Re: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism
On 24 Oct 2012, at 02:01, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/23/2012 5:47 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 10/23/2012 2:39 PM, Russell Standish wrote: I have not met this argument before. I have comments interspersed. On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 08:04:35AM -0400, Roger Clough wrote: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism Problematic Idealism (Berkeley's idealism, not that of Leibniz) is the thesis that we cannot prove that objects outside us exist. This results directly from Descartes' proposition that the only thing I cannot doubt is that I exist (solipsism). If solipsism is true, it seems to raise the problem that we cannot prove that objects outside us exist . But Kant refutes this thesis by his observation that we cannot observe the passing of time (in itself inextended or nonphysical) unless there is some fixed inextended substrate on which to observe the change in time. Thus there must exist a fixed (only necessarily over a small duration of time) nonphysical substrate to reality. A similar conclusion can be made regarding space. Here is an alternate account of that argument: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental/#RefIde Dicker provides a compelling initial representation of Kant's argument (Dicker 2004, 2008): 1) I am conscious of my own existence in time; that is, I am aware, and can be aware, that I have experiences that occur in a specific temporal order. (premise) OK 2) can be aware of having experiences that occur in a specific temporal order only if I perceive something permanent by reference to which I can determine their temporal order. (premise) What motivates this premise? I think it is implicitly assuming that experiences have no 'fuzz' in their duration, they are discrete like states of a Turing machine computation. I'd say we perceive temporal order by overlap between successive experiences. This is consistent with the idea that an experience is not just a state of a computation, but a bundle of states that constitute the same stream of consciousness. Brent I agree. Me too. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism
SNIP ROGER: 2) I can be aware of having experiences that occur in a specific temporal order only if I perceive something permanent by reference to which I can determine their temporal order. (premise) RUSSELL: What motivates this premise? ROGER: The permanent entity could be the first event. (previously) 3) No conscious state of my own can serve as the permanent entity by reference to which I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise) RUSSELL: Even assuming 2), what motivates this premise? ROGER: Temporal order means that, besides images of perceived events, recording an intuition of time passing is necessary. (previously) 4) Time itself cannot serve as this permanent entity by reference to which I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise) RUSSELL: Well, I don't accept an objective concept of time anyway, so I have no problem with this, although I don't see why this should hold, assuming an objective (eg Newtonian) concept of time is valid. (5) If (2), (3), and (4), are true, then I can be aware of having experiences that occur in a specific temporal order only if I perceive persisting objects in space outside me by reference to which I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise) Yes, I can see this follows. (6) Therefore, I perceive persisting objects in space outside me by reference to which I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (1?5) Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/23/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism
Hi Russell Standish I agree. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/24/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Russell Standish Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-23, 18:20:35 Subject: Re: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 02:47:12PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: On 10/23/2012 2:39 PM, Russell Standish wrote: 2) can be aware of having experiences that occur in a specific temporal order only if I perceive something permanent by reference to which I can determine their temporal order. (premise) What motivates this premise? I think it is implicitly assuming that experiences have no 'fuzz' in their duration, they are discrete like states of a Turing machine computation. I'd say we perceive temporal order by overlap between successive experiences. This is consistent with the idea that an experience is not just a state of a computation, but a bundle of states that constitute the same stream of consciousness. Brent Whilst I'm sympathetic to that model, I can also imagine comparing one's current state, or a memory of one's current state, with a memory of a previous state, which is a discrete state model that is in contradiction to 2). I think this model implies one cannot be aware of the totality of one's state (ie that a subconsciousness exists), but does not entail the existence of an external world. As some whit put it, information is the difference that makes a difference (ie you have to compare two states in order to process information at all). Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism
Hi Stathis Papaioannou OK, but I think you are still left with the I. I doubted' still means there's an I present. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/24/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stathis Papaioannou Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-23, 17:51:43 Subject: Re: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 11:04 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism Problematic Idealism (Berkeley's idealism, not that of Leibniz) is the thesis that we cannot prove that objects outside us exist. This results directly from Descartes' proposition that the only thing I cannot doubt is that I exist (solipsism). If solipsism is true, it seems to raise the problem that we cannot prove that objects outside us exist . But Kant refutes this thesis by his observation that we cannot observe the passing of time (in itself inextended or nonphysical) unless there is some fixed inextended substrate on which to observe the change in time. Thus there must exist a fixed (only necessarily over a small duration of time) nonphysical substrate to reality. A similar conclusion can be made regarding space. I cannot doubt that I exist *at this moment*, but I can doubt that I existed before, or that any other moments have or will exist. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism
On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 12:58 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Stathis Papaioannou OK, but I think you are still left with the I. I doubted' still means there's an I present. There's an I present but not necessarily a world to contain it, which is what Kant set out to prove. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism
On 23 Oct 2012, at 14:04, Roger Clough wrote: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism Problematic Idealism (Berkeley's idealism, not that of Leibniz) is the thesis that we cannot prove that objects outside us exist. This results directly from Descartes' proposition that the only thing I cannot doubt is that I exist (solipsism). Descartes was not solipsist. The 1p is solipsist from the 1p view, but this does not enforce it to be solipsist, as we can believe or guess in some thing which we cannot prove. If solipsism is true, it seems to raise the problem that we cannot prove that objects outside us exist . Even if solipisism is false, we cannot prove that something exists outside us. But we can guess it. Assume it, and then we can prove it in the theory which assumes it, by a one line proof. But Kant refutes this thesis by his observation that we cannot observe the passing of time (in itself inextended or nonphysical) unless there is some fixed inextended substrate on which to observe the change in time. Thus there must exist a fixed (only necessarily over a small duration of time) nonphysical substrate to reality. A similar conclusion can be made regarding space. No problem with this, if we want to believe in some notion of time. Here is an alternate account of that argument: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental/#RefIde Dicker provides a compelling initial representation of Kant's argument (Dicker 2004, 2008): 1) I am conscious of my own existence in time; that is, I am aware, and can be aware, that I have experiences that occur in a specific temporal order. (premise) 2) can be aware of having experiences that occur in a specific temporal order only if I perceive something permanent by reference to which I can determine their temporal order. (premise) 3) No conscious state of my own can serve as the permanent entity by reference to which I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise) 4) Time itself cannot serve as this permanent entity by reference to which I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise) (5) If (2), (3), and (4), are true, then I can be aware of having experiences that occur in a specific temporal order only if I perceive persisting objects in space outside me by reference to which I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise) (6) Therefore, I perceive persisting objects in space outside me by reference to which I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (1�5) That is not rigorous, and contradicted by comp, as we know that if comp is correct, time and space are construct of the mind. The argument is locally correct, but does not bear on what is ontological, only epistemological. As such it makes some sense. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism
I have not met this argument before. I have comments interspersed. On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 08:04:35AM -0400, Roger Clough wrote: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism Problematic Idealism (Berkeley's idealism, not that of Leibniz) is the thesis that we cannot prove that objects outside us exist. This results directly from Descartes' proposition that the only thing I cannot doubt is that I exist (solipsism). If solipsism is true, it seems to raise the problem that we cannot prove that objects outside us exist . But Kant refutes this thesis by his observation that we cannot observe the passing of time (in itself inextended or nonphysical) unless there is some fixed inextended substrate on which to observe the change in time. Thus there must exist a fixed (only necessarily over a small duration of time) nonphysical substrate to reality. A similar conclusion can be made regarding space. Here is an alternate account of that argument: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental/#RefIde Dicker provides a compelling initial representation of Kant's argument (Dicker 2004, 2008): 1) I am conscious of my own existence in time; that is, I am aware, and can be aware, that I have experiences that occur in a specific temporal order. (premise) OK 2) can be aware of having experiences that occur in a specific temporal order only if I perceive something permanent by reference to which I can determine their temporal order. (premise) What motivates this premise? 3) No conscious state of my own can serve as the permanent entity by reference to which I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise) Even assuming 2), what motivates this premise? 4) Time itself cannot serve as this permanent entity by reference to which I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise) Well, I don't accept an objective concept of time anyway, so I have no problem with this, although I don't see why this should hold, assuming an objective (eg Newtonian) concept of time is valid. (5) If (2), (3), and (4), are true, then I can be aware of having experiences that occur in a specific temporal order only if I perceive persisting objects in space outside me by reference to which I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise) Yes, I can see this follows. (6) Therefore, I perceive persisting objects in space outside me by reference to which I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (1?5) Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/23/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism
On 10/23/2012 2:39 PM, Russell Standish wrote: I have not met this argument before. I have comments interspersed. On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 08:04:35AM -0400, Roger Clough wrote: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism Problematic Idealism (Berkeley's idealism, not that of Leibniz) is the thesis that we cannot prove that objects outside us exist. This results directly from Descartes' proposition that the only thing I cannot doubt is that I exist (solipsism). If solipsism is true, it seems to raise the problem that we cannot prove that objects outside us exist . But Kant refutes this thesis by his observation that we cannot observe the passing of time (in itself inextended or nonphysical) unless there is some fixed inextended substrate on which to observe the change in time. Thus there must exist a fixed (only necessarily over a small duration of time) nonphysical substrate to reality. A similar conclusion can be made regarding space. Here is an alternate account of that argument: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental/#RefIde Dicker provides a compelling initial representation of Kant's argument (Dicker 2004, 2008): 1) I am conscious of my own existence in time; that is, I am aware, and can be aware, that I have experiences that occur in a specific temporal order. (premise) OK 2) can be aware of having experiences that occur in a specific temporal order only if I perceive something permanent by reference to which I can determine their temporal order. (premise) What motivates this premise? I think it is implicitly assuming that experiences have no 'fuzz' in their duration, they are discrete like states of a Turing machine computation. I'd say we perceive temporal order by overlap between successive experiences. This is consistent with the idea that an experience is not just a state of a computation, but a bundle of states that constitute the same stream of consciousness. Brent 3) No conscious state of my own can serve as the permanent entity by reference to which I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise) Even assuming 2), what motivates this premise? 4) Time itself cannot serve as this permanent entity by reference to which I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise) Well, I don't accept an objective concept of time anyway, so I have no problem with this, although I don't see why this should hold, assuming an objective (eg Newtonian) concept of time is valid. (5) If (2), (3), and (4), are true, then I can be aware of having experiences that occur in a specific temporal order only if I perceive persisting objects in space outside me by reference to which I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise) Yes, I can see this follows. (6) Therefore, I perceive persisting objects in space outside me by reference to which I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (1?5) Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/23/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism
On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 11:04 PM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism Problematic Idealism (Berkeley's idealism, not that of Leibniz) is the thesis that we cannot prove that objects outside us exist. This results directly from Descartes' proposition that the only thing I cannot doubt is that I exist (solipsism). If solipsism is true, it seems to raise the problem that we cannot prove that objects outside us exist . But Kant refutes this thesis by his observation that we cannot observe the passing of time (in itself inextended or nonphysical) unless there is some fixed inextended substrate on which to observe the change in time. Thus there must exist a fixed (only necessarily over a small duration of time) nonphysical substrate to reality. A similar conclusion can be made regarding space. I cannot doubt that I exist *at this moment*, but I can doubt that I existed before, or that any other moments have or will exist. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism
On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 02:47:12PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: On 10/23/2012 2:39 PM, Russell Standish wrote: 2) can be aware of having experiences that occur in a specific temporal order only if I perceive something permanent by reference to which I can determine their temporal order. (premise) What motivates this premise? I think it is implicitly assuming that experiences have no 'fuzz' in their duration, they are discrete like states of a Turing machine computation. I'd say we perceive temporal order by overlap between successive experiences. This is consistent with the idea that an experience is not just a state of a computation, but a bundle of states that constitute the same stream of consciousness. Brent Whilst I'm sympathetic to that model, I can also imagine comparing one's current state, or a memory of one's current state, with a memory of a previous state, which is a discrete state model that is in contradiction to 2). I think this model implies one cannot be aware of the totality of one's state (ie that a subconsciousness exists), but does not entail the existence of an external world. As some whit put it, information is the difference that makes a difference (ie you have to compare two states in order to process information at all). Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism
On 10/23/2012 3:20 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 02:47:12PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: On 10/23/2012 2:39 PM, Russell Standish wrote: 2) can be aware of having experiences that occur in a specific temporal order only if I perceive something permanent by reference to which I can determine their temporal order. (premise) What motivates this premise? I think it is implicitly assuming that experiences have no 'fuzz' in their duration, they are discrete like states of a Turing machine computation. I'd say we perceive temporal order by overlap between successive experiences. This is consistent with the idea that an experience is not just a state of a computation, but a bundle of states that constitute the same stream of consciousness. Brent Whilst I'm sympathetic to that model, I can also imagine comparing one's current state, or a memory of one's current state, with a memory of a previous state, which is a discrete state model that is in contradiction to 2). I think this model implies one cannot be aware of the totality of one's state (ie that a subconsciousness exists), Because otherwise you would only be aware of the passage of time when you consciously remembered and compared two states? I certainly agree that subconscious thought/information-processing must exist. Conscious thought can only account for a small part of our thinking/awareness. It seems to roughly correspond to what we can put into words or otherwise communicate. That's why I think its appearance was associated with the (cultural) evolution of language. Brent but does not entail the existence of an external world. As some whit put it, information is the difference that makes a difference (ie you have to compare two states in order to process information at all). Cheers -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism
On 10/23/2012 5:47 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 10/23/2012 2:39 PM, Russell Standish wrote: I have not met this argument before. I have comments interspersed. On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 08:04:35AM -0400, Roger Clough wrote: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism Problematic Idealism (Berkeley's idealism, not that of Leibniz) is the thesis that we cannot prove that objects outside us exist. This results directly from Descartes' proposition that the only thing I cannot doubt is that I exist (solipsism). If solipsism is true, it seems to raise the problem that we cannot prove that objects outside us exist . But Kant refutes this thesis by his observation that we cannot observe the passing of time (in itself inextended or nonphysical) unless there is some fixed inextended substrate on which to observe the change in time. Thus there must exist a fixed (only necessarily over a small duration of time) nonphysical substrate to reality. A similar conclusion can be made regarding space. Here is an alternate account of that argument: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental/#RefIde Dicker provides a compelling initial representation of Kant's argument (Dicker 2004, 2008): 1) I am conscious of my own existence in time; that is, I am aware, and can be aware, that I have experiences that occur in a specific temporal order. (premise) OK 2) can be aware of having experiences that occur in a specific temporal order only if I perceive something permanent by reference to which I can determine their temporal order. (premise) What motivates this premise? I think it is implicitly assuming that experiences have no 'fuzz' in their duration, they are discrete like states of a Turing machine computation. I'd say we perceive temporal order by overlap between successive experiences. This is consistent with the idea that an experience is not just a state of a computation, but a bundle of states that constitute the same stream of consciousness. Brent I agree. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
