cs.mcgill.ca/~stiglic/PRIMES_P_FAQ.html#PRIMES No, that's primality testing, which has always been much easier than factoring.

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

On 31-Dec-02, you wrote: > Hans Moravec writes: > >> Hal Finney: >>> there are no known problems which take >>> exponential time but which can be checked >>> in polynomial time. If such a problem could >>> be found it would prove that P != NP ... OK, you mean that *provably* take exponential ti

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

>> ... It is suspected but not yet known that factoring is NP-complete. Of course, if factoring were to be shown NP-complete and quantum computers could be built to run Shor's factoring algorithm in polynomial time, then quantu

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

Hal Finney: I'm not sure if you are disagreeing with either of my statements above, that (1) there are no known problems which take exponential time but which can be checked in polynomial time, or that (2) if such a problem could be found it would prove that P != NP. Ah, I see the communications

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

On Monday, December 30, 2002, at 03:46 AM, Brent Meeker wrote: On 31-Dec-02, Hal Finney wrote: One correction, there are no known problems which take exponential time but which can be checked in polynomial time. If such a problem could be found it would prove that P != NP, one of the greatest

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

Hans Moravec writes: > Hal Finney: > > there are no known problems which take > > exponential time but which can be checked > > in polynomial time. If such a problem could > > be found it would prove that P != NP ... > > Communications glitch here. The definition > of NP is problems that can be

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

Brent Meeker wrote: > On 31-Dec-02, Hal Finney wrote: > > One correction, there are no known problems which take exponential > > time but which can be checked in polynomial time. If such a problem > > could be found it would prove that P != NP, one of the greatest > > unsolved problems in computabi

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

On 31-Dec-02, Hal Finney wrote: > One correction, there are no known problems which take exponential > time but which can be checked in polynomial time. If such a problem > could be found it would prove that P != NP, one of the greatest > unsolved problems in computability theory. What about Ham

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

Hal Finney: there are no known problems which take exponential time but which can be checked in polynomial time. If such a problem could be found it would prove that P != NP ... Communications glitch here. The definition of NP is problems that can be solved in polynomial time on a "nondetermin

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

On 30-Dec-02, you wrote: > Dear Stephen, ... > [Bruno]It is perhaps up to you to show me a quantum computable function not > being classicaly computable. But if you succeed you will give me > something like an unitary transformation, and then I will show you > how to write a classical program emul

RE: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

Hal Finney wrote: One correction, there are no known problems which take exponential time but which can be checked in polynomial time. If such a problem could be found it would prove that P != NP, one of the greatest unsolved problems in computability theory. Whoops, I've heard of the P=NP pro

RE: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

Jesse Mazer writes: > I had a science-fictional idea about a way to build an oracle machine after > reading Hans Moravec's article on "Time Travel and Computing" here: > > >http://www.frc.ri.cmu.edu/users/hpm/project.archive/general.articles/1991/TempComp.html > > As I understood it, the basic id

RE: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

Ben Goertzel wrote: Jesse & Stephen: About quantum computing getting around the limitations of Turing machines: you don't have to cite Feynman, this matter was settled fairly clearly in David Deutsch's classic work on quantum computation. He showed that the only quantum-computable functions ar

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

Stephen Paul King wrote: >Dear Jesse, > > Please read the below referenced paper. It shows that QM comp *CAN* " >"solve an undecidable problem" > (relative to a classical computer)." Where does it say that? [SPK] In the abstract of http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~cristian/coinsQIP.pd

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

On Monday, December 30, 2002, at 11:18 AM, Tim May wrote: On Monday, December 30, 2002, at 10:44 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: QM comp seems to operate in the space of the Reals (R) and TM operates in the space of Integers (Z), is this correct? Any finite system, which of course all sys

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

On Monday, December 30, 2002, at 10:44 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: QM comp seems to operate in the space of the Reals (R) and TM operates in the space of Integers (Z), is this correct? Any finite system, which of course all systems are, can have all of its quantum mechanics calculations

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

There go 7 cents out of my 60!... The case indeed is that if you build a quantum computer by emulating a Turing-Universal Machine you are a priori circunscribing its own class of algorithms. That is only natural if that is the largest class of computable problems you think are worthwhile consideri

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

t for, at least, the "illusion" of time and concurrency of events. Kindest regards, Stephen - Original Message - From: "Hal Finney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Monday, December 30, 2002 12:38 PM Subject: Re: Quantum Probability and Decision T

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

Dear Jesse, - Original Message - From: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Monday, December 30, 2002 11:40 AM Subject: Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory > Stephen Paul King wrote: > > > > >Dear Jesse, >

RE: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

> When a finite quantum computer can break the Turing barrier, that will > prove something. But when your first step is to prepare an infinite > superposition, that has no applicability to the physical universe. > > Hal Finney > Precisely. Deutsch's arguments make a lot of assumptions about th

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

Stephen Paul King references: > http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~cristian/coinsQIP.pdf whose abstract begins, "Is there any hope for quantum computer to challenge the Turing barrier, i.e., to solve an undecidable problem, to compute an uncomputable function? According to Feynman's '82 argument, th

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

There are two sides to this question that may be clouding the argument and maybe suggest a change in thread. Here go my 2 cents: 1) Yes, indeed there is no hope that a Quantum Computer _as we understand it today_ (and I underscore this last point) is likely to violate the Turing's Halting Theorem

RE: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

ut I'm of course open to new ideas and new information... -- Ben Goertzel > -Original Message- > From: Jesse Mazer [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > Sent: Monday, December 30, 2002 11:41 AM > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory > &

re:Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

Dear Stephen, >[SPK] > >When what is [relevant]? > >> Quantum computer can be emulated by classical computer (see below). > >[SPK] > >Please point me to some paper, other than yours, that gives something >better than a hand-waving argument of this statement. See Deutsch 1985. (precise ref

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Jesse, Please read the below referenced paper. It shows that QM comp *CAN* " "solve an undecidable problem" (relative to a classical computer)." Where does it say that? I do not see how I misread Feynman's claim Again, the paper says: "Is there any hope

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

st regards, Stephen - Original Message - From: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Monday, December 30, 2002 11:01 AM Subject: Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory snip http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~cristian/coinsQIP.pdf > > &g

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

Dear Bruno, Interleaving. - Original Message - From: "Marchal Bruno" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Monday, December 30, 2002 8:26 AM Subject: Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory > Stephen Paul King wrote: > > >There

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

Stephen Paul King wrote: Also, any quantum computer or physical system can be simulated by a classical computer. [SPK] Bruno has made similar statements and I do not understand how this is true. I have it from multiple sources that this is not true. Do you recall the famous statement by Ri

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

Stephen Paul King wrote: >There do exist strong arguments that the "macroscopic state" of neurons >is not completely classical and thus some degree of QM entanglement is >involved. But hand waving arguments aside, I would really like to understand >how you and Bruno (and others), given the pro

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

Dear Wei, Interleaving. - Original Message - From: "Wei Dai" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Stephen Paul King" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Friday, December 27, 2002 4:18 PM Subject: Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

On Thu, Dec 26, 2002 at 08:21:38PM -0500, Stephen Paul King wrote: > Forgive me if my writting gave you that opinion. I meant to imply that > any mind, including that of a bat, is quantum mechanical and not classical > in its nature. My ideas follow the implications of Hitoshi Kitada's theory >

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

Original Message - > From: "Joao Leao" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: "Stephen Paul King" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Sent: Thursday, December 26, 2002 2:47 PM > Subject: Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory > &g

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

ginal Message - From: "Joao Leao" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Stephen Paul King" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Thursday, December 26, 2002 2:47 PM Subject: Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory > I am sorry but I have to ask: why

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

I am sorry but I have to ask: why would "minds" be quantum mechanical but "bat minds" be classical in your suspicions? I am not sure I am being "batocentric" here but I can anticipate a lot of bats waving their wings in disagreament... -Joao Stephen Paul King wrote: > [SPK] > > Yes. I stro

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

ephen - Original Message - From: "Marchal Bruno" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Tuesday, December 24, 2002 4:03 AM Subject: Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory > Stephen Paul King wrote: > > > >Yes. I strongly suspect that "

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

Stephen Paul King wrote: it seems to me that if minds are purely classical when it would not be difficult for us to imagine, i.e. compute, what it is like to "be a bat" or any other classical mind. I see this as implied by the ideas involved in Turing Machines and other "Universal" classical comp

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

Stephen Paul King wrote: >Yes. I strongly suspect that "minds" are quantum mechanical. My >arguement is at this point very hand waving, but it seems to me that if >minds are purely classical when it would not be difficult for us to imagine, >i.e. compute, what it is like to "be a bat" or any

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

Stephen Paul King wrote: > > Dear Wei, > > Interleaving. > > [SPK] > > Yes. I strongly suspect that "minds" are quantum mechanical. My > arguement is at this point very hand waving, but it seems to me that if > minds are purely classical when it would not be difficult for us to imagine,

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

Dear Wei, Interleaving. - Original Message - From: "Wei Dai" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Stephen Paul King" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Monday, December 23, 2002 5:16 PM Subject: Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

On Wed, Dec 18, 2002 at 08:54:30PM -0500, Stephen Paul King wrote: > Two ideas would seem to mute this strange thought. > > 1) The no-cloning theorem, iff the world follows QM and not just classical > physics. Are you saying the no-cloning theorem will prevent copying of minds? What about AIs

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

Wednesday, December 18, 2002 8:15 PM Subject: Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory > On Wed, Dec 04, 2002 at 04:00:07PM +0100, Marchal Bruno wrote: > > Have you read the "revisited" paper by Wallace on Everett/decision > > theory? Quite interesting imo, and relev

Re: Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

On Wed, Dec 04, 2002 at 04:00:07PM +0100, Marchal Bruno wrote: > Have you read the "revisited" paper by Wallace on Everett/decision > theory? Quite interesting imo, and relevant for some discussion, > about MWI and decision theory we have had on this list. > > http:/

Quantum Probability and Decision Theory

Hi Wei Dai, Have you read the "revisited" paper by Wallace on Everett/decision theory? Quite interesting imo, and relevant for some discussion, about MWI and decision theory we have had on this list. http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/documents/disk0/00/00/08/85/index.html Bruno

a framework for multiverse decision theory

I call this a framework because there are lots of details left unspecified, problems unsolved, etc. However I expected any multiverse decision theory will probably look something like this. My goal in writing this down is to have a framework for formalizing problems and proposed solutions. This

Re: decision theory papers

eed for decision. All most all of this is below the level on consciousness. Although the brain must be almost completely deterministic, it is certainly possible that quantum randomness could play a part. > The more obvious fact that you can't predict your own actions > really has l

Re: decision theory papers

On Wed, Apr 24, 2002 at 04:51:18PM +0200, Marcus Hutter wrote: > In "A Theory of Universal Artificial Intelligence based on > Algorithmic Complexity" http://www.idsia.ch/~marcus/ai/pkcunai.htm > I developed a rational decision maker which makes optimal > decisions in any environment. The only assu

Re: decision theory papers

H J Ruhl wrote: > In any event in my view your argument makes many assumptions - i.e. > requires substantial information, isolates sub systems, and seems to allow > many sub states between states of interest all of which are counter to my > approach. Imo the assumption of a limited information e

Re: decision theory papers

really has less to do with free will, and more with the importance of the lack of logical omniscience in decision theory. Classical decision theory basically contradicts itself by assuming logical omniscience. You already know only one choice is logically possible at any given time in a deterministic

Re: decision theory papers

Welcome to the list, Marcus. I think your analysis is very good. For some predictions there might be a fixed point; for example, I can predict that I will not commit suicide in the next 5 minutes. Even knowing that prediction I will not try to contradict it. For other things there might not be a

Re: decision theory papers

Dear Marcus: I have some basic issues with your post. The idea I use is that the basis of what we like to think of as our universe and all other universes is "There is no information". This is not really an assumption in the sense that you can not extract anything from nothing as one usually

Re: decision theory papers

Dear Everyboy on the Everything list, After having followed the discussions in this list for a while I would like to make my first contribution: The paradox between computability and free will vanishes through careful reasoning: That a part of the universe is computable is defined as follows:

Re: decision theory papers

how different the minds would have to be in a universe which uses Brent's alternative. They would not have free will, and in fact in many circumstances they would be unable to do other than what someone predicted of them. This is sufficiently different from the workings of minds as we understan

Re: decision theory papers

Explorations of the definitional basis of a universe and its effect on the idea of decisions: First examine a deterministic universe j such that [using notation from a post by Matthieu Walraet]: TjTj Tj Sj(0)

Re: decision theory papers

Dear Matthieu: At 4/19/02, you wrote: >On 18 Apr 2002, at 20:03, H J Ruhl wrote: > > > > > 5) I do not see universes as "splitting" by going to more than one next > > state. This is not necessary to explain anything as far as I can see. > > > > 6) Universes that are in receipt of true noise as p

Re: decision theory papers

On 18 Apr 2002, at 20:03, H J Ruhl wrote: > > 5) I do not see universes as "splitting" by going to more than one next > state. This is not necessary to explain anything as far as I can see. > > 6) Universes that are in receipt of true noise as part of a state to state > transition are in effec

Re: decision theory papers

On 18-Apr-02, Wei Dai wrote: > On Thu, Apr 18, 2002 at 05:39:39PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: >> Keeping to the idea of a deterministic universe - wouldn't the >> mathematical description of the universe include a description >> of the brain of the subject. And if the universe is computable >> it f

Re: decision theory papers

On Thu, Apr 18, 2002 at 05:39:39PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: > Keeping to the idea of a deterministic universe - wouldn't the > mathematical description of the universe include a description of the > brain of the subject. And if the universe is computable it follows that > the behavoir of the su

Re: decision theory papers

On Thu, 18 Apr 2002, Wei Dai wrote: > On Thu, Apr 18, 2002 at 04:15:48PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: > > I don't see this. You seem to be making a proof by contradiction - but I > > don't see that it works. There is no contradiction is assuming that there > > is an algorithm that correctly predi

Re: decision theory papers

As a quick contribution to the discussion: 1) What do we mean by the state of a universe? I mean a fixed configuration. 2) What do we mean by the transition to the next state? I mean a new fixed configuration is realized. Successive fixed configurations are not joined by a continuum of interv

Re: decision theory papers

On Thu, Apr 18, 2002 at 04:15:48PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: > I don't see this. You seem to be making a proof by contradiction - but I > don't see that it works. There is no contradiction is assuming that there > is an algorithm that correctly predicts your decision and then you make > that de

Re: decision theory papers

ontext of a decision theory, which we don't have yet. What I'm describing is just the philosophical framework for a decision theory. Invoking probabilities at this point would be circular reasoning, because we want to justify the use of probabilities (or something similar) using more basic co

Re: decision theory papers

verse, > and you also can't compute any events that depend on your choices. That > leaves you free to say "If I do X the following will occur in universes A > and B" even if it is actually mathematically impossible for you to do X in > universes A and B. You can then make what

Re: decision theory papers

On Thu, Apr 18, 2002 at 01:39:59PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: > Exactly. So what does the assumption about the complete mathematical > description add? It's so that your preferences are well defined. > > As a positive theory, decision theory is going to be wrong someti

Re: decision theory papers

gt; the future evolution of the world and you want to find some decision > > theory that tells you what action to take in order to maximize desirable > > outcomes. But if the world is already determined, then so are you actions > > and your decision processes. Thus are actions and

Re: decision theory papers

On Thu, Apr 18, 2002 at 12:26:21PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: > Perhaps "contradictory" is too strong a word - I should have stuck with > "incoherent". But it seems you contemplate having different wishes about > the future evolution of the world and you want to fin

Re: decision theory papers

on process your brain implements. To treat the universe as > > computable and your choices as determined by some utility function and > > decision theory is contradictory. > > Why is that contradictory? Please explain. Also, what alternative do you > propose? Perhaps "cont

Re: decision theory papers

; computable and your choices as determined by some utility function and > decision theory is contradictory. Why is that contradictory? Please explain. Also, what alternative do you propose?

Re: decision theory papers

n your choices. That > leaves you free to say "If I do X the following will occur in universes A > and B" even if it is actually mathematically impossible for you to do X in > universes A and B. You can then make whatever choice best satisfies your > preferences. Decision theor

Re: decision theory papers

o do X in universes A and B. You can then make whatever choice best satisfies your preferences. Decision theory is then about how to determine which choice is best. That's the normative approach. The positive approach is the following. Look at the parts of the multiverse that we can see o

Re: decision theory papers

transitioned to is already the next state which must have been either computationally or noisily arrived at. Hal At 4/17/02, you wrote: >How many people here share my interest in decision theory as it relates to >the all universes hypothesis? I recently found two papers that seem >

decision theory papers

How many people here share my interest in decision theory as it relates to the all universes hypothesis? I recently found two papers that seem relevant: --- http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~blipman/Papers/axiom.pdf Decision Theory without Logical Omniscience: Toward an Axiomatic Framework for

Re: Decision theory

Happy new year, everyone! On Thu, 31 Dec 1998, Wei Dai wrote: > On Wed, Dec 30, 1998 at 04:41:47PM -0500, Jacques M Mallah wrote: > > Certainly any theory with no free parameters will predict many > > cases in which a being like you will be faced with that decision, and in > > some o

Re: Decision theory

On Thu, 10 Dec 1998, Gilles HENRI wrote: > >Unfortunately because currently accepted decision theory makes some > >metaphysical assumptions, it can be compatible with a spacially infinite > >universe but not with MWI. Basicly decision theory depends on the idea of > >alt

Re: Decision theory

On Tue, 29 Dec 1998, Wei Dai wrote: > I realize now the problem with decision theory is really about the absence > of free parameters in a physical theory, and the problem is practical, not > metaphysical. So let me redescribe it. Decision theory depends on a > physical theory to