You will find them by clicking on "publications" on my home page
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
The main one is "informatique théorique et philosophie de
l'esprit" (theoretical computer science and philosophy of mind).
Toulouse 1988. Like my thesis I have been asked to do in french (alas).
Bruno,
Your response is most appreciated. Your publications will keep me busy
for while. You also mentioned earlier some of your publications that
are not on your URL. That reference has gone missing in my
labyrinthine filing system. Would you please post those references
again.
Will
William,
On 18 Mar 2010, at 18:06, L.W. Sterritt wrote:
Bruno and others,
Perhaps more progress can be made by avoiding self referential
problems and viewing this issue mechanistically.
I don't see what self-referential problems you are alluding too,
especially when viewing the issue mec
On 18 Mar 2010, at 23:04, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 19 March 2010 04:01, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/17/2010 11:01 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 18 March 2010 16:36, Brent Meeker wrote:
Is it coherent to say a black box "accidentally" reproduces the I/
O? It is
over some relativel
On 19 March 2010 04:01, Brent Meeker wrote:
> On 3/17/2010 11:01 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On 18 March 2010 16:36, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>
> Is it coherent to say a black box "accidentally" reproduces the I/O? It is
> over some relatively small number to of I/Os, but over a large enou
Thanks. I got it.
Some assertions seem dubious:
"Primal emotions like anger, fear, surprise, and joy are useful and
perhaps even essential for the survival of a conscious organism.
Likewise, a conscious machine might rely on emotions to make choices and
deal with the complexities of the worl
Brent,
I notice that the link that I forwarded opens on the 3rd page; just
select "view all," toward the upper right of the page.
This brief article on consciousness as integrated information may also
be interesting:
http://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/hardware/a-bit-of-theory-consciousnes
Brent,
This link should work. IEEE sometimes makes their articles available
to non-members and non-subscribers:
http://spectrum.ieee.org/biomedical/imaging/can-machines-be-conscious/3
If this does not work, please let me know and I'll find another path
to the article. I could also go ba
On 3/18/2010 12:03 PM, L.W. Sterritt wrote:
Brent,
There are some quite interesting observations in the paper by Koch and
Tonini, e.g.
"Remarkably, consciousness does not seem to require many of the things
we associate most deeply with being human: emotions, memory,
self-reflection, languag
Brent,
There are some quite interesting observations in the paper by Koch and
Tonini, e.g.
"Remarkably, consciousness does not seem to require many of the things
we associate most deeply with being human: emotions, memory, self-
reflection, language, sensing the world and acting in it..."
David,
I think that I have to agree with your comments. I do think that we
will learn something from the quest for conscious machines, perhaps
not what we had in "mind."
Lanny
On Mar 18, 2010, at 10:45 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 18 March 2010 17:06, L.W. Sterritt
wrote:
Perhaps more
On 18 March 2010 17:06, L.W. Sterritt wrote:
> Perhaps more progress can be made by avoiding self referential problems and
> viewing this issue mechanistically.
Undoubtedly.
> I guess I'm in the QM camp
> that believes that what you can measure is what you can know.
But if all that you could
On 3/18/2010 10:06 AM, L.W. Sterritt wrote:
Bruno and others,
Perhaps more progress can be made by avoiding self referential
problems and viewing this issue mechanistically. Where I start: Haim
Sompolinsky, "Statistical Mechanics of Neural Networks," /Physics
Today /(December 1988). He disc
Bruno and others,
Perhaps more progress can be made by avoiding self referential
problems and viewing this issue mechanistically. Where I start: Haim
Sompolinsky, "Statistical Mechanics of Neural Networks," Physics Today
(December 1988). He discussed "emergent computational properties of
On 3/17/2010 11:01 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 18 March 2010 16:36, Brent Meeker wrote:
Is it coherent to say a black box "accidentally" reproduces the I/O? It is
over some relatively small number to of I/Os, but over a large enough number
and range to sustain human behavior - that
On 17 Mar 2010, at 19:12, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/17/2010 10:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Mar 2010, at 13:47, HZ wrote:
I'm quite confused about the state of zombieness. If the requirement
for zombiehood is that it doesn't understand anything at all but it
behaves as if it does what
On 17 Mar 2010, at 18:50, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/17/2010 5:47 AM, HZ wrote:
I'm quite confused about the state of zombieness. If the requirement
for zombiehood is that it doesn't understand anything at all but it
behaves as if it does what makes us not zombies? How do we not we are
not? But
On 17 Mar 2010, at 18:34, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/17/2010 3:34 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 17 March 2010 05:29, Brent Meeker wrote:
I think this is a dubious argument based on our lack of
understanding of
qualia. Presumably one has many thoughts that do not result in
any overt
On 18 Mar 2010, at 07:01, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 18 March 2010 16:36, Brent Meeker wrote:
Is it coherent to say a black box "accidentally" reproduces the I/
O? It is
over some relatively small number to of I/Os, but over a large
enough number
and range to sustain human behavior - t
nguage. We are divine or natural hypotheses.
Bruno
Onward!
Stephen P. King
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com
] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Wednesday, March 17, 2010 1:45 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Jack's
Brent,
I think that the only way out of these dilemmas is to accept the brain
as a self organizing neural network, and consciousness as an emergent
phenomena that we could survive without. In Marvin Chester's, Primer
of Quantum Mechanics, he states "The most important dictum of quantum
m
On 18 March 2010 16:36, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Is it coherent to say a black box "accidentally" reproduces the I/O? It is
> over some relatively small number to of I/Os, but over a large enough number
> and range to sustain human behavior - that seems very doubtful. One would
> be tempted to say
On 3/17/2010 9:28 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 18 March 2010 04:34, Brent Meeker wrote:
However I think there is something in the above that creates the "just a
recording problem". It's the hypothesis that the black box reproduces the
I/O behavior. This implies the black box realize
On 18 March 2010 04:34, Brent Meeker wrote:
> However I think there is something in the above that creates the "just a
> recording problem". It's the hypothesis that the black box reproduces the
> I/O behavior. This implies the black box realizes a function, not a
> recording. But then the arg
On 18 March 2010 06:32, Stephen P. King wrote:
> As I have been following this conversation a question
> occurred to me, how is a Zombie (as defined by Chalmers et al.) any
> different functionally from the notion of other persons (dogs, etc.) that a
> Solipsist might have? They se
, 2010 1:45 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Jack's partial brain paper
On 16 Mar 2010, at 19:29, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/16/2010 6:03 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 16 March 2010 20:29, russell standish <mailto:li...@hpcoders.com.au>
wrote:
Hi Gentlemen,
I start out with the bias that the brain as a neural network with ~
10^11 neurons, given the exogenous and endogenous inputs presented to
it, continuously computes our perception of the world around us.
Some neuroscientists suggest that each neuron in the brain is
separat
On 3/17/2010 11:39 AM, John Mikes wrote:
Brent:
why do you believe IN *"QUALIA"?* they are just as human assumptions
(in our belief system) as* "VALUE"* (or, for that matter: to take
seriously your short (long?) term memories).
I don't believe *"IN*" anything. They are just something that
Brent:
why do you believe IN *"QUALIA"?* they are just as human assumptions (in our
belief system) as* "VALUE"* (or, for that matter: to take seriously your
short (long?) term memories).
A* "ZOMBIE"* is the subject of a thought experiment in our humanly
aggrandizing anthropocentric boasting. A dog
On 3/17/2010 10:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Mar 2010, at 13:47, HZ wrote:
I'm quite confused about the state of zombieness. If the requirement
for zombiehood is that it doesn't understand anything at all but it
behaves as if it does what makes us not zombies? How do we not we are
not? Bu
On 3/17/2010 5:47 AM, HZ wrote:
I'm quite confused about the state of zombieness. If the requirement
for zombiehood is that it doesn't understand anything at all but it
behaves as if it does what makes us not zombies? How do we not we are
not? But more importantly, are there known cases of zombie
On 3/17/2010 3:34 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 17 March 2010 05:29, Brent Meeker wrote:
I think this is a dubious argument based on our lack of understanding of
qualia. Presumably one has many thoughts that do not result in any overt
action. So if I lost a few neurons (which I do co
On 17 Mar 2010, at 13:47, HZ wrote:
I'm quite confused about the state of zombieness. If the requirement
for zombiehood is that it doesn't understand anything at all but it
behaves as if it does what makes us not zombies? How do we not we are
not? But more importantly, are there known cases of
On 17 March 2010 23:47, HZ wrote:
> I'm quite confused about the state of zombieness. If the requirement
> for zombiehood is that it doesn't understand anything at all but it
> behaves as if it does what makes us not zombies? How do we not we are
> not? But more importantly, are there known cases
I'm quite confused about the state of zombieness. If the requirement
for zombiehood is that it doesn't understand anything at all but it
behaves as if it does what makes us not zombies? How do we not we are
not? But more importantly, are there known cases of zombies? Perhaps a
silly question becaus
On 17 March 2010 06:09, John Mikes wrote:
> Stathis,
>
> I feel we are riding the human restrictive imaging in a complex nature.
> While I DO feel completely comfortable to say that there is a neuron through
> which connectivity is established to a "next" segment in our mental
> complexity, and if
On 17 March 2010 05:29, Brent Meeker wrote:
> I think this is a dubious argument based on our lack of understanding of
> qualia. Presumably one has many thoughts that do not result in any overt
> action. So if I lost a few neurons (which I do continuously) it might mean
> that there are some th
Hi Gentlemen,
Regarding Jack's partial brain paper, and Free will: Wrong entry:
The IEEE Computational Intelligence Society, one of the Institute of
Electrical and Electronic Engineers groups, publishes three
journals: the IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks, the IEEE
Transactio
On 16 Mar 2010, at 19:29, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/16/2010 6:03 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 16 March 2010 20:29, russell standish
wrote:
I've been following the thread on Jack's partial brains paper,
although I've been too busy to comment. I did get a moment to read
the
paper th
Stathis,
I feel we are riding the human restrictive imaging in a complex nature.
While I DO feel completely comfortable to say that there is a neuron through
which connectivity is established to a "next" segment in our mental
complexity, and if *that *neuron dies, the connectivity to that particul
On 3/16/2010 6:03 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 16 March 2010 20:29, russell standish wrote:
I've been following the thread on Jack's partial brains paper,
although I've been too busy to comment. I did get a moment to read the
paper this evening, and I was abruptly stopped by a comment
On 16 March 2010 20:29, russell standish wrote:
> I've been following the thread on Jack's partial brains paper,
> although I've been too busy to comment. I did get a moment to read the
> paper this evening, and I was abruptly stopped by a comment on page 2:
>
> "On the second hypothesis [Sudden D
I've been following the thread on Jack's partial brains paper,
although I've been too busy to comment. I did get a moment to read the
paper this evening, and I was abruptly stopped by a comment on page 2:
"On the second hypothesis [Sudden Disappearing Qualia], the
replacement of a single neuron co
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